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It is commonplace that the development of the Romanian state from the `Old
Kingdom' (i.e., Romania before the First World War) to interbellum Greater
Romania meant not only territorial completion and achievement of nation-state
unity, but entailed also a choice regarding the kind of political modernization to
be accomplished, specically, the choice to continue with the Jacobin tradition
20
th century.
Moreover, in
introductory
considerations
The idea of regional identity has been present for a long while in traditional
geographical approaches to regionalism. Regional identity was often seen as the
primordial nature of regions, researchers belonging to this school of thought
stressing the internal `harmony' of regions, which meant for them unity between the regions and their inhabitants (see Paasi 2003: 475-479).
But the
manner how this nature, this unity is constructed, albeit an old question, still
elicits interest and is periodically revisited by geographers, anthropologists and
political scientists alike. Generally, we may consider that regions preceded the
rise of nation-states, but were later eectively omitted or exploited depending
on context by the emerging states while organising governance and control
over their territories. Many strong modern states assimilated former regions
and areas, transforming them in frames or parts of territorial governance
linked, however, to a certain extent to historical and cultural contexts.
In
some states, regions became instruments of state power being dened more or
less `from above', and because of their administrative importance, remained
culturally `thin' (Paasi 2001: 15). In this case, regional identity did not emerge
as a separate and competing focus of political loyalties in contrast to the national identity constructed by the modern state. In other cases, regions were
deeply rooted historical and cultural (`thick') entities, their existence becoming manifest not only through and in their identity, but also through various
social and cultural institutions (Paasi 2001: 15). Consequently, such regions
became powerful competitors in the struggle for capturing the political loyalty
of a territorial community and challenged the loyalty pattern constructed and
prescribed by the state. Regions wield such power in Spain, Italy and Belgium,
and more recently in Great Britain, where the positions of Scotland and
Wales have been signicantly strengthened during the last ten years .
The question of political competition for the loyalty of territorial communities is related
to the recent debate on multicultural citizenship. (See KymlickaStraehle 1999, Fowler 2004.)
21
These two ways of assimilating regions into the structures of governmental power distribution can be interpreted as two types of state construction.
Hechter (2000) made a clear distinction between primary states and secondary
states.
th
Primary states are all the large states which existed before the 19
century and adopted indirect rule because of technical limits to central control.
Their political structure was based on indirect rule relying on the existence
of groups mediating between individuals and the state (Hechter 2000: 40).
This type of rule allowed primary states to arise and function as growing and
culturally diverse political units. Furthermore, Hechter called secondary states
all the states that introduced direct rule with modern state-bureaucracy. However, the functioning of such states required legitimation by nationalism and,
hence, forced these states to strive for cultural homogeneity.
It is clear that a state administration based on institutionalised regions exhibiting strong identities (i.e., `thick' cultural entities) inherited many of its
features from a primary state. However, if regionalisation occurs as a political
programme, every part of a centralist state may be regionalised (even if some
parts were not considered `regions' previously). Yet, a sense of regional identity and cohesion as well as regionalist movements will emerge only if these can
rely on a long-standing regional tradition, a common history and experience,
or a distinct language .
A region's construction may it be strong and `thick' or weak and `thin'
is part of the perpetual transformation of the spatial system in which regions emerge, exist for some time and may then disappear. This process may
be labelled the institutionalisation of regions and, analytically, presents four
simultaneous aspects, which in practice are always dierent sides of the same
process: 1) the creation of the territorial, 2) symbolic and 3) institutional forms
of a region, as well as 4) its establishment as an entity in the regional system
and the social consciousness of the society concerned. It is a process through
which a territorial unit becomes an established entity in the spatial structure
and is afterwards identied in institutionalised political, economic, cultural and
administrative practices and social consciousness alike, while being continually
reproduced in all these practices (Paasi 2001: 16).
In conclusion, Romania's regional perspectives should be analysed according to the above two ways of (creating and) embedding regions and the four
simultaneous aspects of their institutionalisation.
