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What was denazification?

How was it carried out by the major powers and how


successful was it?

“National Socialism is not a cult-movement - a movement for worship; it is exclusively a


'volkic' political doctrine based upon racial principles. In its purpose there is no mystic
cult, only the care and leadership of a people defined by a common blood-relationship.”1

The Fuhrer of Germany Adolf Hitler speaking highly of National Socialism in one of the
September 1938 Nuremburg rallies. Although Hitler makes National Socialism appear
noble, a problem is present in this ideology: racism. Where was Hitler’s conclusive proof
that such a mighty Aryan race existed? It was this aspect that made Nazism despised
throughout the west, especially with the horrifying discovery of the holocaust. Fascist
Nazism reigned over Germany until May 1945 when, on the 8th day, Germany
surrendered in the Second World War. With Hitler dead, the process of ridding Germany
of his racist Nazi legacy – denazification – began. Germany was subsequently split into
four different sections as agreed to at the Potsdam conference during July and August of
1945. Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France each gained a section of
Germany to preside over. Berlin, despite being in the Soviet’s section, was also
quartered. Although each nation had its own ideas on how to address Germany, they all
placed denazification high up on their respective agendas. However, their methods of
achieving this varied.

Britain occupied the northwest region. Historian Constantine FitzGibbon states in his
book Denazification that the Germans saw the British (as well as the Americans) as
“liberators.”2 To address denazification, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Forces (SHAEF) created a Special Branch. This Branch was given a list of rules and
regulations to use in the event of arresting or dismissing someone believed to be an active
Nazi. They were also given questionnaires known as the Fragebogen for the suspects to
fill in. However, the British forces were reluctant to carry out SHAEF policies in their
region, preferring to remove Nazi activists from positions of authority rather than carry
1
<http://www.hitler.org/speeches/09-06-38.html>
2
FitzGibbon, “Denazification”, Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1969 p87
out a full scale National Socialist purge like the Americans. General Robertson, the
British Military Governor, said “we wish the German administration…to be staffed with
people who are not dangerous to the aims of the occupation.”3 Effectively, the British
forces only wished to remove Nazis who opposed their objectives during the occupation
process. The first execution of British denazification policy was by ordering town mayors
to submit lists of officials highlighting their party affiliations. A Nazi discovered through
this process was either dismissed or interned as dangerous.

British Military Government officers would also base their denazification actions on an
instruction that defined Nazi removals in two different ways: dismissal and suspension.
Germans who were either members of the Nazi party before April 1933, held office in a
Nazi organisation or were employed by the Gestapo fell into the first category of
removal. Germans who were regarded as active Nazis or “convinced supporters of the
regime”4 fell into the second category. Ian Turner states in the book Reconstruction of
post-war Germany that Britain’s aim was to “remove the “big Nazis” whilst leaving
mere followers in peace.”5 This tactic proved to be a double edged sword: on one hand,
people who followed the Nazis as a result of intimidation and meant no harm to society
were spared from removal. However, this approach gave serious Nazi officials the
opportunity to lie low in less authoritative roles and re-emerge once the denazification
process was over. Therefore, the British denazification process experienced limited
success: it ensured a fair system of judging Germans on their roles in Nazi Germany
rather than by mere association, however it provided a way for the serious Nazi officials
to hide during the denazification process, thus not fully wiping out Nazi influence in the
region.

The Americans, predominantly situated in the southeast, carried out more elaborate
methods of denazification compared to the British. Professor Volker Rolf Berghahn states
in his book Modern Germany that the American officials were “convinced that Nazism

