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VOL.

260, JULY 31, 1996

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ANNOTATION
BAIL
By
*
ROGELIO E. SUBONG
______________
I. Introduction, p. 162
II. Brief History and Definitions, p. 163
a) A Brief History, p. 163
b) Definitions, p. 164
III. Rationale and Horns of a Dilemma, p. 165
a) Rationale, p. 165
b) Horns of a Dilemma, p. 167
IV. Laws and Related Issuances on Bail, p. 168
V. Some of the Cases on Application for Bail
Decided by the Supreme Court, p. 169
a) Insular Govt. vs. Punzalan of 1907 to People vs.
Follantes, et al. of 1936, p. 169
b) Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs.
Hernandez of 1956, p. 171
c) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San
Diego of 1968, p. 174
d) People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of
1979, p. 177
e) People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990, p.
181

f) Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of


1992, p. 185
_____________________
*

A.B. 62 [UP] & LL.B. 66 [UP].


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g) Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of


1995, p. 188
h) Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs.
Arcueno of 1995, p. 191
VI. The State of the Law and Jurisprudence, p.
194
VII. The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA And Its
Significance, p. 196
VIII. Steps in the Filing of Petition for Issuance of
Bail, p. 197
IX. Conclusion, p. 206
_____________

I. Introduction
Bail may seem to be an innocuous matter but to those who
are under criminal prosecution, especially for capital
offenses, it is of crucial immediacy, since their liberty,
albeit temporary, depends upon it entirely. To the offended
parties and their families bail is also of grave concern for
they would rather that the offender or accused were not
granted bail or incarcerated and remained so during the
pendency of the case and after conviction. To those
connected with the administration of criminal justice, like
the police and the public prosecutors, bail is also of
particular concern for any mishandling of their duties in
this regard would subject them to possible sanctions. To
the trial judges, bail is of paramount importance in their
judicial functions because failure to strictly follow the

guidelines set forth by the Constitution, the law and


prevailing jurisprudence for its grant or denial has either
resulted in stern warnings, hefty fines or even their
outright dismissals from the judiciary (Pico vs. Combong,
Jr., 215 SCRA 421 [1992] Lebarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA
48 [1991] Mangalindan vs. CA, 246 SCRA 105 [1995]
Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 [1995] and De
Los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA 85 [1995]).
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Hence, let us inquire once more into the laws and


jurisprudence on bail. The case of Robin Cario Padilla vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
121917 promulgated on July 31, 1996 provides the occasion
for inquiry. Many of course know about the fruitless plea
for freedom of this action star pending appeal of his case
with the appellate court. He was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and thereafter convicted. The
instant case pertains only to his petition for admission to
bail after conviction while pursuing his appeal before the
Supreme Court. However, before we discuss this case under
annotation, let us first inquire into pertinent principles,
decisions and other related matters on bail.
II. Brief History and Definitions
a) A Brief History
The bail system as presently practiced in the United States
and which is adopted in our jurisdiction, according to an
extensive study on American criminal justice system, was
developed during the first thousand years A.D. in
England. The judges then were few with vast judicial
circuits to cover. Given the primitive means of travel
during the period, judicial visits to faroff circuits to hold
trials were either few and far between, even several years
apart. In the meantime, while awaiting arrival of these
roving judges to conduct trials, the prisoners remained in
the custody of the sheriffs of the place.
Prison conditions then as now were described as

atrocious. Hence, prisoners often escaped. So the practice


of entrusting the prisoners to the custody of sureties, who
were relatives and friends of the accused was evolved. At
first when the prisoners escaped or failed to appear during
the trials of their case, the sureties were the ones tried
instead. Over time, in the event the prisoner escaped
during trial, the sureties were no longer seized bodily or
made personally answerable. Instead, they were merely
ordered to pay money for their failure to produce the
accused during trials. Thus this liability of the surety for
the appearance of the defendant, and the
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ability to discharge the liability by the payment of a sum of


money remain the basis of our present system of bail.
(John Kaplan, Criminal Justice, 1978 ed., p. 314).
b) Definitions
What is the basic concept of bail? Bail is the laws
pragmatic method of compromise between the principle
that a man is innocent until proven guilty and the obvious
fact that a large portion of the defendants in criminal
proceedings are well on the way to being convicted (John
Kaplan, op. cit., p. 312). Its technical definition is provided
in Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in the custody of
the law furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or
recognizance.
The word bail as used in the prohibition against
excessive bail is inadequately translated by the word
fianza as bail implies a particular kind of bondthat is to
say, a bond given to secure the personal liberty of one held
in restraint upon a criminal or quasi criminal charge
(Insular Govt. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546).
Ballentines Law Dictionary defines bail asThe means
of procuring the release from custody of a person charged
with a criminal offense or with debt by assuring his future

appearance in court and compelling him to remain within


the jurisdiction. (Manning vs. State, 190 Okla. 65, 120 P2d
980). The security given for the defendants appearance in
court in cash, bond, or undertaking. (p. 119, 3rd Edition).
Blacks Law Dictionary defines bail
as a verb: To procure release of one charged with an offense by
insuring his future attendance in court and compelling him to
remain within jurisdiction of the court. To deliver the defendant
to persons who, in the manner prescribed by law, become security
for his appearance in court.
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as a noun: The surety or sureties who procure the release of a
person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance
at the time and place designated. Those persons who become
sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court. (p. 73,
Abridged 5th Edition)

On the other hand, a bail bond is an obligation given by


the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to
be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts
as he may legally be required to perform. (People vs.
Abner, 87 Phil. 566).
A bail bond has also been defined as a bond given as
security for the purpose of obtaining release of a person in
custody (Ballentines Law Dictionary, p. 119, 3rd Edition).
Another definition is that a bail bond is a written
undertaking, executed by the defendant to one or more
sureties, that the defendant will render himself amenable
to orders and processes of the court. (Blacks Law
Dictionary, p. 73, Abridged 5th Edition).
The right to bail has also included the right to
recognizance. A recognizance is an obligation undertaken
by a person, generally a defendant in a criminal case, to
appear in court on a particular day or to keep the peace
(Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 661, Abridged 5th Edition). Sec.
12, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides. Whenever
allowed pursuant to law or these Rules, the court may
release a person on his own recognizance or that of a
responsible person.

People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566, explained thatA


recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before
some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it with
the condition to do some particular act, the most usual in
criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for
trial.
III. Rationale and Horns of the Dilemma
a) Rationale
The rationale of bail is nothing more but to guarantee the
appearance of the accused when so required, especially
during
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hearings of the case wherein this bail was granted. While


there is usually the private individual as the offended
party, the legal fiction is that it is the State or the People of
the Philippines which is the aggrieved party. Any criminal
deed or offense is a disturbance or threat upon the order
and integrity of the community so much so that the
offender in a sense is waging war against the People or
the State. The State is entitled to exercise its inherent
right to selfdefense. So the People or the State has to fight
back and exact penalty or retribution against the offender
or accused. Hence, the case is filed in the name of the
People of the Philippines, as public plaintiff, versus the
offender. The private plaintiff appears to be a secondary
party although the latter suffered the immediate damage
or injury.
It is settled that once the case is filed, the prosecution is
under the full control and supervision of the fiscal or public
prosecutor. In other words, it becomes the Peoples fight
and being so it must insure the appearance of the accused
during hearings through the system of bail. Apart from this
consideration, the accused is also entitled to the
presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Accordingly,
in light of this Constitutional presumption of innocence, he
should not be incarcerated unless the charge is for a capital

offense or the penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life


imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. When the
charge is for a capital offense and evidence of guilt is
strong, the presumption of innocence could not take
precedence anymore because the presumption has been
effectively destroyed by the strong evidence of guilt. And
besides, there are practical considerations for the
immediate detention of the accused in this situation, e.g.,
the likelihood of flight considering the gravity of the
penalty or the possibility of harassment of the offended
party or prosecution witnesses if only to avoid prosecution
or gain acquittal, among others.
In any case, the basic rationale of bail is to relieve an
accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial
(Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741). Then in
Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et
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al., 66 SCRA 38, which was cited in Paderanga vs. CA,


