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31. Prior to the enforcement of the Act, the law of


arbitration in this country was substantially contained in
three enactments, namely, (1) the Arbitration Act, 1940,
(2) the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937,
and (3) the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)
Act, 1961. A party holding a foreign award was required to
take recourse to these enactments. The Preamble of the
Act makes it abundantly clear that it aims at consolidating
and amending Indian laws relating to domestic arbitration,
international commercial arbitration and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. The object of the Act is to minimize
supervisory role of the court and to give speedy justice. In
this view, the stage of approaching the court for making
the award a rule of court as required in the Arbitration Act,
1940 is dispensed with in the present Act. If the argument
of the respondent is accepted, one of the objects of the Act
will be frustrated and defeated. Under the old Act, after
making award and prior to execution, there was a
procedure for filing and making an award a rule of court
i.e. a decree. Since the object of the Act is to provide
speedy and alternative solution to the dispute, the same
procedure cannot be insisted upon under the new Act
when it is advisedly eliminated. If separate proceedings
are to be taken, one for deciding the enforceability of a
foreign award and the other thereafter for execution, it
would only contribute to protracting the litigation and
adding to the sufferings of a litigant in terms of money,
time and energy. Avoiding such difficulties is one of the
objects of the Act as can be gathered from the scheme of
the Act and particularly looking to the provisions contained

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in Sections 46 to 49 in relation to enforcement of a foreign


award. In para 40 of Thyssen1 judgment already extracted
above, it is stated that as a matter of fact, there is not
much difference between the provisions of the 1961 Act
and the Act in the matter of enforcement of foreign award.
The only difference as found is that while under the
Foreign Awards Act a decree follows, under the new Act the
foreign award is already stamped as the decree. Thus, in
our view, a party holding a foreign award can apply for
enforcement of it but the court before taking further
effective steps for the execution of the award has to
proceed in accordance with Sections 47 to 49. In one
proceeding there may be different stages. In the first stage
the court may have to decide about the enforceability of
the award having regard to the requirement of the said
provisions. Once the court decides that the foreign award
is enforceable, it can proceed to take further effective
steps for execution of the same. There arises no question
of making foreign award a rule of court/decree again. If the
object

and

purpose

can

be

served

in

the

same

proceedings, in our view, there is no need to take two


separate proceedings resulting in multiplicity of litigation.
It is also clear from the objectives contained in para 4 of
the Statement of Objects and Reasons, Sections 47 to 49
and the scheme of the Act that every final arbitral award is
to be enforced as if it were a decree of the court. The
submission that the execution petition could not be
permitted to convert as an application under Section 47 is
technical and is of no consequence in the view we have
taken. In our opinion, for enforcement of a foreign award

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there is no need to take separate proceedings, one for


deciding the enforceability of the award to make it a rule
of the court or decree and the other to take up execution
thereafter. In one proceeding, as already stated above, the
court enforcing a foreign award can deal with the entire
matter. Even otherwise, this procedure does not prejudice
a party in the light of what is stated in para 40 of Thyssen1
judgment.
32. Part II of the Act relates to enforcement of certain
foreign awards. Chapter 1 of this Part deals with New York
Convention awards. Section 46 of the Act speaks as to
when a foreign award is binding. Section 47 states as to
what evidence the party applying for the enforcement of a
foreign award should produce before the court. Section 48
states as to the conditions for enforcement of foreign
awards. As per Section 49, if the court is satisfied that a
foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award
shall be deemed to be a decree of that court and that
court has to proceed further to execute the foreign award
as a decree of that court.
Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001)
6 SCC 356
7. The question being examined by this Court is in relation
to a consolidated legislation which deals with domestic
arbitration,

international

enforcement

of

foreign

commercial
arbitral

arbitration

awards.