3
Turner, “Reconstruction in Post-War Germany”, Berg Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1989 p244
4
Turner, “Reconstruction in Post-War Germany”, Berg Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1989 p248
5
Turner, “Reconstruction in Post-War Germany”, Berg Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1989 p249
had been deeply ingrained in German society”6. To address this problem, “a thorough
purge followed by a re-education programme in liberal democracy”7 was required –
without doubt the Americans meant business. A key issue was re-educating the German
children with a new curriculum as “even subjects like arithmetic were infected with racist
and militarist ideology”8 according to historian Manfred Malzahn. Teachers from allied
countries along with new resources such as textbooks were brought in to ensure that
Nazism was no longer being taught in the schools. The first implementation of
denazification for adults came in the form of questionnaires issued out to all Germans
aged 18 and over, requiring them to explain their political beliefs. The results would then
determine which one of the five following categories the German was most suited to:
exonerated, follower, lesser offender, offender or major offender. The questionnaire
proved to be far more complex than anticipated: Germans categorised in the three most
severe groups lost not only their jobs and property but also some of their civil rights in
accordance to the programme. This led to criticism of the programme as well as a
growing list of appeals waiting to be heard by the end of 1945. To address this, the
Americans appointed a German-organised Lander government in March 1946. The
Lander government was relied on to assist in sorting out the problems caused by the
questionnaire. However, the government was rather ineffective in the handling of
denazification policies. Problems came about as a result of the differing regulations
between the Allied zones, leading to inequalities for the German people. For instance, a
German living in Munich (in the American zone) may have been classified as a major
offender whereas in Hamburg (in the British zone) a mere bystander. Inequalities also
came about due to the stalling of the process. The longer it took for a German’s
questionnaire to be scrutinised, the better his chances of getting a reprieve. Overall, this
American denazification policy was largely a failure: “13 million people had returned
their questionnaires of whom three-quarters were not even chargeable under the de-
Nazification criteria.”9
6
Berghahn, “Modern Germany Second Edition: Society, economy and politics in the twentieth century”,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987 p185
7
Berghahn, “Modern Germany Second Edition: Society, economy and politics in the twentieth century”,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987 p185
8
Malzahn, “Germany 1945-1949: A sourcebook”, Routledge, London/New York, 1991 p88
9
Berghahn, “Modern Germany Second Edition: Society, economy and politics in the twentieth century”,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987 p186
However, the Americans had another denazification policy put in place: the introduction
of German democratic elections. Of the three zones occupied by Allied forces, America
was the first to implement this in January 1946. Britain and France followed suit soon
after. Although the results of these elections would have pleased the Allied forces (the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
gained the most votes – both left wing democratic parties) they still weren’t keen in
endorsing radical policies put forward by the government. America in particular made
obstructions such as limiting the influence of Antifa (Anti Fascist) committees and
deleting clauses from constitutions which would have enabled the German government a
more active role in the legislative process. To summarise this procedure, America made a
decent attempt at promoting democratic political activity in her zone – the effects of
denazification could be seen through the range of left wing political parties enjoying the
majority of the peoples’ votes. However, this good work was dented through the mistrust
and subsequent prevention of the German government to carry out effective policy which
angered the German people. That may have occurred due to America changing her focus
to a sterner, more serious threat in world politics: the communist Soviet Union.

The Soviets adopted a “gradualist” approach to denazification, much to the surprise of the
allied forces. Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin believed that a hard line approach
would damage Soviet-German relations and, as a result, encourage them to feel more
inclined with western-style ideals (particularly political). Therefore, in an order to his
Red Army troops on the 20th April 1945, Stalin stated that they had to “change their
attitudes toward the Germans…and treat them better.”10 This humanitarian approach was
possibly because “the time for the Sovietisation of Germany was not yet ripe”11 according
to Professor Perry Biddiscombe in his book The Denazification of Germany. The first
Soviet execution of denazification came in the form of (like the British) appointing town
mayors – providing that they held anti-fascist beliefs. This ensured that Nazis were no
longer holding authoritative positions. To accompany this measure, the Red Army had
10
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p125
11
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p125
kommandaturas (town commanders) positioned in various cities and rural communities to
keep an eye on the mayors’ activities. However, this policy inevitably presented the same
problem that its British counterpart experienced: serious Nazi activists were able to hide
in lower capacity jobs during the denazification process. To address this, some regions in
the Soviet sector such as Thuringia were issued with a 1945 July decree. This decree
ordered the removal of Nazis who joined the party before the 1st of April 1933. Of the
Nazis who joined after this date, only those who held authoritative positions in the party
were categorised in the “mandatory removals” bracket. However, this still led to a third
of Nazi bureaucrats remaining in power at the end of 1945. Not only was this as a result
of the stipulations of the decree, but also because some of the Soviets wished to “use the
brains [administrative expertise] of the Nazis as much as possible” 12, according to a
Soviet Military Administration (SMA) official.

