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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT FOR WAYNE COUNTY
CIVIL DIVISION
JAMES EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE DETROIT NEWS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.

BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

By: Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
Attorney for James Edwards

Case No. 16-004874-NO

Hon. Kathleen Macdonald

16-004874-NO

FILED IN MY OFFICE

WAYNE
COUNTY CLERK

5/26/2016 2:21:24 PM
CATHY
HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ
AND M. GARRETT
COHN, LLP
James E. Stewart (P23254)
Leonard M. Niehoff (P36695)
Andrew M. Pauwels (P79167)
315 E. Eisenhower Pkwy., Ste. 100
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
(P): (734) 418-4256
Attorneys for The Detroit News, Inc., and Bankole
Thompson

PLAINTIFFS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
NOW COMES James Edwards (Plaintiff), by and through Attorney Kyle Bristow of
Bristow Law, PLLC, and hereby propounds upon The Detroit News, Inc., Bankole Thompson
(collectively Defendants), and this Honorable Court Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to
Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition:
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff sued Defendants for falsely publishing in The Detroit News and on the website of
said newspaper that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klanwhich is a terrorist organization
associated with criminality. (Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint). Prior to Defendants having

published the statement that Plaintiff is affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, no third-party has ever
stated as a fact that Plaintiff is a leaderor otherwise a memberof the Ku Klux Klan. (Exhibit
B Affidavit of James Edwards).
Defendants allege in Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition that Plaintiff is a
racist and a white supremacist due to being a staunch conservative political activist with proWhite racial views concerning affirmative action, immigration, and multiculturalism, and
therefore, Defendants are somehow legally privileged to publish to third-parties that Plaintiff is a
leader of the Ku Klux Klan. (Defendants Brief, passim). For the reasons set forth herein,
Defendants are mistaken.
The statement which Plaintiff maintains is actionable is as follows: Of particular note to
some in the Jewish community is the unprecedented support the Trump campaign has received
among white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and its leaders like James Edwards,
David Duke and Thomas Robb, the national director of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in
Arkansas. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, 18).
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the statement at issue in the instant civil action states that Plaintiff is formally
affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan.
Plaintiffs Response: Yes, when the context of the statement is considered, it is
clear that readers would interpret it to mean that Plaintiff is
an actual leader of the Ku Klux Klanespecially since
Defendants also cited the names of two other people known
to be affiliated with said organization.
2. Whether Defendants falsely describing Plaintiff as a leader of the Ku Klux Klan constitutes
opinion because the claim was made in an opinion piece.
Plaintiffs Response: No, per legal authorities, false and derogatory statements of
fact are still actionable even if they are published in an
editorial and concern political subject matter.

3. Whether Defendants falsely describing Plaintiff as a leader of the Ku Klux Klan constitutes
rhetorical hyperbole.
Plaintiffs Response: No, legal authorities are clear insofar as falsely stating that
someone is affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan is inherently
defamatory and is not rhetorical hyperbole since the claim is
objectively verifiablesomeone is either a member of the
Ku Klux Klan or they are not.
4. Whether Defendants falsely describing Plaintiff as a leader of the Ku Klux Klan is
substantially true.
Plaintiffs Response: No, Plaintiff is not nownor has Plaintiff ever beena
member or leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
5. Whether Plaintiff is libel-proof since some left-wing organizations disparage Plaintiffs
staunchly conservative political views as white supremacist and racist.
Plaintiffs Response: No, Plaintiff has received favorable recognition with regards
to Plaintiffs conservative political activism and Plaintiff has
no criminal history, and so Plaintiff has a reputation to
protect and which is subject to injury.
6. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary disposition being granted in Plaintiffs
favor as to Defendants contention that the affirmative defenses of opinion, rhetorical
hyperbole, substantial truth, and libel-proof plaintiff are even viable in the instant civil
action.
Plaintiffs Response: Yes, there is no material dispute as to the facts and Plaintiff
is entitled to partial judgment as a matter of law.
III. LAW & ARGUMENT
Roman politician, lawyer, and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero is alleged to have opined
over two millennia ago, When you have no basis for an argument, abuse the plaintiff. In the
instant case, Defendants have no argument and have elected to follow Ciceros advice by not only
abusing Plaintiff, but Plaintiffs counsel as well by unprofessionally whining about Plaintiffs
counsels completely irrelevant1 personal political views. (Defendants Brief, p 7, fn 14).

