Rem Compiled Final

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law
2015)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT
PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC. vs. ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name and
Style of "A. MILAN TRADING," and LAURA M. MILAN
G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, J. LeonardoDe Castro
A final and executory judgment, under the doctrine of immutability and inalterability, may no
longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by the Supreme Court.
However, as rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Thus, in the absence of a pattern or scheme to
delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules
on the part of the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to
dismiss.
Facts:
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing) extended loans against herein respondents
Antonio C. Milan (Antonio) and Laura M. Milan. As such, the latter executed Deeds of Assignment in
which they assigned and transferred to the former their rights to various checks for and in
consideration of the various amounts obtained. Subsequently, when presented for payment, those
checks were dishonored for different reasons. Despite repeated demands, respondents failed to
settle their obligation, which amounted to P2,327,833.33 as of January 15, 2000. PCI Leasing was
then compelled to litigate to enforce payment.
On March 2, 2000, the RTC issued summons to respondents addressed to their place of
residence as stated in the complaint which were, however, returned unserved. As such, PCI Leasing
filed a Motion to Archive Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 subject to its reinstatement after the
whereabouts of the respondents was determined. It was denied by the RTC and on July 13, 2000, it
issued an Order, directing PCI Leasing "to take the necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant
case within ten days from receipt" under pain of dismissal of the case "for lack of interest." Thus,
PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, which was, however, also denied on the
ground of a defective notice of hearing. Another similar motion was thereafter filed by PCI Leasing
and the same was scheduled for hearing on October 13, 2000. However, on said date, there was no
appearance from both counsels of the parties. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-00-40010. PCI Leasing sought a reconsideration of the said Order, explaining that its
counsel was already in the courtroom when Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala of the RTC was dictating
the order of dismissal. However, the same was also denied. On January 26, 2001, PCI Leasing filed
an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC.
PCI Leasing eventually filed a Notice of Appeal which was also dismissed by the RTC by way
of a Resolution, given that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, it resorted into filing a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, which was
however, dismissed outright for having been taken out of time. As its Motion for Reconsideration
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with the CA was also denied, it elevated this case to the Supreme Court by way of the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
With the SC, despite numerous attempts of PCI Leasing of determining the respondents'
address, the latter has been consistent in refusing to accept the summons and to file a comment to
the petition despite the Resolutions ordered by the Court and notwithstanding the penalty of fine
imposed for non-compliance of those. As such, on June 27, 2005, the Court resolved that: 1) the
copies of the said resolutions be deemed served; and b) an alias warrant of arrest against
respondent Milan be issued, directing the NBI to cause his immediate arrest and to detain him until
he complies with the said resolutions.
Eventually, Antonio Milan was arrested and detained by the NBI on March 24, 2006. Also, he
paid the fine earlier imposed upon him and filed an Explanation on Failure to File Comment with
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release from Detention with Prayer for Time to File Comment,
maintaining that he had not received any of the Resolutions of the Court, hence, the failure to abide
by the same. At the onset, the Court denied the said motion but it was eventually granted.
PCI Leasing, for its part, averred that both the lower courts defeated its right to recover the
sums of money it had loaned to the respondents simply because it allegedly committed "some
procedural lapses" in the prosecution of its case. It argued that if those rulings would be allowed to
stand, the respondents would allegedly be enriched at their expense. Thus, invoking for a liberal
application of the pertinent rules of procedure and invoking the inherent equity jurisdiction of
courts, it ultimately prays for the reinstatement of Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.
Issue:
Whether Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 should be reinstated.
Ruling:
We grant the petition.
The Court of Appeals indeed committed a mistake in issuing the Resolutions which
dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by PCI Leasing and denied the latters Motion for
Reconsideration. To recall, it based the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari on the fact that (1)
the appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time and (2) the Notice of Appeal supposedly involved
pure questions of law.
As to the second ground, the CA was mistaken in concluding that the Notice of Appeal
involved pure questions of law on the basis of the statement therein that the Order and Resolutions
of the RTC would be appealed to it on the ground that the same were "contrary to the applicable
laws and jurisprudence on the matter." It was unreasonably hasty in inferring its lack of jurisdiction
over the intended appeal of PCI Leasing. It is only after the specific issues and arguments of PCI
Leasing are laid out in detail before the CA in the appropriate substantive pleading can it make a
conclusion as to whether or not the issues raised therein involved pure questions of law.
The first ground which was in concurrence with the findings of the RTC that the Notice of
Appeal was filed one day late was correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In
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accordance with the ruling rendered in the case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals, a party litigant may
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC Order which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Resolution, denying the same. As said Resolution was received by PCI Leasing on January 17, 2001,
the latter therefore should have filed its Notice of Appeal within 15 days from such date or until
February 1, 2001. However, it actually filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days after
receipt of the said Resolution. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file
the Notice of Appeal should not be reckoned from May 3, 2001, the date of receipt of the RTC
Resolution dated April 6, 2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCI
Leasing, the latter being a prohibited pleading as it was in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration.
Therefore, the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010,
should be deemed final and executory. As such, under the doctrine of immutability and
inalterability of a final judgment, it may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court
which rendered it or even by this Court. The two-fold purpose of the said doctrine are: (1) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. However,
notwithstanding the said doctrine, the Court finds, after a thorough review of the records, that
compelling circumstances are extant in this case, which clearly warrant the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction. It has been settled that rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. To our mind, it will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTCs dismissal of the
case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts
likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross,
negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes. In this
instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount of
P2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from
collecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Milan stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
PCI Leasing.
Also, it is important to note that the hearing in which the counsel of PCI Leasing came late
was merely for the issuance of Alias Summons. It was not even for the presentation of the evidence
in chief of PCI Leasing, where the latters presence would be indispensable. Incidentally, the Motion
for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature, which does not require
a hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC without prejudicing
the rights of the respondents. Thus, it was serious error on the part of the trial court to have denied
the first motion for issuance of alias summons for want of notice of hearing. It was also not
mandatory for the trial court to set the second motion for hearing. However, despite all of these, the
RTC still dismissed the case and eventually denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. While
trial courts have the discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for tardiness or absence
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at hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform to the
dictates of justice and fair play. Moreover, It does not escape this Courts notice that PCI Leasing
failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to the difficulties it encountered in
locating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for changing addresses and refusing to
accept court processes. Clearly, the delay in the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault of
PCI Leasing.
The circumstances of this case do not constitute sufficient bases to warrant the conclusion
that PCI Leasing had lost interest in prosecuting Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. As such, in the absence
of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should
decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR, AGUSTIN R. PERDICES
vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to
the latter.
Facts:
Petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filed
before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with
improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete under the Property Registration
Decree.
The RTC set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and sent notices to the parties.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and Philippine Ports
Authority(PPA), represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate
Oppositions to the application for registration of City of Dumaguete. Both the Republic and PPA
averred that City of Dumaguete may not register the property in its name since the latter had never
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a
portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.
However, before the next hearing, PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of
LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PPA
argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Property Registration Decree, refers
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership.
The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a
foreshore land, as testified to by City of Dumaguete's own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is
not registerable. This was the reason why the property was included in Presidential Proclamation
No. 1232 (delineating the territorial boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so that the same
would be administered and managed by the State, through PPA, for the benefit of the people.
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In its Opposition to Oppositors Motion to Dismiss, City of Dumaguete claimed that the
property was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly, continuously,
exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership. The technical description of the
property showed that the it was not bounded by any part of the sea. It invoked Republic Act No.
1899, which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out, at their own
expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants said chartered cities and
municipalities ownership over the reclaimed lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is
immaterial to the present application for registration because it merely authorizes PPA to
administer and manage the Dumaguete Port Zone and does not confer upon PPA ownership of the
property.
PPA filed a Reply/Rejoinder (To Applicants Opposition to Oppositors Motion to Dismiss),
asserting that there are no factual or legal basis for the claim of petitioner that the subject property
is reclaimed land. The present claim of City of Dumaguete that the property is reclaimed land
should not be allowed for it would improperly change the earlier theory in support of the
application for registration. PPA reiterated that the property is foreshore land which cannot be
registered; and that Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201
because it confirms that areas within the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject property, are
not alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of PPA. It
having been shown by City of Dumaguete's own evidence that the lot subject of the application for
original registration is a foreshore land, and therefore not registerable, the application must be
denied. The admission by Engr. Dorado that there is no formal declaration from the executive
branch of government or law passed by Congress that the land in question is no longer needed for
public use or special industries x x x further militates against the application. The RTC decreed in
the end that "the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit."
In its Motion for Reconsideration, City of Dumaguete contended that the dismissal of its
application was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to
present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application, such as the subject property
already being alienable and disposable at the time it was occupied and possessed. City of
Dumaguete also pointed out that its witness, Engr. Dorado, "testified only as to the physical status
of the land at the time when the cadastral survey of Dumaguete was made sometime in 1916." The
physical state of the subject property had already changed since 1916. It is now within the
"alienable and disposable area" as certified by the Bureau of Lands, as verified and certified by the
Land Management Sector, DENR Regional Office in Cebu City, who has yet to take the witness stand
before the RTC.
City of Dumaguete insisted that the RTC should continue with the hearing of LRC Case No.
N-201 and allow to present evidence to prove it is reclaimed land. It sufficiently alleged in its
application for registration that it has been in "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the [subject property] for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of
ownership."
PPA based its Opposition (To Applicants Motion for Reconsideration) on technical and
substantive grounds.
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In its Order dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with PPA that the Motion for
Reconsideration of City of Dumaguete violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court. Resultantly, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered as
not filed and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal, rendering final and executory
the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201.
However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
City of Dumaguete, the RTC issued another Order dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order
dated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to
determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201.
It was then the turn of PPA to file with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated December 7, 2000. In an Order dated February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the motion of PPA.
The Court wants to correct this error in its findings on the September 7, 2000 Order, that
Lot No. 1 is situated on the shoreline of Dumaguete City. The Court simply committed an oversight
on the City of Dumaguete's evidence that the lot is a foreshore land x x x when in fact it is not. And
it is for this reason that the court reconsidered and set aside said September 7, 2000 Order, to
correct the same while it is true that said September 7, 2000 Order had attained its finality, yet this
Court cannot in conscience allow injustice to perpetuate in this case and that hearing on the merits
must proceed to determine the legality and truthfulness of its application for registration of title.
The Court of Appeals found merit in the Petition of PPA and set aside the RTC Orders dated
December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001.
Issue:
justice?
Can the court a quo allow the liberal application of the rules in order to avoid miscarriage of
Ruling:
Yes, the court may allow the liberal application of the rules.
The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion exists
where an act is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of PPA. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20,
2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 and resolved to have a full-blown
proceeding to determine factual issues in said case.
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Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield
to the latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of
procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy.
Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:
But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be applied
in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice. The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application
of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of
substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal.
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of City of Dumaguete , which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7,
2000 dismissing LRC Case No. N-201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of
procedural rules.
The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently
erroneous.
PPA sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not
because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence
presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a
foreshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of
PPA in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer for
relief in the Application for Original Registration of City of Dumaguete and already scrutinized and
weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner was able to present.
As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which
the RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to
present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial.
It is true that City of Dumaguete, as the applicant, has the burden of proving that the subject
property is alienable and disposable and its title to the same is capable of registration. However, we
stress that the RTC, when it issued its Order dated September 7, 2000, had so far heard only the
testimony of Engr. Dorado, the first witness. City of Dumaguete was no longer afforded the
opportunity to present other witnesses and pieces of evidence in support of its Application. The
RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 already declaring the subject property as inalienable public
land, over which the RTC has no jurisdiction to order registration was evidently premature.
The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet become final and executory as City of
Dumaguete was able to duly file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the same, which the RTC eventually granted in its Order dated December 7,
2000. Admittedly, said motions filed by City of Dumaguete did not comply with certain rules of
procedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of
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paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an
appeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant in the present case warrant the
liberal application of the rules.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively or
arbitrarily, exercised its discretion when it subsequently issued the Order dated December 7, 2000,
setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 and proceeding with the trial in LRC Case No. N201.
JURISDICTION
EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LILIA G. PINEDA
G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009, J. Leonardo- De Castro
In cases where a COMELEC Division issues an interlocutory order, the same COMELEC Division
should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the order.
Facts:
The parties of the case were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province
of Pampanga. On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimed
Panlilio as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest number of votes. On
May 25, 2007, private respondent Pineda filed an election protest based on a number of grounds.
On July 23, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course to
private Pinedas election protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the
protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga. Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied
his omnibus motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directing
the collection of ballot boxes of the contested precincts in the province of Pampanga.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied Panlilios
omnibus motion to certify his motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
Since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division
should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate
the issue to the Court via a petition for certiorari. Under the Rules, the acts of a Division that are
subject of a motion for reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it
completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in the case after its
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issuance, that order is interlocutory. Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised
before the COMELEC en banc. Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the
instances of which the COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. Neither is it one where a Division is
not authorized to act nor one where the members of the Second Division have unanimously voted
to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forum
where petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. FATIMA A. MACUD
G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
As a general rule, the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. However, it admits an exception where the party fully participated in the proceedings. A
teacher cannot raise want of jurisdiction when she has availed of the remedies in the proceedings.
Facts:
As a requirement for her appointment as Teacher I of the Department of Education, Fatima
A. Macud submitted her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) to the CSC Regional Office and declared that she
successfully passed the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET). Upon investigation,
petitioner was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service due to several irregularities in her Application Form (AF) and PDS such
as, first, disparity in Macuds date of birth as December 15, 1958 appeared as her date of birth in the
AF while it was December 15, 1965 that appeared in her PDS; second, the facial features of Macud
in the picture attached to her PDS vis--vis her features as shown in the picture attached to the AF
showed an obvious dissemblance; and lastly, the signature of Macud as appearing in her PDS is
likewise different from that affixed in her AF.
Macud asserted that she personally took the PBET and vehemently denied the findings
about the photograph alleging that the dissemblance of her picture attached to her AF and PSP from
her picture pasted on her PDS was because the two pictures were taken roughly nine (9) years
apart from each other. Anent the disparity in her signatures, petitioner reasoned out that it was the
result of the change of her status, i.e., she eventually got married and had to use the surname of her
husband. With respect to her date of birth, she alleged that her known and recognized date of birth
prior and up to 1994 was 15 December 1958. Thereafter, she was informed that her correct date of
birth was 15 December 1965.
CSC Regional Office found Macud guilty of dishonesty. She appealed to CSC Central Office
but the same was denied. Macud elevated the matter to the CA which reversed the decision of
CSCRO and CSCCO on the ground of lack jurisdiction. The CA held that CSC had no jurisdiction over
the case because it is the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which should apply thus
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall have jurisdiction. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the case of Macud
Ruling:
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Yes. We grant the petition.
As the Solicitor General correctly argues, petitioner CSC is the constitutional body charged
with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches
and agencies of the government.
Article IX-B, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. x x x (emphasis ours)
Section 3 of the same Article further states:
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on
its personnel programs. (emphasis ours)
In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws such
as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of
the civil service, including public school teachers. To quote from that decision:
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to
supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be
classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first
and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of
complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary
committees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against
their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation
of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the
creation of such disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to
instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also
impliedly amend the Constitution itself. (emphasis supplied)
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This Court has also previously held in Civil Service Commission v. Albao that the CSC has the
authority to directly institute proceedings to discipline a government employee in order to protect
the integrity of the civil service.
Indeed, where an administrative case involves the alleged fraudulent procurement of an
eligibility or qualification for employment in the civil service, it is but proper that the CSC would
have jurisdiction over the case for it is in the best position to determine if there has been a violation
of civil service rules and regulations.
Moreover, it is now too late for respondent to challenge the jurisdiction of the CSC. After
participating in the proceedings before the CSC, respondent is effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the CSCs jurisdiction. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised
anytime, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. HON. FRANCO
T. FALCON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 71 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY and BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil
actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. The Court may
suspend or even disregard rules when the demands of justice so require.
No court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a national government project unless
the matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act
complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.
Facts:
In line with the DFAs mandate to improve the passport and visa issuance system, as well as
the storage and retrieval of its related application records, and pursuant to our governments ICAO
commitments, the DFA secured the approval of the President of the Philippines, as Chairman of the
Board of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), for the implementation of the
Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project (the MRP/V Project) under the Build-Operate-andTransfer (BOT) scheme, provided for by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No.
7718 (the BOT Law), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). There were several
bidders responded and BCA was among those that pre-qualified and submitted its technical and
financial proposals. PBAC found BCAs bid to be the sole complying bid; hence, it permitted the DFA
to engage in direct negotiations with BCA. On even date, the PBAC recommended to the DFA
Secretary the award of the MRP/V Project to BCA on a BOT arrangement. BCA incorporated a
project company, the Philippine Passport Corporation (PPC) to undertake and implement the
MRP/V Project.
A Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT Agreement) between the DFA and PPC was
signed by DFA Acting Secretary Lauro L. Baja, Jr. and PPC President Bonifacio Sumbilla. Former
DFA Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Bonifacio Sumbilla, this time as BCA President, signed an
Amended BOT Agreement in order to reflect the change in the designation of the parties and to
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harmonize Section 11.3 with Section 11.8 of the IRR of the BOT Law. The Amended BOT Agreement
was entered into by the DFA and BCA with the conformity of PPC.
An Assignment Agreement was executed by BCA and PPC, whereby BCA assigned and ceded
its rights, title, interest and benefits arising from the Amended BOT Agreement to PPC. As set out in
Article 8 of the original and the Amended BOT Agreement, the MRP/V Project was divided into six
phases. Both the DFA and BCA impute breach of the Amended BOT Agreement against each other.
According to the DFA, delays in the completion of the phases permeated the MRP/V Project
due to the submission of deficient documents as well as intervening issues regarding BCA/PPCs
supposed financial incapacity to fully implement the project. On the other hand, BCA contends that
the DFA failed to perform its reciprocal obligation to issue to BCA a Certificate of Acceptance of
Phase 1 within 14 working days of operation purportedly required by Section 14.04 of the
Amended BOT Agreement.
Later, the DFA sought the opinion of the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) regarding the appropriate legal actions in connection with BCAs alleged delays in
the completion of the MRP/V Project. BCA, in turn, submitted various letters and documents to
prove its financial capability to complete the MRP/V Project. However, the DFA claimed these
documents were unsatisfactory or of dubious authenticity. DFA sent a Notice of Termination to BCA
and PPC due to their alleged failure to submit proof of financial capability to complete the entire
MRP/V Project in accordance with the financial warranty under Section 5.02(A) of the Amended
BOT Agreement.
PDRCI invited the DFA to submit its Answer to the Request for Arbitration within 30 days
from receipt of said letter and also requested both the DFA and BCA to nominate their chosen
arbitrator within the same period of time. Initially, the DFA requested for an extension of time to
file its answer, without prejudice to jurisdictional and other defenses and objections available to it
under the law. However, DFA declined the request for arbitration before the PDRCI. While it
expressed its willingness to resort to arbitration, the DFA pointed out that under Section 19.02 of
the Amended BOT Agreement, there is no mention of a specific body or institution that was
previously authorized by the parties to settle their dispute. DOJ concurred with the steps taken by
the DFA, stating that there was basis in law and in fact for the termination of the MRP/V Project.
Thereafter, the DFA and the BSP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the latter to
provide the former passports compliant with international standards. The BSP then solicited bids
for the supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of a system for the production of Electronic
Passport Booklets or e-Passports. For BCA, the BSPs invitation to bid for the supply and purchase of
e-Passports (the e-Passport Project) would only further delay the arbitration it requested from the
DFA. Moreover, this new e-Passport Project by the BSP and the DFA would render BCAs remedies
moot inasmuch as the e-Passport Project would then be replacing the MRP/V Project which BCA
was carrying out for the DFA.
Thereafter, BCA filed an application for preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an
Order granting BCAs application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, DFA and the BSP filed the
instant Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the trial court when it granted interim relief to BCA .
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Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners did not follow the hierarchy of courts by filing their petition
directly with this Court, without filing a motion for reconsideration with the RTC and
without filing a petition first with the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
in the present case
Ruling:
1. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court is discouraged when
litigants may still resort to remedies with the lower courts, we have in the past overlooked the
failure of a party to strictly adhere to the hierarchy of courts on highly meritorious
grounds. Most recently, the Court relaxed the rule on court hierarchy in the case of Roque, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections wherein it ruled that the policy on the hierarchy of courts, which
petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions
for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.
The Court deems it proper to adopt a similarly liberal attitude in the present case in
consideration of the transcendental importance of an issue raised herein. This is the first time that
the Court is confronted with the question of whether an information and communication
technology project, which does not conform to our traditional notion of the term infrastructure, is
covered by the prohibition on the issuance of court injunctions found in Republic Act No. 8975,
which is entitled An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government
Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof, and for Other Purposes. Taking into account the current trend of computerization and
modernization of administrative and service systems of government offices, departments and
agencies, the resolution of this issue for the guidance of the bench and bar, as well as the general
public, is both timely and imperative.
2. Yes. The trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the ePassport Project.
It is indubitable that no court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a national
government project unless the matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue
such that unless the act complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.
Under Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 8975, there are three types of national government projects
enumerated in Section 2(a), to wit:
(a)
(b)
(c)
current and future national government infrastructure projects, engineering

works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by governmentowned and controlled corporations;
all projects covered by R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 7718, or the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer ( BOT) Law; and
other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or
installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction,
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completion, operation, maintenance, improvement repair and rehabilitation,
regardless of the source of funding.
Although the Court finds that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction, we cannot uphold the theory of BCA and the trial court that the definition of the term
infrastructure project in Republic Act No. 9184 should be applied to the BOT Law.
Republic Act No. 9285 is a general law applicable to all matters and controversies to be
resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods. This law allows a Regional Trial Court to
grant interim or provisional relief, including preliminary injunction, to parties in an arbitration case
prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This general statute, however, must give way to a
special law governing national government projects, Republic Act No. 8975 which prohibits courts,
except the Supreme Court, from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction in cases involving
national government projects.
However, as discussed above, the prohibition in Republic Act No. 8975 is inoperative in this
case, since petitioners failed to prove that the e-Passport Project is national government project as
defined therein. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
against the e-Passport Project.
BF HOMES, INC. and THE PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORP.
vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 171624, December 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Administrative agencies, like the Energy Regulatory Commission, are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling
statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature.
Facts:
MERALCO is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in
the distribution and sale of electric power in Metro Manila. On the other hand, BF Homes and PWCC
are owners and operators of waterworks systems delivering water to over 12,000 households and
commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions in Paranaque City, Las Pinas City, Caloocan City,
and Quezon City. The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned and operated by BF
Homes and PWCC is drawn from deep wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO.
BF Homes and PWCC filed a Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and for the Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order] against MERALCO docketed as
Civil Case No. 03-0151, which the RTC granted. The Motion for Reconsideration of MERALCO was
denied by the RTC.
Aggrieved, MERALCO filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. MERALCO sought the reversal of the RTC Orders granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of BF Homes and PWCC. MERALCO asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the application of BF Homes and PWCC for issuance of such a writ. In its Decision,
the Court of Appeals agreed with MERALCO that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
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preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 03-0151, as said trial court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case to begin with. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of BF Homes and PWCC.
Now, BF Homes and PWCC come before this Court via the instant Petition. BF Homes and
PWCC argued that due to the threat of MERALCO to disconnect electric services, BF Homes and
PWCC had no other recourse but to seek an injunctive remedy from the RTC under its general
jurisdiction. The merits of Civil Case No. 03-0151 was not yet in issue, only the propriety of issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent an irreparable injury. Even granting that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151, the ERC by enabling law has no
injunctive power to prevent the disconnection by MERALCO of electric services to BF Homes and
PWCC.
Issue:
Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151 lies with the RTC
or the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).
Ruling:
A careful review of the material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC in their Petition before
the RTC reveals that the very subject matter thereof is the off-setting of the amount of refund they
are supposed to receive from MERALCO against the electric bills they are to pay to the same
company. This is squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the ERC.
The right of BF Homes and PWCC to refund, on which their claim for off-setting depends,
originated from the MERALCO Refund cases. In said cases, the Court (1) authorized MERALCO to
adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kilowatthour, effective with respect to its
billing cycles beginning February 1994; and (2) ordered MERALCO to refund to its customers or
credit in said customers favor for future consumption P0.167 per kilowatthour, starting with the
customers billing cycles that begin February 1998, in accordance with the ERB Decision dated
February 16, 1998.
It bears to stress that in the MERALCO Refund cases, this Court only affirmed the February
16, 1998 Decision of the ERB (predecessor of the ERC) fixing the just and reasonable rate for the
electric services of MERALCO and granting refund to MERALCO consumers of the amount they
overpaid. Said Decision was rendered by the ERB in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine and
fix the just and reasonable rate of power utilities such as MERALCO.
Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA
over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its
powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and among
participants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and
Regulation provides that the ERC shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are
essential in the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body.
Indubitably, the ERC is the regulatory agency of the government having the authority and
supervision over MERALCO.Thus, the task to approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of the
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refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to implement the judgment of this Court in the MERALCO
Refund cases, also falls upon the ERC. By filing their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and PWCC
intend to collect their refund without submitting to the approved schedule of the ERC, and in effect,
enjoy preferential right over the other equally situated MERALCO consumers.
Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such,
could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation
thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannot
arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially
lodged with the administrative body of special competence.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No.
03-0151, then it was also devoid of any authority to act on the application of BF Homes and PWCC
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary and
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of an
independent action or proceeding
Lastly, the Court herein already declared that the RTC not only lacked the jurisdiction to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction against MERALCO, but that the RTC actually had no
jurisdiction at all over the subject matter of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 030151. Therefore, in addition to the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
RTC, the Court also deems it appropriate to already order the dismissal of the Petition of BF Homes
and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151 for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the
same.
BERNABE L. NAVIDA et al. vs. HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR.
G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on
a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be
dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
Facts:
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose
factual background and issues are closely intertwined.
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts
by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane
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(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign
countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases
prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally
granted the defendants motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the consolidated cases,
the Court noted that in the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home
country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon
proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been
dismissed for [forum non conveniens].
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a
Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages
in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this
chemical when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when
they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed that
their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies
in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which
the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers
health and well-being.
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed
their Motions for Bill of Particulars.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an
Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case. It held that the subject matter stated in the complaint consisted of activity engaged in
by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of
Philippine Courts. It further held that Navida, et al. did not freely choose to file the complaint, but
were coerced to do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995,
and in order for them to have the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Thereafter, another joint complaint for damages against the same defendants was filed
before the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in
G.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) in their complaint, pray for the same
reliefs as those mentioned in the complaint filed by Navida, et al. They likewise based their claims
on almost the same facts as those alleged by Navida, et al.
Finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case the RTC of Davao City dismissed the
complaint of Abella, et al.
Issue/s:
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1. Whether or not the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in
dismissing the Complaints of herein petitioners for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies
Ruling:
1. Yes, General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the Complaints of herein
petitioners for lack of jurisdiction.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by
law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling,
using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP,
"without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its
proper use and application."
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a
quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously
falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
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Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly
suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations
located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in
the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of
the stream of commerce," and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil
actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
2. Yes, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of all the defendant companies.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this connection,
all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and to
represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by
praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the
proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and
will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the
instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the
courts a quo, continues until the termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants
and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising
therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
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exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to
decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY
G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.
Facts:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) filed with the RTC of Makati City a
Complaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the
loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and for damages.
Upon Lepantos motion, the trial court authorized Lepantos counsel to personally bring the
summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter
office to effect service of summons on NM Rothschild & Sons. NM Rothschild & Sons filed a Special
Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground that
the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of NM Rothschild & Sons due to the
defective and improper service of summons.
Later, NM Rothschild & Sons filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take the
deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of NM Rothschild & Sons) before the
Philippine Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on Lepanto.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service of
summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order directing Lepanto to answer some of the questions in NM
Rothschild & Sonss Interrogatories to Lepanto.
Lepanto vigorously argues that NM Rothschild & Sons should be held to have voluntarily
appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was actually afforded, specific reliefs from
the trial court. Lepanto points out that while NM Rothschild & Sonss Motion to Dismiss was still
pending, it prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against Lepanto, such as written
interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of documents.
NM Rothschild & Sons counters that in the leading case of La Naval Drug Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, a party may file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its
person, and at the same time raise affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, without
waiving its objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.
Issue:
Is NM Rothschild & Sons deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court by seeking affirmative reliefs?
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Ruling:
Yes, NM Rothschild & Sons, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court.
NM Rothschild & Sons misunderstood the ruling in La Naval. A close reading of La Naval
reveals that the SC intended a distinction between the raising of affirmative defenses in an Answer
(which would not amount to acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court) and the prayer for
affirmative reliefs (which would be considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court).
The Rules of Court merely mentions other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This clearly refers to affirmative defenses, rather than
affirmative reliefs.
Thus, while mindful of its ruling in La Naval, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative
relief in a court is tantamount to voluntary appearance therein.
NM Rothschild & Sons, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on
account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of NM Rothschild & Sons.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC
G.R. No. 163037, February 6, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition
Facts:
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City rendered a decision approving the Compromise
Agreement submitted by PLDT and respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI) Among others stated therein, PLDT guarantees that all the outgoing telephone traffic to
Hongkong destined to ETPIs correspondent therein, Cable & Wireless Hongkong Ltd., its successors
and assigns, shall be coursed by PLDT through the ETPI provided circuits and facilities between the
Philippines and Hongkong, that neither party shall use or threaten to use its gateway or any other
facilities to subvert the purposes of the Agreement and it shall take effect and shall continue in
Page 21 of 350