The Soviet swing from a gradualist denazification approach to hard line methods began
in August 1945 when the SMA introduced a procedure similar to the Americans in
regards to identifying Nazis. Germans ranging from party members to SS officers were
ordered to sign up with their local Soviet commandments for interviews. However, this
method produced little results and gained criticism from the Americans who believed that
the Russians were not using a thorough-enough procedure to identify Nazis. The hard line
methods surfaced in the subsequent hearings: Germans accused of being Nazis were not
allowed to have lawyers in their defence. The outcome of the hearings affected the
Germans’ employment status: a “nominal” Nazi had the opportunity of retaining his job
if he was given an approval whereas those declared as a more serious Nazi were promptly
sacked on the spot. However, the greatest injustice of this denazification procedure was
the Soviet’s lenient stance towards those who worked in coal mining, the post office or
the railways. Due to their perceived importance in promoting an economic recovery in
the Soviet sector, Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to carry out denazification
policies in those particular sectors. A study in February 1947 discovered that “in Saxony-
Anhalt, nearly nineteen percent of post office personnel were still Nazis, and in Dresden
and Cottbus, a third of all Reichsbahn [railway] officials were still partegenossen [Nazi
12
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p128
party follower]”13. Another problem was apparent: although some Nazis did lose their
jobs, they were able to move to a different region, apply for a new job and lie in their
application forms.

Some Red Army officials took denazification policy into their own hands, ignoring SMA
orders completely. These measures ranged from executions of Nazi officials to enabling
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) special powers to carry out their own unofficial
Nazi purges. Landrats (local government officials) were appointed. They stated that “the
Nazis will be handled the same way they handled us, that is: hard”14. Some Germans
were ironically forced to perform hard labour at the Niemegher concentration camp.
Overall, the Soviets operated eleven detainment camps in which an estimated 240,000
people were deposited. The poor treatment and harsh conditions of the camps resulted in
at least a third of that figure dying in Soviet hands as a result of extreme denazification
methods. The SMA themselves introduced a controversial policy against the Nazi
followers. Order 124 concerned the confiscation of private property that a number of anti-
fascists took advantage of for their personal gain rather than for ridding the region of
Nazi influence. To show that the majority of the German people “supported” this policy,
a referendum was drawn up by the Soviets for the region of Saxony which was
coincidently the most left-wing region in the whole of the Soviet sector. Once the
referendum was passed in July 1946, local German governments were able to execute
Order 124 by themselves without the need of Soviet approval.

The Soviet denazification procedures are generally regarded as the most thorough out of
the four occupying forces despite the transition from being gradualist-minded to being
very authoritative and hard-lined. Biddiscombe summarises that “the Soviet broom failed
to find and sweep up most Nazis”15 – just like the Allied forces’ respective programmes.

13
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p142
14
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p129
15
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p152
The French had a more laid-back approach in their denazification plans compared to the
other three forces. They did not believe in utilising questionnaires as this would,
according to FitzGibbon, “pronounce a verdict on the “facts” rather than on the man.”16
The French believed that more emphasis should be placed on the individuality of the
German rather than relying on mere association to make judgments. It was also believed
that the educational aspect of Germany needed most attention as although Nazis could be
punished for past crimes, the French realised this could only “deal with the past, while
education can only concern the future.”17 The French had a number of factors in their
favour for carrying out denazification. First, the small regions they were assigned to in
the south-west allowed them to try out denazification procedures that the other occupying
forces would struggle to implement in their largely populated regions. Second, they were
absolved from subordination with the other two allied forces, thus enabling them more
freedom to try out different denazification procedures of their own. The third and most
important factor was the fact that France occupied the “traditional heartland of German
liberalism”18, implying little Nazi influence in the region.

