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Legal Techniques and Logic



Taada vs. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
RULING: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Major Premise: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, "unless it is
otherwise provided."
Minor Premise: Laws were not published because it is otherwise
Conclusion: Therefore, these laws shall take effect.

The term "unless it is otherwise provided" is used in more than one sense in the
argument, hence, it violates Rule 1. This argument has four terms. The "unless it is
otherwise provided" in the first proposition refers to the effectivity date of the
publication of the laws. In the second proposition, the "unless it is otherwise provided"
is referred by the respondents as the publication being optional.
Colgate-Palmolive Phils. v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1961
FACTS: For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the
Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used
for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax
Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%
special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit
its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration,
on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of
the Exchange Tax Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special
excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).
RULING: Yes. The refusal to deny refund was based on the argument that all the
items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food
products, book supplies/materials and medical supplies and that for petitioners to be
exempt, the stabilizers and flavors they use must fall under the category of food
products. Respondent contends that since petitioners usethese as toothpaste, the same
stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the
following which were also included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, industrial
starch and more. Therefore, the law must be seen in itsentirety.
Major Premise: The Exchange Tax Law provides for the 17% exemption
of every importation of materials such as stabilizer and flavors.
Minor Premise: The Central bank refused to exempt these stabilizers
and flavors on the theory that they are not exempted under section 2
of the Exchange Tax Law.
Conclusion: Therefore, the importation of stabilizer and flavors are

not exempted.

The term stabilizer and flavors is also used in more than one sense in the
argument. This argument has four terms. The stabilizer and flavors in the first
proposition refers to the use in the preparation of food. In the second proposition, the
stabilizer and flavors refers to those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental


Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo
G.R. 180906, October 7, 2008
FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of
the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped. Ten days after
their escape, they filed a petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and TRO against the
military officers and agents. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manalo brothers should be granted the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. The writ of amparo is the most potent remedy to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
of an act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
Major Premise: The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated.
Minor Premise: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalo brothers right to life, liberty and security.

Conclusion: The Manalo brothers should be granted the privilege of

the writ of amparo.

Edmund Sydeco y Sionzon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014
FACTS: Police officers who were manning a checkpoint flagged Sydecos vehicle
down and asked him to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest before he resumes
driving. The policemen claimed he was smelling liquor but Sydeco denied and insisted
he could manage to drive. One of the policemen told him he was drunk, pointing to
three empty beer bottles in the trunk. The officers pulled Sydeco out and brought him
to a hospital where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate depicting Sydeco as
positive of alcoholic breath, although no examination was conducted. Sydeco was
detained and released only the following day when he was allowed to undergo medical
examination where he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers?
RULING: Sydecos twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a
lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of
this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that Sydeco has not committed a
crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the
influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with
legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of
RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol and the Anti-Drunk
and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the
influence of alcohol.
Major Premise: One who is in the influence of liquor can be penalized
under Anti Drunk and Drugged and Driving Act 2013 if has been
tested beyond reasonable doubt.
Minor Premise: The petitioner is in the influence of liquor.
Conclusion: Therefore, he can be penalized.
This argument violates Rule 2 simply as undistributed middle. The middle term
if has been tested beyond reasonable doubt, is not distributed. This argument may
create a connection only if both the minor and the major terms can be connected with

each other through or by means of the middle term. Respondent police officers
contended in the minor premise that the petitioner was in the influence of liquor, but
not mentioned whether the petitioner has been tested beyond reasonable doubt (middle
term). Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that if the petitioner is in the influence of
liquor, he can already be penalized because his act has not been tested beyond
reasonable doubt.


Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015
FACTS: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 which provides that: the
registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation
on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Petitioners assails the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement
imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, all related thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property.
RULING: The Court held that biometrics validation is not a qualification to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. The Court reiterated their ruling
in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not
a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on
the right to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a qualified elector, he must nonetheless still
comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
Major Premise: Those whose biometrics have not been captured shall
be submitted for validation.
Minor Premise: Many registered voters have not been captured their

Conclusion: All registered voters shall submit for validation.

The minor term many registered voters in the minor premises is undistributed,
yet the minor term in the conclusion all registered voters is distributed. This is the
problem in this argument. It violates Rule 2 and Rule 3. We cannot say that all
registered voters do not have biometrics, which have not been captured, for them to
submit for validation. Even though the minor premise states that many registered voters
have not been captured their biometrics, it doesnt necessarily follow that all registered
voters failed to submit their biometrics. The following terms are distributed in the
premises, but distributed in the conclusion.

