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G.R.No.L46746

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.L46746March15,1990
LIGAYAGAPUSANCHUA,petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALSandPROSPEROPARCON,respondents.
CitizensLegalAssistanceOfficeforpetitioner.
GilB.Parrenoforrespondent.

NARVASA,J.:
Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue onApril 6, 1966 in Bacolod City. Neither her
survivingspouse,ProsperoParcon,norherotherknownrelativesthree(3)sistersandanephewmadeany
movetosettleherestatejudicially.
ItwasLigayaGapusanChua,claimingtobeanacknowledgednaturaldaughterofFelisaGapusanParcon,who
institutedjudicialproceedingsforthesettlementofthelatter'sestate.AboutayearandeightmonthsafterFelisa's
demise,oronJanuary15,1968,LigayafiledwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceofNegrosOccidentalapetitionfor
the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. 1 She also sought her
designationasSpecialAdministratrixpendingherappointmentasregularadministratrix.2

ByOrderdatedJanuary16,1968,theCourtappointedLigayaSpecialAdministratrixofFelisaParcon'sestate.
OnApril22,1968,ProsperoParcon,FelisaParcon'ssurvivinghusband,filedamotionforreconsiderationofthe
OrderofJanuary16,1968.3HedeniedthatLigayawasanacknowledgednaturalchildofhisdeceasedwife,andapplied
forhisownappointmentasadministratorofhiswife'sestate.4

HearingswerehadontheissueofLigayaclaimedaffiliation.Ligayapresented,amongotherproofs,5the following
documents:

a)FelisaParcon'sswornstatementofassetsandliabilitieswhereinLigayaisnamedanddescribed
asthedaughterofFelisa(Exh.4)
b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her (Felisa's)
daughter(Exh.3)
c)CheckNo.44046oftheGovernmentServiceInsuranceSysteminthesumofP505.50paidtoher
(Ligaya)ashershareinthedeathbenefitsduetheheirsofFelisaParcon(Exh.2)and
d)afamilyphotograph,showingLigayabesidethedeceased(Exh.1).
Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits did not constitute conclusive
proofofherclaimedstatusofacknowledgednaturalchild,forthereasonthat:
a)anotherdocument,Felisa'sapplicationformembershipinNegrosOccidentalTeachers'Federation
(NOTF),merelynamedLigayaasher"adopteddaughter"
b) in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS insurance policy, supra,
LigayawasallocatedonlyP500.00whereasProsperoreceivedP1,000.00and
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c) Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and ViceMayor Solomon Mendoza travelled from afar to
affirm before the Probate Court on the witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, 6
Mrs.Papasin'stestimonybeingthatin1942anunknown"drifter"hadsoldLigaya,thenaninfant,toFelisa.

