1. QUIAO V. QUIAO ; G.R.

No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days
later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the
term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129
on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will
govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in
the conjugal partnership NO.

3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family
code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same
are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner
acquired
vested
rights
over
half
of
the
properties
of
the ConjugalPartnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husbandand wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of
the conjugalproperties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal
separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples
properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established
that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them
is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido
states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left
with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnershipof
gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common
fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of thepartnership, the net gains
or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner
the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest
we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.

Quiaov.Quiao,G.R.No.183622,July4,2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another
woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties
pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the
custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective
legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006,
Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define Nets
Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT
EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted
to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples property
relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial
vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under
this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property
of the conjugal partnership of gains.

2. ELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRER

FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Germany on September 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by the parents of
respondent.
In 1992, the spouses decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines.
During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the house of his parents which he
sold. The proceeds of the sale were used to purchase a parcel of land in

Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of the house (P528,000 and P2,300,000
respectively).
The Antipolo property was registered under the name of Elena Murrer.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking,
and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed for a separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon city.
On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between the spouses Muller.
The court also decreed the separation of properties between the spouses
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country excluding those acquired by gratuitous title.
Helmut Muller said that he is not praying for the transfer of ownership of the
property but of the reimbursement of his personal funds.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to the
reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?
HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is not entitled to the reimbursement of the funds used
to purchase the Antipolo property. The Constitution prohibits alien from
acquiring private lands in the Philippines for the conservation of the national
patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines
is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To
allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of
a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity where it is clear that he purchased the property
despite constitutional prohibition. Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2 006.html
3. VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN
FACTS: Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful
married life.
They were blessed to have one son.
Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour.
The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent Dita
Maquilan and the paramour.
Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and
were sentenced to suffer imprisonment.

 Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages on 2001.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent entered into
a Compromise Agreement.
Partial settlements are as follows: - P500,000.00 of the money deposited in
the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and
deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the
deposit in the joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit,
which presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided
equally by the parties; - The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff
shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for te defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of
the store in full settlement thereof. - The motorcycles shall be divided
between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while
the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant; - The passenger jeep shall be
for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his
share thereon and in full settlement thereof; - The house and lot shall be to
the common child.
The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
said agreement.
The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made
by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
valid.
HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void
because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was
convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal
property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner said
that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under
Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code. To the petitioner, it is the clear
intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from
sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites
Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for
legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These
arguments are specious. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise
Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty
spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. The conviction of adultery
does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Neither could it be said that
the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis,

he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument of the

petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the
legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or
vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for
repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/15540 9.htm
4. BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
FACTS:
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros
Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for
distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired
through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to the
respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots 1 and
2142 as co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the
two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.

An Alien Cannot Seek Reimbursement On The Ground Of Equity Where It Is Clear

That He Willingly And Knowingly Bought The Property Despite The Prohibition
Against Foreign Ownership Of Land

The Facts:
Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March
29, 1980. Their marriage was declared a nullity by the RTC on
November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem
filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of
properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.
Among the properties included in the inventory were several lots and
residential house, described below:
1. a Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 &
2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of

252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house
constructed thereon.
2. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a
residential house constructed thereon.
3. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
4. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 &
2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.

During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of Avelina, but it was purchased using funds he
received from the Dutch government as disability benefit, and Avelina
had no sufficient income to purchase the properties. On the other hand,
Avelina alleged that except for the two residential houses and Lots 1 and
2142, all the other lots were her paraphernal properties and acquired
thru her funds.
After trial the RTC disposed of the properties as follows: It awarded to
Willem several personal properties (tools and equipments), the two
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 were declared as co-owned by
Willem and Avelina as there was no prohibition on aliens owning
buildings and houses and were acquired during the marital union. On
the other hand, all the lots covered by several TCTs were declared
paraphernal properties , though acquired during the marriages, in view of
the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real property in the
Philippines. On appeal to the CA, Willem asserted that all the money
for the purchase of the lots came from his funds, and were registered
only in the name of Avelina because of the constitutional prohibition,
hence he prayed for reimbursement of one half of the value of the lots.
The CA disagreed, ruling that he cannot invoke equity when he very well
knew the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning real property in the
Philippines. Thus, Willem elevated his case to the Supreme Court to
assail the RTC and CA decision.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the
purchase price of the lots subject of the case.
The Courts ruling:
The petition lacks merit.