See Hans-Jrgen Puhle Regions, Regionalism and Regionalization in 20th-Century Eu. [http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s9/s9-puhle.pdf], downloaded on 2 August 2009.
rope
22
reect diverging historical-political evolutions, which left their mark on perceptions of spatial dierences as this can be gleaned both from local mentality
and everyday discourse. Moreover, many daily practices contribute to the reproducing of the cultural dierences between these regions. Notwithstanding
th century
Romania are combinations of closeness or openness, context-conformity in relations with institutions and poverty or richness in network capital.) Bearing
in mind that Paasi dened the regions' boundaries not as xed, but saw them
as resulting from processes in which territories and their contested meanings
are socially and culturally constructed (Paasi 2001: 16), these cultural areas
could be used for the formation of territorial units in a wider sense.
Turning to the second aspect, it should be noted that numerous symbolic
elements of the cultural areas and historical regions making up Romania are
present in the public sphere , but the centralist ethos of the dominant Romanian parties constitutes a serious hindrance to their political usage. However,
the political usage of regional symbols is an open question. Until now, only
the Szeklerland's symbols gained political signicance, thanks to an ethnoregional(ist) movement which emerged apparently in the last ve years.
One
may rightly hypothesise that if a regional(ist) party had obtained seats in the
The coat of arms of Romania contains the blazons of the most important historical regions; but the new coats of arms of counties and municipalities were created in a rather haphazard and arbitrary manner after 1990 (Cf. Heraldica_Romniei,
[http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heraldica_Romniei], downloaded on 20 August 2009).
23
parliament or in important county councils, it would have used regional symbols and watchwords, and would have pushed for the enactment of regional
policies.
late 1997, was rather short-lived since its leadership accepted the merger of
this organisation into the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat,
ements may represent a good starting point for the development of the regions'
social capital once the required political bodies and administrative structures
have been established for these regions the fourth aspect mentioned by Paasi.
5 and be-
cause of the specicity of the Romanian party system and political rgime
described as administrative consensualism and patronage (Preda-Soare 2008:
50-57) , the larger parliamentary parties have no interest in launching a radical
regional reform targeting the Romanian administrative system. Their ultimate
The Liberals' proposal took into account the existing cultural and tra-
ditional boundaries of the regions, but remained very cautious in what concerns
See `Partidul Moldovenilor s-a nscris la Tribunal.' Ziarul de Iai (25 August 1998).
[http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/partidul-moldovenilor-s-a-inscris-la-tribunalnig8s] (downloaded on 20 August 2009) and Bakk 2003: 426.
5
On the traditions of Romanian political thinking see Barbu 2005: 11-24.
6
However, in recent years, several civic organisations raised the question of federalism or
asymmetrical regionalism (e.g., the Pro Europa League/Liga Pro Europa / and the Provincia
group ).
24
This term, which translates approximately as `partner nation', suggests that a certain
state, in our case Romania, is formed and inhabited by two (or more) national communities here the Romanian and the Hungarian national communities which are and behave
25
As interpreted by the RMDSZ, the law did not contradict the Con-
the idea that autonomy represented a sustainable project both in the domestic
and the international political arena. The reasons why Hungarian politicians
in Romania reasoned in this manner were the following: rst, in those years,
the Council of Europe apparently preferred policies aiming to augment special
like partners while enjoying equal constitutional status. (Put dierently, the trsnemzet conception is aimed at avoiding the political situation in which members of a national minority are treated as second-rate citizens.)
8
Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly on an additional protocol
on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights can rightly
be interpreted in this way.
26
years. All in all, shelving the idea of autonomy meant that the politicians who
between 1990 and 1995 argued for drafting and submitting various autonomy
conceptions were gradually marginalised inside the RMDSZ.
From 1996 onwards, the course of action taken by the RMDSZ was strongly
inuenced by its (perceived) chances to participate in coalition governments.
This attitude towards government participation seems to be shared by most
ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and appears to be a direct consequence of the European integration process and the basic treaties signed by the
countries in question. A kind of `consociational strategy' replaced the barren
autonomy strategy, and this orientation was supported by the process of European integration. The reason is that the European Union, in the absence of
an acquis stipulating minority rights, was guided by a security-based approach
which preferred the consensual settlement of disputes over the enforcement of
universalistic norms (see Brusis 2003).
