Institutional Constraints Limit Business Reform of K-12 Education

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement in K-12 Education Policy
Author(s): John W. Sipple

Source: American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 447-488
Published by: American Educational Research Association
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AmericanEducationalResearchJournal
Fall 1999, Vol.36, No. 3, pp. 447-488
Institutional Constraints on Business

Involvement in K-12 Education Policy
John W. Sipple
Cornell University
Witheachpassing decade,the U.S.public educationalsystemhas beenunder
increasing scrutiny and pressure to change. Thispressurehas comefrom
manyfronts--including, the media,parents,government,and business.In
thisstudy,I examine the actions of a group of businessleadersrepresenting
severalmultinationalcorporationsas theytryto affecteducationpolicyin the
state ofMichigan.Ifocus specialattentionon the environmentsin which the
corporationsand K-12public schoolsoperateand uncoverthe relationships
betweenthe many agents callingfor school improvement.Thefact that this
grouptook a thoughtfulapproachand had a significantimpacton education
reformis by no means an indication that otherbusinessgroups will do the
same. Given enough good informationand time to reflecton the complex
issuessurroundingschools,it ispossiblethat businessleadersand educators
can reach consensus on a directionfor educational reform.
JOHN W. SIPPLEis an Assistant Professor, Department of Education, 421

Kennedy Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. His specializations are organizational studies and educational administration and policy.

Sipple
Throughout the past 4 decades, there has been a notable increasein the
politicizationof K-12 public schooling. Whereas early reform efforts

focused narrowlyon local school activity,more recent reformeffortscommonly target higher levels of governmentand advocate new models and
templates for broad segments of the educationalsystem (Cibulka, 1996;
Cohen, 1990). This shift has served to increase governmentaland elite
influenceon the publiceducationalsystem.Whilethe additionof new players
into the arenaof educationpolicymakingis undisputed,the role and impact
of the new agents is the topic of much debate and controversy.
To betterunderstandmovementsin contemporaryeducationalpolicy, it
is necessaryto carefullystudy the agentspromotingreformideas, how they
interactwith state government,and how ideas are advancedin the formal
policymakingprocess.The presentstudyaddressesissues of who will shape
the futureof publiceducationandhowtheywill do it.In doingso, I pay careful
attentionto the forces constrainingand shapingthe behaviorsof an interest
groupof businessleadersworkingto shapestateK-12publiceducationpolicy.
Centralto thisstudyarethe rolesandactionsof the stateandthose of business
leaders. Specifically,I examine the actions of a group of business leaders
representingseveralmultinationalcorporationsas theytryto affecteducation
policy in the state of Michigan.I focus special attentionon the environment
in which the businessleadersand K-12 publicschools operatein Michigan.
The Role of the State
The TenthAmendmentto the UnitedStatesConstitutionexplicitlyreserves
powers not delegatedto the federalgovernmentto individualstatesor to the
people. The federalConstitutionis silent on issues of education,although
every stateconstitutionincludesan educationclause.The clausesdenote the
states'responsibilityforand commitmentto educatingtheirchildren.Furthermore,it has been commonpracticeforstatesto furtherdelegateresponsibility
forfundingandoperatingschoolsto localschooldistricts.Forthisreason,early
school reformers-includingbusinessleadersandacademics-focused primarilyon the local level, exertinglimitedefforton statepolicyagentsand issues.
In recent years, provoked by court decisions on issues of racialand fiscal
equality,stategovernmentshave increasedtheirrolein K-12publiceducation
(Brownv. BoardofEducation,1954;Firestone,Bader,Massel,&Rosenblum,
1992;Mazzoni,1993;San AntonioIndependentSchoolDistrictv. Rodriquez,
1973;Tyack& Cuban,1995).
The Role of Business

In additionto statestakinga greaterrolein educationpolicy,severalinfluential
organizationshavedrawna linkbetweenschool performanceandthe nation's
economicwell-being(e.g., the NationalCommissionon Excellencein Education and its much publicized report,A Nation at Risk).Motivatedby this
assumedlink,Americancorporateleadersbeganto committimeandcorporate
resourcesto education reformin nearlyevery state in the union (Business
Roundtable,1991;Plotke,1992).InJuneof 1989,PresidentBushparticipated
448

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

in the annualmeeting of the Business Roundtable(hereafterNationalRoundtable,
an organization of more than 200 CEOsfrom the nation's largest corporations)
and formallychallenged corporate Americato bring its expertise and resources
to bear on the education reformmovement. This challenge had great symbolic
value as it served to move the interests of business from being just one of
many voices in the "babble"(Cohen, 1990) to a formalseat at the policymaking
table.
The National Roundtable quickly decided that advocating educational
change and improvement at the national level was not an efficient use of their
resources. By mid-1989, all of the National Roundtable CEOshad "adopted"a
state in which to involve themselves in issues of education reform. Six National
Roundtable companies adopted Michigan, the focus of this study: Dow,
General Motors,Kellogg, Kmart,Upjohn, and Whirlpool.Joseph Antonini, CEO
of Kmart,was asked by John Akers, CEO of IBM and leader of the National
Roundtable's education initiative, to lead the effort in Michigan. Thus, the
Michigan-Business National Roundtable (MI-Roundtable)was founded in the
fall of 1989.
The central focus of this article is a case study of the MI-Roundtable.
Specifically, I explore the direct and indirect influences and constraints on the
formation and activityof the MI-Roundtableas it attempted to alter educational
policy in Michigan. This organization is but one of many parties calling for
improved performance of the Michigan public educational system, although it
holds a special place owing to its considerable resources, its position within the
polity, and its vested interest in improving the products of the public schools.
Why Study Business Involvement?
Attention should be paid to the MI-Roundtablefor three reasons. First, the
organization is one of 38 state-level coalitions operating today. Littleis known
about these coalitions, and yet they possess great potential for power and
influence. The member corporations'scope and influence span local, state, and
national boundaries, and they are involved in policy networks on myriadissues
(e.g., tax, health care, environmental law). In addition, the financial resources
available to the coalitions are sizable. For instance, the focus of this study, the
MI-Roundtable, has an annual budget of more than $250,000, with each
corporation paying substantial annual dues (approximately $20,000-$30,000
per year).
Second, there is no shortage of debate, controversy, and skepticism
surrounding business involvement in education reform. Criticsquestion the
values and motivations of business as it tries to alterschool policy and practice
(Borman, Castenell, & Gallagher, 1993; Cuban, 1992; Kearns & Doyle, 1988;
Kozol, 1991; Ray & Mickelson, 1990).
Finally,this century (and specifically the lattertwo decades) has witnessed
a significant shift in attention and power (e.g., policy decisions, funding, and
legal control) from local schools and school districtsto state administratorsand
policymakers. In the latter half of the 20th century, the most dramatic shifts
in the institutional environment of schools have been in the relationship of
449

Sipple
public educationto the state (Cibulka,1995).Whereasthe focus of school
policyhad traditionallybeen on norms,structures,politics,and power within
schools,recentattentionis turningto externalinfluencesanddemands,namely
the relationshipwith the stateand federalgovernments,courts,parents,and
the business community(Cibulka,1996;Tyack& Cuban,1995).In addition,
currentresearch has identifiedinstitutionalsectorswithin society, one of
which-the Americanpubliceducationalsystem--is of particular
relevancefor
this study (Rowan& Miskel,1999;Scott& Meyer,1991).Given the increase
in attention paid to the forces at work in the broad sector, or "field"of
education,attentionto specificorganizations
operatingin thissphereis of great
value.
The purposeof this study is to analyzethe context in which an interest
group of business leaders sought to become a catalystfor state education
reform.To thisend, I use datafromdocumentsandinterviewsconductedwith
individualsboth in and outsideof the MI-Roundtable
to describethe environmentin which the MI-Roundtable
formedandanalyzehow a varietyof forces
influencedthe businessgroup'sactions.Froma moretheoreticalperspective,
the MI-Roundtable
entereda complex,thoughwell-established,institutional
environmentof K-12education.Thisenvironmentincludedlong-termhistoricalrootsandwell-established
andpowerrelationships
legalframeworks
(Meyer,
Scott,Strang,& Creigton,1988).
ConceptualPerspectives
Atfirstblush,it would seem to makesense to studyinterestgroupsadvocating
educationalimprovementusing well-establishedtheories of interestgroup
behavior. Such theories (Olson, 1965;Truman,1951) attemptto describe
when, how, and why organizationsformand act.The literaturesuggeststhat
the motivationforinterestgroupactivityis generallyassumedto originatefrom
the innateinterestsof participants
or the pursuitof rationaland personalgain.
The rationaldecision-makingmodelin whichindividualsmakedecisionsand
participatein organizationsthat promote or ensure personal gain is well
known. However, in terms of understandinginterestgroup behavior,the
modelis limitedanddoes notdescribeor predictthe boundsplacedon interest
groupparticipants.As recentempiricalstudiessuggest,neitherexplanationis
satisfying.A morecompleteunderstandingof the externalpressuresaffecting
interestgroups is necessary.Interestgroup theories seem to assume that
participantshave an inherentpolicyinterestor a narrowdesireforfunctional
gain.Butthesepropositionsdo notexplainconsistentbehavioracrossindividuals fromdiversebackgroundsand experiences.Otherforcesseeminglymust
be at work shaping and limitingchoice alternatives(Scott, 1995). It is this
limitationof interestgrouptheoriesthatspurredthe presentinvestigationinto
the institutionalforces actingon the participantsin the MI-Roundtable.
Criticalto the studyof organizationalbehaviorand environmentaladaptationis a focus on and understandingof the relationshipbetween organizations and their external environment.Contingenton the perspectivethat
organizationsareopen systems(Katz&Kahn,1978;Scott,1992),the external
450

environmentof organizationswas once thoughtto includeonly those formal

actorswith which organizationsexchanged informationand resourcesor a
moresubtlediffusionof norms(Selznick,1949).Accordingto ScottandMeyer
(1991, p. 111), "Whilesuch views are not wrong,they are clearlyincomplete
and limited."In the last two decades, conceptualizationsof organizational
environmentshavebroadened.One of the mostsignificantchangesis the view
of environmentsas morecomplex, rational,and layeredthanhad been once
thought (Meyer, 1994; Scott, 1994). Anotheris that organizationsactively
relationsand do not simply act as
participatein organization-environment
passive pawns (DiMaggio,1998;Dimaggio& Powell, 1991a;Zucker,1988).
Scott (1995) suggests that no organization can be judiciously understood
unless the environmentalnorms and expectationsaccordingto which the

organizationoperates are understoodand taken into account. Institutional
theoryprovidesa frameworkwith which to analyzethe environmentof the
MI-Roundtableand can act as a guide to predict how and why the roundtable
responds to its environment. In this case, the MI-Roundtablemust be viewed
as one of many interest groups working to improve the public educational
systemor, in institutionalterms,one of manyinstitutionalagentsinteractingin
the sector of public education. During such interaction, the MI-Roundtableis
shaped by and shapes the formalrules,norms,and belief systemsthatmake
up the institutional environment.