People vs. Rogelio Bitancor

G.R. 147968, December 4, 2002
FACTS: Accused-appellant Bitancor was convicted of the crime of rape in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 50. The lower court disregarded his defense of
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding his defense of alibi.
RULING: The appeal has no merit. Appellant interposes alibi. He claims to have
been at the mahjong den of Fidel Besas at the time of the incident. However, for alibi to
prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
Countless times, we have declared that alibi is an inherently weak defense. Unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot prevail over the positive
declaration of a victim who, in a natural and straightforward manner, convincingly
identifies the accused-appellant. Positive identification, where consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over denial. On the other hand, denial -- if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence -- is negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.
Clearly, the evidence for the defense does not support appellants claim. First,
Besas, the owner of the mahjong den, declared that at seven oclock on the evening of
July 22, 1996, appellant was already at the den where he stayed until twelve
midnight. This fact contradicts the latters claim that he had gone to the mahjong den
after dinner, around nine oclock in the evening, and stayed there until twelve
midnight. Second, the proximity of the mahjong den to the locus criminis (which was
only two hundred meters away) did not preclude the possibility that he could have
perpetrated the crime before going to Besas house around nine oclock in the evening.

Major premise: Those who are not at the scene of the crime are
probably not guilty.
Minor premise: Most of the accused are not at the scene of the
Conclusion: All of the accused are probably not guilty.
A formal fallacy occurs in the two ways in which this rule may be broken. When
the major term in the major premise is undistributed but is distributed in the
conclusion, this is called the Fallacy of the Illicit Process of the Major Term. In this
fallacy, the term is applied to all members of the class in the conclusion, even though it
is limited to some members in the major premise, as stated in the aforementioned


Ople vs. Torres

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of the
Administrative Order No. 308,
Adoption of Computerized Identification
System on the ground that it intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE: Does the A.O. No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy?
HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy
because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear
and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards
for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Major Premise: If Administrative Order No. 308 deprives the people
of their constitutional right to privacy, then this law is

Minor Premise: Administrative Order

constitutional right to privacy of people.





Conclusion: Therefore, this law is unconstitutional.

People vs. Renegado

G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974
FACTS: After a few days, while the deceased was in the canteen sitting with his
back towards the accused, without warning the accused stabbed the deceased with a
knife which later caused the latters death. The counsel of the accused pleads for an
acquittal on the ground that the accused should be exempt from criminal liability
because at the precise time he stabbed de Lira, the accused lost his senses and he
simply did not know what he was doing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is exempt from criminal liability.
RULING: No. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
is a total deprivation of freedom of the will, mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. In the case at bar, it just shows that Renegado is a man of
violent temper who can be easily provoked to violence for no valid reason at all.
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he
was in a normal condition of mind.
Major Premise: If the defendant had lucid interval during the
commission of the crime, then defense of insanity is not credible.
Minor Premise: The defendant had lucid interval during the
commission of the crime.
Conclusion: Therefore, the defense of insanity is not credible.
This kind of syllogism is a compound proposition which does not directly assert
the existence of a fact; instead, it contains a condition, like what was indicated above
the word if. These arguments are conditional if-then statements. They are compound
propositions in that every such proposition consists of two component propositions. In
Ople vs. Torres, the two propositions are: 1) If Administrative Order No. 308 deprives the

people of their constitutional right to privacy; 2) then this law is unconstitutional. The
same applies to People vs. Renegado.


Martinez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. 153795, August 17, 2006
FACTS: Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570 Cattleya Road, Sun Valley
Subdivision, Paraaque City, who was allegedly abducted and taken away by seven (7)
persons around 7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he was walking along
Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at 3891 Marigold Street of the same
subdivision. The abduction was reported by to the Barangay, the Paraaque Police and
the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force at Camp Crame. RTC issued the writ but was reversed
by the CA thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the
petition for Habeas Corpus.
RULING: The CA was correct. If the respondents are neither detaining nor
restraining the applicant or the person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus
has been filed, then it should be dismissed.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy
intended to determine whether the person under detention is held under lawful
Major Premise: When forcible taking and disappearance have been
alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings.
Minor Premise: Arrest and detention does not fall under forcible
taking and disappearance.
Conclusion: Therefore, when arrest and detention have been alleged,
the remedy of habeas corpus may be availed of.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

G.R. No. 139789 and 139808, May 12, 2000

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive

property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein
petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner
(defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board
in 1972.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the
petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their
mother overdose Potenciano that caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February
1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his
husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: WON the petitioned habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING: The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses
to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,
or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Major Premise: No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife.
Minor Premise: Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ
of habeas corpus.
Conclusion: Therefore, this is a matter beyond judicial authority and
is best left to the man and womans free choice.