In the meantime, the short time-span before EU-accession oered possibilities for nding a way towards an internal autonomy arrangement or, at least,
of creating a framework for a later arrangement of this kind. (In this respect,
reference was made to the Copenhagen criteria.)
party reuniting rst and foremost mayors and local councillors from the
Szeklerland has been registered. This organisation, called Hungarian Civic
Party (Magyar Polgri Prt, hereinafter MPP), focuses on Szekler territorial
autonomy, too.
In the context of EU-accession and under the circumstances of erce competition between the four political organisations representing Hungarians in
Transylvania, three strategic conceptions regarding the territorial autonomy
of the Szeklerland have been formulated:
27
1) Considering the history of the proposals, one must mention rst the autonomy statute adopted by the SZNT since its original version has been
elaborated in 1995, prior to the establishment of the organisation that
eventually embraced it.
in-
rial precedent.
territo-
bility of transforming the extant regions of development into politicaladministrative regions or units. The present development regions created in 1998 without taking into account historical-cultural traditions
within Romania do not have administrative competencies and correspond to NUTS II level divisions in EU member states. Consequently,
the RMDSZ aims, as a rst step, to create the Szeklerland Development Region by reuniting three counties (Harghita, Covasna and Mure).
However, the SZNT criticises this idea because the three counties do not
coincide with the historical territory of Szeklerland.
3) The third conception has been elaborated as part of the package deal
oered by the EMNT to the RMDSZ. This package contains three proposals: the draft of a framework law on regions (without specifying their
geographical boundaries), a bill on the creation of the Szeklerland development region, which would enjoy special status and the draft statute
of the Szeklerland region.
asymmetrical regionalism being in the meantime based on the assumption that the prospective Romanian regionalisation will be similar
to the Spanish or the Italian one. Hence, the idea of Szeklerland's territorial autonomy should be included in a larger scheme regarding Romania's
regionalisation, and should be put forward using the language and terminology of regionalism (not the language and terminology of `internal
28
29
fort has been spent in the last twenty years in order to reach at least a minimal
consensus.
Romania's accession to the EU represented an important turning point because this period oered some possibilities for political arm-twisting and for
launching a negotiation process on autonomy arrangements. However, the political actors involved in the process seemed to be unable to practice consensusoriented politics and imagine creative policies. This statement holds true both
for political parties in Hungary, the kin-state, and for the political groups which
assumed the task of representing the Hungarian minority in Romania.
Now that Romania became a full member of the European Union, Szeklerland's regional autonomy can emerge as a successful political project only if
treated as a completely separate matter, without connecting it to the topic of
minority rights construed as individual rights or to the idea of cultural autonomy seen as a legal solution for the entire Hungarian national community living
seeking convergence.
However, another set of questions also arises. Can the failure of autonomy
conceptions be attributed to an inherent structural trait of our region? Is it
somehow encoded in a specic part of Central and Eastern Europe or, put differently, does it require a certain level or degree of democratic consolidation?
It is rather dicult to explain why in countries that until the early 1990s were
parts of the former Soviet Union previously established territorial autonomies
still operate and new ones were also created (Kolst 2001), and in Western Eu-
It should be mentioned that the strategy of the RMDSZ combines these two ideas.
30
Oriental' region of Central and Eastern Europe, where the despotic power
of the state is greater, the state itself seems to be based on an agreement
between territorial-oligarchical elite groups.
More
10
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia (the Russian community in Narva and Sillame), Subcarpathia or Subcarpathian Ukraine (the Ruthenian and the Hungarian minorities), Slovakia
(the Hungarian minority) and Romania (Hungarians in Transylvania) can be ranged in this
category.
11
The despotic power of the state elite refers to the range of non-routinised actions that
the elite is authorised to undertake, while the infrastructural power to the state's capacity
to penetrate civil society and logistically implement political decisions on the whole territory
of the country. (See Mann 1984: 185-201.)
31
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32
Paasi, Anssi 2003. Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question. Progress
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