See M Civ JI 2.04(2)(a) (The lawyers statements, commentaries, and arguments are not
evidence.); M Civ JI 2.04(3)(b) (Opinions of people outside of the trial are not evidence.); MRE
1

For the reasons set forth infra, Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition is meritless:
(1) Plaintiff has unequivocally set forth within Plaintiffs Complaint one or more claims upon
which relief can be grantedespecially since only the Complaint is to be considered and the
allegations made within the Complaint must be accepted as absolutely true for purposes of MCR
2.116(c)(8)and (2) Plaintiffnot Defendantsis entitled to partial summary disposition being
granted in Plaintiffs favor as to Defendants contention that the affirmative defenses of opinion,
rhetorical hyperbole, substantial truth, and libel-proof plaintiff are even viable in the instant civil
action.
A. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY DISPOSITION PER MCR 2.116(C)(8)
1. Standard of Review
MCR 2.116(c)(8) permits summary disposition when the opposing party has failed to state
a claim on which relief can be granted. This Court Rule tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs
claim and results in a determination whether the plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Spiek v
Department of Trasp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Such a motion should be granted
if the claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could justify the plaintiffs
claim for relief. Maiden at 119; Spiek at 337.
A motion brought via MCR 2.116(c)(8) is decided on the pleadings alone; no other
evidence may be considered. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden at 119; Spiek at 337.

401 (Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.); MRE 402 (Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.).
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When deciding a motion made under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the court must accept as true all
factual allegations contained in the complaint as well as any reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from those allegations. Singerman v Municipal Serv Bureau, 455 Mich 135, 139; 565
NW2d 383 (1997). The court may not consider the merits of the plaintiffs factual allegations,
Mieras v DeBona, 452 Mich 278, 291; 550 NW2d 202 (1996), and it must construe those
allegations in the plaintiffs favor. Wortelboer v Benzie County, 212 Mich App 208, 217; 537
NW2d 603 (1995). Mere conclusory statements without supporting allegations of fact are
insufficient to state a cause of action. Churella v Pioneer State Mut Ins Co, 258 Mich App 260,
272; 671 NW2d 125 (2003); Allegheny Ludlum Corp v Department of Treasury, 207 Mich App
604; 525 NW2d 512 (1994).
2. Analysis
Per the legal authorities set forth supra, only the allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint are to
be considered by the Court for purposes of Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition per MCR
2.116(C)(8), said allegations must be accepted as true, and the issue for the Court to determine is
whether Plaintiff properly pled one or more causes of action. For the reasons set forth infra,
Plaintiff has properly pled counts in the alternativeas permitted by MCR 2.111(A)(2)of
defamation (libel per se), defamation by implication (libel per se), and invasion of privacy (false
light). (Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, 38-58).
The gist of Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition per MCR 2.116(C)(8) is that
since Defendants published derogatory materials about Plaintiff within an opinion piece, the
derogatory materials contained therein can only be considered to constitute opinion of the author.
(Defendants Brief, pp 13-15). Defendants rationale is not in accordance with legal authorities,
because a derogatory misstatement of fact contained within an otherwise opinion piece is still