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effect until November 28, 2003, provided that a written notice of termination is given by one party
to the other not later than November 28, 2001. In the absence of such written notice, the Agreement
shall continue in effect beyond November 28, 2003 but may be terminated thereafter by either
party by giving to the other a prior two year written notice of termination, and that in the event of
breach, the parties may obtain judicial relief, including a writ of execution.
Thereafter, ETPI filed a Motion for Enforcement/Execution and an Urgent Motion in RTC,
alleging, among others, that PLDT violated the terms of the above Compromise Agreement. PLDT
and ETPI arrived at a Letter-Agreement which contains, among others, that they shall continue to
negotiate within the shortest possible time for a mutually acceptable agreement which will amend
our existing Compromise Agreement which was approved by the Court; that without prejudice to
other claims of PLDT and ETPI against each other, they will settle amicably or through arbitration;
they likewise agree that to facilitate the resolution of our respective claims and the execution of a
new agreement which shall supersede the Compromise Agreement, both PLDT and ETPI shall not
take any action that will in any way violate the Compromise Agreement.
Subsequently, PLDT advised ETPI that it would be implementing a complete blocking of
telephone service traffic from REACH Hong Kong carried on the ETPI-REACH circuits if the
settlement rate arrangements for telephone service between Hong Kong and the Philippines were
not resolved on or before a certain date.
RTC favored ETPI defendant, PLDT was ordered to restore the free flow of
telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hongkong passing through the REACHETPI circuits since the same was in violation of the Compromise Agreement.
Thus, PLDT filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari , which was granted.
However, later on it amended its own decision, reversing it on the ground that after the approval of the
Compromise Agreement by the RTC, the decision based on the judicial compromise between the
parties became immediately final and executory. NTC although having original and exclusive
jurisdiction over resolving disputes between telecommunications companies regarding settlement
of access charge and/or revenue sharing, it did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to enforce
its judgment through the issuance of the necessary writs.
With respect to the execution of the Letter-Agreement, the Court of Appeals held that the
same did not revise, modify or novate the Compromise Agreement.
Issue:
1) Whether or not RTC retained jurisdiction over the subject matter sought to be enjoined
by ETPI.
2) Whether or not the Letter-Agreement novated the Compromise Agreement when the
former expressly provided that the parties respective claims against each other should
be settled amicably or through arbitration.
Ruling:
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No. After a thorough review of the facts and issues of the instant petition, the Court finds
that, the same is already moot.
The Compromise Agreement, by its own terms, was effective only until 28 November 2003.
It stated that agreement shall take effect and shall continue in effect until November 28, 2003,
provided that a written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not later than
November 28, 2001. In the absence of such written notice, this Agreement shall continue in effect
beyond November 28, 2003 but may [be] terminated thereafter by either party by giving to the
other a prior two year notice of termination. x x x
The conditions for the termination of the Compromise Agreement were complied with in
that: (a) both PLDT and ETPI are now coursing traffic through their respective networks; (b)
foreign telecommunications companies such as Hong Kong REACH, Singtel and Chung Hua TelCom,
were advised about the expiration of the Compromise Agreement; and (c) the parties are
negotiating and/or have already concluded their respective agreements.
It is a fact that there is now nothing to unblock because circuits have already been
deactivated and migrated pursuant to the existing interconnection agreements between PLDT and
ETPI. As a result of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement, there is nothing for the RTCMakati to enforce and/or act upon. x x x.
Far from controverting the above submissions of PLDT, ETPI sustained the same and
insisted on the mootness of PLDTs petition. It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts
of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition
Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the
instant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced.
There was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the RTC Orders since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the very
admission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunication
calls and data from the Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since,
effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of.
Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a
reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an
affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the
above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for the
RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere surplusage.
Although the moot and academic principle admits of certain exceptions, none of them are
applicable in the instant case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA y CHAVEZ
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A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, entitled Resolution Providing Guidelines in the Inventory and
Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are Promoted or Transferred to Other Branches in the
Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy, actually recognizes that both the transferred judge and
the new judge can decide the case but gives consideration to the preference of the parties, but the
lapses in the observance of the rule by the judge which was not chosen by the accused does not
invalidate the decision due to violation of due process when the accused was sufficiently given the
opportunity to be heard, to defend himself and to confront his accusers on the offense hurled against
him.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Giovanni Ocfemia was charged before the RTC with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, penalized under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution averred that a team of PDEA and PNP agents and officers conducted a buy-bust
operation against Ocfemia. After Ocfemia the poseur-buyer PO2 Aldea a sachet of shabu, he was
arrested. The substance later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Ocfemia denied the charge and asserted that he was framed-up by the police. As a police
asset, he joined some of the members of the PDEA/PNP team in a buy-bust operation, where
Ocfemia would be the poseur-buyer. After the supposed suspect was arrested, PO2 Aldea disclosed
that Ocfemia would be charged with illegal sale of shabu.
After the prosecution presented their rebuttal witness, the RTC, then presided by Acting
Presiding Judge William B. Volante (Volante), considered the case submitted for decision. In the
meantime, the Supreme Court en banc approved A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, entitled Resolution
Providing Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are
Promoted or Transferred to Other Branches in the Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy. It
provided in part that Should any case be left undecided by the transferred/detailed/assigned
judge, the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a notice
of transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with a
directive for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice,
whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desire
of the plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected.
However, should the defendant oppose the manifestation of the plaintiff, the new judge shall
resolve the matter in accordance with these Guidelines. Should the plaintiff fail to submit
such manifestation within the said 5-day period, the presumption is that he/she desires that
the case be decided by the transferred judge.
In an Order dated June 6, 2006, the RTC notified the parties that Acting Presiding Judge
Volante had already been replaced by Presiding Judge Angeles S. Vasquez (Vasquez) and directed
the parties to manifest within five days from notice whether they want the case to still be decided
by Judge Volante, otherwise, it would already be decided by Judge Vasquez. While the prosecution
did not submit such a manifestation, Ocfemia filed his Manifestation on July 13, 2006 informing the
RTC that he wished for Judge Volante to decide the case.
The RTC promulgated its Decision, penned by Judge Vasquez, convicting and sentencing
Ocfemia of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
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Issue:
Was the ruling of Judge Vasquez invalid due to his lack of authority to rule on the case in
view of Ocfemias manifestation of his preference that Judge Volante be the one to decide the case?
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
The reason behind A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC is primarily administrative, i.e., to establish an
orderly system for the management and disposition of cases of a trial court in the event of transfer,
reassignment, or promotion of its presiding judge. It intends to prevent conflict between the
transferred judge and the new judge, and confusion as to when, where, and how case records shall
be transferred and decisions shall be promulgated in such cases. It does not touch upon any
jurisdictional issue and, in general, does not have any effect on the validity of the decision or
resolution of either the transferred judge or the new judge.
A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC actually recognizes that both the transferred judge and the new judge
can decide the case but gives consideration to the preference of the parties. Indeed, Judge Volante
was the presumed choice of the Republic of the Philippines and the expressed option of Ocfemia to
decide Criminal Case No. 4594. Under A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, Judge Vasquez should have endorsed
the case to the OCA, which, in turn, would have authorized Judge Volante to decide the case.
Nonetheless, while Judge Vasquez may face administrative liability (after appropriate
administrative proceedings) for his failure to comply with A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, his Decision dated
August 31, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 4594 is completely valid absent any showing that it had been
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of accused-appellants constitutional
right to due process.
Contrary to Ocfemias averment, he was not denied due process of law just because of Judge
Vasquezs lapses in the observance of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. [As ruled by the CA,] Ocfemia was not at
all deprived of due process xxx he was sufficiently given the opportunity to be heard, to defend
himself and to confront his accusers on the offense hurled against him. Hence, due process was not
denied to Ocfemia by the mere issuance of a judge of a decision based on the records despite the
fact that said judge was not the one who conducted the trial [and] receive the evidence of the
parties. The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who
heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,
BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAAQUE CITY, ROBERTO GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PUNONG BARANGAY AND MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY
G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley
Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject
roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. As petitioner has failed to establish that it
has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies
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by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government
Code, the petition must be denied.
Facts:
Pursuant to its power under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), the
Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV
Resolution entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow
and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic," at all hours daily except from 11 p.m. to 5
a.m. at which time the said streets may be closed for the sake of the security of the residents
therein.
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President,
Marita Cortez, filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with
prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City.
NSVHAI claimed that the implementation of BSV Resolution would "cause grave injustice
and irreparable injury" as "the affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly
residential purposes"; that it would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from
the hassles of public places". According to NSVHAI, the opening of the route to all kinds of vehicles
would result to the traffic build-up in an already congested choke point. NSVHAI state that the
maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to
the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was
controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public
use of the roads in question.
Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) directing the Sangguniang Barangay to cease and desist from the implementation of the said
Resolution or maintain the status quo.
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay
had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject roads"); that a
Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law,
an ordinance is required to effect such an act.
The RTC dismissed the case on the grounds that the streets have long been part of the
public domain and beyond the commerce of man. The authority to close or open the said streets is
vested in the local government units and not on homeowners associations, pursuant to Section 21
of the local Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows: "Section 21. Closure and Opening of
Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily
close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction x x x." Hence there
is no right on the part of Plaintiff NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law. Further, defendant
contends that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as ordained in Sections 32 and
57 of the Local Government Code giving the city mayor the supervisory power, and the power of
review by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC.
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Issue:
Can the court issued injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98096 to give petitioner the protection of the law even if it failed to exhaust administrative remedies?
Ruling:
No, petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the
law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of
going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code.
We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Paraaque
City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or
municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general
supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions.
We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this
doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for
the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be
resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court
committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and
opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this
case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner
to show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do. In civil cases, it is a basic
rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defense offered by their opponent.
Petitioner dared to question the barangays ownership over the subject roads when it
should have been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy.
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Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by
respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of
Paraaque and were already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the
subdivisions homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the
gates that they themselves had built. It is petitioners authority to put up the road blocks in the first
place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof of ownership.
On the other hand, the local government units power to close and open roads within its
jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square
falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such
ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun
Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the
subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law,
and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of
going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.
ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC., vs. MEGAWORLD
PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDRO I. IMPERIAL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR,
NCR AND HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
G.R. No. 175039, April 18, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is settled that the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the
dismissal of the complaint.
Facts:
MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong City.
Sometime in 1994, MEGAWORLD conceptualized the construction of a residential condominium
complex on the said parcel of land called Wack-Wack Heights Condominium. MEGAWORLD
thereafter secured necessary clearances, licenses and permits for the condominium project
including a development permit issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), an
ECC issued by the Department of Natural Resources and a building permit issued by the Office of the
Building Official of Mandaluyong City.
Subsequently, Addition Hill Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization (AHMSO) filed a
complaint before the RTC to annul the building permit, CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted
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to MEGAWORLD.
MEGAWORLD filed motion to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and that
jurisdiction over the case was with the HLURB and not with the regular courts.
Issue:
Whether AHMSOs complaint must be dismissed on the ground that it failed to exhaust
administrative remedies available with the HLURB
Ruling:
Yes.
It is settled that the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court
justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
What is apparent, however, is that AHMSO unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking
recourse with the trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then in effect, particularly a
complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be filed before the Housing and Land Use
Arbiter (HLA). Therefore, AHMSO action to annul the Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) and
the Development Permit issued by the HLURB respectively, in favor of MEGAWORLD for its WackWack Heights Condominium Project should have been properly filed before the HLURB instead of
the trial court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CAUSE OF ACTIONS
HON. HECTOR B. BARILLO, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC Guihulngan, Negros Oriental vs.
HON. RALPH LANTION, HON. MEHOL K. SADAIN and HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., The
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Commissioners of the Second Division, Commission on Elections, Manila; and WALTER J.
ARAGONES
G.R. No. 159117, March 10, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WALTER J. ARAGONES vs. HON. HECTOR B. BARILLO, Municipal Trial Court, Guihulngan,
Negros Oriental
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A judge is not an active combatant in proceedings where the order he had rendered is being
assailed. As such, he must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. Being a nominal party to the case,
he has no personal interest nor personality therein. Thus, he has no legal standing to institute a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Walter J. Aragones (Aragones) and Oscar C. Lasola (Lasola) vied for the position of Punong
Barangay of Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental in the July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. After
the votes were canvassed, Aragones was proclaimed the winning candidate. On July 24, 2002,
Lasola duly filed an election protest before the MTC of Guihulngan, which was docketed as Election
Case No. 7-2002 (Election Case). Eventually, Lasola filed an election protest and prayed that a
recount of the votes be conducted. On July 25, 2002, Judge Hector Barillo (Judge Barillo), of the MTC
of Guihulngan, issued an Order, directing the Clerk of Court of the MTC to issue summonses to
Aragones, the Acting Election Officer Raytheon Roy C. Aragones, the Board of Canvassers and the
Board of Election Tellers of Barangay Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, requiring the
aforesaid individuals to file their respective answers within five days from receipt of the notice of
the above Order. He likewise directed all ballot boxes containing ballots and their keys, list of voters
with voting records, book of voters, and other documents used in the said election to be
surrendered to the custody of the MTC Clerk of Court. Thereafter, Judge Barillo issued another
Order which stated that there was a need for the revision of ballots in consonance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Lasola was, thus, ordered to deposit in cash the amount of P150.00
for every ballot box for the compensation of the revisors in an amount to be fixed by the MTC.
Consequently, a Revision Committee was also created by Judge Barillo.
On July 31, 2002, the counsel of Aragones, Atty. Francisco D. Yap, filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) in the Election Case. Atty. Yap
manifested before the MTC that Lasolas counsel, Atty. Justo J. Paras, was suspended from the
practice of law by this Court in an administrative case docketed as A.C. No. 5333 and the latter has
filed a Motion to Lift Suspension, which was yet to be acted upon. Thus, he asserted that pending a
reinstatement, Atty. Paras was not legally permitted to appear as counsel in any court in the
Philippines. Furthermore, the law firm of Paras and Associates, of which Atty. Paras was a partner,
was allegedly owned by the then incumbent Congressman Jacinto V. Paras, such that the law firm
was disqualified to appear as counsel, in view of the prohibition found in Section 14, Article VI of
the Constitution that "[n]o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice."
On even date, Aragones also filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,
which denied the material averments in Lasolas Petition. He argued that the same was based
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merely on the speculations, surmises and conclusions of a losing candidate, without any supporting
affidavits attached thereto. As such, he prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.
On August 2, 2002, Judge Barillo issued an Order in the Election Case, setting the hearing on
the revision of official ballots on August 9, 2002. In the same order, it was also held that in order not
to delay the speedy administration of justice, Atty. Justo J. Paras (unless this court has received copy
of the Supreme Courts Resolution for his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law),
and/or his associates or any authorized counsel for Protestant Oscar C. Lasola were allowed to
appear.
On August 7, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders issued by
Judge Barillo. However, the same was denied. In such Order of Denial, Judge Barillo appeared to rely
on the fact that more than one year had already lapsed since the effectivity of the suspension order
against Atty. Paras on May 23, 2001. He seemed to consider the said suspension to have already
been served out by the end of May 2002; and thus, when the election protest was instituted in the
MTC by Lasola through Atty. Paras on July 24, 2002, said counsel was supposedly no longer
suspended.
Aggrieved, Aragones instituted a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, (and) Mandamus, with
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, which was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 02-01-G (Special Civil Action). Judge Barillo and Lasola were named as respondents
in the petition. Therein, he prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, directing Judge
Barillo to cease and desist from hearing the Election Case until further orders from the RTC; that
the MTC Order dated August 7, 2002 be set aside; that an order be issued directing the MTC to
disqualify Atty. Paras from appearing until the lifting of his suspension by the Court; and that Judge
Barillo be ordered to voluntarily inhibit himself from handling the case.
On August 8, 2002, Atty. Paras filed a Comment on Atty. Yaps motion to disqualify him in
the Election Case. While he admitted that he was indeed suspended by the Court for a period of one
year, which commenced on May 23, 2001 and ended on May 22, 2002, he averred that contrary to
Atty. Yaps theory, a formal reinstatement by the Court was not necessary before he could resume
his practice of law as the penalty imposed upon him has a fixed and definite period of effectivity.
On August 9, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Inhibition in the Election Case against Judge
Barillo on the ground that the latters demeanor, ruling and pronouncements demonstrated his bias
and partiality towards Lasola, thereby violating his rights to due process and an impartial tribunal.
He further ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of Judge Barillo, when the latter gave due course to the Petition filed by Lasola despite the
deficiency of the cash deposit per ballot box and allowed a suspended lawyer to appear before the
MTC. He also filed on the same date, a Motion/Manifestation in the Election Case, asserting that the
Motion for Reconsideration that he filed on August 7, 2002 was set for hearing on August 16, 2002
and yet Judge Barillo promptly denied the motion on the same day it was filed. He stressed that
such acts revealed the manifest bias and partiality of Judge Barillo and denied the parties the
chance to elevate to a higher court the issues raised in the motion. Again in the said motion, he put
forward arguments he previously raised in the other pleadings he filed. Lastly, he disclosed that he
also found out that Judge Barillo was a close relative of Atty. Paras. However, on the same date,
Judge Barillo issued a Resolution denying the said Motion for Inhibition.
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On August 12, 2002, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, (RTC Br.64) through Judge Felix
G. Gaudiel, Jr. issued an Ex-Parte Order in the Special Civil Action stating that the Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) filed by Atty. Yap was a
motion that was litigious; hence, it should have been heard and not denied outright. Furthermore,
Judge Barillo was directed to cease and desist from proceeding with the hearing of the Election Case
within a period of 20 days from receipt of the order, given the perception of the RTC that the
continuance of the acts of Judge Barillo complained of would probably work injustice to Aragones.
The RTC further cautioned Judge Barillo that any proceeding or action taken by the lower court
after the filing of the Petition would be declared null and void.
Both Lasola and Judge Barillo sought for the dismissal of the Petition in the Special Civil
Action. The former, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, contended that the RTC had no appellate
jurisdiction over the election case under consideration, since the same was lodged with the
COMELEC, in accordance with Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 28 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The latter, on the other hand, manifested that Rule 143 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that the said rules shall not apply election cases except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Aragones opposed the Motion to Dismiss the Petition in the Special Civil Action praying that
the same be denied outright. He argued that the action filed before the RTC was an independent
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not a petition for certiorari as a mode of
appeal. The petition was also not a case filed with the RTC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. He also
pointed out that the petition involved was not an election matter, but one that involved a violation
of constitutional rights; a violation of the order of the Court suspending a lawyer, which suspension
was yet to be lifted; and a violation of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, which prohibits a
member of the Senate or the House of Representatives from personally appearing as counsel in any
court of justice.
On September 2, 2002, Judge Barillo filed a Comment/Answer in the Special Civil Action,
wherein he outlined the proceedings undertaken in the MTC and once more pleaded the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the Petition filed by Aragones.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, (RTC Br.64) promulgated a
Decision in the Special Civil Action granting Aragones petition. As such, it has been declared that
the proceedings in the MTC before Judge Barillo were null and void. Apparently, despite the date of
the said decision, the same was released only on December 3, 2002.
On November 25, 2002, presumably before he received a copy of the aforementioned RTC
Decision, Judge Barillo filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Resolution of the Special Civil Action.
Insisting on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC, Judge Barillo sought the immediate rendition of the
RTC Decision on the said issue, given the impending retirement of RTC Judge Felix G. Gaudiel, Jr. on
December 4, 2002 and in order that the decision in the Election Case may be finally promulgated.
On November 27, 2002, the MTC of Guihulngan, through Judge Barillo, rendered a Decision
in the Election Case stating that RTC Br.64 has no jurisdiction to hear and decide said case involving
a barangay election case because the same is vested or conferred by law to the Municipal Trial
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Court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. It also held that it was
Lasola who actually won in the said election.
Soon after, on December 2, 2002, Judge Barillo issued an Order in the Election Case
disclosing the fact that he allegedly received on November 26, 2002 the Decision of the RTC Br.64 in
the Special Civil Action, which dismissed the petition for lack of factual and legal merits. Judge
Barillo then directed the Clerk of Court of the MTC to issue to the parties therein the Notices of
Promulgation of the MTC Decision on December 9, 2002, in compliance with Section 19, Rule 37 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. As stated in the said provision, Judge Barillo warned that no
motion for reconsideration would be entertained.
On December 5, 2002, Aragones filed a Manifestation and Motion in the Election Case,
praying for the cancellation of the scheduled promulgation of the said MTC Decision. He declared
that he had not yet received the Decision of the RTC Br. 64 in the Special Civil Action, purportedly
dismissing his petition. As regards the prohibition on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, he
insisted that his constitutional right to due process should not be undermined by judicial
pronouncements, which had no basis in law. He also accused Judge Barillo of being biased and
partial, seeing the latters personal interest in resolving the election protest with undue haste in
favor of Lasola.
On December 12, 2002, Judge Barillo filed a Manifestation in the Special Civil Action
notifying the RTC of the fact that on November 26, 2002, a day before the promulgation of the said
MTC Decision in the Election Case, the Clerk of Court of the MTC allegedly received through
personal delivery by RTC personnel the RTC Decision dated October 28, 2002 which dismissed
Aragones Petition for lack of merit. Thus, on December 9, 2002, the promulgation of the MTC
Decision proceeded as scheduled. Therein, he also averred that on December 10, 2002, he received
another RTC Decision dated October 28, 2002, which, allegedly to his surprise, had a dispositive
portion completely opposite to the decision he previously received. Nonetheless, he posited that the
above RTC Decisions, whether or not affirmative of his actions, were null and void since the
jurisdiction to hear and decide a barangay election case is vested in the MTC and the COMELEC. He
argued that the second RTC Decision granting Aragones petition was already moot and academic
and contravened the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
On December 16, 2002, Lasola filed a Motion for Execution of the MTC Decision dated
November 27, 2002 in the Election Case given the failure of Aragones to file an appeal thereof
within five days after the promulgation of the said Decision on December 9, 2002. In a Resolution,
on the same date, Judge Barillo, ordered him to assume and take his oath of office as the duly
elected Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The next day, the MTC Clerk of
Court issued an Entry of Final Judgment, certifying that the said MTC Decision in the Election Case
became final and executory on December 16, 2002.
On December 27, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Direct Contempt against Judge Barillo,
which was lodged with the RTC Br.64, then presided over by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr and
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 02-03-G. However, the said motion was denied. Judge Bandal
held that the Decision of Judge Gaudiel, Jr. in the Special Civil Action which granted Aragones
Petition and declared null and void the proceedings before the MTC, was without legal basis for
absence of jurisdiction. He ruled that Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction over election cases
involving barangay officials.
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On January 8, 2003, Aragones instituted with the Comelec Second Division a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Decision dated November 27, 2002, Certiorari, Prohibition, [and]
Mandamus, with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, which
was docketed as SPR No. 2-2003. In a Comment/Answer dated February 10, 2003, Judge Barillo
again pleaded the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC in the Special Civil Action, as well as the finality of
the MTC Decision in the Election Case, in view of the failure of Aragones to file an appeal.
In a Resolution dated June 11, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition
filed by Aragones in SPR No. 2-2003. Disagreeing with the said ruling, Judge Barillo filed with the
Court, on July 1, 2003, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 159117.
On August 5, 2003, another Petition for Certiorari was filed with this Court, this time by
Lasola, likewise assailing the Resolution dated June 11, 2003 of the COMELEC Second Division.
However, the same was dismissed as the full deposit for costs was not paid and the petition was not
accompanied by a legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned resolution.
Lasola sought a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution, but the same was denied with finality.
On January 8, 2003, the same day that the petition in SPR No. 2-2003 was filed, Aragones
likewise filed a Complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Barillo
with violations of his constitutional rights, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, manifest bias
and partiality, gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. The charges in the complaint
pertained to the acts of Judge Barillo of rendering and promulgating the Decision dated November
27, 2002 in the Election Case; allowing Atty. Paras to appear and represent a party in the MTC; and
pleading the case of Lasola in the Special Civil Action.
On January 30, 2004, Aragones filed in G.R. No. 159117 a Manifestation and/or Motion for
Consolidation with Leave of Court, asking for the consolidation of the said petition filed by Judge
Barillo with the administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752) initiated by Aragones. Hence, the two
cases were ordered consolidated.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Barillo has the legal standing to file the instant Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
We dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 159117. Clearly, Judge Barillo has no legal standing to
file the instant petition, since he is but a nominal party in this case.
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is quite explicit in stating this rule, thus:
SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed relates to
the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or
respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such
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private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the
costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the
private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is
pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a
higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein
as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.
(Emphasis ours.)
Settled is the rule that the judge is not an active combatant in proceedings where the order
he had rendered is being assailed. As such, he must leave the opposing parties to contend their
individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. By
filing this case, petitioner in a way has ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead.
Being a nominal party to the case, Judge Barillo has no personal interest nor personality therein.
Moreover, in the instant case it is important to note that he did not merely file a comment or an
answer in the petition at bar. He himself filed the petition. He also failed to make any disputation
and/or rebuttal of whatever ill motive that may have been imputed on his part. A close reading of
the Petition for Certiorari filed before this Court reveals that the grounds invoked therein by Judge
Barillo are purely legal ones, which tend to prove the validity and finality of the MTC Decision dated
November 27, 2002, as well as the alleged absence of appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC Second
Division in SPR No. 2-2003. As Judge Barillo is not the proper party who should question the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, his petition must fail.
Additionally, even if he had the requisite legal standing to file the instant petition, the Court
finds that the same must still be dismissed. Ultimately, it is already beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court in the present petition to still look into the questions pertaining to the legality and
enforceability of the said MTC Decision. The same have since been rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of the term of office originally contested in the said case.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No.185590, December 03, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint. Three
essential elements must be shown to establish a cause of action. In this case, the legal rights of the
petitioner Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established in view of
the failure of the Bank's evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal
relationship.
Facts:
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This is an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary attachment filed by the Philippine Banking Corporation against the Ley
Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) and Spouses Manuel and Janet C. Ley.
LCDC, a general contracting firm, applied with the bank for the opening of a Letter of Credit.
The bank issued Letter of Credit, in favor of the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises Limited, in
the amount of 802,500.00 U.S. dollars. The letter of credit covered the importation by LCDC of
15,000 metric tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq.
Global Enterprises, Inc. negotiated its Letter of Credit with the negotiating bank Credit
Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland. Credit Suisse then sent a reimbursement claim by telex to American
Express Bank Ltd., New York for the amount of USD 766,708.00 with a certification that all terms
and conditions of the credit were complied with. Accordingly, American Express Bank debited the
banks account and credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank, Ltd., New
York for the negotiation of Letter of Credit.
Philippine Banking Corporation received from Credit Suisse the necessary shipping
documents pertaining to Letter of Credit that were in turn delivered to the LCDC. Upon receipt,
defendants executed a trust receipt. But the cement that was to be imported never arrived in the
Philippines. The prompt payment of the obligation of LCDC was guaranteed by Spouses Ley under
the Continuing Surety Agreement executed. The obligation covered by the subject Letter of Credit in
the amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and unpaid, despite repeated demands for
payment thereof.
LCDC filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that plaintiffs
witness Mr. Fenelito Cabrera, Head of the Foreign Department of plaintiffs Head Office, was
incompetent to testify with respect to the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant and
that the plaintiffs documentary exhibits were not properly identified and authenticated. Cabrera
was with the Banks Dasmarias Branch and not with the Head Office during the period the
transaction covered by the documents took place. Thus, he could not have properly identified and
authenticated the Banks documentary exhibits.
Only the following exhibits were admitted: Continuing Surety Agreement, Application and
Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C, and the Statement of
Outstanding Obligations. For the trial court, these were insufficient to show that LCDC and the
spouses Ley were responsible for the improper negotiation of the letter of credit. Thus, the trial
court held that the Bank failed to establish its cause of action.
Although it admitted some of the exhibits previously rejected, the appellate court affirmed
such finding. The bank maintains that its cause of action is not predicated on the improper
negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions of the trust receipt.
Issue:
Whether or not the bank has established a cause of action against LCBC and Spouses Ley
Ruling:
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No, the bank did not. First, the Banks petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. It contravenes
the elementary rule of appellate procedure that an appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. On the
evidentiary weight given to the findings of fact of the trial court which have been affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appealsthey are conclusive on this Court.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented. There is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by
preponderant evidence is essentially a question of fact. The issue which the Bank raises in this
petition is whether the evidence it presented during the trial was preponderant enough to hold
LCDC and the spouses Ley liable. The question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, the basic
issue presented by the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the factual matters alleged by the
Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such, not proper subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate
that this case fell under any of the exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.
Second, the Bank attempts to avoid the only questions of law rule for appeals filed under
Rule 45 by invoking the misapprehension of facts exception. According to the Bank, the trial and the
appellate courts misapprehended the facts with respect to the determination of the basis of the
Banks cause of action. The Bank asserts that its cause of action is not grounded on the Letter of
Credit but on the Trust Receipt.
The Banks reference to the Trust Receipt as its primary actionable document is mistaken
and misleading. The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint. Taken as a whole, the Banks allegations make a cause of action based on the Letter of
Credit. The Letter of Credit figures prominently in the Complaint as it is mentioned in almost all of
the paragraphs.
In short, the Bank seeks to hold liable (1) LCDC for its obligations under the Letter of Credit,
and (2) the spouses Ley for their obligations under the Continuing Surety Agreement which stands
as security for the Letter of Credit and not for the Trust Receipt.
Third, a look at the Letter of Credit confirms the identical findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that: In a
letter of credit, there are three distinct and independent contracts: (1) the contract of sale between
the buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the issuing bank, and (3) the letter of
credit proper in which the bank promises to pay the seller pursuant to the terms and conditions
stated therein.
Here, what is involved is the second contract the contract of LCDC, as the buyer of Iraqi
cement, with the Bank, as the issuer of the Letter of Credit. The Bank refers to that contract when
the Bank argued that, as LCDC and the spouses Ley have admitted the issuance of the Letter of
Credit in their favor, they are deemed to have likewise admitted the terms and conditions thereof,
as evidenced by the stipulation therein appearing above the signature of respondent Janet Ley.
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The importance of the provisions and conditions supposed to be stipulated on the reverse
side of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is underscored by the
following note appearing below the space for the signature of Janet Ley: Important: Please read
provisions and conditions on reverse side hereof before signing above. However, the reverse side
of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is a blank page. Even the copy
attached to the Banks Complaint also has nothing on its back page.
A cause of action the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another has
three essential elements: (1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative
legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission by such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.
In this case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of
LCDC have not been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank's
evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC,
particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of the
Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there
was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the Bank's cause of action was
simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its
burden to prove every element of its cause of action against LCDC. This failure of the Bank to
present preponderant evidence that will establish the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit
necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety
Agreement guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.
PLEADINGS
Initiatory Pleadings
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER OF PAMPANGA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, BENJAMIN POY LORENZO,
LAVERNIE POY LORENZO, DIOSDADO DE GUZMAN, ROSEMARY ENG TAY TAN, LEANDRO DE
GUZMAN, BENJAMIN G. LORENZO, ANTONIO MANALO, AND SOCORRO DE GUZMAN
G.R. Nos. 155322-29, June 27, 2012, J. De Castro
Since the alleged misconduct falls under indirect contempt, proceedings should be initiated
either motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, or by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. It is clear that private respondent has missed out on all of the above requirements as he
filed only a motion rather than a verified petition.
Facts:
Petitioner Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) is a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to the national policy of accelerating the sound
and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into
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alternative productive uses for the promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon
and the entire country in general.
On 1993, Executive Order No. 80 was issued, authorizing the establishment of the Clark
Development Corporation (CDC) to act as the operating and implementing arm of the BCDA with
regard to the management of the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). On the same day, then
President Fidel V. Ramos likewise issued Proclamation No. 163, creating and designating the areas
covered by the CSEZ as those "consisting of the Clark military reservations, including the Clark Air
Base proper and portions of the Clark reverted baselands, and excluding the areas covered by
previous Presidential Proclamations, the areas turned over to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), and the areas in the reverted baselands for military use." Under Section 2 of Proclamation
No. 163, these lands were transferred to the BCDA, which shall determine how to utilize and
dispose of such lands. As such, the BCDA became the owner of these lands, as registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles.
On 2000, CSEZ Technical Research Committee was created to conduct a technical research
of properties within CSEZ covered by patents and certificates of title, applications for patent and
title registration, property surveys, and tax declarations and payments. The CSEZ Technical
Research Committee discovered that titles over parcels of land within the CSEZ, which had just
been transferred to the BCDA, had already been issued in the names of private individuals.
In view of the findings, the BCDA filed separate Complaints for Cancellation of Title against
the private respondents, the PARO, and the Register of Deeds of Angeles City, Pampanga before the
Regional Trial Court. In its complaints, the BCDA alleged that since the properties (subject
properties) were outside those allocated to DAR, and were already titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines then transferred to the BCDA, they could not be the subject of an award
by the PARO. Moreover, the BCDA claimed that the approval and issuance of Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) by the PARO, which became the bases for the TCTs issued to private
respondents, were null and void in view of the fact that these subject properties were already titled
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines issued on February 11, 1958.
Meanwhile, before the Suprme Court could resolve the case, private respondent Benjamin
Poy Lorenzo filed a Motion to Cite the Petitioner in Contempt of Court for certifying before two
branches of the RTC in Angeles City, wherein it filed eminent domain cases against him and
Lavernie Poy Lorenzo, that it has not commenced any other action before this Court.
Opposing the motion, the BCDA argued that the complaints for expropriation involve issues
that are completely different from the one posed in this petition. Moreover, the BCDA said, it had no
intention at all to mislead the RTCs of Angeles City as it mentioned, in both complaints for
expropriation, that the private respondents titles were subject to pending complaints at the RTC
for Cancellation of Title. The BCDA went on to point out Benjamin Poy Lorenzos improper
initiation of a contempt proceeding, as it was done through a mere motion instead of a verified
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion to Cite Bases Conversion Development Authority in Contempt of
Court will prosper.
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Ruling:
No.
This Court, at the outset, would like to resolve Benjamin Poy Lorenzos motion to cite the
BCDA in contempt, for allegedly certifying before the RTCs in Angeles City, that it had not
commenced a similar action before the Supreme Court. Since the alleged misconduct falls under
indirect contempt, proceedings should be initiated either motu proprio by order of or a formal
charge by the offended court, or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements
for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.
It is clear that Benjamin Poy Lorenzo has missed out on all of the above requirements.
Moreover, as the BCDA has shown, it did not hide the fact that it had commenced a separate action
involving his lot before RTC Branch 58 of Angeles City. In fact, the BCDA mentioned it both in its
Complaint for Expropriation and in its Verification and Certification as to Non-Forum Shopping.
This Court is, therefore, denying the motion of Benjamin Poy Lorenzo and will not belabor the point
that such is not in keeping with the rules and jurisprudence.
FAILURE TO FILE AN APPELLANTS BRIEF
MCA-MBF COUNTDOWN CARDS PHILIPPINES INC., AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V, AMABLE C.
AGUILUZ IX, CIELO C. AGUILUZ, ALBERTO L. BUENVIAJE, VICENTE ACSAY and MCA HOLDINGS
AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. MBf CARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED and MBf
DISCOUNT CARD LIMITED
G.R. No. 173586, March 14, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro.
Liberality is given to litigants who are worthy of the same, and not to ones who flout the rules,
give explanations to the effect that the counsels are busy with other things, and expect the court to
disregard the procedural lapses on the mere self-serving claim that their case is meritorious.
Facts:
MBf Card International Limited (MBf Card), a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines, and MCA Holdings, acting through Amable Aguiluz, entered into negotiations for the
execution of a Joint Venture Agreement wherein they would establish a Joint Venture Company
(JVC) in the Philippines wherein 40% of shareholding will belong to MBf Card and 60% of the
capital stock will belong to MCA Holdings and in which said JVC would execute a Countdown
Country License Agreement with MBf Discount Card, under which the JVC would conduct the
business of discount cards in the Philippines under the Countdown mark and use the distinctive
business format and method for such operation.
Furthermore, Aguiluz wrote to MBf Card that he had already incorporated a company
named MBF-MCA Countdown Cards Philippines, Inc. which would later be converted into the
proposed JVC upon the execution and approval of the pertinent agreements.
However, without prior authority of MBf Card, and while the parties were still discussing
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and negotiating on the terms and conditions of the joint venture, Aguiluz, began to promote, market
and sell the Countdown Discount Cards to the public through publication in a newspaper, using the
Countdown name, logo and trademark.
Hence, Mbf filed a complaint for recovery of money, unfair competition and damages with
application for Preliminary Injunction.
In their defense, MBF-MCA Countdown Cards Philippines, Inc. claimed that the contract
between the parties had already been perfected.
The lower court ruled in favor or MBf Card.
Hence, MCA-MBF Countdown Cards Philippines filed a notice of appeal. However they failed
to file their Appellants Brief. The Court of Appeals considered their appeal abandoned and
consequently, ordered the dismissal of the case.
MCA-MBF filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellants Brief
wherein they claimed that the lawyer who was handling the case suddenly resigned from the law
firm shortly after they received the notice to file the Brief. Furthermore the other counsels allegedly
had been handling voluminous cases and attending to numerous court appearances and out of toe
hearings.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the case based on
the failure to file Appellants Brief.
Ruling:
No.
MCA-MBF's plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants' Brief does not
deserve any sympathy. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Furthermore, petitioners characterization of the rules concerning the filing of the
Appellants Brief as insignificant and harmless technicalities is downright improper as it is contrary
to established jurisprudence. In Casim v. Flordeliza, this Court particularly held that long ingrained
in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to
avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. In People vs. Marong, we held that deviations
from the rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate.
These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where
courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with greater
fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.
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Hence, liberality is given to litigants who are worthy of the same, and not to ones who flout
the rules, give explanations to the effect that the counsels are busy with other things, and expect the
court to disregard the procedural lapses on the mere self-serving claim that their case is
meritorious.
DEFAULT
RN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. A.I.I. SYSTEM, INC.
G.R. No. 166104, June 26, 2008, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be
obsessively strict over the occasional lapses of litigants. Given a good reason, the trial court
should set aside its order of default, constantly bearing in mind that it is the exception and not
the rule of the day.
Facts:
On 28 July 2000, AII Systems, Inc. filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against RN
Development Corporation, seeking to collect the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the
pipes and fittings, valves and electrical panels which allegedly ordered from AII Systems, Inc.
The pretrial in this case has been reset for five times already. RTC dismissed A.I.I. System
Incs complaint for its failure to appear for pretrial and for lack of interest. A.I.I. System Inc. went on
appeal to the CA on the lone issue as to whether or not its complaint was properly dismissed for its
failure to appear on November 27, 2001 for pretrial and for its lack of interest to prosecute the case.
In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs Order and remanded the
case to the said trial court for further proceedings.
RN Development Corporation contended that the CA committed a reversible error when it
inferred that the trial court had been unduly strict in applying the rules of procedure and that it
entirely had no reason to dismiss the complaint. It likewise disputed the appellate courts
observation that the trial courts inflexible attitude failed to meet the fundamental requirement of
fairness and justice.
Issue:
Whether CA committed any reversible error when it set aside the order of the trial court
dismissing the respondents complaint
Ruling:
No.
After a careful study and a thorough examination of the records, we find no substantial
reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the CA, particularly, that the respondent should
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not be blamed entirely for the resetting of the pretrial, which were duly approved by the trial court
for the reasons cited in its orders,
Indeed, the dismissal of a case whether for failure to appear during trial or prosecute an
action for an unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. But this
discretion must not be abused, nay gravely abused, and must be exercised soundly. Deferment of
proceedings may be tolerated so that cases may be adjudged only after a full and free presentation
of all the evidence by both parties. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by the
circumstances surrounding each particular case. There must be sufficient reason to justify the
dismissal of a complaint.
It is the policy of the Court to afford every litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, courts must avoid the rigid
application thereof which tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Here, the
counsel for respondent, upon receiving the order dismissing the complaint, immediately filed a
motion for reconsideration which adequately explained his late arrival for four (4) minutes, which
was not disputed before the trial court. Under the circumstances, the latter should have granted
respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint. The interest of justice
will be better served by the continuation of the proceedings and final disposition of the case on the
merits before the trial court
SUMMONS
SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA ANUNCIACION and GAVINO G. CONEJOS, vs.
PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served as
it would be difficult to conceive that when the defendant appears before the Court complaining that he
has not been validly summoned, the case against him will immediately be dismissed.
Facts:
On September 29, 2000, the spouses Anunciacion and Conejos filed before the RTC, Manila,
a complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452. The complaint averred that
the Bocanegras may be served with summons and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro,
Jr., with office address at 2830 Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila. The summons, together with the copies
of the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro. Records show that before the filing of the said
complaint, Atty. Pizarro wrote a demand letteron behalf of respondents and addressed to petitioner
German Anunciacion, among others, demanding that they vacate the land owned by his clients, who
needed the same for their own use. On October 27, 2000, respondents, through their counsel, Atty.
Norby C. Caparas, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
action. A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply was likewise filed on the ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. Thereafter, respondents filed a Second
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation citing among others the Courts lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.
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Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants due to wrongful service of summons despite their voluntary appearance.
Ruling:
No, it should not.
The filing of the first Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents under
the Rules. Hence, the filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the
court of its jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared
before the trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. The
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents
after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly is constitutive of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. The Bocanegras failure to
raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal
to their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the
complaint.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways, through the Hon. Secretary, HERMOGENES EBDANE vs. ALBERTO A. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 175299, September 14, 2011, J. Leonardo De Castro
The Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the Republic by service of summons
upon the DPWH Region III alone. The applicable rule of procedure in this case is Section 13, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that when the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, the
service of summons may be effected on the Office of the Solicitor General. The DPWH and its regional
office are simply agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest.
Facts:
On April 26, 2002, Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against the Department of Public Works and Highways Region III, in the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. Domingo averred that from April to September 1992, he entered into seven contracts with
the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment to said government agency. The
lease contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the
DPWH, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in the adjacent towns in the
provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga. After the completion of the projects, Domingo claimed that the
unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region III amounted to P6,320,163.05.
Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its
obligations. Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above case for the payment of
theP6,320,163.05 balance, plus P200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees. Thereafter, summons was issued by the
RTC. The Proof of Service of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 is duly served. Domingo filed a Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default in view of the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive
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pleading. The RTC directed the counsel of Domingo to submit proof of service of said motion on the
DPWH Region III. Thereafter, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution. On September 2,
2002, the RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and thereafter set the date for the reception
of Domingos evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered judgment finding that from the evidence
presented, testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly proven that Domingo is entitled to the
relief prayed for. A Writ of Execution was then issued on March 24, 2003, commanding the sheriff
to enforce the RTC Decision.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Republic argued that it
was not impleaded as an indispensable party. The Republic averred that, under the law, the
statutory representatives of the government for purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor
General or the Legal Service Branch of the Executive Department concerned. Since no summons
was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Republic. The absence of indispensable parties allegedly rendered null and void the subsequent
acts of the trial court because of its lack of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but
even as to those present. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by the Republic.
Ruling:
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Jurisprudence instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency,
which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against
the agency's principal, i.e., the State. It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. It is
incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all requirements
were met in the service thereof.
In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo
specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III, The DPWH and its regional office are merely
the agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as
mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been
served on the OSG. Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected to inform the
OSG of the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. The Court disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in
mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the
complete determination of the action. It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead the
proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon
the officer mandated by law, that is, the OSG. As Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he cannot
now be allowed to shift the blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.
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The Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in Civil Case No.
333-M-2002. Hence, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic.
Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision are hereby declared void.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION vs. RADIOMARINE NETWORK, INC.,
PILTEL filed different actions to different courts thereby declaring it by the court as guilty of
forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court, or to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
Facts:
The genesis of this prolonged controversy can be traced back to the execution of a Contract
to Sell on December 12, 1996 between petitioner PILTEL and respondent Radiomarine Network,
Inc. (RADIOMARINE), wherein the latter agreed to purchase a 3,500-square meter lot located in
Makati City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-195516 issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Makati City. Thus, under the terms agreed upon, respondent was to give the amount
of P180,000,000.00 as down payment. Any outstanding unpaid obligation, which petitioner owed
respondent, would be deducted from the obligations of the latter. The balance, if any, should be
paid on or before April 30, 1997. Petitioner has failed to do so Respondent then filed a Complaint on
December 1, 1999 against petitioner PILTEL seeking either the rescission of the Contract to Sell or
the partial specific performance of the same with the RTC of Makati City. Respondent then filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 6, 2000 which was opposed by petitioner in its
Comment/Opposition filed on October 26, 2000. The motion was eventually granted by the trial
court.
Respondent Radiomarine Network, Inc then filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Execution on March 15, 2001 manifesting its withdrawal of the two remaining causes of action and
moving for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This was followed by an Alternative Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal that was filed by respondent Radiomarine Network, Inc on March 20,
2001, praying for execution pending appeal in the event that then defendant PILTEL would be held
to have the right to appeal. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals, with an application for a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Reinato Quilala in
issuing the November 13, 2000. petitioner filed before it on April 16, 2001, by registered mail, a
Consolidated Opposition against respondents Manifestation and Motion for Execution dated March
15, 2001 and the Alternative Motion for Execution Pending Appeal dated March 20, 2001. On April
17, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court its Ex Parte Manifestation and Motion stating therein
that, upon verification with the records of the court that day, then defendant PILTEL had failed to
file its Comment/Opposition to respondents Radiomarine Network, Inc aforementioned pending
motions and, thus, respondent Radiomarine Network, Inc moved to submit both motions for the
resolution of the trial court without opposition from then defendant PILTEL.
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While its Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was still pending before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed with the trial court its Notice of Appeal informing the said court that it will raise
before the Court of Appeals the trial courts November 13, 2000 Resolution and April 23, 2001
Order. This appeal was subsequently docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71805. The following day, on April
26, 2001, petitioner filed with the trial court an Urgent Manifestation to Post Supersedeas Bond and
Urgent Motion to Defer Execution Pending Appeal. On April 30, 2001, respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals its Supplement (To: Opposition to the Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) while, on the other hand, petitioner filed
with the trial court another Urgent Motion to Admit Supersedeas Bond on May 2, 2001. On the
same day, by virtue of the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issued by the trial court and there
being no TRO issued against it by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64155, Sheriff George C.
Ragutana issued a Notice of Sale on Execution Pending Appeal of Real Property giving notice to the
public that the sale by public auction of the real property described in TCT No. 195516 or the
Valgoson property shall be on May 31, 2001. Likewise on the same date, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners petition for certiorari along with the request for the issuance of a TRO In
response to petitioners May 2, 2001 motion filed in the trial court, respondent filed an Opposition
to the Urgent Motion to Admit Supersedeas Bondon May 4, 2001 alleging that the offer to post
supersedeas bond does not entitle then defendant PILTEL to a deferment of execution pending
appeal since at that time, compelling reasons warrant immediate execution and that PILTEL has
resorted to forum shopping in order to have the execution postponed. On May 8, 2001, petitioner
filed its Reply (to the Opposition to Motion to Admit Supersedeas Bond) to which respondent filed
its Rejoinder\ on May 9, 2001.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of petitioners Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 64155),
petitioner still filed on May 9, 2001 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari challenging the April 23,
2001 Order of the trial court as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
likewise filed a (Second) Urgent Manifestation and Reiteratory Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 17, 2001. Both pleadings were merely noted
without action by the Court of Appeals. On May 22, 2001, petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration to the May 2, 2001 Court of Appeals Resolution. It followed this up with the filing
of a pleading entitled (A) Third Urgent Manifestation and Reiteratory Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; and (B) Motion to Set Case for Oral
Argumentson June 1, 2001.
Respondent filed its Comment and Supplemental Comment on June 15, 2001 and June 25,
2001, respectively, to petitioners May 22, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration. In return, petitioner
filed by registered mail its Consolidated Reply (to Smartnets [1] Comment and [2] Supplemental
Comment) on August 23, 2001. Subsequently, respondent filed its Rejoinder on September 17,
2001. Back at the trial court, it issued an Order on May 11, 2001 denying petitioners Urgent
Manifestation to Post Supersedeas Bond and Urgent Motion to Defer Execution Pending Appeal on
the ground that the reasons for the allowance of execution pending appeal still prevail and the
posting of a supersedeas bond does not entitle the judgment debtor to a suspension of execution as
a matter of right.
Petitioner then filed on May 30, 2001 a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of the
trial court. This was subsequently denied by the trial court in an Order issued on August 14, 2001,
which likewise granted the withdrawal of all the remaining incidents of the case. This Order later
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became the subject of petitioners Supplemental Notice of Appeal which it filed on September 4,
2001. On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation in CA-G.R. SP No. 64155 informing the
Court of Appeals of the status of the appeal taken by petitioner in CA-G.R. CV No. 71805 and
reiterating the gross violations of the rule against forum shopping allegedly committed by the
same. A month later, or on February 7, 2002,
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner PILTEL is guilty of forum shopping
Ruling:
Yes. He is guilty of forum shopping
The captions/subheadings of the petitioners petition for certiorari and the argument
captions/subheadings of petitioners appellants brief may, at first blush, appear to be
dissimilar. However, the discussion that expounded on each of them plainly betray a similarity of
issues presented, grounds argued, and reliefs sought. Petitioner repeated the same argument in its
appeal and its petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the instant petition
that the trial courts resolution of the case by summary judgment was invalid allegedly because of
materially disputed facts which would render the whole proceeding beyond the purview of the
established rules on summary judgment. Petitioner puts forward in both its petition
for certiorari and its appeal before the Court of Appeals as well as in the present petition the
assertion that the contract at issue was rendered void and unenforceable due to mistakes
attributable solely to the respondent in this case. Both then pending suits before the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition before this Court raised the same issues and sought the same
reliefs, i.e., the annulment of the November 13, 2000 Resolution of the trial court granting partial
summary judgment, as well as the withdrawal of the other causes of action thereby disposing of the
entire case, and the execution of the summary judgment as directed by the trial court in its April
23, 2001 Order.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. There is res judicata when (1) there is
a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two cases identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity
of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the
two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
In the case at bar, the elements of litis pendentia and, consequently, of forum shopping are
present in petitioners petition for certiorari along with its supplemental petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64155 and in its appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 71850. Obviously, there is identity of
parties. Likewise, there is identity of causes of action as both cases assign the same errors on the
part of the trial court. Finally, there is identity of reliefs as both seek the annulment and reversal
of the same orders. It is not difficult to conclude that a decision in either case will necessarily have a
practical legal effect in the other.
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Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court, or to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum
shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of
justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.
HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES vs. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS,
Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 29, 9 th Judicial Region,
San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur and VILMA V. MINOR
Defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. It also
allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription provided that the
ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
Facts:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the
owner of a parcel of land in Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur then covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-18,208 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur. In 1939,
Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spouses Leon Belen and
Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen). In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly attempted, but
failed, to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged
document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property
between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-5,427 in their name. On February 28, 1970, Maria Valientes Bucoy and Vicente
Valientes, legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse
Claim duly entered in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-5,427. Upon the
death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen
executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of Vilma Valencia-Minor, the
present possessor of the subject property.
On June 20, 1979, Minor filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pagadian City a
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TCT NO. T5,427 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, which was docketed as SPL Case No.
1861. On July 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Minors prayer to allow the Register
of Deeds to have the title to the subject property transferred to her name.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur for the CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
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PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-021.
Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia. On August 3, 2000, the RTC issued an order in open court ruling that
forum shopping does not apply. On September 22, 2000, Minor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the August 3, 2000 Order. On May 7, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the
Motion for Reconsideration by dismissing Civil Case No. 98-021 on the ground of forum
shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 30, 2001, but the same was denied
by the RTC in its Order dated September 18, 2001.
On November 12, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari assailing the RTC Orders dated May 7, 2001 and September 18, 2001. Petitioners
raised the sole issue of whether the trial court was correct in finding that Civil Case No. 98-021
constitutes forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata with SPL Case No. 186. The Petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.
The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on said petition on August 16,
2002. Despite agreeing with petitioners that there was no forum shopping, litis pendentia or res
judicata in the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021, the Court of Appeals, asserting that it has the
discretion to review matters not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal if it finds that their
consideration is necessary at arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case, held that Civil
Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the authority to dismiss of the complaint on the
grounds of prescription and laches despite respondents failure to appeal the dismissal order.
Ruling:
We rule in favor of Minor. The Court of Appeals has the authority to dismiss of the complaint
on the grounds of prescription and laches despite respondents failure to appeal the dismissal order.
Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case
should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not
considered by the court.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by
a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
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The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that
defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also
allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription
provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
The Court, therefore, rules that Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of
prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio. Furthermore, as
regards the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily
infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the
same motu proprio. While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may
be considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.
F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC. vs. ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the petition for
review on certiorari such material portions of the record as would support the petition. However, such
a requirement was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would
merit the outright dismissal of the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, the Supreme Court
may require or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem
necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate.
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which seeks to challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71910. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 99-167, which dismissed the complaint filed by herein
respondent Online Networks International, Inc. (ONLINE).
FAT KEE contests the argument of ONLINE that the instant petition is fatally defective for
the failure of the former to attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC
proceedings. FAT KEE counters that there is no need to annex the said TSN given that ONLINE does
not dispute the accuracy of the quoted portions of the transcripts and the petition does not request
for a reevaluation of the evidence of the parties. Assuming arguendo that the TSN should have been
attached to the petition, FAT KEE begs for the relaxation of the rules so as not to frustrate the ends
of substantive justice. FAT KEE also rejects the contention of ONLINE that the petition raises only
factual issues, which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. FAT KEE argues that the
Court of Appeals likewise erred in re-evaluating the evidence and substituted its own interpretation
of the testimonies of the witnesses.
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Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition is fatally defective for the failure of the former to attach
the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings.
Ruling:
We rule that the non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does not render the
petition of FAT KEE fatally defective.
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the petition for
review on certiorari such material portions of the record as would support the petition. However,
such a requirement was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same
would merit the outright dismissal of the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, the
Supreme Court may require or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents
as it may deem necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider
appropriate.
More importantly, Section 8 of Rule 45 declares that if the petition is given due course, the
Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts
thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. Given that the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC
forms part of the records of the instant case, the failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant portions
of the TSN was already cured by the subsequent elevation of the case records to this Court.
This pronouncement is likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural rules should
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. EXPLORER MARITIME CO., LTD.,
OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V "EXPLORER", WALLEM PHILS. SHIPPING, INC., ASIAN
TERMINALS, INC. AND FOREMOST INTERNATIONAL PORT SERVICES, INC.
It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent any allegation
and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to
the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for.
Facts:
On March 22, 1995, petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC), as insurersubrogee, filed with the RTC of Manila a Complaint against respondents, to wit: the unknown owner
of the vessel M/V "Explorer" (common carrier), Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (ship agent),
Asian Terminals, Inc. (arrastre), and Foremost International Port Services, Inc. (broker). PCIC
sought to recover from the respondents the sum of P342,605.50, allegedly representing the value of
lost or damaged shipment paid to the insured, interest and attorneys fees. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 95-73340 and was raffled to Branch 37.
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On the same date, PCIC filed a similar case against respondents Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc., Asian Terminals, Inc., and Foremost International Port Services, Inc., but, this time,
the fourth defendant is "the unknown owner of the vessel M/V "Taygetus." This second case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73341 and was raffled to Branch 38.
Respondents filed their respective answers with counterclaims in Civil Case No. 95-73340,
pending before Branch 37. PCIC later filed its answer to the counterclaims.
On September 18, 1995, PCIC filed an ex parte motion to set the case for pre-trial
conference, which was granted by the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 1995. However,
before the scheduled date of the pre-trial conference, PCIC filed on September 19, 1996 its
Amended Complaint. The "Unknown Owner" of the vessel M/V "Explorer" and Asian Terminals, Inc.
filed anew their respective answers with counterclaims. Foremost International Port Services, Inc.
filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was later denied by the trial court in an Order dated December 4,
1996.
On December 5, 2000, respondent common carrier, "the Unknown Owner" of the vessel
M/V "Explorer," and Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
PCIC failed to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time.
PCIC allegedly filed its Opposition, claiming that the trial court has not yet acted on its
Motion to Disclose which it filed on November 19, 1997. PCIC prayed for the trial court to order
respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. to disclose the true identity and whereabouts of
defendant "Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V Explorer."
The trial court issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 95-73340 for failure of PCIC to
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, PCIC allegedly
realized that its Motion to Disclose was inadvertently filed with Branch 38 of the RTC of Manila,
where the similar case involving the vessel M/V "Taygetus" (Civil Case No. 95-73341) was raffled
to, and not with Branch 37, where the present case (Civil Case No. 95-73340) was pending.
PCIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, explaining that its Motion to Disclose was
erroneously filed with Branch 38. PCIC claimed that the mistake stemmed from the confusion
created by an error of the docket section of the RTC of Manila in stamping the same docket number
to the simultaneously filed cases. According to PCIC, it believed that it was still premature to move
for the setting of the pre-trial conference with the Motion to Disclose still pending resolution. On
May 6, 2003, the trial court issued the Order denying PCICs Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the RTC.
Issue:
Can the court a quo dismissed the said motion due to PCIC's failure to prosecute its action
for an unreasonable length of time?
Ruling:
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In affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-73340, the Court of Appeals held that PCIC
should have filed a motion to resolve the Motion to Disclose after a reasonable time from its alleged
erroneous filing. PCIC could have also followed up the status of the case by making inquiries on the
courts action on their motion, instead of just waiting for any resolution from the court for more
than three years. The appellate court likewise noted that the Motion to Disclose was not the only
erroneous filing done by PCICs former counsel, the Linsangan Law Office. The records of the case at
bar show that on November 16, 1997, said law office filed with Branch 37 a Pre-trial Brief for the
case captioned as "Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Unknown Owners of the Vessel MV
Taygetus, et al., Civil Case No. 95-73340." The firm later filed a Manifestation and Motion stating
that the same was intended for Civil Case No. 95-73341 which was pending before Branch 38. All
these considered, the Court of Appeals ruled that PCIC must bear the consequences of its counsels
inaction and negligence, as well as its own.
PCIC claims that the merits of its case warrant that it not be decided on technicalities.
Furthermore, PCIC claims that its former counsel merely committed excusable negligence when it
erroneously filed the Motion to Disclose with the wrong branch of the court where the case is
pending.
The basis for the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 95-73340 is Section 3, Rule 17 and
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which respectively provide:
Section 3. Dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court,
the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
xxxx
Section 1. When conducted. After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of
the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
In any case, petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the motion to file a
supplemental answer or for the defendants to file a supplemental answer. As previously stated, the
rule clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed.
Since respondents already filed a cautionary answer and [petitioners did not file any reply to it] the
case was already ripe for pre-trial.
It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent any allegation
and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will
give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for.
In this case, there was no justifiable reason for PCIC's failure to file a motion to set the case
for pre-trial. PCIC's stubborn insistence that the case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous.
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Although petitioners state that there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal
application of the rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there are
compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on petitioners, and they
have not adduced any such compelling reason.
In the case at bar, the alleged Motion to Disclose was filed on November 19, 1997.
Respondents filed the Motion to Dismiss on December 5, 2000. By that time, PCICs inaction was
thus already almost three years. There is therefore no question that the failure to prosecute in the
case at bar was for an unreasonable length of time. Consequently, the Complaint may be dismissed
even absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of
any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules.
The burden is now on PCIC to show that there are compelling reasons that would render the
dismissal of the case unjustified.
The only explanation that the PCIC can offer for its omission is that it was waiting for the
resolution of its Motion to Disclose, which it allegedly filed with another branch of the court.
According to PCIC, it was premature for it to move for the setting of the pre-trial conference before
the resolution of the Motion to Disclose.
We disagree. Respondent Explorer Maritime Co., Ltd., which was then referred to as the
"Unknown Owner of the vessel M/V Explorer," had already been properly impleaded pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant Whenever the identity or name of a defendant
is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir, devisee, or by such other designation as
the case may require; when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended
accordingly.
In the Amended Complaint, PCIC alleged that defendant "Unknown Owner of the vessel M/V
Explorer" is a foreign corporation whose identity or name or office address are unknown to PCIC
but is doing business in the Philippines through its local agent, co-defendant Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc., a domestic corporation. PCIC then added that both defendants may be served with
summons and other court processes in the address of Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc.,which was
correctly done pursuant to Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on
the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
As all the parties have been properly impleaded, the resolution of the Motion to Disclose
was unnecessary for the purpose of setting the case for pre-trial.
Furthermore, Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that an agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. Since Civil Case
No. 95-73340 was an action for damages, the agent may be properly sued without impleading the
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principal. Thus, even assuming that petitioner had filed its Motion to Disclose with the proper court,
its pendency did not bar PCIC from moving for the setting of the case for pre-trial as required under
Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
PCICs attempt to shift the blame to the docket section of the RTC of Manila, which allegedly
stamped the same docket number to Civil Case No. 95-73340 (involving M/V Explorer) and Civil
Case No. 95-73341 (involving M/V Taygetus), is completely unfounded. A perusal of the Complaint
in the case at bar shows that it was correctly stamped Civil Case No. "95-73340," and the branch
number was correctly written as 37.
PCIC did not bother to attach the alleged complaint filed in Branch 38 involving M/V
Taygetus. However, it does not escape our attention that PCIC in its own pleadings repeatedly refer
to the case pending in Branch 38 as Civil Case No. 95-73341, contrary to its claim that the two cases
were docketed with the same number. In all, PCIC failed to adequately account how its counsel
could have mistakenly filed the Motion intended for Branch 37 in Branch 38. Worse, said counsel
also allegedly only discovered the error after three years from the filing of the Motion to Disclose.
Such a circumstance could have only occurred if both PCIC and its counsel had indeed been
uninterested and lax in prosecuting the case.
We therefore hold that the RTC was correct in dismissing Civil Case No. 95-73340 for failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute the same for an unreasonable length of time. As discussed by the Court
of Appeals, PCIC could have filed a motion for the early resolution of their Motion to Disclose after
the apparent failure of the court to do so. If PCIC had done so, it would possibly have discovered the
error in the filing of said motion much earlier. Finally, it is worth noting that the defendants also
have the right to the speedy disposition of the case; the delay of the pre-trial and the trial might
cause the impairment of their defenses.
RES JUDICATA
LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LC BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS, INC.,
METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, MANUEL T. LEY, and JANET C. LEY vs. PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INTERNATIONAL BANK, EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF VALENZUELA, METRO MANILA, AND CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
G.R. No. 160841, June 23, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Conclusiveness of judgment, one of the aspects of the concept of res judicata, requires only the
identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if
the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. A case involving an issue of whether or
not an instituted civil case was dismissible due to forum shopping committed by petitioners, which
eventually was dismissed based on that same ground, constitutes as res judicata to a petition with the
same issue between the same parties albeit on a different ground of failure to prosecute.
Facts:
From 1986 to 1990, Ley Construction and Development Corporation, LC Builders &
Developers, Inc., Metro Container Corporation, Manuel T. Ley and Janet C. Ley (petitioners) secured
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52 loans from the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB, now Equitable PCIBank). To
secure the said loans, they executed real estate mortgages over several of their properties and
chattel mortgages over their equipment and machinery. As the debts became due, PCIBs repeated
demands resulted into the payment of some of the loans, but 18 of those remained unpaid. Thus, on
August 16, 1991, PCIB filed separate requests for extrajudicial foreclosure with the sheriffs of Pasig
City RTC and Valenzuela City RTC. The auction sales were thereafter scheduled. To forestall the
same, petitioners, filed a Complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2495, before the Makati City RTC.
One of the causes of action proffered was that PCIB had agreed to the extensions of the due date of
the loans. PCIB, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground that it did
not agree to petitioners request for extra time to make good their obligations. Eventually, the
Makati City RTC issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the conduct of the scheduled auction
sales and denying PCIBs motion to dismiss.
After sometime, the Makati City RTC granted PCIBs Second Motion to Lift Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (February 23, 1993 Order) on the ground that said motion was unopposed.
PCIB was therefore prompted to immediately cause the scheduling of the sheriffs extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of the mortgaged properties. In opposition to the said order, the petitioners filed
an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration and to Expand Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order. They also resorted into filing two separate
complaints in another venue. However, both of those complaints were dismissed the first, due to
the pendency of Civil Case No. 91-2495 and the second, on the ground that petitioners engaged in
forum shopping.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals regarding the validity of the February 23, 1993 Order of the Makati City RTC. The appellate
court ruled in petitioners favor. As such, PCIB elevated the Court of Appeals decision to this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 114951. While the said case was pending, the Makati City RTC rendered an
Order dated July 28, 1994, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-2495, on the ground of failure to prosecute.
Petitioners, as a resort, filed a motion for reconsideration and eventually, an appeal of the foregoing
Order. However, both recourses were denied.
In a parallel proceeding, on July 18, 2003, this Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 114951
dismissing Civil Case No. 91-2495 with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and violation of
judicial stability by filing other cases in a different courts and venues.
The petitioners in this case went to the Supreme Court to question the RTC July 28, 1994
Order which dismissed Civil Case No. 91-2495 for failure to prosecute. PCIB opposed the instant
petition arguing that it is intended to revive Civil Case No. 91-2495, which has been rendered moot
by the earlier dismissal of the same in G.R. No. 114951.
Issue:
Whether the instant petition was already barred by the judgment rendered in G.R. No.
114951, the latter constituting as res judicata to the present case.
Ruling:
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Petition Denied.
The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and
were admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein,
such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter.
Jurisprudence provides that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects: 1) "bar by
prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict" and 2) conclusiveness of judgment otherwise known as
the rule of auter action pendent. The first pertains to the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. Conclusiveness of
judgment, which is the one involved in this case , ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action.
The elements of conclusiveness of judgment are the following::1) Identity of parties; and 2)
Subject matter in the first and second cases. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same
point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in
the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence,
facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of
action. It therefore proscribes the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled
in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch
on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Clearly, conclusiveness of judgment requires
only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
In the case at bar, the presence of the first element which is the identity of parties, is not
disputed. While at first blush, it may appear that the subject of G.R. No. 114951 is the Makati City
RTC Order dated February 23, 1993 granting PCIBs Second Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, whereas the instant recourse assails the July 28, 1994 Order of the same court
dismissing Civil Case No. 91-2495 for failure to prosecute, a closer look, however, discloses that the
last element is also attendant in this case. While at its inception G.R. No. 114951 initially dealt with
the propriety of the February 23, 1993 Order of the Makati City RTC, later progress of the case, such
as the filing of petitioners of two separate complaints in the Manila RTC essentially directed at the
said order of the Makati trial court, shaped the case into a different form. The subject of the case
veered away from its original issue - the validity of the February 23, 1993 Order. This time, the core
issue emerged whether petitioners were guilty of forum shopping so as to make Civil Case No. 912495 dismissible on that ground. Simply stated, the issue in G.R. No. 114951 is whether Civil Case
No. 91-2495 is dismissible. After judicious perusal, this Court in that case eventually found
petitioners guilty of forum shopping and, thus, dismissed with prejudice Civil Case No. 91-2495.
The instant petition exactly ventures into the same issue, whether Civil Case No. 91-2495 is
dismissible, albeit based on a different ground, that is, failure of the petitioners to prosecute the
case.
There is, therefore, no point in resolving the various issues raised by petitioners in this case,
since it will effectively reopen G.R. No. 114951, on which a final judgment has already been decreed,
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rendering it closed. To do so would set a bad precedent, leaving the door wide open for dissatisfied
parties to re-litigate unfavorable decisions to no end. Without a doubt, this is completely inimical to
the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
ENGR. JOB Y. BESANA, HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA III, in his capacity as Administrator of the National
Electrification Administration vs. RODSON F. MAYOR,
G.R. No. 153837 July 21, 2010, J. Leonardo De-Castro
Besana filed complaint for illegal dismissal but the court decided that he was not illegally
dismissed. However, he failed to file an appeal which therefore attained finality of the decision. NEA
issued another resolution including his dismissal and he appealed to such resolution. The court ruled
that he is already barred by Res judicata. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which
holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to
have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause. The doctrine of res judicata is founded on a public policy against reopening that which has previously been decided, so as to put the litigation to an end
Facts:
Administrative Complaint was filed by herein Rodson F. Mayor against [herein petitioner]
Job Y. Besana, then General Manager of [herein intervenor AKELCO] for grave misconduct, serious
irregularity, dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, serious neglect in the performance of official
duty, and gross mismanagement before the [NEA]. After investigation made by State Corporate
Attorney Jesus F. D. Clariza of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and approved by
NEA Administrator Rodrigo Cabrera, Besana was ordered dismissed as AKELCO General Manager
found Besana guilty for grave misconduct, serious irregularities, dishonesty, abuse of authority,
serious neglect in the performance of his official duties, incompetence and gross mismanagement
and thus hereby sentencing him the penalty of dismissal as AKELCO General Manager subject to
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits as well as disqualification for reemployment in
any electric cooperatives. According to Mayor Besana was notified of Board Resolution dismissing
him from the service as early as July 1992, when the Board appointed another General Manager to
take his place but he did not appeal. Hence, the same became final, executory and unassailable. With
the finality of such resolution, the Board of Directors of AKELCO appointed Atty. Leovigildo Mationg
as the new General Manager, which appointment was confirmed by the NEA Board of
Administrators sometime in 1992. On June 3, 1993, Besana questioned his dismissal before the
Arbitration Committee of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He got a favorable
ruling from Labor Arbiter Danilo C. Acosta, who in his decision dated September 15, 1993, directed
Besanas reinstatement and payment to him of backwages as well as of moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. On appeal by AKELCO to the NLRC, however, the latter reversed and
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter, through its Decision dated April 18, 1994, and dismissed
[petitioner] Besanas complaint for lack of merit. Not satisfied with the decision of the NLRC,
[petitioner] Besana questioned the same before the Supreme Court through a petition
for certiorari which was, however, dismissed by the High Court on August 8, 1994 for [petitioner]
Besanas failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
In another twist, the NEA Board of Administrators passed on March 5, 1994, Resolution
No. 12 which authorized the review of the administrative case against Besana, and created a team
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to undertake such review, After investigation, the Urbiztondo Committee submitted its report,
finding that the charge about the unaccounted P38 Million had no leg to stand on; however, Besana
was guilty of the other charges against him and that his dismissal for such charges is duly
supported by the evidence on record. The Court of Appeals proceeded to rule that Besanas
dismissal as General Manager of AKELCO by the NEA Board had already attained finality sometime
after July 1992 since Besana failed to appeal his dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding in favor of Mayor
Ruling:
No. The Court of Appeals did not erred in deciding in favor of Mayor
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. The doctrine of res judicata is founded on a public policy against re-opening that which
has previously been decided, so as to put the litigation to an end. Matters settled by a court's final
judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes
valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.
In the present case, Besanas dismissal originally stemmed from NEA Board Resolution No.
41 which he did not appeal, whether to the OP or the Court of Appeals, hence, rendering said Board
Resolution final. NEA Board Resolution No. 41 was already even executed with the appointment of a
new General Manager.
Even overlooking the finality of NEA Board Resolution No. 41, the legality of Besanas
dismissal was settled with finality in another proceeding instituted by Besana himself. Besana,
instead of directly appealing NEA Board Resolution No. 41, filed an illegal dismissal case before the
NLRC. To recall, the Labor Arbiter initially found that Besana was illegally dismissed. However,
when AKELCO appealed to the NLRC, the latter reversed the Labor Arbiter and held that there was
no illegal dismissal. Besanas appeal to this Court of said NLRC ruling, docketed as G.R. No. 115591,
entitled Besana v. National Labor Relations Commission, was dismissed on technicality in a
Resolution dated August 8, 1994. As a result, the NLRC ruling that Besanas dismissal was legal
already attained finality.
It is true that Besana instituted his illegal dismissal case before the NLRC following the
issuance by the NEA of its Board Resolution No. 41, and that what Besana appealed to the OP was
NEAs Board Resolution Nos. 12, 56 and 35. However, upon closer review, the aforesaid NEA Board
Resolutions all involve the dismissal of Besana as General Manager of AKELCO after being found
guilty of the administrative charges lodged against him by Mayor. The reinvestigation conducted by
the NEA of exactly the same charges against Besana (and all other proceedings arising from said
reinvestigation, including those before the OP, the Court of Appeals, and now, before this Court),
subject matter of NEA Board Resolution Nos. 12, 56, and 35, could not have served any other
purpose except to overturn the NLRC ruling that Besana was not illegally dismissed. Incidentally,
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even after its reinvestigation, the NEA still found Besana guilty of several of the administrative
charges against him warranting his dismissal as General Manager of AKELCO.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO DERLA, namely: ZELDA, JUNA, GERALDINE, AIDA, ALMA, all surnamed
DERLA; and SABINA Vda. de DERLA, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, ZELDA DERLA
vs. HEIRS OF CATALINA DERLA Vda. de HIPOLITO, MAE D. HIPOLITO, ROGER ZAGALES,
FRANCISCO DERLA, SR., JOVITO DERLA, exaltacion pond, and VINA U. CASAWAY, in her
capacity as the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAGUM, DAVAO DEL NORTE
Literally, res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
Facts:
The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the late Maximino Derla (Derla). Respondent
Catalina Vda. de Hipolito (Catalina) on the other hand is Derlas cousin who was married to the late
Ricardo Hipolito (Hipolito). Except for Vina U. Casaway, the respondents, are the registered owners
of a 23.9-hectare fishpond area (the subject fishpond area) located in Sitio Biyawa, Barrio Panabo,
Davao. Casaway, being the Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao Del Norte, was
impleaded as a mere nominal party.
Twenty and five tenths 20.5 hectares of the subject fishpond area were originally
maintained by Derla under Ordinary Fishpond Permit No. F-1080-F. Subsequently, Derla and
Hipolito executed a "Contract" wherein Derla acknowledged Hipolitos rights in the 20.5-hectare
fishpond area. In the "Contract," Derla stated that Hipolito owned one-half of the fishpond area, and
that it was only for convenience that the permit was issued in Derlas name. Thereafter, Derla
executed a document captioned as "Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit" wherein he transferred
all his rights in the fishpond area to Hipolito for P 10,000. Executed together with this document
was Hipolitos own affidavit/promissory note wherein he stated that he agreed to buy his co-owner
Derlas one-half undivided share for the initial amount of P4,500.00. Hipolito also promised to pay
another P4,500.00 once the conflict regarding the subject fishpond area has been settled and
arranged.
Thereafter, Hipolito filed a Fishpond Application over the subject 20.5-hectare fishpond
area. This was approved on August 10, 1956. Derla then filed his own Fishpond Application over a
7.5-hectare fishpond area adjoining Hipolitos fishpond area. Meanwhile, Hipolito charged Derla
with Qualified Theft for gathering and carrying away fish from Hipolitos fishpond. Derla, in his
defense, claimed that he was still part-owner of the fishpond when he harvested the fish. On the
strength of the "Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit" and Hipolitos Affidavit that he and Derla
are co-owners of the fishpond and that he promised to pay Derla after the settlement of the
fishpond boundary conflict, the court rendered a decision acquitting Derla.
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On March 8, 1962, the Director of Fisheries approved Derlas fishpond application. On
appeal, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR), set aside the Director of
Fisheries order and declared that the 7.5-hectare fishpond area Derla applied for was included in
the area covered by Hipolitos Fishpond Permit.
Subsequently, Derla filed a complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of Transfer of Right in a
Fishpond Permit" against Hipolito before the CFI. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 5826 and was
dismissed on the ground of prescription and estoppel. On appeal, the appellate court likewise
dismissed his complaint.
Thereafter, Hipolito filed Sales (Fishpond) Application No. (VIII-2) 9 with the Bureau of
Lands over the subject fishpond area covered by his Fishpond Permit. The Municipality of Panabo
opposed said application on the ground that it will disrupt the development of Panabo. The SANR
however, recommended the denial of this opposition as it had been certified that the area applied
for was not needed by the government for any future public improvement and that it was suitable
for fishpond purposes. On February 11, 1972, the Office of the President, agreed with the SANRs
position that Hipolito had already acquired a vested right over his fishpond area; hence, the
Municipality of Panabos opposition was dismissed and Hipolitos Fishpond Sales Application was
given due course. However, on February 5, 1974 the Office of the President revoked its February
11, 1972 ruling on Hipolitos application. The Office of the President ordered the transfer of the
subject fishpond area to the Municipality of Panabo upon payment of the expenses incurred by
Hipolito. Consequently, Hipolito filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CFI, praying for the
declaration of nullity of the decision of the Office of the President. The CFI then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. Despite this injunction, the Municipality of
Panabo, still passed a resolution allowing a portion of the subject fishpond area to be leased out to
third persons. Subsequently, the CFI rendered a decision dismissing Hipolitos petition. On appeal,
the appellate court affirmed the decision of the CFI. This decision became final and executory.
Thereafter, sometime after the EDSA Revolution, Catalina filed a petition with the Office of
the President for the Revival of the Fishpond Sales Application No. (VIII-2) 9 of her late husband
Hipolito. This was docketed as O.P. Case No. 4732 and in support of her petition, Catalina alleged
that her fishpond was taken away from her despite a final and executory decision in her favor. The
Office of the President granted Catalinas petition.
Afterwards, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC
praying that the certificates of title of respondents over the subject fishpond area be annulled and
cancelled. The RTC dismissed the petitioners complaint on the ground of res judicata. On appeal,
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the present case is barred by res judicata.
Ruling:
Yes, it is,
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To resolve this issue, it would be instructive to revisit the concept of res judicata. Literally,
res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue
in the first suit.
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially
between the same parties.
There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case.
The parties, although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have been the
same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject fishpond area. The
concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the rights to the subject fishpond
area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actions associated and related to it. The
subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and
the petition now before us. With regard to the identity of the causes of action, this Court, in
Mendiola v. Court of Appeals held that:
The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of
actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. x x x.
The similarity between the two causes of action cannot be impugned. The facts and
evidence which supported Catalinas petition for revival of Hipolitos fishpond sales application in
O.P. Case No. 4732 are the same facts and evidence now before us; hence, the difference of actions
in the two cases is of no moment. In O.P. Case No. 4732, the action was to revive Hipolitos fishpond
sales application, which, when granted, gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area,
eventually leading to their ownership over the same. The action in Civil Case No. 97-15, the case
that was elevated to become this petition, is for the nullification of the respondents respective titles
to the subject fishpond area on the ground that the respondents have no right thereto. If we allow
the nullification of these titles on the ground presented by the petitioners, then we would also be
nullifying the decision in O.P. Case No. 4732, because it is the decision in that case which gave the
respondents the right to the subject fishpond area.
Assuming arguendo that the finality of O.P. Case No. 4732 will not trigger the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to bar the petition now before us, the petitioners cause must still fail
because the petitioners hinge their claim on the alleged fraudulent transfer to Hipolito of their
father Derlas right to the Fishpond Permit No. F-1080-F. It must be remembered that this has also
been the subject of a separate complaint in Civil Case No. 5826, wherein the RTC ruled that aside
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from the action being filed beyond the prescriptive period, Derla was estopped from disputing the
authenticity of the transfer as he used the very same document to defend himself in the criminal
case filed against him by Hipolito. In fact, the RTC acquitted him on the basis of that same document
he had disputed and which his heirs are now disputing. The RTCs denial of Derlas petition to
nullify the transfer of fishpond rights was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47070-R
and then by this Court in G.R. No. L-38230 in a Resolution dated February 22, 1974. The ruling in
that case thus became final on March 27, 1974.
TOBIAS SELGA and CEFERINA GARANCHO SELGA vs. SONY ENTIERRO BRAR, represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MARINA T. ENTIERRO
The annulment of the sale of share in the subject property and the legal redemption and the
claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies and
reliefs. The cause of action is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al. to Selga spouses
without Sony Brars knowledge and consent, hence, depriving the latter of her rights and interests over
her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. Therefore, Civil case before
RTC-Branch 56 should be dismissed, being barred by res judicata. Any error committed by RTC-Branch
55 in the Decision in Civil Case No. 276 could only be reviewed or corrected on appeal.
Facts:
Francisco Entierro died intestate on March 7, 1979, and left behind a parcel of land,
identified as Lot 1138-A, located in Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, with an area of 39,577
square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10273 in his name. On May 15,
1985, Franciscos spouse, Basilia Tabile, and legitimate children, Esteban, Herminia, Elma, Percival,
and Gilda, all surnamed Entierro (Basilia, et al.), executed a Deed of Sale with Declaration of
Heirship. Basilia, et al., declared themselves to be Franciscos only heirs who inherited the subject
property; and at the same time, sold the subject property to petitioners, spouses Tobias Selga and
Ceferina Garancho Selga, for P120,000.00. By reason of said sale, TCT No. T-10273 in Franciscos
name was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134408 in Selga spouses names.
On July 10, 1992, respondent Sony Entierro Brar, filed before Branch 55 of the RTC of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages against
petitioners, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 276. Respondent claimed that she was one of the
legitimate children of Francisco and Basilia, and that she had been preterited and illegally deprived
of her rightful share and interests in the subject property as one of Franciscos legal heirs. Sony Brar
alleged that as one of the co-heirs of the undivided portion of the questioned lot 1138-A, he is
legally entitled to redeem the said property from the Selga spouses for the price the said spouses
have paid her co-heirs as appearing in the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship.
After trial on the merits, RTC-Branch 55 rendered a Decision dated May 8, 1996. The Court
rendered judgment declaring the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of heirship
adjudicating ownership of Lot No. 1138-A in the name of Sony Entierro Brar being one of the
legitimate heirs of spouses Francisco Entierro and Basilia Tabile one eleventh (1/11) share and ten
eleventh (10/11) share in the name of Tobias Selga married to Ceferina Garancho.
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Sony Brar informed the Selga spouses that she was exercising her right to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property, in accordance with the final and
executory Decision of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276. In their Reply-Letter, Selga spouses
counsel rejected Sony Brars demand. This prompted Sony Brar to institute a Complaint for Legal
Redemption with Damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56. In its
Decision dated July 27, 2001, RTC-Branch 56 agreed with Selga spouses and dismissed Civil Case.
The Court of Appeals in its Decision reversed and set aside the assailed July 27, 2001 Decision of
RTC-Branch 56.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 involving the legal right to
redeem the subject property from Selga spouses cannot be deemed barred by the final judgment in
Civil Case No. 276 rendered by RTC-Branch 55.
Ruling:
No, right to redeem is deemed barred by Res Judicata.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section
47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c). Res
judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the prosecution of a second action exists when
there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first and second actions. The
judgment in the first action is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In
contrast, res judicata under the second concept or estoppel by judgment exists when there is
identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct. The first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved herein.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept,
bar by prior judgment: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject
matter and, particularly, the causes of action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573.
The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire
subject property by Basilia, et al., to Selga spouses without Sony Brars knowledge and consent,
hence, depriving Sony Brar of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject
property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the sale of Sony Brars share in the subject
property, the legal redemption by Sony Brar of her co-heirs share sold to Selga spouses, and the
claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies
and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her.
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The allegations in respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 573 initially give the impression
that the cause of action therein was petitioners refusal to heed respondents demand to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property. But a closer study of said Complaint,
as well as the trial proceedings before RTC-Branch 56, reveal that respondents right to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property also arose from the sale of the said
subject property to petitioners by respondents co-heirs and co-owners, alleged to be without
respondents knowledge or consent the very same cause of action at the crux of Civil Case No. 276.
Any error committed by RTC-Branch 55 in the Decision in Civil Case No. 276 could only be reviewed
or corrected on appeal. Although respondent initially filed an appeal of said judgment before the
Court of Appeals, she eventually filed a motion to withdraw the same, which was granted by the
appellate court. Hence, the Decision dated May 8, 1996 attained finality.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. DOLORES HILARIO, TERESITA HILARIO,
THELMA HILARIO OCHOA EDUARDO HILARIO
G.R. No. 160446, September 19, 2012, J. DE CASTRO
A judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise
agreement is a judgment on the merits.
Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition
or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when
there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit
the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
Facts:
In two different occasions, Edmund and Yolanda executed a real estate mortgage over [a]
certain property covered by TCT No. 21563 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan to secure a loan
obtained by HPM [a conjugal business founded by Edmund and Yolanda] from RCBC in the amount
of P100,000.00. In both mortgages, Edmund and Yolanda acted as attorney-in-fact of [Yolandas
parents] Dolores P. Hilario and Teofilo Hilario.
Unknown to [Edmund, et al.], Yolanda, Aniag and petitioner had conspired to obtain loans
and other credit facilities from petitioner for HPM at amounts substantially greater than the
original loans secured by the aforesaid mortgages. Thereafter and still in conspiracy, Petitoner,
instead of applying HPMs export proceeds to its loans, released said proceeds to Yolanda, which
thus allowed Yolanda and Aniag to misappropriate and divert HPM funds to their own benefit. A
Complaint for the annulment of mortgage, reconveyance, receivership, accounting and damages
was thereafter filed against his wife, Yolanda H. Perez,Francisco Aniag, Jr., HPM International, Inc.,
Amvhil Garments, Inc. (or collectively Yolanda, et al.) and herein petitioner Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC). Said Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q- 91-100795.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-9110079, respondents filed Civil Case No. C-17332
against petitioner with the Caloocan RTC. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they were
the heirs or successors-in-interest of Teofilo Hilario, the principal of Yolanda, who was one of the
parties in Civil Case No. Q-91-10079.12 Respondents sought the cancellation of the mortgages
annotated on TCT No. 21563 for the reason that Yolanda had allegedly paid the loans secured by
said mortgages.
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RTC dismissed Civil Case No. C-17332 on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.
However, while the appeal was pending, the parties in Civil Case No. Q-91-10079 entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved by the Quezon City RTC. In said agreement both
Edmund and Yolanda admitted the outstanding obligation of HPM to RCBC and the subsistence of
the real estate mortgages executed by them over several properties.
However, it appears that Yolanda failed to fulfill her obligation under the Compromise
Agreement. Consequently, RCBC foreclosed on the aforementioned real estate mortgage and sold
the Caloocan property in public auction. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC for the reason that a compromise judgment upholding and affirming the validity of the
assailed mortgage is not res judicata to an action seeking the cancellation of the same mortgage.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Can a compromise judgment upholding and affirming the validity of the assailed mortgage
constitute a res judicata to an action seeking the cancellation of the same mortgage?
Ruling:
Yes, it constitutes res judicata.
A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata when, upon the
juxtaposition and comparison of the action sought to be dismissed and a previous one, there is (1)
an identity between the parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
(2) a similarity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (that is, the relief is founded on the same
facts); and (3) identity in the two particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle the issues
raised in the action under consideration
In this instance, an examination of the pleadings establishes that there was an identity of
parties in Civil Case No. C-17332 and Civil Case No. Q91-10079. The following were culled from the
pleadings submitted by the parties in both cases: Edmund and Yolanda are married; thus, Edmund
was a relative by affinity of the heirs of Teofilo Hilario. Yolanda is one of the legitimate children
borne of the marriage of Teofilo and Dolores Hilario, and, therefore, a child of Dolores and a sibling
of Doloress correspondents. Upon Teofilos death, Yolanda ceased to be a mere agent of Teofilo and
became respondents co-heir and co-owner with respect to the Caloocan property. It may
reasonably be concluded therefore, that respondents herein, Yolanda and Edmund, with respect to
the Caloocan property, all represent substantially the same interest against RCBC.
As we held in Heirs of Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, [o]nly substantial identity is
necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties
does not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not
impleaded in the first case.
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With regard to the second requirement, i.e., identity in rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, it is noteworthy that respondents herein and Edmund, et al., respectively the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 17332 and Civil Case No. Q-91-10079, similarly asserted as their principal argument for
the cancellation of the mortgages the alleged full payment by Yolanda of the loan obtained from
RCBC. Meanwhile, as a cross-claim against RCBC, Yolanda also sought the cancellation of the very
same mortgages on the assertion that she has already made substantial payments to RCBC but
which the latter supposedly in bad faith applied to unconscionable and exorbitant penalty charges.
Verily, respondents, Edmund and Yolanda all sought the same relief against RCBC on substantially
identical factual allegations and legal justifications. In other words, it cannot be denied that the
primary issue to be litigated in both civil cases is whether or not Yolanda had indeed already paid
the outstanding obligation secured by the mortgages constituted on the Caloocan property. This
issue was settled with finality by the Compromise Agreement wherein Yolanda admitted she still
had an outstanding balance on the loan to be paid to RCBC and said balance was to be secured by
the Real Estate Mortgage dated September 27, 1984 over the Caloocan property.
With regard to the third requisite, i.e., that any judgment which may be rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle the issues raised
in the action under consideration, we find that same is likewise availing in this instance.
Settled is the rule that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. As discussed above, the court-approved
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-91-10079 disposed of the issue of Yolandas payment of
the outstanding loans and the validity of the mortgages involved in these civil cases. This being so,
said Compromise Agreement bound the parties herein.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-17332 is warranted
under the circumstances. However, such dismissal should be premised, not on forum shopping and
litis pendentia, but on res judicata in view of the court-approved Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q-91-10079.
LITIS PENDENCIA
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GATEWAY PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 181485, February 15, 2012, J. Leonardo De Castro
As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second
action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the
two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
otherwise, it is not.
Facts:
Respondent Gateway Property Holdings, Inc. obtained a loan from Philippine National Bank
in the amount of Php 600, 000,000.00. As a security for the loan, the GPHI mortgaged some of its
properties. Because GPHI was having a difficulty in paying its obligations, it had its sister company
GEC to temporarily mortgage two parcels of land it owns. Under the agreement, the mortgage of
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two parcels of land would only be registered once GPHI defaults in their payment in the loan
obligation.
PNB then caused the foreclosure of the properties of GPHI including the two parcels of land
temporarily mortgaged by GEC to PNB. Initially, GPHI filed a complaint for annulment of the
mortgage contract against PNB alleging that the mortgage contract entered into by the parties did
not embody their true intent. While this case was pending, GPHI filed another civil case which is the
annulment of the foreclosure sale initiated by BPI. Because of this, PNB filed a motion to dismiss on
the second case under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court contending that the second case must
be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the motion
and dismissed the second civil case initiated by GPHI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the second civil case (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) must be dismissed
on the ground of litis pendencia.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and
ruled that litis pendencia exists the in the case at bar therefore, the second civil case for annulment
of the foreclosure sale must be dismissed.
As a ground for a motion to dismiss a complaint or any other pleading asserting a claim, litis
pendentia is provided for under Section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
As we held in Dotmatrix Trading v. Legaspi, "[l]itis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally
means a pending suit and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions
are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious."
We further emphasized in Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation that "[t]here is litis
pendentia or another action pendente lite if the following requisites are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration."
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The crux of the controversy in the instant case is whether there is an identity of causes of
action in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 and TM-1108.
As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or
nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the
two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the allegations in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment of the
Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) reveal that the said cases
invoke the same fundamental issue, i.e., the temporary nature of the security that was to be
provided by the mortgaged properties of GPHI.
Therefore, in essence, the cause of action of GPHI in both cases is the alleged act of PNB of
reneging on a prior agreement or understanding with GEC and GPHI vis--vis the constitution,
purpose and consequences of the real estate mortgage over the properties of GPHI. While the reliefs
sought in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108
(Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) are seemingly different, the ultimate question that the trial
court would have to resolve in both cases is whether the real estate mortgage over the properties of
GPHI was actually intended to secure the loan obligations of GEC to PNB so much so that PNB can
legally foreclose on the mortgaged properties should GEC fail to settle its loan obligations. In this
regard, GPHI made reference to the letter of PNB dated August 13, 1997 and the Amendment to the
Credit Agreement between GEC, GPHI and PNB as the primary documents upon which GPHI based
its arguments regarding the supposed intention of the parties in both Civil Case Nos. TM-1022
(Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale). Thus,
the same documentary evidence would necessarily sustain both cases.
That GPHI put forward additional grounds in Civil Case No. TM-1108 (Annulment of the
Foreclosure Sale), i.e., that the auction sale was not conducted at a public place in contravention of
the requirement of Section 4 of Act No. 3135 and that the foreclosure was prematurely resorted to
given that GPHI cannot yet be considered in default, does not alter the fact that there exists an
identity of causes of action in the two cases. In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., the
Court held that "[t]he well-entrenched rule is that a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."
Be that as it may, while the appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-1108 (Annulment of
the Foreclosure Sale) was still pending with the Court of Appeals, GPHI filed on November 23, 2006
a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Conform to the Evidence in Civil Case No. TM-1022
(Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage). GPHI stated therein that after the parties presented their
evidence, the fact of foreclosure and the acquisition of the mortgaged properties by PNB were duly
established. In the accompanying Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. TM-1022 (Annulment of the
Real Estate Mortgage), GPHI prayed, inter alia, for the declaration of the nullity of the foreclosure
and auction sale of the mortgaged properties. As a consequence of such an action, the two cases that
GPHI filed before the court a quo henceforth contained an identity of rights asserted and reliefs
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prayed for, the relief being founded on the same factual allegations. Thus, any doubt as to the act of
GPHI of splitting its cause of action has since been removed.
INTERVENTION
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY represented by its
Chairman vs. ABEDIN LIMPAO OSOP
Jurisprudence describes intervention as "a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve
a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings." "The right to intervene is not an
absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing it."
Facts:
This case ensued because of a petition for the issuance of temporary restraining order filed
by respondent Osop against Chancellor Muslim praying that he desist from implementing the
memorandum he issued terminating the services of Osop. Consequently, trial ensued. When the
case was already at the Court of Appeals, the petitioner Board of Regents of the Mindanao State
University filed a motion to intervene under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals,
however, denied the motion. Hence, the current petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
MSU anchors its right to intervene on Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. MSU stresses
that it has a legal interest in the controversy considering that, ultimately, it will be the one liable for
the relief Osop prays for, particularly, Osops reinstatement at MSU-GSC.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by the Board of Regents of MSU should be
granted.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the motion to
intervene filed by the Board of Regents of MSU.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
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In Alfelor v. Halasan, the Court held that:
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties;
(4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property
in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
Jurisprudence describes intervention as "a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings." "The right to intervene is
not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it."
While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
itself of the remedy of intervention in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 simply because MSU is not a third party
in the proceedings herein.
In Osops Amended Complaint before the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as one of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 6381. MSU came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served
with summons. It participated in Civil Case No. 6381, where it was represented by Atty. Fontanilla,
counsel for Muslim and Ramos, who was deputized by the OSG as counsel for MSU. MSU adopted
the Answer to the Amended Complaint of its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos, and also joined
Muslim and Ramos in subsequent pleadings filed before the RTC in Civil Case No. 6381. Evidently,
the rights and interests of MSU were duly presented before the RTC in Civil Case No. 6381.
Unfortunately, the RTC issued the Orders dated March 20, 2003 and August 21, 2003 in Civil Case
No. 6381 adverse to MSU and its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos.
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE
CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC.
Although Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may
be filed. This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been
granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after
a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has
already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has
already become final and executory.
Facts:
On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125 hectares, located in
Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal (subject property), which was docketed as Land Reg. Case No.
N-5098. CFI, on November 16, 1965, confirms the title of Landicho. Thereafter, on December 22,
1965, it ordered the Register of Deeds to issue OCT in favor of Landicho. Accordingly, the Register
of Deeds issued Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16768111 in Landichos name covering the subject
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property. Notably, the Register of Deeds issued TCT instead of OCT as directed by the court. The
subject property was then sold several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled,
new TCTs were accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the subject property could be traced
from Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI) then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI) and
finally, to herein respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI) on July 15,
1975.
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed another Deed of Absolute Sales over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June
1, 1998, Landicho died. Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez, asserting that he was
Landichos lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC, Branch 75, of San
Mateo, Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged therein that the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
which confirmed Landichos title over the subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez
specifically stated that no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued
by the ROD in Landichos name. In the course of the proceedings concerning the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted as his Exhibit GG TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but
alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC
a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its
intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal
interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. The trial
Court denied the Motion to Intervene. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of RTC and held that
the Motion to Intervene is proper.
Issue:
Whether the Motion to Intervene that was filed by PCCAI is proper
Ruling:
Yes.
Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of
which read:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene.A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene
in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition ofjudgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-inintervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have
also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be
heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the
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judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the
assailed order has already become final and executory.
The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As the
registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property.
The particular circumstances of this case justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on
intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only
after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 and was issued
TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975 while Rodriguez bought the subject property from
Landicho on November 14, 1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and
Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the
November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only to oppose
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered in its
name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after
learning of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N5098 via the November 3, 2006
subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was
the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this reason, the RTC should
have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
JUDGEMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
(GMC) AND LAPU-LAPU DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING Corporation (LLDHc)
G.R. No. 167000 & 169971, June 8, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including
matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time.
Facts:
Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC) was the registered owner of
seventy-eight (78) lots (subject lots), situated in Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City. LLDHC and
the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan Agreement for the development of the subject lots. GSIS
agreed to extend a Twenty-Five Million Peso-loan (P25,000,000.00) to LLDHC. To secure the
payment of the loan, LLDHC executed a real estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of GSIS.
For LLDHCs failed to pay, so GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. GSIS acquired the subject lots,
and was able to consolidate its ownership over the subject. GMC offered to purchase on
installments the subject lots from GSIS. GSIS accepted the offer and on February 26, 1980, executed
a Deed of Conditional Sale over the subject lots.
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LLDHC filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ of Mandatory Injunction
against GSIS before the RTC of Manila (Manila RTC). This became Civil Case No. R-82-3429. On May
10, 1994, the Manila RTC rendered a Decision17 in Civil Case No. R-82-3429. The Manila RTC held
that GSIS was unable to prove the alleged violations committed by LLDHC to warrant the
foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject lots. Thus, the Manila RTC annulled the foreclosure
made by GSIS and ordered LLDHC to pay GSIS the balance of its loan with interest.
GMC filed its own complaint against GSIS for Specific Performance with Damages before the
Lapu-Lapu RTC. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-L and it sought to compel GSIS
to execute a Final Deed of Sale over the subject lots since the purchase price had already been fully
paid by GMC. The Lapu-Lapu RTC held that there existed a valid and binding sales contract between
GSIS and GMC, which GSIS could not continue to ignore without any justifiable reason especially
since GMC had already fully complied with its obligations.
Armed with the Manila RTC decision, LLDHC, on July 27, 1994, filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision. However, such
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. No appeal having been taken by LLDHC, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696 became final and executor. In a last ditch
attempt to annul the decision of the CA, this petition was brought the Supreme Court which
likewise denied the said petition.
Consequently, on November 28, 1996, the Lapu-Lapu RTC issued an Order directing the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L. LLDHC filed a Petition for Certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals While the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44052 was in effect, the Manila RTC, on August 1, 1997, issued a Writ of Execution.
The Sheriff implemented the Writ and ordered the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to cancel the
consolidated certificates of title issued in the name of GSIS and to issue new ones in favor of LLDHC.
With no similar restraining order against the execution of the Manila RTC Decision, a Writ of
Possession was issued on August 21, 1997 to cause GSIS and all persons claiming rights under it to
vacate the properties in question and to place LLDHC in peaceful possession thereof. All of the
parties filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals.
In G.R. No. 167000, GSIS is assailing the Orders issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC on March 11,
2004 and May 7, 2004 for being legally unenforceable on GSIS because the titles of the 78 lots in
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City were already in LLDHCs name, due to the final and executory
judgment rendered by the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429.
In G.R. No. 169971, GMC is praying that the decision of the Special Nineteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 be reversed and set aside. GMC is claiming that the
Court of Appeals, in rendering the said decision, committed a palpable legal error by overruling
several final decisions rendered by the Lapu-Lapu RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 constitutes a
supervening event, which should be admitted as an exception to the doctrine of finality of
judgments
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2. Whether or not the September 23, 2005 Decision of the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 and GSISs Petition in G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res judicata
3. Whether or not there is a legal and physical impossibility for GSIS to comply with the March 11,
2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L
4. Whether or not LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling:
1. No, the decision of the Manila RTC does not constitute a supervening event.
It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may not be changed, altered or modified in any way even if the modification were for
the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. This is referred to as the "doctrine
of finality of judgments," and this doctrine applies even to the highest court of the land.
This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that the doctrine of finality of judgments admits
of certain exceptions, namely: "the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not
yet in existence at that time.
The Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L was promulgated on February 24,
1992, while the Manila RTC Decision in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 was promulgated on May 10,
1994. As early as December 6, 1993, both GSISs and LLDHCs appeals of the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Decision were dismissed by the said RTC.87 Only GSIS moved to reconsider this dismissal, which
was denied on July 6, 1994.88 Strictly speaking, the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision should have attained
finality at that stage; however, LLDHC filed with the Court of Appeals its Petition for Annulment of
Judgment (CA-G.R. SP No. 34696) on July 27, 1994 and it used therein the Manila RTC Decision as
its main ground for annulment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.
The Court of Appeals nonetheless dismissed LLDHCs Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696,89 and that became final and executory on January 28, 1995,90 after
LLDHC interposed no appeal. The entry of judgment in this case was issued on August 18, 1995.91
Moreover, the similar petition of LLDHC before this Court in G.R. No. 118633 was decided on
September 6, 1996 and became final and executory on December 23, 1996. Therefore, the ruling by
the Manila RTC is evidently not a supervening event. It was already in existence even before the
decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L attained finality.
It is settled in jurisprudence that to stay execution of a final judgment, a supervening event
"must create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render
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execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay
immediate execution in the interest of justice."
It likewise does not escape the attention of this Court that the only reason the Manila RTC
Decision was implemented ahead of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision was that LLDHC successfully
secured a TRO from the Court of Appeals through its petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 44052, which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the Manila RTC Decision did not constitute a supervening event that would forestall the execution
of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision. This decision of the Court of Appeals likewise became final and
executory in 1998.
2. Yes. Res Judicata exists in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382
All three parties herein are in agreement with the facts that led to the petitions in this case.
However, not all of them agree that the matters involved in this case have already been judicially
settled. While GMC contends that GSISs petition is barred by res judicata, both GSIS and LLDHC
assert that this Court has not yet decided any similar petition.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is "conclusiveness of judgment." Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or
cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of actions GSIS and LLDHC filed, the doctrine of
res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating the same thing, i.e., the 78 lots in
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, and more importantly, the same contentions and evidence were used
in all causes of action. Evidently, this Court could dispose of this case simply upon the application of
the principle of res judicata. It is clear that GSISs petition in G.R. No. 167000 and LLDHCs petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 should have never reached those stages for having been barred by a final
and executory judgment on their claims. However, considering the nature of the case before us, this
Court is compelled to make a final determination of the issues in the interest of substantial justice
and to end the wasteful use of our courts time and resources.
3. There is no legal and physical impossibility for GSIS to comply with the Lapu-Lapu RTCs orders.
While the previous orders and writs of execution issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC required the
GSIS to execute the final deed of sale and to deliver the subject properties, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, in its
subsequent Orders, modified this by directing its order to the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.
In its July 21, 1997 Order,109 the Lapu-Lapu RTC, seeing GSISs obstinate refusal to implement the
courts previous orders, directed the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to cancel the Transfer
Certificates of Title of the subject properties and to issue new ones in the name of GMC, and to
deliver the same to GMC.
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GSIS had nothing to comply with insofar as the titles to, and possession of, the subject
properties were concerned, the Orders being clearly directed towards the Sheriff of the Lapu-Lapu
RTC and the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Hence, GSISs argument of legal and physical
impossibility of compliance with the assailed Orders is baseless.
4. This Court already found LLDHC guilty of forum shopping and was adjudged to pay treble costs
way back in 2002
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) from another.
In the present case, after the Lapulapu RTC had rendered its Decision in favor of private
respondent, petitioner filed several petitions before this Court and the CA essentially seeking the
annulment thereof. True, petitioner had filed its Complaint in the Manila RTC before private
respondent filed its own suit in the Lapulapu RTC. Records, however, show that private respondent
learned of the Manila case only when petitioner filed its Motion for Intervention in the Lapulapu
RTC. When GMC filed its own Motion to Intervene in the Manila RTC, it was promptly rebuffed by
the judge therein. On the other hand, petitioner was able to present its side and to participate fully
in the proceedings before the Lapulapu RTC.
Petitioner in the present case sued twice before the CA and thrice before this Court, alleging
substantially the same facts and circumstances, raising essentially the same issues, and praying for
almost identical reliefs for the annulment of the Decision rendered by the Lapulapu RTC. This
insidious practice of repeatedly bringing essentially the same action -- albeit disguised in various
nomenclatures -- before different courts at different times is forum shopping no less. Because of
petitioners actions, the execution of the Lapulapu Decision has been needlessly delayed and several
courts vexed.
It is undeniable that both LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of forum shopping, for having gone
through several actions and proceedings from the lowest court to this Court in the hopes that they
will obtain a decision favorable to them. In all those actions, only one issue was in contention: the
ownership of the subject lots.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.
Facts:
Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardian over the property of his father, Cirilo Oropesa.
It is alleged among others that the Cirilo Oropesa has been afflicted with several maladies
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and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and
memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the Cirilo was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
After presenting evidence, Nilo Oropesa filed a manifestation resting his case. However, Nilo
failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, Cirilo Oropesa filed his Omnibus Motion to grant leave to file his demurrer to evidence
which the trial court granted. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision to dismiss the petition filed
by Nilo on the ground that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent.
Issue:
Whether the RTC correctly ruled in granting the demurrer of evidence of Cirilo
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall
have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence
on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to
the relief sought.
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for
guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect
of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude
a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief.
FAILURE TO FILE AN APPELANTS BRIEF
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Facts:
hearings.
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Issue:
Ruling:
No.
meritorious.
MODES OF APPEALS
ROMULO TINDOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal to this Court by way of
a Petition for Review on Certiorari should raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth
in the petition. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. Thus, the Court may be minded to review the
factual findings of the CA only in the presence of any of the following circumstances: 1) the conclusion
is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; 5) the findings of fact are conflicting; 6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the
factual findings are based; 7) the findings of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; 8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; 10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and 11) such findings are
contrary to the admission of both parties.
Facts:
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Petitioner SPO1 Romulo Tindoy together with his fellow police officers, who went into
hiding, were charged with the crime of homicide for the death of Dominador Viernes whom they
assaulted in the early evening of August 29, 1993 when they responded to a call for domestic
violence involving the victim and her common law wife Elsie Fernandez.
The prosecution claims, mainly through Elsie Fernandez, that when the police brought her
and the victim to the police sub-station at Taguig City, there was a heated exchange of statements
which agitated PO1 Fernandez and caused him to box the victim who fell and hit his head against
the wall. SPO1 Tindoy then picked the victim up from the floor and together with two other police
officers dragged the victim to the comfort room and from a distance Elsie Fernandez managed to
see the victim being mauled to the head by the said police officers, which lasted for three to five
minutes.
On August 31, 1993, the victim was rushed to the hospital complaining of chills and severe
headache and two (2) days later he died due to traumatic head injuries, as disclosed by the autopsy
report.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that there was physical confrontation between the
victim and witness Elsie Fernandez where the latter used a piece of wood and struck the former to
the head. It further alleged that the victim even admitted to his doctor that the bruise on his left eye
was due to the piece of wood used by his wife to hit him.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that SPO1 Romulo Tindoy is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Before the Court, Tindoy argues that there was
misappreciation of the evidence that shows Elsie Fernandez as the main culprit for the death of the
victim.
Issue:
Whether or not, as a factual issue, the lower courts erred in giving full faith and credit to the
narration of the principal witness and common law wife of the victim.
Ruling:
SPO1 Tindoy would have the Court review once more the factual findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the CA. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal to
this Court by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari should raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth in the petition. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. Thus, the
Court may be minded to review the factual findings of the CA only in the presence of any of the
following circumstances: 1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 2)
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are conflicting; 6) there
is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; 7) the findings of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; 8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court; 9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; 10) the findings of the CA are beyond the
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issues of the case; and 11) such findings are contrary to the admission of both parties. None of these
exceptions are availing in the instant case.
There is no reason to doubt the positive testimony of Elsie Fernandez, which was found by
the trial court as both convincing and credible. Basic is the rule that findings of the trial court,
especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are generally accorded great weight and
respect on appeal. When the issue is one of credibility, the Court will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the outcome of the case. The trial courts are in a better position to decide
questions of credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during trial.
Furthermore, testimony of Elsie Fernandez that the victim was mauled is corroborated by
three (3) doctors who examined the victim, namely: Dr. Raul Palma, Dr. Nestor Bautista and Dr.
Florante Baltazar. On the opposite end, the countervailing evidence of the defense is weak and its
assertion that Elsie Fernandez inflicted the fatal blows upon the victim using a piece of wood is
highly incredible. The defense failed to present any witness who actually saw Elsie Fernandez hit
the victim with a piece of wood. Even if the Court were to assume for the sake of argument that she
hit the victim with a piece of wood, there is no proof that the same could have produced severe
multiple head injuries as sustained by the victim.
PEDRO GABRIEL ET. AL. vs. MURMURAY JAMIAS ET. AL.
Petitioners assertion in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition that
(a) the foregoing documents/pleadings were not material to the issues they raised and (b) anyway, the
records of the case may be ordered elevated by the CA, cannot excuse them from failing to comply with
the requirement of a petition for review under Rule 43. We reiterate here that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process as it is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
Facts:
Spouses Martin and Delfina Jamias owned a large tract of rice land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 23299. When the spouses died, their heirs herein respondents inherited and
partitioned this agricultural estate at 1/7 each for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36192 was
issued in their names.
In May 1981, the subject estate was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under P.D.
No. 27 and consequently herein petitioners, as agrarian reform beneficiaries were issued with
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) and later emancipation patents. Respondents acted swiftly and
sought for exemption and/or retention of seven (7) hectares each of the estate. This was resolved
by the DAR and eventually affirmed by the Court in favor of the respondents. After which, the
respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution with the DAR, though, they were instead
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referred to the DARAB for an appropriate action for the cancellation or recall of the emancipation
patents covering the retained areas.
Petitioners assailed the petitions for cancellation and recall of emancipation patents filed by
the respondents on the main ground of lack of jurisdiction of the DARAB Regional Office and later
before the DARAB Central Office. Failing to obtain a favorable ruling, petitioners went to the CA on a
petition for review under Rule 43, which likewise merited denial due to being deficient in form and
substance, having no attached copies of the annexes materially referred to therein in violation of
Section 6(c) in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 43.
Petitioners argue principally, in their petition before this Court, the lack of jurisdiction of
DARAB to cancel and recall emancipation patents and land titles issued consequent thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition of herein petitioners for their failure
to attach the pertinent records of the case.
Ruling:
Yes, non-compliance with the procedural requirements is fatal to the subject petition.
The disputed Resolutions of the CA dismissed petitioners appeal on purely technical
grounds, specifically their failure to attach copies of pertinent documents and/or pleadings
materially referred therein. Yet, the petition before this Court neither mentions nor presents
arguments with respect to such procedural grounds.
Under Rule 43, Section 6(c) of Rules of Court, a petition for review shall be accompanied by
a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers. Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition pursuant
to Section 7 of the same Rule.
Petitioners assertion in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition
that (a) the foregoing documents/pleadings were not material to the issues they raised and (b)
anyway, the records of the case may be ordered elevated by the CA, cannot excuse them from failing
to comply with the requirement of a petition for review under Rule 43. We reiterate here that the
right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process as it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right
to appeal.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION
(SCBEU)
G.R. No. 165550, October 08, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
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The Court disagrees with Standard Chartered that the conclusion drawn by the CA from the
evidence based on record is a question of law. This is the opposite definition of a question of law. Its
reliance on the ruling in Commissioner of Immigration vs. Garcia that when the facts are undisputed,
then the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom by the Court of Appeals is correct
is a question of law is misplaced. In the present case, the facts are disputed. SCBEU claims that there is
an existing company practice entitling Standard Chartereds emplo-yees to outpatient medicine
reimbursements and spouses of its male employees to maternity benefits while the latter argues the
contrary.
Facts:
Petitioner Standard Chartered entered into a CBA with its employees union (or SCBEU)
which provided, among others, for medical benefits, particularly under Article XI, Section thereof,
the employees were covered by group hospitalization and major surgical insurance plan including
maternity benefits and that were initially provided by Philippine American Life Insurance
Company. Standard Chartered then changed its insurance provider to Maxicare.
Subsequently, SCBEU charged Standard Chartered with ULP before the DOLE for alleged
violation of the economic provisions of the CBA and diminution or removal of benefits thru the
exclusion of outpatient medicine reimbursements and maternity benefits granted to the spouses of
male employees under the new policy provided by Maxicare, which the bank opposed.
The DOLE ultimately ruled in favor SCBEU and which was later affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the assignment of errors of Standard Chartered, requiring a factual review
of the records, can be allowed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
No, the recourse under Rule 45 excludes a review of factual matters.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised
on appeal by certiorari. Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts and that it is neither the function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence of the
parties all over again.
Standard Chartered urges this Court to determine if (i) the maternity benefits provided to
its female employees extend to the spouses of its male employees and if (ii) its employees are
entitled to outpatient medicine reimbursements as a matter of company practice. Indeed, Standard
Chartered moves this Court to scrutinize the evidence based on record. Such language militates
against its contention that the petition involves purely questions of law.
The Court disagrees with Standard Chartered that the conclusion drawn by the CA from the
evidence based on record is a question of law. This is the opposite definition of a question of law. Its
reliance on the ruling in Commissioner of Immigration vs. Garcia that when the facts are undisputed,
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then the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom by the Court of Appeals is
correct is a question of law is misplaced. In the present case, the facts are disputed. SCBEU claims
that there is an existing company practice entitling Standard Chartereds emplo-yees to outpatient
medicine reimbursements and spouses of its male employees to maternity benefits while the latter
argues the contrary.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN
Moreover, it is the Courts advice to lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be
cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities.
Facts:
Evaristo Tiotien, represented herein by his heirs, initiated a land registration case over a
considerably large tract of land in La Trinidad, Benguet which were opposed by a certain Santiago,
the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet and the Republic represented by the OSG. The Government
anchors its opposition on the alleged fact that the property is located within the communal forest of
La Trinidad, Benguet and therefore part of the inalienable land of public domain.
The land registration court granted the application of Tiotien to which the Government filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. The lower court treated that motion as pro forma which did not toll
the period to appeal and consequently denying the Notice of Appeal. The CA sustained this denial of
the lower court.
In its petition, the OSG claims that it was not immediately furnished with the assailed Order
denying the Motion of the Municipality of La Trinidad and so it was only upon its receipt that the
period to appeal should have started to run. In the alternative, the OSG prays that issues of
procedure should be set aside and the appeal be allowed considering the strong grounds on which
it is based.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the notice of appeal is proper.
Ruling:
Yes, the denial of the notice of appeal is erroneous.
The relevant facts involving the procedural issues in this case are undisputed. Petitioner
and the Municipality received a notice of the adverted decision of the land registration court on
September 6 and 7, 2001, respectively. The Municipality timely filed its Motion for Reconside-ration
of the said judgment on September 20, 2001. The provincial prosecutor adopted this Motion of the
Municipality on October 5, 2001 which was beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of
the Republic of a copy of the decision. The land registration court denied the said Motion in its
Resolution dated December 6, 2001. The OSG was not furnished with a notice of such Resolution.
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The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial on January 4, 2002 when it
received the Letter dated December 19, 2001 of the said prosecutor. The OSG filed the subject
notice of appeal for the Republic only on January 11, 2002 which the land registration court denied
for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal which the said
court reckoned from September 6, 2001.
In deciding this case, the Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an
appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to
appeal from a judgment of the court.
Moreover, it is the Courts advice to lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be
cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities.
JOSE SANTOS vs. COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2)
(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction all cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
constitutes an exception to the aforesaid general rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance
where an appellate review solely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this Court. In
the case at bar, the question on whether Santos can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is undoubtedly a
question of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that he has previously
retired from the government under a particular statute and that he was re-employed by the
government. Thus, he availed of the proper remedy which is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose S. Santos retired from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act 1616 after rendering almost 21 years of service. Thereafter, petitioner was reemployed in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. In 1997, petitioner initiated moves to
avail of early retirement under R.A. 660. He requested and received from the Government Service
Insurance System Operating Unit a tentative computation of retirement benefits under R.A. 660
amounting to P667,937.40. Petitioner formally applied for retirement under R.A. 660. However, the
GSIS Operating Unit informed petitioner that he could no longer retire under R.A. 660 but he could
do so under R.A. 8291, under which petitioner is entitled to a reduced benefit of P81,557.20. This
computation did not consider petitioners 20.91553 years of service with the DAR prior to his
previous retirement. vs.
Petitioner Santos appealed to respondent GSIS Committee on Claims but the latter affirmed
the GSIS Operating Units computation. Petitioner Santos filed with the GSIS Board of Trustees a
complaint against GSIS Operating Unit but the GSIS Board of Trustees denied petitioners complaint.
In the meantime, petitioner Santos was compulsorily retired for reaching the age of sixty-five.
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Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The CA rendered the challenged decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The CA is of
the belief that the focal issue raised is whether or not the petitioner can choose to retire under
either Republic Act 8291 or Republic Act 660, which is a pure question of law. As such, it is not
vested with jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case since there is no dispute with respect to the
fact that when an appeal raised only pure question of law, it is only the Supreme Court which has
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
In Posadas-Moya and Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. Greenfield Development Corporation,
et al., the Court distinguished a question of law from one of fact, thus:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.
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Thus, the question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is
undoubtedly a question of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that
he has previously retired from the government under a particular statute and that he was reemployed by the government. These facts are admitted and there is no need for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented.
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2)
(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction all cases
in which only an error or question of law is involved. It should not be overlooked, however, that the
same provision vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein is prefaced by the
statement that it may review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, the judgments or final orders of lower courts in the cases therein
enumerated. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid
general rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review solely on a
question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this Court.
Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the reglementary period to appeal
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As such, a
question of fact or question of law alone or a mix question of fact and law may be appealed to the
CA via Rule 43.
ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (OSPA), OCCIDENTAL LEYTE FARMERS
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (OLFAMCA), UNIFARM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
INC. (UNIFARM) AND ORMOC NORTH DISTRICT IRRIGATION MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
INC. (ONDIMCO), vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., AND ORMOC
SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.
The right demand arbitration is predicated on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
between the parties except when arbitration is expressly required by the law. Also, the party who
demands the right of arbitration must be privy to the agreement upon which he invokes his right,
otherwise, he has no legal personality to pursue a claim.
Facts:
Ormoc Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. (OSPA), Occidental Leyte Farmers MultiPurpose Cooperative, Inc. (OLFAMCA), Unifarm Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (UNIFARM) and
Ormoc North District Irrigation Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (ONDIMCO) are associations
organized by and whose members are individual sugar planters.
Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (Hideco) and Ormoc Sugar Milling Co, Inc. (OSCO) are sugar
centrals engaged in grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by numerous individual sugar
planters, who may or may not be members of an association such as OSPA, OLFAMCA, UNIFARM
and ONDIMCO.
The associations, without impleading any of their individual members, filed petitions with
the RTC for Arbitration against HIDECO and OSCO. The associations claimed that respondents
violated the Milling Contract when they gave to independent planters who did not belong to any
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association the 1% share, instead of reverting said share to the centrals. Petitioners contended that
respondents unduly accorded the independent Planters more benefits and thus prayed that an
order be issued directing the parties to commence with arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the milling contracts. They also demanded that respondents be penalized by increasing their
member Planters 65% share provided in the milling contract by 1%, to 66%.
The sugar centrals filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of action because
petitioners had no milling contract with respondents. According to the sugar centrals, only some
eighty (80) Planters who were members of OSPA, one of the petitioners, executed milling contracts
and not the associations. Therefore, the associations, not being privy to the milling contracts, had
no legal standing whatsoever to demand or sue for arbitration.
The RTC issued a Joint Order denied the motion to dismiss and declared the existence of a
milling contract between the parties. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari is proper
2. Whether or not the associations have legal personality to file the actions against the sugar
centrals
Ruling:
1. No. The instant recourse is improper because the resolution of the CA was a final order
from which the remedy of appeal was available under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. It is elementary
that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied.
The proper mode of recourse for petitioners was to file a petition for review of the CAs decision
under Rule 45.
Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision
not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari. Erroneous findings and conclusions do not render the appellate court
vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari. For where the court has jurisdiction over the case,
even if its findings are not correct, they would, at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctable by certiorari.
2. No. Section 2 of R.A. No. 876 (the Arbitration Law) pertinently provides:
Sec. 2. Persons and matters subject to arbitration. Two or more persons or
parties may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy
existing between them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject
of an action, or the parties to any contract may in such contract agree to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such submission or
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contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law for the revocation of any contract. xxx (Emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision speaks of two modes of arbitration: (a) an agreement to submit to
arbitration some future dispute, usually stipulated upon in a civil contract between the parties, and
known as an agreement to submit to arbitration, and (b) an agreement submitting an existing
matter of difference to arbitrators, termed the submission agreement. Article XX of the milling
contract is an agreement to submit to arbitration because it was made in anticipation of a dispute
that might arise between the parties after the contracts execution.
Except where a compulsory arbitration is provided by statute, the first step toward the
settlement of a difference by arbitration is the entry by the parties into a valid agreement to
arbitrate. An agreement to arbitrate is a contract, the relation of the parties is contractual, and the
rights and liabilities of the parties are controlled by the law of contracts. In an agreement for
arbitration, the ordinary elements of a valid contract must appear, including an agreement to
arbitrate some specific thing, and an agreement to abide by the award, either in express language or
by implication. The requirements that an arbitration agreement must be written and subscribed by
the parties thereto were enunciated by the Court in B.F. Corporation v. CA.
During the proceedings before the CA, it was established that there were more than two
thousand (2,000) Planters in the district at the time the case was commenced at the RTC in
1999. The CA further found that of those 2,000 Planters, only about eighty (80) Planters, who were
all members of petitioner OSPA, in fact individually executed milling contracts with
respondents. No milling contracts signed by members of the other petitioners were presented
before the CA.
By their own allegation, petitioners are associations duly existing and organized under
Philippine law, i.e. they have juridical personalities separate and distinct from that of their member
Planters. It is likewise undisputed that the eighty (80) milling contracts that were presented were
signed only by the member Planter concerned and one of the Centrals as parties. In other words,
none of the petitioners were parties or signatories to the milling contracts. This circumstance is
fatal to petitioners' cause since they anchor their right to demand arbitration from the respondent
sugar centrals upon the arbitration clause found in the milling contracts. There is no legal basis for
petitioners' purported right to demand arbitration when they are not parties to the milling
contracts, especially when the language of the arbitration clause expressly grants the right to
demand arbitration only to the parties to the contract.
Simply put, petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. Only
eighty (80) Planters who were all members of OSPA were shown to have such an agreement to
arbitrate, included as a stipulation in their individual milling contracts. The other petitioners failed
to prove that any of their members had milling contracts with respondents, much less, that
respondents had an agreement to arbitrate with the petitioner associations themselves.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, FRANKLIN M. VELARDE, ROBERT C. NACIANCENO, REY
DIVINO S. DAVAL-SANTOS, SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, PATRICK B. GATAN, LUIS V. MEDINACUE, SILVESTRE A. DE LEON, RAMON V. DUMAUAL, RUBEN A. DE OCAMPO, MARIANO A.
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BENEDICTO II, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA, CESAR E. A. VIRATA, MANUEL B.
ZAMORA, JR., RONALDO B. ZAMORA, FRISCO F. SAN JUAN and ARSENIO B. YULO
G. R. No. 154117, October 2, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Supreme Court respects the findings of the Ombudsman because it is an independent body
tasked to investigate complaints against public officials and is meant to be free from influence from
the judiciary.
Facts:
Francisco Jr. filed an action against the respondents with the Office of Ombudsman alleging
violations of RA 7080 (Plunder), and RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Francisco Jr
contended that the respondents conspired to commit the offenses by increasing the market value of
the lands to be acquired from AMVEL, a private institution, for the construction of the Cavite Toll
Expressway and C-5 link. Under the tax declaration of the lands, they should have been sold to the
government for P4,950.00 per sqm but the lands were sold for P15,350.00 per sqm causing
prejudice of the government.
It was also alleged by Francisco Jr that the transactions were hurriedly made by the
government due to the influence of Brother Mike Velarde with the administration of President
Estrada. It was because the sale was only made in two days during Holy Tuesday and Holy
Wednesday (considered half-working day). After perfection of sale, the government released 50%
of the purchase price for the lands.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. Francisco also filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was also denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
action for lack of evidence
Ruling:
We find no cogent reason to weigh all over again the evidence in this case and to reverse the
findings of the public respondent quoted above. This is because, as we held in Tirol v. COA:
[This] Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. This
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
immeasurable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in as much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals
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or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
More recently, we had occasion to pass upon a similar case, the core issue of which
was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
complaint against the respondents. In that case, we ruled in the negative and, accordingly,
dismissed the petition. Thus, we held:
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional
officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The raison d 'etre for
its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate it from the
long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and
others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, we dwelt
on the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is
vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis
that the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether
there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the
complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance.
Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it
be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the
Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Ombudsman's powers, and respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested by the
Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in
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prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the exercise thereof is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Even if the issues involved here are factual, petitioner invokes the power of the Court to
reverse the decision of the Ombudsman by alleging that the latter acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, as in Morong Water District v. Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman, we find that:
[The] Order and the Resolution of the Ombudsman are based on substantial
evidence. In dismissing the complaint of petitioner, we cannot say that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion so as to call for the exercise of our
supervisory powers over him. This court is not a trier of facts. As long as there is
substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman's decision, that decision will not
be overturned.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, FRANKLIN M. VELARDE, ROBERT C. NACIANCENO, REY
DIVINO S. DAVAL-SANTOS, SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, PATRICK B. GATAN, LUIS V. MEDINACUE, SILVESTRE A. DE LEON, RAMON V. DUMAUAL, RUBEN A. DE OCAMPO, MARIANO A.
BENEDICTO II, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA, CESAR E. A. VIRATA, MANUEL B.
ZAMORA, JR., RONALDO B. ZAMORA, FRISCO F. SAN JUAN and ARSENIO B. YULO
G. R. No. 154117, October 2, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The decision of the Ombudsman on a complaint involving the finding of probable cause in
criminal cases involving public officials may be reviewed by the Supreme Court via Rule 65 and not
Rule 43. Petition for review under Rule 43 as mode of review only applies to decisions of the
Ombusman over administrative cases.
Facts:
Francisco Jr. filed an action against the respondents with the Office of Ombudsman alleging
violations of RA 7080 (Plunder), and RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Francisco Jr
contended that the respondents conspired to commit the offenses by increasing the market value of
the lands to be acquired from AMVEL, a private institution, for the construction of the Cavite Toll
Expressway and C-5 link. Under the tax declaration of the lands, they should have been sold to the
government for P4,950.00 per sqm but the lands were sold for P15,350.00 per sqm causing
prejudice of the government.
It was also alleged by Francisco Jr that the transactions were hurriedly made by the
government due to the influence of Brother Mike Velarde with the administration of President
Estrada. It was because the sale was only made in two days during Holy Tuesday and Holy
Wednesday (considered half-working day). After perfection of sale, the government released 50%
of the purchase price for the lands.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence. Francisco also filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was also denied. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. The Ombudsman and the respondents claimed that the petition must be
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dismissed because Francisco employed the wrong mode of appeal and should have filed a petition
for review under Rule 43.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition must be dismissed on the ground of wrong mode of appeal
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Private respondents Velarde aver that the courts referred to in the provision quoted above
are the courts that compose the integrated judicial system and do not include quasi-judicial bodies
or agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsman. They claim that the proper mode of appeal in
questioning the final judgment, order, or resolution of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies is provided
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
To support their contention that Rule 43 applies to this case, private respondents rely on
the Courts ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, which provides:
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasijudicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to
"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is
a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical
rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43
even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although
the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-created
body. (Emphasis ours.)
Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief from final judgments,
orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of the Ombudsman, as has
been repeatedly held by this Court, we find that the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 posited by
private respondents Velarde is not proper either. This Court subsequently held that under the
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ruling in Fabian, all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said
remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases involving criminal or non-administrative charges filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, which is the situation in the case before us now. As we further
stated in Tirol v. Del Rosario:
[An] aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under Rule 65, and not Rule
45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released by the
government to a private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road right-of-way in a major
infrastructure project that was undertaken by the former and that naturally affected the general
public. Therefore, even if this case was erroneously filed as shown above, and may be dismissed
outright under the rules, the Court deems it appropriate to brush aside technicalities of procedure,
as this involves matters of transcendental importance to the public; and to consider the petition as
one for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and MARIA
CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
There is no violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts where a decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) is appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
raising only questions of law.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.
The owner of the property is not an indispensable party in an action for expropriation. Failure
to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an actionthe remedy is to
implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable
A declaration of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary civil action such as an action for
reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it involves the establishment of a
status or right While the appropriate special proceeding for declaration of heirship would be the
settlement of the estate of the decedent, nonetheless, an action for quieting of title is also a special
proceeding, specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on declaratory relief and similar
remedies.
Facts:
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This case involves 7 consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition
for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court respectively, arising from actions for
quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
The consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government
of the United States (1914 Cacho case).
In the said case, sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria Cacho (Doa Demetria)
applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in what was
then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy.
Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doa Demetrias applications for registration were docketed as
GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot 1, the
smaller parcel of land. Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos
(Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a
deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. The application
in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot 2, the bigger parcel of land. Doa Demetria purportedly
purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle,
Datto Anandog, who died without issue.
Only the Government opposed Doa Demetrias applications for registration on the ground
that the two parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military
reservation, generally known as Camp Overton. The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only. Doa Demetria
appealed to this Court. The Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision. Eighty-three years later, in
1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2
in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals.
In the 1997 Cacho Case, on June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa
Demetrias son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Teofilos
petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC,
the RTC initially dismissed Teofilos petition for reconstitution of titles because there was
inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. In opposing
Teofilos petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional
infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doa
Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever
issued in Doa Demetrias name; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilos petition and ordering the reconstitution and
re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and
18969. Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the
judgment of CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos.
10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained
finality. The Court further reasoned that to sustain the CA ruling as regards requiring petitioners to
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fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res
judicata.
Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real party-in-interest,
the Court found that these were sufficiently established by the records. The Court stressed that the
execution of public documents is entitled to the presumption of regularity and proof is required to
assail and controvert the same. The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of
the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before
the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case.
In G.R. No. 170375 regarding the Expropriation Case, a Complaint for Expropriation was
originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latters mortgagee, the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTC-Branch 1,
presided over by Judge Mangotara.
During the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532
square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the
Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC
failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106,
MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1
granted the Motion to Dismiss. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the
substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTCBranch 1. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this
Court. Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the
parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint seeking
to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successorsin-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.
MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA
case within the prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to
file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable
delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the
action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of
estoppel by laches.
RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of
the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the
RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the
Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the RTC-Branch 1. MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 106 for failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC
insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and forum shopping
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considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the
same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution denying for lack of merit the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion
to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the
Expropriation Case. This Court notes that the Republic has filed reversion proceedings involving the
same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the RTC Lanao del Norte, Iligan City
Branch 4. The Republic, however, did not state such fact in its Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping attached to its Supplemental Complaint. It is therefore guilty of forum shopping.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution insofar as it dismissed
Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora. The Republic filed with this
Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively. LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the
RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision in Civil Case
No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH. In addition, the CA held that the 1997 Cacho case only
determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the
Philippine Consulate General in the U.S.A. The decision of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case, which
had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo ownership of the parcels of land as it
merely ordered the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition.
CA agreed in the finding of the RTC-Branch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly
supports Vidals claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doa Demetria. The
appellate court further adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject
parcels of land. The prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30 years. Vidals rights
as Doa Demetrias successor-in-interest accrued upon the latters death in 1974, and only 24 years
thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidals cause
of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action was filed within the prescriptive period
provided by law, the doctrine of laches was also inapplicable.
In G.R. No. 173401 regarding the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, the Republic
filed a Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 and 0-1201 and Reversion against the late
Doa Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and
LANDTRADE. Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated December 23, 2004 on the
grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of action. Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch
4 issued an Order declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default.
RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No.
6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH. The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic
had no cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doa Demetria committed any
wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Doa Demetria had sufficiently
proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC in GLRO Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of
land. The Regalian doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doa
Demetria and segregated from the mass of the public domain.
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RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of forum shopping because there is between this
case, on one hand, and the 1914and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of parties, as well as
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming rights of ownership
over the same parcels of land. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of
its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTC-Branch 4.
Finally, the Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July 12,
2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106 alleged that Respondent Judge
committed errors in its judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action pursuant to Section
11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. Whether an expropriation proceeding is an action quasi in rem wherein the fact that the owner
of the property is made a party to the action is not essentially indispensable
3. Whether petitioner committed any forum shopping with the filing of the reversion complaint
docketed as civil case no. 6686 which is pending before branch 4 of the regional trial court of
Iligan City.
4. Whether declaration of heirship can be made in an ordinary civil action such as an action for
reconveyance.
Ruling:
1. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to Rule 3,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately.
MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the party not
joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action.
Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation
proceedings may be instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned appears to
be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals. The same rule
provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest in the property sought to be
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense
in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a
complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an
expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.
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To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land
reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Therefore, the owner
of the property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil
Case No. 106. Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable
party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant
immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation
2. The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been
affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case.
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property
to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court
held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals, the defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming
to own the property. When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not necessarily the
only person who is entitled to compensation.
Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be
named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the
Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party. Also erroneous was the
dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed
only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
3. The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1)
simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil
Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it
conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the expropriation case but asserted
ownership of the same properties in the reversion case.
There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686)
for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The
Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion was filed by the Republic with the RTC. The
records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was filed with
the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was filed after the Complaint
for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing
of the latter. Even then, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for
Cancellation of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that the
Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang, the Court laid down the circumstances when forum
shopping exists:
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties,
either
simultaneously
or
successively,
to
secure
a
favorable
judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
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which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forum-shopping is
an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.
Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686.
4. A declaration of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary civil action such as an action for
reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it involves the establishment
of a status or right.
The appropriate special proceeding would have been the settlement of the estate of the
decedent. Nonetheless, an action for quieting of title is also a special proceeding, specifically
governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on declaratory relief and similar remedies. Actions for
declaratory relief and other similar remedies are distinguished from ordinary civil actions because
in declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these
documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioners rights and duties thereunder.
The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to declaratory relief
as this special civil action presupposes that there has been no breach or violation of the instruments
involved. Consequently, unlike other judgments, the judgment in an action for declaratory relief
does not essentially entail any executional process as the only relief to be properly granted therein
is a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under the instrument, although some
exceptions have been recognized under certain situations.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. ANGEL U. DEL VILLAR
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 562000, in case a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed has been filed, the 60-day period to file a petition
for certiorari shall be computed from notice of the denial of such motion.
Facts:
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company), one of the leading and largest
manufacturers of beverages in the country, initially hired respondent Angel U. del Villar (Del Villar)
as Physical Distribution Fleet Manager with a job grade of S-7 and monthly salary of P50,000.00,
aside from the use of a company car, gasoline allowance, and annual foreign travel, among other
benefits. In 1992, as part of the reorganization of the Company, Del Villar became the
Transportation Services Manager, under the Business Logistic Directorate, headed by Director
Edgardo I. San Juan (San Juan). As Transportation Services Manager, Del Villar prepares the budget
for the vehicles of the Company nationwide.
Del Villar submitted a Report to the Company President, Natale Di Cosmo (Di Cosmo),
detailing an alleged fraudulent scheme undertaken by certain Company officials in conspiracy with
local truck manufacturers, overpricing the trucks purchased by the Company by as much
as P70,000.00 each. Del Villar also implicated San Juan and Jose L. Pineda, Jr. (Pineda), among other
Company officials, as part of the conspiracy. Pineda then served as the Executive Assistant in the
Business Logistic Directorate in charge of the Refrigeration Services of the Company.
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In 1996, the Company embarked on a reorganization of the Business Logistic Directorate. As
a result, the functions related to Refrigeration were assigned to the Transportation Services
Manager, which was renamed the Transportation and Refrigeration Services Manager. Mr.
Nathaniel Evangelista, the Physical Distribution Superintendent of the Zamboanga Plant, was
appointed the Corporate Transportation and Refrigeration Services Manager, replacing both Del
Villar and Pineda, who were in charge of the Transportation Services and Refrigeration Services of
the Company, respectively. Pineda was then appointed as the Corporate Purchasing and Materials
Control Manager, while Del Villar as Pinedas Staff Assistant.
Seven months after the submission of his Report on the fraudulent scheme of several
company officials, Del Villar received a Memorandum from San Juan informing him that he was
designated as Staff Assistant to the Corporate Purchasing and Materials Control Manager, with a job
grade of NS-VII, hence, he ceased to be entitled to the benefits accruing to an S-7 position under
existing company rules and policies; and he should turn over the vehicle assigned to him as
Transportation Services Manager to Pineda.
Although as the Staff Assistant of the Corporate Purchasing and Materials Control Manager,
Del Villar continued to receive the same salary as Transportation Services Manager, but his car and
other privileges were withdrawn and he spent his time at his new post sitting at a desk with no
meaningful work whatsoever. Del Villar believed that he was demoted by the Company to force him
to resign. Unable to endure any further the harassment, Del Villar filed with the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC a complaint against the Company for illegal demotion and forfeiture of company
privileges.
The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss, instead of a position paper, praying for the
dismissal of Del Villars complaint on the ground that Del Villar had no cause of action.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Del Villar. The Company, in filing a Motion to Dismiss,
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and the failure of the
Company to deny or rebut Del Villars allegations of bad faith on the part of the Company, gave rise
to the presumption against the latter. It further held that Del Villar was illegally dismissed stating
that he was not outrightly dismissed; instead, he was removed from his former position as
Transportation Services Manager, and demoted to Staff Assistant to the Corporate Purchasing and
Materials Control Manager.
Del Villar filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated February 26,
1999. Del Villar received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated April 26, 1999, denying his Motion
for Reconsideration, on May 21, 1999. Contrariwise, NLRC held that Del Villar was not demoted
and that the Company has not acted in bad faith or with malice. Del Villar moved for the
reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC Decision, but the NLRC denied such motion for lack of merit.
Del Villar appealed to Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53815. CA decided that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion by turning a blind eye on several indicia that clearly showed Del Villar was demoted
without any lawful reason and ruled that there is a bad faith against the Company.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari filed by Del Villar was filed out of time.
Ruling:
No. Del Villars Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was seasonably filed.
While CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was pending before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was amended anew by Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000, which took effect on
September 1, 2000, to read:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphases ours.)
It is clear that under Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000, in case a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed has been filed,
the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari shall be computed from notice of the denial
of such motion.
The crucial question now is whether Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000 should be applied
retroactively to Del Villars Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815.
The Court answer affirmatively. As we explained in Perez v. Hermano:
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to
run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is
filed.
In the instant case, Del Villar filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated
February 26, 1999. Del Villar received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated April 26, 1999, denying
his Motion for Reconsideration, on May 21, 1999. As already settled by jurisprudence, Del Villar had
a fresh period of 60 days from May 21, 1999 within which to file his Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Keeping in mind the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be
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excluded and the last day included, exactly 60 days had elapsed from May 21, 1999 when Del Villar
filed his Petition with the appellate court on July 20, 1999. Hence, without a doubt, Del Villars
Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was seasonably filed.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES JOEL R. UMANDAP and FELICIDAD D.
UMANDAP
It is the inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.
Facts:
Spouses Joel and Felicidad Umandap were owners of an agricultural land in Sandoval and
Mendoza, Roxas, Palawan, with an area of 412.6745 hectares. On August 8, 1989, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 406.9003 hectares of the said land under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) offered to compensate the spouses Umandap the amount of P2,512,879.88 for the land. The
offer was later raised toP3,392,952.78.
Since the spouses Umandap rejected the offer and the parties failed to agree on the
appropriate valuation, a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just
compensation was commenced before the DARs Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)
Conchita Minas. On December 9, 2002, Adjudicator Minas fixed the value of just compensation for
the land at P23,909,608.86. LBP, dissatisfied with the valuation, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palawan a Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 3750.
Spouses Umandap filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, alleging that LBP had no cause of
action against them and that the petition failed to attach the proper certification against forum
shopping. The RTC issued its Order dismissing the petition on the ground that LBP failed to submit
a proper certification against forum shopping.
On February 3, 2003, the RTC held that since LBPs Operation Center Manager for Region
IV Atty. Delfin Macaraeg is neither an officer nor a director of LBP, he is not qualified to sign the
certification without a board resolution delegating such authority to him.
On February 21, 2003,LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto a
certification signed by LBP President Margarito B. Teves, confirming Atty. Macaraegs authority to
sign the certification. . On April 30, 2003, RTC denied the Motion.
On June 3, 2003, LBP refiled the Petition. The spouses Umandap filed a Motion to Dismiss
anew, pointing out that Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure provides for a 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the Decision of the Adjudicator, and that the refiled petition was filed beyond
this period.
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On June 30, 2003, RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that even though the previous
dismissal was without prejudice, LBP nevertheless failed to refile the petition within the period
allowed by the DARAB Rules and thus, the Adjudicators Decision fixing the just compensation for
the subject property attained finality.
LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Orders dated February 3, 2003, April 30, 2003 and June 30, 2003
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the Petition for Certiorari. In nullifying the three assailed
Orders. CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in initially dismissing the
Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation on the ground of non-compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC acted without jurisdiction in outrightly dismissing the refiled petition.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled Petition.
In the case at bar, as regards the February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders, appeal had
been available to assail them.
In Olympia International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the dismissal without prejudice of a
complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such Order of
dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of
the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders, although without prejudice to the refiling
of the action, nonetheless finally disposed of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just
Compensation docketed as Civil Case No. 3750, and are thus, appealable.
In the case of Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, it is decided that although Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law, this rule is not
without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the
appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy
not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. These grounds relied upon by the Court of
Appeals in asserting that certiorari is improper in the case at bar.
The failure of LBP to file an appeal within fifteen days from its May 29, 2003 receipt of the
April 30, 2003 Order caused the right to appeal this Order to lapse. This failure is not excused when
LBP itself made the choice to refile the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation
instead of appealing the Order dismissing the original one. At this point, neither should LBP be
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allowed to file a Petition for Certiorari to assail the February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders
since, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost
appeal. Appeal, which had been available to LBP, became unavailable to it because of no other
reason than the choice made by LBP itself.
On the other hand, in assailing the June 30, 2003 Order, the remedies of a motion for
reconsideration (with the RTC) and an appeal (to the Court of Appeals) had both been available to
LBP when it received said Order. However, LBP opted instead to file a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, apparently in order that it could assail not only the June 30, 2003 Order, but
the February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders as well. The question that thus arises is whether an
appeal and/or a motion for reconsideration from the June 30, 2003 Order, although available, are
nevertheless inadequate, or if there is a danger of failure or miscarriage of justice without the writ.
On this regard, LBP submits that the RTC, designated as SAC, is abdicating its authority and
duty in its refusal to determine on the merits the just compensation due to the spouses Umandap,
considering that adjudicators are empowered to determine the same only in a preliminary manner.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that while the Petition for Certiorari filed by LBP before
it originally assailed the February 3, April 30 and June 30, 2003 Orders of the RTC, the discussions
on the February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders (which deal with the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3750) have already been mooted. Civil Case No. 3750 was deemed to have been abandoned by LBP
with its filing of the same Petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3785 and with its failure to appeal the
February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders.
In dismissing Civil Case No. 3785, the Court of Appeals affirmed the SAC when it applied
Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of
Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
CA held that since the decision of the adjudicator in the case at bar was received by LBP on
December 11, 2002, the appeal to the SAC should be filed on or before December 26, 2002. The
original Petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3750 was indeed filed on the last day of the period,
December 26, 2002. However, Civil Case No. 3750 was dismissed without prejudice, and the Motion
for Reconsideration on the Dismissal Order was denied.
If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting
as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation
cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents case was properly
brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case.
The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. It would subvert this original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases
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in administrative officials and make the RTC and appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation
was done within five days from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing
the original petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the period within
which a complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did not
appear to have been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition, lead us to
assume a liberal construction of the pertinent rules. To be sure, LBPs intent to question the RARADs
valuation of the land became evident with the filing of the first petition for determination of just
compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB Rules. Although the first petition was
dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBPs refiling of essentially the same petition with a
proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier dismissal order had not attained finality
should have been accepted by the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily
dismissing said refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing this dismissal should be granted. The Court directs the RTC to reinstate LBPs Petition for
Judicial Determination of Just Compensation and to conduct proper proceedings thereon.
CEBU BIONIC BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC. and LYDIA SIA vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOSE TO CHIP, PATRICIO YAP and ROGER BALILA
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed thereunder
shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. This rule, however, admits of
certain exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court.
Facts:
Spouses Rudy Robles, Jr. and Elizabeth Robles (Spouses Robles) entered into a mortgage
contract with DBP in order to secure a loan from the said bank in the amount of P500,000.00. The
properties mortgaged were a parcel of land in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu, covered by TCT No. T- 47783
of the Register of Deeds of Cebu, together with all the existing improvements, and the commercial
building (subject properties) to be constructed thereon. Upon completion, the commercial building
was named the State Theatre Building.
Rudy Robles executed a contract of lease in favor of petitioner Cebu Bionic Builders Supply,
Inc. (Cebu Bionic), a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business, as well as the sale
of hardware materials. The said contract was not registered by the parties thereto with the Registry
of Deeds of Cebu. Then, spouses Robles failed to settle their loan obligation with DBP. The latter
was prompted to effect extrajudicial foreclosure on the subject properties. DBP was the lone bidder
in the foreclosure sale and thereby acquired ownership of the mortgaged subject properties.
Afterwards, a final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of DBP. DBP sent a letter to Bonifacio Sia, the
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husband of petitioner Lydia Sia President of Cebu Bionic, notifying the latter of DBPs acquisition
of the State Theatre Building.
Thereafter, a Certificate of Time Deposit for P11,395.64 was issued in the name of Bonifacio
Sia and the same was allegedly remitted to DBP as advance rental deposit. However, no written
contract of lease was executed between DBP and Cebu Bionic.
Meanwhile, DBP sent a letter to Bonifacio Sia, the husband of petitioner Lydia who was then
President of Cebu Bionic, notifying the latter of DBPs acquisition of the State Theatre
Building. Thereafter, a Certificate of Time Deposit for P11,395.64 was issued in the name of
Bonifacio Sia and the same was allegedly remitted to DBP as advance rental deposit. However, no
written contract of lease was executed between DBP and Cebu Bionic.
Subsequent to the acquisition of the subject properties, DBP offered the same for sale along
with its other assets. Pursuant thereto, DBP published a series of invitations to bid on such
properties. As no interested bidder came forward, DBP publicized an Invitation on Negotiated
Sale/Offer. In the last day for the acceptance of negotiated offers, petitioners submitted through
their representative, Judy Garces, a letter-offer form, offering to purchase the subject properties
for P1,840,000.00. This offer of petitioners was not accepted by DBP, however, as the
corresponding deposit therefor was allegedly insufficient. After the lapse of the above-mentioned
15-day acceptance period, petitioners did not submit any other offer/proposal to purchase the
subject properties.
Respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila presented their letter-offer to purchase the subject
properties on a cash basis for P1,838,100.00. Said offer was accompanied by a downpayment of
10% of the offered purchase price, amounting to P183,810.00. On even date, DBP acknowledged the
receipt of and accepted their offer. They paid the balance of the purchase price and DBP issued a
Deed of Sale over the subject properties in their favor. The counsel of the said respondents sent a
letter addressed to the proprietor of Cebu Bionic, informing the latter of the transfer of ownership
of the subject properties. Cebu Bionic was ordered to vacate the premises within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the letter and directed to pay the rentals from January 1, 1991 until the end of the
said 30-day period.
On February 15, 1991, To Chip wrote a letter to the counsel of Cebu Bionic, insisting that he
and his co-respondents Yap and Balila urgently needed the subject properties to pursue their
business plans. He also reiterated their demand for Cebu Bionic to vacate the premises.
On February 27, 1991, the counsel of respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila sent its final
demand letter to Cebu Bionic, warning the latter to vacate the subject properties within 7 days from
receipt of the letter, otherwise, a case for ejectment with damages will be filed against it. Despite
the foregoing notice, Cebu Bionic still paid to DBP, on March 22, 1991, the amount of P5,000.00 as
monthly rentals for period of November 1990 to March 1991.
Petitioners filed against respondents DBP, To Chip, Yap and Balila a complaint for specific
performance, cancellation of deed of sale with damages, injunction with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners alleged that documents relating to the subject property
were initially accepted by DBP but later returned and the latter advised petitioners that there was
no urgent need for the same since the property will necessarily be sold to Cebu Bionic as a
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preferred party. In its answer, DBP denied the existence of a contract of lease between itself and
petitioners.
RTC granted the prayer of petitioners for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and found meritorious the complaint of the petitioner. It also found that respondents To Chip, Yap
and Balila were aware of the lease contract involving the subject properties before they purchased
the same from DBP. DBP forthwith filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous with the judgment rendered by the trial
court.
Petitioners filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
without seeking a reconsideration of the CAs decision.
Issue:
Whether the instant petition raises questions of fact, which are not allowed in a petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling:
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed thereunder
shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As will be discussed further, this
exception is attendant in the case at bar.
In this case, what are involved are the property rights of the parties given that, ultimately,
the fundamental issue to be determined is who among the petitioners and respondents To Chip,
Yap and Balila has the better right to purchase the subject properties. More importantly, the merits
of the case sufficiently called for the suspension of the rules in order to settle conclusively the rights
and obligations of the parties herein.
In essence, the questions that must be resolved are: 1) whether or not there was a contract
of lease between petitioners and DBP; 2) if in the affirmative, whether or not this contract
contained a right of first refusal in favor of petitioners; and 3) whether or not respondents To Chip,
Yap and Balila are likewise bound by such right of first refusal.
SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES vs. FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL
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CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, and SPOUSES GUALBERTO &
RENE CABAHUG-SUPERALES
G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.
Nevertheless, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The provisions of the Rules of Court, which are
technical rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations. Where a rigid application of the rule
that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, it is within our power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for forcible entry, damages, and attorneys fees filed
by respondents spouses Gualberto and Rene Cabahug Superales (spouses Superales) against the
spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay,
Davao del Sur, and docketed as Civil Case No. 471 (2000)-B.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the (1)
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK,
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction of spouses Leynes spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes (spouses Leynes) for
being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the appellate court in the same
case, denying the spouses Leynes Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari by spouses Leynes should be given due course.
Ruling:
We are accepting and giving due course to the spouses Leynes petition in the interests of
substantial justice and equity.
The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00) in its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC
Decision dated July 9, 2001, which affirmed the MCTC Judgment against the spouses Leynes, and
Resolution inadvertently also dated July 9, 2001, which denied the spouses Leynes Motion for
Reconsideration, should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The spouses Leynes, however, went before the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
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The remedy of appeal to the Court of Appeals was available to the spouses Leynes, only that
they failed to avail of it in time.
We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys
remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being
that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action
for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. The special civil action
of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals held, the spouses Leynes Petition for Certiorari in CAG.R. SP No. 4420-UDK failed to comply with the requirement under Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court that a petition for certiorari should indicate material dates, such as when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. The spouses
Leynes did not refute that their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals did not state the
date they received a copy of the RTC Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. That the
said Resolution was strangely dated July 9, 2001, the same date as the RTC Decision sought to be
reconsidered, is immaterial. The timeliness of the filing by the spouses Leynes of their petition
before the Court of Appeals is determined from the date they received the challenged RTC
resolution and not the date the RTC issued the same.
Seeking recourse from this Court, the spouses Leynes once more filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The spouses Leynes yet again availed themselves
of the wrong remedy.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition
for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may
be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based
on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party
adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.
Nevertheless, we bear in mind that the acceptance of a petition for certiorari,
as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. The provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical rules, may be relaxed in certain
exceptional situations. Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our power to suspend
the rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.
Given the peculiar circumstances extant in the case at bar, the dismissal of the spouses
Leynes Petition for Certiorari would result in the miscarriage of justice. The spouses Leynes were
unjustly declared in default by the MCTC and deprived of the opportunity to present arguments and
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evidence to counter the spouses Superales Complaint. Hence, we are accepting and giving due
course to the spouses Leynes petition in the interests of substantial justice and equity.
SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO and MILAGROS MARCELO vs. LBC BANK
In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new
evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues.
Facts:
The spouses Marcelo, herein petitioners, on different dates, obtained two loans from
respondent LBC bank in the amounts of 3 million and 2.3 million respectively. The two loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Baliuag, Bulacan and covered by
TCT No. N-64135 in the name of Spouses Marcelo.
Thereafter, when the petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loans, respondent LBC
Bank sought for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. After the posting and
publication of the Notice of Sale, the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction. Respondent
LBC Bank, being the highest bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was eventually
registered with the Bulacan Registry of Deeds.
The petitioners failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period. As a result, LBC
Banks Mecauayan Branch Manager, Ricardo B. Milan, Jr., executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Title, which was filed with the Bulacan Registry of Deeds. Consequently, Spouses Marcelos title to
the subject property was cancelled and TCT No. T-145323 was issued in LBC Banks name.
Subsequently, respondent filed with the Regional trial Court of Bulacan a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession over the foreclosed property.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition and directed the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of respondent bank. Thereafter, contending that Milan was not an authorized
representative of respondent bank to consolidate ownership over the foreclosed property,
petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered a decision
initially granting Spouses Marcelo certiorari petition, however, upon submission by LBC Bank of
documents expressly and unequivocally confirming and ratifying Milans authority to consolidate
the title over the foreclosed property, the Court of Appeals amended its original decision. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can admit new evidence in a special civil action for
certiorari.
Ruling:
Yes, it can.
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In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate
courts admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the Court held
that "[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive
new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues." The Court explained further:
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, "The Court of Appeals shall
have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings."
Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Banks
express ratification of Milans consolidation of the title over the subject property. Further, the Court
of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Banks motion for
reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will certainly defeat the
ends of substantial justice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Chief of the Philippine National Police
vs. THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN
The petition under Rule 45 must not involve the calibration of the probative value of the
evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should
be left for the Court to decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of
facts was appropriate.
Facts:
De Guzman is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a contractor
accredited by the PNP for the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for
the delivery of various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and
renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.
The PNP Engineering Services (PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher for the
acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P2,288,562.60) for the construction
of a four-storey condominium building with roof deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief, executed a Contract of
Agreement (the Contract) wherein MGM, for the price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and
deliver to the PNP the construction materials itemized in the purchase order. MGM, on March 1,
1996, proceeded with the delivery of the construction materials
De Guzman, through counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997 to the PNP, demanding
the payment of P2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM procured for the PNP under
their December 1995 Contract. PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, replied, informing that payment
was made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 0000530631. De Guzman,
responded by reiterating her demand and denying having ever received the LBP check, personally
or through an authorized person. Hence, De Guzman filed a complaint for a sum of money.
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During trial, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioners counsel at that time, made the following
stipulations in open court. Counsel presented Edgardo Cruz for the purpose of proving that the
payment respondent was claiming rightfully belonged to Highland Enterprises. Cruz alleged that on,
he and the respondent went to the PNP Finance Center to claim the LBP check due to MGM. Cruz
said that the respondent handed him the already signed Receipt No. 001, which he filled up. He
claimed that the respondent knew that the LBP check was really meant for Highland Enterprises as
she had already been paid her 2% commission for the use of her business name in the concerned
transaction.
The RTC ruled in favor of De Guzman and ordered PNP to pay the contract price with
interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court can review the evidence on record under a Petition 45
2. Whether or not there was a judicial admission on the part of Cruz testimony
3. Whether or not there was valid payment to MGM
Ruling:
1. The Court cannot review evidence on record under a Petition 45. The Court cannot resolve
factual issues.
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the
Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not
involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the
case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether or
not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to the
issue before us, the resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire records of the case
including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari,
questions of fact are not reviewable.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court
will only review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
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Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the
enumerated exceptions to the rule, we are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the conclusions reached in the appealed
decision.
2. The testimony constitutes a judicial admission.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions
are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.
The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity of the Contract of Agreement executed
between the PNP and MGM, as represented by the respondent, on December 11, 1995. It likewise
admitted that respondent delivered the construction materials subject of the Contract, not once, but
several times during the course of the proceedings. The only matter petitioner assailed was
respondents allegation that she had not yet been paid.
Petitioners admissions were proven to have been made in various stages of the
proceedings, and since the petitioner has not shown us that they were made through palpable
mistake, they are conclusive as to the petitioner. Hence, the only question to be resolved is whether
the respondent was paid under the December 1995 Contract of Agreement.
ELOISA L. TOLENTINO vs. ATTY. ROY M. LOYOLA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, DOMINGO C. FLORES,
MUNICIPAL BUDGET OFFICER, ALICIA L. OLIMPO, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, ANNALIZA L.
BARABAT, MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTANT, AMADOR B. ALUNIA, MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR,
NENITA L. ERNACIO, MUNICIPAL AGRICULTURIST, AMELIA C. SAMSON, HUMAN RESOURCE
OFFICER IV, EDWIN E. TOLENTINO, COMMUNITY AFFAIRS OFFICER IV, DOMINGO R.
TENEDERO AND ROEL Z. MANARIN, SANGGUNIAN BAYAN (SB) MEMBERS, ALL FROM
CARMONA, CAVITE
The appointments made by respondent Loyola could not be considered grave misconduct and
dishonesty. There were vacant positions causead by the creation of positions and these vacancies
should be filled up. There is misconduct if there is a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action. In the case, evidence show that respondents Loyolas did not transgress some definite rule of
action. Had there been a transgression in the creation of positions and appointments, the Civil Service
Commission should have so stated when the appointments were submitted for approval.
Facts:
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Petitioner Tolentino filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents Loyola et al. with
Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents and, administratively, for Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Falsification of Official Documents.
The complaint averred that respondent Municipal Mayor Roy M. Loyola requested the
Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite for the creation of twenty-four (24) unappropriated
positions for the inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla.
The Sangguniang Bayan passed the said Resolution No. 061-98 approving the creation of
only 19 out of the 24 requested positions, for inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla of Personnel. Despite
the disapproval of the 5 positions, the respondents Loyola et al., filled-up the inexistent positions
and appointed several personnel. The appointment papers of the aforesaid personnel were
subsequently approved by the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, the respondents Loyola et al.,
allowed and caused the payment of salaries of the aforesaid employees.
Tolentino alleged that Loyola et al., concerted efforts to make it appear that the inexistent
positions were created, causing the unlawful payment of salaries to illegally appointed employees,
they are liable for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents. Also, for gross
neglect of duty, grave misconduct, dishonesty and falsification of official documents.
Loyola et al., filed their Counter-Affidavits alleging that the Annual Budget of the
Municipality of Carmona for the year 1999 carries with it the 24 positions requested of the
respondent Mayor. The approval of the budget was in the form of an ordinance. Also, the
appointments were approved by the Civil Service Commission and the salaries were paid out of
savings.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto ordered the dismissal of the administrative Complaint for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Can the Court overturn the administrative decision ruled by the Ombudsman, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals?
Ruling:
No, the instant petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any reversible error
on the part of the Ombudsman in issuing its assailed administrative decision, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, which would compel this Court to overturn it.
Before proceeding to the discussion on why the Tolentinos contentions fail to convince, it is
appropriate to restate here the law of the case doctrine.
In Padillo v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to explain this principle, to wit:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
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decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of
the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy
of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.
The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a
ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower
court and in any subsequent appeal.
Contrary to respondents assertion, the law of the case doctrine does not find application in
the case at bar simply because what was involved in G.R. No. 149534 was a criminal proceeding
while what we have before us is an administrative case. Although both cases possess a similar set of
facts, allegations and arguments, they do not serve the same objectives and do not require the same
quantum of evidence necessary for a finding of guilt or conviction/liability which makes them
entirely different cases altogether and, therefore, beyond the purview of the legal principle of law of
the case.
In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any finding. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the
petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming. While in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean evidence that
which produces absolute certainty; only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Having disposed of that issue, we now proceed to discuss the reasons why the instant
petition must fail.
On a procedural note, the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman obviously possesses the
character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal. The pertinent provision in this case is the old
Section 7, Rule III of Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1990 (Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman), before it was amended by Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 17,
Series of 2003 (Amendment of Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7), which states that:
Sec. 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In
all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have
been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
The basis for the said rule of procedure is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act), to wit:
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Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
xxxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.
As shown by the aforementioned regulation and statute, a decision of the Ombudsman
absolving the respondent of an administrative charge is final and unappealable.
The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant
in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the
respondent of the administrative charge, as in this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitle to
any corrective recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or
by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the
right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher than public
censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
The absence of any statutory right to appeal the exoneration of the respondent in an
administrative case does not mean, however, that the complainant is left with absolutely no
remedy. Over and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII empowers the
courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This is an overriding authority that cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of the
government and is implemented through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides. A petition for certiorari is appropriate when a tribunal, clothed with judicial or
quasi-judicial authority, acted without jurisdiction (i.e., without the appropriate legal power to
resolve a case), or in excess of jurisdiction (i.e., although clothed with the appropriate power to
resolve a case, it oversteps its authority as determined by law, or that it committed grave abuse of
its discretion by acting either outside the contemplation of the law or in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction). The Rules of Court and its
provisions and jurisprudence on writs of certiorari fully apply to the Office of the Ombudsman as
these Rules are suppletory to the Ombudsmans Rules. The Rules of Court are also the applicable
rules in procedural matters on recourses to the courts and hence, are the rules the parties have to
contend with in going to the CA.
In the case at bar, Tolentino did not file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and instead filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals. The latter is effectively an appeal to the Court of Appeals which is disallowed by the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman as well as the Ombudsman Act in case the respondent
is exonerated by the Ombudsman for an administrative charge.
In any event, the instant petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any
reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman in issuing its assailed administrative decision, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which would compel this Court to overturn it.
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The Court quotes with approval the findings and conclusion of the assailed Ombudsman
ruling which was also adopted by the Court of Appeals:
The appointments made by respondent Loyola including the selection and screening of
employees could not be considered grave misconduct and dishonesty. There were vacant positions
caused by the creation of positions and these vacancies should be filled up. There is misconduct if
there is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. In the case, evidence show
that respondents Loyolas did not transgress some definite rule of action. Had there been a
transgression in the creation of positions and appointments, the Civil Service Commission should
have so stated when the appointments were submitted for approval. Since the appointed personnel
has already rendered service, the processing and payment of their salaries was but legal and proper
and does not constitute dishonesty, falsification and neglect of duty.
In sum, respondents could not be held administratively liable since their official actions
starting from the creation of positions to selection of personnel, appointment, and ultimately
payment of salaries were all in accordance with the law.
In the case at bar, the 24 new positions were included in Ordinance No. 006-98 enacting the
1999 Annual Budget. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan later affirmed the creation of all
questioned positions in separate resolutions and continued to include the said positions in the
appropriations in subsequent budget ordinances. It is likewise undisputed that the questioned
appointments were all approved by the Civil Service Commission.
HEIRS OF RODOLFO CRISOSTOMO (EUPROCINIA, ROYCE AND IRISH CRISOSTOMO)
vs. RUDEX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.
Facts:
Petitioners Euprocinia, Royce, and Irish, are the wife and children of the late complainant,
Rodolfo Crisostomo, who died during the pendency of the case. The respondent, Rudex
International Development Corporation is engaged in the real estate business.
Crisostomos decided to buy the property priced at Php833,000.00 on installment basis
developed by the respondent. They paid Php10,000.00 as down payment and issued 36 postdated
checks to cover the monthly amortizations on the property. When Crisostomo family moved in to
their new house; they started to notice several defects on the house.
Thus, the late Rodolfo personally delivered a letter of complaint to Rudex, rescinding their
Contract to Sell and demanded the refund of all the payments he made, and that he would no longer
pay the monthly amortizations. Rodolfo filed a Complaint for violation of P.D Nos. 1344 and 957,
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and Board Resolution No. 579 of 1995, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
The HLURB conducted an ocular inspection and found Rodolfos allegations to be true. The
HLURB rendered the rescission of the contract to sell as valid and ordering the Rudex to refund the
total payments in the amount of Php71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the filing of
the complaint until full payment. After full payment, complainant is directed to surrender the
property.
Rudex asked the HLURB to review Decision. It alleged that Rodolfos allegations were
concocted to get out of their contract because he could no longer pay his monthly amortizations on
the property. HLURB rendered a Decision on Rudex Petition for Review affirming its previous
decision with some modifications. HLURB ordered complainant to turn over possession of the unit
to the respondent and ordering complainant to pay Rudex reasonable compensation for the use of
the unit in the amount of P4,000.00 per month until possession of the unit is turned over to the
respondent.
This was appealed by the heirs of Rodolfo, who substituted him upon his death, to the Office
of the President. The Office of the President decided in their favor. But when Rudex asked for a
reconsideration of this decision the Office of the President granted Rudex's motion and reinstated
the decision of the HLURB.
The Office of the President held that by staying at the premises for free and without
compensation, to the prejudice of Rudex, it is clear that they unduly enriched themselves at the
expense of another. Rental payments are legally supported by virtue of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment.
On September 15, 2006, the Heirs of Rodolfo filed their Petition for Review before the Court
of Appeals. This was dismissed outright in a Resolution for being filed out of time, the deadline
being September 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals said that the petitioners were already granted a
15-day extension and yet no justification was given to explain why they still filed beyond the
extended period.
Issue:
Can the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review filed before it, on the ground that
it was filed late?
Ruling:
No, the Court of Appeals may allow the case to prosper where no element of intent to delay
the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners.
This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or
avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.
Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners,
a one-day delay does not justify their petitions dismissal.
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In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales v. Pennisi, this Court elucidated on the
rules on reglementary periods, to wit:
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will
render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception,
unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the
reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the period
of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to
controversies.
In Samala v. Court of Appeals, we said:
The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this
liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.
In this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13, 2006. The
petitioners entrusted the drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the
attaching of the required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from
her job sometime later to avoid giving her employer "problems for unexpected absences in the
future." Aside from this, the petitioners also submitted an Affidavit from the secretary, who
narrated her ordeal that day and why she was not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts
of the petition. A certification from the doctor of one of the secretarys children was also submitted
to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the
deadline for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
In light of the foregoing, we are inclined to give the same consideration in this case pursuant
to the rules on justice, equity, and fair play.
GEMMA ONG a.k.a. MARIA TERESA GEMMA CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of the Supreme Court, because
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. However, in exceptional cases, the
Supreme Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, such as when
there was palpable error or a grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court.
Facts:
On July 28, 2000, petitioner Gemma Ong a.k.a. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan was charged
before the RTC for Infringement under Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No.
8293 or the Intellectual Property Code. That sometime in September 25, 1998 and prior thereto at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, the Gemma engage in the distribution, sale, and offering for sale of counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes which had caused confusion, deceiving the public that such cigarettes were
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Marlboro cigarettes and those of the Telengtan Brothers and Sons, Inc., doing business under the
style of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarettes Factory, the exclusive manufacturer of Marlboro Cigarette in
the Philippines. On August 1, 2000, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador of RTC Manila, Branch 1, issued a
warrant of arrest against Gemma, but lifted and set aside the same after Gemma voluntarily
surrendered and filed a cash bond. Gemma pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment on
October 17, 2000. After the pre-trial conference on February 13, 2001, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution called to the witness stand the following: Roger Sherman Slagle, the
Director of Operations of Philip Morris Philippines, Inc.s (PMPI) product/brand security expert, to
testify that according to his examination, the products they seized at the subject premises were
counterfeit cigarettes; as well as Jesse Lara, who, as then Senior Investigator III at the Intellectual
Property Rights Unit of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), led the
investigating team, to testify on the events that led to the arrest of Gemma. Jesse S. Lara, then Senior
Investigator III received reliable information that counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes were being
distributed and sold by two (2) Chinese nationals, Johnny Sia and Jessie Concepcion, in the areas of
Tondo, Binondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo, Manila.
During the surveillance, the container van delivering the Marlboro packed in black plastic
bags was seen parked at 1677 Bulacan corner Hizon Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They also learned
that the place is owned by a certain Mr. Jackson Ong. Executive Judge Dolores L. Espaol issued a
search warrant after finding probable cause to believe that Mr. Jackson Ong has in his
possession/control in the premises. They proceeded to the subject premises but Jackson Ong, the
alleged owner, was not there. It was accused, who is supposedly either the spouse or common-law
wife of Jackson Ong, who entertained them. At first, accused refused to allow them entry into the
premises but eventually the team was able to search the premises and found Marlboro cigarettes
stocked in several boxes containing fifty (50) reams inside each box which were packed in black
plastic sacks like in balikbayan boxes. On the basis of the results of the examination conducted by
PMPI on the samples obtained from the confiscated boxes of cigarettes bearing the Marlboro brand,
which confirmed the same to be unauthorized products and not genuine Marlboro cigarettes.
Gemma, as the lone witness for the defense, then took the witness stand. She said that she is
married to Co Yok Piao, a Chinese national, but she still uses her maiden name Catacutan. She
denied that she is the Gemma Ong accused in this case. She testified that she was arrested on
August 4, 2000, without the arresting officers asking for her name. She said that when she pleaded
to be released, she was instructed to post a cash bond, which she did in the amount
of 12,000.00. Gemma averred that when she posted her bond and signed her certificate of
arraignment, she did so under her real name Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan, as opposed to the
signatures in the Inventory and Certification in the Conduct of Search (search documents), which
she denied signing.
On September 30, 2003, the RTC convicted Gemma of the crime as charged. The Court of
Appeals found Gemmas appeal to be unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTCs
rejection of Gemmas defense of mistaken identity, as she should have raised it at the earliest
opportunity, which was at the time of her arrest, the posting of her bail bond, or during her
arraignment.
Issue:
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Whether or not accused-appellants petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is fatally defective as it raises questions of fact.
Ruling:
As this case reached this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the basic rule is that factual
questions are beyond the province of this Court, because only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review. However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of
fact in order to resolve legal issues, such as when there was palpable error or a grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said that although submission of issues of fact in an appeal
by certiorari taken to this Court is ordinarily proscribed, this Court nonetheless retains the option
in the exercise of its sound discretion, taking into account the attendant circumstances, either to
decide the case or refer it to the proper court for determination. Since the determination of the
identity of Gemma is the very issue affecting her guilt or innocence, this Court chooses to take
cognizance of this case in the interest of proper administration of justice.
FELIMON MANGUIOB vs. JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, RTC, BRANCH 12, DAVAO CITY and
ALEJANDRA VELASCO
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For
a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Facts:
The petitioner Felimon Manguiob and private respondent Alejandro Velasco entered into a
partnership for the sale of agricultural products. The partnership was then dissolved for all intents
and purposes as petitioned by private respondent Velasco. She then filed a complaint for sum of
money, accounting and damages against Manguiob claiming that Manguiob withheld the return of
investments due to her.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Velasco. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Manguiob asserts that he no longer contends the fact he must pay Velasco. But, he alleges
that the amount he must be must be deducted because of the existence of non-cash assets of the
dissolved partnership.
Issue:
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Whether or not the amount due to Velasco must be deducted because of the existence of
non-cash assets of the dissolved partnership.
Ruling:
The issue raised by Manguiob is clearly a question of fact, which not only requires a review
of the evidence already presented, but a reception of new evidence as well. A perusal of the records
of the case shows that no evidence was introduced or received for the purpose of ascertaining the
actual status of the non-cash assets despite the parties' admission of their existence, and their
conformity to the values assigned to them by their accountants. A proper resolution on the
distribution of the non-cash assets obviously necessitates, inter alia, a determination of the
proceeds or whereabouts of these non-cash assets.
This issue, unfortunately, is factual matter, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45
petition, as expressed under the version of Section 1, Rule 45 in force at the time Manguiob filed
this petition to wit:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court
a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.
The distinction between a question of law and one of fact has long been settled. In Binay v.
Odea we said:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the
same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Thus, since this Court is required to review and evaluate the evidence on record, and even
receive new evidence to decide the issue of whether the value of the non-cash assets should be
deducted from what Manguiob was adjudged to pay Velasco, the issue then is definitely one of fact,
and one that is impermissible, as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Furthermore, records show that this issue was not even submitted by the parties during the
trial of the case despite their conflicting allegations on these assets' condition. In Keng Hua Paper
Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals this Court held:
[A]n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the
lower court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by
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the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.
It is settled that issues not raised timely in the proceedings before the trial court cannot be
considered on review or appeal as to do so would be to trample on the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.
SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
NELLY SIAPNO-SANCHEZ and INOCENCIO BERMA
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.
Facts:
On November 23, 1994, spouses Dycoco filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of
certificates of land transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly SiapnoSanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay.
In their complaint, spouses Dycoco alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners
of Lot No. 216, a 38,157 sq.m.parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them, the respondents
named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality of spouses Dycoco, entered the subject
property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied
and cultivated the property to the prejudice of spouses Dycoco. Said respondents deprived spouses
Dycoco of the enjoyment and possession of the property without paying spouses Dycoco or the
Land Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said
respondents subleased their respective landholdings to other persons.
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding
private respondents not worthy to become beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27.
In a decision dated March 20, 2000, the DARAB found that both private respondents were
beneficiaries of Presidential Decree No. 27 and that they are no longer tenants but owners of their
respective portions of the property.
Spouses Dycoco received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April
18, 2000 to file an appeal. They filed a motion in the Court of Appeals praying for an extension of
30 days within which to file their intended petition. The Court of Appeals granted them an
extension of 15 days, with warning that no further extension will be given. Thus, spouses Dycoco
had until May 3, 2000 to file their petition.
Spouses Dycoco filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was
denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 2, 2000.
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Spouses Dycoco moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January 10,
2001.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Dycoco are entitled to the relaxation of the procedural rules.
Ruling:
No. They are not entitled.
Firstly, spouses Dycoco are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which is a wrong remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Contrary to the claim of spouses
Dycoco in the opening paragraph of their petition that there was no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition, the right
recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution
is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
Secondly, spouses Dycoco claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their appeal on the ground of late filing. This is also wrong.
Lastly, spouses Dycoco primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on
liberality in the construction of procedural rules. However, the liberal construction rule is not a
license to disregard procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Spouses Dycoco caused their own predicament when they decided to change
horses in midstream and engaged the services of their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a
week before the expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the services
of their former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to the
DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of their new
counsel for more time to study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the case.
Moreover, as shown above, spouses Dycoco not only failed to show any persuasive reason why they
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules when they filed their petition for review in
the Court of Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the rules in various
ways absent any compelling reason when they filed this petition.
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RHODORA PRIETO vs. ALPADI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Time and again the Supreme Court has declared that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary
period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
instances warranting such deviation.
Facts:
Rhodora Prieto (Prieto) was employed as an accounting clerk and cashier of the Alpadi
Group of Companies, composed of respondent Alpadi Development Corporation (ADC),
Manufacturers Building, Incorporated (MBI), and Asian Ventures Corporation (AVC). ADC and MBI
are both engaged in the business of leasing office spaces.
Prieto was charged before the RTC with the crime of estafa. Prieto, represented by the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO), asked for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC gave
Prieto 20 days from December 13, 2004 within which to file her Demurrer to Evidence. The 20th
day of the period was January 2, 2005, a Sunday, so Prieto could still file her Demurrer to Evidence
on January 3, 2005, a Monday. Records show that Prieto filed her Demurrer to Evidence only on
January 13, 2005. In an Order dated March 8, 2005, the RTC granted Prietos Demurrer to Evidence.
ADC, as the private complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned
RTC Order. The RTC, in an Order dated August 8, 2005, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ADC sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, ADC
averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated March 8, 2005 and August 8, 2005, contrary to law and
jurisprudence, and despite the overwhelming evidence on record proving Prietos liability for
estafa. ADC additionally pointed out that Prietos Demurrer to Evidence was filed beyond the 20day period granted by the RTC. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on August 28, 2009
granting the Petition for Certiorari
The PAO, Prietos counsel before the RTC and the Court of Appeals, received a copy of the
Resolution dated November 12, 2009 on November 24, 2009, hence, giving Prieto until December 9,
2009 to appeal the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Court. Atty. Allan Julius B.
Azcueta (Azcueta), Public Attorney II of the PAO, filed on December 4, 2009 a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court, requesting an extension of 30
days from December 9, 2009, or until January 8, 2010, within which to file Prietos appeal of the
Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
However, on January 12, 2010, Atty. Azcueta filed before the Court a Manifestation with
Motion, alleging that after careful deliberation and exhaustive discussion with the undersigned
counsel, [Prieto] is now voluntarily signifying her desire to withdraw the filing of the Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
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In its Resolution dated February 10, 2010, the Court resolved: (1) to NOTE the
manifestation of Public Attorneys Office that Prieto decided not to appeal her case; (2) to GRANT
the said counsels motion to withdraw the filing of the petition for review on certiorari and (3) to
consider this case CLOSED and TERMINATED. Entry of Judgment was eventually made on April 5,
2010.
Meanwhile, also on February 10, 2010, Prieto, through another counsel, Atty. Xilexferen P.
Barroga (Barroga) of Barroga, Nario & Associates Law Offices, filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the Decision dated
August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals and the
reinstatement of the Orders dated March 8, 2005 and August 8, 2005 of the RTC.
To justify the timeliness of the filing of her Petition on February 10, 2012, Prieto alleges that
she received a copy of the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, denying
her Motion for Reconsideration, only on January 26, 2010, mailed to her by the PAO.
Prieto claims that she was not aware that Atty. Azcueta filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to file a Petition for Review, and that she did not authorize Atty. Azcueta to file a Manifestation with
Motion withdrawing her appeal of the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals. According to
Prieto, she went to the PAO from time to time to follow-up on her case, but she felt that her case
was not being diligently attended to, so she decided to hire the services of a private lawyer with
money raised by her relatives. When she asked for a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated
November 12, 2009 denying her Motion for Reconsideration, she was told by the PAO that a copy of
the same would be sent to her through mail. She received a copy of said Resolution only on January
26, 2010, giving her until February 10, 2010 to appeal. Consequently, her Petition in filed on
February 10, 2010 was filed within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was filed within the
reglementary period by Prieto.
Ruling:
No. The Court hereby outrightly denies Prietos Petition for Review on Certiorari in for
being filed out of time.
The reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari is set forth in Rule 45,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Time for filing extension.The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme
Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to
file the petition.
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In this case, Prieto, through her counsel of record, the PAO, received a copy of the Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals on
November 24, 2009. The 15day period to appeal would have ended on December 9, 2009, but with
the 30-day extension period prayed for by the PAO, the last day for filing the appeal was moved to
January 8, 2010. Clearly, the filing of the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 by Prietos
new counsel was already beyond the reglementary period for appeal.
Time and again the Court has declared that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right
to appeal.
Prieto herein not only alleges mistake or negligence on the part of the PAO, but more
seriously, attributes to her former counsel deliberate acts which deprived her of her right to appeal,
i.e., refusing to give her a copy of the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
and misrepresenting to the Court that it was authorized by Prieto to withdraw her appeal.
However, other than Prietos bare allegations, there is no other evidence of the purported
detrimental acts of the PAO. In addition, Prietos allegations are so contrary to the past conduct of
the PAO, which diligently represented her before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and even up to this
Court, with the PAO even timely filing the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court.
It must be stressed that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary
period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
instances warranting such deviation. Parties praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules must
be able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was
never the Courts intent to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
Unfortunately for Prieto, she was unable to discharge this burden of proof.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT vs. VICENTE ROXAS
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
G.R. No. 157988, December 11, 2013
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS vs. VICENTE ROXAS AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL
MINDORO
G.R. No. 160640, December 11, 2013
J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is already a well-established rule that the Court, in the exercise of its power of review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit: (1) [W]hen the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when
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in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
Facts:
The case is a consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Bureau of Forest
Development and Provident Tree Farms Inc. (PTFI) against respondents Vicente Roxas and the
Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro.
At the crux of the controversy is Lot No. 1-GSS-569 which is located in San Teodoro, Oriental
Mindoro, with an area of 6.2820 hectares and covered by OCT No. P-5885 issued on July 21, 1965
by the Registry of Deeds in Roxass name.
On February 5, 1941, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 678 which
converted forest land measuring around 928 hectares situated in San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro as
Match Forest Reserve placed under the administration and control of the Bureau of Forestry. The
Bureau of Forestry shall have the authority to regulate the use and occupancy of the reserve, and
the cutting, collection and removal of timber and other forest products therein in accordance with
the Forest Law and Regulations.
On May 12, 1965, petitioner Republic, through the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DANR) entered into a Matchwood Plantation Lease Agreement with PTFI for a period of
25 years.
In the meantime, On December 29, 1959, Roxas filed with the Bureau of Lands a Homestead
Application covering a parcel of land he initially identified as Lot No. 4 SA-22657, located at
Paspasin, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro. The OIC, for and by the authority of the Director of Lands
approved Roxass homestead application. Following the letter issued by the Assistant District
Forester of the Bureau of Forestry, DANR informing the District Land Officer of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro that the land is no longer within the administrative jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
and has been verified to be within alienable and disposable land, the Director of Lands issued
Homestead Patent No. 111598 to Roxas. Subsequently, OCT No. P-58885 was issued by the ROD in
Roxass name.
On May 2, 1978, petitioner Republic, represented by the BFD, filed with the RTC a complaint
for cancellation of the title and/or reversion against Roxas and ROD over the subject property.
Petitioner Republic alleged that the subject property was within the Matchwood Forest Reserve
and could not be the subject of private appropriation and ownership; and possession of said
property, no matter how long would not convert the same into private property. Petitioner also
averred that Roxas acquired the OCT through fraud and misrepresentation since the latter was
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disqualified from acquiring the same under the provisions of the Public Land Act, not having
exercised the acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law.
On the other hand, Roxas denied that the subject property was within the Matchwood
Forest Reserve. He presented Assistant District Forester Dacanays letter dated July 12, 1965 to the
District Land Officer of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, verifying that Lot No. 1, GSS-569, was alienable
and disposable, the Blue Print Plan of Land Group Settlement Survey and the Order dated July 19,
1965 of the Director of Lands approving Roxass application for patent. He maintained that the OCT
had been legally and validly issued to him and that he had been in actual, open and continuous
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner.
In order to determine whether or not the subject property was within the Matchwood
Forest Reserve, the RTC created a committee to conduct a relocation survey. The committee found
that subject property was located inside the Matchwood Forest Reserve under PP No. 678 and
recommended for the annulment of the OCT issued to Roxas covering the same property.
Despite the committees findings, RTC ruled in favor of Roxas and declared that petitioner
PTFI had no right over the subject property since the latters lease agreement with the Republic had
already expired on June 30, 1990. It also held that mere preponderance of evidence showed that the
subject property was outside the forest reserve and part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The Court of Appeals sustained the appreciation of evidence by the RTC, hence the
instant petition.
Issues:
What are the exceptions to the general rule that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, cannot re-examine the evidence presented by
the parties during the trial since it is not a trier of facts?
Ruling:
Prefatorily, it is already a well-established rule that the Court, in the exercise of its power of
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,
considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court. This rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
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The case at bar falls under several exceptions, i.e., the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and the
findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on record. As a result, we must return to the
evidence submitted by the parties during trial and make our own evaluation of the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE
G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014, J. LeonardoDe Castro
The accused, arrested through a buy-bust operation of the police, is questioning the non
compliance with the rule on chain of custody of seized illegal drugs but the accused only raised such
objection on appeal at the CA. SC ruled that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
On April 2006, the Philippine National Police in Tabaco City received a confidential
information that Palito of Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana. Upon
investigation, it was later on confirmed that Palito, the accusedappellant Joselito Morate
(Morate), is indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs. The police officers then planned for the buybust operation with PO1 Manamtam designated as poseur-buyer.
Morate was then arrested through the buy-bust operation and was brought to the police
station. Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buybust were counted,
marked and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items were witnessed by
Barangay Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local newsman,
both of whom signed the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3
Eva as the evidence custodian.
PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing the
seized items to PO1 Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking hold of the items. PO1
Borromeo proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City bringing with him the seized
items and a Request for Laboratory Examination. The seized items were received by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Legazpi City where PSInsp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined
them. PSInsp. Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the
prosecutions evidence in the course of her testimony.
The lower court finds the accused, Joselito Morate, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5 of Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Section 11, Art. II of the same law. Morate appealed
his case to the Court of Appeals questioning the noncompliance with the rule on chain of custody
of seized illegal drugs. CA rejected the contentions of Morate and denied his appeal. Hence, the
petition of Morate.
Issue:
1. Whether Morate can raise the non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody for the first
time on appeal
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2. Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the prosecutions non
compliance with the chain of custody requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.
9165.
Ruling:
This Court denies Morates appeal.
1. No, Marate cannot question the non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody for the
first time on appel.
It must be emphasized that Morates defense of alleged noncompliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 was raised belatedly and for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise the
issue of nonobservance of the chain of custody requirement during trial is fatal to the case of
Morate. As explained in People v. Sta. Maria:
The law excuses noncompliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buybust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during
trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial
court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least
intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must
so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the
first time on appeal.
In this case, the Morate never questioned the chain of custody during trial. Specifically, the
records show that the Morate never assailed the propriety and regularity of the process of marking
and inventory of the seized items during the prosecutions presentation of evidence on that matter
during the testimony of PO1 Manamtam. Also, when the prosecution formally offered the
Certification of Inventory as evidence for the purpose of proving the immediate and accurate
inventory, marking and packing of the purchased and the seized marijuana to maintain and
preserve their identities and integrity and the four sachets of marijuana as evidence for the
purpose of proving the identities and integrity of the purchased and the seized marijuana as those
were immediately inventoried, marked and documented/recorded, the accusedappellants
comment was simply Denied as to the purposes for which they are being offered for being self
serving pieces of evidence and said nothing about noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirement.
2. There was substantial compliance with the rule of chain of custody.
The chain of custody is basically the duly recorded authorized stages of transfer of custody
of seized dangerous drugs, from their seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
for examination to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The function of the chain
of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
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preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a twofold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence.
The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain is ideal, the
realities and variables of actual police operation usually makes an unbroken chain impossible.
With this implied judicial recognition of the difficulty of complete compliance with the chain of
custody requirement, substantial compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the chain of custody requirement has
been substantially complied with. The police officers duly recorded the various authorized stages
of transfer of custody of the dangerous drugs confiscated from the accusedappellant. In particular,
PO1 Manamtam had custody of the three sachets of marijuana which the accusedappellant sold
him, from the scene of the buybust to the police station, while PO3 Eva had custody of the sachet of
marijuana which the accusedappellant dropped, from the scene of the buybust to the police
station. Upon arrival at the police station, PO1 Manamtam and PO3 Eva marked the items of
contraband in their respective possession and conducted an inventory in the presence of the
accusedappellant, Barangay Kagawad Marbella and media representative Cea. The seized items
subject of the inventory were then transferred to the custody of PO1 Borromeo who brought them
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City where they were examined by PSInsp. Clemen, the
forensic chemist. PSInsp. Clemen then brought the contraband to the court as the prosecutions
evidence when she testified in court. The four sachets of marijuana taken from the accused
appellant were the same sachets of marijuana which the police officers marked and subjected to
inventory, and they were the very same sachets of marijuana brought to the crime laboratory,
examined by the forensic chemist and presented to court as evidence. Thus, the identity and
evidentiary integrity of the seized items were properly preserved.
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. This petition of the union now before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. The crucial question
of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the
facts of the individual case, and good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The
issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the company is likewise a question
of fact
Facts:
In anticipation of the expiration of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between the petitioner, Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Assoc. and the respondent Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, started negotiations for a new CBA. The union proposed a 20o/o
annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the
new CBA. In lieu of the annual salary increases, the company made a counter-proposal to grant all
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covered employees a lump sum amount of P80,000.00 yearly for the three-year period of the new
CBA.
The union lowered its proposal to 12% annual across-the-board increase for the next three
years. For its part, the company increased its counter-proposal to a yearly lump sum payment
of P88,000.00 for the next three years. The union requested financial data for the manufacturing
class of business in the Philippines. The company reiterated that its counter-offer is based on its
affordability for the company, comparison with the then existing wage levels of allied industry, and
the then existing total pay and benefits package of the employees.
However, the union remained unconvinced and asked for additional documents to justify
the companys counter-offer. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer, the
union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith. The company, in turn, expressed
its disagreement with the unions manifestation.
On that same day, the union filed a Notice of Strike in the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. Upon being
aware of this development, the company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the
Secretary of Labor and Employment which the latter granted. The union thereafter filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged in its petition that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly misappreciating the facts and issue of
the case. However, The Court of Appeals dismissed it. Hence, this petition for review via Rule 45
was filed by the union.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for review via Rule 45 was the proper petition.
Ruling:
No, the petition is improper as it presents questions of fact
A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This petition of the union now before this Court is a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. The
crucial question of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith
typically turns on the facts of the individual case, and good faith or bad faith is an inference to be
drawn from the facts. Thus, the issue of whether or not there was bad faith on the part of the
company when it was bargaining with the union is a question of fact. It requires that the reviewing
court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such
bad faith.
The issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the company is
likewise a question of fact. It requires the determination of evidence to find whether there is a
"counteraction" of forces between the union and the company and whether each of the parties
exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining." This is so because a deadlock is defined as
follows: A deadlock is x x x the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; x x x There is a
deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces x x x. The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which x x x presupposes
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reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in
agreement between the parties.
Considering that the issues presented by the union are factual issues, the unions petition is
improper. As a rule, this Court cannot properly inquire into factual matters in the exercise of its
judicial power under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, none of
the exceptions apply in this case.
PERIOD TO APPEAL
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN,
ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO vs.
ISMAEL VELOSO III
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary appeal from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or
from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
This case involves an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra,
Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr.
and Joel Jongco (Petitioners) against Ismael Veloso (Respondent).
It was alleged in the complaint by petitioners that they are the lessors of a residential house
located in Quezon City which was leased to respondent at a monthly rental of P17,000.00. The
action was instituted on the ground of respondents failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to
December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals and
alleged that he made an advance payment of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the
leased property.
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in favor of petitioners by ordering respondent to
vacate the premises and pay the petitioners the sum of P306,000.00 corresponding to the rentals
due from May 23, 1997 to November 22, 1998, and the sum of P17,000.00 a month thereafter until
respondent vacates the premises.
On appeal to the RTC Branch 88, Quezon City, the MeTC decision was reversed. Respondent
was ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also
given an option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to
the reimbursement by petitioners of one-half of the value of the improvements which it found to be
in the amount of P120,000.00. Respondent was also given the right to remove said improvements
pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should petitioners refuse to pay P60,000.00.
When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the RTC decision, the RTC modified its
previous ruling by increasing the value of the improvements from P120,000.00 to P800,000.00.
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After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision of the RTC
which reversed the decision of the MeTC, became final and executory.
Whilst respondents appeal of the MeTC judgment in the unlawful detainer case was pending
before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed before the RTC-Branch 227 a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 alleging two
causes of action, namely: (1) damages; and (2) breach of contract.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of
respondents complaint and argued that the latter had no cause of action against them because the
MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was a matter of public record and its disclosure to the
public violated no law or any legal right of the respondent. Petitioners averred that said unlawful
detainer case was already judicially decided with finality.
RTC-Branch 227 dismissed respondents complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for
violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the
pendency of a related case.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341
on September 26, 2003. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment on October 10,
2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an Order dated December 30, 2003.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1,
2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order dated March 23, 2004, dismissed respondents
appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April 30,
2004 and he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same on May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in
another Order dated May 31, 2004, granted respondents latest motion because it was convinced
that it is but appropriate and fair to both parties that this matter of whether or not the Appeal was
filed on time, be resolved by the appellate court rather than by this Court.
The Court of Appeals (CA) resolved to give due course to respondents appeal. It fully agreed
with RTC-Branch 227 in dismissing respondents second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract).
However, it held that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the trial on the merits of the
first cause of action (i.e., damages).
Petitioners assert that respondents appeal of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution dated
September 2, 2003, which dismissed the latters complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was filed
out of time. Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he only
had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003. Respondent, instead, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution on October 10, 2003, which left him with only one
more day to file his appeal. The RTC-Branch 227 subsequently denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received
on February 20, 2004. Respondent only had until the following day, February 21, 2004, to file the
appeal. However, respondent filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 1, 2004. Hence, petitioners
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conclude that the dismissal of respondents complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 already attained
finality.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that the award of damages in respondents favor has no
factual and legal bases. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and
exemplary damages to respondent based on the bare and unproven allegations in the latters
complaint and without the benefit of any hearing or trial.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that his appeal of the September 2, 2003
Resolution of the RTC-Branch 227 to the Court of Appeals was timely filed and that the same was
aptly given due course.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of
15 days.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary appeal from
the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from
receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
In Sumiran v. Damaso, it states that as early as 2005, the Court categorically declared
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and
create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or
denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted.
In Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive
word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
within 15 days from notice of the "final order,"
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2,
2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September
26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received
on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying
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his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the
fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15
days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
82610.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227 should not have
dismissed respondents complaint for damages on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint
and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is
whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be
rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.
EFFECT OF DEATH PENDING APPEAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO PANITERCE
G.R. No. 186382, April 5, 2010, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The death of an accused pending his appeal extinguished not only his criminal liabilities but
also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on the crime committed.
Facts:
Domingo Paniterce was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness by the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 37. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
RTC judgment was affirmed with modifications as to the penalties imposed. On 16 September 2008,
Paniterce, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his
intention to appeal to the Supreme Court. The same was given due course. However, while this case
was already submitted for resolution, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and
Security of the Bureau of Corrections, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, informed this Court that
Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital.
Issue:
What is the effect of the death of an accused pending his appeal?
Ruling:
Paniterces death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not
only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters,
but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes.
Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterces appeal. Whether or not he was
guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and our disquisition in People vs. Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred
criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterces
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appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when
he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise
extinguished by his death.
Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
finding Paniterce guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and
ordering him to indemnify his victims had become ineffectual.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Facts:
Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his daughter,
AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The Information specifically charged
Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 finding Amistoso guilty,
not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to
Article 266B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated August 25, 2011, affirmed Amistosos conviction
for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 93466
and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages.
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated January
9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso,
expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-inCharge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the
Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa
City.
Issue:
Whether or not his criminal liability and civil liabilities are extinguished upon his death
pending appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. Criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto are extinguished upon his death.
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In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Delicts
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the
Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not
immediately informed of his death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts
Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and
ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction
to set it aside.
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECTS OF JUDGEMENTS
JORGE Q. GO vs. VINEZ A. HORTALEZA
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A.M. No. P051971. June 26, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondent sheriff departed from the procedure prescribed by the Rules in the collection of
payment for sheriffs expenses in implementing a writ of execution. Respondent as an officer of the
court should have shown a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Instead, he
failed to comply with his duties under the law and to observe proper procedure dictated by the rules.
Facts:
Go and his spouse were the defendants in a civil case. An adverse decision was rendered
against them. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration for the Motion for Execution,
Hortaleza seized and levied upon Go's Toyota Corolla car. He impounded and stored said vehicle at
the parking lot of the Hall of Justice in Dagupan City. Subsequently, MTC denied Go's Motion for
Reconsideration but granted his Motion for Release of Motor Vehicle in view of the deposit of
P161,042.00.
Before effecting the release of the said vehicle, Hortaleza demanded from Go's
representative, Melanio Balolong, the amount of P5,000.00, which purportedly would answer for
the expenses in the implementation of the writ of execution. Hortaleza did not deny his receipt of
the said sum of money as he in fact issued an ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT. Go claimed to have
repeatedly demanded to no avail the return of the said P5,000.00 or the issuance of an official
receipt. Hence, a complaint was filed praying for the imposition of appropriate sanctions on
Hortaleza.
In his comment, Hortaleza cited Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, requiring the requesting party
to pay sheriffs expenses incurred in enforcing writs of execution. He explained that he paid
P4,000.00 to a mechanic and P500.00 to a key master and the balance of P500.00 was spent for his
transportation expenses and other expenses in serving the writ.
In its Memorandum Report, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct.
Issue:
Is the sheriff guilty of simple misconduct?
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 9, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribes the procedure to be followed by
the sheriffs in implementing a writ of execution. In accordance with the Rule, the steps that must be
followed before an interested party pays the sheriffs expenses are: 1) the sheriff must make an
estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; 2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated
expenses; 3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the
Clerk of Court andex officio sheriff; 4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing
sheriff; and 5) the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for
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rendering a return on the writ. Any unspent amount should be refunded to the party making the
deposit. Thereafter, the sheriff must render a full report.
Here, Hortaleza demanded and received the sum of P5,000.00 from Go without first making
an estimate of the sheriffs expenses. Hence, nothing was submitted to the court for approval. Also,
it was Hortaleza, and not the Clerk of Court, who took custody of the fund. While in his
comment, Hortaleza was able to show the breakdown of all the expenses amounting to P5,000.00,
this, however, does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid down in the abovequoted rule.
The Court also doubts the veracity of the belated manifestation of respondent that he turned over
the P5,000.00 to the counsel of the judgment creditor, the plaintiff in the MTC case.
Likewise, respondent, failed to comply with a duty imposed on public officials and
employees by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all
public officials and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public officials and employees shall, within
fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means
of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the
request.
xxx
(d) Act immediately on the publics personal transactions. All public officials and employees
must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must,
at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.
Hortaleza had been remiss in his duties as a court officer. He did not respond to
complainants letter and he ignored complainants request for an official receipt for the P5,000.00
he received in the course of the performance of his official duties. Hortaleza as an officer of the
court should have shown a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Instead,
he failed to comply with his duties under the law and to observe proper procedure dictated by the
rules. A sheriff is a frontline representative of the justice system in this country. Once he loses the
peoples trust, he diminishes the peoples faith in the judiciary.
Nonetheless, there is no clear showing in the records that in demanding the amount of
P5,000.00, Hortaleza was motivated by intent to gain which warrants a finding of dishonesty or
serious misconduct on his part. Hortaleza's violation of the Rules constitutes simple misconduct,
under Section 52, B(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS,et.al
It is also well-settled that the court is authorized to modify or alter a judgment after the same
has become executory, whenever the circumstances transpire rendering itsexecution unjust and
equitable.
Facts:
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On May 20, 1993, Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) filed a civil action for
ejectment against California Bus Lines, Inc. (CBL). The MTC rendered a decision dated July 30, 1993
in favor of MIAA. MIAA filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted on
August 9, 1993.
On November 3, 1993, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was
approved by the MTC. However, CBL failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the
Compromise Agreement. Hence, MIAA filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was
granted by the MTC. The properties of CBL were levied upon by the MTC Sheriff but this levy was
subsequently lifted when CBL issued postdated checks to secure payment of the debt pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement. Again, CBL failed to comply with the schedule of payment stipulated in
the Compromise Agreement prompting MIAA to file a Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of
Execution which was granted by the MTC.
In reaction to the issuance of the aforementioned writ, CBL filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In the RTC, CBL insisted that the alias writ of
execution was issued by the MTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
CBL argued that the decision dated July 30, 1993 of the MTC had already attained finality; that CBL
overpaid the same by seven million pesos; and that the Compromise Agreement is void because
because it was entered into after the finality of the decision dated July 30, 1993 of the MTC.
The RTC dismissed the petition which prompted CBL to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 42 with the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dismissing CBLs petition.
Unperturbed, CBL filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which the CA denied in its subsequent Resolution.
CBL contends that when the Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC, its earlier
decision dated July 30, 1993 was already final and executory. Thus, the Compromise Agreement
substantially altered the July 30, 1993 MTC decision, and the subsequent application for an Alias
Writ of Execution after more than seven (7) years cannot be entertained since it is fundamental
that a final and executory decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or
mistakes.
Issue:
Whether the writ of execution based on the compromise agreement was null and void
Ruling:
No. Petition dismissed.
As correctly emphasized by the CA in modify or alter a judgment after the same has become
executory, whenever the circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust justified the
amicable settlement reached by the parties after having seriously considered in all good faith, the
financial position and the capacity of the defendant CBL to fulfill its obligation under the decision
promulgated in this case and cognizant over the fate of it is also wellsettled that the court is
authorized to modify or alter a judgment after the same has become executory, whenever the
circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and equitable.
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The Compromise Agreement, thus, explicitly justified the amicable settlement reached by
the parties after having seriously considered in all good faith, the financial position and the
capacity of the defendant CBL to fulfill its obligation under the decision promulgated in this case
and cognizant over the fate of almost seven hundred employees and the riding public in the event
the decision is executed . . .
The assailed Alias Writ of Execution dated January 13, 1998 was validly issued by the RTC
and is still enforceable because the prescriptive period by which it can be enforced by motion has
been effectively suspended beginning November 23, 1998 when CBL filed with the RTC its petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 71, CRESENCIANO RABELLO, JR., Sheriff IV, RTC-BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY; and
EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow, ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO,
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.
Facts:
The case now before us stems from two petitions that were consolidated upon motion of
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS): G.R. No. 175393 and G.R. No. 177731.
From 1956 to 1957, spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos (Zulueta spouses) obtained
various loans from GSIS totalling P3,117,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage on several
parcels of land located in Pasig City and covered by three Transfer Certificates of Titles (the mother
titles) in their name. Because of their default, GSIS, in 1974, extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgages, for P5,229,917.84. Being the highest bidder, GSIS was issued a certificate of sale by the
sheriff.
GSIS consolidated its title over the lots subject of the foreclosure sale. Subsequently, GSIS
disposed of the foreclosed properties together with lots not covered by the foreclosure sale.
GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation, which sale was
disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The Register of Deeds of Rizal
cancelled the land titles issued to Yorkstown Development Corporation.
After GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it
began disposing the foreclosed lots, including the excluded ones. The lots had already been divided
by the Zulueta spouses into smaller lots but GSIS consolidated title on the three mother titles,
because these were what the Zulueta spouses had earlier mortgaged to it. Under the first mortgage,
out of the 199 lots covered, 78 lots were expressly excluded from the mother titles mortgage.
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Antonio Vic Zulueta, the Zulueta spouses successor-in-interest, transferred all his rights
and interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo M. Santiago, whose lawyer wrote a letter asking GSIS
to return said lots.
Antonio, represented by Santiago, filed an action for reconveyance of the excluded lots
against GSIS in RTC-Pasig presided over by respondent Judge Lavia, entitled Eduardo M. Santiago,
et al. v. GSIS.
The trial court, finding that neither prescription nor laches had set in, rendered a decision
against GSIS. GSIS appealed to the CA (the first CA case) which affirmed the same. GSIS went up to
the Supreme Court (the first SC case). The first CA decision was by the Supreme Court which
became final and executory.
Santiago filed a motion before the RTC for execution of its decision. Opposing the motion,
GSIS pointed out that under the GSIS Act of 1997, and existing jurisprudence, its funds and
properties were exempt from execution.
Judge Lavia issued an order granting the motion for execution and fixing the current fair
market value of the subject lots, which were ordered reconveyed to Santiago, at P35,000.00 per
square meter, or a total of P1,166,165,000.00 computed on the basis of an aggregate area of 33,319
square meters.
Acting upon said writ, Sheriff Cresenciano Rabello, Jr., along with Santiagos counsel, Atty.
Jose Suing, went to the GSIS main office to serve the same and a notice addressed to Atty. Winston F.
Garcia, president and general manager of GSIS, demanding payment of the abovementioned amount
of P1,166,165,000.00. On the same date, the sheriff and Atty. Suing served notices of garnishment
on GSIS banks: Development Bank of the Philippines, Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine
National Bank, and Philippine Veterans Bank.
GSIS filed a motion to quash writ of execution on the grounds that: (i) it was exempt from
execution under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291; (ii) it was deprived of the opportunity to contest the
order of execution since the writ of execution was served before its receipt of an official copy of said
order; and (iii) the lower courts valuation of the subject lots at P35,000.00 per square meter was
unrealistic, too high and without legal and factual basis. Trial court denied such motion.
GSIS then filed before the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (the second
CA case), with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to annul the Orders, and the Writ of Execution, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying GSISs motion to quash.
GSIS likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus with prayer for temporary mandatory
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. The petition was a special civil action for
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to compel PNB and DBP to release
the deposit made by petitioner by allowing petitioner GSIS to withdraw its funds and monies
deposited in respondent banks. The RTC issued an Order granting the TRO on the ground that
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 8291, the funds of GSIS cannot be subject of any garnishment, considering
that GSIS badly needed the money to finance its daily operations.
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The second CA case was partially granted, that said orders and writ of execution be for
satisfaction to the sum of P399,828,000.99, and that said court is directed to immediately conduct a
hearing for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004
and, upon such determination, issue an order of execution and the corresponding writ for the
unsatisfied portion of the decision.
GSIS filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration to such decision on the second CA case on
the main ground that it should not be deprived of what it alleged was the main mode of satisfying
the judgment, i.e., reconveyance.
Trial court issued an Order denying GSISs Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Urgent
Motion to Quash Order of Delivery of Money, and the Manifestation to Set Case for Presentation of
Rebuttal Evidence.
Subsequently, GSIS filed with Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, G.R.
No. 175393 (the second SC case), with prayer for a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
claiming that the questioned Orders and the Order of Delivery of Money were issued and enforced
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, in the absence of factual and legal bases; and that petitioner had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the present petition, to protect its interest
against the enforcement of the subject Orders.
Supreme Court dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 175393 for: (a) being a wrong mode of
appeal; and (b) violating the rule on forum shopping, saying it is rather obvious that GSISs Motion
for Reconsideration pending with the CA and this Petition, while directed at different orders of the
RTC, are actually aimed at only one objective: to thwart implementation of the Writ of Execution.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File and For Admission of Second Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Arguments. Supreme Court granted GSISs Motion
and setting aside the above Resolution; reinstating the petition; requiring respondents therein to
comment on the petition; and resolving to issue a TRO enjoining respondents therein, their
representatives or assigns, and/or any person acting for and in their behalf, from enforcing the
Orders of the trial court and the Order of Delivery of Money of respondent Sheriff.
Meanwhile, the CA denied GSISs motion for reconsideration in the second CA case. Hence,
GSIS filed Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 177731 (the third SC case).
GSIS averred that finality of judgment is a principle needed in the administration of justice;
however, in cases where gross injustice shall result from insistence on the principle, it has to be
disregarded. GSIS stated that this case is one such case.
GSIS claimed that it is not true that it failed to raise the defense of previous reconveyance as
the records of this case would easily bear out that petitioner mentioned during the proceedings
held in the trial court that there had already been reconveyance. GSIS claimed that any negligence
of its former lawyers in not including the fact of reconveyance in their Answer or in not capitalizing
upon it throughout the proceedings should not prejudice the interests of the 1,500,000 GSIS
members and pensioners.
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GSIS also argued that under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, its funds are
exempt from taxes, legal processes, liens, attachments, garnishments, and executions, and such
exemption is a state policy based on the Constitution under its social justice provisions.
GSIS asked that the Supreme Court revisit the ruling in Rubia v. GSIS, which held that the
GSIS exemption from execution is not absolute. It submitted that the trust funds under its
stewardship have the same public character as funds of regular departments, bureaus, and offices
of the Government. GSIS is not in business, in the commercial meaning of the word. GSIS tries to
make its trust fund earn in order to meet the heavy demands and requirements of the future. In the
same way as funds needed to construct school buildings or to buy tanks, helicopters, and other
defense equipment may not be garnished to pay debts of the Department of Education and Culture
or the Department of National Defense, so should funds intended for pensions of public servants,
their death compensation or disability benefits be freed from the perils of execution and
garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the consolidated petitions should be dismissed due to violation of the rule
on forum shopping
Ruling:
Yes, the Court dismissed the consolidated petitions due to violation of the rule on forum
shopping.
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.
The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of socalled nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. None of the exceptional circumstances to this doctrine exist in this case.
What GSIS sought to do is for the Court to hold that there had already been reconveyance,
conducted through various transactions, of the subject properties even before the commencement
of the case with the RTC, and, in effect, for us to nullify a final and executory judgment that had been
passed upon by the RTC, the CA, and this Court in the first SC case. The Court disagreed, saying it
will not do so, not even under the veiled threat that in failing to grant the petition, it will be deciding
against the fate of the GSIS funds that exist for the service of government employees who deserve to
be favored in law under the principles of social justice and equity.
Regarding the alleged exemption of the funds and properties of GSIS, the Court quoted the
Court of Appeals in the second CA case: In Rubia vs. GSIS (432 SCRA 529), the Supreme Court ruled
that the exemption from execution enjoyed by GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 is not
absolute. The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS
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Charter should be read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial
solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the retirement,
disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the
purposes and objects covered. Any interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to
exempt all GSIS assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
The declared policy of the State in Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an
exemption from tax, lien, attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be read
together with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its "excess funds" under Section 36 of the
same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary power to invest in business and other
ventures for the benefit of the employees, by using its excess funds for investment purposes. In the
exercise of such function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to a private
corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly granted by its charter. Needless to say,
where proper, under Section 36, the GSIS may be held liable for the contracts it has entered into in
the course of its business investments. For GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from liability in
regard to its business ventures under said Section. Nor can it deny contracting parties the right of
redress and the enforcement of a claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual
relationship, of a private character between an individual and the GSIS.
GSIS asked the Court to reverse the findings in Rubia case, and as a result, rule that the
immunity granted to it by Rep. Act No. 8291 is absolute. The Court saw no reason to depart from
the conclusions reached in said case. In fact, all the more should GSIS not be allowed to hide behind
such immunity in this case, where its obligation arises not just from a simple business transaction,
but from its utter failure to return properties that it had wrongfully foreclosed.
GSIS questioned the manner in which execution was conducted in this case, and insisted
that reconveyance should be the primary mode and then payment only a secondary mode. The
Court did not agree. It quoted the discussion of the second CA decision:
There is no need for respondent judge to first issue a writ of execution for the
reconveyance of the subject lots. Such recourse would merely be an exercise in futility because as
shown in the Sheriffs Partial Report reconveyance was not possible as of April 29, 2004 since the
subject lots were no longer registered in the name of GSIS. Since GSIS did not deny the facts stated
in the sheriffs partial report, we accord the same full faith and credit in keeping with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Based on GSIS own appraisal of lands in San Antonio Village, the reasonable value of the
subject lots ranged from P12,000.00 to P15,000.00 per square meter depending on the street where
a particular lot is located. Since GSIS itself has admitted that the reasonable value of the subject lost,
which have an aggregate area of 33,319 square meters, was at least P12,000.00 per square meter or
a total value of P399,828,000.00, partial execution may now proceed on the basis of said valuation.
Any difference between the P12,000.00 per square meter valuation and the fair market value of the
subject lots as of April 29, 2004, as may be finally determined by the court a quo, can be recovered
later. It is the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004 which must be reckoned for
purposes of enforcing the judgment in question because it was on that date that it was ascertained
that reconveyance of those lots was no longer possible.
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This is as it should be in order to afford private respondent partial satisfaction of the
judgment which she and her predecessors-in-interest have long sought. As found in said judgment,
private respondent and her privies have been deprived of ownership and enjoyment of the subject
lots since November 1975. To add insult to injury, it took them almost fourteen years to obtain a
final and executory judgment against GSIS.
The Court noted that GSIS deliberately filed two cases, herein consolidated, involving the
same parties and issues, in its desperate attempt to stay the execution of the judgment against it.
Petitioner should be reminded that rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues. The Court admonished
GSIS from bending the rules of procedure to suit its purposes. Obedience to the rules promulgated
by this Court to ensure the efficient administration of justice must be the norm, and not the
exception.
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INCORPORATED vs. MARIAN CLINICS, INC. and DR.
LOURDES MABANTA
It is settled that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of
the judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must
conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
Facts:
Marian Clinics, Inc. (MCI) and University Physicians Services, Incorporated (UPSI) entered
into a Lease Agreement whereby the former leased to the latter the Marian General Hospital (MGH)
and four schools for a period of ten (10) years, from June 1, 1973 to May 31, 1983. The land,
buildings, facilities, fixtures and equipment appurtenant thereto, including the Soledad Building,
were included in the lease, for which a monthly rental of P70,000 was agreed upon.
UPSI filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, Branch 34 for specific
performance against MCI, alleging that (1) MCI failed to deliver Certificates of Occupancy on certain
buildings, and (2) there were some defective electrical installations that caused the issuance of a
Condemned Installation Notice by the Office of the City Electrician of the City of Manila. UPSI prayed
for the delivery of the Certificates of Occupancy of the buildings leased, for the correction of the
defects in the electrical installations thereon, and damages.
UPSI sent a letter to MCI, informing it of the filing of the complaint and the suspension of
payment of the monthly rentals until the resolution of the case. MCI sent a demand letter to UPSI
for the payment of the rent. MCI and Dr. Lourdes Mabanta (Dr. Mabanta) filed a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer against UPSI with the then City Court of Manila (now the MeTC). The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 006665-CV.
In the meantime, UPSI filed with the CFI a Motion availing of its right to suspend payment of
rentals under Article 1658 of the Civil Code. CFI ordered that all payments shall be made to said
court pending the resolution of the case. The City Court dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the
finding that (1) UPSIs suspension of rental payments was justified; and (2) there was no ground to
cause the rescission of the lease and warrant the ejectment of UPSI.
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35.
MCI and Dr. Mabanta appealed to the RTC of Manila, where the case was raffled to Branch
During the pendency of these cases, MCI ceded to the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) some of the leased buildings, including certain facilities, furniture, fixtures and equipment
found therein, in full settlement of MCIs debt to DBP. The Deed of Cession of Properties in Payment
of Debt (Dacion en Pago) listed the properties ceded to DBP. Upon the execution of the dacion en
pago, UPSI paid P60,000 of the monthly rental to DBP as the new owner of the properties subject of
the dacion en pago.
RTC Manila affirmed the City Court Decision dismissing MCIs unlawful detainer case. This
case was appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). While the RTC Decision in the
unlawful detainer case was under review with the IAC, UPSI bought from DBP the leased properties
ceded to the latter by MCI under the dacion en pago.
IAC reversed the rulings of the lower courts. According to it, the absence of the certificates of
occupancy for two of the leased buildings, being a matter between the owner of the building and the
city government, did not impair the peaceful and adequate enjoyment by UPSI of the premises. IAC
further held that the alleged defective electrical installations on the premises leased is no
justification for the refusal to pay rentals, as, under Article 1663 of the Civil Code, the lessee may
have said installations properly reinstalled at the expense of the lessor.
Both MCI and UPSI filed Motions for Reconsideration of the IACs Decision. IAC granted
MCIs Motion for Reconsideration and denying that of UPSI. Noting the finding that UPSI violated the
lease agreement by failing to pay the stipulated rentals, the IAC ruled that MCI may now require
UPSI to vacate the leased premises.
UPSI appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that said judgment did not order the
replacement of the leased properties lost or deteriorated and/or to pay their value if replacement
cannot be made.
CA ruled that the judgment sought to be executed reveals the intent of the court to have all
of the leased properties returned upon the execution of the judgment. Indeed, the original Writ of
Execution included these personal properties. As some of the leased properties were not returned,
causing only a partial execution of the judgment, the November 5, 1990 Order of the RTC Manila
was necessitated since it did not vary the terms of the judgment but merely implemented the IACs
Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of execution conform substantially to the essentials of the
promulgated judgment.
Ruling:
The Court rules in the affirmative.
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It is settled that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular
of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It
must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision.
To begin with, it cannot be disputed that the subject matter of the lease agreement between
the parties included real and personal properties. As discussed in the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the basis for the obligation of UPSI to return, and in certain circumstance, replace or pay
the value of the above-mentioned appurtenances in the leased properties is both law and contract.
Article 1665 of the Civil Code provides that the lessee shall return the thing leased, upon the
termination of the lease, just as he received it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of
time, or by ordinary wear and tear, or from an inevitable cause. Article 1667 likewise states that the
lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that it took
place without his fault. In other words, by law, a lessee is obliged to return the things leased and be
responsible for any deterioration or loss of the properties, except for those that were not his fault.
Under the principle of the parties freedom of contract, the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the parties.
As regards Article 1667 of the Civil Code, we hold that the applicability thereof, or of the
provision of the lease contract holding UPSI liable in case of loss or deterioration of the subject
properties, are not dependent on the presence, at the moment, of inventories. The execution court
may conduct hearings to determine the existence of such an inventory and, if found that such is
unavailable, further hearings may be conducted to reconstruct the same and determine the value of
the properties that should be returned or replaced, if necessary.
YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ vs. SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Trece Martires City, Cavite
A.M. No. P-11-2972, September 28, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules laid down under Section 9, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court when he did not give Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under
in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose
which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately
levied upon the vehicle that belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda.
Facts:
Upon the complaint of Alicia Panganiban, for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were
instituted against Juanito Corpuz before the MTCC. In an order the MTCC approved the Compromise
Agreement executed between Panganiban and Juanito in which Juanito promised to pay
Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00 and dismissed provisionally the criminal case. The MTCC
allegedly rendered a judgment based on the Compromise Agreement, but there was no copy of said
judgment in the records of this case. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under the
Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution of the MTCC judgment. On March
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17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on Panganibans Motions and issued a Writ of Execution
addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC of Trece Martires City.
On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanitos wife, and her daughter were in her office at the Cavite
Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolandas office and
demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was
registered in Yolandas name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do
so. Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Yolanda
surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any document which
Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.
Yolanda was compelled to file the present administrative complaint against Sheriff
Pascua. Yolanda alleged in her complaint that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even
used the same on several occasions for his personal use. Yolanda attached to her complaint pictures
to prove that Sheriff Pascua, parked the vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also
claimed that her vehicle was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ
of Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against Juanito, Yolandas
husband. Sheriff Pascua denied that he threatened and used force in levying upon the vehicle in
question, and avowed that he was the one maligned when he served the Writ of Execution at
Yolandas residence and at Yolandas office. Sheriff Pascua averred that after the levy, he politely
informed Yolanda that he would temporarily keep the vehicle at his place as there was no safe
parking within the court premises. Sheriff Pascua already stated in the Sheriffs Return that he was
keeping temporary custody of Yolandas vehicle. Sheriff Pascua argued that Yolanda is the wife of
Juanito, the accused in Criminal Case, and the vehicle is their conjugal property, which could be
levied upon in satisfaction of a Writ of Execution against Juanito.
On November 17, 2010, The Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report
recommended that Sergio V. Pascua, be REPRIMANDED for impropriety in taking the vehicle and
parking the same at his garage; and be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day
for Simple Neglect of Duty. Resultantly, the case was already submitted for resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Pascua in levying upon Yolandas vehicle he digressed far from the
procedure laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments.
Ruling:
Yes, Sheriff Pascua departed from the procedure of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
judgment obligor is given the option to immediately choose which of his property or part thereof,
not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the
judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent or cannot be
located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and
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then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and should not be the one to determine which property to
levy if the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given
the option to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.
In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving
Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in cash, certified
bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his
property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon
the vehicle that belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda.
SPOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO AND BEMA CACHOPERO vs. RACHEL CELESTIAL
G.R. No. 146754, March 21, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a direct effect on
the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events must create a substantial change
in the rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice.
Facts:
Jesse Capochero is the younger brother of Rachel Celestial. Celestial owned a residential
house located in Midsayap, Cotabato, Philippines. A major portion of this house stood on the eastern
part of the subject land immediately adjoining Celestials lot.
Celestial filed an Ejectment case against spouses Jesse and Bema Cachopero. However, the
spouses Cachopero refused to vacate the premises. In the meantime, Celestial and the spouses
Cachopero entered into a Compromise Agreement. The agreement stipulated that the spouses
Cachopero are going to vacate the old house and Celestial will shoulder all the expenses in
dismantling said house. Such agreement was approved by the trial court.
However a portion of the house beyond Celestials lot was not demolished, hence Celestial
filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. The court denied the motion on the
ground that the old house constructed on Celestials lot had already been demolished and whatever
remained were owned by the spouses Cachopero.
Meanwhile, Jesse Cachopero instituted a petition for certiorari assailing the orders of the
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources which denied his sales application over a
portion of the subject land.
On the other hand, Celestial filed a petition for mandamus for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution which was denied by the RTC on the ground the petition filed by Jesse Cachopero was
considered as a supervening cause necessitating refusal to issue a writ of execution. Celestial
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In granting her appeal, the Court of Appeals said the compromise judgment is immediately
executory and once judicially approved, has the force of res judicata between the parties.
Furthermore, in the petition filed by Jesse Cachopero, the issue is who between the parties has a
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better right to purchase the lot of the public domain the pendency of which may not abate the
execution of the compromise agreement in the ejectment case.
Issue:
Whether the petition filed by Jesse Cachopero is a supervening event to justify the stay of
the execution of the compromise agreement
Ruling:
No.
A decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such agreement has the force
of law and is conclusive on the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only
upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with
the Rules.
The terms of the compromise agreement involved herein are clear and unequivocal. The
spouses Cachopero agreed to vacate Celestials lot and transfer the old house to the land at the back
of Celestials lot. While it has been shown that the spouses Cachopero had already removed part of
the old house, Jesse Cachopero himself admitted, during the ocular inspection done by the RTC, that
part of the old house beyond Celestials lot were not demolished nor removed
This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the petition of Jesse Cachopero, has nothing
to do with the case before us. The spouses Cachopero anchor their right on the MSA that they filed
with the DENR over the subject land, whereas this case concerns the compromise agreement they
executed with Celestial.
Furthermore what is involved herein is the transfer of the old house from the subject land,
and not the subject land itself. Unless the spouses Cachopero can show this Court that there is a
supervening event, which occurred after the judgment of the MTC, and which brought about a
material change in their situation vis--vis that of Celestial, the latter has the right to have the
compromise agreement executed, according to its terms.
To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a direct effect
on the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events must create a substantial
change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment
unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of
justice.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION)
and BERNIE G. MIAQUE
Section 21, Rule 70 provides that the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases appealed to it
shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher
court. To avoid such immediate execution, the defendant may appeal said judgment to the CA and
therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. In this case, the decisions of the MTCC, of the RTC,
and of the CA, unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and the
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corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the
MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in
possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a
clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he
shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the
MTCC.
Facts:
The Air Transportation Office filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City. The MTCC rendered a judgment finding Miaque to be
unlawfully detaining the involved premises. The RTC affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety.
Miaque questioned the RTC Decision in the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 79439. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision. Miaque brought the case to this Court in a petition for review, which petition was denied
as no reversible error in the Court of Appeals Decision.
As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court of Appeals issued on February 27, 2004 a
temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for a period of 60 days and required Miaque to post a
bond. After the lapse of the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent motion for the execution of the RTC
Decision pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This was opposed by Miaque. The
RTC granted the ATOs motion. However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated August 18,
2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the ATO and all
persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the respective Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of Miaques petition for review in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion for execution of the RTC Decision. The RTC
granted the ATOs urgent motion for execution. Miaque filed a motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439
praying that the Court of Appeals order the RTC judge and the concerned sheriffs to desist from
implementing the writ of execution Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated June
14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs to desist from executing the Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is still pending.
On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution dated January 5, 2006
denying Miaques motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the revival of the writs of execution. The RTC issued
an Order dated March 20, 2006 granting the ATOs motion and revived the writs of execution.
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition for certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603, where he assailed the RTCs Order dated March 20, 2006. The CA issued a resolution dated
March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO effective for 60 days, and Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of execution dated August
16, 2004 and June2, 2005.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 which granted petitioners
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603
Ruling:
Yes. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21.
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the
Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule
42 of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting
and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately
executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its
discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction,
receivership, accounting, or award of support. The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to
bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the
adverse party.
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant characteristics of the
RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate courts discretion, suspended or modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is emphasized
by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent or stay the execution of
the RTCs judgment. The significance of this may be better appreciated by comparing Section 21 of
Rule 70 with its precursor, Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Where defendant appeals
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the
restoration of possession, shall not be stayed unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and
within the periods referred to in section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein
provided.
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Under the old provisions where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could prevent the
immediate execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a periodic deposit of monthly
rentals during the pendency of the appeal thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of
the premises in the meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that
the judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately
executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. The RTCs duty
to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by
mandamus. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTCs judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the
RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom reinforces the first. The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon
its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom.
This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid
immediate execution of the RTC decision. The defendant may x x x appeal said judgment to the
Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction.
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil Case No.
02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of
the ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately
vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled
that Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore
puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with
the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises
leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by
a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of
origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Preliminary Injunction
JIMMY T. GO vs. THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, ILDEFONSO M. VILLANUEVA, JR., and SHERIFF DIOSCORO F. CAPONPON, JR. and
MULTI-LUCK CORPORATION
G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009, J. De Castro
The doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly adjudicated and to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish (a) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; (c) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Facts:
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Respondent Multi-Luck Corporation filed a collection suit against Alberto T. Looyuko as sole
proprietor of Noahs Ark Merchandising Inc. (NAMI). The complaint pertained to three dishonored
UCPB checks issued by Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General Merchandising. These checks were
indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to be a holder in due course of such checks.
Upon Multi-Lucks motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bacolod RTC rendered a
Decision ordering Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the thre UCPB
checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an appeal. Hence, the Decision became final and executory. Upon
Multi-Lucks motion, the Bacolod RTC issued a writ of execution over a house and lot registered in
the name of Looyuko and one share in the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. in the
name of NAMI. The auction sales were then scheduled.
Petitioner Jimmy Go filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Multi-Luck before the RTC, Pasig City. The
complaint alleged that petitioner is a business partner of Looyuko and that the former co-owned
the properties of Looyuko/NAMI including the properties subject of the aforementioned auction
sales. It was further alleged that the intended public auction of the subject properties would unduly
deprive him of his share of the property without due process of law considering that he was not
impleaded as a party in the civil case. Multi-Luck filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners claim and over the public
respondent sheriffs as well as over Multi-Luck.
The Pasig RTC granted petitioners prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Thereafter, the Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining public respondent
sheriffs Caponpon, Jr. and Villanueva, Jr. from holding the public auction. It also denied Multi-Lucks
motion to dismiss. Multi-Luck elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA
granted Multi-Lucks petition and reversed the ruling of the Pasig RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the principle on non-intervention of co-equal courts apply where a third
party claimant is involved;
2. Whether or not there is a ground for the issuance of the preliminary injunction
Ruling:
1. Yes. No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This
doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. As
correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are
still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. Since the
Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit and rendered judgment in
relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its
judgment, including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers,
namely public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction was a clear act of interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC.
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The jurisprudential exception adverted to by petitioner, i.e. Santos v. Bayhon, 199 SCRA 525
(1991), finds no application in this case. In Santos, we allowed the implementation of a writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter to be enjoined by order of the RTC where a third party
claimant had filed his action to recover property involved in the execution sale, since the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction to decide matters of ownership of property and the civil courts are the
proper venue therefor. In the case at bar, the Bacolod RTC had jurisdiction and competence to
resolve the question of ownership of the property involved had petitioner filed his claim with the
said court.
2. None. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably
in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Pursuant to the above provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial
protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or
future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be
a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the
following requisites:
(1)
(2)
(3)
a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