Before

and
the

enactment of the Act there were separate statutes


governing
arbitration,

the

international

namely,

the

arbitration
Arbitration

and

domestic

(Protocol

and

Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act,

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1940 (10 of 1940) and the Foreign Awards (Recognition


and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961). These statutes
have been repealed as provided in Section 85 of the
Act.
8. The 1996 Act was enacted considering the international
scenario as is evident from its preamble, which reads:
WHEREAS

the

United

Nations

Commission

on

International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the


UNCITRAL

Model

Law

on

International

Commercial

Arbitration in 1985;
AND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United
Nations has recommended that all countries give due
consideration to the said Model Law, in view of the
desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures
and

the

specific

needs

of

international

commercial

arbitration practice;
AND WHEREAS the UNCITRAL has adopted the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules in 1980;
AND WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United
Nations has recommended the use of the said Rules in
cases where a dispute arises in the context of international
commercial relations and the parties seek an amicable
settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation;
AND WHEREAS the said Model Law and Rules make
significant contribution to the establishment of a unified
legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of
disputes arising in international commercial relations;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make law respecting
arbitration and conciliation, taking
aforesaid Model Law and Rules;

into account the

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9. The enforcement of foreign awards has been dealt with


in Part II of the Act which has two chapters, Chapter I
dealing with the New York Convention Awards and Chapter
II

dealing

with

the

Geneva

Convention

Awards. ........................................... Section 44 defines


foreign award. It is not in dispute that the present case
falls under the ambit of Section 44. Section 45 has already
been extracted above. The conditions for enforcement of
foreign awards are stipulated in Section 48 under which
enforcement may be refused at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to
the court proof as postulated in clauses (a) and (e). In
addition, the enforcement of the award may also be
refused on the grounds stipulated in Section 48(2) of the
Act. Section 49 provides that where the court is satisfied
that the foreign award is enforceable under Chapter I, the
award shall be deemed to be a decree of the court. Section
50 provides as to against which orders an appeal shall lie.
It reads as under:
50. Appealable orders.(1) An appeal shall lie from the
order refusing to
(a) refer the parties to arbitration under Section 45;
(b) enforce a foreign award under Section 48,
to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from such
order.
(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in
appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall
affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme
Court.
As can be seen from the above, an order refusing to refer

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the parties to arbitration under Section 45 of the Act is


appealable. There is, however, no provision for filing an
appeal if the judicial authority refers the parties to
arbitration.
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.,
(2005) 7 SCC 234
3. Arbitration in India was earlier governed by the Indian
Arbitration Act, 1859 with limited application and the
Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Then came the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 8 of that Act
conferred power on the court to appoint an arbitrator on
an application made in that behalf. Section 20 conferred a
wider jurisdiction on the court for directing the filing of the
arbitration agreement and the appointment of an
arbitrator. Section 21 conferred a power on the court in a
pending suit, on the agreement of parties, to refer the
differences between them for arbitration in terms of the
Act. The Act provided for the filing of the award in court,
for the making of a motion by either of the parties to make
the award a rule of court, a right to have the award set
aside on the grounds specified in the Act and for an appeal
against the decision on such a motion. This Act was
replaced by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
which, by virtue of Section 85, repealed the earlier
enactment.
4. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) was intended to comprehensively
cover

international

conciliations

as

and
also

commercial
domestic

arbitrations
arbitrations

and
and

conciliations. It envisages the making of an arbitral

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procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting


the needs of the arbitration concerned and for other
matters set out in the Objects and Reasons of the Bill. The
Act was intended to be one to consolidate and amend the
law

