Case 2:15-cv-09291-CM Document 6 Filed 09/29/15 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

TOMMIE PERRIS CRAWFORD,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 15-9291-CM-GEB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

TOMMIE PERRIS CRAWFORD,
US PENITENTIARY LEAVENWORTH,
AND UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT OF MINNESOTA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES MOTION TO DISMISS

Table of Contents
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 1
Relevant Procedural History................................................................................................ 2
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 3
Crawford v. Crawford.......................................................................................................... 7
Sanctions Against Crawford for Filing Yet Another Frivolous Suit ................................... 8
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 10

Overview

Tommie Perris Crawford is an inmate at USP-Leavenworth serving a sentence

imposed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota upon his

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conviction for possession of drugs and a firearm. For apparently the sixth time 1 Crawford
commences a frivolous habeas corpus or civil action seeking immediate release from his
primary term of incarceration from his federal sentence. Because the law does not
recognize the posting of a bond or a Satisfaction of Judgement as a means of
challenging a federal sentence of conviction, this case, like his previous cases, should be
dismissed as a frivolous and meritless attack on his federal sentence.
Crawford once again suggests that his self-styled Satisfaction of Judgment
entitles him to be released from incarceration by the United States. Because Crawford
has not in fact satisfied the judgment entered against him in his federal criminal case
because he has not served his full sentence, this case should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.
Relevant Procedural History

Crawford is currently incarcerated at USP-Leavenworth. Crawfords projected

release date from the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons is November 7, 2018. See

See Crawford v. United States, Case No. 14-3184-RDR (dismissing Crawfords

petition for habeas corpus seeking immediate nonnegotiable release and delivery of
Crawford to an unnamed attorney-in-fact in Columbia Heights, Minnesota); Crawford v.
United States, Case No. 14-CV-2024-CM-TJJ (based upon the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge James, Judge Murguia dismisses Crawfords
Satisfaction of Judgment claims as frivolous), Crawford v. United States, No. 09-cv3078-RDR, 2009 WL 1657546, at *1 (D. Kan. June 12, 2009) (Judge Rogers concludes
that Crawford was not entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence on his claims
arising from a private bond as a matter of law and summarily dismissing the action);
Crawford v. United States, Case No. 11-3021-RDR (Judge Rogers dismisses as frivolous
the habeas corpus petition claiming that the indemnity bond that he posted offsets his
criminal conviction in the District of Minnesota); Crawford v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 10-3108-RDR, 2010 WL 2671986, at *1 (D. Kan. June 30, 2010) (same). Copies of
the unpublished opinions cited in this footnote are attached as Attachment A.
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Federal Bureau of Prisons, Find an Inmate, http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/; enter BOP

Register Number 06613-041. (Last visited on September 29, 2015).
Analysis

Crawford seems to suggest that his Satisfaction of Judgment entitles him to be

released from incarceration under his federal conviction and sentence. To the extent that
Crawford suggests that the criminal conviction and sentence reflected in the judgment in
United States v. Crawford, Case No. Criminal Case No. 05294 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 487
F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2007), is now satisfied by his self-styled Satisfaction of Judgment,
he is completely wrong. See Glover v. United States, No 13-cv-2646-JTM-TJJ (D. Kan.
Apr. 7, 2014) (dismissing similar Satisfaction of Judgment civil action seeking to
circumvent federal criminal proceedings) (Attachment B); Amerson v. United States,
No.13-cv-3132-SAC (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2013) (same) (Attachment C), affd, 550 F.
Appx 603 (10th Cir. 2013). No amount of moneywhether real or imaginedwill buy
Crawfords release from his conviction and sentence. See Bostic v. Unknown Agents of
State of N.C. Judicial Sys., 896 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1990) (Bostics suit [pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1983] shows that he takes literally the notion that a prisoner must pay his debt to
society. . . . Bostic has no right under the laws or Constitution of the United States to
have his criminal conviction reduced to a monetary judgment which he can satisfy by
payment in money or prison time.).
Nor can Crawford unilaterally set aside the sentence imposed against him by the
federal district court in Minnesota. To the extent that Crawford is attempting to
unilaterally commute his sentence, this he cannot do; only the President of the United
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States has the power to do so. See Binion v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1190
(9th Cir. 1983) (The Constitution confers on the President power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States. U.S. Const. Art. II, 2, cl. 1. A
presidential pardon is an act of grace.). Instead, a motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. 2255
would be Crawfords only lawful means to challenge his conviction or sentence. See
United States v. Thody, 14-7000, 2014 WL 2808265 (10th Cir. June 23, 2014) (It is
well-settled that [t]he exclusive remedy for testing the validity of a [federal] judgment
and sentence, unless it is inadequate or ineffective, is that provided for in 28 U.S.C.
2255.) (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted)). The remedy under 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only in extremely
limited circumstances. Lee v. Maye, No. 14-3054-RDR, 2014 WL 1643521, *2 (D.
Kan. Apr. 24, 2014) (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)).
That Crawford styled his pleading as a Satisfaction of Judgment does not control
the manner in which it should be interpreted by this Court:
Any motion filed in the district court that imposed the sentence, and
substantively within the scope of 2255 1, is a motion under 2255, no
matter what title the prisoner plasters on the cover. See, e.g., Ramunno v.
United States, 264 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2001). Call it a motion for a new
trial, arrest of judgment, mandamus, prohibition, coram nobis, coram vobis,
audita querela, certiorari, capias, habeas corpus, ejectment, quare impedit,
bill of review, writ of error, or an application for a Get-Out-of-Jail Card; the
name makes no difference. It is substance that controls. See Thurman v.
Gramley, 97 F.3d 185, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1996).
Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original); see
United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006) (It is the relief sought, not
pleadings title, that determines whether the pleading is 2255 motion.).