a violation of that right;
that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage.
To bolster his claim of interest on the attached properties, petitioner Jimmy Go presented
the Agreement dated February 9, 1982, showing that he is a co-owner of all properties and monies
belonging to Looyuko/NAMI. However, the Court notes that the authenticity and the due execution
of these documents are presently under litigation in other proceedings which are not pending
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before the Pasig RTC. There appears to be a pending case, wherein Looyuko claims that his
signatures on these Agreements were a forgery.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the CA, NAMI had already been in existence as early as
the middle part of the 1970s. It is undeniable that for a little more than two (2) decades pending the
advent of the present controversy, NAMI has been doing business as a registered single
proprietorship with Looyuko as single proprietor. On this score, we quote the following discussion
of the CA:
At this juncture, this Court notes that even assuming the validity of the
foregoing partnership agreements, for all legal intents and purposes and in terms of
binding effect against third persons, the Noahs Ark Merchandising is a registered
single proprietorship. Corollarily, third persons dealing with the said business,
including Multi-Luck, had the right to rely on the fact that the registered single
proprietor thereof, in the person of Alberto Looyuko, may be held personally liable
for any and all liabilities of the single proprietorship and vice-versa. Moreover, this
Court finds it very unlikely that for more than twenty-years of the existence of the
business, and considering Private Respondents purported personal interest in the
business, he would risk allowing third persons to deal with and consequently have
the business liable as a single proprietorship when Private Respondent, assuming a
valid partnership indeed existed, could have easily compelled Alberto Looyuko to
cause the registration of the business as a partnership to afford legitimate
protection to Private Respondents property interests therein as a partner
thereof. In any event, Private Respondent is now estopped from disavowing the
standing of Noahs Ark Merchandising as a registered single proprietorship and from
claiming that the properties in question belong to a purported partnership.
The attached real properties are registered solely in the name of Looyuko and
NAMI. Corollarily, petitioner had no standing to question the Bacolod RTCs judgment as he is a
stranger to Civil Case No. 98-10404 and he has no clear right or interest in the attached
property. Likewise, the stock certificate is registered in the name of NAMI. Moreover, the checks
subject of Civil Case No. 98-10404 were made in payment for obligations incurred by Looyuko in
the course of the business operation of NAMI. Even assuming for the sake of argument that indeed,
petitioner co-owns NAMI, whatever obligation the business incurred in the course of its operation
is an obligation of petitioner as a part owner. In effect, petitioner was merely forestalling the
implementation of a final judgment against the corporation which he purportedly co-owns.
SPS. GONZALO T. DELA ROSA & CRISTETA DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN VALDEZ AND
SPOUSES POTENCIANO MALVAR AND LOURDES MALVAR
Although as a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some exceptions.
For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject
property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. In the
case at bar, the intervenors Valdez and Malvar have established a clear and legal right of ownership
and possession and the alleged TCT of the defendants spouses dela Rosa is non-existent.
Facts:
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This involves a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Transfer
Certificates of Title involving the property, filed before the RTC by Manila Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines (MCDC), against Gonzalo and Cristeta dela Rosa
(spouses Dela Rosa) and Juan, Jose, Pedro and Maria, all surnamed De la Cruz. Complaints-inintervention were filed in the said case by (1) North East Property Ventures, Inc. (NEPVI), and (2)
spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar.
In its complaint, plaintiff MCDC states that: the property (103 hectares) was acquired by
Deed of Absolute Sale; that Juan Valdez and Apolinaria Valdez were awarded with Sales Patent.
MCDC and its predecessor-in-interest Juan Valdez have been in continuous, adverse and open
possession of the property.
MCDC has been unlawfully deprived of the possession and enjoyment of the property
because of the continuing acts of dispossession committed by the defendants spouses Gonzales and
Cristeta dela Rosa as well as the other defendants who have no right at all. MCDC has suffered
irreparable damages; thus, the writ of preliminary injunction is urgently necessary to prevent
further acts of dispossession of plaintiff MCDC.
While in the Complaint-in-intervention of Intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. it is
alleged that: It is the co-owner of one half (50%) of the land according to a Deed of Absolute
Conveyance/Transfer for valuable services to be rendered; and for the amounts to be advanced by
intervenor corporation needed to update the real estate taxes; and the removal of the defendants
and from the disputed property.
Intervenors Valdez spouses state that they are the absolute owners of the land being the
vendees/grantees of Sales Patent. While intervenors Malvar spouses allege that they are the
grantees/assignees under the Deed of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance executed by the intervenors
spouses Valdez.
Noticeably, plaintiff MCDC; Intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. and Intervenor
Valdez spouses and Malvar spouses under separate applications have commonly prayed for the
relief of mandatory injunction; however, all the prayers for reliefs of mandatory injunction have
conjoined against defendants dela Rosa spouses and the other occupants of the land.
The RTC granted the joint prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction of the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. The Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses
Dela Rosas Petition for Certiorari and uphold the RTC Orders. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
Court of Appeals, the RTC, and the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar, and their agents,
representatives, and anyone acting on their behalf, from implementing and enforcing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar filed several motions to lift the TRO, but these were
all denied by the Court, TRO remained effective and binding.
Issue:
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Can the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the spouses Dela Rosas Petition for Certiorari
which, is dependent on the question of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, which placed the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar in possession of the subject
property during the pendency of Civil Case?
Ruling:
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error when it dismissed the said petition.
The Court shall address only with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of the case
pending before the RTC. A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the
main case and subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order. It may be: (1) a prohibitory injunction, which commands a party to
refrain from doing a particular act; or (2) a mandatory injunction, which commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitive or mandatory:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo between the parties, it also
commands the performance of an act. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right
is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is improper.
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
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interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the instant Petition, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the spouses Valdez and spouses
Malvar. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the spouses Dela
Rosas Petition for Certiorari.
The RTC discussed its factual and legal bases for granting the challenged writ in favor of the
spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar:
This Court honestly believes, after evaluation of the relevant averments in the pleadings and
documents formally offered and admitted, and the established facts, that the joint application for
mandatory injunction of the Intervenors Valdez spouses and Malvar spouses is meritorious.
MCDC nor the intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. proprietary right or rights of
dominion under their respective title were subject to conditions which were not complied with. The
Joint Venture Agreement has qualified the Deed of Absolute Sale since both deeds involved the
same parties with the same disputed land; hence, both deeds are to be interpreted jointly and to be
harmonized.
The parties primarily affected by the continuing acts of dispossession are the intervenors,
the spouses Valdez and the Malvar spouses, who evidently by the facts and circumstances by the
pleadings and evidence, have already shown to have established clear legal rights to be entitled to
the relief of writ of mandatory injunction under the salutary ruling that enunciates:
"x x x In Visayan Realty, Inc. vs. Meer, we ruled that the approval of a sales application
merely authorized the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile, the
government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be cancelled and
the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements had not been
complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. x x x" (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 414, 419-420)
The supposed title of ownership of defendant dela Rosas, has been certified to be nonexistent by the Registry of Deeds while the Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 where defendants dela
Rosas right to occupy was fatuously derived was nullified in the case of the Intestate Estate of Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733.
The situations as established relative to the preliminary mandatory injunction in this case is
clearly within the ambit of the exceptional or extreme urgency cases of: "x x x WHERE the right to
the possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear;
WHERE there was willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs rights, over his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; WHERE the effect of the preliminary mandatory
injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing and continuing relationship between the
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parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, rather than to establish a new
relationship during the pendency of the principal case x x x" authoritatively mentioned in G.R. No.
104782 prom. March 30, 1993, entitled Nelly Raspado vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 650, 653.
Although as a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some
exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or
unless the subject property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the
undisputed owner. In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit is covered by a torrens title
under the name of NHA." (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
254 SCRA 220, 232-233).
This ruling is applicable in this case, the intervenors Valdez and Malvar have established a
clear and legal right of ownership and possession and the alleged TCT of the defendants spouses
dela Rosa is non-existent.
With reference to the issue as to the non-existence of extreme urgencies or necessity of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; that long before or in 1993 the filing of an ejectment
case, defendants dela Rosa had already intruded into the portions of the land in controversy.
Evidently, there are ample justifications for the grant by the RTC of a writ that places the
subject property in the possession of the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar for the duration of the
trial of Civil Case. Sales Patent covering the property, had already been issued to Juan Valdez which
makes him, the equitable owner of the said property. There is already a request for the registration
of Sales Patent pending before the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City. The spouses Valdez
acknowledge the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Malvar.
In contrast, the title of the spouses Dela Rosa is nebulous. The title is based on TCT in
Cristeta dela Rosas name, which is not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City or
Antipolo City. TCT is also traced back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate
Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already declared null
and void, and from which no rights could be derived.
There is likewise no merit in the spouses Dela Rosas contention that the RTC Orders
amounted to a prejudgment of the case, there being no trial on the merits of Civil Case as yet. In Levi
Strauss (Phils.) Inc. v. Vogue Traders Clothing Company,25 the Court already explicated that:
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence adduced by the applicant. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive, for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its
issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a
court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature. Moreover, the
sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard. Since Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial courts sufficient
discretion to evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ which often
involves a factual determination, the appellate courts generally will not interfere in the absence of
manifest abuse of such discretion. A writ of preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of
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a case only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so that
there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters. x x x.
The RTC Orders have settled nothing more than the question of which party/parties is/are
entitled to possession of the subject property while Civil Case is still being heard. The findings of
fact and opinion of the RTC, based on the evidence that had so far been submitted by the parties, are
merely interlocutory in nature. Even with its issuance of said Orders, the RTC is not precluded from
proceeding with to receive additional evidence and hear further arguments that will help said trial
court to determine with finality the rightful owner/s and possessor/s of the subject property.
BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL PHILIPPINES, INC.) vs. CLARK TRADING
CORPORATION
Writ of injunction would issue: [U]pon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is
not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
Facts:
BP Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), a corporation engaged in the development, manufacture,
importation, distribution, marketing, and wholesale of: (i) the products of the BURMAH CASTROL
GROUP, including, x x x the CASTROL range of lubricants and associated products x x x,4 filed a
Complaint5 for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
(TRO) and damages in the RTC against respondent Clark Trading Corporation, owner of Parkson
Duty Free, which, in turn, is a duty free retailer operating inside the Clark Special Economic Zone
(CSEZ). Parkson Duty Free sells, among others, imported duty-free Castrol products not sourced
from petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1994 it had entered into a Marketing and Technical
Assistance Licensing Agreement6 and a Marketing and Distribution Agreement7 (agreements) with
Castrol Limited, U.K., a corporation organized under the laws of England, and the owner and
manufacturer of Castrol products. Essentially, under the terms of the agreements,8 Castrol Limited,
U.K. granted petitioner the title exclusive wholesaler importer and exclusive distributor of Castrol
products in the territory of the Philippines.9 Under the July 22, 1998 Variation territory was
further clarified to include duty-free areas.
Petitioner claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing Castrol products11 not
sourced from petitioner in the Philippines, violated petitioners exclusive rights under the
agreements. Despite a cease and desist letter12 dated September 14, 1998 sent by petitioner,
respondent continued to distribute and sell Castrol products in its duty-free shop. Petitioner, citing
Yu v. Court of Appeals13 as basis for its claim, contended that the unauthorized distribution and
sale of Castrol products by respondent will cause grave and irreparable damage to its goodwill and
reputation.
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On March 4, 1999, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO for a period of
twenty (20) days enjoining respondent from selling and distributing Castrol products until further
orders x x x. On April 15, 1999, the RTC denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, there being no sufficient justification for the relief. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner was not able to establish the existence of a clear
legal right to be protected and the acts which would constitute the alleged violation of said right.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunction against third-persons on the basis of its
marketing and distribution agreements.
Ruling:
No, petitioner is not entitled to injunction.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or
refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and
as an incident in the main action. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of
an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the
main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from,
and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object
of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until
it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
In the present case, neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals found any nefarious scheme
by respondent to induce either party to circumvent, renege on or violate its undertaking under the
marketing and distribution agreements. We note that no allegation was made on the authenticity of
the Castrol GTX products sold by respondent. Thus, there is nothing in this case that shows a ploy of
the character described in the Yu case, so this is clearly distinguishable from that case.
As we have already stated, the writ of injunction would issue: [U]pon the satisfaction of two
requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of
said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
Respondent not being able to prove and establish the existence of a clear and actual right
that ought to be protected, injunction cannot issue as a matter of course.
PALM TREE ESTATES, INC. and BELLE AIR GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE
BANK,
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For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be
protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. A
writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction
are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting
in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for
having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
The determination of the completeness or sufficiency of the form of the petition, including the
relevant and pertinent documents which have to be attached to it, is largely left to the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the petition, in this case the Court of Appeals. If the petition is insufficient in
form and substance, the same may be forthwith dismissed without further proceedings. That is the
import of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of
section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the
respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court
may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem
necessary and proper.
Facts:
On January 29, 1997, Petitioner PTEI entered into a seven-year term loan agreement with
Respondent PNB for the amount of P320 million, or its US dollar equivalent, in view of urgent need
for additional funding for the completion of its ongoing projects in Lapu-Lapu City. As security for
the payment of the loan, a Real Estate Mortgage over 48 parcels of land covering an aggregate area
of 353,916 sq.m. together with the buildings and improvements thereon, was executed by PTEI in
favor of PNB on February 21, 199.
As a result of petitioners transfer to BAGCCI of the ownership, title and interest over
199,134 sq.m. of the real properties mortgaged to PNB, petitioner executed an Amendment to Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB with BAGCCI as accommodation mortgagor with respect to the
real properties transferred to it by petitioner.
Respondent demanded payment of petitioners outstanding obligations. Responent denied
petitioners request for another restructuring of its past due indebtedness. As petitioner defaulted
in its payment of past due loan with respondent, the bank filed a Petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.
On April 23, 2001, to enjoin respondent from foreclosing on the mortgage, petitioners filed
a Complaint in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City for breach of contracts, nullity of promissory notes,
annulment of mortgages, fixing of principal, accounting, nullity of interests and penalties,
annulment of petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, injunction, damages, with prayer for temporary
restraining order, and writ of preliminary injunction.
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In their complaint, petitioners claimed that, respondent failed to release the term loan
despite demands. They also averred that PNB took advantage of their financial difficulty by
unilaterally (1) converting the US dollar denominated loan to a peso loan at an unreasonable
conversion. Moreover, petitioners signed the amendment to the loan agreement because of PNBs
offer to extend an additional P 80 million loan which the latter failed to release despite the fact that
all conditions for its release had been complied with in April 1999. PTEI and BAGCCI further
claimed that the amendment to the loan agreement, amendment to the real estate mortgage, certain
promissory notes and their respective disclosure statements and the restructuring agreement
should be declared void as they were executed pursuant to a void amendment to the loan
agreement, and with vitiated consent and without full consideration.
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City issued the Order dated May 17, 2001 ordering the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. However, according to the Court of Appeals, petitioner and BAGCCI failed
to show a clear and unmistakable right which would have necessitated the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, while respondent had the right to extrajudicial foreclosure under the loan
agreement when its debtors defaulted in their obligation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners petition for writ of preliminary injunction be granted.
2. Whether or not respondents Petition violated Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when
it deliberately omitted all the supporting material documents attached to the complaint
such as the petition for foreclosure, the real estate mortgage, the loan agreements, and
promissory notes.
Ruling:
1. No, petitioners are not entitled to writ of injunction.
A petition for a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, and one who comes to claim
for equity must do so with clean hands. Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must
apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of
equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be
protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in
the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant
of an injunction are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are
shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ
must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the hands of PTEI were not unsullied when it sought preliminary injunction. It
was already in breach of its contractual obligations when it defaulted in the payment of its
indebtedness to PNB. PTEIs President, Akimoto, admitted that PTEI has unsettled accrued
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obligations in the letter dated March 28, 2001. Moreover, PTEI had sought the rescheduling or
deferral of its payment as well as the restructuring of its loan. This Court has held that a debtors
various and constant requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually
paying the amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation.
As PTEI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is BAGCCI. The
accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of BAGCCI as accommodation mortgagor
is tied to PTEIs principal obligation to PNB and arises only in the event of PTEIs default. Thus,
BAGCCIs interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by
PTEIs wrongful conduct and breach of contract.
The right of PNB to extrajudicially foreclose on the real estate mortgage in the event of
PTEIs default is provided under various contracts of the parties. Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness. In view of PTEIs failure to settle its
outstanding obligations upon demand, it was proper for PNB to exercise its right to foreclose on the
mortgaged properties. It then became incumbent on PTEI and BAGCCI, when they filed the
complaint and sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to establish that they have a
clear and unmistakable right which requires immediate protection during the pendency of the
action. The Order dated May 17, 2001 of the trial court granting the application for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction failed to show that PTEI and BAGCCI discharged that burden.
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory
notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default by
the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default, making the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
The Order dated May 17, 2001 of the trial court failed to state a finding of facts that would justify
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. It merely stated the conclusion that "real
controversies exist" based on the observation that "the positions of the parties are completely
opposed to each other."
2. No, respondents Petition did not violate Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
An examination of PNBs petition and the documents attached to it would show that the
Court of Appeals determination as to the formal sufficiency of the petition is correct. The
documents attached to the petition were adequate to support the arguments of PNB and to give the
Court of Appeals a satisfactory, or at least substantial, picture of the case.
Second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46.
The determination of the completeness or sufficiency of the form of the petition, including
the relevant and pertinent documents which have to be attached to it, is largely left to the discretion
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of the court taking cognizance of the petition, in this case the Court of Appeals. If the petition is
insufficient in form and substance, the same may be forthwith dismissed without further
proceedings. That is the import of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Order to comment. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the
respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any
annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions
of section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the
respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court
may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem
necessary and proper.
The Court of Appeals already determined that PNBs petition complied with the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and, consequently, that the said petition is
sufficient in form and substance when it ordered PTEI and BAGCCI to comment on PNBs petition.
This Court sees no compelling reason to set aside the determination of the Court of Appeals on that
matter. Moreover, PTEI and BAGCCI wasted their opportunity to question the formal sufficiency of
PNBs petition when they failed to file their comment on time, leading the Court of Appeals to rule
in its Decision dated March 21, 2003.
Moreover, PTEI and BAGCCI compounded their error when they subsequently failed to raise
the issue in their motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such omission
constituted a waiver of the said issue pursuant to the omnibus motion rule.
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the
face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued
to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicants showing of two important requisite conditions,
namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury.
Facts:
China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBCs favor several surety
agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land.
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Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged
properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole
obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of
title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all loans.5
In response, CBC sent SBI a letter stating that the loans had been completely restructured
effective. On the aspect of interests and charges, CBC suggested the updating of the obligation to
avoid paying interests and charges. Subsequently, CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding
account within ten days from receipt thereof.
Interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to
enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel
Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in (RTC) of Pasig City.
In its Answer and Opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, CBC
alleged that to implement the agreed restructuring of the loan, SBI executed ten promissory notes.
For its part, MFII executed third party real estate mortgage over its properties in favor of CBC to
secure the payment of SBIs restructured loan. As SBI was delinquent in the payment of the
principal as well as the interest thereon, CBC demanded settlement of SBIs account.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of SBI and MFII which were able to sufficiently comply
with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. However, CA reversed such decision as
there were no findings of fact or law which would indicate the existence of any of the requisites for
the grant of an injunctive writ. Hence, this petition.
Plaintiffs argued that the interest and penalties charged them in the subject letters and
attached statements of account increased during a seven-month period to an amount they
described as "onerous", "usurious" ad "greedy". They likewise asserted that there were on-going
talks between officers of the corporations involved to treat or restructure the contracts to a dacion
en pago, as there was a proposed plan of action by representatives of plaintiffs during the meetings.
Issue:
Whether or not SDI and MFII have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent
CBC from taking over their properties.
Ruling:
None. SDI and MFII does not have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent
CBC from taking over their properties
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of
final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a
preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a partys substantive rights or interests pending
the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a
claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome
of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
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At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is
no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the
issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainants favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the
parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in
the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant
of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction
is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicants showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented
would cause an irreparable injury.
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from
foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on the
loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and unconscionable. As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and
MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged
properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest."
First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of
the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lenders right to recover the principal loan,
nor affect the other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay
the debt due.
Second, even the Order of the trial court, which granted the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to be heard on the alleged lack
of "fairness of the increase in interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. Thus, the basis
of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or disputable as there is still a need
to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various circumstances surrounding the
agreement of the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable. Therefore,
such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them
from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. A debtors various and constant
requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount
due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation. SBIs default or failure
to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified
it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.
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As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The
accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and
surety is tied to SBIs principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBIs default.
Thus, MFIIs interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced
by SBIs wrongful conduct and breach of contract.
As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been
shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary
injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be
wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction
must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err when it granted the petition for certiorari of CBC and ordered the dissolution of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable
if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured
with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER
BRO. BERNARD OCA, et al., vs. LAURITA CUSTODIO
A status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested
state of things which preceded the controversy, not to provide mandatory or injunctive relief. In this
case, it cannot be applied when the respondent was already removed prior to the filing of the case.
Facts:
St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. was organized and established as a non-stock
and non-profit educational institution. Its organization and establishment was through the
assistance of the La Salle Brothers without any formal agreement with the School. The
incorporators of the School were: private respondent Custodio, petitioner Mojica, petitioner
Pascual, Rev. Msgr. Feliz Perez, Bro. Vernon Poore, FSC. The five original incorporators served as
the Schools Members and Board of Trustees until the deaths of Bro. Poore and Msgr. Perez.
To formalize the relationship between the De La Salle Greenhills (DLSG) and the School, a
Memorandum of Agreement was executed, permitting DLSG to exercise supervisory powers over
the Schools academic affairs. DLSG appointed supervisors who sit in the meetings of the Board of
Trustees without any voting rights.
The first was Bro. Victor Franco. Later on, Bro. Franco also became a member of the Board
of Trustees and President of the School. Then petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca joined as DLSG
supervisor. In a while, Bro. Oca also served as a member of the Board of Trustees and President of
the School. Bro. Dennis Magbanua also joined Bro. Franco and Bro. Oca as DLSG supervisor and also
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as a Treasurer of the School. Petitioners declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the
Board of Trustees as its officers was valid since an election was conducted to that effect.
Custodio challenged the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and their
purported election as officers of the School. Custodio alleged that clearly the composition of the
membership of the School had no basis there being no formal admission as members nor election as
officers. The legality of the membership and assumption as officers of the DLSG Brothers was
questioned by Custodio following a disagreement regarding a proposed MOA that would replace
the existing MOA with the DLSG Brothers and her removal as Curriculum Administrator through
the Board of Trustees.
Under the proposed MOA, DLSG will supervise and control not only the academic affairs of
the School but also the matters of the finance, administration and operations of the latter. Unable to
convince Custodio and the academic populace to accept the MOA, the DLSG brothers withdrew their
academic support from the School. A day after the rejection of the proposed MOA, Mojica and
Pascual retired. However, they maintained their positions as Members and Trustees of the School.
Custodio contends that while Pascual and Mojica remained to be Members and Trustees of the
School, upon retirement, they stopped reporting for work.
Thus, Custodio avers that being the only remaining Administrator, she served as the Overall Director of the School. Being the Over-all Director, Custodio made appointments to fill in the
vacuum created by the sudden retirement of Pascual and Mojica. Upon the new appointments
made, a special meeting was called by Bro. Oca in which the petitioners alleged that the prior
organizational structure was restored, and the retirement of Pascual and Mojica disapproved by
proper corporate action.
In the same meeting, petitioners alleged that Custodio admitted to having opened an
account with the Luzon Development Bank in her own name for the alleged purpose of depositing
funds for and in behalf of the School. A directive was issued for the immediate closing of this
account. Still, Custodio refused to close such account. Subsequently, Mojica and Pascual formally
resigned from their administrative posts.
According to petitioners, due to the repeated refusal of Custodio to close the account she
opened in her own name with the Luzon Development Bank, the Board of Trustees approved a
resolution to file a case against the latter. Consequently, the Board of Trustees also approved
resolutions to the effect that Custodio be stopped from performing functions in the School.
Custodio filed a Complaint in the RTC questioning the legality of the Board of the School.
Custodio prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of preventing Bro. Oca as President of the corporation, from calling a
special membership meeting to remove Custodio as Member of the School and the Board of
Trustees. But it was dismissed on July 4, 2002.
Thereafter, the Board of Trustees resolved to remove Custodio as a member of the Board of
Trustees and as a member of the Corporation pursuant to Sections 28 and 91 of the Corporation
Code. Subsequently, respondent was issued a Memorandum and signed by petitioner Bro. Bernard
Oca, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, wherein she was informed of her
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immediate removal as Curriculum Administrator on the grounds of willful breach of trust and loss
of confidence and for failure to explain the charges against her despite notice.
Custodio filed with the trial court a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction against petitioners again assailing the legality of the membership of the Board of
Trustees of St. Francis School.
It was alleged that a meeting with the parents of the Schools students was convened
wherein they were informed of her removal. As such, the parents were directed to give all
payments regarding matriculation and other fees to the corporate treasurer.
Custodio filed another Motion for Clarification asking the trial court to issue an order as to
whom the matriculation fees should be paid pending the hearing of the complaint and the earlier
Manifestation and Motion. The trial court appointed Herminia Reynante as cashier of the school and
required all parties to turn over all money previously collected with respect to matriculation fees
and other related collectibles of the school to the latter.
At this point, petitioners Mojica and Pascual put up another school called the Academy of St.
John. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside such order, alleging lack of moral
integrity of Reynante to act as court appointed cashier. Subsequently, they filed a Manifestation
informing the trial court that they took steps to turn over the amount of P397,127.64, representing
collections from matriculation fees, but it was not accepted by Reynante, who preferred to receive
the amount in cash.
Custodio averred that contrary to petitioners claim, petitioners had not complied for failure
to include in their accounting, the funds allegedly in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 and Special
Savings Deposit No. 459 or the retirement fund for the teachers of the School, amounts paid by the
canteen concessionaire, and amounts paid to three resigned teachers. The trial court ordered these
to be included.
Subsequently, in the second questioned Order, the trial court acted in favor of Custodio. A
status quo order was issued wherein the plaintiff is hereby allowed to continue discharging her
functions as school director and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer to continue performing their duties until the
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is resolved.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify the orders was filed in the Court
of Appeals, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. It was dismissed outright by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders
Ruling:
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The petition was partly meritorious. As to the first Order, it was ruled that the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion. However, as to the Status Order, the Supreme Court set aside
the Order for non-compliance with the rules.
In the case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary, it was reiterated that grave abuse of discretion
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the case at bar, petitioners were not denied due process by the trial court.. The records
show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate their arguments through pleadings
and that the same pleadings were acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus,
petitioners cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on the basis of
denial of due process.
However, with respect to the assailed Status Quo Order, the trial court has failed to comply
with the pertinent procedural rules regarding the issuance of a status quo order. Jurisprudence tells
us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a
status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing
or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. Pertinently, the
manner of the issuance of a status quo order in an intra-corporate suit is governed by Section 1,
Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads: A party
may apply for any of the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for
the purposes. However, no temporary restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save in
exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the posting of a bond.
The trial courts Status Quo Order conflicted with the rules and jurisprudence in the
following manner: First, the directive to reinstate Custodio to her former position as school director
and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act already consummated
which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief and not of a status quo
order. Custodio was already removed months prior to her filing of the present case in the trial
court.
Second, the trial courts omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before the
issuance of the Status Quo Order is in contravention with the express instruction of Section 1, Rule
10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which in fact
seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: the application
must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond. In the present case, the Manifestation
and Motion, through which respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status
quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and was unverified.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
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2015)
DECLARATORY RELIEFS
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO vs. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding,
Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA
PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A.
PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO
BAUTISTA,
Petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their motions to suspend
proceedings. This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court order is
not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63. A petition for declaratory relief cannot
properly have a court decision as its subject matter.
Facts:
Respondents Segundo Bautista and spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster
from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and Sergio Abejero,
who are occupants of separate home lots in Camarin, Caloocan City. It was commenced on
December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the parcel of land
occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) against the latter spouses with the
RTC Caloocan City. Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action, was initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, before the Quezon
City RTC. This was a complaint for Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case)
against Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon,
the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala
Estate. The case sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name
of Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suit
to be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded to the
actual occupants.
The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard and
Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.
Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third case, an ejectment action against
Sergio Abejero. Subsequently, these two ejectment cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases). In
her Answer and during the preliminary conference, Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in Civil Case No. Q96-29810. In its Order dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion, instead,
it required her to submit a position paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999. On
April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property.
During the pendency of the cases, certain events supervened when the Ejectment cases ran
their course and petitioner Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC. In the RTC, the Ejectment
cases were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. C-18904-05. Apparently, respondent-spouses Perl moved
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for the execution of the MeTC decision pending appeal, which the RTC granted as the Writ of
Execution was thereafter issued on October 20, 2000. Petitioner Erlinda Reyes and company, thus,
filed with this Court a motion to suspend the proceedings in the RTC. On October 25, 2000, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the implementation of the said writ of
execution.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy
Ruling:
No. Declaratory Relief is not the proper remedy
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code,
may be brought under this Rule.
The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph concerns
declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance,
executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an
instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a
right to repurchase. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be
inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a
statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation.
A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that: A court decision cannot be
interpreted as included within the purview of the words other written instrument, as contended by
appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an
ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the
expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo
assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts
denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot
be countenanced since a court order is not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63. The
proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to
suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is
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denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On
the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The
necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in
the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Both petitions must be
filed within 60 days from the receipt or notice of the denial of the motion to suspend proceedings or
from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
PROHIBITION
RN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. A.I.I. SYSTEM, INC.
G.R. No. 166104. June 26, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be
obsessively strict over the occasional lapses of litigants. Given a good reason, the trial court
should set aside its order of default, constantly bearing in mind that it is the exception and not
the rule of the day.
Facts:
On 28 July 2000, AII Systems, Inc. filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against RN
Development Corporation, seeking to collect the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the
pipes and fittings, valves and electrical panels which allegedly ordered from AII Systems, Inc.
The pretrial in this case has been reset for five times already. RTC dismissed A.I.I. System
Incs complaint for its failure to appear for pretrial and for lack of interest. A.I.I. System Inc. went on
appeal to the CA on the lone issue as to whether or not its complaint was properly dismissed for its
failure to appear on November 27, 2001 for pretrial and for its lack of interest to prosecute the case.
In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs Order and remanded the
case to the said trial court for further proceedings.
RN Development Corporation contended that the CA committed a reversible error when it
inferred that the trial court had been unduly strict in applying the rules of procedure and that it
entirely had no reason to dismiss the complaint. It likewise disputed the appellate courts
observation that the trial courts inflexible attitude failed to meet the fundamental requirement of
fairness and justice.
Issue:
Whether CA committed any reversible error when it set aside the order of the trial court
dismissing the respondents complaint
Ruling:
No.
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After a careful study and a thorough examination of the records, we find no substantial
reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the CA, particularly, that the respondent should
not be blamed entirely for the resetting of the pretrial, which were duly approved by the trial court
for the reasons cited in its orders,
Indeed, the dismissal of a case whether for failure to appear during trial or prosecute an
action for an unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. But this
discretion must not be abused, nay gravely abused, and must be exercised soundly. Deferment of
proceedings may be tolerated so that cases may be adjudged only after a full and free presentation
of all the evidence by both parties. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by the
circumstances surrounding each particular case. There must be sufficient reason to justify the
dismissal of a complaint.
It is the policy of the Court to afford every litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, courts must avoid the rigid
application thereof which tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Here, the
counsel for respondent, upon receiving the order dismissing the complaint, immediately filed a
motion for reconsideration which adequately explained his late arrival for four (4) minutes, which
was not disputed before the trial court. Under the circumstances, the latter should have granted
respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint. The interest of justice
will be better served by the continuation of the proceedings and final disposition of the case on the
merits before the trial court
SPOUSES ALVIN GUERRERO AND MERCURY M. GUERRERO
vs. HON. LORNA NAVARRO DOMINGO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 201,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS CITY & PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 156142, March 23, 2011, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Facts:
Private respondent PDC and petitioners spouses Guerrero entered into a Contract to
Sell whereby PDC agreed to sell to petitioners the property covered by TCT No. T-51529 and the
house standing thereon. The parties agreed that the price shall be paid on 120 monthly instalments.
However, due to the failure of the petitioners to promptly pay their obligation, private respondent
decided to cancel the contract to sell. Subsequently, private respondent then filed with the MeTC a
complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner spouses. The Complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 6293.
Thereafter, the petitioner spouses filed a Petition for Prohibition with the RTC praying that
Civil Case No. 6293 be quashed on the ground that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case since
it is an action involving 2 joined controversies, one beyond pecuniary estimation such as
extinguishment of contract and the other for ejectment. The former being cognizable by the RTC,
petitioners contended that the action is beyond the adjudicatory powers of the MeTC.
Meanwhile, proceedings in Civil Case No. 6293 continued. Ruling in favor of PDC, the MeTC
held that the complaint and the reliefs prayed for indicate that the suit is one of unlawful detainer,
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hence, cognizable by it. On appeal, the RTC dismissed the same on account of the failure of the
petitioners to file their Memorandum of Appeal. The Petition for Prohibition previously filed by
petitioners was likewise denied. In denying the Petition, the RTC held that prohibition does not lie
to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. The RTC considered the cancellation of the contract
as the act sought to be prevented, and since the contract has already been cancelled prior to the
filing of the petition it held that the remedy of prohibition was inappropriate. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a Petition for Prohibition was the proper remedy.
Ruling:
No, it is not.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. However, we disagree
with the pronouncement of the RTC-Branch 201 that the act sought to be prevented in the filing of
the Petition for Prohibition is the cancellation of the contract to sell. Petitions for Prohibition may
be filed only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers or persons exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions. Though couched in imprecise terms, the Petition for Prohibition in
the case at bar apparently seeks to prevent the MeTC from hearing and disposing Civil Case No.
6293.
Before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." We are convinced that in the case at
bar, a Motion to Dismiss or an Answer is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the
jurisdiction of the MeTC. Being in possession of the subject property, the step of filing a Motion to
Dismiss or an Answer instead of resorting to an extraordinary writ under Rule 65 would have even
favored the spouses Guerrero, as there is no threat of dispossession until the MeTC renders its
judgment on the action.
MANDAMUS
FIDELA R. ANGELES vs. The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. The legal right to the performance of the
particular act sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Otherwise, where the right sought
to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, mandamus cannot issue. Thus, the issuance by the
LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that
such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land.
Facts:
On May 3, 1965, Fidela R. Angeles (Angeles, for brevity) together with other individuals, all
of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are
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entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for
partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No.
994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Some of
them were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate.
Eventually, Judge Jaime D. Discaya issued an order (RTC Order) granting the partition and
accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case. The said order also directed the respective Registers
of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all
the co-owners, including Angeles, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One
Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less.
Allegedly, the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to
comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator
before proceeding. Angeles counsel then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers
of Deeds to comply with the Order. In a letter-reply by Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, the LRA
Administrator, with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st
Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11 issued to all Registers of Deeds, the following have been
established: 1) there is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or
registered on May 3, 1917; 2) the [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a
fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City; 3) the alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such
relationship; and 4) OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various
certificates of title in the names of different persons. In refusing compliance with the RTC Order, the
LRA insisted that, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title, it is mandated to prevent
anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in
the Torrens system of land registration.
Insisting that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and
her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order,
and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than
this action,"
Angeles filed a petition for mandamus seeking the Secretary of Justice, the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
(herein respondents) to comply with the said Order.
Issue:
Whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to
issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to Angeles and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right,
as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Ruling:
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It was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and
the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the
petition must be dismissed.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
to wit:
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive,
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather
than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's
reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of
titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners'
legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled
is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a
right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the
right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical
questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. (Emphasis
ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of
registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the
double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves
the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by
mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title
covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting
for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the
Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the
explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the reasons for his
refusal to grant petitioners request. There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to
refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
Service of Notice of Sale
SPS. ELIZABETH S. TAGLE & ERNESTO R. TAGLE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC, QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 97, SPS. FEDERICO and ROSAMYRNA CARANDANG and SHERIFF CAROL
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BULACAN
The written notice of sale to the judgment obligor need not be personally served on the
judgment obligor himself as it may be served on his counsel, or by leaving the notice in his office with
his clerk or a person having charge thereof.
Facts:
Sometime in 1984, the Carandangs mortgaged several properties with the Philippine
Banking Corporation. Among those mortgaged and subject of the present controversy is a house
and lot located in White Plains, Quezon City. Unable to pay their mortgage obligation, the
Carandangs ceded or assigned the subject property, among others, to PBC by way of a Dacion En
Pago with Right to Repurchase. On January 26, 1989, the parties herein executed a Contract to Sell
involving the White Plains property for P 4.5 million and thereupon the Tagles issued a check for P1
million in favor of the Carandangs. The Carandangs, in turn, delivered said amount to PBC as partial
payment of the redemption/repurchase price and surrendered possession of the property to the
Tagles. Since the property was still to be redeemed from PBC, the parties executed another contract
on March 31, 1989, this time, the Carandangs, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment, sold the right to
repurchase the subject property to the Tagles. Upon submission of the deed of assignment to PBC,
the latter signified its approval. On March 20, 1992, PBC and the Tagles executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, whereby the former sold the White Plains property to the latter for the price of P2,934,884.96.
This deed made no mention of the parties prior Deed of Assignment because the Tagles refused to
sign unless any reference thereto was removed. Having dealt with PBC directly, the Tagles refused
to honor their obligation to the Carandangs under the Deed of Assignment. Hence, on September 26,
1991, the Carandangs filed a complaint for rescission of contract against the Tagles. The
Carandangs eventually won the case at the CA and said resolution became final and executory. Upon
motion of the Carandangs, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The Tagles now
comes to Court asserting that they never received notices of the auction sale thereby invalidating
the same.
Issue:
Whether there was sufficient notice to the Tagles of the auction sale conducted.
Ruling:
Yes, there was.
Following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the judgment obligor need not be
personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be served on his counsel, or by leaving
the notice in his office with his clerk or a person having charge thereof. If there is no one found at
the judgment obligors or his counsels office or if such office is not known/inexistent, it may be
served at the residence of the judgment obligor or his counsel and may be received by any person of
sufficient age and discretion residing therein. Likewise, other circumstances on record further
support the finding that petitioners were duly notified of the auction sale. The Sheriffs report state
that on the auction sale eventually conducted on August 9, 2000, the Tagles son, Eric Tagle, was
present hence weakening Tagles assertion of lack of notice. It must be noted that the Sheriffs
Report is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The sheriff enjoys the presumption of
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regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. This presumption prevails in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving
allegations.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
CHARLES LIMBAUAN vs. FAUSTINO ACOSTA
G.R. No. 148606. June 30, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur,
namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and (2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2,
particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings.
Facts:
Sometime in 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate consisting of 808 hectares,
located in Kalookan, primarily for a leprosarium. However, the State utilized only one fifth of the
property for the purpose. On April 26, 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 843 allocating the property to the Department of Health, the National Housing Corporation, the
PHHC and Department of Social Welfare and Development.
In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate and
constructed his house thereon. In 1984, Paulino Calanday took possession of the said property,
constructed a beerhouse thereon and then conveyed it to Juanita Roces. Thereafter, Juanita
conveyed the beerhouse to her nephew, Charles Limbauan.
Faustino alleged that he acquired possessory rights over the subject property by virtue of a
government grant. Sometime in February, 1995, Congress approved Republic Act 7999 under
which the State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total area of 120 hectares, for use as a
housing site for residents and employees of the Department of Health, with the National Housing
Authority as the leading implementing agency:
He leased the property to Charles for a monthly rental of P60.00. When Charles failed to pay
the rentals, Faustino eventually sent two demand letters asking Charles to pay and vacate the
premises. Charles refused, thereby prompting Faustino to a complaint against Charles with the
Lupon for ejectment for failure of Charles to pay his rentals from October, 1987.
On December 29, 1997, the Court promulgated a Decision in favor of the Faustino and
against Charles. The CA decision affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
1.Whether the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether or not the case is rendered moot and academic on account of the death of
Faustino
Ruling:
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1. Yes.
It is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur,
namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and (2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2,
particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings.
As to whether respondent observed this fifteenday period, an affirmative answer can be
gleaned from the evidence on record. Respondents first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave
petitioner five (5) days from receipt within which to pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the
premises. Petitioner received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 while respondent brought the
action for unlawful detainer on February 7, 1996, which was clearly more than 15 days from the
time petitioner received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 and well within the oneyear period
set forth by Section 1, Rule 70.
Moreover, upon the advice of the MTC, respondent sent another demand letter dated March
7, 1996 to petitioner, this time giving the latter fifteen (15) days within which to vacate the subject
property and when petitioner still refused, respondent was compelled to file a Motion to Approve
Attached Amended Complaint. The said motion was rightly granted by the MTC in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.A
party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. Under this
provision, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading whether a new cause of action or
change in theory is introduced, at any time before the filing of any responsive pleading.
Undoubtedly, when respondent filed his Amended Complaint on May 16, 1996, no responsive
pleading had yet been filed by petitioner, thus, the MTC validly admitted the said amended
complaint.
2. No.
Lastly, petitioner capitalizes on the failure of respondents counsel to inform the court of
the death of his client, Faustino.
It is wellsettled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court to inform the court of the death of his client and no substitution of
such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action
survives the death of such party. Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his successorininterest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a
real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken his place and
now represent his interests in the instant petition.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOURDES PACANA
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G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, J. De Castro
Although matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special
proceeding, it would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of the parties if it appears that there is only one property being claimed by
the contending parties.vs.
Facts:
Subject of the present controversy is Lot 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City and was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the
RTC, respondent Lourdes Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having
inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero. She further claimed that
her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan and his wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. Prior to Hermogenas death, she demanded for the return of the land
but to no avail. Respondent Lourdes also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property.
Petitioners denied that Lourdes mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or Lourdes is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners
maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived
by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and
Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been
in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50). The complaint was amended wherein the heirs of
Teofilo. The RTC declared Lourdes Pacana as the owner of the lot. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC can make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action
Ruling:
As a general rule, no. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in
a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
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However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the
Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine
the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under
the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not
only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over
the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by
the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as
the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, especially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092,
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon. In the case at bar, Lourdes failed to prove that she is the
sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation.
GUARDIANSHIP
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly
be placed under guardianship.
Facts:
Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardian over the property of his father, Cirilo Oropesa.
It is alleged among others that the Cirilo Oropesa has been afflicted with several maladies
and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and
memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the Cirilo was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
After presenting evidence, Nilo Oropesa filed a manifestation resting his case. However, Nilo
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failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, Cirilo Oropesa filed his Omnibus Motion to grant leave to file his demurrer to evidence
which the trial court granted. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision to dismiss the petition filed
by Nilo on the ground that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent.
Issue:
Whether Cirilo Oropesa is considereed an incompetent person as defined under Sec. 2,
Rule 92 of the Rules of Court who should be placed under guardianship
Ruling:
No.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents
who may properly be placed under guardianship.
With the failure of Nilo to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister and their fathers
former caregiver. These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of Nilos cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by Cirilo.
Even if we were to overlook Nilos procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate
to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on
record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of Cirilo, it also contained findings that supported the view
that Cirilo on the average was indeed competent.
WRIT OF AMPARO
REVEREND FATHER ROBERT REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALES,
in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, in
his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration
G.R. No. 182161, December 03 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The constitutional right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of
Amparo covers the right to life, liberty, and security. A persons right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
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Facts:
Rev. Fr. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. Fr. Reyes and fifty others were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In
that evening, Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors conducted inquest proceedings to
ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold them for trial on charges of Rebellion
and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
Upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government, DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering Commissioner of Immigration to
include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
Fr. Reyes and the others in the case in the interest of national security and public safety.
After finding probable cause against Fr. Reyes and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion, the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the trial court. Petitioner Fr. Reyes then filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon
Recognizance, asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable
cause must be made personally by a judge.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge against Fr. Reyes and 17 others for lack of
probable cause. According to the trial court, evidence submitted failed to show that Fr. Reyes and
the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms
against the government; that Fr. Reyes and others were arrested because they ignored the call of
the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing
ones sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete
evidence that they knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and
that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally
rendered.
Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in
view of the dismissal of the case. Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the DOJ could not
act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner is settled in, due to a
certain Atty. J. V. Bautista also representing himself as counsel of Fr. Reyes and had also written a
letter.
Fr. Reyes subsequently filed petition for issuance of writ of amparo, claiming that despite
the dismissal of the rebellion case, HDO No. 45 still subsist. And that Fr. Reyes was held by BID
officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List. Had it not for his counsel, Fr.
Reyes would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong. Though he was able to
fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong, every time he would present himself at the NAIA for his
flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued
inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List.
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to
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issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since the
criminal has already been dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo
Ruling:
No, he is not entitled to the privilege of writ of amparo. The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo provides: Section 1. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Supreme Court made a
categorical pronouncement that the Writ of Amparo is confined to these two instances of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats.
Fr. Reyes insisted that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court held
that the right to travel is not covered by the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the
Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to life was explained in the case of Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et
al. The Court stated that this guarantees essentially the right to be alive upon which the enjoyment
of all other rights is preconditioned while the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life.
In the case of City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., the right to liberty was defined.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. It is not only mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities
with which he has been endowed, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the right to security was expounded.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Thus, it is
more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
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body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily
integrity or security of a person.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 and 2 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights, especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As stated
in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by
the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted
to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion.
The restriction on Fr. Reyes right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to
life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
The direct recourse to the Supreme Court was also held inappropriate, under Section 22 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Pursuant to such provision, Fr. Reyes should have filed with the
trial court motion to lift HDO No. 45, by virtue of the trial courts residual power to entertain
incidents in the criminal case.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA
In rape cases, the accused cannot capitalize on the inconsistencies in testimonies of the
witnesses when such inconsistencies cover inconsequential details such as the time or place of
commission because they do not form part of the elements of the offense. He cannot also bank on the
delay of the filing of the offense because it is established in jurisprudence that the delay is justified due
to victims fear of public stigma.
Facts:
In 1996, AAA, a 5-year old girl, played with her cousin (7 years old) and other children
when Richard Sarcia invited her to go to the backyard of a certain Saling Crisologo. Unknown to the
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accused, AAAs cousin followed them. There, Sarcia pulled down the shorts and panties of AAA and
succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her. AAAs cousin saw the said act and proceeded to tell
AAAs mother what happened but the latter disregarded the story of AAAs cousin stating that they
were too young to understand those matters. AAAs father was, at the time, working in Manila.
Almost after four years, Sarcia was charged by AAAs father with rape. Sarcia denied the
allegations and contended that the rape case was only instituted to bolster the arguments in
another case where he was charged of murder of a certain Christine Camu. In the said murder case,
Sarcia was accused of Christines grandmother of the said and even helped AAAs family to pursue
the rape case against him.
During the trial, the testimonies of AAA, AAAs cousin and AAAs father were presented, as
well as the medical examination report which contained that AAA had no scars nor healed wounds
inside but the hymen showed signs of trauma caused by a blunt object which could be a medical
instrument or a penis. Also, the prosecution was only able to establish that the crime was
committed in 1996 but no specific date was proven and Sarcia was about to turn 18 years old at the
time. Sarcia asseverated that the absence of scars and healed wounds negated the allegations of
rape against him and that the testimonies of the AAA and AAAs cousin were inconsistent as to the
time and place of commission of the offense and failed to establish his guilt. Sarcia also noted that
the rape charge was only instituted almost four years from the alleged time of commission and that
the delay of filing affected the credibility of the witnesses.
The RTC found Sarcia guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision but modified the penalty to death. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sarcia is guilty of the crime of rape despite the inconsistencies on the
testimonies presented by the prosecution
Ruling:
Yes. As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and
prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. The alleged
inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is
important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was
sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape
incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they
were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes
and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who
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could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord
them ample space for inaccuracy.
Sarcia capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was
committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false
testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and
immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. In People v. Purazo, We
ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the
crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As
such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As
early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged
is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of
the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at
the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima, the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The
precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as
it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we
ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and until October 15,
1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in November 1995
and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in
the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date
December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the
latter due to the intense cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes
it could have been in any month and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the
information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention the month and date but only the
year.
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the only reason
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why this case was filed against him was to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same
accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000.
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her
aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In People
v. Coloma we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victims
father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old
daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere
concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to
defeat the charge.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO BUBAN
In cases of rape, the discrepancies in the testimony of the victim as to the dates of the
commission of the offense do not negate the finding of guilt. What is material in the offense is the
occurrence of rape and not the date of commission.
Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, was already an orphan and has two other siblings named BBB (15
years old) and CCC (the youngest). Since she was a small child she had been living with her
aunt. Her aunt has nine children the eldest of whom named GGG is the one married to Alberto
Buban. She claimed that Buban succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her through force,
threats, intimidation and without her consent four times and that all incidents happened inside the
house of her aunt because the accused and his wife GGG used to live with them.
She was only able to file the cases for rape at the time when her aunt noticed that her
stomach was getting bigger. When her aunt learned that she was raped by Buban, her aunt
accompanied her to file a complaint. The declaration was corroborated by the testimony and the
findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the offended party. It was found out in the
examination that AAA was six months pregnant. She subsequently surrendered her child to a social
worker contending that she had no love for the child as it served as a remembrance of what Buban
did to her.
The defense upon the other hand, admitted Buban had carnal knowledge of the victim for
several times, but argued that the sexual intercourse had been consensual as Buban and AAA were
sweethearts. The accused further claimed that the instances of carnal knowledge happened so
frequently that he could no longer count them. Also, he asseverated that there were discrepancies
in the testimony of AAA as to the dates of commission of the offense.
The RTC found Buban guilty of rape which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, the
present review.
Issue:
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Whether or not discrepancies in the specific dates of commission of the offense negates the
finding of guilt of the accused
Ruling:
No, the discrepancies do not negate the finding of guilt.
As regards the alleged discrepancies as to the dates of the commission of the rape, the rule
is well settled that in rape cases, the date or time of the incident is not an essential element of the
offense and therefore need not be accurately stated. Section 11 of Rule 110 pertinently provides:
SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
In rape cases, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, not the time of its commission. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material
ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through
force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial
bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is
sufficient if the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as
near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ASILAN Y TABORNAL
The Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the accused, the designation of the
offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense.
Facts:
Joseph Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.
The prosecution, based on the testimony of Joselito Binosa, narrated that in one evening,
Binosa while chatting with his friends heard a gunshot nearby. He then went to the place where the
sound came and from where he was standing, he saw a uniformed policeman, who was arresting
someone and order the latter to lay on the ground.
The police officer pushed the man to the wall and was about to handcuff the latter when
another man, Asilan, arrived, drew something from his back and stabbed the police officer on his
back several times until the latter fell to the ground. The man who was being arrested then took the
officers gun and shot the latter with it.
Binosa then threw stones at the malefactors who subsequently left the place. Then, Binosa
followed Asilan and his companion. Thereafter Asilan returned to the place of the incident. At that
moment, a policeman passed by and Binosa pointed Asilan to him. Asilan then was arrested and the
knife which was used in the stabbing was confiscated by the policeman.
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In his defense, Asilan stated that while he was waiting for a jeepneet, 3 motorcycles stopped
in front of him, the passengers of which approached and frisked him. He was thereafter brought to
the police station and he was forced to admit the stabbing of a police officer.
The RTC acquitted Asilan for the crime of direct assault for the reason that the prosecution
failed to establish that the police officer was in the performance of his duty. On the other, the RTC
convicted him for the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in toto
the RTCs ruling. Hence this appeal.
One of the arguments of Asilan is that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted for Murder, since the
manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
alleged in the Information against him. Thus, he asserts, he was effectively only charged with
Homicide.
Issue:
Whether Asilan was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him
Ruling:
No.
This Court does not find merit in Asilans contention that he cannot be convicted of murder
because his acts of treachery were not alleged with specificity in the Information. Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
This Court held that under Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it contains the full name
of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense.
The Information herein complied with these conditions. Contrary to Asilans contention, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was specifically alleged in the Information. The rule is that
qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the
accuseds constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Asilan never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature
of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the Information.
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DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE ROSAS
In a case of murder, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not require the use of such words to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an
offense. It is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category,
but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the
crime to a higher category. It is sufficient that the qualifying circumstances be specified in the
Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his
defense, thus precluding surprises during trial.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rene Rosas was charged with crime of Murder. It was alleged that he
shot several times one Nestor Estacio with a pistol at close range near the public terminal and
market of Kabacan, Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato on September 15, 1995. Upon arraignment,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Accused-appellant hinged mainly on denial and alibi. He testified that in the morning of September
15, 1995, he was at his boarding house located along USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato. Karen
Nayona, accused-appellants girlfriend, corroborated his testimony that he was in the boarding
house.
The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court via a notice of appeal. The Court
resolved to refer the case to Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the conviction of accused-appellant.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant with murder
when the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not alleged with specificity in the information
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Ruling:
Accused-appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of murder because the Information
failed to state that treachery was a qualifying circumstance. Accused-appellants argument deserves
scant consideration. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the use of such
words to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the
words qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation
of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category.
The Information which reads:
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xxx, accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with treachery, attack, assault and shot Nestor Esatcio,
xxx.
Sufficiently alleged the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Not only was treachery
sufficiently alleged, it was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
Nestor Estacio was attacked from behind and assaulted without warning and provocation. Even
when the already wounded Nestor fell on the ground, accused-appellant mercilessly fired several
more shots at him. He obviously wanted to ensure the execution of the killing, without risk to
himself, and deprive Nestor of any opportunity to retaliate or defend himself. The fact that accusedappellant brought a gun with him indicated that he made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the
means to kill Nestor.
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict,
in which case an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
Facts:
Accused Jaime Ayochok y Tauli (Ayochok) attacked, assaulted and shot SPO1 Claudio Caligtan y
Ngodo (Caligtan) while he was relieving himself with his back turned to Ayochok, the latter coming
from the blind side of the victim, shot him several times hitting him on the different parts of his
body and there was no opportunity or means to defend himself from the treacherous act of the
assailant, thereby inflicting upon the victim hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage;
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, neck, and upper extremities which directly caused his death.
When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty.
RTC found the accused Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder.
Ayochok was committed at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on October 31, 2003. The case
was directly elevated to us for automatic review and was docketed as G.R. No. 161469. However,
pursuant to the case of People v. Mateo which modified the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment G.R. No. 161469 was
transferred to the Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed with modifications the RTC judgment whereby reducing the civil indemnity, moral
damages, actual damages and unearned income of the accused.
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Initially, Ayochok filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, however, Ayochok filed a Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration
with Notice of Appeal. CA denied Ayochoks Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with
Notice of Appeal. Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals
conveying his intention to appeal the decision of said court.
Ayochok filed his Supplemental Appellants Brief while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief given that its Appellees Brief,
originally filed in G.R. No. 161469, is adequate to ventilate the Peoples cause.
However, Ayochok died on January 15, 2010.
Issue:
What is the effect of Ayochoks death on the present appeal.
Ruling:
Ayochoks death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his
criminal liability for the crime of murder committed against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N.
Caligtan, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
In the case of People v. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
e) Quasi-delicts
Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Ayochoks
appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become irrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Ayochok
had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because
Ayochoks appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against
him when he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was
likewise extinguished by his death.
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Consequently, the appealed Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding Ayochok
guilty of Murder, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victim had
become ineffectual.
DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto insenso strictiore.
Facts:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of February 24, 1995, at about
7:00 a.m., Jerica, aged 5, was playing with her friends Khamil and Neeca near the house of their
neighbor Boyet Rama (Boyet) situated at the corner of a street in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; that
suddenly, Dante Hernandez Datu (Dante) grabbed Jerica and inserted his middle finger in her
vagina, after which, he warned her not to tell it to anyone; that immediately, Jerica ran to her house;
that while her mother was giving Jerica a bath, she found bloodstain in her (Jerica) panty and blood
in her vagina; that upon being informed of her mothers discovery, Rolando, Jericas father, looked
at her vagina and found it swollen; and that asked by her father who did it, Jerica disclosed that it
was Dante.
In the end, the trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610. Taking issue with the said judgment,
Dante appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed the
assailed lower court ruling.
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision. This Court gave due course
to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective Memoranda. However, in
Dantes Memorandum, his counsel indicated that Dante died. As proof of his death, a certified
photocopy of his Death Certificate with Registry No. 2006-859 was attached as Annex 1 of the said
pleading.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Dante extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling:
In light of this supervening event which occurred while Dantes appeal of the judgment of
his conviction was pending resolution before this Court, we are constrained by both law and
jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the appeal has been rendered moot.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the offender, to wit:
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1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
In the seminal case of People v. Bayotas, we formulated the following principles which guide
this Court as regards to the application of the foregoing penal provision, to wit:
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto insenso strictiore.
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
d) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.
It is therefore evident from the foregoing discussion that venturing into the merits of
petitioners appeal given the circumstance of his untimely demise has become superfluous because,
even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the lower courts judgment of conviction, such a
ruling would be of no force and effect as the resultant criminal liability is totally extinguished by his
death. Consequently, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, is
likewise extinguished by his death. Since his appeal was still pending before this Court, there was
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no final judgment of conviction upon which an award of civil indemnity could be based. Thus, the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision affirming Dantes conviction by the trial court, had become
ineffectual. As a result thereof, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET OLACO y POLER
Olacos death during the pendency of her appeal, extinguished not only her criminal liability for
qualified theft committed against private complainant Ruben Vinluan, but also her civil liability,
particularly the award for actual damages, solely arising from or based on said crime.
Facts:
In an Information dated August 24, 2004, Olaco was charged with Qualified Theft. That on
or about the 21st day of August 2004, in the City of Las Pinas, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with one alias Rena, Victor Catulong, Roland Baroga and alias Roger, whose true
identities and whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, accused Olaco being the housemaid of Ruben Vinluan y Torno, and as such enjoying the
trust and confidence reposed upon her by her aforementioned employer, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with grave abuse of confidence, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away the following
belonging to Ruben Vinluan y Torno to the damage and prejudice of the aforenamed owner thereof
in the total amount of P972,100.00.
When arraigned, Olaco pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision on March 5, 2007, finding Olaco guilty. On March 26, 2007, Olaco was committed to the
Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City. Olaco filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court denied Olacos appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC
judgment. However, in a letter dated January 27, 2011, Rachel D. Ruelo, Superintendent IV of the
Correctional Institution for Women, informed the Court of Appeals that Olaco had died on February
17, 2010. On February 2, 2011, Olacos counsel still filed, on behalf of his deceased client, a Notice of
Appeal, which the Court of Appeals gave due course. Accordingly, the appellate court directed its
Judicial Records Division to elevate to us the original records. Ruelo submitted on a certified true
copy of Olacos Death Certificate, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City.
Issue:
Whether or not Olacos appeal filed by his counsel should be given due course.
Ruling:
No, Olacos appeal should not prosper.
Olacos death on February 17, 2010, during the pendency of her appeal, extinguished not
only her criminal liability for qualified theft committed against private complainant Ruben Vinluan,
but also her civil liability, particularly the award for actual damages, solely arising from or based on
said crime. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the
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death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Clearly, it is already unnecessary for us to rule on Olacos appeal. Olacos appeal was still
pending and no final judgment had been rendered against her at the time of her death. Hence,
whether or not Olaco was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even
assuming that Olaco did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by her death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code. For the same reasons,
the appealed Decision dated January 20, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in finding Olaco guilty of
qualified theft, sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, and ordering her to pay private complainant
Ruben Vinluan actual damages in the amount of P200,000.00 had become ineffectual.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT vs. CITY OF PASIG
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another
pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should
be stayed.
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of
several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of
which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT
No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of
Rizal (Cainta). Upon consolidation, the new TCT issued now bore Municipality of Cainta, as its
address. A commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.
The City of Pasig filed a petition to correct the location stated in the consolidated TCTs.
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute
with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against
Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes. Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been
religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by
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virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the
claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.
Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on
the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. Cainta further
asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the subject
properties are within its metes and bounds.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed
that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between
Cainta and Pasig, presented a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case.
The RTC ruled in favor of Pasig. It ordered Sta. Lucia Realty to pay estate taxes to the City of
Pasig and ordered the Municipality of Cainta to reimburse the erroneously collected taxes to Sta.
Lucia Realty. The RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution against Sta. Lucia.
Sta. Lucia filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals to question the writ of execution, the CA
ruled that the boundary dispute case presented a "prejudicial question which must be decided
before Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties.
Meanwhile, a separate appeal was filed by both Sta. Lucia and Cainta to question the
decision of the RTC itself. In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no
proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings. Elucidating on the legal meaning of a "prejudicial
question," it held that "there can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at hand involves a prejudicial question
Ruling:
Yes. The case involves a prejudicial question.
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it already paid
simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. To begin with,
we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary
dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be
held.
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as appearing in the
cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to
its ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court.
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its dockets with
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economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the
second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that of counsel and the
litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It
bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is
submitted to its sound discretion.
ARREST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y
JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y CRUZ
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
by a competent judicial authority. Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions. On the other hand, Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person
Facts:
On September 27, 1999, while Jundoc and Jingabo were tending to their fish stall in Iloilo
Public Market, Dequina, their friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed
reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following day, September
28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally
joined them.They knew Sally to be Dequinas supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while,
Dequina and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they talked
privately. Soon after Sally left, Jingabo and Jundoc asked Dequina what they talked about. Instead of
answering, Dequina asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get
something. While a little bit surprised, Jingabo and Jundoc readily agreed as they had never been in
the city before. Dequina handed to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were
given by Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the
names of other persons. When they called the attention of Dequina about it, the latter simply
replied Anyway that is free. Jingabo noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that
time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28,
1999.
From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of Dequinas aunt in
Guadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar
vehicles. Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful about it,
they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus
Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached Dequina and handed to her bus tickets. They were
pointed to the particular vehicle where they were to board.
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They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September 29,
1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple approached Dequina and they had a
talk. Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the
opposite side of the road. Upon Dequinas instruction, they took the bags from the three men. Then,
they waited for their ride back to Manila.
As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment. They
alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting
tricycle. When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they loaded
two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed Dequina to a waiting taxi where they
boarded along with their baggages.
As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car ordered
them to stop. They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the
taxis compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the
bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The police
officers ordered them to board the mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment
of the same car.
They were brought to a sari-sari store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they later knew
to be the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated Dequina and at one point, he
slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were
brought to the Hospital ng Bayan and finally, to the police precinct were they were charged
accordingly.
In its Decision dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused-appellants
conviction. Hence, accused-appellants appealed to this Court.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal. They
were not doing anything illegal that would have justified their warrantless arrest, much less a
warrantless search of their persons and belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be
justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful. Accused-appellants insist that
the description of the persons who were transporting marijuana relayed by the Chief of Police to
the apprehending officers, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it could not be
sufficient ground for the apprehension of accused-appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of
the marijuana were valid and legal.
Ruling:
There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless
seizure of the marijuana were valid and legal.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
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secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey
from one place to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accusedappellants were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling
bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its
content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and
in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accusedappellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of
their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags
containing marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO
G. REYES, alias "Mac-Mac,"
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search
of accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from
accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in
evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the
acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
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Facts:
On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal
possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City,
found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation
of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so far as
Lantion-Tom was concerned.
On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and
Lantion-Tom, insisting on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC,
which said trial court granted.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution,
recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Lantion-Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events
presented by the parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation.
In accordance with the resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with leave of
court to admit amended information.
The RTC denied the prosecutions motion. Contrary to the finding of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against accused-appellant Reyes
and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well. After the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Dela Cruz
and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura; the 10 heat-sealed plastic
sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants. The RTC admitted all the
aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its Order21 dated March 1, 2001.
The defense, presented the testimonies of Marlon David, accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom. Accused-appellant Reyes
did not testify.
In its Decision the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT.
Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal, subsequently he moved to withdraw his notice
of appeal, instead, filing before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open
Proceedings and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to
review its judgment of conviction.
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Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an
illegal drug deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul was suspicious, if not incredible.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order,
acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly admitted that it erred in
giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago,
and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, sustained the conviction of accused-appellants, and
merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accusedappellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption that the
police officers regularly performed their official duties.
Issue:
Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime
charged without taking into considerations the contradictory testimony of the prosecution's
evidence resulting to a complete fabrication and frame-up?
Ruling:
Yes, the court a quo erred when it ruled that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime
charged without taking into considerations the given circumstances.
We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to
the facts surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Lantion-Tom from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the
Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding
probable cause against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.
The RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, totally reversed itself and
acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by
the defense.
The Court of Appeals, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by
the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
charged.
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Guided by the settled rule that "where the facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced failed to
meet the test of moral certainty," we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its
subsequent Order in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro is more in keeping with the evidence on
record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented against Emmanuel
de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is also
insufficient to convict the latter.
Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated.
In sum, the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police officers, with regard to the facts of
how the crime was committed engenders doubt as to their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that
these police officers gave identical testimonies of the events that happened from the moment they
arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until the arrest of the accused at 10:30 oclock in the evening at
the EDSA Shangri-La. This uniform account given cannot but generate the suspicion that the
circumstances testified by them were well thought-out and prefabricated story. Because of the close
camaraderie of these witnesses who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to
make the same story. Their testimonies are so general, they testified uniformly only as to material
facts but have not given the particulars and the details having relation with the principal facts.
While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the evening, they
were not able to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at the premises without
being noticed by their target. They could not also gave an explanation how their confidential
informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was supposed to take place.
Except for their bare allegation that they have that information regarding the drug deal they were
not able to present any proof of such report, say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report
and a spot report. Even their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented.
There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements
following accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers
attested in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest that "upon sensing suspicious transactions, team leader
immediately accosted the suspects and introduced themselves as Police Officers and after that,
subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their possession illegal drugs and showed
the same to the arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest." Yet, during trial before the
RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de
Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto,
without mention at all of the suspects purported admission.
We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal
involvement even when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person
to deliver the shabu. This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of
February 17, 2000.
In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their
defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at
Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate
themselves for possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and
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Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and
Roberto de Claro consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, LantionToms accountant, regarding documents for a business permit (photocopies of the said documents
were presented during trial); and that they were illegally arrested without warrant and forced to
admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are adequate to
overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance by the arresting police officers of their
official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-appellants favor.
Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on
the night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental
to their arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2
of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations.
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a
peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
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be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
There is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the in flagrante delicto arrests of
accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.
A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
reveal that they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an
illegal drug deal was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects
pass from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was
already able to conclude that the box contained shabu and "sensed" that an illegal drug deal took
place.
Evident from the excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched
the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro
conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being
passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and
finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of
a felonious enterprise." SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the
suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify
the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no
evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all
was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the
white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to
establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as
officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal
drug deal.
Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the
integrity of the shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before
the RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura
and PO3 Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the
white plastic bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before
proceeding to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination that he
saw the shabu for the first time at the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted
that the shabu was marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.
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Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the
search of accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the
shabu from accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized
shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime
charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it
should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty
to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their
good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if
he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants, vs. JUDGE ERWIN B.
JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required. When two cases involve same accused, proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
Moreover, a case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa when
required to for conciliation shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Facts:
Respondent Judge Javellana was accused of gross ignorance of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug. They cited several occasions as examples:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana
issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to
Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon
requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that
said motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al.,
for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and,
instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite
confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material
facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case. Lastly,
Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a
warrantless arrest had been effected.
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The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report dated January 2, 2006, found
Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Respondent Judges issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure categorically stating that
"the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required."
2. Whether or not Respondents Judge erred in dismissing the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
accused even though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure categorically stating that "the court shall not order the arrest of the
accused except for failure to appear whenever required."
Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His
justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in
another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance
of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for
malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted
homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
2. Yes, Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even
though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by
Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has not been previously
referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings
prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the
Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et
al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground.
Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice)
filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL MORES
Non-flight does not connote innocence.
Facts:
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The accused appellant was charged with the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced
but appellant, who was previously granted bail. Failed to appear during two hearing dates. Thus,
the bail bond that he was posted was forfeited, a bench warrant was issued against him and he was
tried in absentia. However, he did not leave the town. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were summarized in this manner: In the evening of January 24, 1994, while of the Roxas
Gymnasium, and while a dance was being held, the accused-appellant was seen to pulled out a
round object from his left pocket, transferred it to his right hand and then threw it on the dance
floor full of revelers as if rolling a ball. Thereafter an explosion occurred causing the death of Ramie
Balasa and multiple injuries to other victims. The accused claims that his continued presence at the
vicinity of the Municipality of Roxas right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of
the crime charged.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, hence
the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the non-flight of the accused connotes his innocence
Ruling:
No. Non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence. Flight is indicative of guilt, but its
converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing
and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt
while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby
avoiding suspicion from other members of the community.
In People vs Camat, the Court ruled that flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of
justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an
inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent
are as bold as a lion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO VELASCO
G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-de Castro
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Roberto Velasco was charged with three counts of rape under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code and one count of acts of lasciviousness. According to the
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prosecution, Velasco is the live-in partner of victim [Lisas] mother. On December 27, 28 and 29,
2001, at around 11 in the morning while [Lisas] mother and brother were out for work, Velasco
would approach [Lisa], remove their shorts and underwear, mount her and insert his penis into her
vagina. He would then threaten her not to tell anyone about the incident.
A year thereafter, or on December 21, 2002, at midnight, when the other members of the
family were asleep, appellant attempted to insert his penis into [Lisas] vagina while the latter was
sleeping on her folding bed. This time, [Lisa] cried. Although appellant succeeded in touching and
kissing [Lisas] private parts, he did not push through with his intention of raping her for fear of
getting caught by the other family members who were sleeping just a few feet away from them.
Meanwhile, the medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan Viray states
that [Lisa] is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal lacerations at 2 and 3
oclock positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 oclock positions.
One the other hand, while Velasco admitted that he is the live-in partner of [Lisas] mother,
he related that he was at work at Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan on the 27th, 28th and 29th of December
2001 with his nephew Roderick Palconet while he was at home on the 21st of December 2002. He
argued that the accusations against him were instigated by [Lisas] father who was mad at him for
having a live-in relationship with [Lisas] mother.
To support Velascos defense, Palconet averred that from 8:00 oclock in the morning to
5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001, he was with Velasco.
On March 5, 2008, the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan convicted Velasco on all the
charges leveled against him. On appeal where Velasco raised for the first time the question as to the
validity of his warrantless arrest, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed such decision with
modifications as to the sentence and damages. It ruled that such a question on his arrest came too
late in the day to be worthy of consideration. Hence, Velasco filed the instant appeal with the
Supreme Court.
Velasco contended that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that his warrantless arrest
illegal and that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person
Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining
and Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof) were violated.
doubt.
Moreover, Velasco asserted that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
He argued that the trial court erroneously gave probative weight and credence to the
alleged victims incredible and uniform testimony which casts doubt on her truthfulness. He added
that the alleged victims failure to resist or to wake her brother and mother immediately after the
alleged sexual molestation on December 21, 2002 or to shout for help from their neighbors who
were in close proximity to their house negated the credibility of her accusations. He also reasoned
that the alleged victims willingness to live in the same house with him despite what he allegedly
did to her, taken together with her failure to immediately report the alleged sexual assaults to the
authorities, further eroded the reliability of the victims statements.
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Velasco also contended that the medico-legal reports conclusion, which states that the
"subject is in a non-virgin state physically", did not prove that the victim was indeed raped.
Finally, he pointed out that he could not have possibly committed the crimes attributed to
him because, during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he claims to be
somewhere else.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding Velascos question as to the validity of his
warrantless arrest?
2. Whether or not the victims failure to resist, failure to shout for help from their neighbor, failure
to report the incident to the authorities, or the alleged victims willingness to live in the same
house with the accused despite what he allegedly did to her erodes the credibility of the victim?
Ruling:
1. No, the CA did not err in its ruling as to Velascos question on the validity of his warrantless
arrest.
The Supreme Court has previously held that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment.
Thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Nevertheless, even if appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a
scenario would still not provide salvation to appellants cause because jurisprudence also dictates
that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.
In order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis
for acquittal, the defense must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the accused for the crime
charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court was in full agreement with the Court of Appeals that
no fact or circumstance exists to warrant a reversal of the trial courts assessment that the victims
testimony is credible and worthy of belief. They also concurred with the findings of the appellate
court that the testimony of the victim was made in a candid and straightforward manner, even on
extensive cross-examination. In sum, the alleged discrepancies in the victims testimony were not
significant enough to successfully tilt the scales of justice in favor of appellant.
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2. No.
The Supreme Court reiterated its previous rulings that the failure of the victim to shout for
help does not negate rape and the victims lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the
offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.
Furthermore, it is doctrinally settled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of
threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim because "delay in reporting an
incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on
the credibility of the complainant."
It is likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are unpredictable
when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims
can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.
It has been established that a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission
of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
It is well-settled that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of
the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene.
However, here, the testimony of accuseds sole corroborating witness reveals that the
distance between the construction site and the appellants house where the instances of rape and
acts of lasciviousness occurred is relatively short and can be covered by a mere five-minute travel
by motor vehicle.
Furthermore, it is also established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of an
alibi to be considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses.
In the case at bar, the testimony of accuseds nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a
close relative, cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. Therefore,
considering these factual circumstances, accuseds defense of alibi certainly cannot prosper.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Illegal Search and Warrant
HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATIONS CORP AND HYMAN YAP vs. PLDT
G.R. No. 170217 and G.R. No. 170694, December 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., this Court held that the quantum of evidence
required to prove probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof
beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be subsequently filed. We ruled
in this case that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
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standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial. Taken together, the aforementioned pieces of evidence are more than sufficient
to support a finding that test calls were indeed made by PLDTs witnesses using Mabuhay card with
PIN code number 332 1479224 and, more importantly, that probable cause necessary to engender a
belief that HPS Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal ISR
activities exists. To reiterate, evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be
distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not
required.
Facts:
In October 2000, the complainant PAOCTF filed with RTC two applications for the issuance
of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for Theft of Telephone
Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication
equipments following the complaint of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company or PLDT
that they were able to monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and
equipments capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without
these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT.
Complainants witnesses testified under oath that Respondents are engaged in the business
of International Simple Resale or unauthorized sale of international long distance calls. They
explained that International Simple Resale (ISR) is an alternative call pattern employed by
communication provider outside of the country. This is a method of routing and completing
international long distance call using prepaid card which respondents are selling in the States.
These calls are made through access number and by passes the PLDT International Gate Way
Facilities and by passes the monitoring system, thus making the international long distance calls
appear as local calls, to the damage and prejudice of PLDT which is deprived of revenues as a result
thereof.
Subsequently, the trial court issued two search warrants for Violation of Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code (Theft of Telephone Services) and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401
(Unauthorized Installation of Telephone Connections) which both contained identical orders
directing that several items are to be seized from the premises of HPS Corporation and from the
persons of Hyman Yap, et al.
The search warrants were immediately implemented on the same day. Items contained in
the search warrant were seized. Subsequently, a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
assistant City Prosecutor and found probable cause recommending filing of information.
Petitioners filed and Motion to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.
RTC issued an order granting the quashal of seized articles. CA affirmed, hence this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the Solicitor General which has the
exclusive and sole power to file such appeals in behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Issue:
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1. Whether or not PLDT has the personality to file the petition and not the Solicitor General.
2. Whether or not the search warrant at issue was improperly quashed.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The PLDT has the personality to file the petition.
Anent the first issue of whether PLDT possesses the legal personality to file the petition in
light of respondents claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the Solicitor General which has the
exclusive and sole power to file such appeals in behalf of the People of the Philippines Court rules in
the affirmative. The petition filed by PLDT before this Court does not involve an ordinary criminal
action which requires the participation and conformity of the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General when raised before appellate courts.
On the contrary, what is involved here is a search warrant proceeding which is not a
criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal process. In the seminal case of
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, we expounded on this doctrine in this wise: The basic flaw in this
reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with
the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is
only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It
ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of
the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature,
and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein. Invariably, a judicial process is
defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law also the
means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses,
and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or
order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite
the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a
court of justice.
Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that the
requirement set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that
all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of a public prosecutor does not apply.
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In Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we sustained the legal
personality of a private complainant to file an action or an appeal without the imprimatur of
government prosecutors. Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Bright Future Technologies, Inc., we upheld the right of a private complainant, at whose initiative a
search warrant was issued, to participate in any incident arising from or in connection with search
warrant proceedings independently from the State.
2. Yes. The Subject search warrants were improperly quashed.
We find that the contention is impressed with merit. This Court has consistently held that
the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and
things to be seized.
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and
the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., this Court held that the quantum of evidence
required to prove probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof
beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be subsequently filed. We
ruled in this case that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules
and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied
by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full-blown trial.
Essentially, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals relies solely on the fact that the Mabuhay
card with PIN code number 332 1479224 with a card value of $10.00 did not lose any of its $10.00
value before it was used in the test calls conducted at the NTC office and in open court. Thus, the
Court of Appeals concluded that, contrary to PLDTs claims, no test calls using the same Mabuhay
card were actually made by PLDTs witnesses when it applied for a search warrant against HPS
Corporation, et al. otherwise, the Mabuhay card should have had less than $10.00 value left in it.
This Court cannot subscribe to such a hasty conclusion because the determination of whether or
not test calls were indeed made by PLDT on Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332 1479224
cannot be ascertained solely by checking the value reflected on the aforementioned Mabuhay card.
In fact, reliance on this method of verification is fraught with questions that strike deep into the
capability of the said Mabuhay card to automatically and accurately reflect the fact that it had
indeed been used by PLDTs witnesses to make test calls.
Taken together, the aforementioned pieces of evidence are more than sufficient to support a
finding that test calls were indeed made by PLDTs witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN code
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number 332 1479224 and, more importantly, that probable cause necessary to engender a belief
that HPS Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal ISR activities
exists.
To reiterate, evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be
distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is
not required.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN
G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-de Castro
Where the accused is charged of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and now questioning
the legality of his arrest as the same was done without a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest,
the Court ruled that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto and had reiterated that warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Facts:
Donald Vasquez (Don), claiming that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), was arrested, together with Reynar Siscar, through a buy-bust operation of the
Philippine National Police. The police found six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust
operation contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the
brown envelope was confiscated from Don, the police put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it.
The police also noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re
Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but the police did not bother to check out what they were for or who made
them. When they interrogated Don about the brown envelope, they found out that the same was
submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. The police also testified that after the appellant
was arrested, they conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more
plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant which vary in sizes and were contained in a white
envelope and marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers
then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.
Don denied all the allegations of the prosecution stating that the drug specimen was
obtained from him through force when the police entered his house and searched his room, picking
up what they could get. One of the police opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donalds]
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide; from two (2) cases and marked as DD-931303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug
specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3
April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and
his wallet containing P2,530.00.
Issue:
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Whether the search and arrest of the accused is illegal.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
The Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing
of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission
to the trial courts jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the
validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA BARGAINING
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO A. LOPIT
It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the plea; the court must explain fully to
the accused that once convicted, he could be meted the death penalty; that death is a single and
indivisible penalty and will be imposed regardless of any mitigating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the felony. Thus, the importance of the courts obligation cannot be
overemphasized, for one cannot dispel the possibility that the accused may have been led to believe
that due to his voluntary plea of guilty, he may be imposed a lesser penalty, which was precisely what
happened here.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged in thee (3) separate informations, Criminal Case Nos. 852003, 86-2003 and 87-2003, with three (3) counts of rape committed against his own 14-year old
daughter AAA on September 5, 7, and 9, 2003. Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty in all
of the Information. During the pre-trial accused-appellant manifested his desire to plea-bargain. In
open court, he expressed willingness to plead guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-2003, on the condition
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that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 86-2003 and 87-2003 be withdrawn. Victim AAA,
assisted by her mother BBB and the provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. Thus,
accused-appellant entered a new plea of guilty to the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 852003. This was done with the assistance of counsel de oficio and after the trial court conducted
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused-appellants plea. The trial court commenced with the reception of evidence to prove
accused-appellants guilt and degree of culpability. The prosecution presented the victim AAA and
her mother BBB as witnesses, while accused-appellant testified on his own defense.
The trial court rendered a decision imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme
penalty of death. The records of these cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in
view of the death penalty imposed. Accused-appellants appeal by way of automatic review was
transferred to the CA. The CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming in most part
the decision of the trial court with modification only in the amount of the award of moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, this review. In his Brief, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court
gravely erred in imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court has satisfied the requirement as mandated by Rule 116 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure with respect to plea bargain.
Ruling:
No. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. Three things are
enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension
of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask
the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
Clearly, Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was not satisfactorily
complied with. The trial court should have taken the necessary measures to see to it that accusedappellant really and freely comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his
plea but it did not. It failed to explain to accused-appellant that the penalty imposable for the crime
attended by the qualifying circumstance of minority and filiation, as alleged in the Information
against him, is death, whether or not he pleads guilty and regardless of the presence of other
mitigating circumstances. Accused-appellants justification that he had no money to defend his case
and his belief that the penalty would be reduced if he pleaded guilty were not sufficient reasons for
the trial court to allow a change of plea from not guilty to one of guilty. It was the duty of the judge
to see to it that the accused did not labor under this mistaken impression.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH Div.) and HENRY BARRERA,
G.R. Nos. 153952-71 August 23, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
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Respondent Mayor Henry Barrera was charged for violation of anti graft and corrupt
practices for ousting the vendors in the market however he filed demurrer to evidence. The court
granted demurrer to evidence for elements of such crime was not present in the case specifically
manifest partiality. For an act to be considered as exhibiting manifest partiality, there must be a
showing of a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the
other. Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they
are wished for rather than as they are. Evident bad faith, on the other hand, is something which does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; It partakes of the nature of fraud.
Facts:
Henry E. Barrera was a public officer being then the municipal mayor of Candelaria,
Zambales; That private complainants were awarded individual contract of lease for a market stall in
the new Candelaria Public Market by the former Mayor Fidel Elamparo before the oath taking of the
Henry Barrera. After taking his oath as the new Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales went to the public
market and pleaded with the complainants herein not to occupy the new market stalls AND
contended that during the time of Mayor Fidel Elamparo, the public market of Candelaria, Zambales
was razed to the ground. That the incident displaced about 60 market vendors; That Ex-Mayor
Elamparo assured the market vendors who were displaced together with Congressman Antonio
Diaz that they will enjoy priority/preference over the new stalls once the public market is re-built;
and That the displaced market vendors were temporarily sheltered along Perla St. and Ruby St.,
adjacent to the burned public market.
Mayor Barrera filed his Demurrer to Evidence on November 8, 2001, avowing that there
was no bad faith in his issuance of Memorandum No. 1, which prevented Abella, et al., from
occupying the new stalls at the Candelaria Public Market. Mayor Barrera argued that any purported
damage sustained by Abella, et al., by reason of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum
No. 1 should be solely borne by them, being damnum absque injuria.
In its Comment/Opposition to Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence, the People asserted
that the pieces of evidence it adduced and presented were more than sufficient to sustain the
accused Mayors conviction. The People maintained that it would be in Mayor Barreras best interest
to explain during trial why on June 30, 1998, said Mayor, assisted by the police, forcibly evicted
Abella, et al., from the new public market and padlocked the market stalls without the benefit of any
court order. According to the People, Mayor Barreras actuations displayed a wanton disregard of
the constitutional rights to life and property, as well as to due process of law, which resulted to
business losses on the part of Abella, et al., from the time their market stalls were closed. On May 6,
2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision granting Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence
and dismissing the criminal cases against said Mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Demurrer to Evidence
Ruling:
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No. The instant Demurrer to Evidence is impressed with merit.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019, provides that:
Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful;
e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
To be liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, four essential elements
(as stated in the Information filed in the present cases) must be present:1) That the accused is a
public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the public officers; 2) That said
public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation
to his public position; 3) That he causes undue injury to any party, whether government or
private individuals; and 4) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The first two above-stated elements are clearly present in the instance cases. However, the
third and fourth elements appear to be absent, or at best remain doubtful. The undue
injury mentioned as the third essential element in the commission of the crime requires proof of
actual injury and damage.
Clarifying, the Supreme Court, in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, stated: Unlike in actions for
torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has
been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of a crime.In fact, the causing
of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under
this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the
point of moral certainty. In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
prove actual injury and damage suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of the
crime herein charged, in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral certainty
the purported undue injury. The complainants in their testimonies, admitted that they have been
working and earning, either as market vendors or in pursuit of their profession from the time of the
closure of their respective market stalls up to now. Also, their claims of business losses, at the time
material to the cases at bar, leave much to be desired vis--vis the moral certitude exacted by law to
prove the alleged undue injury. Pathetically, said evidence, are either contradictory or incredible.
Likewise, the prosecutions evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad
faith on the part of the accused, as the fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of
the crime herein charged. For an act to be considered as exhibiting manifest partiality, there must
be a showing of a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than
the other. Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are. Evident bad faith, on the other hand, is something
which does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
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or intent or ill will; It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design, or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purpose. Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest and deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to
establish the fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with evident bad faith. On the
contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was that herein accused simply exercised his
legitimate powers under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a
municipal mayor has the power to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers and, for this purpose, he shall have the power
to issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of the laws
and ordinances. Ex-Mayor Elamparos acts of entering into lease contracts, when his term was about
to expire and herein accused-movants term was about to commence, being the mayor-elect, was not
only in violation of the Local Government Code provision that no contract may be entered into by the
local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the
sangguniang concerned, but also of the other requirements of law such as, a verified application
from the complainants, payment of application fees, drawing of lots and the opening of bids, since
not all the displaced vendors can be accommodated in the thirty-two stalls in the new public
market. The intent of such a maneuvering was obviously to tie the hands of the incoming
administration.
SEARCH WARRANT
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR
T. VIOLA, RTC JUDGE, BRANCH 57, ANGELES CITY
The Director of NBI may delegate his duty of signing the authorization to apply for search
warrant to a subordinate. Such delegation of duty shall not make the application or the resulting
search warrant null and void. Furthermore, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure did not repeal
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC which authorized the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs
which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction.
Facts:
On February 15, 2002, NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division applied for search warrants with
the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners house located in Angeles City and
(2) the premises in Porac, Pampanga, both for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The request for
issuance was founded on personal knowledge of Special Investigator Ray Lagasca (Lagasca) and
that of witness Roland Fernandez after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners house. Executive Judge Mario Guaria III (Judge Guaria III) granted the applications. As a
result, the search warrants were effected and shabu and marijuana were confiscated from the
house of the petitioners.
The petitioners were charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
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Evidence Illegally Seized on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed
outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was
committed; (2) the questioned search warrant is void ab initio for being violative of Section 2 Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court and for having a signature other than that of Director Wycoco
who is the person required under the law to affix the same; and (3) the evidence illegally seized by
virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, the Office of the City Prosecutor claims
that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC which authorized the
Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all
applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and
provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City.
Lagasca averred it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who
signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant in
the house/premises of petitioners for violation of R.A. No. 6425.
Judge Omar T. Viola denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, hence, the present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco is fatal to the cause of the
prosecution
2. Whether or not the search warrants are void ab initio
Ruling:
1. No. We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI,
PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for
search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as
may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. Director
Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy
Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent
with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols endorsement had the same force and effect as an
endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned Orders
that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is
unassailable.
2. Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain
that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when
the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied,
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being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
The petitioners contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants
provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M.
No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And
Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly
stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
xxx
xxx
xxx
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Tuan was charged with Illegal possession of dangerous drugs and contended that the issuance
of search warrant was not justified for the Search Warrant did not describe with particularity the
place to be searched. The court ruled that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to
it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Facts:
Two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived
at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS
Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay
Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Afterwards they conducted surveillance operations which resulted
positive that indeed Tuan was selling marijuana. SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for
Search Warrant for accused-appellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search
Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two
hours later, at around three oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong,
and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable
cause
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a probable cause to issue the issue warrant
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Ruling:
Yes. The issuance of the search warrant was justified.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search
warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and
examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and
Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and
fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be
searched and things to be seized.
In People v. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows: Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable
men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause
relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence
that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and
that the items will be found in the place to be searched.
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are
in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accusedappellants residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and
Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not
only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and
conducted surveillance of accused-appellant.
Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did not
describe with particularity the place to be searched. A description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
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that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly
leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants
residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY SABANGAN and NOLI BORNASAL
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test which considers the following factors: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
It is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility
of an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification
was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
attended it.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Gerry Sabangan was charged with murder for the death of Barangay
Captain Abe Felonia together with his co-accused, Noli Bornasal. Both accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged against them.
Prosecution presented the testimonies of 2 witnesses who saw Sabangan shoot the victim to
death; another witness who saw both accused running away from the vicinity immediately after the
shooting incident; the Chief of Police of Kidapawan City who investigated the shooting incident; and
the daughter of the victim who testified on the damages suffered by Felonias heirs.
According to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses, on December 27, 1999, the
victim (Abe Felonia) who was the barangay captain of Duroloman, Arakan, Cotabato, was gunned
down at Mega Market in Kidapawan City. Eden Allado and Flora Navales testified that they were
inside a store at Mega Market with the victim when the accused went inside the store and shot the
victim three times at the back of the head of Felonia.
Roberto Badian, the Chief of Polcie of Kidapawan said he conducted an investigation right
after the shooting incident and came up with the information from bystanders and witnesses that
Gerry Sabangan who had a pending robbery case in Kidapawan but out on bail, was one of the
suspects. Thereafter, when Gerry Sabangan was spotted in Antipaz, he was invited to the police
safehouse where the 3 witnesses positively identified and pointed the accused as the man who shot
the victim. Sabangan was arrested and locked up in jail and a case for murder against him was
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initiated by the police. Accused Noli Bornasal was subsequently apprehended based on the account
of one witness who testified that he saw him running away from the vicinity with Sabangan
immediately after the shooting incident.
Sabangan denied the accusations against him and put up the defense that he was at
Barangay Luhong, Antipas, Cotabato at the time of the incident, helping in the preparation of a
wedding ceremony of a relative. He argued that it was physically impossible for him, on the date of
the shooting incident, to be in Kidapawan City when Felonia was killed considering that Kidapawan
City was approximately 40 kilometers away from Antipaz, Cotabato. Sabangan also complained of
the irregularity in the conduct of the investigating police officers during the out-of-court
identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.
Bornasal argued, on the other hand that no other circumstantial evidence was presented by
the prosecution to establish the alleged conspiracy between him and Sabangan to kill Felonia.
The RTC found both Sabangan and Bornasal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder
of Felonia. On appeal, both accused asserted that the award of actual damages in the total sum of
P234,080.00 was excessive, contrary to what was sufficiently proven during trial.
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Sabangan but acquitted Bornasal on the
ground of reasonable doubt, and modified the award of damages. Hence the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was irregularity in the conduct of the investigating police officers
during the out-of-court identification of Sabangan by the witnesses?
Ruling:
No, the Court ruled that there appeared no irregularity in the conduct by the investigating
police officers of the out-of-court identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.
There are 3 ways when an out-of-court identification may be conducted by the police:
a) show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification;
b) mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect; and
c) line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test which considers the following factors: (1) the
witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
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The out-of-court identification made by the witnesses in the case at bar complies with the
totality of circumstances test.
First, the affidavits of Navales and Allado establish that even before they identified
Sabangan in person on February 18, 2000, they already recognized Sabangan among the
photographs of different people shown to them during the polices initial investigation on February
7, 2000. It would then appear that the out-of-court identification of Sabangan by Allado and
Navales on February 18, 2000 was only to confirm the earlier out-of-court identification of
Sabangan by the same witnesses on February 7, 2000. It is worthy to note that in both instances,
Allado and Navales confidently and consistently identified Sabangan as the person who shot
Felonia.
Second, based on their respective accounts of the shooting incident, Allado and Navales, at
different times, had the opportunity to clearly view Sabangans face. Their candid and detailed
testimonies prove that they were both fully attentive of what was happening at the time
immediately before, during, and after Felonias shooting.
Third, and more importantly, it is settled that an out-of-court identification does not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that, even
assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. In the instant case, the
independent in-court identification of Sabangan by Allado and Navales during trial proper was
categorical, candid, and positive, hence, worthy of credence and weight.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA
The accused cannot claim that the evidence obtained from a search conducted incident to an
arrest is inadmissible because it is violative of the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine only
applies to cases where the arresting officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Facts:
While driving a towing truck, Edwin Lojera had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi
cab and the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their
guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police
station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez who
immediately responded to the complaint. When they found the taxi, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards the police officers and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez
chased the suspects and recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiaos companion a .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Pablo Temena, and
PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM".
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Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The
result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa revealed that the same was
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
At the trial, the testimony of PO1 Mariano was corroborated by PO3 Ramirez who testified that he
personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. The driver of the taxi, Mr.
Crisendo Amansec, was also presented in open court and testified that on that date, two (2) persons
boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran
away.
According to the testimony of Calantiao, this instant case originated from a traffic mishap
where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car.
Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons on board of that car.
The act of Reyes resulted in a chase where PO1 Reyes subsequently slapped Reyes and poked his
gun against the latter. When Calantiao and Reyes were apprehended, they were told in the police
station that they will be charged for drugs and that they were shown a newspaper containing
marijuana.
The RTC found Calantiao guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In convicting
Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered
during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at
the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly
established by the prosecution.
Calantiao appealed to the CA questioning the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it
violates the plain view doctrine and the propriety of the chain of custody. However, the Court of
Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiaos conviction. It found that there was sufficient
reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate complaint
and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the
offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of the
marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest. Calantiao then raised
the issue to the SC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana was valid
2. Whether or not the evidence is admissible despite the fact that the marking was not made in
the presence of the accused at the time of the arrest
Ruling:
1. Yes, the search and seizure of marijuana is valid.
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos contention that the marijuana in his possession
cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not
having been within the apprehending officers "plain view."
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Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore
a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that
may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being
destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of
the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos possession and
within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to
destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct
a warrantless search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced. The Plain View Doctrine is
actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so
because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the
police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently
come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part
of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.
2. Yes, the evidence is still admissible.
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Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is
still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the
rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity
of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical
inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that
the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that
the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1)
in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the
time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up
to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no
reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the
seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao
inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the
evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The
burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the
seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao.
Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIE VILLACORTA GIL
This circumstantial evidence constitutes positive identification of Gil as the perpetrator of the
crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the motive to commit the crime
and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her neighbourhood the fire
that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately before and
after the fire sufficiently points to Gil as the author of the said crime.
A well-entrenched legal precept, the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not
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conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the case and the said trial
court is in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
through actual observation of the witnesses manner of testifying, demeanor and behaviour while in
the witness box.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Gil was convicted of the crime of Destructive Arson with Homicide under
Article 320 of the RPC, as a result of the fire that razed her house on March 1, 1998 and in the
process took the life of Rodolfo Cabrera. In the decision of the trial court, it was found that the
prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence, coupled with the written confession
of Gil, to sustain her conviction. The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court.
In this review before the Court, Gil asserts that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt and her alleged confession deserves no merit for being involuntary on her end. In particular,
Gil contends that no one saw that she deliberately set afire her mattress and the confession was
obtained without assistance of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not Gil is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Ruling:
Yes, Gil is guilty of the crime of arson with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of Gil at the
time she caused a public disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and
to drag her neighbours into this turmoil, two days prior to the conflagration;
testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the room of
Gil, the latter said to him in the vernacular: Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na
tayo;
testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to chase Gil during
the fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark: Damay-damay na
tayo diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog; and,
testimony of Kagawad William Lim that Gil approached and admitted to him
immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the
conflagration.
This circumstantial evidence constitutes positive identification of Gil as the perpetrator of

the crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the motive to commit the
crime and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her neighbourhood
the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately
before and after the fire sufficiently points to Gil as the author of the said crime.
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To quote a well-entrenched legal precept, the factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are
given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered, will alter the
outcome of the case and the said trial court is in the best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through actual observation of the witnesses manner of
testifying, demeanor and behaviour while in the witness box.
In this case, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified consistently and
truthfully. The chain of events before, during and after the fire as narrated by the prosecu-tion
witnesses established beyond reasonable doubt that Gil committed the acts alleged in the
information. Gil failed to show any misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance that could alter the outcome of the case. She also did not show any
credible motive why the prosecution witnesses testified against her. Thus, the Court finds
conclusive the findings and observation of the trial court that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were candid and trustworthy, and that the testimony of Gil was not impressed with
candor and honesty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO
G. R. No. 172326, January 19, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
Facts:
Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was
preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual who
was with Christopher, his 2-year old youngest child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had liquor
already. For three (3) instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house as he was
already sleepy and drunk but nonetheless will return 10 to 15 minutes later, twice still with the
child and only to continue drinking every time he returned. On the third time, he was without the
child anymore, leaving Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. alone just outside the house at 724 Ballesteros St. Twenty
20 minutes later, Divina Pascual, appellants wife, came out the house looking for her husband.
Divina started looking for him inside the house and later in the billiard hall 10 or 15 minutes away.
Moments later, Divina went back to the place where Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was drinking, rushing
upstairs to the second floor of the house. Soon after, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out
towards the gate. Divina asked for help from Jundos saying Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet
(referring to Alfredo Pascual)). Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos,
Jr. joined the chase but could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to
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instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to Ling-ling (Lorelyn).
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. is the husband of appellants older sister, Laarni.Together, Jundos and Divina
rushed to the second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on the light and there they saw
Ling-ling (Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and legs open, her
panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up above the breast with blood on the right
breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was
shocked at what he saw. Divina got hysterical and repeatedly told Arlene Gorospe what happened.
It did not take long before policemen arrived. Based on the Medico-Legal Report, the cause of death
was asphyxia by smothering.
Alfredo denied the charges against him. He alleged that when he came home, he had a fight
with his wife Divina because the latter allegedly wouldnt permit him to go to a friends house in Sta.
Mesa, Manila, as he was already drunk. Nonetheless, he still went to Sta. Mesa and stayed at his
friends house for more or less six days.
Defense witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the
specimens submitted by the trial court consisting of the victims vaginal smear and
panty. According to her, no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens.
However, she declared that, it was possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a complete
and good result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic chemist
confirmed that DNA testing on the subject specimens was inconclusive and that the result was not
good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had
already undergone serological analysis. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented against the accused-appellant was
sufficient for his conviction;
2. Whether or not the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an
acquittal
Ruling:
1. Yes. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime
of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left
to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide
is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as
here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if the following requisites concur:
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(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged. Prior to the discovery of
her dead body, Jundos testified that the victim was alone in her room on the second floor of the
house. This fact was known to accused-appellant who admitted as much in his crossexamination. Eduardo Velasco, who used to visit the sister of the victim and have drinks with
accused-appellant, testified that the latter confided to him his love for the victim. Dr. Felimon
Porciuncula, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim, testified
that hymenal lacerations were discovered on the body at 3, 6 and 9 oclock positions, but there is an
abrasion or abrated posterior meaning that the injury was fresh or was inflicted right before the
death of the victim. Dr. Porciuncula further testified that spermatozoa was found in the vagina of
the victim. Furthermore, the statements of accused-appellants wife, Divina, immediately after the
fateful incident all the more convince the Court as to accused-appellants guilt. Part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule were Divinas utterances to
Gorospe after seeing the dead and raped body of the victim, i.e., May nagyari sa itaas at galing doon
si Boyet,and her subsequent narration of seeing the accused-appellant going out of the victims room
and running away therefrom.
2. No. In People v Yatar, we held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Here, while the DNA analysis of the victims vaginal smear showed no complete profile of the
accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was already stained
or contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete
and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal
smear, they could see if there is a male profile in the smear. However in this case, when they
received the vaginal smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological
analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of
this case was inconclusive. In light of this flawed procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA
examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES
PALALAY Y VILLAROSA
Page 243 of 350