actionable. See Dannis v C & G Publishing, Incorporated, 187 Mich App 691; 469 NW2d 331
(1991) (defendant sued for publishing editorial containing false and derogatory facts, but the jurys
verdict in plaintiffs favor was overturned for a reason other than that the statement of fact
constitutes opinion); Hodgins v Times Herald Co, 169 Mich App 245; 425 NW2d 522 (1988);
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323 (1974); Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 2 (1990)
(Simply couching a statement -- Jones is a liar -- in terms of opinion -- In my opinion, Jones is
a liar -- does not dispel the factual implications contained in the statement.).
Within Defendants opinion piece which disparages Donald Trumpwhich Defendants
are clearly privileged by right to publish, Defendants falsely stated as a fact that Plaintiff is a
leader of the Ku Klux Klanwhich Defendants are not privileged by right to publish.
(Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, 18).
Defendants misleadingly contend within their Brief that when Defendants stated that
Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, that Defendants merely meant that Plaintiff inspires
members of the Ku Klux Klan and not that Plaintiff is formally affiliated with said organization.
It is clear, however, from the wording of the article that readers would interpret leaders to mean
formal association with the organization, because Defendants listed Plaintiffs name with two
people who are actually known to associate with the Ku Klux Klan: David Duke and Thomas
Robb, the national director of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Arkansas. (Exhibit A
Plaintiffs Complaint, 18). This interpretation of the text of the article is a very reasonable
inference that a jury could make at trial, which the Court must accept for purposes of deciding
Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition. See Singerman at 139.
Plaintiff has properly pled the applicable elements for defamation and even pled that malice
occurred on the part of Defendants since Plaintiff is a public figure in the context of conservative

political activismas is required by New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). (Exhibit
A Plaintiffs Complaint, 38-51); Rouch v Enquirer & News, 440 Mich 238; 487 NW2d 205
(1992); Northland Wheels Roller Skaing Ctr v Detroit Free Press, 213 Mich App 317; 539 NW2d
774 (1995); Linebaugh v Sheraton Michigan Corp, 198 Mich App 335; 497 NW2d 585 (1993).
Plaintiff has properly pled the applicable elements for invasion of privacy (false light).
(Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, 52-58); Early Detection Ctr, PC v New York Life Ins Co,
157 Mich App 618, 630; 403 NW2d 830 (1986).
Although free speech is a right per the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, free speech is not unlimited, public figures can still sue for defamation if the
facts warrant it, and in light of Plaintiffs Complaint properly setting forth claims upon which relief
can be grantedespecially since the allegations must be accepted as true and reasonable inferences
thereof must be drawn from said allegations in Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiffs claims should not be
dismissed per MCR 2.116(C)(8).
B. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY DISPOSITION PER MCR 2.116(C)(10)
1. Standard of Review
A motion made per MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of the movants claim.
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 154, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994); Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich
App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995). Summary disposition under this subrule is available when,
[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10),
see also Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558; 718 NW2d 73 (2006); Haliw v City of Sterling
Heights, 464 Mich 297; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
7

which reasonable minds differ. Attorney Gen v PowerPick Players Club of Michigan, LLC, 287
Mich App 13, 26-27; 783 NW2d 515 (2010) (quoting West v GMC 469 Mich 117, 118; 665 NW2d
468 (2003)).
A fact is material if it is un ultimate issue upon which a jurys verdict must be based.
Estate of Neal v Friendship Manor Nursing Home, 113 Mich App 759, 763; 318 NW2d 694
(1992).
In reviewing a motion made per MCR 2.116(C)(10), the Court must consider the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other admissible evidence in favor of the nonmoving
party. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden at 120. If after reviewing the admissible evidence and viewing
it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party the Court is convinced that there is no genuine
issue of material act, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v Cross
& Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); Helsel v Morconi, 219 Mich App 14,
17; 555 NW2d 852 (1996).
Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), courts are required to be liberal in finding genuine issues of
material fact. Jimkowski v Shupe, 282 Mich App 1; 763 NW2d 1 (2008). Nevertheless,
Summary disposition is appropriate when the party opposing the motion fails to provide evidence
to establish a material factual dispute. Porter v City of Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 484; 542
NW2d 905 (1995). In deciding the motion, [t]he trial court is not permitted to assess credibility,
to weight the evidence, or to determine the facts. Henry Ford Health Sys v Esurance Ins Co, 288
Mich App 595, 598-599; 808 NW2d 1 (2010). If the evidence is conflicting, summary disposition
is improper. Hine v Volkswagon of America, Inc, 265 Mich App 432, 437; 695 NW2d 84 (2005).