supra., the High Court clarified that bail is neither a
penalty or a revenue raising measure: The sole purpose of
bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when
required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part
of the government. Thus when in this case the trial court
insisted on a cash bond instead of a surety bond, the High
Court rejected this for being abhorrent to the nature of
bail and transgresses our law on the matter. Finally,
Blacks Law Dictionary states that the object of bail in
criminal cases is to secure appearance of principal before
the court when his presence is needed (p. 73, Abridged 5th
Edition).
b) Horns of the Dilemma
Some legal scholars have raised misgivings about the logic
and practicality of the purpose for which bail has been
devised. Is bail really an effective guarantee for the
appearance of the accused in a criminal case? It is argued
that if the charges were for lesser offenses with minor

penalties, perhaps, bail would be generally effective. But if


the charge were for capital offenses or for offenses calling
for the death penalty, reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or even any stretch of jail term which to the
accused would be unbearable, bail may prove to be
ineffective as insurer that the accused will not jumpbail,
so to speak.
Thus, it was observed that
Although bail has obvious uses in preventing an accused criminal
who cannot provide bail from repeating his presumed
transgression, in theory the only purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the proceedings against him.
The thought is that having posted the amount of cash or collateral
named in the bail bond, he will appear in court, rather than
forfeit his money or property. As applied to a defendant, such as
Jack Ruby (the televised killer of Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused
assassin of Pres. John F. Kennedy) who was threatened with
death penalty, there is an obvious fallacy in this reasoning. It is
difficult to envision
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a bail so large as to guarantee a mans returning for a trial which


he has reason to believe will result in his death or lengthy
imprisonment. The horns of the dilemma are that (a) if a man has
enough money to put up bail, the chances are that his bond will
not guarantee his appearance at trial and (b) if he does not have
the money, the setting of bail will be irrelevant to his appearance
since he will not be able to make bail at all. (John Kaplan, op.
cit., p. 312)

IV. Laws and Related Issuances on Bail


The paramount legal basis for the granting or withholding
of bail is naturally the fundamental law of the land. The
basic provision is reproduced hereunder:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be

released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to


bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art.
IIIBill of Rights, The Constitution of 1987)

Then there are the provisions on bail in the Rules of Court


specifically the entire Rule 114. This Rule in the Rules of
Court provides a comprehensive coverage of all possible
principles that should govern the granting and denial of
applications for bail. Then too, some of the provisions
embodied therein important decisions of the Supreme
Court that were found to be useful for our criminal justice
system, e.g., the guidelines in the fixing of bail under
Section 6 (see Villaseor vs. Abao, 21 SCRA 312 [1967]),
the provision that hearing on bail application may be
deemed automatically reproduced in the trial, the court
must give reasonable notice to the prosecutor of the bail
hearing, or require him to submit his recommendation, etc.
There are also the circulars of the Department of Justice
particularly Dept. Circular No. 36 and its addenda and of
the Supreme Court particularly, Administrative Circular
No. 292.
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V. Some of the Cases on Applications for Bail


Decided by the Supreme Court
a) Insular Govt. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 of 1907 to People
vs. Follantes, et al. of 1936
About the first case on bail bond in our jurisdiction appears
to be Insular Govt. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 (1907). This
case pertains to an action upon a bond of P2000 executed
by the defendants in favor of the government to secure the
safekeeping of some 20 rifles which were thereafter stolen
by a band of brigands. Condemned to pay on the bond, one
of the errors the defendants raised on appeal was that the
bond violated Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
against excessive bonds. The High Court ruled that this
provision prohibiting excessive bonds does not apply to this

kind of bonds. The word bail as used in that portion of


Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
provides that excessive bail shall not be required is
inadequately translated by the word fianza as bail implies
a particular kind of bondthat is to say, a bond given to
secure the personal liberty of one held in restraint upon a
criminal or quasi criminal charge.
Then there was Montalbo vs. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 595
(1930) wherein a petition for mandamus was filed against a
trial judge to compel him to decide whether or not evidence
of guilt of the accused charged with murder is strong with a
view to determine whether the offense charged was
bailable. The High Court issued the writ of mandamus. The
first question of law raised was whether Section 3 of Jones
Law (That all persons shall before conviction be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses.) was
repealed by Section 63 of General Orders No. 58 (All
prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those
charged with the commission of capital offense when proof
of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong).
The Court held that there was no repeal. It declared that:
As is well known, General Orders No. 58 was promulgated by the
United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands on
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April 23, 1900, and Section 63 thereof conferred jurisdiction upon


judges to admit persons accused of capital offenses to bail, except
when the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption of guilt
strong. And the Jones Law far from revoking this power,
expressly recognized it in Section 26. This is in effect the ruling of
this Court in United States vs. Babasa (19 Phil. 198) where it was
held that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction and authority
to admit defendants to bail in a criminal case before conviction
although charged with a capital offense x x x.
As to whether mandamus would lie as set forth above, the
Court ruled in the affirmative. The High Court cited a US case
which held that although the exercise of discretion will not be
controlled by mandamus, yet writ will lie to compel the person or
the body in whom the discretion is lodged to proceed to its
exercise.

In Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210 (1936) the accused sought


also the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the
judge to decide on the strength of the proof of guilt against
her with a view to determining whether the offense
charged is bailable. It appears that in this case, the accused
was charged with murder with the information filed before
the justice of the peace court who provisionally released her
upon filing a bond therein. Before the Court of First
Instance, the bond was canceled and accused recommitted
to jail. The petition for mandamus as mentioned above was
then filed with the High Court which denied the same. The
petitioner relied upon Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra, to
support her view that a judicial investigation should have
been conducted by the judge to assess the evidence of guilt
of the accused. The High Court ruled that there was
already a showing by the provincial fiscal of the results of
the preliminary investigation and what was shown was a
strong evidence of guilt.
The High Court further declared that:
Article III, Section 1, paragraph 16, of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides:
All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
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Section 63, General Orders No. 58, also provides as follows:


All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those
charged with the commission of capital offenses when proof of
guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong.

The High Court made the conclusion that has been


unchanged up to the present:
It is evident from the foregoing that the accused in a criminal
case is entitled to bail as a matter of right before conviction except
in capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.

The next case of People vs. Follantes & Jacinto, 63 Phil.


474 (1936) is about similar to the Robin Padilla case. There

was an attempt by the accused to secure bail after


conviction of the crime of murder with the sentence of
reclusion perpetua. The High Court denied the Petition. It
ruled that:
Persons convicted of the crime punishable by death, as murder,
are not bailable, as the law recognizes such right in a person
accused of said crime, before conviction, only when the evidence of
his guilt is not strong (Art. III, Sec. 1, No. 16, of the Constitution
of the Philippines).
Under the law, persons convicted of noncapital crimes, who
appeal from a judgment sentencing them to penalties other than
death have no absolute right to bail except when said penalties
are imposed upon them by the justice of the peace courts, as the
right to bail after conviction is not authorized by the Constitution
and is, as a general rule, not recognized. x x x.

b) Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs.


Hernandez of 1956
After the war, we have the case of Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945) which dealt with offenses
committed during the war years. The High Court held that
the basic rule on bail under the Constitution also applies in
treason cases. Here a person accused of treason before the
Peoples Court asked to be admitted to bail. The High
Court held that
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Art. III, Sec. 1(16) of the Constitution applies in this case.


The Constitutional mandate refers to all persons xxx xxx
xxx the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who
have been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their
liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said
provision. It further ruled that upon the filing of an
application for bail, a hearing, summary or otherwise,
should be held with due notice to the prosecution and the
accused.

