End Flash Gas Compressor discharge NRV blockage

Alert no: PTU-AW-201101

Shell Global Solutions

June 2011

For Information Purposes Only

Target audience for this alert

Process engineers, Process safety engineers

Rotating equipment engineers

What happened
This LFI discusses an incident at an LNG site which involved blockage of a Non Return Valve (NRV) in
the discharge of the End Flash Gas (EFG) compressor, resulting in relief of hydrocarbons to the Flare and
some production loss. This incident was rated as Medium by the site as per their Risk Assessment Matrix.
Before the incident both LNG trains were on stable operation at maximum capacity. At some point the
End Flash Compressor (1K-1450) discharge pressure rapidly increased from 24 bar(g) to 33 bar(g) and
compressor load increased up to 11.2 MW while the relieve valve in the discharge (114RV-116) opened
to flare. As a result of this the Fuel Gas pressure dropped which was quickly picked up by the backup
systems. After this the MCHE outlet temperature was reduced to lower End Flash gas flow rate to 1K1450.
Further investigation showed that elevated pressure was present upstream of NRV-3. Downstream this
NRV the pressure was normal (24 barg). Therefore NRV-3 was suspected blocked.
The relief valve in the compressor discharge (114RV-116) is located between NRV-1 and NRV-2. The
function of these NRVs is to reduce the Consequence of Failure on Demand (CoFoD) of the compressor
discharge isolation valve (14UZV-410) that prevents backflow from the fuel gas system to the suction of
K-1450. Any blockage of NRV-1 could still lead to an unprotected overpressure scenario of the K-1450
discharge system (RAM C5).

RV102
SP 10.4

RV116
SP 35

NRV-1
NRV-2
End Flash Vessel

NRVs included to reduce Demand

Rate on 14RV102 & CoFoD of
backflow protection trip

Seal gas

NRV-3
Failed NRV
Fuel Gas System

Why it happened
X-ray scanning of NRV3 revealed that a nut was missing from hinge of NRV-3, the hinge was in vertical
position and flapper was missing and stuck in the body of the NRV. This was later confirmed, when
shutting down train 1 and opening up NRV-3 for inspection. NRV-3 was found damaged with a severe
wear of internals. Most likely flapper assembly damage started from pin/retaining nut loosening with
subsequent breakage by the force of the gas stream. The flapper partially blocked gas flow in the NRV
discharge.
The damaged NRV-3 was replaced with a new NRV which has a more secure nut retaining pin. These
particular NRVs are classified as class 1 NRVs and therefore should be on a regular plant inspection
program. This would reveal damage to the NRV before failure of the NRV.

Lessons learned
1. 14RV-116 tie in location was identified between two NRVs. The relief valve cannot protect the
compressor from overpressure by potential blockage of upstream NRV-1.
2. Flapper type NRVs can fail causing blockage for forward flow
3. Nowadays, buying specs for NRVs specify that the flapper and disc shall be positively secured
against loosening. Acceptable methods are by applying a retaining tab or by tack welding.
Unacceptable methods are the application of spring tension, split or cotter pins, without additional
tack welding.
4. NRVs which are classified as Class1 shall be put on the plant regular inspection program, shall
have a unique tag number and indicated on Process and Instrument Diagrams and Safeguarding
Memorandum.

Goal Zero: Zero injuries, Zero fatalities

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and/or affiliates of Shell ('Shell Global Solutions'), and your company, and is written for intended Shell use and not tailored for nonShell use, including Recipient's company. Although the LFI represent Shell Global Solutions good faith judgment of the matters
dealt with, they are merely provided for information only and for Recipients use by its qualified professionals, and should not be
relied upon as authoritative guidance in any particular situation. When relevant, Recipient shall seek advice from its own technical
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implied, concerning the accuracy, sufficiency or completeness of the information contained in any LFI Alert. Shell Global Solutions
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