TheProbateCourtfoundforLigaya.ItsOrderdatedApril16,1969disposedasfollows:7
WHEREFORE,itisherebydeclaredthatpetitioneristheacknowledgednaturalchildofthelateFelisa
Gapusan, and for being the next of kin of the deceased (Rule 78, Rules of Court), she is hereby
appointed regular administratrix of the properties of the abovementioned deceased with the same
bondgivenbyherasspecialadministratrix,withcostsagainsttheoppositors.
Onappealseasonablyperfected,theCourtofAppeals(FourthDivision),inaDecisiondatedApril13,1977,(1)
set aside the Probate Court's Order of January 16, 1968 (appointing Ligaya SpecialAdministratrix) and ofApril
16,1969(declaringherthedecedent'sacknowledgednaturalchildandappointingherregularadministratrix),and
(2)appointedProsperoParconregularadministratorofhiswife'sestate.InthatCourt'sview,theevidenceatbest
showed merely that Ligaya had been treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this did "not constitute
acknowledgment"but"onlyagroundtocompelrecognition"andthatLigayahadfailedtoestablishthatshehad
been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance withArticle 278 of the Civil Code (Article 131 of the Civil Code of
1889).AppealhasinturnbeentakenfromthisjudgmenttothisCourtbyLigayaGapusanChua.
Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently establish her status as the
acknowledgednaturalchildofFelisaParcon,andthatherappointmentasregularadministratrixisjustifiedbylaw
andjurisprudence.
Moreparticularly,shecontendsthattheswornstatementofassetsandliabilities,apublicdocumentsubmittedby
the decedent pursuant to a legal requirement therefor, and the latter's application for life insurance were in law
indubitablerecognitionbyhermotherofherstatusasanacknowledgednaturalchild,voluntarilymade,andwere
adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements, she alleges, were
"authenticwritings"incontemplationofArticle278oftheCivilCode:
Art.278.Recognitionshallbemadeintherecordofbirth,awill,astatementbeforeacourtofrecord,
orinanyauthenticwriting.
These, she contends, together with her treatment as a daughter by Felisa a fact found to have been
established by the evidence by both the Trial Court and the Court ofAppeals eliminate all doubt about the
juridicalverityofherrecognitionasanaturalchild.
ProsperoParcondisagrees.Hearguesthat,asruledbytheCourtofAppeals,thestatementsdesignatingLigaya
asFelisa'sdaughtermerelyfurnishedgroundforLigayatocompelrecognitionbyactionwhich,however,should
have been brought during the lifetime of the putative parent in accordance with Article 285 of the Civil Code,
readingasfollows:
Art.285.Theactionfortherecognitionofnaturalchildrenmaybebroughtonlyduringthelifetimeof
thepresumedparents,exceptinthefollowingcases:
(1)Ifthefatherormotherdiedduringtheminorityofthechild,inwhichcasethelattermayfilethe
actionbeforetheexpirationoffouryearsfromtheattainmentofhismajority
(2)Ifafterthedeathofthefatherorofthemotheradocumentshouldappearofwhichnothinghad
beenheardandinwhicheitherorbothparentsrecognizethechild.
Inthiscase,theactionmustbecommencedwithinfouryearsfromthefindingofthedocument.
Since, Parcon continues, no such action was instituted prior to the death of Felisa, proof of the "authentic
document" (sworn statement of assets and liabilities) in the proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate
wasinefficaciousasbasisforadeclarationoffiliationorheirship.
TheissuethuspresentediswhetherornotFelisa'sswornstatementofassetsandliabilitiesandherapplication
forinsuranceare"authenticwritings"whicheffectivelyoperatedasarecognitionofLigayaGapusanChuaasher
naturalchild,evenifnoactionwasbroughtbythelattertocompeltheformer,duringherlifetime,torecognizeher
assuch.
Recognitionofnaturalchildrenmaybevoluntaryorcompulsory.8
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed
parent,expressedintheformprescribedbytheCivilCode.Itsessenceliesintheavowaloftheparentthatthe
childishistheformalityisaddedtomaketheadmissionincontestable,inviewofitsconsequences."9Theformis
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prescribedbyArticle278oftheCivilCode,earlieradvertedtoitprovidesthatavoluntaryrecognition"shallbemadeinthe
recordofbirth,awill,astatementbeforeacourtofrecord,orinanyauthenticwriting."10

Compulsoryrecognitionissometimesalsocalledjudicialrecognition,todistinguishitfromthatwhichisapurely
voluntaryactoftheparent. 11Itisrecognitiondecreedbyfinaljudgmentofacompetentcourt.ItisgovernedbyArticles
283and284,settingforththecasesinwhichthefatherormother,respectively,isobligedtorecognizeanaturalchild,and
Article 285 providing that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
thepresumedparents.12