To analyze and investigate the formationand impact of institutions,I draw
from both Cibulka (1995) and Scott (1995) in defining an institution as a
socially defined purpose around which normative, cognitive, and regulative
structuresemerge to provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutionalization is the intentional or unintentional (Cibulka, 1995) process "by
which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike
status in social thought and action" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341). The
emergence of institutionsin a society, or bounded units within a society, results
in stability and order through the creation of socially accepted (according to
some, socially constructed) practices, norms, and ways of thinking. Institutions
are understood to result from "institutionbuilding"efforts and strategies on the
part of institutional agents. These typically include the state, professions,
interestgroups, education professionals,academics, courts, and the media, with
institutionalchanges occurringmore frequentlyin times of social, economic, or
political crises (Cibulka, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; Fligstein & MaraDrita, 1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Scott (1995) describes three pillars,
or ways of conceptualizing institutions, each emphasizing a different set of
institutional attributes.I rely heavily on Scott'sconstructs for the framework of
this article.
Scott's Three Pillars
The regulative pillaris geared toward expedience with institutionsproliferated
through coercive means in the form of laws or sanctions. These rules are legally
sanctioned by formalauthorityand serve to constrainand "regularize"behavior.
Enforcement of rules takes place by monitoring and allocating penalties for
451

Sipple
noncompliance.Whenfocusingon the regulativeaspectsof institutions,the

state plays a prominentrole in both the creation of institutionsand the
monitoringof rules.Withregardto the impactof regulativeinstitutionson the
the interestgrouphadto followlegalrulesforits participation
MI-Roundtable,
in the policyprocessas well as learnwhereformalauthorityresideswithinthe
public education system so that it could target its resources and tactics
effectivelyand efficiently.
The normativepillaris based on the notionsof prescription,evaluation,
and obligationof normativerules in the creationand maintenanceof social
order. Consistingof values and norms,preferredand desirableactions are
establishedwith which organizationaland individualbehaviorcan be compared.Normsprovidebehavioralprescriptionsandlimitappropriategoals to
pursue.Rolescan become internalizedby the actor,be formallyassigned,or
be taken on afterfrequentinteractionwith others;they can restrictbehavior
or grantspecialpower and conferrightson an actor.The MI-Roundtable
may
have been constrainedin its possible actionsby its role as a group of freemarketbusiness leaders or by the expectationsinstitutionalagents had for
businessleaders.
The thirdpillar,cognitive,is basedon the notionthatindividualsinterpret
and constructtheirown meaningof the worldaroundthem.As notedby Scott
(1995), "Tounderstandor explain any action, the analystmust take into
accountnot only the objectiveconditionsbut the actor'ssubjectiveinterpretationof them"(p. 40).Meaningsarederivedby actorsthroughinteractionwith
otheractorsandsymbolsbutarepreservedand changedby humanbehavior.
Social identitiesare centralto the understandingof cognitive institutions,
created an
particularlyas actors performsimilartasks. The MI-Roundtable
in
which
it
viewed
as
itself
from
distinct
the
education
establishidentity
being
ment and yet had a valuablevoice in the educationdebate.
Few researchershave investigatedand categorizedthe types of institutions found within the sector of public education.The complexityof the
institutionalenvironmentplaysan importantrole in the behaviorof organizations operatingin thatenvironment(Greenwood&Hinings,1996).Organizations and theirideas are rarelythe subjectof a narrowset of influencesand
pressures,but they are oftenfacedwith competingand conflictingpressures,
even withinthe samesector(D'Aunno,Sutton,&Price,1991;Fligstein&MaraDrita,1996;Friedland&Alford,1991;Meyer,1987).The U.S.educationsector
is no different,and thus the agents operatingwithin that sector probably
confrontmultipleand competingpressures.
In the late 1980sand early 1990s,therewas no shortageof reformideas
or educationalreformorganizationsadvancingthose ideas.Thisresultedin an
increasinglycomplex environmentas more and more agentstriedto involve
themselves in school reform(Cibulka,1995; Cohen, 1990; Rowan, 1990).
Given the multiple agents in the educationalsector-including the state,
professionalorganizations,historicalprecedent,and businessinvolvementthe MI-Roundtable
probablyfaced multipleinstitutionalpressuresand processes. Hence, the firstpropositionin this studyis as follows.
452

InstitutionalConstraintson BusinessInvolvement
Proposition 1: When entering into the sector of public education, the MIRoundtable will encounter all three types of institutions-regulative, normative, and cognitive.
OrganizationalFields and Sectors
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) observed that the increased rationalization of
society-the homogenization of structureacross organizational types-is less
driven by competition and efficiency than by the structurationof organizational
fields. Meyer, Scott, Strang,and Creighton(1988) suggest that the United States
public educational system is becoming more structuredas a result of a process
of societal rationalization (Meyer, 1994; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983). This
increased rationalization is due not to a strong central state or exclusive
professional control but, rather, to the "profusion of professional standards,
court decisions, special-purpose legislative interests, and a huge network of
interest groups" (Meyer et al., 1988, p. 165).
Nearly synonymous with organizational fields are what Scott and Meyer
(1991) term societal sectors. They propose this term to emphasize a common
framework of relationships, both horizontal and vertical, that make up any
given institutionalfield. This set of relationshipsmay reach from individualunits
to national organizationsand offices, serving to structurethe flow of institutions
across as well as within sector levels. Scott and Meyer (1991, p. 117) define
a sector as "acollection of organizations in the same domain, identified by the
similarityof their services, products, or functions, together with those organizations that critically influence the performance of the focal organizations."
Sectors comprise units and agents woven together in functional terms, although they may be geographically distant (Scott & Meyer, 1991).
Societal sectors typically have five levels (Scott & Meyer, 1991). At the
are
national or society-wide offices and headquartersfor government and
top
private officials and organizations. While plausibly an additional level exists
above the national (e.g., multinational or world sector), this discussion of
societal sectors is limited to sectors within nations (in this case, the U.S. public
educational system). Moving down, the fourth level is that of regional or
multistateauthorities,associations, or organizations.This level is only modestly
applicable to the educational system, since governmental units and most
professional associations operate at the national, state, or local level. The third
level consists of state offices and associations. Formalstate authorities, as well
as many professional associations, operate at the state level. The second level
consists of within-state districtsand councils, frequentlyrepresentingor providing services for multiple local units. Finally, the most basic level is that of the
local unit, branch, or establishment, in this case schools. Table 1 provides a
summary of the theoretical levels within the sector of K-12 public education.
In any given sector, each level has its own authority, function, and
decision-making power. When the sector and the related institutions-whether
flowing up or down-are well established, the power, the decisions, and the
authorityat each level are constrained and shaped by rules, norms, or common
belief systems. In addition, the direction and flow of institutionsand institution-
453

Sipple
Table1
Sector Levels of the Public EducationalSystem in the United States
Sector level"
Public education
5.
Nationalor society-wide offices,

headquarters
4.
Regionalor multistateauthorities,
associations
3.
Stateoffices, associations
U.S. secretaryand Departmentof

Education,NCTM,NCTE,NBPTS,NEA/
AFT,NASSP,NASB
Regionalresearchlabs (e.g., NCREL)and
accreditationagencies (e.g., North Central
AccreditationAssociation)
Statedepartmentand board of education,
chief stateschool officer,MEA/MFT,
MASB
MASSP,
District,board,superintendent,local
teachersunions
School, principal,teacher
2. - Substateareas,districts,councils
1.
Localunits,branchoffices,
establishments
"aScottand Meyer (1991).

Note. NCTM=NationalCouncil of Teachers of Mathematics, NCTE=NationalCouncil of Teachers
of English, NBPTS=National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, NEA=National
Education Association, AFT=AmericanFederation of Teachers, NCREL=NorthCentral Regional
Education Lab, MEA=MichiganEducation Association, MFT=MichiganFederation of Teachers,
MASSP=MichiganAssociation of Secondary School Principals, MASB=MichiganAssociation of
School Boards.
alizationare well understood,as are limitationsof participantsat each level

(Scott & Meyer, 1991).
Public education,like other sectors in the United States(e.g., energy,
environment,healthcare), is inherentlydecentralizedand fragmented.The
U.S. Constitutionensures that this is so. Our system of governmentwas
designed to ensurethe separationof powerswithinthe nationalgovernment
and also between the levels of national,state, and local governments.Such
decentralizationand fragmentation,however, do not necessarilyindicatea
feeble systemguidedby weak institutionalrulesand norms.On the contrary,
the publiceducationalsystemis strongin its commitment-legal and socialto decentralizedand local controlof schools. This includesthe fragmented
sourcesof power seeminglyinverselyproportionalto theirdistancefromthe
classroom.Althoughdecentralized,the power relationships,resource and
informationflows, and acceptable norms of practiceare well established
(Meyer,1983, 1987;Meyer& Rowan,1978;Meyeret al., 1988;Rowan,1982).
Given the well-establishedsector of K-12 education, the sector must be
analyzed in light of its theoreticaland practicalinteractionwith the MIRoundtable.
I suggestthe MI-Roundtable
was morelikelyto operateat the statelevel
than either the local or nationallevel for several reasons. First,the parent
organization(the NationalRoundtable)instructedthe CEOsto formcoalitions
with theirgovernorsand to enact change within theirstate.Second, the MI454

Roundtabletargetedissues of curriculumand assessmentas foci for reformin

Michigan.In 1989, a move was under way in the Michiganlegislatureto
develop a model core curriculumfor all K-12 students.PublicAct 25, signed
into law in 1990, consolidated the decisions necessary to create a core
curriculumat the state level (technicallyby the StateBoardof Education).
Thus,to effectwidespreadcurriculum
changesin Michigan,the MI-Roundtable
the MI-Roundtable's
secondmajor
mustbe involvedatthe statelevel.Similarly,
initiativeaimedto raisethe standardsof the MichiganEducationalAssessment
Program(MEAP)(implementedby the StateDepartmentof Education)and
align the tests with the core curriculum.Again, activityat the state level
seemed most appropriate.
Proposition2: Giventhe institutionallyimposedlevel of involvementby
the NationalRoundtableand the institutionallyestablishedlevel of decision
makingandauthoritywithinthe sectorof publiceducation,the MI-Roundtable
will engage in the majorityof its activityat the state level.
Pressures
Organizational
Responseto Institutional
The earlyyearsof the "new"institutionaltheory (DiMaggio&Powell, 1991b;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978) focused on the need for institutionalized
organizationsto adaptto surroundinginstitutionsso thatthey could obtainor
maintainlegitimacy.Thecommonmechanismby whichorganizations
adapted
was through the creationof structures-often loosely coupled from their
technicalcore-similar to those foundin moresuccessfulor powerfulinstitutional forms.The process by which organizationsadopt similarstructuresis
calledisomorphism.
Currenttheorizingon organizationaladaptationto institutionalpressures
views the processof isomorphismas incompleteandlimited.Today,the range
of strategiesandtacticswithwhichto respondto or resistinstitutional
pressures
is believed to be considerablymore complex. In fact, Oliver(1991, p. 150)
suggeststhatorganizationsrespondto institutionalpressuresin ways thatare
self-serving,includingincreasedprestige,stability,legitimacy,socialsupport,
internalandexternalcommitment,accessto resources,attractionof personnel,
to questioning.Oliverwarnsthat
acceptancein professions,andinvulnerability
the assumptionof a dichotomousresponse-passive or active, conformor
resist-by an organizationto environmentalpressuresis fartoo simplisticand
not valuable.Rather,Oliver(1991) arguesthatmore specific organizational
responses can be predictedif carefulattentionis paid to the context of the
is neitherinevitablenor
pressuresandthe organizationof interest:"Conformity
invariablyinstrumentalin securinglongevity"(p. 175). Scott(1995) recently
articulatedthe integratednatureof organization-environment
relations,with
each agent involvedin activedecisionsbased on the contextof the situation:
Justas institutionsconstituteorganizations,they also constitutewhat
are theirappropriateways of acting,includingactsthatare responses
to institutionalpressures.Strategiesthat may be appropriatein one
kindof industryor fieldmaybe prohibitedin another.Tacticsthatcan
455

Sipple
be successfullypursuedin one settingmay be inconceivablein
another.Not only structures
but also strategiesare institutionally
shaped. (p. 125)
Oliver(1991, p. 152) identifiesfive generalstrategiesorganizationsuse

to respondto institutionalprocesses-acquiescing, compromising,avoiding,
defying,and manipulating-andseveraltacticsforeach type of response.The
responses fall on a continuumfrom passive agreementand acceptanceto
moreactiveandrebelliousbehavior.Organizations
mayacquiesceby responding out of habit (i.e., "thisis the way it has always been done"), imitating
successfulorganizational
responses,or simplycomplyingto the pressure.This
strategyhas been frequentlydescribedby institutionalscholarsand involves
littleconflictor thoughton the partof the organization.
Organizations
mayalso
respondin the formof compromise.Thismaybe done to appeaseor balance
multipleand conflictingenvironmentalpressures.Pacifyingtactics may be
employed by offeringonly minimalresistancewhile allocatinga majorityof
resourcesto placatingthe agentexertingthe institutionalpressure.Organizations may put up some fight,but they mustbe carefulnot to seriouslyoffend
a majorsource of revenue,information,or legitimacy.Bargainingis another
formof compromisein which an organizationattemptsto negotiateconcessions or reducepressurefromthe agentby adoptingportionsof the prescribed
practice,structure,or norms.
Avoidanceis another,moreactiveorganizational
responseto institutional
pressures.Oliverdefinesthis strategyas an attemptto precludethe necessity
of conformity;organizationsachievethisby concealingtheirnonconformity,
bufferingthemselvesfrominstitutional
pressures,orescapingfrominstitutional
rulesor expectations.Meyerand Rowan(1977)describedhow organizations
can concealtheirresistanceby adoptingritualsandceremoniesor by buffering
anddecouplingtheirtechnicalcore (whatElmore,1995,callsthe "instructional
core"in schools)fromtheirorganizational
structure.
Manyschoolorganizations
recentlyadopteda policy of site-basedmanagementas a symbolof progressive organizationalmanagement,but by doing so school leadersmayconceal
the propagationof traditionalclassroompractices.If publicapprovalis indeinternaltechnicalpractice,bufferinganddecoupling
pendentof an organization's
can be effectiveavoidancestrategies.
A fourthstrategydescribedby Oliver(1991) is for organizationsto defy
the externalinstitutionalpressures.Suchan activeapproachis effective,and
moreplausible,when enforcementof the institutionalpressuresis unlikelyor
when the institutionalnormsandscriptsarein conflictwith those of the target
organization.Organizationsmayalso overtlychallengeanddismissthe externally imposed institutionalpressures.Thiscan be an effectivestrategywhen
supportedby an organization's
integrityor rationalargument.Anorganization,
forexample,mayarguethata giveninstitutional
ruleis harmfulto childrenand
thatthe organizationplaces the needs of childrenfirst.
Atthe farend of the passive-activecontinuum,an organizationmayresist
an institutionalruleor normby attemptingto influenceor controlit. Organi456