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is suspect where motive and intent are at
issue or where the credibility of a witness is crucial. Foreman v Foreman, 266 Mich App 132,
135; 701 NW2d 167 (2005).
When a motion for summary disposition is considered by the Court, the Court may award
judgment to the nonmoving partyeven if the nonmoving party does not file its own motion for
summary dispositionif the Court determines that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgement
as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(I)(2); Charter Township of Meridian v Ingham County Clerk, 285
Mich App 581; 777 NW2d 452 (2009).
2. Analysis
a. Defendants Stating As Fact That Plaintiff Is A Leader Of The Ku Klux Klan Is Neither
Opinion Nor Rhetorical Hyperbole
Restatement of Torts, 2d, 559, illustration 2 (1977) provides as an example of what
constitutes defamation: An allegation of membership in the Ku Klux Klan is defamatory.
(Emphasis added.) Liberty Lobby, Inc v Dow Jones & Co, Inc, 838 F2d 1287, 1294 (US App DC,
1988); see also Partington v Bugliosi, 825 F Supp 906, 915, fn 9 (D Hawaii, 1993) ([A] false
charge of membership in the Ku Klux Klan * * * [is] defamatory per se.). In the instant case,
Defendants falsely accused Plaintiff of being a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, which is pretty much
the textbook definition of defamation as far as the American Law Institutewhich publishes the
Restatement of Tortsis concerned. Needless to say, Michigan courts find the Restatement of
Torts to be extremely persuasive. See Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594; 374 NW2d
905 (1985) (utilizing the Restatement of Torts to determine the elements of the common law tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Defendants are improperly trying to conflate being a racist or a white supremacist
which are offensive rhetorical hyperbole slurs for people of a right-of-center political persuasion
9

with membership or a leadership position with the Ku Klux Klanwhich is neither opinion nor
rhetorical hyperbole since it is easily factually determinable. Defendants are not being sued for
calling Plaintiff racist or white supremacistrather, Defendants are being sued for alleging
that Plaintiff is actively involved with the Ku Klux Klana terrorist organization well-known for
engaging in criminality. Defendants describing Plaintiff as racist and white supremacist is
constitutionally permissible, but Defendants crossed the Rubicon of constitutional protection when
Defendants stated as fact that Plaintiff is affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan.
As was rightfully observed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California:
At the outset it is important to make clear that there is only one defamatory
statement at issue in this case; Defendant's statement that he was told (or that he
knew for a fact) that Plaintiff was a dangerous member of the Ku Klux Klan.
There is no dispute that this statement is both false and derogatory * * *. However,
it is important to stress that it is the allegation of membership in the Ku Klux Klan
that is actionable; the allegation that a person is a racist, on the other hand is not
actionable because the term racist has no factually-verifiable meaning. See
Overhill Farms, Inc. V. Lopez, 190 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1262 (4 Dist. 2010)
(charging a person with being racist, unfair or unjust - without more - [...]
constitute mere name calling and do not contain a provably false assertion of fact
as is required to state a claim for defamation).
Forte v Jones, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, 1:11-cv-0718-AWI-BAM (ED Cal, March 19, 2013); but see Armstrong v Shirvell, 596
Fed Appx 433, 442 (CA 6, 2015) (Courts have held that words like liar and racist have clear,
well understood meanings, which are capable of being defamatory. [(Citations omitted)].).
Whether a derogatory statement made against public political figures constitutes opinion
or rhetorical hyperbole has been analyzed by courts. See Buckley v Littell, 539 F2d 882 (CA 2,
1976).