The case that followed, Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55


(1946) pertained to a petition for certiorari filed by the
defendant accused of treason before the Peoples Court to
set aside the Order denying his application for bail. The
most serious charge was his having reported to the
Japanese a fellow Filipino as guerilla for which the latter
was shot to death. During the bail hearing the prosecutor
merely read the contents of an affidavit which did not
touch on his alleged role in the death of that fellow Filipino
and only manifested that he had 27 more affidavits. The
defendant testified denying this charge and also claimed
that mere recital is not evidence and that evidence cannot
be considered strong which has not been subjected to the
test of crossexamination. Held: The High Court ruled that
there was abuse of discretion in denying bail because no
proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Another legacy of the war years was De la Rama vs.
Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461 (1946) a decision cited in this
case under annotation. The accused petitioned the
Peoples Court for the second time for the grant of bail
alleging therein that as per Medical Report of Quezon
Institute, he was suffering from tuberculosis. Said Report
recommended his stay in the sanitarium for regular
treatment. The Peoples Court issued an order granting
confinement to the Quezon Institute but this was assailed
by the accused as abuse of discretion since he insisted on
bail so that he could be treated at home as he could not
afford staying in the hospital. The High Court sus
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tained the plea of the accused and ordered the Peoples


Court to grant bail. The ruling of the Peoples Court which
ordered confinement of the accused in the hospital does
not in any way modify or qualify the denial so as to meet or
accomplish the humanitarian purpose or reason underlying
the doctrine adopted by modern trend of court decisions
which permit bail to prisoners, irrespective of the nature
and merits of the charge against them, if their continuous
confinement during the pendency of their case would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life.

Thereafter the decision in People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566


(1950) was promulgated by the High Court. This was an
appeal of the Order canceling the bond of the accused for
the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape for failure to
appear during hearings of his case. Appellants also assailed
the bond as being void for not having been signed by Abner
as principal. The High Court disregarded this pretense and
affirmed the order by arguing that the bond secured was a
recognizance which need not be signed by the accused. It
also clarified that under the Rules, there are two (2) modes
of taking bail: (1) by bail bond and by recognizance. A bail
bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more
sureties, with the condition to be void upon the
performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally
be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of
record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly
authorized to take it with the condition to do some
particular act, the most usual in criminal cases being the
appearance of the accused for trial.
Then we have the famous case of People vs. Hernandez,
99 Phil. 515 (1956), involving noted poet and labor leader
Amado V. Hernandez who was charged and convicted with
the crime of Rebellion Complex With Murder, Arson, etc.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, he also filed a Motion for
issuance of bail. It ruled that murder, arson, and other
related crimes are mere ingredients of the charge and that
the actual crime charged should be simple rebellion which
carries the maximum imposable penalty of not exceeding
12 years of Prision Mayor and a fine of P20,000. Not being
a capital offense any
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more, bail should be granted. Citing Montano vs. Ocampo,


G.R. No. 6352 dated January 29, 1953, the Court further
ruled that in denying bail it is not enough that evidence of
guilt is strong but also that upon conviction the liability of
accused would probably call for capital punishment. As to
the claim of threat to public safety if accused were granted
bail, the High Court dismissed such fears. Furthermore,
individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and
vital to a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon

mere general principles and abstract consideration of


public safety. It concluded that the preservation of liberty
is such a major preoccupation of our political system so
much so that the bill of rights has numerous provisions
guaranteeing its enjoyment.
c) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San Diego of
1968
In the sixties, the High Tribunal promulgated Feliciano vs.
Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) which ruled on the question
of whether a person not under detention can be admitted to
bail. Here, the accused was one of those charged with
kidnapping and a warrant of arrest was issued against
him. Without surrendering himself he asked for bail. This
was not acted upon so he filed a Petition for mandamus to
compel the judge to rule on his Motion for bail. The High
Court denied the Petition for being premature since the law
requires that for bail to issue the subject should be under
detention. It declared that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of liberty. The High Court also
declared that: it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free.
The case of Ong See Hang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 (1962) addressed the issue of
whether bail could be granted to aliens under detention
pending deportation. In this case, certain Chinese
nationals from Amoy, China who were held in our
Immigration Bureau pending deportation proceedings were
released on bail by the court. This order was questioned
before the Supreme Court in a Petition for
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Certiorari. The High Court held that the right to bail


guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in
favor of petitionersappellees, considering the deportation
proceedings do not constitute a criminal action x x x x and
the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime x x
x x it is merely for the return to his country of an alien who
has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to
reside within our borders.

In Bernardez vs. Valera, 4 SCRA 911 (1962) the accused


was charged with murder and frustrated murder. During
pendency of the case before the trial court, accused filed a
motion for bail to which the prosecution objected. Hearings
were held on this incident and the prosecution presented
evidence in opposition thereto. The judge thereafter denied
the motion and on a petition for certiorari, the High Court
ruled to reverse. It held that the affidavits presented were
of persons who did not see the actual shooting and there
was no sufficient proof of premeditation or alevosia as for
the offense to amount to murder. It declared that: It must
be observed in this connection that a person charged with a
criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before
conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong. Then
in Pareja vs. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830 (1962) the petitioner was
one of those accused in the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis,
a lawyer and civic crusader in Cebu. Upon being arrested
and detained, he filed a Motion for Bail claiming among
others that the evidence against him was merely
circumstantial. After the trial court denied the motion,
accused filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order but
the High Court sustained the court a quo. It ruled that to
forfeit the constitutional right to bail in capital offense, it is
enough that the evidence of guilt be strong. It found there
was sufficient basis for the judge to deny the motion, e.g.,
the murder weapon having been found in one of the safes in
his office as City Treasurer of Cebu City, and accordingly
declared that he did not abuse his discretion, much less
gravely, in issuing the orders complained of.
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Magno vs. Abbas, 13 SCRA 232 (1965) is another case


involving plea for bail before the trial court of accused
charged with Kidnapping with Rape. After due hearing on
the incident, the trial court denied the motion stating in
the order that the proof of the guilt of the accused is
presumptively strong. The accused questioned this finding
since the law specifically requires that the evidence of
guilt is strong. The High Court rejected this pretense since
the evidence presented during the bail hearing showed

evidence of strong evidence of guilt as the accused


participated in the commission of the offense. In the
following case entitled, Villaseor vs. Abao, 21 SCRA 312
(1967), the accused who was charged with the murder of a
police sergeant (Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in
authority with murder) filed a motion for bail which was
granted but in the amount of P60,000 which he found to be
excessive. He questioned this order of the trial judge before
the Supreme Court which saw no abuse of discretion given
the facts and the law. It further declared that in the fixing
of bail, the principal factor considered, to which most other
factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of
the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment. It also
set the guidelines in bail fixing: (1) ability of the accused to
give bail (2) nature of the offense (3) penalty for the
offense charged (4) character and reputation of the
accused (5) health of the accused (6) character and
strength of the evidence (7) probability of the accused
appearing in trial (8) forfeiture of other bonds (9) whether
the accused was fugitive from justice when arrested and,
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
other cases (Now, Sec. 6, Rule 114).
In the oftcited case of People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA
522 (1968) the accused were charged with the murder of
action star Jess Lapid inside the then Lanai Restaurant
along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. The prosecution and
defense agreed that the motions for bail for the defendants
would be considered during the course of the trial instead
of the court holding a summary proceeding for the purpose.
After the presentation of 8 witnesses the trial court issued
orders granting bail de
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spite the objection of the prosecution which was still


presenting witnesses. On certiorari, the Supreme Court set
aside the bail orders by ruling that the prosecution was
denied procedural due process. It held that: the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. The High Court further ruled that: The

courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be


exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence,
the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. It
then set aside the orders since they were defective in form
and substance for not containing a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution, but only conclusion that guilt
was not strong.
d) People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of 1979