zations may manipulatethe rule by co-opting it for their own purposes or

workingto changethe ruleto betterservetheirinterests.Scott(1995)suggests
thatthis type of strategy,specificallythe techniquesused by organizationsto
scholars.
manipulateviews of theirlegitimacy,is of greatinterestto institutional
aremoreproneto use suchaggressiveandcontrollingstrategies
Organizations
when institutionalexpectationsare "incipient,localized,or weaklypromoted"
(Oliver, 1991, p. 158).
Two centralconstructsthoughtimportantin predictingwhatorganizations
do when confrontedwith institutionalpressuresare dependenceand consonance (Oliver, 1991). Dependence can be defined as the fiscal, social, or
politicalneed forone agentto be associatedwith another.Oliver(1991)posits
thatan organizationthatis dependenton anotherwill be less successfulshould
thatrelationshipwane. The relativedependencemay indicatea rationalefor
eitheradherenceor resistanceto the institutional
rules,norms,or beliefsystems
being advocated.The second issue used to predictorganizationalresponseis
the consonanceof the MI-Roundtable's
ideas,beliefs,and agendawith thatof
the pressuringinstitution.Oliver(1991)suggeststhatwhen an organizationis
in harmonywith institutionalpressures-similar in norms and beliefs--the
organizationwill conformto the pressure.Conversely,shouldthe institution
and the organizationhave diametricallyopposed belief systems, norms,or
ideas, the organizationis more likelyto aggressivelyoppose complianceand
activelyattemptto change the institutionadvanced.
Withregardto the focus of this study,the MI-Roundtable
undoubtedly
facedinstitutionalpressuresin conflictwithits own views of educationreform.
Forexample, some conservativeorganizationsthatadvocatelimitedpowers
for governmentwould stronglyargue against the state deciding what all
studentsshould learn.Otherorganizationsmay want the state to providea
curriculumbut be opposed to a rigorous,high-stakestestingprogram.
Proposition3: The greaterthe dependence of the MI-Roundtableon
institutionalagents advancinginstitutionalpressures,the less likely the MIRoundtableis to resistthe institutionalpressuresadvancedby the agents.
Proposition4: The greaterthe coherence between the MI-Roundtable's
agendaandan institutional
agent'sinstitutional
pressures,the less likelythe MIRoundtableis to resistthe institutionalpressures.
Dataand ResearchMethods
The data for this study include participantobservation,extensive archival
documentation,and threewaves of structuredinterviewswith centralfigures
insideand outsideof the MI-Roundtable.
Theparticipantobservationincludes
the ongoing involvement of the author and his colleagues with the MIRoundtablein the formof educationconsultantsforthe businessleaders.The
consultationbeganin 1990andcontinuestoday.Throughoutthe involvement,
the MI-Roundtable
has reliedon the consultantsfor a varietyof supporttasks
and technicalexpertise on varioustopics relatedto schools and education
policy.Theconsultantshaveproducedseveralformaldocumentsforthe group
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detailingthe MI-Roundtable's
agendaandpolicypositionsin additionto several
smaller,more informalassessmentsand reports.
Mycolleaguesand I conductedthreewaves of structuredinterviews(15
in 1992, 25 in 1994, and 52 in 1995-1996) with membersof both the MIRoundtableand the largerpolicy community.The schedules used in the
interviewswere developedforpurposesotherthanthisstudy,butat the same
time the data are very relevant and appropriatefor use here. Archival
documents were gathered from a varietyof sources (e.g., letters, e-mail,
publishedand unpublisheddocuments,meetingminutes)and cataloguedby
topicanddate.Documentswere used to triangulateinterviewandobservation
datafor accuracyand consistencyby providingtechnicalinformationsuch as
dates, membershipinformation,and policy statements.Furthermore,these
data provide accurateand reliableinformationon the group's formaland
informalpolicypositions,characteristics
of the groupmembershipandleaderand
in
and
ship,
changes policy positions
membership.
A case study approachis used to carryout this investigationof the MIRoundtable'sinvolvementin stateeducationpolicymaking.Casestudymethods are employed to structuredatacollection,guide the analysis,and focus
conclusions.Yin(1994)arguesconvincinglythata case studyis a "comprehensive researchstrategy"(p. 13), not to be confusedwith issuesof epistemology
or general qualitativeresearch.Stake (1994) describes three types of case
studies.Intrinsiccase studiesare those whose sole interestis a betterundercase.Instrumental
casestudiesarethosein whicha case
standingof a particular
is examinedin orderto derivea broadermeaning,gaininsightintoa particular
issue, or refine theory. Collectivecase studies focus on several cases that
collectively provide inquiryinto a phenomenon, population,or condition
(Stake, 1994). This study encompasses the first two of Stake'scase study
Giventhe poorreputationandhistoryof case
types:intrinsicandinstrumental.
studyanalysis(Miles&Huberman,1987;Yin, 1981),I heeded the recommendations of Yin and Miles and Hubermanin conductinga systematicand
replicablestudythroughthe use of multiplesourcesof data,creationof a case
studydatabase,developmentof a chainof evidence,convergenceamongdata
types, and investigationof rivalexplanations.
createsinevitabletradeFinally,my involvementwith the MI-Roundtable
offs in conductingresearchsuch as this.On the one hand,the involvementof
universityresearcherswiththe MI-Roundtable
membershipraisesquestionsof
bias in thisanalysis.Someskepticsmayarguethatthe close relationshipeither
cloudsthe judgmentof the researchersor prohibitsthe researchersfrombeing
criticalof theirassociates,particularly
given the annualpaymentfromthe MIRoundtableto the Universityof Michigan($80,000).On the other hand, the
close relationshipprovidesunique accessibilityto people, documents,and
events unavailableto personsoutsidethe organization.In addition,the close
relationshipover7 yearsservedto developa highdegreeof trust-and, hence,
candid responses-between MI-Roundtable
membersand the researchers.
This degree of trustand openness would not be possible withoutthe close
biasin collecting,interpreting,
andanalyzing
workingrelationship.Researcher
458

the data was checked in a varietyof ways. First,several researcherswere

responsiblefor the collectionof the dataover the course of 7 years.Second,
and results
(withnamesremoved)were coded by threeresearchers,
transcripts
were comparedto checkforan adequatedegreeof interrater
reliability.
Finally,
the editors,reviewers,and,ultimately,the readerprovidea finalcheckforbias.
Findings: Institutional Influences on the MI-Roundtable
The 1989 annual meeting of the Business National Roundtable proved to be
a watershed moment for corporate involvement in education policy in many
states, including Michigan, the focus of this study. The National Roundtable
provided the leadership to expand business involvement in education beyond
independent, locally based, and often short-termprogramstoward more broadbased and long-term involvement at the local, state, and national levels. As
reported in Phi Delta Kappan:
Those who were expecting business to sweep in like a rich uncle
takingover a school bake sale and handingout computers,endowed
chairs, or whateverelse is on the wish list may find that this new
versionof business involvementis a short-termdisappointmentand
a long-termshock. (Pipho, 1990, p. 582)
As K martand the five other Michiganmembers of the NationalRoundtable
began the process of creating a state-level coalition with the governor and
other interested parties,this new group faced pressures and influence on many
fronts: the National Roundtable, the leadership of the six member companies,
higher education, K-12 education, the broader business community, and the
established networks, power relationships,and politics of the education sector.
During the summer of 1989, the CEOof Kmartand two of his senior-level
executives began to coalesce the Michiganmembers of the NationalRoundtable.
Guiding their efforts were the goals and general tactics outlined by the National
Roundtable, the prioritiesand interests of the member companies' leadership,
and at least one other education reform organization representing small
business interests. The individuals participatingin the MI-Roundtableall came
from the corporate world. Original participants included vice presidents and
individuals assigned to public policy and government relations. Given the
participants'high-level positions, they were obviously quite adept and successful in the corporate world. The earliest data suggest that when the participants
looked at schools they saw inefficiency, poor management, a lack of accountability, a stagnating union, and graduates who needed remedial (and expensive!) training before they could effectively work with the encroaching technological advanceson the showroom and shop floor.Butwhile the MI-Roundtable
readily identified perceived problems with the public schools, ascertaining
strategies and solutions proved more vexing.
During the summer of 1990, less than 1 year after the group's formation,
many of the original participants admittedly viewed the MI-Roundtable as
"confused" and unsure of what direction and strategy to take in reforming
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Sipple
Michigan'sK-12 schools. Probablystemming from their long-standing involvement in private business, the group assembled a (wish) list of ideas for altering
school performance. This included the incorporation of free-market mechanisms in the educational system, the abolishment of the teachers' unions,
consolidation of smaller districts, and a longer school year. The organization
possessed little capacity to frame a systemic reform agenda-as called for by
the National Roundtable-and struggled putting together its own plan. The
participants had little knowledge outside of their own personal K-12 experiences and so relied on their business sense. At this early stage, the National
Roundtable was still developing its agenda, and the National Roundtable
Education Task Force had just begun to meet and so too had little capacity to
ensure that each state adopted its recommendations. Hence, in 1990 the MIRoundtable had no template to guide its actions and little capacity to act as a
leader, or catalyst, for educational improvement.
InstitutionalAgents
Here I briefly describe the agents with whom the MI-Roundtableinteracted.
The list was constructedby identifyingall agents with whom the MI-Roundtable
had contact. I make specific note of the level at which the agent operated and
the messages advanced.
Business National Roundtable. The National Roundtable functioned at
the national level, but the decisions it made had a strong impact on the state
coalitions. It sought to control and direct the state initiatives while continuing
to maintain a presence on the national scene. The National Roundtable,
particularlyDavid Hornbeck, provided direct guidance and assessment of the
state coalitions, as evidenced by Hornbeck's reading and commenting on the
University of Michigan'swhite paper. Its national presence was reflected in its
public informationcampaigns (e.g., editorials)and lobbying efforts in Washington (e.g., Head Start).
Member companies. The personal interests and leadership of its member
CEOs also prodded the fledgling MI-Roundtable.This study characterizesthe
CEOsof member companies as agents external to the MI-Roundtablebecause
the bulk of the work on behalf of the MI-Roundtablewas and is done by seniorlevel executives within a working group, not by CEOs themselves. The
organization operated with the endorsement, support, and knowledge of the
CEOs, but the day-to-day actions did not include the chief executives. For this
reason, when the CEOs did act, their influence can be viewed as external to
the operation of the MI-Roundtable.
The CEOsexhibited an interest in developing a relationship with the new
governor and in passing legislation. One CEOrevealed his perspective on what
most needed to be done: "Wecan sit around a room and talk about what's right
and what's wrong [with schools] but unless it's really decided upon and...put
into effect through legislation, [education reform]won't work." The CEOsalso
looked for results-evidence thattheir initiativewas accomplishing something.
The chief executives used their'position to appoint government relations
personnel to the MI-Roundtableand forge a relationship with the governor.
460