relating

commercial

to

domestic

arbitrations

arbitrations,

and

enforcement

international
of

foreign

arbitral awards, as also to define the law relating to


conciliation and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. The preamble indicates that since the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has adopted a Model Law for International
Commercial Arbitration and the General Assembly of the
United Nations has recommended that all countries give
due consideration to the Model Law and whereas the
Model Law and the Rules make significant contribution to
the establishment of a unified legal framework for a fair
and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international
commercial relations and since it was expedient to make a
law respecting arbitration and conciliation taking into
account the Model Law and the Rules, the enactment was
being brought forward. The Act replaces the procedure laid
down in Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Part I of the Act deals with arbitration. It contains Sections
2 to 43. Part II deals with enforcement of certain foreign
awards, and Part III deals with conciliation and Part IV
contains supplementary provisions. In this case, we are not
concerned with Part III, and Parts II and IV have only
incidental relevance. We are concerned with the provisions
in Part I dealing with arbitration.
5. Section 7 of the Act read with Section 2(b) defines an

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arbitration agreement. Section 2(h) defines party to


mean a party to an arbitration agreement. Section 4 deals
with waiver of objections on the part of the party which
has proceeded with an arbitration, without stating his
objections referred to in the section, without undue delay.
Section 5 indicates the extent of judicial intervention. It
says that notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in matters governed by Part
I, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so
provided in Part I. The expression judicial authority is not
defined. So, it has to be understood as taking in the courts
or any other judicial fora. Section 7 defines an arbitration
agreement and insists that it must be in writing and also
explains when an arbitration agreement could be said to
be in writing. Section 8 confers power

on a judicial

authority before whom an action is brought in a matter


which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, to refer
the dispute to arbitration, if a party applies for the same.
Section 9 deals with the power of the Court to pass interim
orders and the power to give interim protection in
appropriate cases. It gives a right to a party, before or
during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making
of the arbitral award but before its enforcement in terms of
Section 36 of the Act, to apply to a court for any one of the
orders specified therein. Chapter III of Part I deals with
composition of Arbitral Tribunals. Section 10 gives freedom
to the parties to determine the number of arbitrators but
imposes a restriction that it shall not be an even number.
Then comes Section 11 with which we are really concerned
in these appeals.

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6. The marginal heading of Section 11 is Appointment of


arbitrators. Sub-section (1) indicates that a person of any
nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed
to by the parties. Under sub-section (2), subject to subsection (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for
appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. Under sub-section
(3), failing any agreement in terms of sub-section (2), in an
arbitration with three arbitrators, each party could appoint
one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so appointed could
appoint the third arbitrator, who would act as the presiding
arbitrator. Under sub-section (4), the Chief Justice or any
person or institution designated by him could make the
appointment,

in

case

where

sub-section

(3)

has

application and where either the party or parties had failed


to nominate their arbitrator or arbitrators or the two
nominated arbitrators had failed to agree on the presiding
arbitrator. In the case of a sole arbitrator, sub-section (5)
provides for the Chief Justice or any person or institution
designated by him, appointing an arbitrator on a request
being made by one of the parties, on fulfilment of the
conditions laid down therein. Then comes sub-section (6),
which may be quoted hereunder with advantage:
11. (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed
upon by the parties,
(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or
(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to
reach

an

agreement

expected

of

them

under

that

procedure; or
(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any
function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,

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a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or


institution designated by him to take the necessary
measure, unless the agreement on the appointment
procedure

provides

other

means

for

securing

the

appointment.
Sub-section (7) gives a finality to the decision rendered by
the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by
him when moved under sub-section (4), or sub-section (5),
or sub-section (6) of Section 11. Sub-section (8) enjoins the
Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him
to keep in mind the qualifications required for an arbitrator
by the agreement of the parties, and other considerations
as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent
and impartial arbitrator. Sub-section (9) deals with the
power of the Chief Justice of India or a person or institution
designated by him to appoint the sole or the third
arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration. Subsection (10) deals with the Chief Justices power to make a
scheme for dealing with matters entrusted to him by subsection (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section
11. Sub-section (11) deals with the respective jurisdiction
of the Chief Justices of different High Courts who are
approached with requests regarding the same dispute and
specifies as to who should entertain such a request. Subsection (12) clause (a) clarifies that in relation to
international arbitration, the reference in the relevant subsections to the Chief Justice would mean the Chief
Justice of India. Clause (b) indicates that otherwise the
expression