People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 (1969) is an interesting case


of a student charged with murder in conspiracy with
others. He moved for the issuance of bail before the trial
court for his provisional release. During the bail hearing,
he presented his examination paper accomplished by him
during the time of the crime. His professor and his
assistant testified that it is not possible to have this
examination paper without having taken the said
examination. This naturally controverted the ante mortem
statement of the deceased that accused was present during
the attack. Then there was the claim of prosecution
witnesses that accused was not the triggerman. The trial
judge granted bail and this order was challenged by the
fiscal before the Supreme Court. It held that under our
regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal
presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is
entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception
being when he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. The High Court sustained
the trial judges finding that evi
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dence of the prosecution did not meet the standard of


strong evidence to warrant the denial of the motion for
bail. Besides, the judge did not rule on the admissibility
and probative value of the evidence. It merely held that
with the issue of the whereabouts of the accused when the

crime was committed having thus become contentious, the


evidence of guilt of the accused (so far presented) can not
be considered strong.
In De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971) the High
Court resolved the issue of excessive bail imposed by the
trial court. In this case, a municipal mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental was charged with multiple murder and
frustrated murder. Prior to presentation of his evidence, he
filed a Motion for admission to bail. The trial court allowed
bail but fixed the same at P1,195,200.00 in his Order of
August 20, 1970. When challenged before the Supreme
Court, it opted not to rule on the plea to nullify the order
because the accused escaped in the meantime. However,
speaking through then Justice Enrique Fernando, the High
Tribunal declared that: What respondent judge did,
however, does call for repudiation from the Court. It then
reaffirmed a settled jurisprudence: 2. Where, however, the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there is no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. This
holding was reiterated in another decision regarding bail
claimed by the accused also as excessive which was also
penned by then Justice Enrique Fernando in Vituoso, Jr.
vs. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191 (1978).
The High Court then in Siozon vs. Presiding Judge of
CCC, 42 SCRA 184 (1971) which is a prosecution for
murder, addressed the issue, among others, of whether the
proceedings for issuance of bail is summary in nature. In
this case the prosecution already took 3 months to present
27 witnesses. When directed by the trial court to present a
particular witness otherwise the court would declare the
evidence already presented closed, the prosecution
questioned this order before the High Court. It however
sustained the trial court because application for bail is
summary in nature and to allow a full
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dress trial on the merits would defeat the purpose of the


proceedings. It also reiterated the settled doctrine as to
when an accused is bailable as well as the proper area of

inquiry for bail hearings: the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or
on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. (8 C.J.S. 93, 94).
Then in the case of Mendoza vs. CFI, 51 SCRA 369
(1973), the bail granted to the accused by the municipal
court was revoked by the Court of First Instance for which
he brought certiorari action before the High Court. But this
was unavailing. It found out that when bail was granted by
the municipal court, the accused was not even under
custody and what is worse, the prosecution was never
given a chance to present its evidence. The Supreme Court
also reiterated the settled jurisprudence on bail, e.g., that
writ of habeas corpus will not issue if detention is based on
valid warrant of arrest right to bail presupposes accused is
under legal custody and accused is entitled to bail except
in capital offenses wherein the evidence of guilt is strong
and that citing People vs. San Diego, supra, the prosecution
should be given a chance to be heard on the motion for
issuance of bail, otherwise, there would be violation of
procedural due process.
Hadhirl Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378 (1975) is an
administrative case against a judge who admitted in the
course thereof that he granted bail in a murder case to an
accused upon the request of a congressman, despite his
belief that the evidence of guilt against the accused was
strong. The High Court reiterated the usual principle that
the accused is entitled to bail before conviction except when
charged with capital offenses and the evidence of guilt is
strong. In this case, he was specifically charged in this
regard, the High Court also declared that the actuation of
the judge in granting bail, is indeed reprehensible.
In Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975) the High
Court addressed the question of whether the court can
impose strictly cash bond instead of surety bond for the
provisional
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release of an accused charged with a noncapital offense.

The High Court ruled that the trial court may not reject
otherwise acceptable sureties and insist on a cash bond.
After defining bail under the Rules of Court it affirmed
thatThe purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance for trial. It then observed that to
require cash bond would entail hardship on the part of the
accused in securing the transfer of these assets in the
possession of the court as to have the effect of altogether
denying him his constitutional right to bail. Then it
reiterated settled jurisprudence:
In this jurisdiction, the accused as of right, is entitled to bail
prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital
offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is
guaranteed by the Constitution and may not be denied even
where the accused has previously escaped detention or by reason
of his prior absconding.
In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the
Constitution further provides that excessive bail shall not be
required. This is logical because the imposition of an excessive
bail may negate the very right itself.

In the subsequent case of Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA


214 (1979) the orders of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza, a CFI
judge in Zamboanga del Norte were assailed in a certiorari
petition for among others, refusing to dismiss a criminal
information which emanated from a purely civil obligation
and for refusal to fix and accept the bail bonds being
offered in said case. The High Court declared as error the
actuation of the judge of giving due course to the aforesaid
information. But his graver error is in issuing a warrant of
arrest without a recommendation for bail by the fiscal
when the charge is clearly bailable. It finally held: The
right to bail is a constitutional right. Its denial to an
accused is allowed only in rare cases. Respondent judge
would do well to examine more carefully the laws and
jurisprudence on the right to bail before denying the same.
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e) People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990


In People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981) the accused in the
murders of several persons were immediately issued bail by
the trial judge without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong. The High Court faulted the trial court for this and
set aside the order granting bail. It explained that the
failure to accord the prosecution the opportunity to present
its evidence against the plea for bail is to disregard the
authoritative doctrine enunciated in People vs. San Diego
(26 SCRA 522). And there would be a violation of
procedural due process and the order of the court granting
bail should be considered void on that ground. On the
other hand, in Rodil vs. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362 (1981), it
was the defense that was denied the right to procedural
due process. In this case, the accused moved for the recall
of a witness during the preliminary investigation proper so
that the defense could crossexamine him on clarificatory
and amplificatory matters which was denied. The motion
for bail was also denied. When the issue was brought to the
High Court, it set aside the order of denial of bail and
directed the lower court to conduct hearing on the bail
application in accordance with the requirements of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and this opinion. It also
directed that the hearing on bail application while
summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or
pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused
should not be denied his day in court.
In Bolaos vs. Dela Cruz, 116 SCRA 78 (1992) the High
Court resolved a Petition challenging the validity of the
order of the trial court denying bail to some accused who
were charged with murder. It sustained the ruling of the
trial court by reiterating the settled rule that an accused is
bailable unless the charge is for capital offense and
evidence of guilt is strong. It further conceded that: It is
the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong and it has determined the
affirmative in this case after consideration of the evidence
already presented by the prose
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cution. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, We


are not prepared to substitute Our judgment for that of the
trial court.
In GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983) the
High Court ruled that the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus carried with it the suspension of the right to bail.
This holding was later abandoned under the Constitution
of 1987 (Sec. 13, Art. IIIBill of Rights). In this case, the
accused were arrested and detained pursuant to a PCO
(Presidential Commitment Order) when they were raided
while having a conference in the house of Dra. Aurora
Parong at Bayongbong, Nueva Ecija. They filed a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and prayed therein admission to
bail during pendency of the case. After the hearing before
the Supreme Court, and the parties had submitted their
memoranda, it resolved to sustain the validity of the
arrests of the detainees. As to their plea for admission to
bail, the High Court ruled: The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the governments
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. It added that if bail is granted to
detainees, they might only rejoin their comrades and thus
jeopardize the efforts of the government against the rebels.
It reiterated the holding in Buscayno vs. Military
Commission, 109 SCRA 273 (1981) which also held that
the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect
to certain crimes. This holding was also reiterated in the
subsequent habeas corpus case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,
121 SCRA 538 (1983) which further held that to hold
otherwise, would defeat the very purpose of the suspension.
Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was
arrested is anyone of the said offenses (national security
cases) he has no right to bail even after the charges are
filed in court. However this holding was later abandoned
in People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991), as will be
discussed later in this inquiry.
In Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA 466 (1985) the
defendant who was accused of murder was 16 years old at
the time of
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commission of the offense. He then moved for grant of bail


alleging that the evidence of his guilt not being strong and
that as minor he would be entitled to at most only life
imprisonment. The Judge refused bail. On a Petition for
Certiorari before the High Court it ruled to grant bail in
view of the unrebutted evidence (Certified true copy of the
birth certificate of the accused) as to the minority of the
accused. The Court ruled that even if he would be
sentenced to death, he would be entitled to one degree
lower penalty which effectively rules out the death
penalty. This decision was prior to ratification of the
Constitution of 1987. It also held that the birth certificate
attached to the motion and unrebutted by the fiscal was
sufficient to prove the age of the accused. However, it
rejected his contention to the effect that the test of
determining whether the charge is capital offense is the
actual penalty imposed upon the accused. It held that the
capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty
prescribed by law. To base issuance of bail on the actual
penalty imposed would require already a full hearing and
would naturally defeat the purpose of bail.
In Harvey vs. DefensorSantiago, 162 SCRA 840 (1988)
the High Court ruled again on the right of the
Commissioner on Immigration to grant bail although the
basic petition was for habeas corpus. In this case, 3
foreigners who were detained prior to deportation filed a
Petition for bail which was denied by the Commissioner.
Even as one was allowed provisional release for 15 days,
they brought a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Supreme Court. The High Tribunal sustained the
Commissioner on Immigration for the foreigners who were
pedophiles were validly arrested and were facing
deportation proceedings as undesirable aliens. It held that:
Writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the
confinement is or has become legal. It also sustained the
Commissioner in her denial of the petition to bail by these
foreigners because in deportation proceedings the right to
bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on
the part of the Commissioner on Immigration and
Deportation. As earlier ruled, deportation proceedings are
not in the nature of criminal pro