They did not meet with local superintendentsor gatherinformationon their

own. The only evidence of CEOactivityat the nationallevel was attendance
by some at the annualmeetingof the BusinessNationalRoundtable.
EconomicAllianceofMichigan. In additionto the NationalRoundtable
and the membercompanies,the only evidence of anotherinstitutionalagent
interactingwith the MI-Roundtable
duringthe firstyear of operationwas an
organizationcalled the EconomicAllianceof Michigan(hereafterAlliance).'
Thisorganization
consistedof a varietyof businessorganizations
includinglabor
and tradegroupssuch as the MichiganRealtorsAssociationand the Michigan
Manufacturers
Association.TheAlliancehadrecentlybegunassemblingitsown
for
agenda reformingMichiganschools. It actedby advancingspecificpolicy
proposalsat the state level. The Allianceplannedto affectlegislativepolicy
decisionsand assumedthatsuch policieswould filterdown to the local level,
influencingteachersand schools. One active MI-Roundtable
participantatto
the
two
collaboration
as an
tempted engage
groups, viewing potential
for
the
MI-Roundtable
to
broaden
its
business
ties
opportunity
throughoutthe
state and thus increaseits politicalcapital.
UniversityofMichigan.Througha priorassociationwith the presidentof
the Universityof Michigan,the MI-Roundtable
CEOscontactedthe university
presidentin July of 1990 to seek guidanceon theirdevelopmentof a K-12
educationreformagenda.The presidentsubsequentlycontactedthe dean of
the university'sSchool of Educationto inform him of the contact and to
recommendhe be involved.The universityfacultyhad ties to otherscholars
across the country,supplementingtheir own expertise on policy issues of
interestto the MI-Roundtable,
systemicreform,and publicpolicy. Moreover,
the universityprofessionalstaff(e.g., the GovernmentRelationsOffice)provided expertise in interactingwith state governmentand the media. This
bifacetedapproach(informationdevelopmentandpoliticalguidance)proved
valuableto the MI-Roundtable.
Governor'soffice.The election of John Engleras governorin November
of 1990 played a significantrole in the behavior and impact of the MIRoundtable.Englerrode to victoryon a wave of fiscalconservatism.A slogan
repeatedoften by Englercalledfor "newpriorities,not new taxes."In his first
state-of-the-state
address(February11, 1991),Englerlistedchildrenas his "one
absolutespending priority."He vowed to "puteducation back at the top of
the agenda."The governordescribed"excellencein everyschool"as the most
withhis top spendingpriority,propertytax
importantnationalgoal.Concurrent
reduction became Engler'snumber one method of attractingbusiness to
Michigan.In his firstspeech on the topic of education,Englermentionedthe
MI-Roundtable
by name and emphasizedthe mainpoints of its agenda.
In sum, Englerand his staff used a bully pulpit strategyin which they
identified and proclaimedgoals for the state, but they left much of the
implementationandmanyof the detailsto the locallevel. In doingthis,Engler
could call himselfthe educationgovernorand take a strongleadershiprole
while not getting mired in details, regulations,and the expense of statesponsored programs.Englerquicklyconsolidatedhis power over issues of
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Sipple
education,resultingin broadagreementon who was in chargeof educationat
the statelevel. Forthe MI-Roundtable,
this nearlyspelled disasteras it got off
on the wrong foot with Englerby not backinghim in the 1990gubernatorial
campaign.Throughpriorrelationshipsand the high statusof MI-Roundtable
was able to work to gain the supportof the
participants,the MI-Roundtable
governor.
Michigan Partnershipfor New Education. Anotheractor in Michigan
educationreformwas the MichiganPartnership
forNew Education(hereafter
This
at
Partnership). organizationbegan MichiganStateUniversityin 1987and
was fundedby both the stateandprivateentities.Duringthe MI-Roundtable's
formativeyears,the Partnership
was headedby the deanof the MichiganState
College of Education.2The primarythrust of the organizationwas to
reconceptualizethe preparationof teachersand the relationshipbetween
universitiesandK-12schools.Themainprogrampromotedby the Partnership
was the creationof professionaldevelopmentschools in which university
facultycollaboratewithK-12 personnelto improvepracticeand providea rich
environmentfor the preparationof new teachers.
In earlyOctoberof 1990,the executivedirectorof the Partnershipwrote
the MI-Roundtable
leadership.The letterwas in regardto the possibilityof
andthe MI-Roundtable,
an idea met
coordinatingthe effortsof the Partnership
with skepticismat the SeptemberMI-Roundtable
workinggroupmeeting.The
directorstressedthe importanceof workingtogetherwith one voice: "Sincea
clear and consistentmessage about educationalchange is critical,multiple,
in Michigan'sschools
conflictingmessageswill encourage'business-as-usual'
and colleges."The directoralso remindedthe leaderof the working group
aboutthe NationalRoundtable
guidelinesforthestatecoalitions,whichstressed
the importanceof coalitionbuilding.Not-so-subtlepressuredirectedat the
leader to persuadehis organizationto join forces with the Partnershipwas
includedin the secondletter:"Onlyyou canhelpthe MichiganPartnership
and
the MichiganNationalRoundtableworkin concert.You arekey to ourbuilding
a formidableallianceforeducationalchangehere in Michigan."
wantto joinforceswiththe MI-Roundtable?
Whydid the Partnership
Why
was the MI-Roundtable
reluctantto mergewith the Partnership?
The answers
to these questionsserveto illuminatethe complexitiesof the coalitionsin state
wantedto developa closeworkingrelationship
policymaking.ThePartnership
withthe MI-Roundtable
to increaseitspoliticalcapitalandbroadenits resource
base. The Partnershiphad only a single sourceof privatefunds(a prominent
commercialrealestatedeveloperin Michigan)and probablyviewed the large
MI-Roundtable
corporationsas a solid sourceof continuedfinancialsupport.
The MI-Roundtable
was reluctantto joinwith the Partnershipbecause of the
relativelynarrowconceptionof reformadvocatedby the Partnership.However, given thatthe developer,AlfredTaubman,was also a majorcontributor
to the university,the presidentindicatedthatit was veryimportantto include
Taubmanand MichiganStateUniversityPresidentJohn DiBiaggioin the MIRoundtableactivities.The deferenceto DiBiaggioand the developercreated
an artificialallegianceto and inclusionof the Partnershipin MI-Roundtable
462


activities. The president admitted that the MI-Roundtableis "between a rock
and a hard place because of the importance of [the developer] to many of our
agendas."
In sum, the Partnershipsolicited state funds but worked primarilyat the
local and districtlevels, creating professional development schools across the
state. The group had strong support from the governor and a prominent
contributor to the state university system and state politics. This tangled web
fostered a degree of dependence on the Partnership.
State Board of Education. With regard to the present study, the State
Board of Education's most significant activity between 1989 and 1991 was the
development of a core curriculumfor Michigan K-12 schools. The board was
charged by the legislature (Public Act 25 of 1990) with preparing a model core
curriculum for the state of Michigan, a function central to the goals of the MIRoundtable. The legislature assigned the board responsibility for setting the
tone and standards for the curriculum,although it functions predominantly in
a supervisory capacity. The board delegated the actual creation of the curriculum to the State Department of Education. I found no evidence suggesting
that, during this time, the board actively sought input from the MI-Roundtable,
but because of its work on the state's new model core curriculum, the MIRoundtable was quite interested in the board's actions. With regard to the
issues of concern to the MI-Roundtable, the board played a limited but
important role. However, given the legal authority and responsibility for the
state's model core curriculum,the board, in a universityleader'swords, became
the "policy target"for setting high and rigorous standards for what Michigan
children should learn. The actions of the MI-Roundtabledid not rest with the
board, though, as meetings also took place with representatives from the
Department of Education.
Department ofEducation. As just described, the Department of Education
was in charge of the actual development of the core curriculum content
standards and outcomes. As such, the MI-Roundtablealso targeted key members of the department to share the goals of the MI-Roundtable policy
document. In constructing the core curriculum content standards and outcomes, the Department of Education contractedwith educators and academics
in various fields to create a best-practice curriculum. The department then
proposed drafts of the core curriculumto the State Board of Education. In the
end, the board was responsible for establishing the standards and rigor of the
curriculum.
Chamber of Commerce. The State Chamber of Commerce represents the
interests of many of Michigan's local businesses, both large and small. Its
purpose is to foster an economic environment favorable to business interests
through lobbying the state government on issues of tax, corporate, and
environmental law. The MI-Roundtabledid not have regular contact with the
Chamber of Commerce until the beginning of 1991. Chamber involvement in
education had been limited to issues of school finance. The chamber made
clear its opposition to any policy or program requiring tax money. This made
for an awkward relationship, with the state's largest employers advocating
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Sipple
policiesrequiringfundingandthe stateorganization
representingtheirinterests
opposing the same policies.
ChallengesFacingthe MI-Roundtable
faced many
Throughoutits formativeyears (1989-1991),the MI-Roundtable
and
In
I
this
review
and
summarize
the main
section,
opportunities challenges.
institutionalpressuresand processes imposed on the MI-Roundtable
by its
fellow agents in the environmentof K-12 education.Providingstructurefor
thissectionareScott's(1995)threetypesof institutions:regulative,normative,
cognitive.
Regulativeinstitutions.Formalregulationswere imposed on the MIRoundtableby the National Roundtableand the governor. The National
Roundtabledevelopeda set of guidesand actionplansforeach statecoalition
to follow. These includedthe NationalRoundtable's"nineessentialcomponents"(BusinessRoundtable,1991),a set of goals forYear 1, and eventually
the call for developmentof a "gapanalysis"in each state,all decreed by the
NationalRoundtableEducationTaskForceand assessedfor compliance.The
gap analysismeasuredthe "gap"between the NationalRoundtable'sessential
components and actualstate policy and practice.These rules and practices
could be viewed as normativeinstitutionsexcept for the explicit detail to
which they had to be followed and the persuasionapplied by the National
Roundtableto ensure compliance.Consequencesfor rogue coalitions not
adhering to the prescribedguidelines were public derision and National
Roundtabletakeover.The NationalRoundtablepubliclypraisedthose conformingto its model but also listed the states not conforming.Hornbeck
personallytook on a role of enforcerof the NationalRoundtablestandards.
GovernorEngleralso shapedthe activityof the MI-Roundtable
by advanca
institution.
As
stated
took
in
office
a time of
earlier,Engler
ing regulative
economic tumultin Michigan,givingriseto one of his popularslogans:"new
that
priorities,not taxes."As a result,it was made clearto the MI-Roundtable
the governorwouldnotendorseanypolicyproposalrequiringadditionalfunds,
andthoserequiringno statefundsatallwouldbe givenhighestpriority.Adding
to this climate was a $500 million state-budgetdeficit the governor faced
during his firstyear in office. Clearly,as governor,Englerhad the formal
authorityto set his own prioritiesforstatepolicy and attemptto influencethe
notabideby thegovernor's
policyproposalsof others.ShouldtheMI-Roundtable
it
would
do
so
at
its
Not
the
precept,
peril.
following directionof the governor
would
have
resulted
in
of the groupwhen it came
probably
marginalization
time for policy decisionsto be made.Thus,in its infancy,the MI-Roundtable
had to toe the line laid out by the governor.
Normativeinstitutions.Normativeprescriptionsfor informalrules and
roles came fromthe StateBoardof Educationand the Universityof Michigan.
The boardwas chargedwith developinga corecurriculumin 1990.The board
directedthe StateDepartmentof Educationto develop the curriculumand
content standardsbut maintainedits veto authorityfor final approvalof the
standards.Withthis authoritycame the responsibilityand opportunityto set
464


the standards at a level the board deemed appropriate. Should the board want
the most rigorouscurriculumand standardsin the nation, they had the authority
to demand it. Conversely, should the board approve a less-than-rigorous
version of a curriculum, the state and the MI-Roundtablewould have to live
with whatever consequences ensued. In short, the board had the authority to
establish the normative roles for the MichiganK-12 school curriculum.The MIRoundtable had to decide whether they would try to influence the board's
decision and, once the decision was approved, whether they would support
it. Should the MI-Roundtablehave chosen not to endorse the board's decision,
however, it is doubtful that any harm would have come to the group given its
independence from the board. Hence, the institutioncarriedby the board was
not regulative.
The University of Michigan served as a second source of normative
institutional pressure for the MI-Roundtable.Normative institutions guide and
define the proper role for agents acting within a sector, although they carryno
coercion for noncompliance. The university and its representatives held no
formal authority over and provided no direct financial support for the MIRoundtable. Rather, the university served as a source of information and
guidance.
In 1989 and 1990, the MI-Roundtablewas unable to develop a coherent
agenda for education reform with the information available to them. At the
request of the MI-Roundtableleadership, the university representatives provided a model agenda for education reform that could be successfully advanced-politically and educationally-by the business leaders. In preparing
the document, the universityresearchersgathered informationfrom colleagues
at other institutions and used their own expertise to consolidate and develop
the ideas for a "state-of-the-art"agenda for education reform. Much of the
information came from outside the purview of the MI-Roundtable.
The data also suggest that the university provided guidance for MIRoundtable actions with the governor, legislature, and general operations
concerning the public pronouncement of their agenda. This guidance can be
construed as a resource but also as a constraint on the actions of the MIRoundtable participants.For example, the MI-Roundtableleadership planned
a press conference in October of 1990 to announce a collaboration with the
Alliance and make public the white paper prepared by the University of
Michigan. The university representatives quickly squelched the plan, fearing
that the proposal might become a political pawn in the upcoming election.
Another example was the university's plan to ensure that the group took the
lead from the newly elected governor. The institution advanced by the
university representatives and imposed on the MI-Roundtable was that of
defining the proper role of interest groups under a new administration. The
university'spublic affairsofficial was not making up the rules (i.e., building the
institution)but, rather,understood the rules, norms, and protocol and provided
the information to the group to use at their discretion. Once again, the
university had no formal authority over the business leaders; however, it
provided substantive educational information and procedural norms for
465