2015)
The Trial Court correctly convicted the accused of the crime of qualified Carnapping based on
circumstantial evidence, when the combination of circumstances are interwoven in such a way as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Facts:
On April 12, 2005 at Santiago City, Philippines, Renato Lagat and James Palalay, conspiring,
conniving with each other, and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain and without
the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI then driven and owned by Jose Biag, valued at P 70,000.00, to
the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof. And that the two accused were arrested in
possession of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, Lagat and
Palalay, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping each other, and with intent to kill, assault,
attack and wound the said Jose Biag with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the
vital parts of the body of the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds
which directly caused the death of the said Biag.
The Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. testified that on April 13, 2005, after
he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Floridas report, they immediately went to the Alicia Police
Station, wherein they found Biags tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card
recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in
Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban. Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay
were also told that the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San
Guillermo Road.
PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of the report, their Chief of Police composed a team,
which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the
report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to them by their chief, with the
cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team
were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered" to different directions.
After "collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the
tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they reached the station, they asked
the two accused if they had any papers to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two
accused did not answer. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they
discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet containing
the tricycles Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued in the name of Jose Biag. When
they asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the
name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that
upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and Palalay that anything they say would
be used against them, and that they had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the
PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused, they proceeded to
Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biags body in a ravine just after the bridge near
the road.
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The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
was not sufficient to convict them. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC rendered a
Decision, the Court finds the accused Renato Lagat and James Palalay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified carnapping. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision nn affirming the
conviction of the accused, held that the elements of carnapping were all present in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No, the Trial Court did not erred.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the
registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. The prosecution was also able to
establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the
palay buying station. Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their
unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking
of the tricycle. Lagat and Palalays intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as
they were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used
to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell at the station.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused. A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that
are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively
establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. First, Lagat and Palalay were
found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag, was reported
missing. Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle
packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela. Third, Lagat and Palalay who were
then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biags
tricycle. Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycles registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its
inspection by the Alicia PNP. Sixth, Biags body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem
autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it. When a person is killed or raped in
the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the
penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNESTO DE LA CRUZ @ BERNING
Page 245 of 350