The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary recognition is dealt with in
Article281oftheCivilCode.13
Art.281.Achildwhoisofagecannotberecognizedwithouthisconsent.
Whentherecognitionofaminordoesnottakeplaceinarecordofbirthorinawill,judicialapproval
shallbenecessary.
A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his
majority.
Inotherwords,judicialapprovalisnotneededifarecognitionisvoluntarilymade
1)ofapersonwhoisofage,onlyhisconsentbeingnecessaryor
2)ofaminorwhoseacknowledgmentiseffectedinarecordofbirthorinawill.
Ontheotherhand,judicialapprovalisneedfuliftherecognitionoftheminoriseffected,notthrougharecordof
birthorinawillbutthroughastatementinacourtofrecordoranauthenticdocument.Inanycasetheindividual
recognizedcanimpugntherecognitionwithinfouryearsfollowingtheattainmentofhismajority.14
Now,therearenolessthanthree(3)writingssubmittedinevidenceinthiscaseinwhichFelisaGapusanParcon
describesLigayaGapusanChuaasherdaughter,viz.:
a)Felisa'sswornstatementofassetsandliabilities,inwhichshenamesanddescribesLigayaasher
daughter(Exh.4)
b)herapplicationforGSISlifeinsuranceinwhichsheagaindescribesLigayaasherdaughter(Exh.
3)and
c)herapplicationformembershipintheNegrosOccidentalTeachers'Federation,whereshenames
Ligayaasher"adopteddaughter"(Exh.1).
Eachofthesewritingsisundoubtedlyan"authenticwriting"withinthecontemplationofArticle278."An'authentic
writing'forpurposesofvoluntaryrecognition...(is)understoodasagenuineorindubitablewritingofthefather"
(ormother),including"apublicinstrument"(oneacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicorothercompetentofficial
withtheformalitiesrequiredbylaw),15and,ofcourse,apublicorofficialdocumentinaccordancewithSection20,Rule
132oftheRulesofCourt.TheswornstatementofassetsandliabilitiesfiledbyFelisaParconisapublicdocument,having
been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the law. So it has been held by this Court. 16 The other two
writingsabovementionedare,tobesure,notpublicdocuments,butthisisofnomomentneitherofthemhastobeapublic
documentinordertobecategorizedasan"authenticwriting."Itisenoughthattheyarethegenuineorindubitablewritingsof
FelisaGapusanParcon.Thatinoneofthewritings,Felisa'sapplicationformembershipintheNegrosOccidentalTeachers'
Federation, Felisa describes Ligaya as her "adopted" daughter is also inconsequential. It may be explained by her
reluctancetoconfesspubliclytohercolleaguesintheteachingprofessionthatshehadborneachildoutofwedlock.Itisin
any case a categorical avowal by Felisa that Ligaya is indeed her daughter, an admission entirely consistent with the two
other authentic writings executed by her in which she acknowledges Ligaya to be her daughter without qualification.
Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in conjunction with the undisputed fact that Ligaya had been
continuouslytreatedbyFelisaasherdaughter,thepropositionthatLigayawasindeedFelisa'sdaughterbecomeswellnigh
conclusive.

It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa to
compelhertorecognizeLigayaasherdaughter.ItisalsoevidentthatLigaya'srecognitionasFelisa'sdaughter
wasnotmadeinarecordofbirthorawill,acircumstancewhichwouldhavemadejudicialapprovalunnecessary,
onlyherownconsenttotherecognitionbeingrequired.Theacknowledgmentwasmadeinauthenticwritings,and
hence,conformablywiththelegalprovisionsabovecited,judicialapprovalthereofwasneededifthewritingshad
been executed during Ligaya's minority. 17 In other words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial
approvalnegatedtheeffectofthewritingsasamodeofrecognitionofLigayaisdependentuponthelatter'sageatthetime
thewritingsweremade.
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Thepointneednotbebelabored,however.ForwhetherLigayawerestillaminororalreadyofageatthetimeof
her recognition in the authentic writings mentioned, that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the
attendantfacts.
Inthefirstplace,theconsentrequiredbyArticle281ofapersonofagewhohasbeenvoluntarilyrecognizedmay
be given expressly or tacitly. 18 Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the
evidenceshowsthatshehasinfactconsentedthereto.Herconsenttoherrecognitionisnotonlyimplicitfromherfailureto
impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that
recognitioninthejudicialproceedingforthesettlementofhermother'sestateasbasisforherrightsthereto.Assumingon
the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was
necessary,theabsencethereofwascuredbyherratificationofthatrecognition,afterhavingreachedtheageofmajority,by
herinitiationoftheproceedingsforthesettlementofherdeceasedmother'sestateontheclaimpreciselythatshewasthe
decedent's acknowledged natural daughter. 19 The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly
intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment
made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." 20
"Therefore,thelack,orinsufficiencyofsuchapprovalisNOTadefectavailabletotherecognizingparentbutonewhichthe
minormayraiseorwaive.Ifafterreachingmajoritytheminorconsentstotheacknowledgment,thelackofjudicialapproval
should make no difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even
afterreachingtheageofmajority,theacknowledgmentpapersandtheuseoftheparent'ssurname.21

Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily
acknowledgednaturalchildofFelisaGapusanParcon.Sheisthereforeentitled,inaccordancewithArticle282of
theCivilCode,tobearhermother'ssurname,andtoreceivethehereditaryportionaccordedtoherbytheCode.
WHEREFORE,thechallengeddecisionoftheCourtofAppeals(FourthDivision)datedApril13,1977ishereby
REVERSEDANDSETASIDE,andtheOrdersoftheProbateCourtdatedJanuary16,1968appointingLigaya
GapusanChua Special Administratrix and of April 16, 1969 declaring said Ligaya GapusanChua the
decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing her regular administratrix are REINSTATED AND
HEREBYAFFIRMED,withoutpronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Cruz,Gancayco,GrioAquinoandMedialdea,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1DocketedasSp.ProceedingsNo.8427ofBranch5ofsaidCourt.
2Rollo,p.10.
3Thedecedent'ssistersalsoopposedLigaya'spetition.
4Id.,pp.1011.
5HerowntestimonyregardingFelisa'srevelationsthatLigayawashernaturalchild,herfatherbeing
GaudiosodeMonteverdeandthatofRosarioEdar,regardingthestatementofdeMonteverdethat
LigayawashisdaughterbyFelisaGapusan.Rollo,pp.2425.
6Id.,pp.1213.
7Id.,p.28.
8SEE,e.g.,Castrov.C.A.,etal.,G.R.Nos.5097475,May31,1989,inwhichitisalsopointedout
thatundertheFamilyCode(Exec.OrderNo.209,July6,1987,asamendedbyExec.OrderNo.
227,July17,1987),thereareonlytwoclassesofchildren,legitimateandillegitimate,and"thefine
distinctionsamongvarioustypesofillegitimatechildrenhavebeeneliminated"(TitleVI)andthat
illegitimatechildrenmayestablishtheirfiliation"inthesamewayandonthesameevidenceas
legitimatechildren"(Art.175).
9Caguioa,CommentsandCasesonCivilLaw,3rded.(1967),Vol.1,p.375.
10TheFamilyCode,suprawhichhas"retroactiveeffectinsofarasitdoesnotprejudiceorimpair
vestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws"(Art.256)providesthat
thefiliationoflegitimate(orillegitimate)childrenmaybeestablishedby(a)therecordofbirth
appearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgment,or(2)anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublic
documentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentsignedbytheparentconcernedandintheabsenceof
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theforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationmaybeprovedby(a)theopenandcontinuous
possessionofthestatusofalegitimatechildor(b)anyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourt
andspeciallaws(Art.172).
11Tolentino,CivilCode,CommentariesandJurisprudence,1983ed.,Vol.1,p.577,citing5Sanches
Roman1033.
12Art.173oftheFamilyCodedeclaresthattheactiontoclaimlegitimacymaybebroughtbythe
childduringhisorherlifetimeandshallbetransmittedtotheheirsshouldthechilddieduring
minorityorinastateofinsanity.Inthecases,theheirsshallhaveaperiodoffiveyearswithinwhich
toinstitutetheaction.Theactionalreadycommencedbythechildshallsurvivenotwithstandingthe
deathofeitherorbothoftheparties.
13NotreproducedintheFamilyCode.
14TheredoesnotappeartobeanyprovisionintheFamilyCodegoverningimpugnationbythe
recognizedchildofhisrecognition.WhattheCodedoesdealwithisanactiontoimpugnbythe
husbandortheheirsofthepersonrecognizing(Arts.170,171).
15Tolentino,op.cit.,p.585,citingPareja,etal.,v.Pareja,etal.,95Phil.167Limv.C.A.,65SCRA
160,161Padilla,CivilLaw,1975ed.,Vol.1,pp.96101,citingGustilov.Gustilo,14SCRA149,
Varelav.Villanueva,etal.,95Phil.248,anddecisionsoftheCourtofAppeals.
16Parejav.Pareja,95Phil.167,citedinCaguioa,op.cit.,p.379.
17Art.281,CivilCode.
18Donadov.Donado,55Phil.861,citedinCaguioa,op.cit.,p.382.
19ApacibleAguilarv.Castillo,74Phil.589,citedinParas,CivilCodeofthePhilippinesAnnotated,
11thed.(1984),Vol.1,pp.676677,andinCaguioa,op.cit.,p.382.
20Caguioa,op.cit.,p.385,citingGuariav.Guaria,L15707,Oct.31,1960andApaciblev.
Castillo,74Phil.589.
21Paras,op.cit.,p.677,citingJavelonav.Monteclaro,74Phil.393Apaciblev.Castillo,74Phil.
589,supraGuariaetal.v.GuariaCasas,109Phil.1111.
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