Sipple
couldacceptthe informationandguidance,
policymaking.The MI-Roundtable
and
actions
its
altering plans
accordingly,orit couldchoose to ignorethe advice
and continueon its way. If the MI-Roundtable
resistedthe institutionalpresit
on
without
would
the
information
and
sure,
carry
guidancethe universityhad
to offer. No punishmentor public humiliationwould ensue, and the MIRoundtablewould not sufferfinancially.On the otherhand,the MI-Roundtable
would blindlyhead into unchartedterritoryof stateeducationpolicymaking
with no map, compass,or guide.
Cognitiveinstitutions.Cognitiveinstitutions,the models and identities
thatorganizationsuse to constructtheirown meaning,were advancedby the
Allianceandthe Universityof Michigan.Theseinstitutionsareprevailingbelief
systemsthatsubtlyshape and guide behaviorsand decisions.
Otherthan the NationalRoundtable,the firstexternalagent with which
had contactwas the Alliance.The list of policy reforms
the MI-Roundtable
advocatedby the Allianceincludedbusiness-typepracticessuch as improving
economies of scale (school consolidation),improvingmarketsthroughincreased competition(school choice), and increasingproductivitythrough
longerhoursof operation(lengtheningof the school day andyear).Whenthe
Allianceapproachedthe MI-Roundtable
(andKelloggspecifically),it encountered an organizationwith a similarbackgroundand belief system.Joining
forcesandadvocatingreformsbasedon popularandsuccessfulbusinesstactics
made sense to the MI-Roundtable
leadership.In this case, the institution
advanced by the Alliancewas that of taken-for-granted
business practices
TheMI-Roundtable
couldjoin
designedto improveefficiencyandproductivity.
the Alliance, accept its policy ideas, and work toward the reformof the
educationalsystem.On the otherhand,the MI-Roundtable
was free to ignore
the Allianceproposal,since it had no essentialties to the Allianceand did not
depend on politicalor economic supportfromthis agent.
A key differencebetween the institutionalmessage of the Allianceand
thatof the Universityof Michiganis the emphasison structuralversusproceduralissues, a focus on school governanceand the length of the school day
as compared with a focus on instruction,learning,and assessment. The
universitypushed the taken-for-grantedassumptionthat to improve the
performanceof schools,reformersmustfirstimprovethe contentof the school
curriculumand then measureto whatdegreestudentslearnthe curriculum.In
addition,the universityrepresentativestriedto get across the message that
schools do not operatein vacuumsbut ratherare a partof a largerand often
unequalsociety.Forthisreason,if adequateopportunitiesareto be provided
for all students to learn the common and rigorouscurriculum,additional
programsmustbe in place forsome young childrento ensurethatall children
can read by the thirdgrade. For the same reason, the capacityof schools
servingpoorstudentsmustbe improved,withadditionalassistancetargetedfor
such schools.Thismessageis markedlydifferentfromthe traditionalbusiness
view in which free marketcompetitionwill force school improvement,as if
schools are blackboxes thatwill improvewhen given the properincentives.
Whatoccurredin classroomsbetween teachersand studentswas not at
466

the forefront of the business-inspired reforms of the Alliance or the MIRoundtable company representatives. The institutional pressure applied by
the University of Michigan was causing the business leaders to construct a
different vision of education reform, one focused on instruction, learning, and
assessment, not simply improved and more efficient management of schools
and school districts.
Returning to the first proposition (when entering into an institutional
environment with many sources of rules, norms, and belief systems, an
organization will face all three types of institutions),the data for this case study
of the MI-Roundtable clearly suggest that it faced multiple and sometimes
competing institutions from a variety of agents. In Scott's(1995) terms, the MIRoundtable encountered regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions carried by multiple agents within the education sector. Of course, this brief
discussion is representativeonly of the range of institutionaltypes faced by the
MI-Roundtableand not a complete survey of all of the institutionsto which the
MI-Roundtablemust respond. Table 3 provides a summary of the institutions
carried by the main agents with whom the MI-Roundtableinteracted. Nevertheless, I have described profound examples as they relate to the behavior of
the MI-Roundtablein its formative years. The issues of how and why the MIRoundtable responded to these institutional pressures are discussed subsequently.
Levelof Involvement
As described earlier, the institutionalsector of education involves activity by a
variety of agents functioning at many levels. In predicting the level at which
the MI-Roundtablespent its time and resources, it is necessary to understand
the sources of traditionalpower within the education sector, where decisions
are made with regardto relevant issues, and who is affected by these decisions.
I posit that in order to help identify the level at which the MI-Roundtable
chose to operate, it is necessary to stay focused on the policy issues of concern
to the MI-Roundtableand the agents within the education sector that have the
authority to influence such issues. Afterits association began with the University of Michigan, the MI-Roundtablequickly became interested in issues of
curriculum, assessment, and, to a lesser degree, programs promoting early
childhood education and supporting schools affected by poverty. Given this,
it is logical to investigate the level at which decisions affecting these issues
were made.
Curriculumdecisions in Michigan had long been left to teachers, schools,
local school districts, and sometimes intermediate school districts. Even after
implementation of the state's assessment program in the 1970s, the content
of what teachers taught students was locally controlled. However, with the
passage of Public Act 25 in 1990, the state (particularly the State Board of
Education and the State Department of Education) assumed responsibility for
the creation of a model core curriculum for all Michigan schools. This is
precisely the same time at which the MI-Roundtable became focused on
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Sipple
curricular
issues.The datasuggestthatthe MI-Roundtable
recognizedthe new
role and responsibilityof the state and began to meet with and make
presentationsto the governor,his educationpolicyadvisor,the board,andthe
did not attemptto meet with school district
department.The MI-Roundtable
curriculumdirectors,principals,or teachersat the local level or with professional associationsconcernedwith issues of curriculumat the nationallevel
until 1992,well afterthe developmentof the policy agenda.
The MI-Roundtable's
second policy focus was on student and school
assessment.Specifically,a majorpolicygoalwas the developmentof a rigorous
statewideassessmentprogramlinkeddirectlyto the state'smodelcore curriculum. School and studentassessmentwas anotherissue long left to the local
level. In the 1970s,however,Michiganbegan a statewideprogramto better
understandthe performanceof students,schools,anddistricts.The expressed
examswas diagnosticin nature:identifyingwhichschools
purposeof the MEAP
were underperforming.
In 1990,a logicallink to a new assessmentprogram
was througha conduit to the creationof an assessmentsystem based on
rigorous,world-classstandardsand the state'sdeveloping core curriculum.
Apparentlyagreeingwith this logic, the MI-Roundtable
pressedtheiridea for
a rigorousassessmentlinkedto the state'scorecurriculum
in meetingswiththe
Departmentof Educationandwith the governorand his staff.Once again,no
datasuggest thatthe MI-Roundtable
attemptedto meet with representatives
fromthe local or nationallevel.
Inadditionto workingwiththe currentsourcesof decision-making
authoron
andassessment),theMI-Roundtable
ity itstwo mainpolicyissues(curriculum
hadto operatewithinthe multitudeof preexistinginstitutional
rulesandnorms
thatmakeup the educationsector.Educationalpolicy,with the exception of
compensatoryfederalprograms(e.g., Title1) and specialeducationprograms
and rules(e.g., PL94-142and manyfederalcourtdecisions),is rarelymade at
the nationallevel. The federalgovernmentabdicatedits directauthorityto
affectthe educationof Americanyouth more than 200 years ago. President
Reagan'sNew Federalismonly reinforcedthe decentralizednatureof education policy, as did the recent backlashcaused by the specter of a national
curriculumand exam for all studentssuggestedin the early1990sby the New
AmericanSchoolsDevelopmentCorporation
(DeWitt,1991).Decisionmaking
at the locallevel has also been reducedas statesrecoupsome of the delegated
authorityon educationalissues. Spurringthe centralizationof power by the
stateswas the increasein use of statefundingforlocaleducationand the view
thatthe economichealthof the stateis linkedto the performanceof itsschools.
Therefore,it is in the interestof the stategovernmentto ensurethatall children
achieve at high levels.
My second propositionis stronglysupportedby the data for this case
study.An examinationof the agents fromwhom the MI-Roundtable
sought
guidanceand support,and the agentsit soughtto influence,suggeststhatthe
vast majorityof the activityof the MI-Roundtable
occurredat the state level
with state-levelagents(see Table2). In short,to influencecertainpolicies,one
needs to go to where the action is.
468

Table2
Summaryof Levelof Involvementof Institutional

Agents
Agent
Roundtable
Membercompanies
Alliance
Universityof Michigan
Governor'soffice
Partnership
Board
Department
Chamber
Primarylevel
Secondarylevel
National
State
State
Regional
State
State
State
State
State
State
National,local
Local
State
Local
Substate
OrganizationalResponse of the MI-Roundtableto Its Environment

This section attempts to answer the following questions: How did the MIRoundtable respond to institutional pressures once it began operating in the
education sector?Did the organizationsimply conform to (i.e., become isomorphic with) institutionalrules, norms, and belief systems to maintain legitimacy
in the eyes of the other agents (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977)?Or was their response more complex, cognitive, and active, as
suggested in the more recent literature (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a;
Oliver, 1991)?
Roundtable. As described earlier, the National Roundtable and its Education Task Force prescribed a specific set of strategies and guidelines for the
state coalitions. In 1990, the National Roundtable approved its "nine essential
components for a successful educational system,"the implementation of which
formed the guide for assessment for each state coalition. In the elite business
circles of the CEOs of the nation's most powerful companies, appearance is
important,particularlythe appearance of being a good corporate citizen (read:
doing what the National Roundtable prescribed). This created a sense of
dependence on the National Roundtable on the part of the CEOs and thus the
working group. In addition, the message advanced by the National Roundtable
was concordant with the direction and goals pushed by the University of
Michigan representatives. In short, the MI-Roundtablewas both dependent on
and in agreement with the message of the National Roundtable.As a result, the
MI-Roundtable would be expected to respond to the National Roundtable
using one of the strategies on the passive end of Oliver's (1991) continuum.
In fact, the MI-Roundtableresponded by endorsing the National Roundtable
position, adopting some of the language from the nine essential components,
acting predominantly at the state level, and participating in many of the
activities prescribed by the National Roundtable. In drafting the first gap
analysis, the university representatives structuredthe document to follow the
essential components.
Member companies. I remind the reader that, for the purposes of this
469

Sipple
study, I describe the member companies, specificallythe CEOs,as agents
externalto the MI-Roundtable
workinggroup.SeveralCEOsexertedconsiderablepressureon theircompanyrepresentative
andon the MI-Roundtable
as
a whole. The workinggroupwas, of course,dependenton the supportof the
CEOs,not so much for money but for allowing representativesto spend
activities.Withoutthe CEOs'consent, it is
companytime on MI-Roundtable
of
that
the
could havespent the timeand
unlikely
any
originalrepresentatives
exertedthe effortthey did. The datasuggestgreatvariabilityin the degree of
and
agreementbetweenthe ideasof the CEOsandthoseof the MI-Roundtable
itsworkinggroupparticipants.
Therewas solid agreementon the need forK12 school improvementand thatbusinessmustplay a role in determiningthe
futuredirectionof educationreform.The new legislationand programswere
viewed as victoriesthe corporateleaderscouldholdup fortheircolleaguesand
stockholdersto see. Someworkinggroupmembersdisagreedwith the focus
on state legislationand advocatedprogrammatic
options gearedtowardimprovingthe actualpracticein schools.
In short,the workinggroupwas dependenton the CEOsand hadvarious
points of agreementand disagreementas to the directionthe group should
take.Muchto the chagrinof some members,the MI-Roundtable
compliedwith
the CEOs'wishes and, at times, took actionto pacifythe CEOs.
EconomicAllianceofMichigan.TheAllianceprovidedthe MI-Roundtable
with a model agendaforeducationreformas createdby business.The model
was not unlike the early policy ideas derivedby the MI-Roundtable
participants. Even though the Alliance agenda items were differentfrom those
proposed by the Universityof Michiganand differentfrom the National
Roundtable's
nine essentialcomponents,the universityagreedto includethese
in a secondarysupportcategoryor as ideas for furtherinvestiitems
agenda
In
was not dependent on the Alliance,
gation. addition,the MI-Roundtable
for
the
between
except
relationship
Kellogg and the Alliance. The MIRoundtabledidnot benefitfinanciallyor politicallyfromitsassociationwiththe
Alliance.So how did the MI-Roundtable
respondto the Alliance?Ratherthan
recoiledandessentiallyavoidedthe overtureby
joinforces,the MI-Roundtable
the Alliance.Theuniversitydiscouragedanyjointparticipation,
particularly
any
use of the universitylabel,but did exploresome of the policyideas proposed
by the Alliance.The degree to which the decision to avoid the Alliancewas
influencedby the universityrepresentativesis uncertain.It is clear,however,
thatafter3 monthsof workingwith the university,the MI-Roundtable
participants agreed to operateseparatelyfromthe Alliance.
UniversityofMichigan.The relationshipwith the Universityof Michigan
was valuableto the MI-Roundtable
on two fronts.First,the universityrepresentativesprovideda comprehensiveframeworkforthe MI-Roundtable
reform
initiative.Second,the universityprovidedpoliticalexpertiseto worksuccessfullywith the governorandwith the legislature.It is importantto note thaton
neitherfront--educationalinformationor politicalguidance-was the universitythe sole sourceof the information.The NationalRoundtable,the Alliance,
the Partnership,and the governorall had educationreformagendasthe MI470