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ceedings hence the constitutional guarantee to bail cannot


be availed of.
There is also the case of People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA
489 (1989) which pertains to the issuance of bail without
giving the prosecution a chance to be heard or its right to
procedural due process. As will appear in this case, the
accused who was charged with murder filed a Motion for
issuance of bail. The judge without any hearing
immediately issued an order granting bail and on motion
for reconsideration, it held in abeyance resolution pending
presentation of prosecution of its evidence. On certiorari
without resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the
High Court set aside the challenged order becauseThe
Respondent Court acted irregularly in granting bail in a
murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for
it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it tuned out later, over its
strong objection. If further held: To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled to due process.
The defense contended that murder is no longer a
capital offense being no longer punishable with death. The
High Court reasoned:
This is erroneous because although the constitution states that
the death penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its
imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19
[1]), it does not follow that all persons have an absolute right to
bail. In Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, capital offenses is
replaced by the phrase offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua.

Then as to the claim of lack of motion for reconsideration so


that the trial court could possibly correct its error, the High
Court argued that this rule does not apply when special
circumstance warrant immediate or more direct action.
This is the same ruling in the case of People vs. Calo,
Jr., 186 SCRA 620 (1990) wherein the trial court was
adjudged precipitate in granting bail even as it held

hearings therefor. This arose from the shooting of a person


inside a courtroom in
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Butuan City which resulted also in shooting of the fiscal


investigating the case. Atty. Tranquilino Calo, Jr., who was
charged along with others for the courtroom killing was
granted bail after a speedy hearing on his bail application.
When brought to the Court of Appeals, the said court
sustained the issuance of bail. However, the High Court set
aside the order granting bail by declaring that The mere
fact that formal hearings were conducted does not preclude
a finding of arbitrariness and denial of due process for the
prosecution. And in this case, it was shown during the
hearing that accused Tranquilino Calo, Jr. slipped the
fatal gun to the alleged assailant. Furthermore, there was
undue haste to resolve the incident because the judge
terminated the hearings on the bail application even as the
prosecution was still presenting witnesses.
f) Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of 1992

Carpio vs. Maglalang, 196 SCRA 41 (1991) is a challenge of


the order granting bail to an accused in the murder of
Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan, Bataan. The accused
who was in the custody of the NBI was granted bail by a
Bataan trial judge after a hearing wherein the number of
witnesses for the prosecution were merely mentioned in the
order granting bail and thereafter there was a conclusion
that evidence of guilt was not strong. This plea for bail was
strongly opposed by the NBI since the accused was charged
with a capital offense. On appeal by certiorari by the NBI
Director and the People, the High Court nullified the order
granting bail. The Court faulted the trial judge in not
following the teaching of People vs. San Diego which directs
the court to summarize the factual basis of its order and to
discuss the respective testimonies of the witnesses. The
High Court observed that the position of the judge is that
since death penalty has been constitutionally abolished and
reclusion perpetua has replaced it, bail may be granted to
Escano (the accused) inasmuch as at that particular point,

no legislative enactment had as yet been made restoring


the death penalty. Consistent with the hold
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ing on this point in People vs. Dacudao, supra, it declared


this premise to be invalid and reflects the lower courts
reckless application of the provisions of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court. It then ruled that:
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that
(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. As the phrase capital
offenses has been replaced by the phrase offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua, crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence
of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to
bail should be made available to all accused.

Then in People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) the High
Court addressed the following issues whether bail may be
denied to a person even as the offense charged is bailable
and whether the right to bail may be waived. These were
the issues in the case involving the rebellion charges filed
against Rafael Salas and company who were arrested in
1986. When the informations for rebellion were filed
against Salas and company, the penalty for said offense
was reclusion perpetua to death. But during pendency of
his motion for bail, the penalty was restored as originally
set forth under Art. 135 of the R.P.C. pursuant to
Executive Order No. 187. Thus Salas was granted bail. The
People appealed the ruling and was sustained by the High
Court. It ruled that rebellion is a bailable offense since the
penalty is now lower than reclusion perpetua and also
under the 1987 Constitution it is provided that the right to
bail subsists even with the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. The High Court concluded that this provision
overturns the courts ruling in GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, et
al., supra which held that when the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended the right to bail is also suspended. However,

the grant of bail was set aside since in the course of the
proceedings, Salas had made a categorical waiver of his
right to bail which is a right personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, mor
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als, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a


right recognized by law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
concluded: The respondent Judge then clearly acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.
Lebarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991) is an offshoot
of the Tranquilino Calo, Jr. case (People vs. Calo, supra.).
This controversy also arose from the tragic shooting of the
litigant (Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr.) inside a courtroom in
the Butuan City Regional Trial Court and the subsequent
shooting also of the fiscal investigating the case. For his
unsatisfactory handling of his judicial function, an
administrative complaint was filed against the judge for
gross ignorance of law for immediately granting bail to
Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and company who were charged with
murder. The Court found the judge guilty of ignorance of
the law for which he was accordingly fined by the Court. It
clarified again that when an accused is charged with a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time all
evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the
accused. Failure to conduct hearing before fixing bail in the
instant case amounted to a violation of due process.
In Aswat vs. Galido, 204 SCRA 205 (1991) the issue to
be resolved was whether a member of the military who shot
to death a fellow soldier can file a Petition for Habeas
Corpus from the military court martial. He further alleged
that he is entitled to bail under Section 13, Art. III of the
Constitution. The High Court ruled that the right to bail is
not without exception. It cited Comendador vs. De Villa
(200 SCRA 80) which ruled that the right to bail has not

traditionally been recognized and is not available in the


military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the
Bill of Rights.
People vs. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 (1992) is another case
questioning an Order granting bail to an accused charged
with a capital offense (Kidnapping with Murder) wherein
the trial
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court issued bail without hearing. On a Petition for


Certiorari and Prohibition to annul the bail order before
the Supreme Court, it accordingly set aside the same. It
warned that Nothing is more settled than that where the
People is deprived of due process, an order granting bail to
the accused charged with offense without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to adduce proof of guilt is a
patent nullity and must be struck down for being null and
void. This ruling was reiterated in Pico vs. Combong, Jr.,
215 SCRA 421 (1992) an administrative case against a
judge for serious misconduct and abuse of discretion for
granting bail to a person accused of murder without
ascertaining whether he was in custody and without any
hearing and without even ascertaining if he was already in
custody of the law. The grant of bail without hearing
effectively deprived the People of its right to due process.
The High Court castigated the judge and labeled what he
had done as arbitrary, capricious and whimsical action.
Such inexcusable conduct reflects either gross ignorance of
the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements.
Respondent judge fined P20,000, censured and warned to
be more diligent in his duties and repetition of the same in
the future would be dealt with more severely.
g) Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of 1995

Medina vs. De Guia, 219 SCRA 153 (1993) involves


administrative
complaints
against
Judge
Romeo
Maglalang, among others, filed by a fellow judge at the
regional judicial district of Bataan. One of the charges
(A.M. No. RTJ89306) pertained to the issuance of bail by
Judge Romeo Maglalang to one accused of statutory rape

punishable with reclusion perpetua, a nonbailable offense.