Early methods of French denazification involved the rapid arrests of Nazi members near
the end of 1945. 12,500 suspects were detained whereas another 800 were under
surveillance. The arrests were based on their own discretion rather than on SHAEF
policies (official French guidelines were not drawn up until January 1946). Although the
French ordered Germans to fill Fragebogen papers later on that year, their method of
categorising the German based on his answers was handled in a different way compared
to their allies’. The Fragebogen papers were compared to recovered Nazi documents and
ceremonial events to determine whether the German in question was active in Nazi
events and activities. The comparison would then, at least in theory, lead to a more
accurate categorisation for the German. As mentioned, the French targeted education as a
main avenue for eliminating Nazi influence in their region. This method was known as
kulturpolitik – cultural policy. Lieutenant Raymond Schmittlein, the head of the
Gouvernement Militaire’s (GM) education branch, promptly suspended seventy five
16
FitzGibbon, “Denazification”, Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1969 p102
17
FitzGibbon, “Denazification”, Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1969 p107
18
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p156
percent of teachers in the French zone during the summer of 1945. However, as a result
of a severe shortage of teaching staff, thirty nine percent of that proportion had to be
recalled.

The French also turned to old, retired teachers particularly those with no political leaning
to ease the shortage of teachers. Teacher colleges were established to help develop
fledging teachers, although some of the French officials according to Biddiscombe had
concerns that the new generation of teachers “had been brought up in the National
Socialist spirit.”19 Although these colleges provided 12 percent of the high school
teachers by 1947, they were still 5000 teachers below the 1939 figure. Denazification of
the universities was an easier task for the French - only thirty percent of lecturers were
dismissed thus allowing them to rush their denazification programme in order for the
universities to re-open by autumn 1945. By mid 1946, the GM had appointed 166 French
lecturers and professors in German universities.

Although the French began the ending of denazification programmes at the beginning of
1949, it took another year for the remaining cases to be heard and decided on. On the
whole, the French appeared to have made a decent attempt at denazifying their region
although the fact remained (as emphasised by FitzGibbon) that they “were not loved by
the Germans in their zone. They were hardly even respected.”20 It can be concluded,
therefore, that although the French implemented somewhat effective denazification
policies, it came at a cost: the co-operation and respect of the majority of the German
people.

In hindsight, most people would assume that the major forces’ denazification
programmes were successful in ending Nazi influence purely because of the democratic
running of Germany today. However, the major forces’ denazification procedures were
not as successful as they appeared. Although some policies did indeed contribute to the
eradication of Nazi influence, such as the removal of Nazis holding authoritative
19
Biddiscombe, “The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950”, Tempus Publishing Ltd,
Chalford, 2007 p165
20
FitzGibbon, “Denazification”, Michael Joseph Ltd, London, 1969 p107
positions, there were a number of external factors that contributed to the downfall of
Nazism. For instance, the economic recovery of the 1950s (often referred to as the
“economic miracle”) promoted the idea of consumer culture: Germans cared less for
National Socialism and preferred to associate themselves with pan-European identities.
Also, a student revolt occurred in 1968, protesting the passing of a law that limited the
rights of people in emergency circumstances. This revolt demonstrated that Germans
themselves were trying to prevent Nazi-style legislation from being passed:
denazification was occurring here, but not by the major forces in question. What also
needs mentioned is that even before the end of the Second World War there were signs of
denazification. The loss of husbands to war meant that women had to provide for
themselves and their children - they were therefore violating their roles in the “proper”
German family promoted by Nazi ideology. Also, war-time rationing led to a more level
social class system which of course damaged the Nazi’s promotion of a mighty Aryan
race being at the top of German society with minorities (such as foreigners and Jews)
being at the bottom.

Therefore, in conclusion, the major forces’ denazification policies contributed to the


denazification of Germany but were not outstandingly successful. The unfair structure of
some policies and the long, complicated procedures of others limited the major forces’
success in ridding Germany of her Nazi followers and ideals.

Bibliography

Books
Constantine FitzGibbon, 1969: Denazification, Michael Joseph Ltd, London

Perry Biddiscombe, 2007: The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950,


Tempus Publishing Ltd, Chalford
Manfred Malzahn, 1991: Germany 1945-1949: A sourcebook, Routledge, London/New
York

Volker Rolf Berghahn, 1987: Modern Germany Second Edition: Society, economics and
politics in the twentieth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Ian Turner, 1989: Reconstruction in Post-War Germany, Berg Publishers Ltd, Oxford

Websites
http://www.hitler.org/speeches/09-06-38.html

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