Roundtablecouldhave adopted.Moreover,Whirlpool,Kmart,Dow Chemical,

Kellogg,and Fordall selectedgovernmentrelations,publicpolicy,and corporate relations experts to represent their company at the working group
was
meetings. In this context, it is difficultto argue thatthe MI-Roundtable
the
MI-Roundtable
So
did
on
the
seem
necessarilydependent
university. why
to rely so heavilyon the university?The answermay be found in the degree
andthe messagesdeliveredby the
of consonancebetweenthe MI-Roundtable
university.
Fromthe beginningof the relationshipbetweenthe universityandthe MIRoundtable,the universitypushed the business leadersto focus on student
learning.Other issues were to be addressedonly if they affected student
learning.The universityconsultantsstressedthe idea of a comprehensive,
systemicapproachto educationreformtargetedon the improvementof the
"instructional
core."The academicsarguedthatonly by increasingstandards,
andbuildingthe capacityof school personnelandstudents
results,
measuring
would long-termimprovementbe realized.Short-termquick fixes or "silver
bullets"would not change the system. As a result of their own corporate
organizationalimprovementefforts,the businessleadersunderstoodthe need
forcomprehensivechange if an organizationis to improveits performanceor
product.Eachof them had alreadyundergoneor were proceedingwith their
own corporate"reengineering"
(Hammer& Champy,1993)and understood
thatisolatedfixes do not changeorganizations.The comprehensiveapproach
promotedby the university"madesense"to the businessleadersand was in
sharpcontrastto the agendasproposedby the Alliance,the governor,and the
becamedependenton the university
Partnership.In sum, the MI-Roundtable
as it bought into the universityapproachto educationreform.The business
leadersalso agreedwith the universityplan the more they learnedabout it.
was dependenton the universityand in agreement
Hence,the MI-Roundtable
with the messages advancedby the university.
The second importantservice supplied by the universityto the MIRoundtableis moredifficultto explain.The MI-Roundtable
includedfull-time
lobbyistsand governmentrelationspersonnelwho, on a dailybasis,worked
with politiciansin Lansingand Washingtonon issues of concern to their
corporations.Andyet, when it came to seekingguidanceon issues of formal
protocol and politicalstrategyin Lansingto implementthe MI-Roundtable
policy agenda, the leadershipsought the guidance of the university.This
response is puzzling, although two explanationsare plausible. First,the
universityhas its own full-timelobbyistsin Lansingand Washingtonwith
experience in difficultpoliticalsnarls.The MI-Roundtable
may have known
neverconsulted
this,althoughthe datasuggestthatthe universityparticipants
the lobbyistsin Lansingor Washington.Anassociatevice presidentfor public
affairsat the universitydid have 10 years of experience in high-levelWashingtonpoliticsbutwas quitenew to the scene in Lansing.A secondexplanation
may be found in the dataavailableto me. The dataare limitedby what was
collectedby the universityconsultants.I have nearlycompletedata(e-mails,
faxes, letters,memos) for thatwhich in some way made its way throughthe
471

Sipple
School of Education. In regard to archival data that never passed through the
university, however, I do not know the extent of the documentation unavailable to me. To improve the comprehensiveness of the documentation, I pulled
files from the MI-Roundtableoffice at the Chamber of Commerce in the state
capital in the summer of 1995. This uncovered some correspondence not
collected by the university representatives.
Even without complete data on all correspondence, there is no doubt that
the MI-Roundtabletrusted and relied on the information from the university.
Whether they relied on the university exclusively or only for a portion of the
total political guidance is uncertain.Corroboratingthe archivaldocuments used
in this study, however, are the data from interviews with members of the MIRoundtable. There was near unanimous acknowledgment that the university
faculty played a vital role in shaping the content and strategy of the MIRoundtable. It is important to note that interview respondents mentioned the
president, the dean, and faculty members by name, but not one mentioned the
public affairsofficials.This again substantiatesthe claim that the MI-Roundtable
relied on the university for guidance, specifically relying on two of the most
involved faculty members. The behind-the-scenes operations included these
professors seeking input from the public affairs personnel.
Governor'soffice. The response of the MI-Roundtableto the governor and
his office was complex. As described earlier, the MI-Roundtable made a
political blunder before the surprise election of John Engler in November of
1990. Hence, the MI-Roundtable operated defensively and carefully in the
early months of Engler's administration.There is no doubt that, in December
1990, the MI-Roundtablebelieved its state policy success hinged on getting
the governor to adopt and subsequently advance its policy positions (in 1994,
this would change). The central message, or institution, that the governor
carried was that education was the number one priorityof his administration,
although fiscal conservatism was the mantrafor all state appropriations.
The MI-Roundtable, with the help of the university, recognized the
important role the governor would play in any legislative activity. The organization did not respond by acquiescing to the governor's whims and wishes;
instead, they tried to push their message to the governor with hopes that he
would adopt it as his own. By staging meetings with Engler(in December 1990
and April 1991) and his chief of staff and education policy advisor (in January
and May 1991), the MI-Roundtable representatives sought to influence the
governor's education plan (Michigan 2000) and his public messages on education reform. In Oliver's (1991) terms, the MI-Roundtabledid not co-opt the
governor's message as their own but, rather, attempted to influence the
governor's plan.
The MI-Roundtable'scomprehensive--and politically palatable-reform
initiative may have surprised and caught the attention of the governor and his
staff (and many legislators as well). In the words of a central member of the
governor's office:
[TheMI-Roundtable
policy statement]was interestingto me because
it didn'tleap intothe voucherfrayor the charterschool or choice fray,
472


which I often see people fromthe businesscommunitypay a lot of
attentionto.... The elementsof so-calledsystemicreformto focus on
to focus on the needs of children
a core curriculumand particularly
from low income households...whatyou might call compensatory
early childhood educationwas very well advisedtoo.
In its attempt to influence Engler,the MI-Roundtabledid not simply ignore
the governor's early education reform ideas. In his education action agenda,
Englercalled for tougher graduationrequirements,increased accountabilityand
merit pay for teachers and administrators,alternative routes to teacher certification, revision of teacher tenure laws, school finance reform, statewide
parental school choice, and other more indirect ideas to alter schools. Of these
ideas, the MI-Roundtablesupported alternative certification, finance reform,
and school choice, forming common ground on which to work with the new
governor.
Michigan Partnership for New Education. The Partnership pressed the
MI-Roundtableto join forces in the name of comprehensive education reform.
The participants of the MI-Roundtableviewed the Partnership's agenda of
reforming teacher preparation as important but too narrow to bring about
substantive and long-term change in schools. It is clear that the MI-Roundtable
wanted to dismiss the Partnership'sadvances. Standingin their way, however,
was the insistence by the University of Michigan's president and the recommendation by the governor that Taubman and the Partnershipbe given a seat
at the table of education reform.The MI-Roundtablecould not afford to offend
Engler, and the university could not afford to upset Engler or Taubman. In
short, the MI-Roundtabledepended on the supporters of the Partnership(i.e.,
de facto dependence on the Partnership) but disagreed with the reform
messages advanced by the Partnership.Midwaythrough 1991, a letter from the
leader of the CEOs to the other MI-RoundtableCEOs (copied to Governor
Engler) summed up the response of the MI-Roundtableto the Partnership
(with documented assistance from university consultants): "All participants
believe that working with the Michigan Partnership for New Education is
appropriate, but think that we should continue on separate paths at this time."
Over the next several years, the two organizations operated independently of
each other.
State Board ofEducation. In 1990, the Michigan legislature gave formal
authority to the State Board of Education to oversee the development of the
state's first-ever model core curriculum.The relevant institution carried by the
board was normative in nature (i.e., a statute stating that the board would
develop curriculum)and served to elicit action from the MI-Roundtable.When
faced with this institution, the MI-Roundtablemade the board a policy target.
The business leaders, in general, acted independently of the board's actions.
But in this case, the future success of the MI-Roundtableinitiative became
dependent on decisions made by the board. Moreover, the MI-Roundtable
agreed with the general idea of a model statewide core curriculum. The
potential disagreement involved how high the new standards for the curriculum should be set. The response of the MI-Roundtableconsisted of attempting
473

Sipple
to influence the board. The business leaders procured a place on the board's
January 1991 meeting agenda. At this meeting, an MI-Roundtable leader
presented the roundtable'sposition, insisting on high curriculumstandardsand
an assessment system linked closely to the standards.
State Department ofEducation. The State Department of Education acted
under the authority of the same normative institution as did the board. The
Department of Education was charged with developing the state model core
curriculum for the board. This position of the department elicited action from
the MI-Roundtable.InJanuaryof 1991 the MI-Roundtableleadership met with
the deputy superintendent for public instruction, and in Februarythe group
met with the Cabinet Council of the department. In both meetings, the
representatives of the MI-Roundtable presented their vision and goals for
comprehensive education reform in Michigan.The degree of dependence and
consonance with the department was similar to what the MI-Roundtablehad
with the board. The goal of the MI-Roundtablein its meetings with the board
and the department was to challenge the two organizations to develop core
curriculum and assessment systems based on high and rigorous standards.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce
played only a subtle, secondary role in the activity of the MI-Roundtable
between 1989 and 1991. The data suggest that the MI-Roundtablewas not
significantly dependent on the chamber, even though each of the participating
companies was probably a member. The chamber carried a cognitive institution-fiscal conservatism-that shaped its identity and policy priorities. It was
this institutionthat the chamber brought to bear on the MI-Roundtable.The MIRoundtable participants wholly agreed with the conservative policies for
business, although there is evidence of disagreement with regardto education
policies. Frustrationwas expressed by one business leader who found fault
with the group's departure from sound business practice, "asif education was
somehow different [from business]." Table 3 provides a summary of the
context within which institutionalactivitypresented itself to the MI-Roundtable
and how the organization responded.
Mythirdproposition suggested thatthe more dependent the MI-Roundtable
is on a given institutional agent, the less likely it will be to resist the pressure
advanced by the agent. The MI-Roundtable was less dependent on the
Alliance, the Partnership, and the State Department of Education and subsequently either avoided them or paid superficial respect so as to not offend
other key figures. On the other hand, those agents on whom the MI-Roundtable
was dependent (e.g., the governor, the National Roundtable, the University of
Michigan, and the CEOs) stirred more passive and agreeable responses from
the MI-Roundtable.The working group participantsessentially complied and
sometimes bargained with the agents on whom they were most dependent.
Similarly,with regardto the fourth proposition, the MI-Roundtablewas not
likely to resist the institutionalpressures of various agents if it was in agreement
with the goals of these agents. The working group had views similar to those
of the CEOs (general interest in education), the governor and Chamber of
Commerce (fiscal conservatism), and the university representatives (measur474