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Title 18, Section 3582, sets forth the three circumstances under which the Court
has jurisdiction to modify a sentence of imprisonment:
(1) upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons if the defendant, inter
alia, is at least 70 years of age and has served at least 30 years in prison (see
3582(c)(1)(A));
(2) to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute, such as 28 U.S.C.
2255, or by Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (see 3582(c)(1)(B)); or
(3) if the defendant was sentenced under a guideline sentencing range which has
subsequently been lowered (see 3582(c)(2)).
Because Crawfords pleading does not demonstrate that any of those circumstances are
applicable, the Court is without jurisdiction to modify his sentence. See, e.g., United
States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008).
The Bureau of Prisons, by law, is required to incarcerate Crawford until he has
completed his term of imprisonment. A person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the
expiration of the term imposed . . . . 18 U.S.C. 3621(a); see also 18 U.S.C. 3624(a)
(addressing the date of release). Because Crawford cannot demonstrate that his
Satisfaction of Judgment actually satisfies the judgment against him, or otherwise
suggest any legitimate basis for setting aside his conviction or sentence under 2255, he
must serve the term of incarceration imposed by the Court until released from custody by
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and after his release, all of the conditions of his supervised
release. Cf., Amerson, 550 F. Appx 603 (rejecting as frivolous within the meaning of
PLRA plaintiffs arguments suggesting that the documents he filed in state court are
authorized under the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and that those
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documents satisfy all financial interests against him, including those connected to his
federal criminal conviction; [t]he UCC governs commercial transactions and cannot be
used to upset criminal convictions, even collaterally.) (citations omitted).
Even if this case is not an improvident collateral attack on Crawfords conviction
and sentence, 2 Crawford cannot sue the United States or its agencies in state or federal
court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity:
[T]he United States cannot be sued without its consent. Iowa Tribe of
Kan. & Neb. v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jacks, 960 F.2d 911, 913
(10th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation mark omitted). District courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against the United States for which
sovereign immunity has not been waived. Id. (citing Normandy Apts., Ltd.
v. HUD, 554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009)). When the United States
does consent to be sued, it can impose conditions on that consent, San
Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1175 (10th Cir. 2007), and
the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the
court's jurisdiction, Sw. Four Wheel Drive Ass'n. v. BLM, 363 F.3d 1069,
1071 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841,
106 S. Ct. 2224, 90 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1986)) (internal quotation mark
omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the United States'
waiver of sovereign immunity. Iowa Tribe of Kan. & Neb., 607 F.3d at
1232.
Beals v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 460 F. Appx 773, 775 (10th Cir. 2012). Crawford cannot
demonstrate the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity that authorizes this suit
2

State courts lack the authority to reverse or set aside federal convictions and
sentences. See 18 U.S.C. 3231 (The district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1996) (a 28
U.S.C. 2255 petition attacks the legality of detention and must be filed in the district
that imposed the sentence); Fouche v. Mukasey, 296 F. Appx. 74 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(defendants complaint constituted a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence,
which must be pursued by motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 in the sentencing court;
or, if the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective, by a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
2241 in the judicial district where appellants custodian is located).
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against the United States, the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, or the Federal
District Court of Minnesota in either state or federal court. The United States has not
consented to suit in any state court with the exception of actions to quiet title, foreclose a
mortgage or other lien, condemnation or interpleader, see 28 U.S.C. 2410, and therefore
this case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Crawfords
claims against it are barred by sovereign immunity.
Crawford v. Crawford