2015)
The accused was convicted of rape with homicide. The accused on appeal raised the issue of
the absence of direct evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. In this regard, the Supreme Court
held that circumstantial evidence may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrators
crime when these are credible and sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. With respect to the appellants
contention that the witnesses presented were not credible, the Court reiterated the jurisprudential
principle affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses especially if the factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On March 19, 2001, an information for the crime of rape with homicide was filed against the
accused Bernesto dela Cruz. The information states that Bernesto raped AAA, a married woman,
while the latter was gathering gabi on May 27, 2000 and thereafter beheaded the victim through
the use of a bolo. Upon trial, BBB, the sister of the victim, was presented and testified the following:
that she saw Bernesto at the scene of the crime he was wearing bloodied underwear he was
wielding a bolo owned by AAA, cutting branches which he used to cover something on seeing BBB
he threw the bolo away and ran when BBB checked what the appellant was trying to hide, she
discovered it to be the headless body of AAA AAAs undergarments had been removed. The medical
examination found that there was spermatozoa in the genitalia of the victim and that she was
hacked several times before she was beheaded. However, there were no eyewitnesses to the crime.
The Trial Court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant by
circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
1. Can the accused be convicted of the crime of rape with homicide despite the absence of
direct evidence?
2. Can the accused raise the credibility of the witnesses before the Supreme Court?
Ruling:
1. Yes. To an unprejudiced mind, the circumstances testified by BBB form a solid unbroken
chain of events which ties Bernesto to the crime beyond reasonable doubt. The Rules of
Court allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the
identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning
or inferences being drawn on the part of the fact finder in contrast, circumstantial
evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference
or reason from circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to
establish the complicity of the perpetrators crime when these are credible and sufficient,
and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex
crime of rape with homicide.
2. With respect to the appellants contention that the witnesses presented were not credible,
the Court reiterated the jurisprudential principle affording great respect and even finality to
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses especially if the factual findings
Page 246 of 350

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are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The trial judge can better determine if witnesses are
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO REY
ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES
A.K.A. NONONG ITCOBANES, NONOY ESTONILO-AT LARGE, TITING BOOC-AT LARGE, GALI
ITCOBANES-AT LARGE, ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM A.K.A. NEGRO MATERDAM, AND
CALVIN DELA CRUZ A.K.A. BULLDOG DELA CRUZ
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.
Facts:
A shooting incident happened at an elementary school in Masbate City. It resulted to the
death of District Supervisior Floro Casas. Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo and Mayor Estonilo allegedly
induced Edel, Nonong, and Calvin to kill the victim after the latter was found to be supporting the
opposite mayoralty candidate.
The prosecution presented 9 witnesses and among them is Serapion who testified that he
was on the scene when the crime was committed and he heard gunshots coming from inside the
compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or less six persons coming
out of the school; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.s vehicle, which was parked
near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the
vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. mission accomplished, sir; that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using two motorbikes.
Antipolo was also presented as an eyewitness to the incident narrating the same set of facts
presented by Serapion. The defense of the accused was alibi. RTC found them to be guilty. CA
affirmed. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Can the accused be convicted based on circumstantial evidence?
2. Can the defense of alibi be given credence?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
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Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the
crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which
the facts in issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and
Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this
order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolos eyewitness account as well as
Serapions testimony.
2. No.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility
involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the
accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the
crime was committed.58 Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that
they were near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place.
Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the
school, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
PRESUMPTIONS
VICENTE MANZANO, JR. vs. MARCELINO GARCIA
The fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The
presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
Facts:
Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia) is an owner of a parcel of land and such property was the
subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992 allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of
Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-interest and brother of petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr.
(Vicente). Garcia did not redeem the subject property within the three-month period. Consequently,
Vicente instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership over the property
Garcia filed an opposition and answer, alleging that the document evidencing the pacto de
retro sale was a forgery. On February 15, 1994, Garcia filed a complaint for annulment of pacto de
retro sale and recovery of the owners title with preliminary injunction against Vicente. The two
petitions were consolidated before the RTC.
Page 248 of 350

2015)
During the trial, Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized
the deed of conveyance in question, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who appeared in his office
and who executed the pacto de retro sale is not the same Marcelino Garcia who was in court during
the trial of the case.
The RTC held that Garcia failed to prove that his signature in the pacto de retro sale was
forged. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring that on the basis of Atty.
Mediantes testimony, the presumption of regularity in the execution of the public document has
been sufficiently destroyed and overcome.
Vicente argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate that the notarized
deed of pacto de retro sale was entitled to the presumption of regularity and should be given great
weight.
Issue:
Is the presumption of regularity in the execution of the public document sufficiently
destroyed?
Ruling:
Yes, the presumption of regularity of the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was
sufficiently destroyed by the testimony of Atty. Mediante.
It is settled that while a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption of regularity of
notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
Irregularities in the notarization of the document may be established by oral evidence of persons
present in said proceeding. Thus, in Eulogio v. Apeles, where the party insisting on the presumption
of regularity of a notarized deed of sale admitted that the same was notarized without his presence,
SC held that such fact alone overcomes the presumption of regularity, since a notary public is
enjoined not to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
In the case at bar, even more convincing evidence of the irregularity was presented as it was
the notary public himself who testified that the person who appeared before him was not
respondent Garcia. Since the very official who attested to the crucial facts in the notarization i.e.,
that the persons who personally appeared before him are the same persons who executed the deed
of conveyance admitted in open court the falsity of said manifestation, the reliability of the
Acknowledgment that clothes the document with a presumption of regularity is completely
shattered.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE (Substantial Evidence)
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MARITA C. BERNALDO vs. THE OMBUDSMAN and THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS
This Court has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support
an administrative finding of fact Where the decision of the Ombudsman is not supported by
substantial evidence, but based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, as in the present case,
this Court finds sufficient reason to overturn the same.
Facts:
DPWH had nine (9) river dredging projects in Bataan sometime in 1987 to 1988 which were
awarded to various private contractors. At the time of the reported completion the Almacen River II
Project, Bernaldo was the DPWH Region III Project Engineer for the same.
A contrary finding as to the accomplishment of works involving all three projects was
reported by a Survey and Investigation Team of the Bureau of Design of the DPWH. The Survey
Team indicated, among others, that the amount of work accomplished by L.J. Cruz Construction on
the Almacen River II Project was only about 21% completed.
Based on the foregoing reports, the DPWH Region III Engineers connected with the these
projects were all administratively charged for Falsification, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Bernaldo contends that the change in the condition at the time the Almacen River II Project
was reported as completed as compared to the state of the project at the time it was inspected by
the Survey Team months thereafter deserves serious consideration in determining whether the
alleged completion of the said project was in fact bloated.
Issue:
Whether Bernaldo may be held administratively liable
Ruling:
It should be noted that the November 7, 1988 report of the Survey Team does not state that
unsatisfactory condition of the dredging projects was due to the failure of the contractors to
complete them. It is apparent from the overall observation of the Survey Team that the continuous
sedimentation of the dredging sites due to strong magnitude of stream waves and tidal effects of
the delta areas may have caused the destruction of works involved in the projects. The signatories
to the report testified that the continuous sedimentation, soil erosion, or siltation of the rivers could
have wiped out traces of the dredging projects.
Here, the complainant/prosecution in the administrative case failed to discharge its burden
to prove the fact of bloating or overstatement of the percentage of completion of the said project
which purportedly led to overpayments to the contractor. Thus, there is no factual basis to find
petitioner guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
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It is well settled that in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and
substantial evidence, in that order. This Court has consistently held that substantial evidence is all
that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. This is not to say, however, that
administrative tribunals may rely on flimsy, unreliable, conjectural evidence. Substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Where the decision of the Ombudsman is not supported by substantial evidence, but based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures, as in the present case, this Court finds sufficient reason to
overturn the same.
WILFREDO Y. ANTIQUINA
vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or MASTERBULK, PTE., LTD.
The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. And in labor
cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Facts:
Petitioner Antiquina was hired, through respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the vessel, M/T Star Langanger, which was
owned and operated by respondent Masterbulk Pte., Ltd. (Masterbulk). According to petitioners
contract of employment, his engagement on the vessel was for a period of nine (9) months.
Almost seven months after petitioner commenced his employment, he suffered a fracture
on his left arm which resulted to his repatriation to the Philippines. Upon his arrival, petitioner was
diagnosed by a company doctor who advised him to undergo physical therapy. However, despite
several months of physical therapy, petitioner noticed that his arm had not yet healed.
Consequently, he was then again diagnosed by another company doctor who advised petitioner to
undergo a bone grafting procedure. However, upon learning that the metal piece will only be
removed from his arm after one and a half years, petitioner allegedly reacted with fear and decided
not to have the operation.
After informing respondents of his decision to forego the medical procedure, petitioner filed
a complaint for permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorneys fees
against herein respondents.
In his position paper, petitioner asserted that he is entitled to sickness allowance as
stipulated under Section 20 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. With respect to his claim
for permanent disability benefits, he relied on the medical opinion of two doctors who both issued
medical certificates, finding to the effect that petitioner was no longer fit for sea service and
recommending a partial permanent disability grade of 11 under the POEA Schedule of Disability
Grading. However, petitioner claimed that, notwithstanding his own medical evidence regarding his
disability grade, he was entitled to the purportedly superior benefits provided for under Section
20.1.5 of respondents CBA with the Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP).
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In their defense, respondents contended that petitioners monetary claims were premature
by reason of the latters refusal to undergo the operation recommended by the company designated
physician.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and awarded him sickness
allowance and the amount of US$80,000.00 representing petitioners permanent medical unfitness
benefits under the CBA between respondent and AMOSUP. On appeal, the Labor Arbiters decision
was affirmed by the NLRC. However, finding that the award of medical unfitness benefits had no
basis due to the petitioners failure to attach a copy of the CBA, the Court of Appeals modified the
Labor Arbiters decision by computing the amount of the medical unfitness benefit based, not on the
provisions of the CBA, but on the schedule of disability allowances provided for by the POEA
Standard Contract of Employment. Thereafter, petitioner sought for the reconsideration of the said
decision. He alleged that it was only by inadvertence that he previously failed to attach a copy of the
CBA. Attached as annexes to his motion were: (a) a copy of the CBA (Masterbulk Vessels Maritime
Officers Agreement 1999) which allegedly entitled him to US$110,000.00 in disability benefits and
(b) a copy of his monthly contributions as union member during the period that he was employed
by respondents. Nevertheless, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in not admitting and
considering the belated evidence submitted by petitioner.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
In line with the objective of dispensing substantial justice, this Court has examined the
evidence belatedly submitted by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, even with this
procedural concession in favor of petitioner, we do not find any sufficient basis to overturn the
Court of Appeals May 31, 2005 Decision on the merits.
Although petitioner was able to submit to the Court of Appeals copies of his identification
card as an AMOSUP member and a certification from AMOSUPs Legal Department that he was a
member of said union during the period of his employment on the M/T Star Langanger, he still
failed to present any copy of respondents supposed CBA with AMOSUP.
What petitioner belatedly presented on appeal appears to be a CBA between respondent
Masterbulk and the Singapore Maritime Officers Union, not AMOSUP. Article 20.1.5, or the
stipulation regarding permanent medical fitness benefits quoted in petitioners Position Paper and
relied upon by the Labor Arbiter in his decision, cannot be found in this CBA.
In National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion
Hotel Chapter v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held that "[t]he burden of proof rests
upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. And in labor cases, the quantum of proof
necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
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What is indubitable in this case is that petitioner alleged in his Position Paper that there was
a CBA with AMOSUP (a local union of which he was purportedly a member) which entitled him to
disability benefits in the amount of US$80,000.00. It is elementary that petitioner had the duty to
prove by substantial evidence his own positive assertions. He did not discharge this burden of proof
when he submitted photocopied portions of a different CBA with a different union.
In all, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no error in ruling that the Labor
Arbiters award of US$80,000.00 in disability benefits was unsupported by the evidence on record,
even if we take into consideration petitioners late documentary submissions. There is no cogent
reason to disturb the appellate courts finding that the only credible and competent bases for an
award of disability benefits to petitioner are the POEA Standard Contract of Employment and
petitioners own medical evidence that his disability grade is Grade 11 (14.93%). Thus, the Court of
Appeals computation of petitioners permanent medical unfitness benefits in the amount of
US$7,465.00 must stand.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs.
ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR)
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated,
a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.
As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions.
Facts:
Respondent Arnel A. Bernardo was hired by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on and
therein rendered continuous and uninterrupted service until his promotion to his present position
as Attorney V with Salary Grade of 25 and assigned as Technical Assistant at the Office of the
Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue Criminal Prosecution Group. Primarily, the respondent
derived his income from his employment with the BIR.
OMBUDSMAN filed the appropriate administrative action against the respondent for
Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1379 alleging that the
respondent is an incorporator and director of BP Realty Corporation and that his wife, Ma. Lourdes
I. Bernardo is the owner/proprietress of Rinas Boutiques and Gift Shop-Gels Gift Center. On
various dates in 1979 up to 2001 the respondent purchased parcels of residential and agricultural
land, the purchase prices and costs of which were manifestly out of proportion or not
commensurate to his and his wifes lawful incomes, allowances, savings or declared assets. He and
his family also made several foreign travels during the period 1995 to 2002. The respondents cash
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on hand and net worth also consistently increased. However, respondents SALN for the years 1993
up to 2001 did not disclose any business interest and/or financial connection.
In Bernardos Counter-Affidavit, he averred that: he is engaged in various legitimate businesses; he
had divested his interest and/or shares from BP Realty Corporation as may be shown by a Deed of
Assignment; he religiously paid corresponding internal revenue taxes from income of the business
disclosed in his SALN; on his earnings derived not purely from compensation income, but also from
legitimate business as well as business interest or financial connection to Rinas Boutique and Gift
Shop/Gels Gift Center managed by his wife as shown by business permits for Rinas Boutique and
Gift Shop, he stated that he disclosed in his SALNs filed during the period 1993 to 2001 under "B.
Personal and Other Properties
OMBUDSMAN rendered a decision that Bernardo had acquired unexplained wealth during
his tenure as a government employee. However, CA overturned such decision. Hence petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Bernardo liable for the charge of
Dishonesty and thus subject to review by this Court?
Ruling:
Yes. There is substantial evidence to hold Bernardo liable for the charge of Dishonesty and
thus subject to review by this Court
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise
stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts.9 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the findings set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by evidence on record.
Page 254 of 350

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The issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for the
charge of Dishonesty is one of fact, which is not generally subject to review by this Court.
Nonetheless, a review of the facts of the instant case is warranted considering that the findings of
fact of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals were not in harmony with each other.
The Ombudsman applied against the respondent the prima facie presumption laid down in
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, which states that:
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
Nevertheless, the presumption in the aforementioned provision is merely prima facie or
disputable. As held in one case, "a disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence
that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for
which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence."
Unsurprisingly, Section 5 of the same statute requires any court, before which the petition
for forfeiture is filed, to set public hearings during which the public officer or employee may be
given ample opportunity to explain to the satisfaction of the court how he had acquired the
property in question, to wit: Section 5. Hearing. The court shall set a date for a hearing, which may
be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain,
to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
Respondent appears to have been given sufficient opportunity by the Ombudsman to rebut
the prima facie presumption applied against him which is that his properties were illegally
acquired, however, as the instant case illustrated, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals came
to differing conclusions with regard to respondents evidence.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
VIOLA CAHILIG et al.,vs. HON. EUSTAQUIO G. TERENCIO et al
It is well-settled that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. Acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Facts:
After Soterania Siel defaulted on her loan payments when they became due under the
promissory notes she had executed, Mercantile Credit caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage over the property at issue. A certificate of sale was issued in its favor and a
final deed of sale was issued by the Sheriff in the name of Mercantile Credit after Siels failure to
redeem the property within the prescribed period.
Page 255 of 350

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Later, Mercantile Credit filed with the RTC an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the subject property which was eventually granted. Viola Cahilig filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order but after giving due consideration to Cahilig's motion for
reconsideration and, subsequently, to their supposed third-party claim wherein Cahilig allege that
they and their other siblings had already bought the subject property from their mother, the now
deceased Soterania Siel, prior to the constitution of the mortgage and that they were in actual
possession of the land in dispute, the RTC issued the alias writ of possession.
Cahilig admitted in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration that they opposed the issuance
of the writ of possession over the subject property because of the pendency of a civil case filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In the said civil case, petitioners, along with their other
siblings, sought the annulment of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings
affecting the subject property in their capacity as heirs of the now deceased Soterania Siel and not
as vendees to an alleged sale of the land in dispute. Cahilig raised for the first time their theory that
they are third parties (vendees) holding the property adversely to the mortgagor only in their
Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Possession, after the trial court had already
issued the first order granting a writ of possession to Mercantile Credit and after the Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration (of the original order issuing a writ of possession) had been denied.
Issue:
Is there a judicial admission on the part of Cahilig?
Ruling:
Yes, there is.
It is well-settled that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted
do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
The judicial admissions made by Cahilig in their motion were wholly incompatible with
their belated claim that they are actually vendees of Soterania Siels property. In light of the written
admission in their pleading, Cahilig cannot be allowed to subsequently claim in the same
proceedings that they oppose the issuance of the writ of possession because they already owned
the subject property prior to the constitution of the mortgage without first showing that the
contradictory admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
This Cahilig failed to do and, worse, they offer no explanation as to why they failed to
adduce evidence of the purported sale of the property in their favor at the earliest opportunity. As a
consequence thereof, they must be bound by their original admission that they are merely
successors in interest of the mortgagor, rather than adverse claimants.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOURDES PACANA
Page 256 of 350

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Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the
presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original
is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established.
Facts:
Subject of the present controversy is Lot 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City and was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the
RTC, respondent Lourdes Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having
inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero. She further claimed that
her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan and his wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. Prior to Hermogenas death, she demanded for the return of the land
but to no avail. Respondent Lourdes also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property. To prove her filiation with Juan and
Hermogena, Lourdes presented her birth certificate and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena
was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.
Petitioners denied that Lourdes mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or Lourdes is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners
maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived
by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and
Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been
in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50). The complaint was amended wherein the heirs of
Teofilo. The RTC declared Lourdes Pacana as the owner of the lot. CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Lourdes was able to prove her filiation with Juan Gaban
2. Whether or not the Deed of sale offered to prove Lourdes filiation is admissible
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Page 257 of 350

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Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were presented at the RTC. To begin
with, Exhibit A offered by Lourdes, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or
facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding
that Exhibit 1 offered by the defendants was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the
trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation
on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945)
which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form
was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual
signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified
on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth certificate. The names of the
attendant at birth and the local civil registrar in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.)
also merely typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the
signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the
very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were
prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a
witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient
authentication of her birth certificate.
The Court cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the
handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated
by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho, Archivist of the National Statistics
Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they
have custody of birth records in their respective offices, and (b) the certified true copy of
respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of
the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the
original. Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate
exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate. Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the
original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from
which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil
Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their
respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by
the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter
documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
2. No. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Although the best evidence
rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence
would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario, we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence.
Page 258 of 350