Chief

Justice

shall

be

construed

as

reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court within

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whose local limits the Principal Court is situated. Court is


defined under Section 2(e) as the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction in a district.
7. Section 12 sets out the grounds of challenge to the
person appointed as arbitrator and the duty of an
arbitrator appointed, to disclose any disqualification he
may have. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 gives a right to
the parties to challenge an arbitrator. Section 13 lays down
the procedure for such a challenge. Section 14 takes care
of the failure of or impossibility for an arbitrator to act and
Section 15 deals with the termination of the mandate of
the arbitrator and the substitution of another arbitrator.
Chapter IV deals with the jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals.
Section 16 deals with the competence of an Arbitral
Tribunal, to rule on its jurisdiction. The Arbitral Tribunal
may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any
objection with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement. A person aggrieved by the rejection
of his objection by the Tribunal on its jurisdiction or the
other matters referred to in that section, has to wait until
the award is made to challenge that decision in an appeal
against the arbitral award itself in accordance with Section
34 of the Act. But an acceptance of the objection to
jurisdiction or authority, could be challenged then and
there, under Section 37 of the Act. Section 17 confers
powers on the Arbitral Tribunal to make interim orders.
Chapter V comprising Sections 18 to 27 deals with the
conduct of arbitral proceedings. Chapter VI containing
Sections 28 to 33 deals with making of the arbitral award
and termination of the proceedings. Chapter VII deals with

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recourse

against

an

arbitral

award.

Section

34

contemplates the filing of an application for setting aside


an arbitral award by making an application to the Court as
defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. Chapter VIII deals with
finality and enforcement of arbitral awards. Section 35
makes the award final and Section 36 provides for its
enforcement under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
the same manner as if it were a decree of court. Chapter IX
deals with appeals and Section 37 enumerates the orders
that are open to appeal. We have already referred to the
right of appeal available under Section 37(2) of the Act, on
the Tribunal accepting a plea that it does not have
jurisdiction or when the Arbitral Tribunal accepts a plea
that it is exceeding the scope of its authority. No second
appeal is contemplated, but the right to approach the
Supreme

Court

is

saved.

Chapter

deals

with

miscellaneous matters. Section 43 makes the Limitation


Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings under the Act as it
applies to proceedings in the Court.
SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618
In my view, Section 22 of SICA does not debar the
arbitration

proceedings

under

the

Arbitration

and

Conciliation Act, 1996.


San-A Tradubg Co. Ltd. v. I.C. Textiles Ltd.,(2012) 7
SCC 192
15. It is thus necessary to see whether the language of the
said Act is so plain and unambiguous as to admit of only
the interpretation suggested by Mr Sen. It must be borne
in mind that the very object of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act of 1996, was to establish a uniform legal

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framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes


arising

in

international

commercial

arbitration.

The

conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the


intention of its makers. If a statutory provision is open to
more than one interpretation then the court has to choose
that interpretation which represents the true intention of
the legislature. This task often is not an easy one and
several difficulties arise on account of variety of reasons,
but all the same, it must be borne in mind that it is
impossible even for the most imaginative legislature to
forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that
may emerge after enacting a statute where its application
may be called for. It is in such a situation the courts duty
to expound arises with a caution that the court should not
try to legislate. While examining a particular provision of a
statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of a court is
ousted or not, the principle of universal application is that
ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be ousted unless the
very statutory provision explicitly indicates or even by
inferential conclusion the court arrives at the same when
such a conclusion is the only conclusion. Notwithstanding
the conventional principle that the duty of Judges is to
expound and not to legislate, the courts have taken the
view that the judicial art of interpretation and appraisal is
imbued with creativity and realism and since interpretation
always implied a degree of discretion and choice, the
courts

would

adopt,

particularly

in

areas

such

as,

constitutional adjudication dealing with social and defuse


(sic) rights. Courts are therefore, held as finishers,
refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them