Although this analysis demonstrates that Crawfords case against the United
States, USP-Leavenworth, and the Federal District court of Minnesota, must be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, their dismissal leaves one
remaining defendant: Crawfordbecause Crawfords pleadings seemingly name himself
as a defendant. First, Crawfords suit against himself presents a non-justiciable claim
that must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction:
There is much argument with citation of many cases to establish the longrecognized general principle that no person may sue himself. Properly
understood the general principle is sound, for courts only adjudicate
justiciable controversies. They do not engage in the academic pastime of
rendering judgments in favor of persons against themselves. Thus a suit
filed by John Smith against John Smith might present no case or
controversy which courts could determine.
United States v. I.C.C., 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949). Under Article III of the Constitution,
federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Lewis v.
Contl Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). [T]he case-or-controversy limitation is
crucial to maintaining the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). Consequently, [n]o
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principle is more fundamental to the judiciarys proper role in our system of

government. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). Because this
Court lacks jurisdiction over Crawfords claims against the United States and himself, it
should be dismissed entirely under Rule 12(b)(1).
Second, Crawford lacks the power to grant the relief he seeksa release order
from incarceration, and therefore his pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Sanctions Against Crawford for Filing Yet Another Frivolous Suit

In this, his sixth frivolous habeas or civil case filed in Kansas, Crawford tries once
again to unilaterally commute his federal sentence. As repeatedly explainedas
common sense would dictateCrawford cannot shorten his federal sentence by collateral
meritless schemes in state court. Because he keeps trying the same trick that has failed
three or more times, Crawford should no longer be permitted to needlessly consume the
time and resources of the state court, this Court, and the United States.
First, the United States asks this Court to again find this case to be frivolous.
Second, assuming that the prior rulings of dismissal were insufficient to put Crawford on
notice of the possibility of sanctions for filing frivolous civil cases, 3 the United States

The district court in Minnesota has imposed filing restrictions in his continued
post-conviction attacks on his criminal convictions:
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant's most recent
post-conviction submissions in this matter. (Docket Nos. 223, 224, 225,
226, 227 and 229.) None of Defendant's pending submissions presents any
viable grounds for granting him any relief in this matter. Indeed, the Court
finds all of Defendant's pending submissions to be frivolous, because they
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asks this Court to warn Crawford that any future actions in state court challenging his
sentence may result in sanctions against him under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or the inherent
power of the Court.

lack any arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Therefore, all of Defendant's pending requests for
relief will be summarily rejected and denied.
Defendant has now filed well over 100 pro se submissions in this
case, including more than two dozen since his conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on direct appeal.
Furthermore, Defendant's submissions have become increasingly
incomprehensible, redundant and abusive.
Prisoners do, of course, have a right of access to the courts. That
right, however, does not guaranty prisoners, (or anyone else), an
unrestricted opportunity to file frivolous, malicious or abusive documents.
See In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1988) (there is no
constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is
frivolous or malicious' ), (quoting Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 208
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981)). Frivolous, bad faith claims
consume a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the time and
energy of the judiciary away from processing good faith claims. Tyler,
839 F.2d at 1292. Such excessive litigation imposes unnecessary
burdens on, and the useless consumption of, court resources. Id. A
federal court has authority to control and manage matters pending before
it, and may, in its discretion, place reasonable restrictions on any litigant
who files non-meritorious actions for obviously malicious purposes and
who generally abuses judicial process. Id. at 1292, 1293.
In light of Defendant's extensive record of frivolous filings in this
matter, the Court finds that it is now necessary and appropriate to protect
the District Court and its staff from any further abusive submissions by
Defendant. Therefore, any written materials hereafter received from
Defendant shall be presented to the Court without being filed. The Clerk of
Court shall not file, or respond to, any future submissions from Defendant,
except as directed by the Court.
United States v. Crawford, No. CRIM. 05-294 JRT/AJB, 2009 WL 1096050, at *1 (D.
Minn. Apr. 22, 2009)
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Conclusion

Crawfords case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in

the alternative, for failure to state a claim.
Respectfully submitted,
BARRY R. GRISSOM
United States Attorney
s/ Christopher Allman
CHRISTOPHER ALLMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
KS S. Ct. No 14225
500 State Avenue, Suite 360
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
PH: 913.551.6730
FX: 913.551.6541
EM: Chris.Allman@usdoj.gov
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Attorneys for the United States

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 29, 2015, the foregoing was electronically filed with
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that on this date the
foregoing document including copies of the unpublished cases cited herein, and the
notice of electronic filing were mailed by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF
participant:
Tommie Perris Crawford
#06613-041
USP Leavenworth
P.O. Box 1000
Leavenworth, KS 66048
Pro Se Plaintiff
s/Christopher Allman
CHRISTOPHER ALLMAN

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