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In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana
(who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no
testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was
recorded in any public office.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
FLAVIO S. SUAREZ, JR., RENATO A. DE ASIS, FRANCISCO G. ADORABLE, et al., vs. NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION
A CBA is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. It covers the whole employment relationship and prescribes the
rights and duties of the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. However, if the CBA
imports ambiguity, then the parties intention as shown by their conduct, words, actions and deeds
prior to, during, and after executing the agreement, must be ascertained. That there is an apparent
ambiguity or a failure to express the true intention of the parties, especially with regard to the
retirement provisions of the CBA, is evident in the opposing interpretations of the same by the Labor
Arbiter and the CA on one hand and the NLRC on the other. It is settled that the parole evidence rule
admits of exceptions. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he raises as an issue, among others, an intrinsic ambiguity in the written
agreement or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto.
Facts:
Respondent National Steel Corporation experienced financial reverses sometime in 1994,
which culminated in retrenchment affecting herein petitioners. Each of the petitioners received a
separation package consisting of the following: (1) separation pay equivalent to two (2) months
salary for every year of service; (2) leave balance credits; (3) 13th month pay; and (4) uniform plus
rice subsidy differential. Thereafter, petitioners executed and signed release and quitclaim
documents, written in English and translated in the Visayan dialect, which were duly acknowledged
before a notary public. When the new CBA took effect, petitioners were also given their salary
differentials, and for which they executed and signed another release and quitclaim.
In 1997, petitioners wrote National Steel claiming that they were entitled to retirement
benefits under the CBA. National Steel rejected their claims prompting them to file a labor case. The
Labor Arbiter found no merit to the complaint of petitioners while NLRC reversed the same and
thus upholding the provision of retirement benefits to the retrenched employees. The Court of
Appeals held that petitioners were no longer entitled to such benefits considering that they
accepted separation pay and validly signed waivers.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavits executed by the management and union officers should not be
relied upon in determining the true intent of the parties in the CBA as it violates the parol evidence
rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
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Ruling:
No, the Court finds the affidavits executed by the management and the union officers as not
violative of the parol evidence and they evince the true intention of the parties in the CBA.
A CBA is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. It covers the whole employment relationship and prescribes
the rights and duties of the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. However, if
the CBA imports ambiguity, then the parties intention as shown by their conduct, words, actions
and deeds prior to, during, and after executing the agreement, must be ascertained. That there is
an apparent ambiguity or a failure to express the true intention of the parties, especially with
regard to the retirement provisions of the CBA, is evident in the opposing interpretations of the
same by the Labor Arbiter and the CA on one hand and the NLRC on the other. It is settled that the
parole evidence rule admits of exceptions. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of the written agreement if he raises as an issue, among others, an intrinsic ambiguity
in the written agreement or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto.
While the CBA, on its face, does not contain an express prohibition of payment of retirement benefits to retrenched employees, the parties may still prove it by means ofcontempora-neous
and subsequent acts of the parties to the agreement, such as the execution of the affidavits of the
management and the union officers.
It bears stressing that no less than the union officers confirmed that in drafting the CBA, the
intent of the parties was to make payment of separation package for retrenched employees
exclusive of retirement benefits. These officers were members of the negotiating panel for the
previous CBA and the one subject of judicial scrutiny. In their affidavits, they attested that under the
CBA, an employee who is separated pursuant to a retrenchment program and who received the
corresponding separation package is completely proscribed from demanding and claiming payment
of retirement benefits provided under the CBA. The members of the management panel during the
CBA negotiations also executed their own affidavits and confirmed that payment of separation pay
precludes entitlement to retirement benefits.
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, EULOGIO TOSINO et al., vs. SPOUSES ANDRES T.
ROSARIO et al
The Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced
into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. A party may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of
Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his pleadings any of those allowed by the Rules.
Facts:
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The Torbela sibling inherited the title to the subject property (Lot No. 356-A) from their
parents, the Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first registered owner of the
lot, Valeriano. Later, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 12,
1964 in which they transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of
P9.00.
However, the Torbela siblings claimed that they only executed the Deed as an
accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and use said
property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which would be used for building a hospital on
Lot No. 356-A. On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already issued
in Dr. Rosarios name.
On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which
he expressly acknowledged that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and
conveying the same back to the Torbela siblings for the consideration of P1.00.
On February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of P70,200.00, secured by a
mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital
building started on Lot No. 356-A. In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in 1979-1981.
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario (spouses Rosario), acquired
a loan from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To secure said loan, the
spouses Rosario again constituted mortgages on Lot No. 356-A among others.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus
damages, against the spouses Rosario. The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from
Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A and a
Certificate of Sale in favor of Banco Filipino was later issued.
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their Amended Complaint,
impleading Banco Filipino as additional defendant. During trial, Dr. Rosario testified that he
obtained Lot No. 356-A after paying the Torbela siblings P25,000.00, pursuant to a verbal
agreement with the latter.
Issue:
Can Dr. Rosario modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of Absolute
Quitclaim?
Ruling:
No, Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of
Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his pleadings any of those allowed by the Rules.
Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 12, 1964 and December 28, 1964, even affirming his own signature on the latter Deed.
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The Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of
Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake,
or imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement
of the parties thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to by
the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario after the execution of the Deeds.
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosarios testimony on his alleged verbal agreement with the
Torbela siblings, the SC finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario averred that the two Deeds were
executed only because he was planning to secure loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines and Philippine National Bank and the bank needed absolute quitclaim.
While Dr. Rosarios explanation makes sense for the first Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 12, 1964 executed by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario for P9.00.00), the same could not be said for the second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964 executed by Dr. Rosario.
In fact, Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim (in which he admitted that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for P1.00.00) would
actually work against the approval of Dr. Rosarios loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosarios Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 is a declaration against his self-interest, it must be
taken as favoring the truthfulness of the contents of said Deed.
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or asserting ownership over
Lot No. 356-A based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's
admission in the said Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed conclusive upon him.
Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. That admission cannot now be denied by Dr. Rosario as against the Torbela
siblings, the latter having relied upon his representation. Consequently, Banco Filipino was ordered
to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings.
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Public Documents
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES RODOLFO T. TIU AND VICTORIA N. TIU
G.R. Nos. 173090-91, September 7, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
As pointed out by the trial court, the Restructuring Agreement, being notarized, is a public
document enjoying a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing
evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. The spouses Tiu, who attested before
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the notary public that the Restructuring Agreement "is their own free and voluntary act and deed,"
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove otherwise.
Facts:
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and respondent spouses Rodolfo T.
Tiu and Victoria N. Tiu (the spouses Tiu) entered into a Credit Line Agreement (CLA) whereby
Union Bank agreed to make available to the spouses Tiu credit facilities in such amounts as may be
approved. The spouses Tiu took out various loans in the total amount of US$3,632,000.00.
Union Bank advised the spouses Tiu through a letter that, in view of the existing currency
risks, the loans shall be redenominated to their equivalent Philippine peso amount. Union Bank and
the spouses Tiu entered into a Restructuring Agreement. The Restructuring Agreement contains a
clause wherein the spouses Tiu confirmed their debt and waived any action on account thereof.
The restructured amount (P155,364,800.00) is the sum of the following figures: (1)
P150,364,800.00, which is the value of the US$3,632,000.00 loan as redenominated under the
above-mentioned exchange rate of US$1=P41.40; and (2) P5,000,000.00, an additional loan given to
the spouses Tiu to update their interest payments.
As likewise provided in the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses Tiu executed a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of Union Bank over their "residential property inclusive of lot and
improvements" located at P. Burgos St., Mandaue City.
The spouses Tiu claim to have made the following payments: (1) P15,000,000.00 on August
3, 1999; and (2) another P13,197,546.79 as of May 8, 2001. Adding the amounts paid under the
Deeds of Dation in Payment, the spouses Tiu postulate that their payments added up to
P89,407,546.79.15
Asserting that the spouses Tiu failed to comply with the payment schemes set up in the
Restructuring Agreement, Union Bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
residential property of the spouses Tiu.
The spouses Tiu, together with Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King, Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T. Young and
Rosenda T. Tiu, filed with the RTC a Complaint seeking to have the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
declared null and void.
The spouses Tiu claim that from the beginning the loans were in pesos, not in dollars; that
the spouses Tiu merely received the peso equivalent of their US$3,632,000.00 loan at the rate of
US$1=P26.00. The spouses Tiu claim that they were forced to sign the Restructuring Agreement
and take up an additional loan of P5,000,000.00, the proceeds of which they never saw because this
amount was immediately applied by Union Bank to interest payments.
The spouses Tiu allege that the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties was invalid, as
the loans have already been fully paid. They also allege that they are not the owners of the
improvements constructed on the lot because the real owners thereof are their co-petitioners,
Juanita T. Tiu, Rosalinda T. King, Rufino T. Tiu, Rosalie T. Young and Rosenda T. Tiu.
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The spouses Tiu claim that prior to the signing of the Restructuring Agreement, they
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Union Bank whereby the former deposited with
the latter several certificates of shares of stock of various companies and four certificates of title of
various parcels of land located in Cebu. The spouses Tiu claim that these properties have not been
subjected to any lien in favor of Union Bank, yet the latter continues to hold on to these properties
and has not returned the same to the former.
On the other hand, Union Bank claims that the Restructuring Agreement was voluntarily
and validly entered into by both parties. Union Bank contends that the foreclosure of the mortgage
on the residential property of the spouses Tiu was valid and that the improvements thereon were
absolutely owned by them.
The RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction preventing the sale of the residential
property of the spouses Tiu. Subsequently, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Union Bank by
dismissing the Complaint and lifting and setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses Tiu. The Court of Appeals held that the
loan transactions were in pesos, since there was no stipulation the loans will be paid in dollars and
since no dollars ever exchanged hands. Considering that the loans were in pesos from the
beginning, there is no need to convert the same. By making it appear that the loans were originally
in dollars, Union Bank overstepped its rights as creditor, and made unwarranted interpretations of
the original loan agreement. The Restructuring Agreement, which purportedly attempts to create a
novation of the original loan, was not clearly authorized by the debtors and was not supported by
any cause or consideration. Since the Restructuring Agreement is void, the original loan of
P94,432,000.00 (representing the amount received by the spouses Tiu of US$3,632,000.00 using
the US$1=P26.00 exchange rate) should subsist.
Issue:
Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that the said Restructuring Agreement is void?
Ruling:
Yes, the court a quo erred when it ruled that the said Restructuring Agreement is void
without taking into considerations the surrounding circumstances.
Validity of the Restructuring Agreement
The Court of Appeals declared that the Restructuring Agreement is void on account of its
being a failed novation of the original loan agreements.
Union Bank does not dispute that the spouses Tiu received the loaned amount of
US$3,632,000.00 in Philippine pesos, not dollars, at the prevailing exchange rate of US$1=P26.53
However, Union Bank claims that this does not change the true nature of the loan as a foreign
currency loan, and proceeded to illustrate in its Memorandum that the spouses Tiu obtained
favorable interest rates by opting to borrow in dollars (but receiving the equivalent peso amount)
as opposed to borrowing in pesos.
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We agree with Union Bank on this point. Although the spouses Tiu received peso
equivalents of the borrowed amounts, the loan documents presented as evidence, i.e., the
promissory notes, expressed the amount of the loans in US dollars and not in any other currency.
This clearly indicates that the spouses Tiu were bound to pay Union Bank in dollars, the amount
stipulated in said loan documents. Thus, before the Restructuring Agreement, the spouses Tiu were
bound to pay Union Bank the amount of US$3,632,000.00 plus the interest stipulated in the
promissory notes, without converting the same to pesos.
Such stipulation of payment in dollars is not prohibited by any prevailing law or
jurisprudence at the time the loans were taken. In this regard, Article 1249 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
Having established that Union Bank and the spouses Tiu validly entered into dollar loans,
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that there were no dollar loans to novate into peso loans
must necessarily fail.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that the novation was not supported by any cause or
consideration is likewise incorrect. This conclusion suggests that when the parties signed the
Restructuring Agreement, Union Bank got something out of nothing or that the spouses Tiu
received no benefit from the restructuring of their existing loan and was merely taken advantage of
by the bank. It is important to note at this point that in the determination of the nullity of a contract
based on the lack of consideration, the debtor has the burden to prove the same. Article 1354 of the
Civil Code provides that "although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it
exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary."
In the case at bar, the Restructuring Agreement was signed at the height of the financial
crisis when the Philippine peso was rapidly depreciating. Since the spouses Tiu were bound to pay
their debt in dollars, the cost of purchasing the required currency was likewise swiftly increasing. If
the parties did not enter into the Restructuring Agreement in December 1999 and the peso
continued to deteriorate, the ability of the spouses Tiu to pay and the ability of Union Bank to
collect would both have immensely suffered. As shown by the evidence presented by Union Bank,
the peso indeed continued to deteriorate, climbing to US$1=P50.01 on December 2000. Hence, in
order to ensure the stability of the loan agreement, Union Bank and the spouses Tiu agreed in the
Restructuring Agreement to peg the principal loan at P150,364,800.00 and the unpaid interest at
P5,000,000.00.
The spouses Tiu belatedly argue that their consent to the Restructuring Agreement was
vitiated by fraud and mistake, alleging that (1) the Restructuring Agreement did not take into
consideration their substantial payment in the amount of P40,447,185.60 before its execution.
We have painstakingly perused over the records of this case, but failed to find any
documentary evidence of the alleged payment of P40,447,185.60 before the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement.
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As pointed out by the trial court, the Restructuring Agreement, being notarized, is a public
document enjoying a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and
convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. The spouses Tiu, who
attested before the notary public that the Restructuring Agreement "is their own free and voluntary
act and deed," failed to present sufficient evidence to prove otherwise. It is difficult to believe that
the spouses Tiu, veteran businessmen who operate a multi-million peso company, would sign a
very important document without fully understanding its contents and consequences.
This Court therefore rules that the Restructuring Agreement is valid and, as such, a valid
and binding novation of loans of the spouses Tiu entered into from September 22, 1997 to March
26, 1998 which had a total amount of US$3,632,000.00.
Validity of the Foreclosure of Mortgage
The spouses Tiu challenge the validity of the foreclosure of the mortgage on two grounds, claiming
that: (1) the debt had already been fully paid; and (2) they are not the owners of the improvements
on the mortgaged property.
Allegation of full payment of the mortgage debt
We have ruled that the Restructuring Agreement is a valid and binding novation of loans of
the spouses Tiu in the total amount of US$3,632,000.00. In order that the spouses Tiu can be held to
have fully paid their loan obligation, they should present evidence showing their payment of the
total restructured amount under the Restructuring Agreement which was P104,668,741.00.
However, while respondent Rodolfo Tiu appeared to have identified during his testimony a
computation of the alleged payments made to Union Bank, the same was not formally offered in
evidence.
Applying Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, such computation cannot be considered
by this Court. We have held that a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
at the trial. It has several functions: (1) to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes
for which the proponent is presenting the evidence; (2) to allow opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility; and (3) to facilitate review by the appellate court, which
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Moreover,
even if such computation were admitted in evidence, the same is self-serving and cannot be given
probative weight. In the case at bar, the records do not contain even a single receipt evidencing
payment to Union Bank.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that several payments made by the spouses Tiu had
been admitted by Union Bank. Indeed, Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that an
allegation not specifically denied is deemed admitted. In such a case, no further evidence would be
required to prove the antecedent facts.
Allegation of third party ownership of the improvements on the mortgaged lot
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The Court of Appeals, taking into consideration its earlier ruling that the loan was already
fully paid, permanently enjoined Union Bank from foreclosing the mortgage on the property.
We disagree. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the burden to prove the spouses
Tius allegation that they do not own the improvements on the property, despite having such
improvements included in the mortgage is on the spouses Tiu themselves. The fundamental rule
is that he who alleges must prove. Upon careful examination of the evidence, we find that the
spouses Tiu failed to prove that the improvements were owned by third persons.
This Court sets aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals permanently enjoining Union Bank
from foreclosing the mortgage on property, including the improvements thereon.
Validity of Alleged Rental Payments on the Properties Conveyed to the Bank via Dacion en Pago
The Court of Appeals found the lease contracts over the properties conveyed to Union Bank
via dacion en pago to be void for being against public policy.
The Court of Appeals committed a serious error in this regard. As pointed out by petitioner
Union Bank, the spouses Tiu did not present any proof of the alleged rental payments. Not a single
receipt was formally offered in evidence. The mere stipulation in a contract of the monthly rent to
be paid by the lessee is certainly not evidence that the same has been paid. Since the spouses Tiu
failed to prove their payment to Union Bank of the amount of P5,952,000.00, we are constrained to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals ordering its return.
Order to Return Certificates Allegedly in Union Banks Possession
The spouses Tiu alleged that they delivered several certificates and titles to Union Bank
pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement. These certificates and titles were not subjected to any
lien in favor of Union Bank, but the latter allegedly continued to hold on to said properties.
The evidence on hand lends credibility to the allegation of Union Bank that the
Memorandum of Agreement did not push through. The copy of the Memorandum of Agreement
attached by the spouses Tiu themselves to their original complaint did not bear the signature of any
representative from Union Bank and was not notarized.
We, however, agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that despite the failure of the
Memorandum of Agreement to push through, the certificates and titles mentioned therein do
appear to be in the possession of Union Bank.
As regards Union Banks argument that it has the right to retain said documents pursuant to
the Restructuring Agreement.
Assuming arguendo that the Restructuring Agreement indeed allows the retention of the
certificates as security for spouses Tius debt, Union Banks position still cannot be upheld. Insofar
as said provision permits Union Bank to apply properties of the spouses Tiu in its possession to the
full or partial payment of the latters obligations, the same appears to impliedly allow Union Bank to
appropriate these properties for such purpose. However, said provision cannot be validly applied to
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the subject certificates and titles without violating the prohibition against pactum commissorium
contained in Article 2088 of the Civil Code, to the effect that "the creditor cannot appropriate the
things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them; any stipulation to the contrary is
null and void."
This Court affirms the order of the Court of Appeals for Union Bank to return to the spouses
Tiu all the certificates of shares of stock and titles to real properties that were submitted to it or, in
lieu thereof, to pay the cost for the replacement and issuance of new certificates and new titles over
the said properties.
Validity of the Award of Damages
The Court of Appeals awarded damages in favor of the spouses Tiu based on its taking
judicial notice of the alleged exploitation by many banks of the Asian financial crisis, as well as the
foreclosure of the mortgage of the home of the spouses Tiu despite the alleged full payment by the
latter.
Article 1339 of the New Civil Code provides that the failure to disclose facts, when there is a
duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.
Undoubtedly, the banks and their clients are bound by confidential relations.
We have already held that the foreclosure of the mortgage was warranted under the
circumstances. As regards the alleged exploitation by many banks of the Asian financial crisis, this
Court rules that the generalization made by the appellate court is unfounded and cannot be the
subject of judicial notice. "It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing
evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently
prove such allegation. Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails." The
alleged insidious design of many banks to betray their clients during the Asian financial crisis is
certainly not of public knowledge. The deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of the spouses Tiu is therefore in order.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (also known as Philtrust Bank) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Notarized documents (e. g. the notarized Answer to Interrogatories in the case at bar is proof
that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories) are merely proof of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the
portion wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before
him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we
have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.
Facts:
Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) is engaged in agricultural business and real
estate development and owns several parcels of land in Pampanga. It is the registered owner of two
(2) parcels of land subject of the present controversy, situated in Angeles City, Pampanga, under
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Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 10896 and 64884 consisting of 1,126,530 and 571,014 square
meters, respectively. Sometime in 1989, plaintiff received a letter from the Department of Agrarian
Reform with the names Ma. Teresa Limcauco and Ellenora Limcauco as addressees. Upon
verification with the DAR and the Register of Deeds made by Forfom Vice-President at that time,
Mr. Jose Marie L. Ramos, Forfom discovered that the subject properties had already been
transferred in the names of said Ma. Teresa Limcauco and Ellenora Limcauco who were never
known to plaintiff or its employees. Forform Board of Directors decided to seek the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the matter. On November
23, 1989, Forfom caused the annotation of its adverse claim on TCT No. 75533 of the Registry of
Deeds of Angeles City.
The results of the NBI Investigation and plaintiffs own inquiry revealed the following acts
through which the subject parcels of land were transferred in the names of Ma. Teresa Limcauco
and Ellenora Vda. De Limcauco, fictitious names which were used by Honorata Dizon in the
questioned transactions.
Forfom instituted the present action against the defendants Ma. Teresa Limcauco, Ellenora
D. Limcauco, spouses Raul P. Claveria and Elea R. Claveria, Philippine Trust Company and the
Register of Deeds of Angeles City (Philtrust). The Complaint alleged conspiratorial acts committed
by said defendants who succeeded in causing the fraudulent transfer of registration of Forforms
properties in the names of Ma. Teresa Limcauco and Ellenora D. Limcauco and the subdivision of
the land covered by TCT No. 10896 over which separate titles have been issued.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor Forfom. Philtrust filed a Notice of Appeal, alleging
that the lower court erred in declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 75533-Angeles City void and
in concluding that it was a mortgagee in bad faith.
When the Court of Appeals ruled that the claims by Philtrust were not supported by
evidence, the latter countered that it stated in the Answer to Interrogatories that it followed the
standard operating procedures in accepting the property as security. Since said Answer to
Interrogatories is a notarized document, Philtrust claims that it is a public document which is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents. The Court of Appeals denied Philtrusts Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Philtrusts claim that the Answer to Interrogatories, being a notarized
document, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, is correct.
Ruling:
The notarized Answer to Interrogatories in the case at bar is proof that Philtrust had been
served with Written Interrogatories but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court enumerates three kinds of public documents, to wit:
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
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Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Notarized documents fall under the second classification of public documents. However, not
all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer include those specified
as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and
the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section
19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to
their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories in the case at bar is proof that
Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the
date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under
Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence
of the execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution
of the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been
regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required
to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person
authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests that
the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus,
even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving,
must be received with caution.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANDY MAGBANUA alias BOYUNG and WILSON MAGBANUA
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The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers if does not dwell on material points
shall not negate the finding of guilt. Also, the failure on the part of the police officer to issue an official
receipt for the confiscated items is not fatal defect because the issuance of the same is not an element
of the crime of possession of illegal drugs.
Facts:
According to the prosecution, on November 26, 1999 at around 11:50 o clock in the
morning, SPO1 Alberto M. Javier, Jr., was conducting traffic with the assistance of PO2 Noel D.
Cordero. A white car disregarded SPO1 Javiers signal to stop to give way to the pedestrians
crossing the street. When accosted, Wilson rolled down the window of the car and PO2 Cordero
asked for the Wilsons drivers license. Due to the opening of the window, the police officers were
able smell the scent of marijuana from inside the car which prompted them to order Wilson and his
company, Randy, to alight from the car. The police officers confiscated 4 bricks of marijuana from
the back of the car and a weighing scale which were sent to the laboratory where it tested positive.
Both of the accused confessed to the possession but imputed a certain Uehara Mikio as their
financier. The police officers were able to apprehend Uehara in Manila with the help of the
Magbanuas and were charged of possession of illegal drugs. The case against Uehara was dismissed
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
During the trial, the Magbanuas alleged that they were only made as fall guys for the
package to be delivered to Uehara. They contended that Wilson was working as driver in a car
rental company and was ordered to pick up a Japanese national named Tamayama and his Filipina
companion. Upon reaching their destination, Tamayama instructed the Magbanuas to deliver a bag
to Uehara in Manila. Before reaching Manila, they were flagged down by the police officers due to a
tip that they were carrying firearms. At the police station, the bag that supposed to be delivered to
Uehara was forcibly opened by the officers where they found out that they were transporting
marijuana to Uehara. Furthermore, the Magbanuas asseverated that after the apprehension of
Uehara in Manila, the Japanese national paid the officers in exchange for his freedom.
The trial court found the Magbanuas guilty of illegal possession of drugs which was affirmed
by the CA. The Magbanuas claimed that the testimonies of the police officers were inconsistent
therefore failed to prove their guilt and the police officers did not issue an official receipt for the
confiscated materials which is fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Magbanuas are guilty of illegal possession of drugs
2. Whether or not the failure to issue an official receipt for the confiscated materials
negates the finding of guilt of the accused
Ruling:
1. Yes. We are not persuaded.
Contrary to accused-appellants assertion, there is no real inconsistency between the
testimonies of SPO1 Javier and PO2 Cordero.
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The two police officers consistently testified that it was PO2 Cordero who flagged down the
car and was the first to approach accused-appellants car since it went past SPO1 Javier after Wilson
ignored SPO1 Javiers halt signal to give way to crossing pedestrians. Thereafter, SPO1 Javier
approached PO2 Cordero to assist him. The police officers smelled the aroma of
marijuana after Wilson rolled down the cars window. PO2 Cordero, after noticing something at the
back seat, ordered the accused-appellants to alight from the car. Thereafter, the police officers
found on the back seat of the car four (4) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the two (2) police officers pointed out by
the accused-appellants are not material but relate only to minor matters. What is essential in a
conviction for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is that the possession of
the prohibited drug must be duly established.
As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate each other on material points, the
minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies may
even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are
fabricated or rehearsed. Even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused
and inconsistent statements.
Generally, courts give full faith and credit to police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. Courts cannot simply set aside their testimonies where
there is no showing that the search conducted on the accused-appellants was clearly violative of
their constitutional rights or the said search was a mere ploy to extort on the part of the police
officers.
Accused-appellants failed to show any motive why the arresting police officers would
falsely impute a serious crime against them. Without such proof and with the presumption that
official duty was performed regularly, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
shall prevail over accused-appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial.
2.
Anent the contention that the absence of a confiscation receipt or inventory of the
items confiscated from them casts doubt as to accused-appellants culpability of the crime charged,
such argument deserves scant consideration.
In the case of Yolly Teodosio y Blancaflor v. Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines, the Court belittled the argument that the prosecutions case was weakened by the fact
that the police officers did not issue a receipt for the confiscated drugs and declared that issuing
such a receipt is not essential to establishing a criminal case for selling drugs as it is not an element
of the crime. Neither is it an element of illegal possession of prohibited drug.
The evidence for the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary
to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) the accusedappellants were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated
drug, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and (c) the accused-appellants freely and
consciously possessed said drug. Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, provides:
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SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to provisions of Section 20
hereof.
Under this Section, the mere possession of any prohibited drug consummates the crime. The
charge of illegal possession of marijuana was proven beyond reasonable doubt as it was found at
the back seat of the car with accused-appellants, without legal authority. The four (4) bricks of
dried suspected marijuana found in the accused-appellants possession, upon laboratory
examination, were positively identified as marijuana, a prohibited drug.
As long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, the failure to issue a receipt will not render
the items seized/confiscated inadmissible as evidence. As held by the Court in People v. Alvin
Pringas, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Here, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The
seized drugs were immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded
to the Crime Laboratory for examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY
PAMPLONA A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO
G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Mere inconsistencies as to minor details in the testimony of the witness does not affect his
credibility. It may also strengthen his position as the court abhors memorized statements. The accused
must prove ill motive on the part of the witness, otherwise, his statement shall be given full credence by
the court.
Facts:
Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia were charged of the crime of murder
for the killing of Mauro Biay. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dulce Borero, the sister of
the accused, the forensic expert who conducted the autopsy over the victim and the victims widow,
Amelia Biay.
According to her, Dulce Borero was selling balut with her brother Mauro Biay. She was
about 7 arms length from her brother when he was called by Jessie Garcia. When Biay approached
Garcia, the latter twisted the formers hand behind his back and Garcias companions, Joey
Pamplona and Arnold Garchitorena, repeatedly stabbed Biay. Biay tried to free himself from the
three but failed to do so. Garchitorena told his companions to run away and Borero went home to
call her elder brother Teodoro, but when they returned to the scene, the Biay was no longer there
as he had already been brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
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According to the autopsy report, Biays death was caused by multiple stab wounds. Dr.
Poblete, who conducted the autopsy, specified the victim suffered eight (8) stab wounds and the
nature of stab wounds indicated that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.
Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses amounting to P16,700.00 due to the
death of her husband and alleged that her husband earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a balut
vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-time carpenter.
Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay while Garcia interposed
the defense of alibi, and Garchitorena raised the defense of insanity. The respective defenses of the
accused were:
Pamplona claimed that he was seated on a bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then
the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his
pocket and stab the balut vendor and that due to fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran
away from the scene. A certain Danilo Garados testified that Garcia was not there and Pamplona
allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro. Garcia also took the stand and claimed that he was
still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt when the incident happened. With respect to
Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident physician of the National Center for
Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused Arnold and based on the history of the
patient, it was found that he had been using prohibited drugs two (2) years prior to the stabbing
incident and that he was allegedly suffering from schizophrenia. However, Dr. Belen also testified
that the accused Garchitorena had remissions and understands what he was doing and was aware
of his murder case in court.
The trial court found that Garchitorena, Pamplona and Garcia were in conspiracy and used
superior strength in killing Mauro Biay and therefore, guilty of the crime of murder and were
sentenced to death. Further, they were ordered to pay jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of
the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums: a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity, b) 50,000.00 as
and for moral damages, c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, d) 16,700.00 as and for actual
damages, e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and, f) To pay the
costs of suit.
The accused appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto. Hence, the automatic review. Pamplona and Garcia contended that the trial court
erred in giving credence to the testimony of Dulce Borero and failed to appreciate the evidence in
favor of them. Further, the judge who decided the case was not the same judge who heard the
testimonies during the trial. Garcia also claimed that there was no proof presented to prove that
they conspired nor used superior strength to kill Mauro. As to Garchitorena, he claimed that the
trial court erred in not considering the testimony of his expert witness as to his mental state. Lastly,
they are questioning the propriety of awarding of moral and exemplary damages absent any proof
from the prosecution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Borero as the
judge who rendered the decision was not the judge who observed Boreros demeanor and
due to inconsistencies in her testimony
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2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering the testimony of the expert witness
as to the mental state of Garchitorena
Ruling:
1. No. Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial courts decision was rendered by a
judge other than the one who conducted trial. Hence, the judge who decided the case failed to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand so as to gauge their credibility. This argument
does not convince the Court for the reason it has consistently maintained, to wit:
We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214, March 30, 1993,
220 SCRA 551), that the circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision
had not heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his
decision. After all, he had the full record before him, including the transcript of
stenographic notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who
had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion in the factual findings reached by him.
Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering, straightforward, categorical
and spontaneous in her narration of how the killing of her brother Mauro took place. Notably, her
testimony as to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay was even
corroborated by another defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo,
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower court in giving
her testimony full faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecutions version is supported by the
physical evidence. Boreros testimony that the victim was successively stabbed several times
conforms with the autopsy report that the latter suffered multiple stab wounds.
Accused-appellant Pamplonas argument that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Borero is not convincing. The seeming inconsistencies between her direct
testimony and her cross-examination testimonies are not sufficient ground to disregard
them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz, we
ruled that:
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even
tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a
testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero or her narration
of the incident. On the contrary, they showed that her account was the entire truth. Undoubtedly,
accused-appellants identities as the perpetrators were established by the prosecution. The
prosecution witness was able to observe the entire incident, because she was there. Thus, we find
no reason to differ with the trial courts appreciation of her testimony. Positive identification, where
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categorical and consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.
2. No. Accused-appellant Garchitorenas defense of insanity has also no merit. Unlike other
jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of
insanity as an exempting circumstance. As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, insanity is a
defense in the nature of confession and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and
accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly failed to do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial
court that he was not totally deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after the stabbing
incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-appellants to run away from the scene of the crime.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE GALVEZ y BLANCA
Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in
modern jurisprudence. It deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and
the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. Thus, the modern trend of jurisprudence is
that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.
Facts:
In her initial direct examination, private complainant AAA testified that she was born on
August 22, 1988. She identified that the accused is her grandfather, the father of her mother. On
June 21, 2002 at around 12:00 oclock midnight, she was in their house at Bulacan sleeping with her
siblings, accused, her grandmother and her grandfather. While she was sleeping, accused crawled
beside her and inserted his penis in her vagina. She pushed the accused but he threatened her with
a knife which he poked at her side. He told her not to tell anyone. She told the pastor of her church
about the incident sometime in June. She and her pastor thereafter went to the police station to give
her statement. She testified that this was the first time that accused raped her.
Continuing her direct-examination, private complainant testified that the June 21, 2002
incident was not the first time that the accused raped her. She could not, however, remember the
dates these incidents were committed against her by the accused. She remembers that accused
raped her many times, the first time of which was when she was 12 years old. It took her 3 years
before she reported the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell anyone about what
happened or else he will kill her. After this incident, he again raped her sometime in 2002. Aside
from the incidents when she was 12 years old, and on June 21, 2002, she was 13 years old when she
was raped again in their house. As to how this rape happened, she stated that [it is] "the same". Her
grandfather raped her many times, almost everyday since she was 13 years old up to when she was
14 years old. Even so, she only reported the incident to her aunt in 2002 because she could not bear
what accused was doing to her. She was with her aunt and pastor when she reported the incident to
the police. Thereafter, she testified that after reporting the incident to the police, they went to the
doctor for examination. Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, the doctor who examined AAA, testified that AAA is
no longer a virgin; that there are no external signs of application of any trauma; and that there was
a shallow healed laceration at 9:00 oclock position on complainants hymen.
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The trial court rendered a Decision convicting accused-appellant Galvez in Criminal Case
No. 3094-M-2002, but acquitted him in the other four cases. In arriving at the foregoing disposition,
the trial court noted that there was no testimony at all as regards the alleged rapes to which
accused-appellant was accused of in Criminal Case Nos. 3090-M-2002 and 3091-M-2002. As
regards Criminal Case Nos. 3092-M-2002 and 3093-M-2002, the trial court found AAAs testimony
to be very general, as she appeared to have failed to remember any detail other than that the
accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint under Criminal Case No. 3094-M-2002 should suffer the same
fate like the rest of the charges due to the discrepancy in AAAs testimony.
Ruling:
No, it should not.
We disagree. We have held that in our jurisprudence, falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not
an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. It deals only with the
weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of
universal application. Thus, the modern trend of jurisprudence is that the testimony of a witness
may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case.
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe both AAA and accused-appellant
directly and to test their credibility by their demeanor on the witness stand, was completely
persuaded by the above testimony of AAA as regards the events of June 21, 2002. Other than the
fact that we give great weight to the findings of fact of the trial court, an independent reading of
said testimony compels us to conclude that AAAs version is indeed worthy of credence especially
when compared to the bare denial of accused-appellant who did not even offer an alibi. As observed
by the Court of Appeals, AAAs testimony is "unflinching and resolute" and "passes the test of
credibility nary any indication whatsoever of a concocted testimony." Furthermore, it is almost
clich to add that "[c]ourts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing
to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to
condemn an injustice."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANICETO BULAGAO
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she testified for the
prosecution, and was returned to the family of the Aniceto Bulagao during the time when SHE
recanted her testimony. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction
does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind
for one reason or another.
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Facts:
Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations both dated
December 21, 2000. On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room
which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the room. She
recognized Bulagao as the intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife. Bulagao poked the knife at
AAAs neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Bulagao removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both
AAA and Bulagao were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Bulagao kissed her neck
and inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but Bulagao did not stop and
continued raping AAA for one hour.
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in Lolomboy,
Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the second floor of the
house, where there are no rooms. AAA was roused from her sleep when Bulagao was already
undressing her. Bulagao removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to
resist, but Bulagao held her hands. Bulagao then touched her breasts and kissed her. And he
remained on top of her for half an hour. AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the
rape incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB, the mother did not believe AAA and whipped her.
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, Bulagao pleaded not guilty on both
counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand
for the prosecution. AAA was born on April 13, 1986 (14 years old). In April 2000, AAA arrived
from the province and settled in the house of her brother DDD and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and Aniceto Bulagao, and her
younger sister, then six-year-old FFF who were also the children of BBB, the mother and CCC, the
father (deceased) AAA being an adopted child. When it was time for the defense to present their
evidence more than a year later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony
for the prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her and the Bulagao
appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape against the Bulagao because she was
supposedly angry with him. She also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who
investigated the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a knife. She also testified that she
was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years old. She was recanting her previous
testimony because she purportedly was no longer angry with Bulagao.
On redirect examination, AAA testified that Bulagao did not force himself upon her. She
affirmed that he had a little defect in his mind. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma,
a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on Aniceto Bulagao, and found that
Bulagao was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. Aniceto Bulagao, who
was 40 years old claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knife
at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was asking for P300 from him after they kissed. He
also testified that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang). On
January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal.
Issue:
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Whether or not the prosecutions evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs
withdrawal of her original testimony.
Ruling:
No, AAAs withdrawal will not render prosecutions evidence insufficient.
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she testified for the
prosecution, and was returned to the family of the Aniceto Bulagao after her original testimony. It
was during the time when she was back in the custody of the accused-appellants family that she
recanted her testimony for the prosecution. We have recently held that courts look with disfavor
upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of
justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another. We have, in the past, also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not
necessarily render the prosecutions evidence inconclusive. These rules find applicability even in
rape cases, where the complainant is usually the lone eyewitness.
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAAs accusation
and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in open court, by testifying
for the defense. Unlike in cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this
case had the opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details
of the alleged rape by her adoptive brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her
previous rape charges out of anger. As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court
convicted accused-appellant even after examining the young witness as she made a complete
turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this case where AAA
was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross examinations
both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private complainants
testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief.
However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court which of the narrations of AAA was
sincere and which was concocted. AAAs testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she
was in the custody of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All
accused-appellant can harp on in his appellants brief was AAAs failure to recall the length of the
knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant detail not material to the elements of the crime
of rape.
GEMMA ONG a.k.a. MARIA TERESA GEMMA CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Despite all these findings, Gemma has posited from the RTC all the way up to the Supreme
Court that she is not the Gemma Ong named and accused in the case. Positive identification of a culprit
is of great weight in determining whether an accused is guilty or not. Thus, it cannot take precedence
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over the positive testimony of the offended party. The defense of denial is unavailing when placed
astride the undisputed fact that there was positive identification of the accused.
Facts:
On July 28, 2000, petitioner Gemma Ong a.k.a. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan was charged
before the RTC for Infringement under Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No.
8293 or the Intellectual Property Code. That sometime in September 25, 1998 and prior thereto at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, the Gemma engage in the distribution, sale, and offering for sale of counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes which had caused confusion, deceiving the public that such cigarettes were
Marlboro cigarettes and those of the Telengtan Brothers and Sons, Inc., doing business under the
style of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarettes Factory, the exclusive manufacturer of Marlboro Cigarette in
the Philippines. On August 1, 2000, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador of RTC Manila, Branch 1, issued a
warrant of arrest against Gemma, but lifted and set aside the same after Gemma voluntarily
surrendered and filed a cash bond. Gemma pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment on
October 17, 2000. After the pre-trial conference on February 13, 2001, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution called to the witness stand the following: Roger Sherman Slagle, the
Director of Operations of Philip Morris Philippines, Inc.s (PMPI) product/brand security expert, to
testify that according to his examination, the products they seized at the subject premises were
counterfeit cigarettes; as well as Jesse Lara, who, as then Senior Investigator III at the Intellectual
Property Rights Unit of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), led the
investigating team, to testify on the events that led to the arrest of Gemma. Jesse S. Lara, then Senior
Investigator III received reliable information that counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes were being
distributed and sold by two (2) Chinese nationals, Johnny Sia and Jessie Concepcion, in the areas of
Tondo, Binondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo, Manila.
During the surveillance, the container van delivering the Marlboro packed in black plastic
bags was seen parked at 1677 Bulacan corner Hizon Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They also learned
that the place is owned by a certain Mr. Jackson Ong. Executive Judge Dolores L. Espaol issued a
search warrant after finding probable cause to believe that Mr. Jackson Ong has in his
possession/control in the premises. They proceeded to the subject premises but Jackson Ong, the
alleged owner, was not there. It was accused, who is supposedly either the spouse or common-law
wife of Jackson Ong, who entertained them. At first, accused refused to allow them entry into the
premises but eventually the team was able to search the premises and found Marlboro cigarettes
stocked in several boxes containing fifty (50) reams inside each box which were packed in black
plastic sacks like in balikbayan boxes. On the basis of the results of the examination conducted by
PMPI on the samples obtained from the confiscated boxes of cigarettes bearing the Marlboro brand,
which confirmed the same to be unauthorized products and not genuine Marlboro cigarettes.
Gemma, as the lone witness for the defense, then took the witness stand. She said that she is
married to Co Yok Piao, a Chinese national, but she still uses her maiden name Catacutan. She
denied that she is the Gemma Ong accused in this case. She testified that she was arrested on
August 4, 2000, without the arresting officers asking for her name. She said that when she pleaded
to be released, she was instructed to post a cash bond, which she did in the amount
of 12,000.00. Gemma averred that when she posted her bond and signed her certificate of
arraignment, she did so under her real name Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan, as opposed to the
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signatures in the Inventory and Certification in the Conduct of Search (search documents), which
she denied signing.
On September 30, 2003, the RTC convicted Gemma of the crime as charged. The Court of
Appeals found Gemmas appeal to be unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTCs
rejection of Gemmas defense of mistaken identity, as she should have raised it at the earliest
opportunity, which was at the time of her arrest, the posting of her bail bond, or during her
arraignment.
Issue:
Whether or not Gemmas guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt in light of her alleged
mistaken identity.
Ruling:
Yes, Gemmas guilt was sufficiently proven.
This Court has time and again held that between an affidavit executed outside the court, and
a testimony given in open court, the latter almost always prevails. A reading of the original
affidavits executed by Slagle and Atty. Ancheta, readily reveals that they concentrated on the facts
and events leading up to the search and seizure of the contraband materials from the subject
premises. They not only failed to mention Gemma Ongs presence there, but they also failed to
mention the other witnesses names and presence there as well. Although this might appear to be a
mistake on the part of a known and established law firm like the Quasha Law Office, the firm
immediately sought to rectify this by having the affidavits of Slagle, Atty. Ancheta, and Lara
amended.
If it were true that Gemma was not at the subject premises at all on September 25, 1998,
then she should have grabbed every chance to correct this notion and expose this mistake before
she was arrested. She could have brought up her defense of mistaken identity or absence at the raid
in the preliminary investigation conducted prior to the issuance of her warrant of arrest; but
instead, she chose to ignore her subpoena and disregard the preliminary investigation. Even
then, Gemma had the opportunity to raise the fact that she was not Gemma Ong; not only during her
arrest, but also during the posting of the cash bond for her bail, and more importantly, during her
arraignment, when she was asked if she understood the charges against her. Gemma also knew that
the Information was filed against her on the basis of the amended affidavits, thus, she could have
filed a motion to quash the information before she entered her plea, or asked that a reinvestigation
be conducted. However, all these Gemma failed to do. We agree with the RTC that it is highly
unlikely that a person of her stature and educational attainment would be so meek and timid that
she failed to protest against her being wrongly identified, accused, arrested, and potentially
imprisoned. If what she says were true, she would not have agreed to post bail or to be arraigned
without at the very least, bringing up the fact that she was not the Gemma Ong the police officers
were looking for.
Gemma further accuses the prosecution witnesses of falsely testifying and of perjuring
themselves just so they can satisfy a big client like PMPI by showing that somebody had been
arrested for counterfeiting its cigarettes. The crimes Gemma is imputing on these witnesses are
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serious crimes, and in the absence of concrete and convincing evidence, this Court could not believe
her mere allegations that imply that these people would destroy someones life just so they can
please a client, more so over mere cigarettes. The prosecution witnesses, contrary to Gemmas
claim, had positively identified her as the person who initially refused the search team entrance,
then later acquiesced to the search operations. Slagle explained that even though he mentioned
Gemma only in his amended affidavit, he was sure that she was at the subject premises on the day
that they searched it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL T. ADALLOM
Delay in making criminal accusations will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if
such delay is satisfactorily explained. Furthermore, the positive identification of the witnesses is more
than enough to prove the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
Noel T. Adallom was charged with murder against Danilo Villareal and Rommel Hina.
Further he was also charged with attempted murder against Babelito Villareal.
Babelito Villareal, a construction worker, testified that he was with his brother Danilo, and
Rommel Hina, a neighbor, towards midnight, in front of the store of his sister, Nanieta. They were
drinking beer but ran out of it. Danilo asked Rommel to buy cigarettes from a nearby store because
their sisters store was already closed. When Hina returned, they stayed in the same place. Soon a
tricycle with its lights out and its engine turned off, arrived.
Babelito Villareal saw Noel Adallom alight from the sidecar. After Adallom alighted, he fire
his carbine. There was successive burst of gunfire. When Adallom fired his gun, Danilo turned his
head and tried to run but he was hit at the back. Danilo and Rommel died due to the gunshots.
After the shooting incident, Babelito did not immediately give any statement to the police
because there was still the wake. After the funeral, he told his siblings about the incident. They
decided to have Adallom arrested. Hence, Adallom was detained at the police office.
On his part, Noel Adallom interposed the defenses of alibi and denial. He testified that he
went to play billiards around midnight after working as a machine operator. Further, they were
playing when they heard the gunshots. They continued playing until his wife arrived to fetch him.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Adallom guilty of attempted murder against
Babelito and murder of Danilo Villareal but it dismissed the charge of murder of Rommel Hina for
insufficient evidence.
The Court of Appelas affirmed the conviction. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the delay in charging Noel Adallom raises serious doubt on the testimony of
Babelito Villareal
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Ruling:
No.
Well settled is the rule that delay in making criminal accusations will not necessarily impair
the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. It has been established that the
delay in filing a criminal complaint is attributed to his confusion and desire to consult his sister-inlaw who is the wife of deceased Danilo. He also testified that he did not file a complaint immediately,
because he did not want to disturb the wake of his brother. Such explanation is acceptable. True
enough, he filed a complaint with the barangay officials and asked for their assistance in bringing
accused-appellant to Station 6 after the funeral of his brother.
Furthermore, Adallom is not successful in proving the incredibility and improbability of the
testimonies of the prosecutions two eye witnesses, hence, his arguments on the slight difference in
the location and nature of gunshot wounds as opposed to the position of the assailant as testified by
the witness are not sufficient to overturn the eyewitness accounts of Diorito and Babelito.The
positive identification of the witnesses is more than enough to prove the accused guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CATALINO DULAY
Dulay points out that the prosecution failed to present the informant in court, alleging that the
same was necessary to corroborate the testimony of PO1 Guadamor, since it was only the informant
and PO1 Guadamor who witnessed the actual transaction. The Court disagrees. It is settled that the
identity or testimony of the informant is not indispensable in drugs cases, since his testimony would
only corroborate that of the poseur-buyer. The Court has repeatedly held that it is up to the
prosecution to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of
their necessity. After all, the testimony of a single witness, if trustworthy and reliable, or if credible and
positive, would be sufficient to support a conviction. Moreover, in determining values and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
Facts:
A buy- bust operation was conducted against accused Catalino Dulay (Dulay) due to a report
given by an informant to Bgy. Capt. Del Prado at the office of MADAC Cluster 3. The report was
about the illegal drug-selling activity of Dulay. After receiving said report, Brgy. Capt. Del Prado
coordinated with the Makati Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU). The DEU sent PO1 Robles to the
Barangay Hall of the barangay. PO1 Robles conducted a briefing of the buy-bust team. Jose
Guadamor was designated as the poseur buyer. PO1 Robles as team leader, provided Guadamor
with the two hundred pesos buy bust money. PO1 Robles coordinated the operation with the PDEA.
After the briefing the buy-bust team accompanied by the informant proceeded to the place of
operation after the briefing. The poseur buyer and the informant saw Dulay standing along the
street. The poseur buyer and the informant approached Dulay. The informant introduced the
poseur buyer to Dulay, Ito si Jojo, nangangailangan ng shabu. Dulay asked the poseur buyer how
much he is going to buy. The poseur buyer replied, Tapatan mo itong dos ko. The poseur buyer
handed to the accused the two-hundred pesos buy bust money and the accused drew from his right
pocket, two plastic sachets and handed it to the poseur buyer. The poseur buyer took the two
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plastic sachets and gave the pre-arranged signal by arrested Dulay. It was PO1 Robles who
informed the accused of his constitutional rights. Jose Guadamor, the poseur buyer marked the
sachets of shabu with CDC the initials of the accused at the place of operation. After the arrest, the
accused was brought to the DEU where a complaint was filed against him. Thereafter, the accused
was brought to Fort Bonifacio, Taguig for drug test of the accused and laboratory examination.
Two Informations were filed against Dulay, charging him with violations of Section 5 and
Section 15, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, Dulay pleaded not
guilty to the charge, but pleaded guilty to the charge of drug use. RTC convicted the accused. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this appeal.
Dulay claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on
account of the failure of PO1 Barbosa to identify him at the trial, and the unreliability of the
testimonies of PO1 Robles and PO1 Barbosa on account of their distance of ten to fifteen meters
from the place where the alleged transaction took place. He likewise point out the failure of the
prosecution to present the informant to corroborate the testimonies of the police officers.
Issue:
Whether or not appellate court erred in sustaining the conviction of the accused.
Ruling:
No. The appellate court did not err in convicting the accused.
The decision of the CA is hereby affirmed. It is significant to reiterate at this point that it is
the trial court which is deemed to be in a better position to decide the question of credibility of PO1
Guadamor, as well as those of the other witnesses, since it had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
realization of their oath. The trial court found PO1 Guadamor to be credible, and our examination of
his testimony does not give us any reason to find otherwise. As we have often repeated, the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would affect the result of the case.
Furthermore, Dulay was, in fact, positively identified in court by PO1 Robles and the
poseur-buyer himself, PO1 Guadamor. Dulays persistent assertion that PO1 Robles and PO1
Barbosa were too far at ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the alleged transaction does
not disprove their ability to positively identify him, as they have testified that they eventually went
closer to the scene when PO1 Guadamor gave the signal. Neither was the proximity of PO1 Robles
and PO1 Barbosa relevant to prove the details of the transaction since their account was merely to
corroborate the already convincing testimony of PO1 Guadamor.
Dulay further points out that the prosecution failed to present the informant in court,
alleging that the same was necessary to corroborate the testimony of PO1 Guadamor, since it was
only the informant and PO1 Guadamor who witnessed the actual transaction. We disagree. It is
settled that the identity or testimony of the informant is not indispensable in drugs cases, since his
testimony would only corroborate that of the poseur- buyer. We have repeatedly held that it is up
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to the prosecution to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own
assessment of their necessity. After all, the testimony of a single witness, if trustworthy and reliable,
or if credible and positive, would be sufficient to support a conviction. Moreover, in determining
values and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
Furthermore, informants are often not presented in court in order to preserve their cover
and continue to be of service as such. Their lives may also be placed in danger if they testify in
court.
In People v. Ho Chua this Court has held that the presentation of an informant is not a
requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. In People v. Nicolas, the Court ruled that police
authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their
poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in
court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants. It is
understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret. In any event, the
testimony of the informant would be merely corroborative.
QUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS
A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense
of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.
Facts:
Mark Almodovar (Mark) was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was
assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the
Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for
the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal
University with a degree in teaching special education children.
On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Mark went out of his house to
play ball in the basketball court. He walked to the basketball court, played there, and at about 9:00
oclock, he stopped playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball
court where there were five cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car.
The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man, who
entered a parked car. The two male persons who were then following the fat man then separated:
one went to the left side of the fat mans car and stood by the door at the drivers side of the vehicle.
While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a
diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, (Exhibit L) depicting the car and the
positions of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the drivers side had a knife while his
companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing
the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once.
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After taking the fat mans personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular
phone, the two men left. He followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw
them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a drawing representing the place where he
followed them. After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a
place which he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He
recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the victim who was
later on identified as the accused Edwin Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided not to
follow them and went home instead. It was about 11:00 oclock in the evening when he arrived
home. After waking up at 8:00 oclock the following morning, he returned to the scene of the
incident. There were many people gathered in the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl
and requested her to call the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby
girl. They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there. He recognized and identified the
face of the fat man depicted in the picture shown to him.
In his defense, Edwin Aleman (Aleman) stated that he was at the billiards hall on February
10, 2003 playing against Ruben until around 10:00 in the evening was corroborated by Filomena
Fungo, grandmother of Ruben, who saw Aleman and Ruben playing when she went to the billiards
hall twice that night to fetch Ruben.11 Hilda, Alemans sister, also corroborated Alemans testimony
that she fetched him from the billiards hall at around 10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003.
She further stated that, upon getting home, she and Aleman ate dinner together and, thereafter,
watched some television shows until Aleman went to sleep some 30 minutes later.
Aleman also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during the
police lineup. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one who prepared the
spot report although it was his superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark failed to identify
Aleman during the police lineup. Another defense witness, barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos
(Barrientos), stated that he was with Mark on February 13, 2003 when Mark was asked to identify
the robber-killer of the victim from a lineup.
According to Barrientos, a police officer made a gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with
the use of his hand and, after viewing the persons in the lineup, Mark shook his head. The lineup
was presented to Mark twice and he shook his head in both instances.
After studying the parties respective evidence, the trial court rejected the defenses of
Aleman for their inherent weakness and implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed the
prosecutions evidence favorably, particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his positive
identification of Aleman as the one who stabbed the victim. In particular, the trial court found
Marks testimony simple and credible. He had no ill motive that would make him testify falsely
against Aleman. While there were minor inconsistencies in his testimony, the discrepancies were
inconsequential and did not affect the truthfulness of Marks narration. The RTC was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Mark is qualified to be a witness.
Ruling:
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Yes. Mark, who is a deaf-mute, is qualified to be a witness.
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness.
The rule is that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses. A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses,
such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about
his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute
from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or
through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a
witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and he/she can make those
observations known to others. As this Court held in People v. Tuangco:
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent
witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath (2) can
comprehend facts they are going to testify on and (3) can communicate their ideas through
a qualified interpreter.
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute
should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion,
and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing
that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted.
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and
appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court
sees no reason in ruling otherwise.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVADOR C. DACO
As a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing
upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears on the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted
or misapprehended. The reason for this is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Daco was found by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA guilty
beyond reasonable of seven (7) counts of qualified rape against his own daughter and sentenced
him to suffer the extreme penalty of death on each count. Based on the records, Daco ravished his
then thirteen-year old daughter at least once a month from November 1999 to April 2000. The
prosecution was able to present the physician who examined the victim and made the medical
certificate showing that there were deep lacerations on the hymen of the victim. Also, the
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prosecution presented the Certificate of Live Birth of the victim indicating her date of birth and
paternal filiation with Daco.
In this review, Daco argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Further,
the trial court failed to appreciate the discrepancies in the testimony of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the discrepancies in the principal witness affidavits and with that of her
open-court testimony exculpates Daco from the crime of rape.
Ruling:
To begin with, inconsistencies between a witness sworn declaration and her testimony in
open court do not necessarily impair her credibility. In several cases, the Court has held that
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit her, since ex parte affidavit tend to be incomplete and
inaccurate. Hence, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to declarations made in open
court.
Considering the number of times the victim, a girl of tender age, was subjected to the
pervert desire of her own father, the Court finds as minor details, which are not of great significance as to affect her credibility as a witness, her testimony regarding her companion and the exact
time when she was raped, the persons to whom she revealed her traumatic experience, the number
of houses the family owned, the number of rooms in the house where she was raped, and the
condition then prevailing inside the culvert where one of the rape incidents took place. It is settled
that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimonies, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant. In fact, honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility
of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to
the senses. What is important is that the victims declaration , both in her sworn statement and her
testimony in court, are consistent on basic matters constituting the elements of the crime of rape
and the positive identification of Daco by the victim.
Moreover, as a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court
in passing upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears on the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted or misapprehended. The reason for this is that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grilling examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ, JR., alias SANDY
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The issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial
court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. and absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.
Facts:
Domingo Dominguez, Jr. (Domingo) was indicted for four counts of rape and one count of
attempted rape, all qualified by his relationship with and the minority of the private offended
party.
In its Decision, the RTC found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551, and two counts of attempted rape
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.
Domingo interposed his appeal from the judgment of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. He
asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.
On the two counts of attempted rape, Domingo claimed that the prosecution failed to show
any overt act which would prove his intent to rape AAA. AAAs claims during her testimony that he
was about to rape her or about to go on top of her were it not for the timely arrival of her mother,
BBB, in Criminal Case No. 02-548, or were it not for the fortunate appearance of a relative, CCC, in
Criminal Case No. 02-552, were allegedly so vague that one cannot make a clear conclusion whether
the he really intended to rape AAA.
Domingo also noted that should his conviction for the crime of attempted rape be sustained,
the trial court committed an error in the imposition of the proper penalty. With the abrogation of
the death penalty, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape committed in the attempted stage,
which must be two degrees lower than that of the penalty imposed for the crime intended to be
committed, should be prision mayor.
Anent the three counts of qualified rape, Domingo denied the accusations and questioned
the motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. He pointed out that it was implausible that AAA
would not tell her mother and siblings about the alleged rapes. It was also incredible that AAA
would still accompany him repeatedly to the coconut farm despite her having been previously
sexually assaulted by him, with AAA knowing that their seclusion was another opportunity for him
to sexually assault her again. He averred that AAAs unexplained silence and continuous
acquiescence to the sexual abuses supposedly committed against her made her accusations
dubious.
After its review of the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed Domingos conviction in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape; while it modified
the RTC judgment in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 and convicted Domingo for two counts
of acts of lasciviousness. Thereafter, Domingo appealed his convictions before us.
Issue:
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Whether or not Domingos allegation of ill motive on AAAs part in filing the criminal charges
are bereft of evidentiary value.
Ruling:
We find no reason to doubt AAAs credibility, and accord great weight and respect to the
findings of the trial and appellate courts that her testimonies are consistent, candid, and
straightforward. Domingos bare denial, as opposed to AAAs positive testimonies, and Domingos
uncorroborated allegation of ill motive on AAAs part in filing the criminal charges, are bereft of
evidentiary value.
Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best
addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and absent any substantial reason which would
justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown
to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome
of the case. This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial
court.
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving,
and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not
enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it
must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity
of the crime scene (People vs. Nieto).
It is well-settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of defense and it can never
overcome an affirmative testimony particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Accused-appellants bare assertion that private complainant was just using him to allow
her to freely frolic with other men, particularly with a certain Renato Planas, begs the credulity of
this Court. This is especially true in the light of our consistent pronouncement that no decent and
sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt the dire consequence of a rape charge unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. (People vs. Mendoza)
It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her
most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to
shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean
the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been
aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she
wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating
her (People vs. Canoy).
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER TEJERO
The victim s delay in reporting the rapes does not undermine her credibility. In a long line of
cases, the Court pronounced that the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not
necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. Moreover, Jurisprudence teaches that between
categorical testimonies that ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the Court has
strongly ruled that the former must prevail. Indeed, positive identification of the accused, when
categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial.
Facts:
Private complainant herself, [AAA] was only fourteen years old when the accused raped her
on three different occasions in the year 2004. She directly identified accused Roger Tejero as the
man who raped her repeatedly. She regarded him as her stepfather since he has been cohabiting
with her mother in their home when the criminal acts were committed by him. She claimed that she
was first raped by the accused on a Sunday February 1, 2004 at their living room. She stated that
this happened at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon when her mother was out selling vegetables and
while her two siblings went to the family house of their maternal grandparents. She narrated that
she was suddenly pulled by her stepfather, removed her clothes and then raped her. He then
warned her not to tell anybody or else he would kill all of them. On February 8, 2004, the next
Sunday, the accused again raped her at their living room in the same house. At that time, her
mother was selling vegetables again in another barangay while the accused fended off her sisters to
the family house of their maternal grandparents again. For the third time, the accused again raped
her on April 4, 2004 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon now inside a room at their house while
her mother was out selling vegetables again. In her sworn statement, she also revealed that she did
not report all the incidents to anyone because of her fear of her stepfathers repeated threats that he
would kill all of them if she did. Her mother [BBB] only came to know that she has been repeatedly
ravaged by him when she was hospitalized for three weeks due to her appendicitis. During her
check-up, her attending doctor discovered that she was already about five months pregnant. She
said that her pregnancy was a result of the rape. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the victims delay in reporting the incident of rape undermines her
credibility as a witness.
2. Whether or not the offenders alibi and denial are strong evidence.
Ruling:
1. No.
AAA s delay in reporting the rapes does not undermine her credibility. In a long line of
cases, the Court pronounced that the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not
necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. It is quite understandable how AAAs tender age,
AAAs regard for Tejero as her stepfather, Tejeros threat to kill AAA and her whole family, and
Tejeros physical proximity to AAA and her family (Tejero lives in the same house with AAA and her
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family) could all have easily convinced AAA that Tejeros threat was real and discouraged AAA from
immediately reporting the rapes to anyone.
2. No.
In comparison to the evidence for the prosecution, Tejero proffered denial and alibi as his
defense. For an alibi to prosper, it should be satisfactorily shown that the accused was at some
other place during the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to
have been then at the site thereof. Tejero insists that he was plying a jeepney on the days when AAA
was raped, and was at a parking lot in Bangued, Abra, waiting for passengers at the exact time when
the rapes occurred. Without corroborating witnesses, however, Tejeros testimony is essentially
self-serving. Also, since Tejero had access to a vehicle, it was not improbable that he could have
been at AAAs house at some time during the days of the rape incidents.
Jurisprudence teaches that between categorical testimonies that ring of truth, on one hand,
and a bare denial, on the other, the Court has strongly ruled that the former must prevail. Indeed,
positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY BATULA