People vs. Alminario

G.R. No. 210430, February 18, 2015
FACTS: The accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape by the
Dasmarinas, Cavite Regional Trial Court. On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant
maintained that the prosecutions evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof required
to convict him. He asserted that the medical examination results negate AAAs claim
that she was raped. They showed no physical injuries, sexual abuse and lacerations,
and since her hymen is no longer intact, it could mean that she had intercourse
months before.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of lacerations on the genitals of the victim
negates the possibility of rape.
RULING: No. It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations
does not negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or
hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of
injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.
Major Premise: Not finding lacerations on the genitals of the victim
does not negate the crime of rape.
Minor Premise: No lacerations were found on the victims genitals.
Conclusion: Therefore, the victim is not raped.

People vs. Mosquerra

G.R. No. 129209, August 9, 2001
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt
for killing his brother, Nelson Soro. On his part, accused-appellant Jimmy Mosquerra
claimed that he was never at the scene of the crime when Soro was killed. He
maintained that his services as a tricycle driver were contracted by Leopoldo Sy to
transport the latter's companions to a gathering at the Mina de Oro Hotel on that fateful
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be acquitted based from his alibi.
RULING: Accused interposed alibi as their defense. Time and again, it has been
held that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution's witness who has no malice to testify falsely against them.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was at some other
place for such a period of time and that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. In the
case at bench, the place where accused claimed to have been at that time of the
incident was only a few thousand meters away from the scene of the crime.
Accused defense of alibi is not worthy of belief. It has been repeatedly ruled that
alibi is a weak defense as it is easy to concoct and fabricate. It became weaker in the
face of the positive identification of the accused by an eye witnesses with no improper
motive to falsely testify. More, it is not sufficient for the accused to alleged that he was
away from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. He must also present a
clear and convincing proof that it is physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis while the crime is in progress. That physical impossibility is not present in this
case. The records show that Jimmy Mosquerra's residence is about one and a half (1)
kilometers away from the crime scene, its distance could be negotiated in just a few
minutes only, especially, when one uses a motor vehicle which is of common use for
travel today.

Major Premise: Not finding the accused at the scene of the crime
does not prove that he is not guilty.
Minor Premise: The accused was said to not be at the scene of the
Conclusion: The accused is not guilty of the crime of murder.

This kind of syllogism involves two negative premises and a negative conclusion. If
both premises are negative, there will be an inability to determine anything regarding
their relation to one another. This type of syllogism is unacceptable because of the
difficulty in sustaining a factual proposition merely by negative evidence. In People v.
Alminario, the two negative premises are 1.) Not finding lacerations on the genitals of
the victim does not negate the crime of rape; 2.) No lacerations were found on the
victims genitals.


People vs. Baldo

G.R. 175238, February 24, 2009
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape. On appeal, the
accused-appellant invoked sweetheart theory as his defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sweetheart theory is valid to warrant the acquittal of
the accused-appellant from the crime of rape.
RULING: No. The "sweetheart theory" or "sweetheart defense" is an oft-abused
justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our
patience. For the Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be
proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs. There is none presented here by the defense.
Even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape.
A man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires.
Major Premise: Baldo is either the boyfriend of the victim, or the one
who raped her.
Minor Premise: Baldo is the boyfriend of the victim.
Conclusion: Therefore, Baldo is not the one who raped her.
People vs. Arivan
G.R. 176065, April 22, 2008
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape. On appeal, he
invoked the sweetheart defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sweetheart defense invoked by the accused-appellant
is sufficient to acquit him of the crime of rape.
RULING: No. This Court is in conformity with the findings of both the trial court
and the appellate court that, indeed, the appellant and the private complainant were
not sweethearts. The "sweetheart defense" is a much-abused defense that rashly derides
the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience. Being an affirmative defense,
the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. In the present

case, other than the appellants self-serving assertions, there was no support of his
claim that he and AAA were lovers. His "sweetheart defense" cannot be given credence
in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or tokens, that
such romantic relationship really existed.
Major premise: The accused Ramon Arivan is either the boyfriend of
the victim, or his rapist.
Minor premise: The accused is the victims boyfriend.
Conclusion: Therefore, the accused is not the victims rapist.

Disjunctive syllogisms are those which one premise takes the form of a disjunctive
proposition and the other premise and the conclusion are categorical propositions
which either deny or affirm part of the disjunctive proposition. In the case of People v.
Arivan, the premise whih takes the form of a disjunctive proposition is: The accused
Ramon Arivan is either the boyfriend of the victim or his rapist; the premise: The
accused is the victims boyfriend; and the conclusion: Therefore, the accused is not
the victims rapist.
The given syllogism is a fallacy since the sweetheart defense or the fact that
someone is a boyfriend of a victim does not negate the possibility of the former raping
the latter.