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Sipple
ing outcomes).In these cases, the MI-Roundtable
agendareflectedthe views
and goals of the variousagents.One possibleexceptionwas the Alliance.The
Allianceagendacontainedmanyof the same ideasespoused by the business
leaders(before1991),andyet the Alliancewas dismissed.In thiscase, the lack
of dependenceof the MI-Roundtable
on the Allianceseemed to supersedethe
on
Thiswas especiallyso as the university
ideas.
apparentagreement policy
became involved and shiftedthe focus of the MI-Roundtable's
agenda away
from singular and independent policy ideas ("silverbullets")toward the
coordinated scheme of the systemic reform movement. Conversely,the
andexternalagents,the
greaterthe disagreementbetweenthe MI-Roundtable
more likely the group was to avoid, defy, or manipulatethe institutional
messagesadvancedby the agents.Forinstance,the Partnershipcalledfor an
almostexclusivefocuson teacherpreparation,
an issueof onlymodestconcern
to the MI-Roundtable.Given the differentpoints of focus and goals for
education reform,it is not surprisingthat the MI-Roundtable
bufferedand
defied the Partnership.
A moreaggressiveresponse,however,was not advisable owing to the MI-Roundtable's
dependence on Mr.Taubman.
After2 years of operation(one of them in conjunctionwith the university),the MI-Roundtable
finallyreleaseditspolicypositionpaperto the public
on October 24, 1991. Antoniniwrote his fellow CEOsin September1991,
statinghis expectationsforthe presstour:"Ihave high hopes thaton October
24 we can begin the work of our BusinessNationalRoundtablecommitment
for educationreform."Dow, Kmart,and Whirlpoolprovidedthe use of their
corporatejets to fly the executives and the governor across the state on
October24, stagingconsecutivepressconferencesin third-grade
classroomsin
Detroit,Lansing,and GrandRapids.Mostnewspapersacrossthe statecarried
the story,as did a few radiostations.The releaseof the document,a yearafter
it was draftedand 2 yearsafterthe organizationwas founded,markedthe end
of the MI-Roundtable's
formativeyears. It was at this time that the group
publicly threw its hat into the ring and became a public player in state
educationreform.
Throughoutthe nextseveralyears,the MI-Roundtable's
agendaremained
remarkablyconsistent,which laterprovedvaluableto the organization(see
Sipple,Miskel,Matheney,&Kearney,1997).Thiswas quitea feat for a group
of business leadersplayingthe complex and politicallyvolatilegame of state
establisheditselfas a viable force in
policymaking.Once the MI-Roundtable
state educationpolicy, severalquestionsarose. How did the MI-Roundtable
advance its agenda in light of the complex arenaof K-12 education?Or, in
institutionalterms, how did the MI-Roundtable
engage in the process of
institutionbuildingcriticalto changingpracticewithinthe sectorof education?
Thesequestionsarebeyondthe scope of thisstudybutclearlyworthyof future
studyand attention.
Conclusions and Implications
This study was conducted duringa time of explorationand debate within
institutionaltheory.Severalinstitutionaltheoristshave attemptedto "advance"
476

the theoryto what is now termed"newinstitutionalism"

(Crowson,Boyd, &
Powell
&
Within
this
1991).
1996;
debate, a view is
Mawhinney,
DiMaggio,
emergingthatinstitutionalrules,norms,and cognitionsdo not simplyshape
and constrainorganizationsone at a time.Rather,ScottandMeyer(1991) and
Rowanand Miskel(1999) arguethatinstitutionshave a muchbroaderreach.
Sector-wideinstitutionsshape and constrainany and all organizationswithin
any given societalsector.In addition,organizational
responsesto institutional
pressuresare now believed to be more complex than the formerview that
organizationspassively adopt structuresto ensure legitimacy(DiMaggio&
Powell, 1991b).Oliver(1991) proposes a range of responses organizations
may select; the response is dependent upon the context in which the
organizationfaces the pressure.
Othertheorists,however,criticizethe new directionof institutional
theory,
of the pastand
arguingthatthe theoryhasdiscardedthe valuablecontributions
that the currentview is too removed from the decisions and desires of
individualsand organizations(Mitchell,1996;Selznick,1996).To counterthis,
DiMaggio(1988) recognizedthe need for greaterattentionto the interestsof
individualsand organizations.Moreover,Bacharach,Masters,and Mundell
(1995) have called for an increasinglypoliticalperspectiveon institutional
activity,hoping it will lead towardan improvedunderstandingof institution
buildingactivity.
The presentstudyinvestigatedthe presenceof interestand agencywithin
the MI-Roundtable,
analyzedthe effects of the institutionalsector, and describedthe degree to which the organizationactivelyrespondedto its environment.The relevantsectorwas the K-12 educationalsystemwith all of its
inherentinstitutionalpressuresand structures.The importantquestion addressedhereinis how the sectorshapedandconstrainedthe MI-Roundtable
as
it began to operatewithin the sector.
Thisstudywas also conductedwithina policy contextin which business
groups are increasinglyinvolved in school improvementefforts.Since the
inception of the earliestpublic schools, business has triedto influence the
content and process of instruction.In recent decades, however, business
leadersand otherconstituentshavetakena centralrole in the creationof state
and federaleducationpolicy. Thisinvolvementhas generatedmuchcontroversy and debate about the properrole for business in educationand who
should control the future directionof public schooling. Such criticismof
business involvementis common, yet little is known about why business
groups become involved, and specificallywhat resources and tactics the
groupsuse to affectpolicyandpractice.Moreover,despitethe presenceof 38
currentBusinessRoundtablecoalitions,verylimitedknowledgeis availableas
to the functioningof the groupsor the policiestheyareadvancing.Thisstudy
aimedto addressthese importantand understudiedissues.
Summaryof Findings
Within these contexts, I conducted this case study of the MI-Roundtable'swork
in affecting education policy and practice in the state of Michigan. I found
477

Sipple
strongsupportfor most of my propositions.I found thatthe MI-Roundtable
was, no doubt,shapedandconstrainedby the societalsectorin whichit formed
and functioned. My findings support the notion that the sector of K-12
educationis complexandwell established,althoughit is undergoinga shiftin
power fromlocal school boardsto the state.The issues most affectedby the
assessment,andschool finance.
powershiftin Michiganconcernedcurriculum,
Two of these issues (curriculumand assessment)were a high priorityfor the
and thus served to influencethe level at which it chose to
MI-Roundtable
exerted most of its resourcesat the
operate.As a result,the MI-Roundtable
state level. The decision to act at the state level was not so much forcibly
imposed on the business leadersby institutionalpressures;rather,the MIRoundtable-in response to the pressures-selected the state level as the
wanted
placewhereit couldhavethe mostimpact.Inshort,the MI-Roundtable
to effect change, and it deemed thatthe potentialfor bringingabout change
was greatestat the state level.
didtryto involveitselfat the locallevel.
Nevertheless,the MI-Roundtable
The businessleadersinitiateda planto workwith school personnelas a way
to pilot theirideas for school improvement.The plan was short-lived,as the
groupfaced a numberof pressuresthateventuallypushedthembackto state
policy activity.For example, the MI-Roundtableparticipants,as business
leaders, found it exceedingly difficultto communicatewith the educators.
Theyreportedstrongresistancefromschool personnelandfeltunwelcome.In
districtswhere the group felt less resistance,it simply could not mobilize
enough resourcesto meetthe demandsof the localactivity.In short,although
the MI-Roundtable
knew it wanted to affectclassrooms,its participantswere
that
persuaded
they would have to accomplishtheirgoal indirectlythrough
state policy or throughthe supportof local chambersof commerce.The MIRoundtablenever attemptedto become involved at the nationallevel. This
probablystemmedfromthe BusinessRoundtable'schargeof forminga statelevel coalitionand the generalnotionthatactionand responsibilityforeducationin the UnitedStatesresidelegallyandphilosophicallyat the stateandlocal
levels.
The contentof the MI-Roundtable's
agenda,strategies,andtacticswas also
withinthe sectorof education.Whilethe institutional
shapedby the institutions
sector of AmericanK-12 schools is commonlybelieved to be complex and
sometimesconflicting,few studieshave attemptedto describethe varietyof
institutionsaffectingorganizationsworkingwithinthe sector.Thisstudyidentifiedregulative,normative,andcognitiveinstitutions
facingthe MI-Roundtable
as it enteredand participatedin the sector.I also foundstrongsupportthatthe
originalpolicyideasgeneratedby the businessleadersweresquelchedin favor
of reformpolicies more politicallypalatableand potentiallyeffective. The
institutionsI foundresponsibleforthissea changecamefromthe governorand
the state'sflagshipuniversity.The governorplayeda key role in influencing
the MI-Roundtable's
actionsbecausehis positioncarriedwith it formalauthority,thusenablinghimto enforceregulativeinstitutions.The university,on the
otherhand,providedthe MI-Roundtable
withvaluableinformation
concerning
478

both policy solutionsand politicalstrategy.A centralleaderof the University
of Michigancontingentsummarizedthe role the universityrepresentatives
were able to play:
A brokeringrole perhaps,I felt thatwe had some insighton certain
issuesandwe couldhelpthem.We hadourown routesintostate

officethatwe couldbe usefulwith.I felt
politicsandthegovernor's
thatwe couldreallyhelpin termsof intellectual
contact,in termsof
andif necessary,providea neutralgroundon which
relationships,
couldcometogetherandworkthesethingsout.
corporations
would respond passively(e.g.,

Theory posited that the MI-Roundtable
acquiesce by adoptingthe institutionspromotedby an agent) when it was
dependenton and in agreementwithan agent.I also foundstrongsupportfor
this. Througha tangledweb of relationshipsand needs, the MI-Roundtable
took passiveaction(as comparedwitha moreaggressiveresponseof rejecting
or co-opting the agent's institutions)toward the governor, the Michigan
Partnershipfor New Education,the Universityof Michigan,and the Michigan
Chamberof Commerce.It is importantto point out that after the 1994
elections, when the governornarrowedhis scope of reformpolicies (e.g.,
charterschools),the MI-Roundtable
backedoff the promotionof theiragenda,
much to the dismay of some policymakersand educators.The group was
carefulnot to criticize(too loudly)the governor,butneitherdid it cave in and
blindlyadopt the governor'smessage.The groupdid seem to muffleits calls
for systemicideas for reform,althoughit adheredto its originalprinciples.In
this case, the level of disagreementwith the governortook precedenceover
the group'sdependence on the governor.
Interestingto point out is the interplayamong the interestsof the MIRoundtableparticipants,theirmembercompanies(i.e., CEOs),and the institutionalpressuresconfrontingthe group.The businessleadershad strongbut
vague interestsin improvingschools(see Sippleet al., 1997)andbelievedthat
the properpath to such change was throughbusiness-typepractices.Once
confrontedwith the university,however,theirinterestsin reformpolicy soon
shiftedto improvingthe curriculumand assessmentof Michiganschools. Did
the ease withwhich the universityconsultantsreconceptualizedthe problems
for the business leaders indicatea true shift in interestson the part of the
business personsor simplyweak interestsin reform?I suggest,based on the
present analyses, that the institutionalpressuresfelt by the MI-Roundtable
servedto providesubstanceto the vague interestsof the participants.I argue
thatthe CEOsand workinggroup membersdid and still do have an interest
in improvingschools but that this vague policy interest(as opposed to a
functionalinterest)was focused and sharpenedby the institutionalpressures
(largelyfromthe university).
Whatdid the MI-Roundtable
accomplishbetween 1989and the present?
The organizationinstitutionalizeditself as a viable and stable agent in the
educationpolicyarena.Keypolicymakerswithinthe Michiganstateeducation
of theMI-Roundtable
policyarenaacknowledgedthepresenceandcontributions
479

Sipple
during this time, although the greatest impact occurred before the 1994
statewide election. Adding to the MI-Roundtable'sstability was its status as a
semi-autonomous organization operating somewhat independent of its member companies. This moderate degree of independence enabled the MIRoundtable to push forth without constant attention to the interests of the
CEOs. The organization was also able to assist in the institutionalization of
several structuresand programswithin the sector of MichiganK-12 education.
The MI-Roundtable was instrumental in the creation of annual school
reportcards for Michiganschools. It provided financialand substantivesupport
used by the governor and his staff, specifically the governor's education policy
advisor, to develop the annual school assessments. This first-of-its-kindreport
stirredmuch criticismand discussion, including many calls for its abolishment.
The MI-Roundtableand others, including the governor, argued for the continued improvement and use of the school reports. The report seems to be on
firm ground and will probably continue for years to come.
The effort to publicly promote higher standardsfor Michiganschools was
also given a majorboost by the MI-Roundtable.Business-government collaboration in public information campaigns such as "Keepthe Promise, Michigan"
was written into law, and its outcomes have become a staple on late night
television and in newspapers across the state. Just how successful this campaign has been in institutionalizing increased expectations for student and
school performance is uncertain. Altering cognitive institutions (taken-forgranted ways of viewing what is wrong with schools) is difficult and is likely
to occur only when pressure is exerted over long periods of time. It is clear,
however, that the MI-Roundtable has done much to promote (and make
permanent) such tools for shaping public opinion.
The passage of Public Act 25 in 1990, although mandating the use of the
MEAPas the tool for measuring student and school performance, did not align
the exam to what was actually taught in schools. The MI-Roundtablebecame
a major advocate for a new assessment system (later called the State Proficiency Test) that would be tightly aligned with the model core curriculum
under development. Despite being cloaked in controversy, the new proficiency exams are based on the higher order skills prescribed in the Michigan
model core curriculum content standards. These exams were first implemented in 1995 and have been improved each year since, and they have
survived calls for their abolishment. The continued implementation is due in
part to the insistence of the business leaders and the governor.
Time will tell how firmly institutionalized these programs (school report
card, public informationcampaigns, core curriculumaligned with state exams)
have become in Michigan. For now, it is clear that the MI-Roundtablehas had
an impact on the Michigan educational system and, to some extent, practice
in classrooms.
Implications
So what does all this mean?The present findings have important implications
for both theory and policy. The effect is to improve the models for understand480