The purported inconsistency between the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB merely
refers to a minor detail. The central fact is that Batula, by means of force, threats, and intimidation,
and use of a bolo, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Whether AAA was able to name
Batula as the perpetrator immediately after the rape or AAA was able to identify Batula as her rapist
at a later time, does not depart from the fact that Batula raped AAA. We have said time and again that
a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.
Facts:
In April 2002, AAA, then nine years old, went with her mother BBB and father CCC to their
farm in Samar. Upon arrival at the farm at around 7:00 a.m., BBB ordered AAA to get the lighter
from their nipa hut located at the other side of a hill. On her way back to where her parents were,
AAA met Jerry Batula (Batula). Batula asked AAA for directions going to Barangay Canano. After
answering Batulas questions, AAA resumed walking but she noticed that Batula was following her.
Without any warning, Batula seized AAA and flung AAA to a creek that had nearly dried. AAA felt
pain in her back. Batula made stabbing motions with his bolo, at the same time threatening AAA
that, if you will not undress yourself, I will stab you. Fearing for her life, AAA stripped off her
sando and shorts. Batula also stripped himself naked. After lubricating his penis with his own saliva,
Batula drove his penis into AAAs vagina. Severe pain wracked AAAs whole body, but unmindful of
AAAs agony, Batula moved in a push and pull motion. However, Batula was interrupted when CCC
(father of AAA), looking for his daughter, shouted, Where are you, AAA? Upon hearing CCC, Batula
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hurriedly picked up his bolo and clothes and left. AAA quickly dressed up and when she saw CCC,
she immediately told her father that she had been raped. CCC searched for the perpetrator while
AAA returned to her mother BBB. BBB almost fainted when she removed AAAs shorts and saw
blood dripping down AAAs legs.
A criminal information was later filed against Batula. The RTC rendered a decision finding
Batula guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping AAA. CA affirmed with modification his conviction.
Batula assails the conflicting statements of AAA and her mother BBB. AAA testified that she
did not know the name of the man who ravished her as that was the first time that she saw him. Yet,
BBB narrated on the witness stand that AAA told her that she (AAA) had been raped by a man
named Cesar. Batula asserts that such contradiction reveals the malicious intent of AAAs parents in
implicating him in AAAs rape. Batulas appeal essentially challenges the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
Isuue:
Whether or not the witnesses are credible to sustain his conviction.
Ruling:
The instant appeal is denied.
Yes. The witnesses are credible witnesses. The issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved
primarily by the trial court since it is in a better position to decide the same after having heard the
witnesses and observed their conduct, deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, the
findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of the case.There
is no exceptional reason herein for us to depart from the general rule.
As the RTC declared, AAA was straightforward, sincere, and very credible, as she recounted
the rape incident on the witnesses stand. Forced to relive her ordeal all over again, AAA broke
down in tears as she was testifying. The crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the
truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels
when asked to recount her traumatic experience.
Moreover, the medical evidence likewise lends credence to AAAs testimony. It is wellsettled that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration,
there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.
The purported inconsistency between the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB merely
refers to a minor detail. The central fact is that Batula, by means of force, threats, and intimidation,
and use of a bolo, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Whether AAA was able to name
Batula as the perpetrator immediately after the rape or AAA was able to identify Batula as her
rapist at a later time, does not depart from the fact that Batula raped AAA. We have said time and
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again that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to
minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to
strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed
testimony.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM MANGUNE
In People v. Paringit, this Court has declared that not all blows leave marks. Thus, the fact that
the medico-legal officer found no signs of external injuries on AAA, especially on her face, which
supposedly had been slapped several times, does not invalidate her statement that Mangune slapped
her to silence her. But, even granting that there were no extra-genital injuries on the victim, it had
been held that the absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of the
crime of rape. The same rule applies even though no medical certificate is presented in evidence. Proof
of injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential element of the crime This Court, in a long
line of cases, has ruled that the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape. The
doctrine is thus well- entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the Court of Appeals correctly applied it.
Facts:
AAA alleged that Mangune started raping her when she was just a little girl. She said that
since she was so young when the first rape occurred, her first clear memory of her father raping her
was in 1994, when she was in Grade III. AAA narrated how her father called her then, asking for a
massage. However, she continued, her father apparently did not really want a massage because he
took off her shorts and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA claimed that since his penis
could not fit into her vagina, Mangune inserted his finger instead, with a threat that if she told her
mother of what had just transpired, he would kill them both.
AAA said that throughout the years, her father continued raping her and eventually
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. On May 7, 2003, AAA finally told her mother about
the rapes, the last of which occurred that same morning. AAA averred that at around 5:30 in the
morning, while she was sleeping inside her room, she felt her shorts being removed and something
heavy go on top of her. Realizing it was her father, AAA testified that she tried to fight back but was
overpowered, at which point, Mangune was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA stated that
her shouts and pleas were met with slaps on the face and a scary look from her father, prompting
her to simply keep quiet. When her mother and aunt fetched her at around noon later that day, she
told them about the rapes, and her mother immediately brought her to Camp Crame to be medically
examined.
Explaining the finding that there were no external signs of application of any form of
trauma, the medico-legal explained said it meant that aside from the genital organ, there were no
injuries noted in the other parts of the body
Mangune was charged in an information for rape. The RTC found Mangune guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) as qualified by his
relationship to the minor victim under Article 266-B, paragraph 2, no. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
CA later affirmed.
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Mangune asseverates that the lower courts should have acquitted him based on reasonable
doubt as AAAs testimony is not worthy of belief for having been fabricated. He supports such
assertion by making much of the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical marks, as
shown by the medico-legal findings, despite her testimony that he slapped her many times on the
face. This, Mangune insists, makes AAAs testimony incredible.
Issue:
Whether or not the witness is credible to sustain his conviction.
Ruling:
The instant appeal is denied.
Yes. The witness is a credible witnesses. In People v. Paringit, this Court has declared that
not all blows leave marks. Thus, the fact that the medico-legal officer found no signs of external
injuries on AAA, especially on her face, which supposedly had been slapped several times, does not
invalidate her statement that Mangune slapped her to silence her.
In People v. Rabanes, the accused similarly assailed the victims testimony by saying that if
her claim that she was slapped several times were true, then there would have been visible marks
or injuries on her face, which would have been reported in the medical certificate.
But, even granting that there were no extra-genital injuries on the victim, it had been held
that the absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of the crime
of rape. The same rule applies even though no medical certificate is presented in evidence. Proof of
injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential element of the crime This Court, in a long
line of cases, has ruled that the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape.
The doctrine is thus well- entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the Court of Appeals correctly
applied it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX MORANTE
Alleged inconsistencies do not detract from AAAs credibility as a witness. A rape victim is not
expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in
fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not
necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party. We reiterate the jurisprudential principle of
affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
In People v. Arpon, we stated that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial courts observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness deportment and
manner of testifying. Her furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath are all useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
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case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals
Facts:
AAA and her siblings lived with their mother, BBB, and Felix Morante (Morante) in onestory house/apartment. Sometime in December 1999, at midnight, while she was sleeping and her
mother and siblings were not one foot away from her, she was suddenly awakened as somebody
heavy settled on top of her. She awoke to find Morante on top of her, kissing her cheeks, and feeling
her up. Morante thereafter removed his clothing and had carnal knowledge of her. She was not able
to alert her mother for fear that Morante might kill them. After the deed, Morante got off her and
went back to sleep.
AAA also testified that every night from January 10 to 15, 2000, Morante, despite living with
the family in close quarters, repeatedly violated her, all the while threatening to kill her if she made
any noise or reported the incident to anyone else.
Thereafter seven informations were filed against Morante for violation of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 7610 and six separate counts of rape as defined under Article 266- B of the RPC.
Morante pleaded not guilty to the charges. On cross-examination, however, AAA testified
that on January 10 to 15, 2000 she lived with her aunt in Masuso, Calumpit, Bulacan and while
staying there, she slept beside her aunt and woke up early morning the following day. On redirect
examination, AAA clarified that she and her mother lived in the same house as her aunt and her
children, together with appellant. She maintained that appellant had carnal knowledge of her
despite living in close quarters and with several people around.
Both RTC and CA found Morante guilty of the crimes as charged. The CA noted that while
there seemed to be inconsistencies between AAAs testimony in the direct and cross-examinations,
she was able to explain these during the redirect examination.
Morante argued that that his guilt for the crimes charged was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because of alleged inconsistencies in AAAs testimony and was thus rendered
without basis.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the inconsistency and
discrepancy in the testimony of the witness.
Ruling:
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Yes. The conviction of the accused must be upheld. Alleged inconsistencies do not detract
from AAAs credibility as a witness. A rape victim is not expected to make an errorless recollection
of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her
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memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of
the offended party.
We reiterate the jurisprudential principle of affording great respect and even finality to the
trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses. In People v. Arpon, we stated that when the
decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial courts
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge
has the advantage of observing the witness deportment and manner of testifying. Her furtive
glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty
and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must
be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than
not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victims
credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victims testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,
unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victims testimony do
not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter
the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding.
Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA and appellant does not present to this Court any
scintilla of evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must
uphold the assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RADBY ESTOYA
Estoya likewise makes much of the inconsistencies between CCCs Sinumpaang Salaysay and
his testimony in open court. Said inconsistencies do not at all damage CCCs credibility as a witness. It
is doctrinally settled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and
testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. We
also add that CCC was only 10 years of age when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and testified in
court. It is not difficult to imagine that CCC was also overwhelmed by the circumstances, young as he
was when these all happened. The important thing is that CCC was consistent in saying that he saw
Estoya with AAA in BBBs house he saw AAA crying and he immediately ran to ask help from their
neighbor, DDD. Moreover, as we pronounced previously herein, AAAs testimony alone already
established the elements of rape committed against her by Estoya. At most, CCCs testimony on the
events that occurred in 2006 is merely corroborative.
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Facts:
During her school vacation in 2006 while her parents were in away, AAA stayed at the
house of her maternal aunt, BBB. Appellant Radby Estoya (Estoya) lives six (6) to seven (7) meters
away from BBBs house.
In 2006, around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, AAA was sleeping on her aunts bed when she
was awakened because someone was on top of her. When she realized that it was Estoya, she
attempted to shout but her resistance was subdued by his threat that he will stab her with a knife.
She realized that Estoya had undressed her and suddenly felt Estoyas penis entering her vagina.
Due to fear, the two (2) nephews of AAA and her brother CCC, hurriedly ran out of the house to
report AAAs ordeal to DDD, a neighbor. After satisfying his lust, Estoya ran away and climbed to the
roof of the house. However, he immediately returned to the room and taunted AAA to report to the
police if she can prove that rape was committed. Estoya left. Soon after, CCC and DDD arrived and
saw AAA crying on the bed.
DDD accompanied AAA to the police station to report the incident and later, accompanied
her to the doctor for physical examination. The medical examination yielded the following result: a
shallow fresh laceration at 6:00 oclock position and clear evidence of penetrating trauma to the
hymen.
Subsequently, Estoya was charged through an Information for Rape. RTC rendered its
Decision finding Estoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping AAA which was later affirmed by
the CA.
Estoya admits that although he was not able to adduce any evidence to corroborate his
denial and alibi, he should not be convicted based on the weakness of his evidence. Citing People v.
Manansala, Estoya argues that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Estoya points out
several purported inconsistencies, ambiguities, and improbabilities in the evidence of the
prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming his conviction despite the lack of
credibility of the prosecutions evidence.
Ruling:
No. We find no merit in Estoyas appeal.
Estoyas appeal primarily hinges on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is
axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great
respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe the
demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them
is telling the truth. After a painstaking review of the records of this case, including the exhibits and
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transcript of stenographic notes, we find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of
the RTC.
Estoya further attempts to raise doubts in AAAs testimony by questioning AAAs failure to
offer tenacious resistance during the supposed sexual assault. We are not swayed. We must keep in
mind that AAA was only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, and at such a tender age, she could
not be expected to put up resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Also, Estoya had
threatened AAA that he would stab her with a knife if she resisted. In any case, the law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against
her will to the rapists lust because of fear for life and personal safety.
Estoya has failed to allege and prove any improper motive on AAAs part for AAA to falsely
accuse Estoya of rape. Since there was no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim
to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence.
Estoya likewise makes much of the inconsistencies between CCCs Sinumpaang Salaysay
and his testimony in open court. Said inconsistencies do not at all damage CCCs credibility as a
witness. It is doctrinally settled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness
affidavit and testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and
are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating
officer. We also add that CCC was only 10 years of age when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay
and testified in court. It is not difficult to imagine that CCC was also overwhelmed by the
circumstances, young as he was when these all happened. The important thing is that CCC was
consistent in saying that he saw Estoya with AAA in BBBs house he saw AAA crying and he
immediately ran to ask help from their neighbor, DDD. Moreover, as we pronounced previously
herein, AAAs testimony alone already established the elements of rape committed against her by
Estoya. At most, CCCs testimony on the events that occurred in 2006 is merely corroborative.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WELVIN DIU Y KOTSESA, And DENNIS DAYAON Y TUPIT
G.R. No. 201449 , April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
Perlie testified that she and her sister Nely Salvador (Nely) were employed as waitresses at
Angeles city. As the sisters were walking home from work along Colorado Street, they saw accusedappellants and De La Cruz about two to three meters away. The three men were facing the wall,
urinating. As soon as the sisters passed by the three men, the latter accosted the former. Accusedappellant Diu embraced Perlie while accused-appellant Dayaon and De La Cruz held on to Nely.
Perlie was able to break loose by elbowing accused-appellant Diu, but accused-appellant Diu
grabbed Perlies bag. Perlie ran away to ask for help from people nearby. Meanwhile, accusedappellant Dayaon and De La Cruz were embracing Nely from behind. As she tried to go near Nely,
Perlie saw accused-appellant and De La Cruz stabbing Nely, passing a knife to each other. Perlie
described the knife as double bladed and approximately seven inches long. After the stabbing, Nely
was left lying face down on the ground, covered in blood. The entire incident took place within two
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minutes. Two men then helped Perlie bring Nely to the Ospital ng Angeles, where Nely was
pronounced dead on arrival
For the defense, accused-appellants Diu and Dayaon themselves took the witness stand.
They denied their culpability and participation in the incident, and mainly laid the blame on their
co-accused De La Cruz, who remained at-large.
RTC found that Perlies testimony was more credible. Thus, accused-appellants and De La
Cruz were convicted in the commission of the crime robbery with homicide which was affirmed by
CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not Perlie Is Credible As A Witness.
Ruling:
Yes. Perlie Is A Credible Witness Under The Law.
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best
addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the
witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are
the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Thus, it has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts factual
findings including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are accorded great respect and
even conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are
affirmed by the court of appeals.
In this case, the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, gave more weight and credence to
the testimony of Perlie compared to that of accused-appellants and their witnesses. There is no
reason for the court to overturn the judgment of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter.
Perlie is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving victim of the crime. Her testimony,
as described by the rtc, was "categorical and straightforward." Perlie had positively identified both
accused-appellants and described specifically the role each played, together with De La Cruz, in the
commission of the crime. The physical injuries Perlie and her sister Nely suffered were consistent
with Perlies account of the events.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VITERO
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In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by
holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a
certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her
own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a
lifetime of shame.
Facts:
Edmundo Vitero, accused, and BBB were married on April 5, 1984. Out of the marriage, they
begot six (6) children, four (4) girls (AAA, the eldest, CCC, DDD and EEE) and two (2) boys (FFF and
GGG). In September 1996, accused and BBB separated. She left the conjugal home bringing with her
CCC, EEE, and GGG and established her own residence at Barangay.
AAA, DDD and FFF were left to the custody of the Edmundo Vitero. They transferred to the
house of the parents of the accused at Barangay XXX, Ligao City, Albay. AAA, then already thirteen
(13) years old, having been born on April 30, 1985, her sister DDD, and her brother FFF. AAA slept
in the extreme right portion of the room, immediately beside the wall separating their room from
that of her grandparents. To her left was the Edmundo Vitero followed by DDD and FFF.
AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When she opened
her eyes, she saw her own father mounting her. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She
started to cry, but he was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise. She tried to resist his
lewd desires, but her efforts were in vain. She did not shout for help because she feared accused
who had a 20-inch knife beside him might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself
and went back to sleep. Because of the harrowing experience she suffered from the hands of her
own father, AAA was not able to sleep anymore. AAA did not report her ordeal to her grandparents
for fear they would only scold her.
Sometime, Edmundo Vitero brought AAA to the house of his sister Salvacion at Batangas.
Meantime, HHH, AAAs maternal grandfather, visited his daughter BBB, and showed to her an
anonymous letter stating that AAA had been raped by [her] father. Thereafter, BBB went to see
Salvacion, her sister-in-law in her house at Lian, Batangas to look for AAA, but she did not find her
She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas. BBB asked AAA if she
was indeed raped by her father. AAA disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times while they
were still living in her grandparents house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and her
siblings were already sleeping in their room. Upon learning they reported the incident to the Ligao
Police Station and with the help of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
However, accused Edmundo vigorously denied the allegations against him. He testified that
he was employed as a construction worker in Manila. However, upon his return to Albay, he learned
that he was criminally charged with raping his own daughter AAA.
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Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. However, the penalty was
modified because of Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death finding appellant Edmundo Vitero guilty of the crime of
qualified rape and was affirmed in toto by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Victim ,BBB , is a credible witness.
Ruling:
Yes, BB is a credible witness.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape
case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has
repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the
rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give
credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions
for rape.
When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of
the trial court is controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the
latters demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of the trial court
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the
case.
We have also previously pronounced that in incestuous rape cases, the fathers abuse of the
moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latters will thereby forcing
her to do whatever he wants. AAAs delay in reporting the rape is understandable. At the outset,
we note that the initial reluctance of a rape victim to publicly reveal the assault on her virtue is
neither unknown nor uncommon. It is quite understandable for a young girl to be hesitant or
disinclined to come out in public and relate a painful and horrible experience of sexual violation.
Indeed, the vacillation of a rape victim in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
impair her credibility as a witness. Delay in reporting the crime neither diminishes her credibility
nor undermines her charges, particularly when the delay can be attributed to a pattern of fear
instilled by the threats of one who exercises moral ascendancy over her.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABEL DIAZ
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When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Abel Diaz was charged with the crime of rape. During the trial, The
prosecution established that the offended party, 17- year old Mara, and the accused-appellant were
neighbors as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. At early
dawn of March 30, 2003, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top of her.
While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room and
allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused- appellant as the intruder. Startled, she pushed
the accused- appellant away and shouted for him to go away but she was not able to free herself as
he held her hands and he was straddling her. The accused boxed her and was able to penetrate her
despite of her shouts and resistance. The dastardly deed done, the accused- appellant stood up,
wore his pants and left. Mara also testified that the accused stayed at her room at approximately
two hours.
Abel Diaz used the defense of denial and alibi. He claims that he was attending a party of
another neighbor at the time the crime was allegedly committed. He further contends that the
victims failure to make an outcry for the two hours that he was allegedly in her room and the fact
that the room is dark makes his identification by the victim makes her statements not credible.
After weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court found Maras testimony
categorical, spontaneous and consistent. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Can the credibility of the witness be raised with the Supreme Court?
Ruling:
No. The credibility of the witness is the sole province of the trial court. It is well-settled that:
When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.
In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the
trial courts findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. On the
one hand, this judicial deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact finding trial
judges have the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe first-hand
the details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and the drama during the
trial. On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this Court of the limitations of its review in
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appealed cases this Court stands outside the trial court, is far removed from the witness stand,
and relies solely on the records of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCIDITA T. RESURRECCION
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the
basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses credibility.
The testimonies of police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith
and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.
Facts:
Two separate Informations for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
filed against the accused-appellant Mercidita Resurreccion. When arraigned, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges. In its Decision promulgated on August 28, 2006, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The trial court gave full
weight and credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution and disregarded
accusedappellants defenses of denial and frameup. Accusedappellant appealed her conviction
before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated January 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the RTC judgment. Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in totally disregarding the version of the defense
Ruling:
Accused-appellant is trying to make an issue of the alleged inconsistency between PO2
Liques sworn affidavit and his testimony before the RTC. In his sworn affidavit, PO2 Lique averred
that accused-appellant voluntarily emptied her pockets and handed over to the police the canister
containing the 12 heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu. When he testified before the trial court, PO2
Lique narrated that accused-appellant had refused to obey the order for her to empty her pockets
so that PO2 Lique himself checked accusedappellants pockets wherein he found the said canister,
which he immediately confiscated. The inconsistency is trifling and does not affect any of the
elements of the crime charged. Regardless of who emptied accusedappellants pockets, the
important fact was that the canister was actually found inside accusedappellants pockets and in
her possession. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and
not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses credibility. More so, an
inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a
conviction.
The Court similarly views accusedappellants defenses of denial and frameup very
doubtful. The testimonies of police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full
faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence,
when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frameup, the testimony of the officers
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who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In order to
overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill motive,
none of which exists in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO y PAULINO
Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge
the credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
At around midnight of February 10, 2001, Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio
(Inocencio) were causing a ruckus on Libertad Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water
bottles at passersby. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante (Alfante), who was
seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: Pare,
mukhang high na high ka.Alfante retorted: Anong pakialam mo? At this juncture, Vergara threw
his arm around Alfantes shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante.
Vergara then said Taga rito ako.
Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several
witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February
10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for
baon the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go
to the 711 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and
proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of
the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his
side for the duration of the incident. Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police
station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his
right palm sustained during the tussle.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001,
the RTC found Vergara and Inocencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as principal and accomplice, respectively.
On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of
damages the Decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual finding of the RTC as to the credibility of a witness binding upon
the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
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No. It is not binding upon the Supreme Court.
But the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there
is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent
herein.
The findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand,
and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not. A witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on crossexamination is a credible witness.
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed first-hand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the
trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility. On the other hand, this
Court is far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the
case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court
admits to its limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give
due deference.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA
Where the ten-year old son of the victim was able to witness the death of his father and was
the lone witness to testify in the case, the Court ruled that when it comes to the matter of credibility of
a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Furthermore, Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and
straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth.
Facts:
On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita (Lita),
accompanied by his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the formers black Kawasaki
tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino (Aquino)
together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the
tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by Aquino.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, Aquino and his companions had a shabu session while
Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay
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Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Bing suggested to her
companions that they leave the nipa hut, thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the
engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while Aquino and
Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson sitting at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle,
Aquino pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the Litas side. After the Lita
was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while Aquino drove the tricycle to his friends
house where they again stabbed the Lita using the latters own knife. Then they loaded the victim to
the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where Aquino and his companions dumped the body of Lita.
Thereafter, they returned to Aquinos residence. Jefferson told the sister of Aquino about the death
of his father but the sister only told him to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get
home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father. Ma.
Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met a police
outside their residence. The police informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in
Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told the police that he was with his father at the time of his death
and he brought the police officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned
by Aquino. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of
Lita. Aquino was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does
not know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of Aquino
which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who
stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to
Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also
stabbed his father. Aquino denied the accusations against him.
RTC found Aquino guilty for murder and carnapping; the CA affirmed the decision with
modifications on penalties.
Issues:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the alleged lone eyewitness positively
identified the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes.
Ruling:
With regard to appellants inquiry into the credibility of the lone eyewitness of the
prosecution, we depend upon the principle that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the
credibility of a witness. In People v. Vergara, we elaborated on this premise in this wise:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of
which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court,
unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which
showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as
he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
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Furthermore, Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and
straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A perusal of
the testimony of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies the aforementioned
test of credibility. More importantly, during his time at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and
categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who stabbed his father.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ
When the accused questions the credibility and demeanor of the victim as witness, the
recognized rule is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." Furthermore,
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally expected. Since human
memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never
been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.
Facts:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse
took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in December 2003, February 2004, and March
27, 2004. AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with Bernabe
Pareja (Pareja) who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their
children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in Pasay City.
The first incident took place in December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAAs
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the
situation, Pareja, while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was
already naked, begun to undress AAA. Pareja then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied,
Pareja likewise inserted his penis into AAAs anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,
AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house. AAA never told anyone about the
December 2003 incident for fear that Pareja might kill her. Pareja threatened to kill AAA in the
event that she would expose the incident to anyone.
In February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by Pareja.
Under the same circumstances as the December 2003 incident, with her mother not around while
she and her half-siblings were asleep, Pareja again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts.
But this time, Pareja caressed her and held her vagina and inserted his finger in it. With regard to
the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAAs mother who saw
Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs
mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then
narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by Pareja many times.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. After the results of the medico-
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legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAAs mother then filed a complaint for rape
before the Pasay City Police Station.
Pareja, on the other hand, offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his
defense. He denied raping AAA but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in
partner and that they all stay in the same house. Pareja further averred that it would have been
impossible that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of
their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10)
meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the
vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.
Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings. All taken into account, [Pareja]
asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with his plan without
AAAs siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Pareja was charged of two counts of rape and attempted rape. The RTC acquitted Pareja
from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. On appeal, CA
affirmed RTCs ruling in toto.
Issue: Whether AAAs testimony is credible by reason of inconsistencies and AAAs demeanor.
Ruling:
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, the Court
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when
his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter of AAAs credibility.
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Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally
expected. Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. The
inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused
AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the
December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAAs ordeal. The date and time of the
commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the
commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other
words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the
crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped.
Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any commotion inside their
house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to
seek their help. Moreover, Pareja said, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the
authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. A person accused of a
serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the victim for failing
to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut
behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure
of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the
victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into
submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father,
stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.
In this case, AAAs lack of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on
his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is
also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act
within reason or in accordance with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be
expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
Estoppel
CENTURY SAVINGS BANK vs. SPOUSES DANILO T. SAMONTE and ROSALINDA M. SAMONTE
The mortgagor is already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after
entering into a Contract of Lease with the buyer over one of the foreclosed properties the title of the
landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or lessee.
Facts:
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This case involves two loans, in the aggregate amount of P3,500,000.00, extended by
Century Savings Bank (CSB) to Spouses Danilo and Rosalinda Samonte (Sps. Samonte). Each loan
was secured by a promissory note and deed of real estate mortgage executed by respondents in
favor of CSB. The real estate mortgages were constituted on parcels of land, in the name of Sps.
Samonte.
When Sps. Samonte defaulted in the payment of their loans by the latter part of 1999, CSB
initiated before the notary public extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged
properties, pursuant to Act No. 3135, also known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under
Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, as amended.
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 provides for the following pre-requisites for an extrajudicial sale:
SEC. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than
twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos,
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
CSB caused the publication of a Notice of Sale, prepared by Notary Public Enriqueto I.
Magpantay (Magpantay), in the Challenger News a weekly newspaper of general circulation on
November 15, 22, and 29, 1999.
The public auction sale took place as scheduled on December 9, 1999, with CSB as the
winning and highest bidder. Notary Public Magpantay subsequently issued a Certificate of Sale,
covering the subject properties, in favor of CSB. This Certificate of Sale mentioned, among other
things, that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties was only a partial
satisfaction of Sps. Samonte total outstanding financial obligations to CSB. Consequently, CSB filed a
complaint against Sps. Samonte for the collection of the deficiency of their loans.
Sometime in 2001, the parties executed a Contract of Lease whereby CSB leased one of the
foreclosed properties to Sps. Samonte for a period of one year. It was acknowledged in said contract
that CSB acquired the real property subject of the lease as the highest and winning bidder in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, conducted pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. CSB eventually
consolidated its titles to the foreclosed properties. As a result, new certificates of title were issued
in the name of petitioner.
A few months later, Sps. Samonte filed a complaint, seeking the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their real properties contending that the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings initiated by CSB failed to comply with the posting requirements under Section 3 of Act
No. 3135, as amended. On the other hand, CSB insisted that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
duly conducted in accordance with law.
The Makati RTC-Branch 58, after trial, dismissed Sps. Samontes complaint. The trial court
found that under the equitable principle of estoppel, Sps. Samonte were precluded from impugning
the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings as they already acknowledged the same in
their 2001 Contract of Lease with CSB.
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Sps. Samonte appealed before the Court of Appeals.
CA granted the appeal and annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the said properties.
Hence, CSB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CAs Decision.
Issues:
Whether or not Spouses Samonte are already estopped from challenging the validity of the
foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the foreclosed
properties.
Ruling:
Yes. By entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the foreclosed
properties, Spouses Samonte are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure
sale.
The Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the
validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of
the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant
or lessee.
According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees
carries with it a recognition of the lessors title. As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny
their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person
while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor
and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title.
F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC. vs. ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the
representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and
circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the party
conducts himself with careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or ignores
highly suspicious circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
Facts:
Online Networks International, Inc. (ONLINE) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against
F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. (FAT KEE) docketed as Civil Case No. 99-167. ONLINE alleged
that sometime in November 1997, it sold computer printers to FAT KEE for which the latter agreed
to pay the purchase price of US$136,149.43. The agreement was evidenced by Invoice Nos. 4680,
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4838, 5090 and 5096 issued by ONLINE to FAT KEE. The invoice receipts contained a stipulation
that interest at 28% per annum is to be charged on all accounts overdue and an additional sum
equal to 25% of the amount will be charged by vendor for attorneys fees plus cost of collection in
case of suit. It was further asserted in the Complaint that thereafter, FAT KEE, through its President
Frederick Huang, Jr., offered to pay its US dollar obligations in Philippine pesos using the exchange
rate of P40:US$1. ONLINE claimed to have duly accepted the offer.The amount payable was then
computed at P5,445,977.20. FAT KEE then made several payments amounting to P2,502,033.06
between the periods of March and May 1998. As of May 12, 1998, the balance of FAT KEE
purportedly amounted toP2,943,944.14. As the obligations of FAT KEE matured in December 1997,
ONLINE applied the 28% interest on the unpaid amount. However, in view of the good business
relationship of the parties, ONLINE allegedly applied the interest on the balance for a period of
three months only. Thus, the total amount due, plus interest, was P3,012,636.17. FAT KEE
subsequently made additional payments in the amount of P2,256,541.12. A balance of P756,095.05,
thus, remained according to ONLINEs computations.
Despite repeated demands, FAT KEE failed to pay its obligations to ONLINE without any
valid reason. ONLINE was allegedly constrained to send a final demand letter for the payment of the
aforementioned balance. As FAT KEE still ignored the demand, ONLINE instituted the instant case,
praying that FAT KEE be ordered to pay the principal amount of P756,095.05, plus 28% interest per
annum computed from July 28, 1998 until full payment. ONLINE likewise sought the payment of
25% of the total amount due as attorneys fees, as well as litigation expenses and costs of suit.
FAT KEE duly answered the complaint alleging, inter alia, that it did not reach an agreement
with ONLINE for the payment of its obligations in US dollars. FAT KEE claimed that the invoice
receipts of the computer printers, which quoted the purchase price in US dollars, were unilaterally
prepared by ONLINE. While FAT KEE admitted that it offered to pay its obligations in Philippine
pesos, it averred that the amount owing to ONLINE was only P5,067,925.34, as reflected in the
Statement of Account (SOA) sent by ONLINE dated December 9, 1997. FAT KEE stated that
payments in Philippine pesos were tendered to ONLINE, in accordance with the SOA, and the latter
accepted the same.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of ONLINE, ratiocinating that it appears that the exchange
rate used by ONLINE is PHP34.00 for every US$1.00. ONLINE, therefore, is estopped from claiming
that the rate of exchange rate should be at the rate of either PHP41.50 or PHP40.00 per US$1.00, as
the rate which ONLINE itself used is PHP34.00 for every US$1.00 by ONLINEs own
computation. ONLINE filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ONLINE argued that estoppel may not be
invoked against it as FAT KEE did not act or rely on the representations in the SOA dated December
9, 1997. The RTC denied ONLINEs motion for lack of merit. ONLINE thereafter filed a Notice of
Appeal, elevating the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC. FAT KEE filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of
Appeals denied. Hence, this petition.
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Issue:
Whether or not FAT KEE can invoke estoppel against ONLINE for the latters issuance of the
SOA on December 9, 1997.
Ruling:
We find that FAT KEE cannot invoke estoppel against ONLINE for the latters issuance of the
SOA on December 9, 1997.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals ruling that any misconception on the part of FAT
KEE engendered by the issuance of the SOA should have already been rectified when the parties
subsequently met on January 15, 1998. The testimonial evidence of both ONLINE and FAT KEE
establish that, during the meeting, the parties tried but failed to reach an agreement as regards the
payment of FAT KEEs outstanding obligation and the exchange rate to be applied thereto. Whether
or not FAT KEE was duly informed of the fact that the SOA was unauthorized is no longer of much
importance. By their act of submitting their respective proposals and counter-proposals on the
mode of payment and the exchange rate, FAT KEE and ONLINE demonstrated that it was not their
intention to be further bound by the SOA, especially with respect to the exchange rate to be used.
Moreover, FAT KEE only started making payments vis--vis the subject invoice receipts on March 17,
1998, or two months after the aforementioned meeting.
At this point, Mijares v. Court of Appeals is instructive in declaring that:
One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been
misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his
own want of reasonable care and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party
claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the party conducts himself with careless
indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or ignores highly
suspicious circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Good faith is
generally regarded as requiring the exercise of reasonable diligence to learn the
truth, and accordingly estoppel is denied where the party claiming it was put on
inquiry as to the truth and had available means for ascertaining it, at least where
actual fraud has not been practiced on the party claiming the estoppel.
RAMONA RAMOS and THE ESTATE OF LUIS T. RAMOS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, OPAL
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS (SPV-AMC), INC. and GOLDEN DRAGON STAR EQUITIES, INC.
In the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may
change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation
of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory. None of the above exceptions, however, applies to the instant case. As regards the first
exception, the issue of jurisdiction was never raised at any point in this case. Anent the second
exception, the Court finds that the application of the same in the case would be improper, as further
evidence is needed in order to answer and/or refute the issue raised in Ramoss new theory.
Facts:
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In 1973, Luis Ramos obtained a credit line under an agricultural loan account from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Balayan Branch, for P83,000.00. To secure the loan, the parties
executed a Real Estate Mortgage.
Ramos principally argue that the scope and coverage of the real estate mortgage excluded
the sugar quedan financing loan. They assert that the mortgage contained a blanket mortgage
clause or a dragnet clause, which stated that the mortgage would secure not only the loans already
obtained but also any other amount that Luis Ramos may loan from PNB. Ramos posit that a
dragnet clause will cover and secure a subsequent loan only if said loan is made in reliance on the
original security containing the dragnet clause. They further state that said condition did not exist
in the instant case, as the sugar quedan financing loan was not obtained in reliance on the
previously executed real estate mortgage. Such fact was supposedly apparent from the documents
pertaining to the sugar quedan financing loans, i.e., the credit line agreement, the various
promissory notes and the contracts of pledge.
PNB responded that the issue of whether the parties intended for the real estate mortgage
to secure the sugar quedan financing loan was never raised in the RTC or in the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the same cannot be raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals decision and in the instant petition.
Ramos are now claiming before the SC that the sugar quedan financing loan it availed from
PNB was not obtained in reliance on the real estate mortgage. They even insist that the credit line
agreement, the promissory notes and the contracts of pledge entered into by the parties were silent
as to the applicability thereto of the real estate mortgage.
They are harping on the intention of the parties vis--vis the security arrangement for the
credit line agreement and the availments thereof constituting the sugar quedan financing loan.
Ramoss new theory, on the other hand, was only raised much later on the spouses motion
for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision dated November 8, 2006, or after a period of
more or less seventeen years since the execution of the credit line agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos a party may change his legal theory on appeal
Ruling:
No, to give credit to the new theory proffered by Ramos would gravely offend the rights of
PNB to due process.
To begin with, we note that, indeed, petitioners Ramos are presently raising issues that
were neither invoked nor discussed before the RTC and the main proceedings before the Court of
Appeals. The very issues laid down by petitioners for our consideration were first brought up only
in their motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 8, 2006.
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In their complaint before the RTC and in their reply to PNBs appeal to the Court of Appeals,
Ramos relied on the theory that they have already settled all of their loan obligations with PNB,
including their sugar quedan financing loan, such that they were entitled to the release of the real
estate mortgage that secured the said obligations.
When the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, Ramos foisted a new argument
in their motion for reconsideration that the parties did not intend for the sugar quedan financing
loan to be covered by the real estate mortgage. Before the SC, Ramos are now reiterating and
expounding on their argument that their sugar quedan financing loan was beyond the ambit of the
previously executed real estate mortgage. We rule that such a change in petitioners theory may not
be allowed at such late a stage in the case.
The general rule is that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and
arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice,
and due process.
Jurisprudence, nonetheless, provides for certain exceptions to the above rule. First, it is a
settled rule that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, provided that its
application does not result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play. Second, as held in Lianga Lumber
Company v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., in the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of the
appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
None of the above exceptions, however, applies to the instant case. As regards the first
exception, the issue of jurisdiction was never raised at any point in this case. Anent the second
exception, the Court finds that the application of the same in the case would be improper, as further
evidence is needed in order to answer and/or refute the issue raised in Ramoss new theory.
HEARSAY RULE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y CORONADO
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, the hearsay rule does not apply
where only the fact of such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial.
Facts:
Jesusa Figueroa was charged for a violation of Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the version of the prosecution, it testified that an informant came to the office of Supt.
Yabut, Chief of the Special Operation of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force and
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informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain Baby later identified as Figueroa. Supt.
Yabut instructed his task force to conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.
PO3 Callora, together with the informant, met with Figueroa at the parking area of SM
Bicutan in Taguig, Manila. The informant introduced PO3 Callora to Figueroa as the one who was
willing to regularly buy shabu from her should the sample be of good quality. Figueroa however
told them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 Callora
through the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu.
Figueroa informed PO3 Callora that she had a stock of shabu and she agreed to deliver the
shabu in front of 7-eleven Convenience Store at the corner of San Joaquin, Pasig City. The task force
proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3 Callora and the informant waited Figueroa, who after a
few minutes, arrived driving a car. Stopping near them, Figueroa rolled down the window of her car
and asked where the money was. At that juncture, Figueroa opened a Chowking plastic bag and
showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 Callora was about to
hand over the buy-bust money, Figueroa, sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she
sped away. Figueroas vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue. At the time, a police office
saw a boy alighted from the backdoor of the car and threw the Chowking plactic bag to the
pavement. The police officer picked it up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance inside. Subsequently, Figueroa was arrested.
On her defense, Figueroa denied that she met and transacted with PO3 Callora. She likewise
denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered. Furthermore she alleged that
the sale transaction borne out by evidence was not between the Callora and Figueroa, but was
instead between the latter and the unnamed informant. Hence, the testimony of PO3 Callora
regarding the alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and without
probative value, as it was the informant which is competent to testify the alleged agreement to sell
drugs.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Figueroa guilty of the offense of violation of Sec. 26 of
RA 9165 which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of PO3 Callora regarding the sale transaction is hearsay, hence
inadmissible as evidence
Ruling:
No.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, the hearsay rule does not apply
where only the fact of such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial.
In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the conversations between the
informant and Figueroa is admissible insofar as it established that the said information let the
police officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy bust operation. The conversation between
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the informant and Figueroa was not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt
to sell was already clear from Figueroas actuations, which were all within the personal knowledge
of PO3 Callora, to wit: (1) when Figueroa arrived at the scene, (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and
the informant, Figueroa asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for the
shabu, (3) when Figueroa showed PO3 a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet of white
crystalline substance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO
A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more
precisely, those which are derived from her own perception. A witness may not testify on what she
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not
be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or heard. Notwithstanding the
inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from AAAs narration, we
nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court
Facts:
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in
their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six
houses away from BBBs house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a
problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant were already at
the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who
raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant.
During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
accused appellant, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When Cataytay
answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA
went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita
Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report
stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAAs birth
certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999
against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused appellant. Accused-appellant claims that BBBs testimony concerning the
details of the commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no probative
value.
RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
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Whether or not BBBs testimony is a hearsay evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, BBBs testimony is a hearsay evidence.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the
commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and
cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own
personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception. A
witness may not testify on what she merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has
learned, read or heard.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from
AAAs narration, we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court.
Despite lacking certain details concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly raped, the trial
court, taking into consideration the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child
witness, found her testimony to be credible and convincing AAAs mental condition may have
prevented her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her testimony almost three years
later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was asked at the barangay outpost merely
minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape
was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are generally badges
of truth.
Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical examination were
consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the testimonies of
AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and the
defense.
DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE EDJILLO AND GERVACIO HOYLE, JR
The RTC admitted Aurelios dying declaration to prove the identity of his assailants and the
circumstances that led to his death because it qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule with the
concurrence of all four essential requisites, to wit: One of the most reliable pieces of evidence for
convicting a person is the dying declaration of the victim. Courts accord credibility of the highest order
to such declarations on the truism that no man conscious of his impending death will still resort to
falsehood. The requisites for admitting such declaration as evidencean exception to the hearsay
ruleare four, which must concur, to wit: a.) the dying declaration must concern the crime and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death b.) at the time it was made the declarant was
under a consciousness of an impending death c.) the declarant was competent as a witness and d.)
the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the decedent
was the victim. (People v. Sacario, 14 SCRA 468 People v. Almeda, 124 SCRA 487).The four requisites
are undoubtedly present in this case.
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Facts:
Aurelio is a 22yearold Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Kagawad of Barangay Bugang, San
Miguel, Bohol. On or about 3:00 a.m. of July 29, 1996, in Barangay Bugang, Aurelio was stabbed
below his left rib. Aurelio was pronounced dead on arrival at the infirmary in San Miguel.
It appears that by midnight, Romeo, one of the prosecutions witness fell asleep on a
bamboo bed outside of one Celsos house. At around 3:30 a.m. of July 29, 1996, Romeo was
awakened by the crowing of a rooster. While still lying down, Romeo saw clearly Aurelio and
accused-appellants on the barangay road, just four meters away. Accused-appellant Gervacio, alias
Dongkoy, had his left arm on Aurelios right shoulder and with his right hand, held and raised
Aurelios left hand to shoulder level. Accused- appellant Dante then stabbed Aurelio with a knife at
the left side of the latters body.
Florenda, Aurelios sister, testified that she was asleep at her residence when she was
awakened at around 3:30 a.m. of July 29, 1996 by the sound of running feet. Remembering accusedappellant Dantes threat against Aurelios life six days earlier, Florenda started looking for Aurelio.
She met accused-appellant Gervacio along the way, who pretended to help in searching for Aurelio.
Florenda subsequently heard Aurelio shouting for help. Florenda found her brother at a road canal,
leaning against the canal wall. Thinking that her brother was only drunk, Florenda asked accusedappellant Gervacio to help her carry Aurelio home but accused-appellant Gervacio pulled- up
Aurelios T-shirt and said, So, he was hit because he was stabbed by Ramie Puracan. Yet, as
Florenda was embracing Aurelio, Aurelio was able to whisper in Florendas left ear that, I was
stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me. By this time, Saul, Petronilo, Sr., and Amelita (Florendas
niece) had arrived at the scene. As Florenda ran home to get her husband, Amelita heard Saul
asking her uncle Aurelio who stabbed him and Aurelio answering that it was accused-appellants
Dante and Dongkoy. Petronilo, Sr., father of accused-appellant Dante, went near Aurelio and
covered Aurelios mouth. Florenda and her husband took Aurelio to the San Miguel Infirmary where
Aurelio was pronounced dead on arrival. Aurelios Death Certificate stated that his cause of death
was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to hypovolemia (internal hemorrhage) secondary to stab
wound.
Accused-appellants were later charged for Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended
by RA 7659. RTC later convicted them. CA subsequently affirmed the RTCs decision.
Accused-appellants assert that there was no dying declaration made by Aurelio and that the
same was a mere afterthought of the prosecution witnesses which must not be given any
evidentiary weight. Accused-appellants further point out that defense witness Petronilo, Sr. was
likewise present when Aurelio was found wounded and he categorically testified that Aurelio was
not able to answer when asked who stabbed him. Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses
mentioned anything to police about Aurelios dying declaration during the initial investigation. It
was only a month after Aurelios stabbing and death that prosecution witnesses Florenda and
Amelita executed affidavits relating Aurelios dying declaration while prosecution witness Saul
executed no such affidavit and he disclosed Aurelios purported dying declaration only during the
rebuttal stage of the trial.
Issue:
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Whether or not there was a valid dying declaration to sustain the accused-appellants
conviction.
Ruling:
Yes. There was a valid dying declaration.
We affirm the CAs decision. In view of all the foregoing, the Court sustains the conviction of
accused-appellants for the crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
The Court gives great weight and respect to the foregoing RTC findings and conclusions
which were chiefly based on its evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, and the veracity and
probative value of said witnesses testimonies. As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter
of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. The demeanor of the
person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant
pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest
blush or the guilty blanchthese can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth.
The RTC admitted Aurelios dying declaration to prove the identity of his assailants and the
circumstances that led to his death because it qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule with the
concurrence of all four essential requisites, to wit: One of the most reliable pieces of evidence for
convicting a person is the dying declaration of the victim. Courts accord credibility of the highest
order to such declarations on the truism that no man conscious of his impending death will still
resort to falsehood.
The requisites for admitting such declaration as evidencean exception to the hearsay
ruleare four, which must concur, to wit: a.) the dying declaration must concern the crime and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death b.) at the time it was made the declarant was
under a consciousness of an impending death c.) the declarant was competent as a witness and d.)
the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the
decedent was the victim. (People v. Sacario, 14 SCRA 468 People v. Almeda, 124 SCRA 487).The
four requisites are undoubtedly present in this case.
Finally, the Court finds highly specious and speculative accused-appellants contention that
Aurelio would have already lost too much blood from his stab wound, rendering him unable to talk,
and even unconscious, by the time Florenda found him. Defense witness Dr. Hamilcar repeatedly
stated before the trial court that during his post-mortem examination of Aurelios cadaver, he did
not actually see whether Aurelios spleen was hit or punctured. He even admitted that because of
the lack of facilities at the infirmary, he merely conducted a surface anatomy of Aurelios cadaver,
going only so far as probing Aurelios wound with a blunt object.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellants for the
crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA,"
Under the rules, statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is
admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification made by the victim
before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein Rarugal. It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing
incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent proximate cause of
his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence of Rarugals stabbing him in the chest.
Facts:
While victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Novaliches, Quezon City,
appellant, Ramil Rarugal, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus,
forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, Ramil hurriedly fled the scene. This
incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant in court. Florendo
arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato.
When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and
his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to
Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due to the
unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo.
In his defense, Ramil Rarugal denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time
working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his
cousin in Pangasinan, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997
to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point.
RTC found Rarugal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether there was dying declaration made by Florendo and if it was admissible as evidence
against Rarugal
Ruling:
Yes. There was dying declaration made by Florendo and was admissible.
Florendo was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to reach his house and
confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was Rarugal who had stabbed him. Rule 130, Section
37 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person,
made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.
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The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he
or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry
involves the declarants death."
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother
Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that
Florendo, after being stabbed by Rarugal twice on the chest, went home and under labored
breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was
an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the
consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was
incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the
deceased was at the time competent as a witness.
Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
In this case, the Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the Rarugal. The victim,
apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil
Rarugal. Under the rules, statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification made
by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence
indicating the liability of herein Rarugal. It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from
the stabbing incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent
proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence of Rarugals stabbing
him in the chest.
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
NARCISO C. LOGUINSA, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Cash examination report contains entries made in the performance of official functions and is,
thus, sufficient by itself to establish prima facie the truth of the facts stated therein without the need
of presenting other evidence following the rule laid down by Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence.
Facts:
Enrique B. Lapore, Provincial Auditor of Mati, Davao Oriental, issued an order creating
Special Audit Teams to conduct Financial and Compliance Audit on the Municipalities of
Banaybanay, Manay, San Isidro and Boston, and Cash Examination of their respective Municipal
Treasurers. In compliance with said Order, a team composed of State conducted a Cash
Examination of the Cash and Accounts of accused-appellant Narciso C. Loguinsa, Jr., Municipal
Treasurer of the Municipality of Banaybanay, Davao Oriental.
Budget Officer Lumpay examined the journals and ledgers in the accounting section in order
to reconcile the cash book balances posted for the period June 17, 1992 to March 29, 1993 and
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those entered in the ledgers. He found no difference in the INFRA, SEF, NALGU and Trust Fund, but
as to the General Fund Cashbook, which cashbook was personally prepared by the appellant
Loguinsa, there appeared a shortage in the amount of P1,728,145.35. The conduct of the cash
examination lasted for three weeks. Lumpay prepared the Report of Cash Examination using
General Form 74(A). Lumpay gave the Loguinsa a copy of the report and the latter affixed his
signature thereto.
Lumpay demanded from the appellant to produce immediately the missing funds and to
submit within seventy-two (72) hours a written explanation on how this shortage occurred. As
there was no answer from Loguinsa, Lumpay reiterated his demand. Lumpay submitted a
Memorandum to Provincial Auditor Lapore regarding the findings of the audit team and the
corresponding demand made on the appellant. Provincial Treasurer Antonio P. Quilala issued an
order for an investigation on the cash shortage of appellant.
Appellant Loguinsa came to the meeting held by the investigators at the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer but refused to sign any document and to answer questions propounded to him
regarding the results of the cash verification. After the meeting, they prepared a statement of the
accountability of the appellant. They submitted their findings to Quilala, which confirmed the
shortage run up by appellant.
The Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) formally charged
accused with Dishonesty thru Malversation of Public Funds. The court convicted Loguinsa. The
Sandiganbayan affirmed said decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Loguinsas conviction on the basis of General Form No. 74(A) is contrary to
law;
2. Whether or not Loguinsas signature in the assailed General Form No. 74(A) is enough to
establish his admission of the alleged shortage in his accounts
Ruling:
1. No. The records will bear out that the judgment of conviction on Loguinsa that was handed down
by the trial court did not merely rely on General Form No. 74(A) or the cash examination report
alone. The prosecution presented several pieces of documentary evidence in order to establish its
case. It also introduced the testimonies of witnesses Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor II
Robert Lumpay and Lupon Municipal Treasurer Maximo Tanzo who were involved in the first and
second government audits respectively that led to the discovery and confirmation of the shortage in
Loguinsas accounts. It also introduced the testimony of witness Banaybanay Assistant and later
Acting Municipal Treasurer Melinde G. Conson.
As correctly stated in the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, the failure of the prosecution to
present and have the Cashbooks of General Fund marked in evidence does not necessarily
exonerate petitioner. The conviction of the petitioner was based on the testimonies of witnesses
and other documentary exhibits of the prosecution. It is the prerogative of each party to determine
which evidence to submit therefore herein petitioner cannot dictate or impose on the prosecution
during the lower court trial as to who or what documentary evidence it should present. Section 5,
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Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly provides that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal and what prosecution evidence
should be presented during the trial depends solely upon the discretion of the prosecutor.
Moreover, as aptly pointed out in the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, the cash
examination report contains entries made in the performance of official functions and is, thus,
sufficient by itself to establish prima facie the truth of the facts stated therein without the need of
presenting other evidence following the rule laid down by Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence.
2. Yes. We do not agree with Loguinsas assertion that mere reliance on the fact that he signed the
assailed General Form No. 74(A) is not enough to establish his admission of the alleged shortage in
his accounts in light of our pronouncement in the case of Tinga v. People where this Court held that
it is incorrect to state that petitioner-accused had admitted his shortage when he signed the audit
report prepared by the audit team. We find that the facts in that case to be in variance with those
found in the case at bar.
In Tinga, there was a dispute as to the amount of shortage because the audit team failed to
consider certain records and past transactions of the defendant, which were only brought to light
after the audit. Thus, this Court declared that there was an incomplete and haphazard compliance
with the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and Other Guidelines in the
examination made by the audit team. We also ruled in that case that the prima facie presumption
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code arises only if there was no issue as to the accuracy,
correctness and regularity of the audit findings and if the fact that the funds are missing is
indubitably established. Moreover, in Tinga, the Sandiganbayan itself decreed that the audit
conducted by the COA audit team was riddled with errors which were borne out by the evidence
on record.
In the case at bar, we find the first audit made by the COA personnel led by COA State
Auditor II Lumpay and the second audit made by Lupon Municipal Treasurer with Office of the
Provincial Treasurer Administrative Officer to be in proper order.
EXPERT WITNESS
VICENTE MANZANO, JR. vs. MARCELINO GARCIA
The trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to
experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which
can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the
currently existing ones.
Facts:
Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia) is an owner of a parcel of land and such property was the
subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992 allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of
Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-interest and brother of petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr.
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(Vicente). Later, Constancio Manzano passed away. Garcia did not redeem the subject property.
Consequently, Vicente instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership over the property. Garcia
filed an opposition and answer, alleging that the document evidencing the pacto de retro sale was a
forgery.
On February 15, 1994, Garcia filed a complaint for annulment of pacto de retro sale and
recovery of the owners title with preliminary injunction against Vicente. The two petitions were
consolidated before the RTC.
During the trial, Garcia testified that the signatures appearing in the pacto de retro sale
were not his and his wifes. He presented his passport and drivers license, both of which bear an
entirely different signature than what appeared in the pacto de retro sale document.
Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized the deed of
conveyance in question, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who appeared in his office and who
executed the pacto de retro sale is not the same Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial
of the case.
Perla Babano, one of the witnesses to the execution of the pacto de retro sale, likewise
testified that the person who introduced himself as Marcelino G. Garcia and signed the document on
May 26, 1992 is not the same Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial of the case.
The RTC held that Garcia failed to prove that his signature in the pacto de retro sale was
forged. According to the RTC, Garcia should have presented an expert witness to determine
whether the signatures were made by the same person. However, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC declaring that there is no rule requiring expert testimony to determine the genuineness of
a signature appearing on a document.
Issue:
Is there a need of a handwriting expert to determine which document is forged when the
questioned signatures appear obviously far different from the customary or standard signatures of
the person claiming forgery?
Ruling:
No, there is no need of an expert witness to prove the forgery.
The alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale is utterly dissimilar from his
customary signature appearing in the evidence on record, as well as in the verifications of the
pleadings before the courts. From such circumstance alone, the SC affirmed the ruling of the CA
finding that the pacto de retro sale was forged and, therefore, void ab initio.
In assailing the finding of the CA that the signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale was
forged, Vicente echoes the opinion of the RTC that Garcia should have presented an expert witness
to prove the same. Jurisprudence, however, is replete with instances wherein the SC dispensed with
the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. Thus, in Estacio v. Jaranilla, red the SC held:
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It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without
necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity
or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved
to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
In the case at bar, the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale,
on one hand, and in the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before the
courts, on the other hand, was enormous and obvious, such that the SC can readily conclude that
the pacto de retro sale was in all likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary
signature of Garcia.
Furthermore, the falsity of the signature on the pacto de retro sale was affirmed by two
persons present when the instrument was signed, one of which is the very person who notarized
the same. An examination of their testimonies reveals that the trial court had disregarded their
statements for very flimsy reasons.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO SALUDO
It should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence. Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and
immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version
of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified
were not true.
Facts:
In four separate Informations, accused-appellant was charged with four counts of rape
committed against AAA on April 10, April 26, May 19, and June 21, 1995. During his arraignment,
accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all four charges against him.
AAA, the victim, testified that the accused Saludo was their long time neighbor who lived
just a few meters away from their hut. She alleged that on April 10, 1995, while she was sleeping,
the accused entered their hut and raped her. After the accused succeeded in raping her, the accused
threatened her that she and her mother would be killed if she would tell to anybody what have
transpired. Thereafter, the accused left the place.
Giving credence to the testimony of the victim, the trial court rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. On appeal, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
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Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the
victim.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
The prosecutions evidence established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of rape
committed against AAA on four occasions. The supposed defects in AAAs testimony, pointed out by
accused-appellant, do not diminish AAAs credibility.
It should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence. Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and
immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they
testified were not true.
As put down on record, AAA broke down and cried as she was giving her testimony before
the RTC. Such tears were a clear indication that she was telling the truth. As it has been repeatedly
held, no woman would want to go through the process, the trouble and the humiliation of trial for
such a debasing offense unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a
response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice.
Facts:
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hearings.
Issue:
Ruling:
No.
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meritorious.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUN
Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
Facts:
On September 6, 2004, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. During the
trial of the case, the prosecution put forward AAA, the victim, as a witness. AAA testified that
accused-appellant was her uncle since the latter was the cousin of her father, BBB. He was also the
common-law husband of her mother, CCC, as her parents had already separated. AAA related that in
September 2003, accused-appellant started to sexually abuse her inside their house. He pulled her
to her mothers room when nobody else was around. He touched her breasts and her vagina.
Afterwards, accused-appellant was able to insert his penis into her organ. He was only able to insert
his penis halfway but the same hurt AAA. She cried and fought back by boxing him but he continued
to assault her. He also kissed her lips and licked her vagina. She said that she did not bleed after she
was raped. Accused-appellant succeeded in abusing her seven times. AAA presented in court her
birth certificate, which showed that she was born on November 6, 1992. Medical findings shows
that there is no evident injury at the time of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude
sexual abuse.
For his defense, accused-appellant testified that AAA was his niece as he was the cousin of
AAAs father. He was also the commonlaw husband of AAAs mother, CCC. Accusedappellant
denied AAAs accusation of rape against him. He stated that CCCs children had a grudge against
him, as they did not want him to live with their mother.
On June 17, 2008, the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, adjudged accused-appellant guilty of
statutory rape. On November 24, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape
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Ruling:
Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. Moreover, we held in People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634 (2004), that the spontaneity with
which the victim has detailed the incidents of rape, the tears she ha[d] shed at the stand while
recounting her experience, and her consistency almost throughout her account dispel any
insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The Court gave more weight to her testimony, which was
found to be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and delivered in a frank manner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed.
Facts:
On January 8. 1999, upon the sworn complaint of AAAs mother, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City filed with the RTC an Information charging the accused-appellant Ricardo Pionsang of
the crime of rape. He pleaded not guilty of the charge. During trial, AAA, who was only 4 years old
during the commission of the crime, testified that on July 8, 1998, while AAA was playing with some
friends, then eleven-and-a-half-year-old CCC, her neighbor, called and asked her to play computer
with him at the house of the accused-appelant Ricardo on instructions of the latter. On the way,
however, AAA and CCC were suddenly pushed inside accusedappellants comfort room, which was
built separately from the house. Inside, accused-appellant whipped out a fan knife and pointed it
toCCC, telling the two children to keep quiet, otherwise, he will kill them. After accused-appellant
had barred the door shut, he instructed CCC to hold AAA from behind, which CCC obeyed by
clutching AAA on her stomach. Accused- appellant removed his short pants, then applied something
reddish on his penis and, while AAA was standing atop the toilet bowl being held by CCC from the
back, inserted the same into her vagina and made pumping motions while standing. The victim AAA
could only cry. After having satiated his carnal desires against AAA, accused-appellant once again
pointed the knife at CCC and told him to likewise insert his penis into AAAs private part. CCC
pretended to do what [he] was told, and while doing so, the latter masturbated and, when he
ejaculated, wiped the semen on the helpless AAAs mouth. Thereafter, he reiterated his threats to
kill them if they told anyone of what happened, and then let them go home.
Months later, however, or on September 23, 1998, while AAA and her mother, BBB, were
playing, BBB told her daughter not to let anyone touch her private part. After being silent for a
moment, AAA suddenly blurted out, Mama, bastos si Kuya Ric Ric and Kuya CCC, because,
according to AAA, they inserted their penises into her vagina. At this revelation, BBB confronted
CCCs mother, DDD, who made her son disclose what truly happened to AAA. CCC tearfully narrated
what accused-appellant did on July 8, 1998 and that he threatened to kill both him and AAA if they
reported the matter. In his defense, the accused avers that he was in his home drying his hair when
the alleged crime was committed.
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The RTC rendered its Decision on November 26, 2009 finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping AAA. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings if the fact of the RTC
which gives more weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution as compared to those of
the defense
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
AAA, who was six years old by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively,
and categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and
replete with details of the rape. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is
of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if
the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story.
And although AAAs testimony was already convincing proof, by itself, of
accusedappellants guilt, it was further corroborated by the testimony of CCC, who personally
witnessed the rape, and by the medicolegal findings which reported healed lacerations on AAAs
genital area and AAAs non-virgin physical state. In contrast, accused-appellant averred that he was
at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time of AAAs rape. We have oft pronounced that
both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as
between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROEL VERGARA y CLAVERO
G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-de Castro
In rape cases, where the victim was only a child and was able to narrate how the accused had
been raping her since 2003 and describe in great detail the last rape that occurred on September 12,
2004, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.
Facts:
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Roel Clavero Vergara (Roel), the stepfather of one [AAA], began abusing her as soon as she
had her first menstruation and by the time AAA was nine (9) years old, he had sexually molested
her five (5) times. The last incident of rape happened at around 3 oclock in the afternoon of 12
September 2004. The 9-year old AAA was left alone in the house with Roel and the latters 2-year
old daughter. The latter ordered AAA to go inside his bedroom where the latter allegedly raped her.
AAA confided her suffering to her mothers friend, Tita, who helped her report the incident to the
police authorities. AAA was also examined by Dr. Remigion R. Camerino, whose findings revealed
the following: thin circular hymen with rough edges and previous healed lacerations; (-) vaginal
lacerations; (-) bleeding/discharge; positive pregnancy test (9/15/04); uterus enlarged to 4
months age of gestation. On 16 January 2005, AAA gave birth to a baby boy. Roel on his own
defense, denied that he raped AAA and offered an alibi that he never had the chance to be with the
victim on the day in question since his work was from 3:00 oclock in the afternoon to 2:00 oclock
in the morning of the following day.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple statutory rape which
the CA affirmed, thus, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In People v. Teodoro, the Court clearly explained the elements of statutory rape committed under
Article 266-A(1)(d):
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of
injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the childs consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Roel had
carnal knowledge of AAA in the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when AAA was just nine years
old. In her Sworn Statement dated September 15, 2004 to Senior Police Officer 4 Eloisa B. Ocava,
AAA narrated how Roel had been raping her since 2003, and described in great detail the last rape
that occurred on September 12, 2004.
It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.
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Moreover, SC considers the alleged inconsistency on the place where the crime happened as a
minor inconsistency which should generally be given liberal appreciation considering that the place
of the commission of the crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is
decisive is that [accused-appellants] commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently proved.
The alleged inconsistency is also understandable considering that AAA was only ten (10) years old
at the time she testified before the trial court. Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a childvictim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape. Such inconsistencies on minor
details are in fact badges of truth, candidness and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed. These
discrepancies as to minor matters, irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot thus be
considered a ground for acquittal. In this case, the alleged inconsistency in AAAs testimony
regarding the exact place of the commission of rape does not make her otherwise straightforward
and coherent testimony on material points, less worthy of belief.
OFFER OF EVIDENCE
THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, ET.AL. vs. THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, ET.AL.
While it is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered, evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
Facts:
Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective claims before the then,
Court of First Instance of the province of Oriental Negros for the titling of the respective lots they
occupy, among them were Severo Chaves and Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot No.
382, to be titled in their names, together with Escolastico Saves, Maximo Saves, Romana Saves,
Rafaela Saves, and Januaria Saves.
A Decision was rendered by the court, adjudicating several parcels of land to different
claimants. Decree No. 177831 was issued by the United States of America for the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Negros ordering the registration of Lot No. 382 in the names of
Benedicta Saves, Escolastica Saves, the sons of Romana Saves, deceased, Rafaela Saves, Januaria
Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased.
Thereafter, Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa Ramirez, his four (4)
surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who predeceased him. Adelaida Martinez and
Felicidad Martinez, who were the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold their 1/6
share in Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia in a Motion for the Issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title, filed by Gaudencia Valencia.
A Deed of Sale was executed by the heirs of Romana Saves, namely: Sinforosa Alimayda,
Juan Alimayda, Vicente Alimayda, Felimon Alimayda and Porferia Alimayda; the sole heir of Rafaela
Saves, Pablo Saves Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico Saves, Teodoro Saves, their respective 1/6
share in Lot No. 382, or 3/6 of the property, to Gaudencia Valencia.
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Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir of Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6
share in Lot No. 382, also to Gaudencia Valencia, or 2/6 of the property. Considering that all the 1/6
share, rights, and participation of each co-owner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia
Valencia, she initiated the titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for Issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. Subsequently, TCT
No. 148 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Oriental in the name of Gaudencia Valencia.
Sometime in 1961, Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire property to Enriqueta Chavez Abella,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 was issued in the name of Enriqueta Chavez, who was
married to Charles Abella.
Meleriana Saves, who was then residing in Cebu, wrote her relatives in Negros Oriental, the
herein appellees, asking them to verify from the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot
382, as they were among the heirs entitled to said property.
On March 17, 1981, a case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental by plaintiffs-appellees, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382
was fraudulently acquired by Gaudencia Valencia, and that Gaudencia Valencia fictitiously sold the
lot to her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella.
The complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs considering that the original plaintiffs and
defendants were all deceased. The parties failed to arrive to an amicable settlement during the pretrial stage, but have agreed to exclude Lot 386 in the litigation and limited the issues as to the
ownership of lots 382 and 383, thus, trial ensued.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners and declared the Deed of Sale and Deed
of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio; and being derived from a polluted source, whatever
documents Gaudencia Valencia executed in favor of defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella in relation
to Lot No. 382, Dumaguete Cadastre and the issuance of TCT No. 110 covering said lot, suffers the
same legal infirmity that of a total nullity and ordered Enriquita Chavez Abella to convey and
deliver unto the plaintiffs their shares of Lot No. 382, Dumaguete Cadastre in the proportion of
their respective rights and interests thereto which they are entitled to participate and succeed from
the shares of their predecessors-in-interest who are the original registered owners of the aforesaid
lot.
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and
set aside the same in the herein assailed CAs Decision and declared the TCT No. 110 in the name of
Enriqueta Chaves Abella as valid and subsisting. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
this was denied by CA.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally offer Exhibits 7, 8
and 13 at the trial court proceedings. In accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the trial court did not consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals
allegedly utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial courts decision.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Court of Appeals can consider evidence not formally offered in the trial
court as basis for the herein assailed CA ruling.
Ruling:
It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. A formal offer is necessary
because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court.
However, in People v. Napat-a, citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the
case at bar, the records would show that the above requisites have been satisfactorily complied
with respect to Exhibit 7.
With regard to Exhibit 7, which is a document entitled Motion for the Issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title filed by Gaudencia Valencia (hereinafter Valencia) in the same trial court that led
to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 148, the records would show that it is the
same document that petitioners witness Fruto Rosario identified in his March 5, 1984 testimony
and marked as petitioner-plaintiffs Exhibit I.
Verily, Exhibit 7 was incorporated and made part of the records of this case as a common
exhibit of the parties. That only plaintiffs were able to formally offer the said motion as Exhibit I
most certainly does not mean that it can only be considered by the courts for the evidentiary
purpose offered by plaintiffs. It is well within the discretion of the courts to determine whether an
exhibit indeed serves the probative purpose for which it is offered.
Likewise, Exhibit 13, which is TCT No. 110 or the Torrens title that was issued to
respondent Abella after she bought Lot No. 382 from Valencia, complies with the requirements
enunciated in Napat-a and Mate. The existence of Exhibit 13 was not only known to petitioners but
it was expressly alleged in their Appellees Brief filed with the Court of Appeals and their Petition for
Review filed with this Court that Lot No. 382 is registered in the name of respondent Abella.
Indeed, petitioners did not merely acknowledge the existence of TCT No. 110 (respondents
Exhibit 13), but in fact relied upon it in order to put forward their main theory that the sale from
Valencia to respondent Abella is fictitious or void because, according to petitioners, it appears from
the said title that respondent Abella was supposedly only nine years old at the time of the
transaction. Verily, it is inconsistent for petitioners to claim that Exhibit 13 proves its theory and in
the same breath assail it as inadmissible.
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Lastly, petitioners present objection to Exhibit 8 hardly deserves any credit. Exhibit 8 is a
rather innocuous document which has no bearing on any of the significant issues in this case.
Though it never formed part of the records of this case upon appeal, a careful perusal of the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision would reveal that Exhibit 8 was not in any way used or referred to by the
Court of Appeals in arriving at the aforementioned ruling.
OBJECTIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILY MENDOZA Y SARTIN
G.R. NO. 189327, February 29, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
The Special Operations Group of the Western Police District received information from a
confidential informant that one Emily Mendoza, a pregnant woman was selling shabu in Tondo,
Manila.
Acting on this information, police officer Mangilit immediately formed a buy--bust operation
team, with police officer Ching as the poser-buyer. The informant introduced Ching to Mendoza as a
buyer, and in return asked how much he would buy. After that, Mendoza handed him one plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. Ching then gave her the bill and executed the prearranged signal to inform his team of the completed transaction. Hence, Mendoza was arrested.
Thereafter, the results of the laboratory examination of the plastic sachet was methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
In her defense, Mendoza denied that she sold the shabu to Ching. In addition, she was
subjected to an inquest upon reaching the police station.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Mendoza appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the police
officers failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court stating that such argument of Mendoza was deemed waived as it was
raised for the first time in appeal.
Issue:
Whether the failure of Mendoza to question the prosecution in establishing the identity of
the dangerous drug with certainty during trial is deemed waived
Ruling:
Yes.
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Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
The Court of Appeals said, Mendoza only questioned the chain of custody when she
appealed her conviction. This issue was neither raised nor mentioned during the trial before the
RTC. Whatever justifiable ground may excuse the prosecution from complying with the statutory
requirements on chain of custody will remain in obscurity but will not adversely affect the
prosecutions case if not timely questioned during the trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLE
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party to desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection
he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
On September 24, 2003, a confidential informant called the Caloocan City Police Station,
telling the police officers about the drug-peddling activities of the appellant.
On September 25, 2003, in a buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was arrested while in
possession of three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu weighing 0.02 gram
each. He also sold and delivered shabu weighing 0.02 gram to a police officer, who posed as buyer.
On September 30, 2003, accused was charged for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
During the trial, the defense painted a different picture of the events that transpired on the
day the appellant was arrested. The appellant was arrested while watching a basketball game on
September 24, 2003 at about 6:00 or 7:00 oclock in the evening at Sabalo St., Dagat-Dagatan,
Caloocan City. While simply observing his neighbors play basketball, the appellant was suddenly
approached by several unidentified individuals who inquired if his name is "Lito." After replying in
the affirmative, they suddenly grabbed and handcuffed him for no apparent reason. He tried to
resist but to no avail, the policemen succeeded in seizing him and thereafter, brought him to the
police station. Thereat, he was told that the reason why he was arrested was because he had
quarrelled with their assets on April 22, 2003.
The appellant denied the charges filed against him and that he only came to know about
such charges at the police station. Nevertheless, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellant, thus, filed the instant
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
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Whether the police officers committed lapses in procedure in the safekeeping of the seized
drug specimens
Rulings:
No.
It must be pointed out, however, that the appellant raised the issue of the police officers
non-compliance with the above provisions only in his appeal before the Court of Appeals. The
appellants objections were not raised before the trial court in such a way that the prosecution may
have had the opportunity to explain and/or justify the deviations from procedure that was
ostensibly committed by the police officers in this case. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time
on appeal.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN DRUGS CASES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SONNY PADUA y REYES,
G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010, J-Leonardo-De Castro
Sonny Padua was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous drugs and thereby contended that
the Officer has failed to comply with the process of chain of custody of the drugs and thereby absolving
him to such crime. The court ruled that Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure of Chain of
Custody, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers.
Facts:
PO2 Dante Aguilar of the District Drug Enforcement Unit (DDEU), Southern Police District
(SPD), Taguig City. He established that in the morning of August 18, 2002, when he arrived at their
office at the Police Station of SPD, District Drug Enforcement Group in Taguig City, his team leader,
Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Rodolfo Anicoche, upon the tip of an informant, ordered him and the rest
of his teammates, namely, SPO2 Banzuela, PO3 Cirilo Zamora, PO3 Felix Mayuga, PO2 Roberto
Jovenir and PO1 Michael Esparagoza to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant,
who was allegedly selling illegal drugs in Taguig City Per instructions, PO2 Aguilar was tasked to
pose as the poseur-buyer. Following the briefing, his team leader handed him P200.00 marked
money.
On the same day, at around 10:30 a.m., the group proceeded to the residence of accusedappellant at No. 216 Mozo St., Purok 2, Napindan, Taguig City. PO2 Aguilar, SPO2 Banzuela, the
asset, and P/Insp. Anicoche conducted surveillance, and observed that there were persons coming
in and out of Paduas house talking to the latter. They then went back to the other police officers and
told them the place where Sonny Padua accused-appellant was. Thereafter, PO2 Aguilar and the
asset proceeded to the house of Sonny Padua accused-appellant. The asset called Sonny, and when
the latter went out of his house, the asset introduced PO2 Aguilar to him as a delivery truck driver
who had just arrived from a provincial trip and in dire need of shabu for his personal
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consumption. Aguilar handed the P200.00 marked money to the Sonny Padua accused-appellant,
who folded and placed it on his left pocket. Sonny Padua Accused-appellant then took something
from his right pocket and handed an aluminum sachet to PO2 Aguilar. Subsequently, PO2 Aguilar
removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that he had already
bought the shabu. When PO1 Esparagoza arrived, PO2 Aguilar frisked and arrested the Sonny Padua
accused-appellant. He recovered the buy-bust money in the left pocket and four sachets in the right
pocket of the Sonny Padua accused-appellant. He informed accused-appellant of his right to remain
silent, and of the fact that he would be charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165. They
brought him to the police station. Later, PO2 Aguilar turned over the seized drugs to the
investigator, who thereafter brought the evidence to the SPD Crime Laboratory
Office, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
Sonny Padua Accused-appellant asserts that the police officers failed to account for the
chain of custody of the seized items alleged to be shabu. He questions the non-presentation as
witness of the alleged investigator, the officer on duty who received the specimen together with the
request for laboratory examination from PO2 Aguilar. He maintains that the specimen, which PO2
Aguilar turned over to Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas, may no longer be the same specimen
taken from him by PO2 Aguilar.
Issue:
doubt.
Whether or not CA erred in finding that the accused appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
Ruling:
No. It did not erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged against him.
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of the seized
items, found to be shabu, from the time PO2 Aguilar got the shabu, to the time it was turned over to
the investigating officer, and up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows: (1) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165, which implements said provision, stipulates (a) The apprehending officer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
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evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable
grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is centered on
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The testimony of PO2
Aguilar outlines the chain of custody of the confiscated items, i.e., sachets of shabu:
The fact that the persons who had possession or custody of the subject drugs, such as
Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas and the alleged investigator, were not presented as witnesses to
corroborate SPO2 Aguilars testimony is of no moment. The non-presentation as witnesses of other
persons such as the investigator and the forensic chemist, is not a crucial point against the
prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to
decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to
choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. As may be noted, the prosecution dispensed with
the testimony of Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas because the defense had already agreed during
the pre-trial in the substance of her testimony to be given during trial
Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the informant, it is wellsettled that the testimony of an informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential for conviction and
may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer testified on the same. Informants are almost always never
presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Further,
not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is
nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such
requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have
been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not
indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the
witness stand. In People v. Zeng Hua Dian, we ruled: After a thorough review of the records of this
case, we find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as
witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer
on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to
present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALD DELA CRUZ Y LIBANTOCIA
Non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not render an accused's arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
Page 341 of 350

2015)
At about 10:00 a.m. on March 30, 2003, an informant called the Cubao Police Station and
reported that someone was selling shabu at Yale Street, Cubao, Quezon City. A team of police
officers was then formed to conduct an entrapment operation. PO2 Ocampo was designated as
poseur-buyer. Before the dispatch, two pieces of P100.00 bills were given to PO2 Ocampo as buybust money, which he marked with his initials "JO." Upon arrival of the police team at Yale Street,
they spotted a person selling drugs on said street. They then approached the person, who was later
identified as respondent Dela Cruz. The informant introduced PO2 Ocampo to Dela Cruz as a person
interested to buy shabu. When PO2 Ocampo gave two P100.00-bills to Dela Cruz, the latter handed
over in exchange a plastic sachet to PO2 Ocampo. PO2 Ocampo examined the contents of the plastic
sachet, and believing that the same to be shabu, he tapped Dela Cruzs shoulder, which was the prearranged signal to the other members of the police team.
The rest of the police team rushed to the crime scene and identified themselves as police
officers. PO2 Ocampo arrested Dela Cruz and recovered from the latter the two P100.00-bills used
as buy-bust money. While PO2 Ocampo kept possession of the buy-bust money, he passed the
plastic sachet containing the shabu to his companion. PO2 Ocampo marked the plastic sachet with
"JO." The plastic sachet was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination of its contents, which was later confirmed as methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu.
After respondent Dela Cruz was arrested he was then brought to the police station.
Respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 also known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. During arraignment, respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings and conclusion of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized
item alleged to be shabu and to establish the identity of the illegal drug, the corpus delicti of the
case.
Ruling:
No, the chain of custody of the seized item was established.
Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 instructs the apprehending
authorities on the proper procedure they should follow immediately after seizure and confiscation
of dangerous drugs.
In People v. Naquita, we expressly declared that non-compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 does not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Page 342 of 350

2015)
Furthermore Dela Cruz did not present any evidence at all to substantiate his allegation that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu presented as evidence at his trial had been
compromised at some point. To the contrary, records show that there had been substantial
compliance with the prescribed procedure.
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's
assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Not finding any arbitrariness or oversight on the part of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
we have no reason to set aside their factual findings.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELLY ULAMA y ARRISMA
The failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph the confiscated items in the manner
prescribed under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 cannot be used as a ground for
Arrismas exoneration from the charge against him/her.
Facts:
Having received confidential information from an informant about the drug trafficking
activities of Nelly Ulama y Arrisma, Barangay Chairman Rodolfo Doromal convened a group of
Makati Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operatives to plan and carry out a buy-bust operation.
In coordination with the Makati Police Station, Drug Enforcement Unit and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team composed of PO2 Rodrigo Igno, MADAC operatives
Edison Bill, Leo Sese, Antonio Banzon proceeded to the corner of Dapitan and San Nicholas Streets,
Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City where according to the informant, Arrisma was conducting
her illegal trade. MADAC operative Edison Bill was designated as poseur-buyer who kept the
marked buy-bust money.
Negotiations ensued, until the poseur-buyer signaled the members of the team that the deal
was consummated. PO2 Rodrigo Igno with MADAC operatives Leo Sese and Antonio Banzon who
were just nearby immediately rushed to the scene. They disclosed their identity as police officer
and MADAC operatives and effected the arrest of Arrisma.
In her defense, Nelly Ulama y Arrisma argues that the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody of the confiscated items because it was not made clear if the plastic sachet of shabu
allegedly confiscated from her was the same specimen examined at the crime laboratory. In support
of this argument, Arrisma points to the fact that the chief investigator who allegedly brought the
Page 343 of 350

2015)
seized item to the crime laboratory was not presented to testify before the proceedings in the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether the chain of custody of the illegal drugs taken from Arrisma firmly established
Ruling:
Yes, there is enough evidence which can account for the crucial links in the chain of custody
of the confiscated plastic sachet of shabu starting from its seizure from Arrisma up to its
examination by the forensic chemist.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identities of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
A thorough review of the records would indicate that the foregoing requisites are present in
the case at bar. The proof of the drug transaction was established by prosecution witness Edison
Bill (Bill), the poseur-buyer, who made a positive identification of the appellant as the one who gave
him the plastic sachet which contained shabu and to whom he gave the marked money during the
buy-bust operation.
Moreover, Arrismas allegation that the chain of custody of the illegal drugs taken from her
was not firmly established cannot be countenanced. On the contrary, there is enough evidence
which can account for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachet of
shabu starting from its seizure from Arrisma up to its examination by the forensic chemist.
The records would indicate that, immediately after Arrismas arrest and in her presence,
poseur-buyer Bill marked the plastic sachet with the markings NAU. This piece of evidence was
turned over directly to the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) under the Office of the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Makati City Police Station where it was included in the items subject to
laboratory examination by the PNP Crime Laboratory of the Southern Police District Office as
indicated in the Request for Laboratory Examination dated April 10, 2003 which was signed by
Police Senior Inspector (PSINSP) Leandro Mendoza Abel, the chief of the DEU.
An examination of the lower left portion of the said document would bear out a mark stamp
of the PNP Crime Laboratory showing that the request letter along with the accompanying evidence
specimens was delivered by poseur-buyer Bill at 4:45 p.m. on April 10, 2003.
Furthermore, Physical Science Report which was signed and prepared by PINSP Maria Ana
Rivera-Dagasdas (Rivera-Dagasdas) indicates that the plastic sachet with the markings NAU, which
was recovered from appellant and listed as item D in the said document, yielded 0.3 grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. The same report likewise
indicates that the evidence specimen was received at 4:45 p.m. on April 10, 2003 and that the
Page 344 of 350

2015)
laboratory examination conducted by PINSP Rivera-Dagasdas was completed at 6:45 p.m. on the
same date.
The Court is aware of the stringent requirements laid down in Section 21, paragraph 1 of
Republic Act No. 9165 which states that:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately,
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
However, minor deviations from the foregoing procedure would not necessarily result in an
acquittal. In the past, we have also declared that the failure to conduct an inventory and to
photograph the confiscated items in the manner prescribed under the said provision of law cannot
be used as a ground for Arrismas exoneration from the charge against him/her.
Thus, the conviction of Arrisma must be sustained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO NACUA
Marking of the seized drugs must be done immediately after they are seized from the accused
and failure to do so suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delict. Marking of the seized drugs
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Facts:
Police Officer (PO) 3 Cirilo R. Luague (Luague) and POl Julius B. Anifion (Anifion) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Cebu City executed and filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu a Joint Affidavit charging Reynaldo Nacua and his common-law wife, Teresita
Villanueva-Nacua (Teresita), of selling and delivering methamphetamine hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, at their residence in Cebu City.
According to their Joint Affidavit, PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion were instructed to conduct a
surveillance of the house of accused-appellant and Teresita (Nacua couple) based on information
from a "police asset" that the said couple was illegally trading shabu. PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion,
with the help of their informant, executed a "test-buy" operation, during which, PO3 Luague and
PO1 Anion bought and received from the Nacua couple a sachet of suspected shabu. The police
officers immediately submitted the sachet and its contents for forensic examination at the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office (RCLO), which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Page 345 of 350

2015)
RTC of Cebu City granted P/Insp. Agustins application and issued Search Warrant,
authorizing the search of the residence of the Nacua couple and seizure of undetermined quantity
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, locally known as Shabu. PO3 Luague and
PO1 Anion, together with Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Elmo Y. Rosales (Rosales) and PO1 Julius S.
Regis (Regis), implemented the search warrant at the house of the Nacua couple. Also present at the
house during the search were Barangay Councilor Omar D. Durano, Sr. and Barangay Tanod Carlito
Murillo. In the course thereof, the police officers found and seized the items at the house of the
Nacua couple and consequently, the police officers immediately arrested the Nacua couple.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
indict the Nacua couple for violation of Article 2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said Office
reasoned that the purpose of a "test-buy operation" is different from a "buy-bust operation;" and
that "[t]he former is conducted for the purpose of applying for a search warrant, and the latter is
conducted when it is difficult to locate the residence of the accused or when his identity or name
cannot be determined with absolute certainty."
RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and affirmed by Court of Appeals with modification the RTC judgment.
In his Brief, Reynaldo maintains that aside from the testimonies of the police officers, no
other credible evidence was offered to substantiate the alleged sale of shabu. The consideration for
the purported sale, an essential element of the crime charged, was not at all proved as no "test-buy"
money was recovered from him and Teresita. Reynaldo likewise bewails the total lack of
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, intended to safeguard the integrity and
evidentiary value of the shabu he purportedly sold and delivered to the police officers during the
purported "test-buy" . He cites jurisprudence applying the chain of custody rule in dangerous and
illegal drugs cases, which require that the marking of the seized items must be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon its confiscation, to truly ensure
that the seized items are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not there Nacua Couple are guilty of selling and delivering methamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as shabu?
Ruling:
No. They are not guilty of selling and delivering methamphetamine hydrochloride, also
known as shabu due to lack of compliance with the requirements of law and jurisprudence.
Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance
itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Of paramount importance, therefore, in these
cases is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt.
Given the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by
Page 346 of 350

2015)
accident or otherwise, there must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be
observed during and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the
custody and transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
Such measures are described with particularity under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.
9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165,
which read:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Section 21(a) of the IRR of Rep. Act No. 9165: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Moreover, in People v. Coreche, the Court emphasized that the marking of the seized drugs
must be done immediately after they are seized from the accused and failure to do so suffices to
rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and raises reasonable
doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti. Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking
of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
Page 347 of 350

2015)
until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
In this case, there was a total disregard of the requirements of law and jurisprudence. The
prosecution even admits that the police officers acquired the sachet of shabu presented in court
against accused-appellant in a mere "test-buy" operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, and PO1
Anion. The police officers, after supposedly buying the sachet of shabu from the Nacua couple for
Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the residence of the Nacua couple, without recovering the
marked money or effecting the couples arrest. The police officers brought the sachet of suspected
shabu all the way back to their police station, and only there marked the said item, without the
presence of the accused and/or other disinterested witnesses.
While the Court allows for relaxation of the rules in some cases, there must be compelling
and justifiable grounds for the same and it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items have been properly preserved. However, such conditions are not present in the
instant case.
Firstly, the prosecution did not offer any explanation as to why the police officers failed to
strictly comply with the established procedure for the custody of the suspected shabu. The Court
can only surmise that the operation was only meant to be a "test-buy," so that the police officers
could secure a search warrant for the house of the Nacua couple. There was no original intention to
arrest and charge the Nacua couple for the shabu purchase that day. Surprisingly and inexplicably,
however, the prosecution chose to indict the Nacua couple for the "test-buy", rather than for the
result of the search conducted at the house of the Nacua couple which purportedly yielded more
shabu and related paraphernalia and led to the arrest of the couple. Secondly, the prosecution failed
to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of suspected shabu allegedly bought
from the Nacua couple during the "test-buy" operation has been properly preserved from the time
said item was transmitted to the crime laboratory up to its presentation in court. No evidence was
offered to show as to how the said specimen was kept and by whom after its forensic examination
throughout its presentation in court.
With reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti, the acquittal of accusedappellant of the crime charged is in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO ANDY SOMOZA y HANDAYA
Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation.
Facts:
The prosecution established that, sometime during the first week of July 2005, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received confidential information that Reynaldo Andy Somoza
(Somoza) is engaged in the repacking and selling of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, and conducting his business in his residence at Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City.
Page 348 of 350

2015)
The NBI coordinated with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Dumaguete City and discreet
inquiries and surveillance were made to verify the information.
In the course of the surveillance, PO1 Bautista was able to gain the trust of Somoza to the
point of pretending to agree to be his girlfriend. This led to a positive test buy of P600.00 worth of
shabu from Somoza by PO1 Bautista and PO1 Moreno.
To facilitate the execution of the plan, PO1 Bautista sent Somoza a text message asking
where he was. Somoza replied that he was not at his house and instructed PO1 Bautista to proceed
to Oracion Drive in Barangay Looc where he would wait for her by the roadside. PO1 Bautista and
PO1 Moreno were designated as poseur-buyers with the rest of the members serving as backup.
The team was to be accompanied by Rogelio Talavera, Kagawad of Barangay Looc, and media
representative Reysan Elloren.
However, someone from inside the adjacent house shouted to alert Somoza that he was
going to be arrested. Somoza scampered away and tried to scale a concrete fence but the law
enforcers caught up with him. Before being captured, however, he threw away on the other side of
the fence some of the marked bills and a metallic tube containing a tooter. A coin purse with six
sachets containing powdered crystalline substance was found in his pocket when he was searched.
Only P800.00 worth of marked money, consisting of the P500.00 bill and three pieces of P100.00
bills, was recovered.
NBI Agent Celon marked the items recovered from the scene immediately after Somozas
apprehension. The remaining sachet bought by PO1 Bautista was marked as BBRS01, 18 the six
sachets found in the coin purse as POSRS01 to POSRS06 and the metallic tube as POSRS21 July
05. The marking was witnessed by Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren.
NBI Agent Celon proceeded to conduct an inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust
operation. He prepared two receipts one for the sachet bought by PO1 Bautista from Somoza
and the recovered marked bills worth P800.00, and another receipt for the six sachets and the
metallic tooter. The inventory receipts were signed by Kagawad Talavera, media representative
Elloren, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Manuel Sanchez of PDEA, and Dumaguete City Assistant
Prosecutor Nilo Sarsaba.
Somoza was subsequently brought to the NBI office for booking and documentation. He
was photographed with the seized items in front of him and the incident was entered in the PDEA
blotter.
In the morning of the following day, NBI Agent Celon made a return of the search warrant
with prayer to retain custody of the seized items. The court approved the request and NBI Agent
Celon received the items. He proceeded to bring them to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Dumaguete
City for chemical examination. Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Maria Ana Dagasdas, forensic
chemical officer, received the items and examined them. She then prepared Chemistry Report No.
D1332005 and a sworn Certification to the effect that the sachet marked as BBRS01 contained 0.5
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the six sachets marked as POSRS01 to POSRS06
contained an aggregate of 0.69 gram of the same prohibited substance.
Page 349 of 350

2015)
For his part, Somozas defense was denial. He disclaimed possessing or selling shabu on the
day he was arrested. According to him, on the said date, his friend Victor Asunio invited him to the
latters birthday party at Oracion Drive. When he arrived at the venue at around 2:00 in the
afternoon, only Asunio and two ladies were there. The ladies turned out to be PO1 Bautista and
PO1 Moreno. Asunio told him to wait for awhile as Asunio was still doing something. Asunio went
out and, moments after, shouted a warning that Somoza would be arrested. Somoza immediately
went out of Asunios house and ran away but several persons suddenly appeared, blocked his path
and arrested him. He was handcuffed and bodily searched but the police officers found nothing. He
was then shown a copy of a search warrant and told that it was for him. He was thereafter boarded
in a police car and brought to his house. A search was made in his place but nothing illegal was
found there. He was subsequently brought to the NBI office where he was photographed and
documented.
The trial court disregarded the Somozas defense for its inherent weakness and gave full
faith and credence to the testimony of the law enforcers. It found no improper motive or ill will on
the part of said law enforcers to testify against him. Their testimonies, credible and consistent,
corroborated by the statements of Kagawad Talavera and media representative Elloren and backed
by object and documentary evidence sufficiently established the guilt of Somoza.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody was not broken to support the conviction of Somoza.
Ruling:
No. The chain of custody was not broken.
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus delicti, which is
the dangerous drug itself. Such chain of custody should show that the dangerous drug sold by or in
the possession of the accused is the same dangerous drug seized from the said accused and taken
into custody by the apprehending officer, marked and subjected to physical inventory by the
apprehending officer, submitted to the PDEA or PNP forensic laboratory, subjected by the forensic
laboratory examiner to laboratory examination the results of which are contained in a sworn
certification, and presented to the court as evidence against the accused. This is to ensure the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items and preclude the possibility of alteration,
tampering or substitution of substance in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug.
Nevertheless, a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Page 350 of 350

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008- Remedial Law