Said judge did not accord the prosecution the opportunity
to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. The High Court faulted the judge on this score and
once more reiterated the settled rule that: where a person
is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct
a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a rea
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sonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove


that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release
of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing
bail amounts to a violation of due process. (Libarios vs.
Judge Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991] and People vs. Sola,
103 SCRA 393 [1981]).
People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993) is very pertinent
to the case under annotation. In this case, the accused
was convicted of rape of a 13 yearold rural girl and was
found guilty thereof for which he was sentenced with
reclusion perpetua and also ordered to pay money
judgment. He appealed the ruling and filed a Petition for
Bail pending his appeal which was denied by the trial
court. On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the denial
order of the trial court on the matter of bail and also
affirmed the conviction. Citing Sec. 3, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, the High Court declared that if an accused who is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the
accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that
the evidence of guilt is strongwhich would have been
sufficient to deny bail even before convictionit would
have likewise ruled that the accuseds guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction. About the same holding
was rendered by the High Court in People vs. Valeriano,
226 SCRA 694 (1993).

The case of Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778 (1994)


repeated once more settled principles on bail issuances.
This case involves the fixing bail in the warrant of arrest
for murder (ambushslaying in Bulacan) for accused
Estelita Hipolito, et al. who were even at large at the time.
The judge was charged with ignorance of the law, among
others. It ruled that the sua sponte grant of bail, without
any motion or application therefor by any of the accused
and without any notice to the prosecution or any hearing
conducted therein was stigmatized by the Court as
whimsical and arbitrary exercise of
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jurisdiction which calls for this Courts exercise of


disciplinary power. The case of Lardizabal vs. Reyes, 238
SCRA 640 (1994) is another administrative complaint
against a judge for issuing also bail to an accused in a rape
of a 12 yearold girl and also reducing the same without
affording the prosecution opportunity to be heard. The
High Court took to task the respondent judge for such
display of ignorance of the law. It held that the judge
should have conducted a hearing on the question of
strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused considering
the charge of rape which calls for capital penalty.
Respondent (judge) could not have arrived at a fair
conclusion that the evidence was not enough to deny bail to
the accused when the prosecution had not been heard on
the matter. Respondents unjustified haste in granting bail
and thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both
instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution,
speaks poorly of his competence in applying the law and
jurisprudence on the matter. A similar ruling was handed
down by the Supreme Court in Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr., 240
SCRA 155 (1995) wherein it faulted a judge who in an
application for bail acted affirmatively thereon without
conducting another hearing and, what is worse, his order
concededly lacked the requisite summary or resum of the
evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support
the grant of bail.
People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995) is a case cited in
the decision under annotation pertaining to the granting

of bail pending appeal. In this case, the accused was


charged with murder for having shot at the back of the
head a neighbor during a quarrel. He was convicted and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua among others. The High
Court affirmed the decision with modification and in the
course thereof, it declared that: The subsistence of a bail
bond is no legal obstacle to accusedappellants immediate
incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving a
felony punishable by reclusion perpetua. It cited the case of
People vs. Fortes, supra which ruled that bail cannot be
granted after conviction of a capital offense because
conviction imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong (en banc resolution of 15
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Oct. 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez).


h) Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs.
Arcueno also of 1995
The case of Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84
(1995) is significant because a judge was dismissed through
the complaint of an unknown complainant (Concerned
citizen) for ignorance of the law in failing to observe settled
guidelines in the grant of bail. In this case, a person
accused of illegal recruitment in a large scale (a non
bailable offense) was granted bail by him upon a mere
petition by the accused without hearing. The High Court
ruled that while the judge has the discretion to weigh the
strength of the evidence against the accused, such
discretion may be exercised only after hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of determining whether or not she should be granted
provisional liberty. The judge claimed that he did ask the
prosecutor to comment which the latter did and therefore
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of
hearing.
This only infuriated the Court which rejected this
pretense thus:
The stance of the respondent judge magnifies his ignorance of the
law. Summary hearing is such brief and speedy method of

receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable


and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is to
determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of trial.

The High Court further explained the importance of a


hearing: On its result depends the right of an accused to
provisional liberty as opposed to the duty of the State to
protect its people against dangerous elements. The Court
noted that in 2 previous cases, the respondent judge has
run roughshod on the right of the prosecution to oppose
bail of persons accused of capital offenses. Accordingly,
respondent judge was ordered dismissed from the judiciary.
192

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Tucay vs. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 (1995) is another


administrative case against a judge who granted bail on
nonbailable offense of murder and justified his action by
claiming that the fiscal had noted in the petition that it
was not interposing objection thereto. Still the High Court
found the action erroneous and a fine of P20,000 was
imposed upon the judge. It ruled that a hearing should
nonetheless be held to ascertain whether the fiscal was not
really opposing the petition for bail and for the purpose of
taking into account the guidelines set forth in Rule 114,
Sec. 6 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. About the same thing happened in the
subsequent case of Sule vs. Biteng, 243 SCRA 524 (1995)
wherein the judge granted with indecent haste the
petition for bail at P50,000.00 without affording the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard. The High Court
found with his open admission that he granted bail to the
accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions
of this Court holding that such an act amounts to a denial
of due process. Respondent judge was found guilty of
ignorance of the law and imposed a fine of P20,000.00 along
with the usual warning. A similar holding regarding
another case of issuance of bail for murder and reduce the
same illegal possession of firearm without hearing was
made by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of
Santos vs. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56 (1995).

However in the administrative case entitled Alvarado


vs. Laquindanum, 245 SCRA 501 (1995) the judge who
issued bail to an accused in a dangerous drugs case was
absolved by the High Court of charges of ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. It
found the charges of ignorance of the law unfounded and
that the judge was not remiss in her duties when she
granted bail to the accused in question. The High Court
found that: She conducted hearings to determine the
existence of probable cause against the accused which was
actively participated in by witnesses for the prosecution.
Then again in De los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA
85 (1995) a judge with a record of incompetence was finally
or
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dered dismissed for gross ignorance of the law for having


issued bail to Estelita Hipolito, et al., accused for another
ambushslaying in San Juan Del Monte, Bulacan, of a
policeman and barangay captain even without the required
petition for bail, without hearing and even as the accused
were still free. The High Court cited settled jurisprudence
on the matter, particularly on the need to conduct hearing
to accord the prosecution the chance to prove the strength
of the evidence regarding the guilt of the accused. It further
concluded that: the respondent judge wantonly ignored the
due process requirement of hearing to afford the
prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence
of guilt of the applicants is strong. Then came Chin vs.
Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175 (1995) another administrative case
against a judge for ignorance of the law. The judge in this
case was reprimanded for issuing bail to an accused
without giving notice to the public prosecutor of the
application for bail.
In Paderanga vs. CA, 247 SCRA 741 (1995) the High
Court summarized the prevailing rule on admission to bail
as it ruled on the propriety of granting or denying bail to a
lawyer who was charged with others with multiple
murders. A lawyer who was implicated in the crime of
multiple murders by his client in a bizarre twist of fate
during preliminary investigation was granted bail while he

was in the hospital recuperating from an illness. The


issuance was questioned by the People in a certiorari
petition before the Supreme Court. As to whether the
accused was under the jurisdiction of the trial court when
he asked for bail, the Court ruled that he was under
constructive custody of the law. The prosecution was not
accorded procedural due process since it was not
represented by the authorized prosecutor and that it was
not given reasonable time to oppose the application for
bail. The Supreme Court after discussing the basic
doctrines on bail applications disagreed. It found that there
was the appearance by an authorized representative of the
prosecution, there was hearing on the bail application, the
order contained summary of the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, and the records showed scrupulous
adherence to procedural rules.
194

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Then finally, in Gimeno vs. Arcueno, Sr., 250 SCRA 376


(1995) the High Court reiterated the importance of holding
a hearing for bail applications. In this Robbery In Band
With Homicide case the accused were granted bail upon the
filing of information after the prosecutor merely filed a
comment on the petition for bail wherein no hearing was
conducted. The High Court faulted the judge for this and
categorically declared that hearing is mandatory for bail
applications, after citing its earlier rulings in previous
cases: A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge
can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether
the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.
VI. The State of the Law and Jurisprudence
Culled from the Constitution, the law, circulars and the
decisions of the High Tribunal, the principles, doctrines or
holdings on bail are clearly summarized in Paderanga vs.
CA, supra:
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security
given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any

court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its


main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance
at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure ones
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over
him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his
lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a
case, it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an
accused could just send another in his stead to post bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.
x x xx x xx x x
x x xx x xx x x
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x x xx x xx x x
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except
only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance
thereof, Section 4, Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all
persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right
to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in custody of
the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded
every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at
the outset since after trial would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the
regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to
be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions
thereto being the instance where the accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under the
general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course,

grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine


the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail
becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court
under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature
and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, is required with the participation of both the defense
and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to
ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof
is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.