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in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing


(see Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways3, All ER at p.
1071 D, WLR at p. 732, State of Haryana v. Sampuran
Singh4, AIR at p. 1957). If a language used is capable of
bearing more than one construction, in selecting the true
meaning, regard must be had to the consequences,
resulting from adopting the alternative constructions. A
construction

that

results

in

hardship,

serious

inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which


leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the
system which the statute purports to regulate has to be
rejected

and

preference

should

be

given

to

that

construction which avoids such results. (See Johnson v.


Moreton5 and Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.6) In
selecting out of different interpretations, the court will
adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather
than that which is none of those things, as it may be
presumed that the legislature should have used the word
in that interpretation which least offends our sense of
justice. In Shannon Realities Ltd. v. Ville de St Michel7, AC
at pp. 192-93, Lord Shaw stated:
Where words of a statute are clear, they must, of course,
be

followed,

but

in

Their

Lordships

opinion

where

alternative constructions are equally open that alternative


is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth
working of the system which the statute purports to be
regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will
introduce

uncertainty,

friction

or

confusion

into

the

working of the system.


This principle was accepted by Subba Rao, J. while

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construing Section 193 of the Sea Customs Act and in


coming to the conclusion that the Chief of Customs
Authority was not an officer of Customs. (Collector of
Customs v. Digvijaysinhji Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd.8)
16. A reading of the provisions shows that the said Act
applies to arbitrations which are held in India between
Indian

nationals

and

to

international

commercial

arbitrations whether held in India or out of India. Section


2(1)(f) defines an international commercial arbitration. The
definition makes no distinction between international
commercial arbitrations held in India or outside India. An
international commercial arbitration may be held in a
country which is a signatory to either the New York
Convention or the Geneva Convention (hereinafter called
the convention country). An international commercial
arbitration may be held in a non-convention country. The
said Act nowhere provides that its provisions are not to
apply to international commercial arbitrations which take
place in a non-convention country. Admittedly, Part II only
applies to arbitrations which take place in a convention
country. Mr Sen fairly admitted that Part II would not apply
to an international commercial arbitration which takes
place in a non-convention country. He also fairly admitted
that there would be countries which are not signatories
either to the New York Convention or to the Geneva
Convention. It is not possible to accept the submission that
the

said

Act

makes

no

provision

for

international

commercial arbitrations which take place in a nonconvention country.


17. Section 1 of the said Act reads as follows:

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1. Short title, extent and commencement.(1) This Act


may be called the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
(2) It extends to the whole of India:
Provided that Parts I, III and IV shall extend to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir only insofar as they relate to
international commercial arbitration or, as the case may
be, international commercial conciliation.
The words this Act mean the entire Act. This shows that
the entire Act, including Part I, applies to the whole of
India. The fact that all Parts apply to the whole of India is
clear from the proviso which provides that Parts I, III and IV
will apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only so far as
international

commercial

arbitrations/conciliations

are

concerned. Significantly, the proviso does not state that


Part I would apply to Jammu and Kashmir only if the place
of the international commercial arbitration is in Jammu and
Kashmir. Thus if sub-section (2) of Section 2 is read in the
manner suggested by Mr Sen there would be a conflict
between Section 1 and Section 2(2). There would also be
an

anomaly

inasmuch

as

even

if

an

international

commercial arbitration takes place outside India, Part I


would continue to apply in Jammu and Kashmir, but it
would not apply to the rest of India. The legislature could
not have so intended.
18. Section 2(1)(a) defines arbitration as meaning any
arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent
arbitral institution. Thus, this definition recognises that the
arbitration could be under a body like the Indian Chamber
of Commerce or the International Chamber of Commerce.
Arbitrations under the International Chamber of Commerce