ing interest group activityas well as significantlyimproving our understanding
of business involvement in education policy reform. I now describe how this
study confirms and advances the relevant theoretical lenses and provides
important insights into the province of public policymaking.
Theory.The theoretical implications of this study are important. As suggested by Yin (1994), results from a single case study are generalizable to
theory, not to other cases. My findings concerning institutionaltheory speak to
the importance of the concept of an institutionalsector. It is very clear that the
MI-Roundtablewas shaped and constrained by various institutions in a wellestablished sector. The established sector served to limit the choice of levels
at which the group could act by making clear where particulardecisions are
made within the sector. Despite a modest attempt to implement change in
local school districts,the MI-Roundtableacted predominantlyat the state level.
This can be partlyattributedto a lack of resources, but it may also be the result
of strong institutional forces pushing (or drawing) the group to act at a higher
level. Continued investigation of institutional sectors can help to predict at
what level new agents will function and on what policy issues agents are most
likely to act.
This study also speaks to the important theoretical and practical issue of
how organizations respond to institutional pressures. My findings support
Oliver's (1991) hypotheses about the importance of context in response
decisions. Dependence on an agent is a strong predictor of how an organization will respond. The same is true of the degree of consonance between the
agent and the organization. Thus, in trying to understand and predict organizational behavior, it is importantto analyze the sector in which the organization
functions as well as its relative dependence on and consonance with other
agents in the sector. This focus underscores the interconnectedness of organizations within societal sectors.
The present study confirms the importance of agency and interests of
participantswithin organizations(Bacharach,Masters,& Mundell,1995;DiMaggio,
1988). The MI-Roundtable participants actively discussed the choice of responses and typically reached consensus before actively responding. Farfrom
acting as passive pawns, this interest group sought to understand its environment and respond accordingly. For this reason, it is imperative for future
studies using an institutional perspective to take into account the probability
that organizations do not simply conform to institutionalpressures by adopting
accepted structures and functions to increase legitimacy. Organizations are
much more complex than this now outdated view. Does this mean that, when
faced with the same institutionalpressures, the Business Roundtablecoalitions
in Ohio, Wisconsin, or New York would respond in the same manner as the
MI-Roundtable?Not necessarily. What can be said is that the prevailingtheories
describing organizational activity within institutionalsectors are supported by
this study.
Institutional theory alone does not have the tools-at least not yet-to
adequately describe or predict how institutions are created or altered. What
institutionaltheorists have identified are the conditions necessary for institution
481

Sipple
building.Butgiventhe properconditions,how is it thatorganizations

strategize
andcarryout actionsthatresultin new or alteredinstitutional
rules,norms,and
cognitions?Thisis preciselywhatI suggestis the valueof carefulexamination
of the resourcesand tacticsof interestgroups.Operatingwithin the context
and constraintsof an institutionalsector, organizationsplan and carryout
strategiesaimed at furtheringa set of ideas and priorities.
Policy. This study has importantimplicationsfor policy as well. As an
organizationaltype, the MI-Roundtableis not unique. To date, there are
reportedly38 NationalRoundtablecoalitionsoperatingacrossthe country,and
yet littlehas been writtenas to how theyfunction.Thisstudysuggeststhatthe
coalitionshave promisefor being a viablevoice in stateeducationreform.To
gain a richunderstandingof such organizations,researchersmustinvestigate
the sourcesof the informationcoalitionsuse to maketheirpolicy recommendations.Particularly,
analystsmustpay attentionto how such businessgroups
conceptualizethe problemsof theireducationalsystemsandschools.The MIRoundtable,aftercoming into contactwith universityconsultants,shiftedits
view of the problemsfrom inefficiencyand lack of effortto lack of a highqualitycurriculumand assessmentprogram.
Moregenerally,thisstudydescribesan exampleof businesscontributing
substantivelyto the debate over the directionof educationreform.The fact
thatthisgrouptook a thoughtfulapproachto educationreformis no indication
that other business groupswill do the same. Whatcan be suggested is that,
given enough good informationand time to thoughtfullyreflect on the
complex issues surroundingschools, it is possibleforbusinessand educators
to reachconsensus as to the desiredfocus of educationalimprovement.
So what is the policy impactof the ideas developed herein?First,policy
reformsadvocatedby businessshould not be blindlycriticizedand ignored.
This study showed that business leaders functioningwithin the education
sector-much to the surpriseof some educatorsand policy leaders-are
capableof developinga thoughtfulandlong-termapproachto school reform.
Second,layingblanketcriticismon businessgroupsgettinginvolvedin education reformmay serve only to antagonizethe businessleadersand heighten
theirmistrustof educators.Third,garneringthe supportof businessleadersfor
a given set of reformideas(alsosupportedby educators)broadensthe support
base and influencein policy arenas.
Forinstance,the systemicreformideasgeneratedby some academicsand
educatorswere given a tremendousboost in Michiganwhen the leadersof its
largestcorporationsthrewtheirsupportbehindthe ideas.Additionalpolitical
clout resultedfromthe subsequentbipartisansupportforthe reformideas.Of
course, involvingthe voice of businessin the debateover the futureof K-12
schoolingis no guaranteeof improveddiscussionandpolicysolutions.Justas
educatorscannotaffordto ignorethe potentialadvantagesof businessinvolvement, business leaders cannotunilaterallyexpect to change schools. When
businessignoresthe views of educators(andacademics),it does so at its peril.
Withoutengaging in dialoguewith educators,business leadersare likely to
adheretoo closely to theirown businessideals and practicesand not garner
482

sufficientsupportamong policymakersto implementtheirreformsolutions.

Finally,it is importantto understandthe natureof the relationshipbeand theirmembercompatween businessgroupssuch as the MI-Roundtable
is madeup of severalcompanies,each providingone
nies. TheMI-Roundtable
or moreindividualsto participate.However,as describedearlier,I distinguish
between the corporaterepresentativesand the companiesthemselves.Over
became a semi-autonomousorganization,(nearly)
time, the MI-Roundtable
independentfrom its parentcompanies.Importanthere is the relationship
between the corporate(or CEO)interestsandthe interestsof the organization
supposedly providingagency for the corporations.It is clear that the MIRoundtablewas shapedand constrainedby the institutionalsector,but not as
clear that the corporateinterestswere alteredas well. This loose coupling
(Weick, 1976) between the MI-Roundtableand its sponsors is criticalto
identifyand understand.Shouldthe organizationprovidingagencytrulyrepresentthe interestsof the corporations,the organizationwould be less susceptible to institutionalforcesas a resultof its relativelyhigh dependence on the
corporations,which operateoutsidethe sectorof education.Alternatively,if
the organizationis less dependenton the corporations,then it follows thatit
would be relativelymore responsive to institutionalpressureswithin the
educationsector.In the case of the MI-Roundtable,
the truecorporateinterests
are beyond the scope of the data collected for this study. Only three of the
CEOsagreedto be interviewed,and theyvoiced a stronginterestin the value
of public educationsince it had been a vital partof theirpersonaldevelopment.The interestsof the othercompaniesareuncertain,especiallygiven that
the CEOsmost involved in the MI-Roundtable
were the three interviewed.
the
institutional
Conversely,
analysisprovidestoolswithwhich to understandhow andwhy certainchoicealternatives
areavailableandothersarenot.
Forinstance,the MI-Roundtable
hada goal of promotinghigh-qualitycurriculumin schools.One strategyto accomplishthisgoalwould be to workdirectly
with teachersand professionalteacherorganizations,becausetheyareclosest
to the classroom.Anotherstrategywould be to changerulesand normsat the
statelevel, which mayalterschool practice.Withinsectors,however,choices
and behaviorsareconstrainedby the prevailingrules,norms,and cognitions.
Myanalysisof the educationsectordocumentedthe shiftin responsibilityfor
curriculum
developmentfromlocalto stateofficials.Inthisway, an institutional
lens is able to complementthe politicallens and resultsin a morecomprehensive understandingof interestgroupactivity.
Recommendations
forFurtherStudy
The presentstudy,howevercomprehensive,is but a studyof a single interest
group.Anygeneralizationto otherbusinessgroups,even BusinessRoundtable
coalitions,is unwarrantedand potentiallydangerous.Using the models includedherein,I recommendadditional
studiesof otherstateBusinessRoundtable
coalitions.Suchstudieswill begin to documentthe activitiesand functionsof
similarorganizationsgiven the same chargefromthe BusinessRoundtable.
Investigationof these organizationsshould includespecial attentionto how
483

Sipple
they view the problems they are trying to solve and with whom they interact.
Explication of the perceived problems and where the ideas came from is
invaluable to understand and important in developing an improved understanding of the groups' goals and strategies. Attention should also be paid to
the context in which the Business Roundtable coalitions face, and must
respond to, institutionalpressures. For instance, it would be interestingto note
how the external agents differed from those of the MI-Roundtable.The degree
of dependence on other agents and the level of agreement with the agents'
messages may help to predict the responses of the organizations. Moreover,
it is increasingly apparent that investigation of the network of agents within a
sector-the relationships between external agents-is of critical importance
(Rowley, 1997).
Additional research should also attempt to confirm or refute the institutional pressures I have identified within the education sector. It may be
necessary to study other education interest groups in Michigan to assess the
portrait I have painted of the state's education sector. As state governments
across the country consolidate power and dictate what is taught and assessed
in their public schools, it will be important to identify the similarities and
differences between states and agents. Institutional theorists suggest that
various state education sectors will continue to become more isomorphic,
probably following recognized leaders of state education reform or agents
promoting institutions at a more national or international level. The current
condition of the education sector in the United States provides an opportune
chance to test the hypothesized phenomenon of "early adopters" adopting
new forms and structuresfor technical reasons and later participantsadopting
the same structuresfor less technical and institutionalreasons. Thus, investigation of state governments and the associated interest groups should receive
increased attention across the country. Of course, it is possible, and theoretically plausible, that the education sector in the United States will develop (or
has already developed) institutionsconstrainingcross-stateinfluences, thereby
ensuring a federalist system of public education. If this is the case, cross-state
differences would not be unexpected. On the other hand, if institutions are
advanced at the national level, then greater similarityof form would develop
across states.
Finally, as more research is conducted on business organizations involved
in education reform, assessment can be made as to the value of such
involvement. Currently,anecdotal evidence dominates opinion on whether or
not business should have a say in how the educational system functions. This
study was able to document that the MI-Roundtablemade a healthy contribution to the education policy debate. At the state level, the business leaders'
opinions and suggestions were welcomed, although not always heeded or
agreed upon. This perspective on business involvement, however, is not
widespread. Carefulstudy of other business organizations interested in education reformwill go far in providing quality informationwith which to judge the
efficacy and value of business participation in the debate surrounding the
future of American K-12 education.
484

Notes
The author is gratefulto Cecil Miskel,CarolynRiehl,BrianRowan, Phil Kearney,and
Paula Allen-Mearesfor the helpful critique and comments on an earlier version of this
article.
'There is the possibilitythat the MI-Roundtableinteractedwith other agents between
June 1989 and July 1990. The data available are fairly sparse for the first year. I rely
predominantlyon interviews for informationbefore July 1990.
2Unfortunately,the dean declined to be interviewed, leaving me without firsthand
interviewdatafromthe head of this organization.Myonly data directlyfromthe dean were
copies of letters she sent to MI-RoundtableCEOsand the working group. I was able to
interview her successor.
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Accepted February25, 1999
488


Institutional Constraints Limit Business Reform of K-12 Education

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Institutional Constraints Limit Business Reform of K-12 Education

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement in K-12 Education Policy

Author(s): John W. Sipple

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Institutional Constraints on Business

JOHN W. SIPPLEis an Assistant Professor, Department of Education, 421

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politicizationof K-12 public schooling. Whereas early reform efforts

The Role of Business

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

environmentof organizationswas once thoughtto includeonly those formal

unless the environmentalnorms and expectationsaccordingto which the

systemor, in institutionalterms,one of manyinstitutionalagentsinteractingin

the sector of public education. During such interaction, the MI-Roundtableis

shaped by and shapes the formalrules,norms,and belief systemsthatmake

up the institutional environment.

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noncompliance.Whenfocusingon the regulativeaspectsof institutions,the

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Nationalor society-wide offices,

U.S. secretaryand Departmentof

"aScottand Meyer (1991).

alizationare well understood,as are limitationsof participantsat each level

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

Roundtabletargetedissues of curriculumand assessmentas foci for reformin

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shaped. (p. 125)

Oliver(1991, p. 152) identifiesfive generalstrategiesorganizationsuse

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

zations may manipulatethe rule by co-opting it for their own purposes or

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

the data was checked in a varietyof ways. First,several researcherswere

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

They did not meet with local superintendentsor gatherinformationon their

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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

Summaryof Levelof Involvementof Institutional

OrganizationalResponse of the MI-Roundtableto Its Environment

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 09:17:27 AM

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

Roundtablecouldhave adopted.Moreover,Whirlpool,Kmart,Dow Chemical,

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