Then in the event of conviction of an offense punishable by


reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the bail
bond of the accused shall be canceled and the latter shall
be placed in confinement during the pendency of appeal. At
this stage or after conviction, bail is no longer a matter of
right on the part of the accused or of discretion on the part
of the court because
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evidence of guilt is not only strong but in fact it was


already proven beyond reasonable doubt.
VII. The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA and Its
Significance
It is the unfortunate fate of Robin Padilla that from the
facts of his case, he could not find any refuge under the
prevailing law and wellentrenched jurisprudence as set
forth above. As has been regularly reported in the media a
few years ago, Mr. Robin Padilla, was on his way to
Pampanga when he sideswiped a balut vendor which led to
the local police to apprehend him. In the process, the police
found assorted firearms in his vehicle. Hence, he was
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms which is punishable by reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. While the case
was being tried before the regional trial court of Pampanga,
Robin Padilla was granted bail for his temporary liberty.

After trial which has been closely watched and monitored


by the media given the celebrity status of the accused, the
trial court promulgated a decision convicting the latter.
The penalty was for an indeterminate penalty of 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua. Robin Padilla immediately appealed to
the Court of Appeals and in a few months the latter
affirmed the conviction.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals canceled his bail bond
and ordered his immediate imprisonment at the
Muntinlupa National Penitentiary. After the denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision, Robin Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of Petition for Review on Certiorari with an
application for bail pending appeal. He further moved for a
separate resolution on his plea for bail while the appeal
pended with the High Tribunal.
Hence, the High Courts resolution of this plea for bail
after conviction in the lower court and affirmance of the
same by the Court of Appeals. As stated above the weight
of law and authority militates against the plea for bail of
petitioner
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Padilla. Relying upon clear provisions of law and its


previous decisions on the matter, the High Tribunal held
that where an accused is charged and thereafter convicted
of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua bail is no
longer a matter of right or discretionary on the part of the
court. There is no more issue as to strength of the evidence
of guilt of the accused as in fact he was already found
guilty. As the High Court concluded: In this case,
appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, we find appellant
not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of guilt is strong. In any case, there is a
significant passage in American Jurisprudence: However
since constitutional provisions relative to bail do not
prohibit bail after conviction and pending appeal, the
matter is generally left to the sound discretion of the court
in the absence of a statutory provision (8 Am. Jur. 2d, p.

612).
What is the significance of the Robin Padilla vs. CA
case? As far as jurisprudence is concerned, no new trail was
blazed by the High Court. All that can be said about this
case is that it has adhered strictly to law and settled
jurisprudence. Even the hope for deliverance in the case of
De La Rama vs. Peoples Court, supra, decided in 1946
proved to be unavailing. It will be noted that in that case,
the accused as per Medical Report was suffering from
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic granular pharyngities of which they (the
doctors) have seen many similar cases later progressing
into advanced stages when treatment and medicine are no
longer of any avail. The High Court saw no reason to apply
the holding in this postwar decision because appellants
situation is not akin to De la Ramas factual milieu.
VIII. Steps in the Filing of Petition for Issuance of
Bail
Securing bail after conviction of a capital offense has been
virtually foreclosed with the promulgation of Robin Padilla
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vs. CA, supra, consistent with earlier rulings (People vs.


Follantes & Jacinto, supra, and People vs. Nitcha, supra,
which cited the Resolution in People vs. Cortesconviction
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged
is strong). However, while at the initial stage of the
criminal proceedings after the filing of the information for
an offense which carries the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the chances of securing bail
may still be brighter if the accused can establish that the
evidence of his guilt is not strong.
Of late, there has been a great interest in this matter of
bail for the accused in view of sensational cases involving
high officials in the government and their relatives who are
either already incarcerated or are facing criminal
prosecution. In this regard, we take the opportunity to
reproduce the steps in securing bail when the charge is for

a capital offense as set forth by that brilliant courtroom


tactician and legal authority, Don Vicente J. Francisco in
his fivevolume classic, entitled Trial Technique and
Practice Court. There are no more copies on sale of this
monumental work. Hence, it would be of immense benefit
to lawyers if this important portion of the chapter
pertaining to bail application were preserved in this
inquiry (with pertinent Notes):
Procedure to secure release on Bail
(a) Filing of application for bailThe accused must of
course file an application for bail. No standard form has
been prescribed by the Rules of Court for such petition.
However, in accordance with the constitutional provision
aforecited, the petitioner must allege that there is no
strong evidence of his guilt, and that therefore, he is
entitled to be released on bail. Hereunder is an illustration
for a petition for bail which may be filed.
(Caption and Title)
COMES NOW, the defendant x x x x
1. That the defendant is in custody for the alleged commission of a
capital offense
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2. That no bail has been recommended for his temporary


release, on the assumption that the evidence of guilt is strong
3. That the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is
on the prosecution, and unless this fact is satisfactorily shown,
the defendant may be bailed at the courts discretion
WHEREFORE, upon prior notice and hearing, it is respectfully
prayed that the defendant be admitted to bail in such amount as
the Hon. Court may fix.
, 196
xxx
xxx
xxx
(Note: The petition does not allege/explain why evidence of guilt
of the accused is not strongfor tactical reason).

(b) Notice of HearingWhen admission to bail is a matter

of discretion, the court must require that reasonable notice


of the hearing for the application for bail be given the
fiscal.
[Note: In the present provision under Section 15 of Rule 114, the
following was added: or require him to submit his
recommendation. It has been recently held that although the
provincial prosecutor interposed no objection to the grant of bail to
the accused, respondent judge should nevertheless have set the
petition for hearing and diligently ascertained from the
prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail
application. In fact, if the court has reason to believe that the
stand of the prosecutor in not opposing or in merely leaving the
matter to the sound discretion of the court is not justified it may
inquire from the former as to the nature of his evidence to
determine whether or not it is strong. (Paderanga vs. CA, supra,
citing Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756)].

(c) Right to prompt hearingThe petitioner for bail has the


right to have his application heard summarily and
promptly, but his right can be waived.
[Note: Since the right to bail may be waived (People vs. Donato,
supra) the petitioner may also waive expeditious hearings on his
petition through postponements and other dilatory procedure or
incidents attributable to the accused (see Muoz vs. Rilloraza, 83
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


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Phil. 609)].

(d) HearingThere should be a hearing, for an application


for bail calls for an exercise of judicial discretion, in
determining the probability of the defendants guilt. This,
of course, requires the submission of evidence.
The hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the
Constitution and laws in force the petitioner is entitled to
provisional release under bail. Such hearing should be
governed by existing laws and rules of court, the hearing
and disposal of such applications being a mere part of the
prosecution, trial and corresponding disposal of the
corresponding cases before the court.

The court should hear all material and relevant evidence


offered by either party, and should consider the evidence as
a whole.
The hearing should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court. By summary hearing is meant such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely for the purpose of
determining the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail.
On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or
to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course
of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and crossexamination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.
[Note: Hearing is mandatory, when grant of bail is a matter of
judicial discretion. On the other hand, as the grant of bail
becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court
under the exception to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature
and which should be
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summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required


with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant. (Paderanga vs. CA, supra)].