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would be held, in most cases, out of India. Section 2(1)(c)


provides that the term arbitral award would include an
interim award.
19. Section 2(1)(f) of the said Act defines an international
commercial arbitration. It reads as follows:
2. (1)(f) international commercial arbitration means an
arbitration

relating

to

disputes

arising

out

of

legal

relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as


commercial under the law in force in India and where at
least one of the parties is
(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident
in, any country other than India; or
(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country
other than India; or
(iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals
whose central management and control is exercised in any
country other than India; or
(iv) the government of a foreign country.
As

stated

above,

the

definition

of

international

commercial arbitration makes no distinction between


international commercial arbitrations which take place in
India or internal commercial arbitrations which take place
outside India.
20. Section 2(1)(e) defines court as follows:
2. (1)(e) court means the Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subjectmatter of the arbitration if the same had been the subjectmatter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a

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grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of


Small Causes;
A court is one which would otherwise have jurisdiction in
respect of the subject-matter. The definition does not
provide that the courts in India will not have jurisdiction if
an international commercial arbitration takes place outside
India. Courts in India would have jurisdiction even in
respect of an international commercial arbitration. As
stated above, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied.
An ouster of jurisdiction has to be express.
Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4
SCC 105
12. So far as the issue relating to maintainability of the
application itself is concerned, is no more res integra. This
Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4
SCC 105, held as under: (SCC p. 107b-d)
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2(2) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, indicating that Part I
of the said Act would apply where the place of arbitration
is in India, even in respect of international commercial
agreements, which are to be governed by the laws of
another country, the parties would be entitled to invoke
the

provisions

of

Part

of

the

aforesaid

Act

and

consequently the application made under Section 11


thereof would be maintainable. It clearly lays down that
the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, would be equally applicable to international
commercial arbitrations held outside India, unless any of
the said provisions are excluded by agreement between
the parties expressly or by implication, which is not so in

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the instant case.


[See also Indtel Technical Services (P) Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins
Rail Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 308 and Citation Infowares Ltd. v.
Equinox Corpn. (2009) 7 SCC 220]
13. In Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services
Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 190 this Court considered a similar issue
and after considering various earlier judgments, came to
the conclusion that implied exclusion of the provision of
Part I cannot be inferred and therefore the principles
regarding the arbitral reference laid down in Bhatia
International1 are applicable.
14. Honble Mr R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was)
however, has taken a contrary view as in Shreejee Traco
(I) (P) Ltd. v. Paperline International Inc. (2003) 9 SCC 79 it
was held: (SCC p. 82, para 8)
8. So far as the language employed by Parliament in
drafting sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act is
concerned, suffice it to say that the language is clear and
unambiguous. Saying that this Part would apply where the
place of arbitration is in India tantamounts to saying that it
will not apply where the place of arbitration is not in India.
15.

However,

considering

the

fact

that

Bhatia

International1 is a three-Judge Bench judgment and has


consistently been followed, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge in Shreejee Traco (I) (P) Ltd. (2003) 9 SCC 79
does not have binding effect. As a consequence, the
application is held to be maintainable.
Cauvery

Coffee

Traders

v.

Hornor

Resources

(International) Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 420

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ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996

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1. (2004) 2 SCC 663


[Chairman and MD, NTPC Ltd. Vs. Reshmi Constructions,
Builders & Contractors]
2. (2006) 13 SCC 475
[M/s. Ambica Construction Vs. Union of India]
3. (2009) 1 SCC 267
[National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt.
Ltd.]
4. (2011) 2 SCC 400
[R.L. Kalathia & Co. vs. State of Gujarat]
5. (2011) 12 SCC 349
[Union of India & Ors. Vs. Master Construction
Company]

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LIST OF JUDGMENTS
1. San A Tradubg Co. Ltd. v. I.C. Textiles Ltd.

(2012) 7 SCC
192

2. SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd.

(2005) 8 SCC
618

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

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