The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For

Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller1 the
Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of
purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut
Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It
held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
land2 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is well aware of the
[above-cited] constitutional prohibition3 and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject
properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed
his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the
Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not
be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.4

In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the

funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of
his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit
that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,5 he
likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire
the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is
now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever
over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot
be done directly6. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces
no legal effect at all.7 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil
Code,8 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or
allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.9 Indeed, one cannot salvage any
rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the
basis of unjust enrichment10. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also
involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent
on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does
not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code
which reads:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or

any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem
verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto
doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing
an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering
the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated
in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at
all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary
to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.11 (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his
foreign citizenship12. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon,
such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the
national patrimony13 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed

October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 195670, December 03, 2012, WILLEM

BEUMER, PETITIONER, VS. AVELINA AMORES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
5. Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289
Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the
USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia
states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live with his
mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he
renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the
Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for
divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial
decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia.
Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC since the marriage has already been
dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community because
they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony.
Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to David,
subject to the payment of the childrens legitimes. Upon Leticias appeal to
the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally
between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David
argues that the Court should have recognized the California judgment that
awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in
the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already
owns all the US properties.
Issues:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper
Held: 1.No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule
132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may

be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be
authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule
states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct
copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented
in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
2.
Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following
shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: xxxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in
fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was
not tackled in the trial courts decisioc because, the trial Court erroneously
treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having
established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one
year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.

6. Valdes vs. RTC, 260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the FC, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the
custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
Valdez vs RTC
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring
their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and
to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
"unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering
that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties
for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed,
arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties
are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and
129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies
to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at
bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included
in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by
both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.
The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed
in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home"
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749.
July 31, 1996).
7. Buenaventura vs. CA

Facts:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. (Note: So
there are two sets of children here.)

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real
property executed by Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their codefendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names.

The plaintiffs in this case sought for the declaration of nullity of the six deeds of
sale and certificates of title in favor of the defendants.

They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio because they
are simulated.

They said that: a. Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of
sale xxx over the properties in litis; b. Secondly, assuming that there was consideration
in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold
times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein; c. Thirdly, the deeds of
sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees);
and d. Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of
action against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles
over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and
made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the
consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued
with sufficient factual and legal basis.

RTC ruled in favor of the defendants (respondents in this case) and dismissed
the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA upheld RTCs ruling.

Issues:
1. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration. NO
2. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price. NO

Held:

1st issue: There was a consideration.

If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is
valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment.
If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but
subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price,
because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void.
Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated,
the sale is void.

It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
sale.
Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of
the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the
fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the
latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely
simulated.
To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating
that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to

her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. The
trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible.

Petitioners failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of

knowledge of their respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.
On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence plainly
showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the
purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing
of the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent
father.

2nd issue: The general rule is that inadequacy of consideration shall not
invalidate a contract.

Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
(Emphasis supplied)

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some
other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of
the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there
is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of
sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what
they gave.

Ruling: In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price
stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by
the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us. WHEREFORE,
we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
8. John abing vs Juliet Waeyan
Facts:
In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. In December
1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter
deposited in their joint account. In 1992, their house was renovated and to it was
annex a structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1994, Juliet returned.
In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They
executed

a Memorandum of

Agreement.

Unfortunately,

the

document

was

left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of
P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum
of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34
to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the
annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her.
John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his
own funds and thru the money he borrowed from his relatives. He added that the
tax declaration for the structure was under his name.
Issue:
Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?
Held:
No. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he
borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence
is wanting to support such naked claim.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She
is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. Juliet's failure to pay
John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise
to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement
and not for ejectment. (John Abing vs Juliet Waeyan, G.R. NO. 146294, July 31, 2006)
http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/05/abing-vs-waeyandigest.html#sthash.UgnOJnAx.dpuf

9. Agapay vs. Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left
to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia
was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957,
Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in
the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child
Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979,
they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get
back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by
Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded
in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with
Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution.

If actual

contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of

equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of
buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court
that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the
land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who
was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering
his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as

her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without
judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the
deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim
that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The
lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997

FACTS;
Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his
second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a
parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also
purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their

conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a
complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house
and lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties,
particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:
No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude

that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there
being no proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor
of their daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted
from the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.

10.

MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriage]

FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During
their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business
flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely
in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a
complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages
against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between
them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not

married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting
marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved
in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.
Both with subsisting marriage
During union had properties and businesses
Due to irreconcilable differences separated
Castillo filed for co ownership
Mallilin contended that coownership cannot apply
Each exclusive property shall be divided and not shared Article 148

actual joint contribution of money, property or industry

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to
marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where coownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage

11. JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC,

BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE
and GINA S. REY
October 25, 2012 Leave a comment

FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their

9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former
was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article
148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal.

12. Property Relationship In

A Void Marriage
In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married man
cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real
property and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they
parted. He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of
limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru her
own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the
CA reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal,
he contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property
because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC,
for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be
legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with
Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the
same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. (Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual
contribution is required. (Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650,

April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29,
2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is
not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the
property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise
the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact
that his claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated
March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he
fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent.
In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find
no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated,
petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial
courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In
contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property

from earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property.

13.

G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR, respondent.

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in
love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was
issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature
remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner
for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and
a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner
sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the
name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer
and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the
owner thereof.

RULINGS:
1.

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute.
At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used
to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the
owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in
the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to
transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the
respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the
mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does
not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owne

14.