(e) Burden of proofIn this jurisdiction, the filing of a


complaint does establish a presumption of guilt nor does it
destroy the presumption of innocence. Hence, when a
motion for bail is filed, it is the duty of the fiscal to prove
that the accused is not entitled to be admitted to bail,
because he is charged with capital offense and the proof of
his guilt is strong.

xxx
xxx
The accused has the right of crossexamination and to
introduce his own evidence of guilt in rebuttal to establish
his right to bail.
[Note: Under the new Rules of Criminal Procedure effective Oct. 1,
1988, Section 5, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court, it is clearly
provided that in application for admission to bail for capital
offenses, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence
of guilt is strong.]

(f) Ex parte evidence not permissibleThe court cannot


examine the prosecutors evidence in a private inquiry
without the presence of the petitioner and upon the basis of
knowledge acquired therein deny the application for bail.
This is improper, arbitrary and constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.
The determination whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This judicial
discretion is directed to the weight of evidence, and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the
right of crossexamination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits
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Bail

are not sufficient since they are merely hearsay evidence,


unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.
(g) The fiscal (now, prosecutor) may or may not oppose
the application.Since the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution, the fiscal is
free to satisfy or not that burden. He is free to oppose or
not to oppose the application for bail according to what he
believes to be in the interest of the State. Since the accused
by proper procedure, may test the probative force of the
evidence for the State in order to fully present his case for
the purpose of hearing, the fiscal may prefer not to oppose
the application for bail, in order not to disclose prematurely

his evidence. And it is unnecessary to say that if the fiscal


refuse to satisfy his burden because he does not oppose the
application for bail, the usual course open to the court leads
to the granting of the bail.
(Note: However, it appears that in light of the holding in
Paderanga vs. CA, supra, the court may still inquire as to nature
of the evidence of the prosecution even if the latter has manifested
no desire to object to the petition for bail.)

(h) Where evidence of guilt is strongThe judge must


decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong or not, for the ruling to be made will depend upon
that decision. This is a ministerial duty.
(Note: In Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra, a judge was compelled
to make a finding on the weight of the evidence of the accused [a
ministerial duty] for the purpose of determining whether bail may
be allowed [a discretionary duty]. Thus it cited a US case which
qualified that: although the exercise of discretion will not be
controlled by mandamus, yet writ will lie to compel the person or
the body in whom the discretion is lodged to proceed to its
exercise.)

If a wellfounded doubt of guilt can even be entertained,


then the evidence of guilt cannot be said to be strong, and
in such case bail shall be granted.
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If the evidence is clear and strong, leading a wellguarded


and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the
offense has been committed, that the accused is the guilty
agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if
the law be administered, bail is not a matter of right.
The uncorroborated testimony of a selfconfessed killer
for reward, when tainted with contradiction and
improbabilities, is not a strong evidence of a capital offense
against his coaccused.
Lone testimony from polluted sources appears not to
satisfy the constitutional requirement that the evidence of
guilt must be strong in a capital offense in order that a
court may be justified not to grant bail.

Where bail is a matter of right and where discretionary


Where on a motion to admit bail the evidence of the
witness does not make a prima facie case against the
accused, the latter is entitled to bail.
(Note: The authority for this holding regarding the sufficiency of
making a prima facie case to deny bail is Bernabe vs. Ocampo, 77
Phil. 55, which merely quoted an excerpt from a US court decision.
From the statement above, it would seem that if a prima facie case
is established by the prosecution, bail would be denied. However, it
would seem that the weight of authorities in our jurisdiction is
that while a prima facie case warrants the filing of an
Information, the quantum of evidence needed to show that
evidence of guilt is strong sufficient to sway court discretion to
deny bail application needs more than that. Otherwise, if a prima
facie case were enough to deny a bail application, why further
require a summary hearing to find out the nature/strength of the
evidence of the prosecution? Apropos is a definition in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Feria in Herras Teehankee vs.
Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 [822]: Strong evidence of guilt for
purposes of bail means such evidence as would not be of less
efficacy than that which would sustain a conviction [6 American
Jurisprudence, p. 53]).

When there is no strong evidence of guilt of the accused,


the defendant may be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
204

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Bail

If the evidence of the defendants guilt is strong he may be


admitted to bail at the discretion of the court. However, the
discretion must be exercised with extreme caution because,
as Clark says, where the offense was a felony punishable
by death, bail was scarcely even allowed, for it was not
thought that any pecuniary consideration could weigh
against the desire to live.
(Note: This is a significant statement on the part of the author,
Don Vicente J. Franciscothat even though evidence of guilt is
strong, the discretion to grant bail remains with the court, but to
be exercised with extreme caution.)

In this jurisdiction, courts are controlled in the exercise of


their discretion, first, by the applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the statutes second, by the rules which
the Supreme Court has promulgated under the authority of
Article VIII, Section 13, of the Constitution and third,
those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be
part of the laws of the land.
(Note: Don Vicente J. Francisco then cited the ruling in People vs.
Alano, 81 Phil. 19 which clarified that the discretion of the court
in such cases is neither absolute nor beyond control but subject to
the Constitution, the laws and the rules of equity and justice. Then
he also discussed and recited the facts of the case of Dela Rama vs.
Peoples Court, supra, which has been already reported earlier
which he successfully handled during the early years of Liberation.
He observed that: Illness of the prisoner which would render his
continued confinement in jail injurious to his health or endanger
his life is a ground for his release on bail, although the Court has
found that there is strong evidence of the prisoners guilt.)

xxx
xxx
xxx
In the petition of Senator Justiniano S. Montano for bail,
our illustrative case for this chapter, the Supreme Court
held (G.R. No. L6352, Res. of January 29, 1953, XVIII,
Lawyers
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Bail

Journal, 103):
Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the
otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the
natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal
appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the
determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt
necessary to warrant a deprivation of right.
Besides, to deny bail, it is not enough that the evidence of guilt
is strong, it must also appear that in case of conviction the
defendants criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before the Court has

been made.
In the evaluation of the evidence, the probability of flight is one
rather important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose
of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed,
is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of
bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the
proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied
in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of
prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case bearing in mind the
defendants official and social standing and his other personal
circumstances, seems remote, if not nil.

It is, therefore, the rule now in this jurisdiction that in


cases of capital offenses, the Court should be fair and
liberal in the appreciation of the evidence to determine the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to
warrant a deprivation of the right to bail guaranteed by the
Constitution that in order to deny bail in such cases, it is
not enough that the evidence of guilt be strong but (1) it
must appear that in case of conviction, the defendants
criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment, and (2) that there must be satisfactory evidence
of the probability of flight, that is, that the defendant would
flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the decision
of the Court (Italics supplied).
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Bail

(Acknowledgment: The writer reiterates that the foregoing portion


beginning with Procedure to secure release on bail up to Where
bail is a matter of right and where discretionary except the
Notes were reproduced from Trial Technique and Practice
Court by Don Vicente J. Francisco, Vol. IV, pp. 3745. This 5
volume legal treatise on trial technique took years to finish with
Volume I published in 1955 and finally, Volume V was published
in 1961. The precise language of Sen. Francisco was reproduced
because as an acknowledged legal authority his every word would
be crucial in every plea for admission to bail.)

IX. Conclusion
Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est.
The law may be hard but so the law is written. Of course
the more familiar maxim is that: Dura est lex sed lexThe
law may be hard but that is the law. The constant laments
of Robin Padilla and those who sympathize with him are:
Why such penalty? Why no bail? After all, he did not
murder anyone much less did he commit a heinous crime?
But to those who understand the workings of our legal
system, they realize that the courts are merely following
the provisions of our statute books, the Constitution, the
Rules of Court and the holdings in a long line of consistent
decisions of the Supreme Court on bail applications.
Thus, others have faulted P.D. No. 1866, as one of the
remaining vestiges of the siege syndrome from the years of
dictatorship. The decree aimed to discourage or instill fear
among the populace from carrying unlicensed firearms to
nip in the bud, so to speak, any attempt at distabilization.
Now, there is a move in the Senate to amend such decree or
reduce the penalty for illegal possession of firearms to a
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua consistent with the
socalled restoration of democracy in the land. As any
legislation aimed to remedy a perceived evil, only time
will determine its wisdom.
o0o
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