10

In Buckley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with a case in
which William F. Buckley, Jr. (Buckley)a prominent conservative activist of yesteryear
sued Franklin H. Littella left-wing political detractorfor writing that Buckley is a fellow
traveler of fascism and for stating that Buckley is a liar. Buckley at 887 and 895-896. The
Second Circuit observed that an allegation of fascism is not actionable because the word is
loosely definedi.e., rhetorical hyperbole, but that alleging that Buckley is a liar is actionable
because it is an assertion of facti.e., not rhetorical hyperbole. Buckley at 895. Said the Buckley
court:
We have a different factual context, however, concerned in the third alleged libel.
For here appellant's book says, Like Westbrook Pegler, who lied day after day in
his column about Quentin Reynolds and goaded him into a lawsuit, Buckley could
be taken to court by any one of several people who had enough money to hire
competent legal counsel and nothing else to do. This is an assertion of fact, namely
that Buckley had lied about and implicitly libeled several people who, if they
wanted to and could afford it, could take him to court for his lies. As opposed to
the loosely definable, variously interpretable statements of opinion above referred
to made inextricably in the contest of political, social or philosophical debate, in
this instance appellant's comment makes a factual assertion relating to Buckley's
journalistic integrity. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra 566 & Comment.
Even while Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, in effect states that an expression of
pure opinion may not be the basis of an action for defamation, it also said, 418
U.S. at 401, 94 S.Ct. at 3037, that there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Regardless of what other implicit but unelaborated
comparisons Littell was attempting to draw between Buckley and Pegler, and
regardless of whether he was attempting to say that Buckley lied about individuals
precisely in the way that Pegler did, see note 2, supra, it seems to us that this third
remark as it appears on its face states that Buckley was engaging in libelous
journalism. Given the proof of falsity which was presented and not successfully
rebutted, it is constitutionally as well as tortiously defamatory.
Buckley at 895-896.
In the instant case, Defendants stated as a fact within an otherwise opinion piece that
Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan. This is not rhetorical hyperbole, because it is an assertion
of factto use the language of the Second Circuit, since this statement is not loosely

11

definable. Unlike slurs like white supremacist, racist, and fascistwhich are variously
interpretable statements of opinion made inextricably in the context of political * * *
debate, whether one is a leader or otherwise involved as a member of a Ku Klux Klan group is
easily objectively verifiable.
Likewise, in Gertz, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a defamation case in which
a conservative organizations publication labeled the prominent left-wing plaintiff a Leninist
and a Communist-fronter who had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described as
a Communist organization that probably did more than any other outfit to plan the Communist
attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. Gertz at 326. The United
States Supreme Court observed that [t]hese statements contained serious inaccuracies insofar as
the plaintiff had never engaged in criminal activity and had not been a member of the objectionable
organization. Id. After the United States Supreme Court remanded the case back for retrial, the
jury awarded the Gertz plaintiff four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000.00), which was affirmed
on appeal, after said plaintiff proved that the defendant acted with actual malice. Gertz v Robert
Welch, Inc, 680 F2d 527 (CA 7, 1982).
In Hodgins at 254-255, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated,
Direct accusations or inferences of criminal conduct or wrongdoing are not
protected as opinion. Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694,
698 (CA 9, 1984); Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 65 (CA 2,
1980); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 896 (CA 2, 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 1062,
97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977). There is no First Amendment protection for
a charge which could reasonably be understood as imputing specific criminal
conduct or other wrongful acts. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64.
See also MCL 600.2911(1).
In the instant case, Defendants accused Plaintiff of being affiliated with an organization
which is notorious for committing heinous crimes. See Virginia v Black, 538 US 343 (2003)

12

(describing history of the Ku Klux Klans reign of terror). There is clearly no First Amendment
protection for Defendants to falsely state as a fact that Plaintiff is a leader of or otherwise involved
with the Ku Klux Klan.
Just as it is actionable for a conservative organization to falsely state as a fact in an
otherwise opinion piece that a liberal activist is involved with a communist organization that
engages in criminal activitysee Gertz, it is likewise actionable for a news organization and
left-wing journalist to falsely state as a fact in an otherwise opinion piece that a conservative
activist is involved with an organization which engages in criminal activity. What is good for the
goose is good for the ganderunless equal protection under the law is not afforded to politically
right-of-center citizens of our country and the Court is prepared to so rule.
b. Defendants Stating As Fact That Plaintiff Is A Leader Of The Ku Klux Klan Is Not
Substantially True
As set forth supra, Defendants are erroneously trying to conflate being racist or white
supremacistwhich are offensive slurs that arguably constitute constitutionally-protected
rhetorical hyperbole when used against right-wing political activistswith membership or a
leadership position with the Ku Klux Klanwhich is not rhetorical hyperbole since it is easily
factually determinable:

a person is either affiliated with the repugnant criminally-inclined

organization or they are not. Being called a racist or white supremacist is qualitatively
different than being accused of being a member or leader of a criminal syndicate. Plaintiff is not
suing Defendants for calling or even implying that Plaintiff is racist or white supremacist
rather, Plaintiff is suing Defendants for falsely stating as a fact that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku
Klux Klan. (Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, 38-58).
Minor inaccuracies in a published article cannot provide the basis for actionable
defamation if they are immaterial or if they accurately describe the circumstances. Duran v The
13

Detroit News, 200 Mich App 622, 633; 504 NW2d 715 (1993). In the instant case, it is not
immaterial that Defendants falsely alleged that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klanwhich
is a noxious terrorist criminal organization, and stating as a fact that Plaintiff has such
involvement with said organization does not accurately describe the circumstances: Plaintiff is
not now, nor has Plaintiff ever been, affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, and Defendants have no
reason to believe otherwise and acted with malice. (Exhibit B Affidavit of James Edwards).
The Michigan Supreme Court observed that a statement is not considered false unless it
'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would
have produced.' Rouch at 238, 260 (quoting Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc, 501 US 496,
517 (1991)). The pleaded truth in the instant civil actionPlaintiff is not a leader of the Ku Klux
Klanwould have produced a different effect on the minds of the readers than the false statement
made by Defendantsparaphrased, Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
Plaintiffs views are not even Ku Klux Klan-likePlaintiff does not advocate racial
violence, Plaintiff has never engaged in racial violence, Plaintiff has never engaged in criminal
activity, and although Plaintiffs radio talk show advances right-wing views, it is nevertheless
mainstream enough that a significant number of prominent or mainstream personalities have
chosen to be interviewed by itincluding but not limited to rock-and-roll legend Ted Nugent, Dr.
Alveda Kingthe niece of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., conservative African-American
activists Rev. Jesse Lee Peterson and Ezola Foster, conservative Native American activist David
Yeagley, Bay Buchanana former treasurer of the United States, New York Times bestselling
author Jerome Corsi, Patrick Buchanana former candidate for U.S. president, MSNBC political
commentator, and New York Times bestselling author, Dr. Paul Craig Robertsa former U.S.

14

Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Economic Policy, U.S. Congressman Walter Jones, and
actors Sonny Landham and Gary Sinese. (Exhibit B Affidavit of James Edwards).
It is neither true nor substantially true that Plaintiff is now or was previously a member or
leader of the Ku Klux Klan. (Exhibit B Affidavit of James Edwards). Since the evidence must
be considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffthe nonmoving partyfor purposes of
Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition per MCR 2.116(C)(10), Plaintiffs Affidavit lays
waste to Defendants substantially true argument.
c. Plaintiff Is Not Libel-Proof
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is libel-proof. (Defendants Brief, pp 17-18). Although
Defendants are correct that some people in extremely rare situations are libel-proofand cite the
example of convicted murderer Jack Dr. Death Kevorkian, Plaintiff is not libel-proof: (1)
Plaintiff has no criminal record, (2) Plaintiff is a church-going family man, (3) Plaintiff has been
interviewed by CNN on national television for which Plaintiff was described as a conservative
talk radio host instead of a Ku Klux Klan leader as Defendants represented Plaintiff to be, (4)
Plaintiff was named an Honorary City Councilman of Memphis, Tennessee, by said city council
for Plaintiffs contributions to his community via Plaintiffs conservative talk radio show, and (5)
Plaintiffs conservative talk radio show has received a certificate of recognition by the Memphis
City Council for outstanding contributions to Plaintiffs community. (Exhibit B Affidavit of
James Edwards). To the best of Plaintiffs knowledge, prior to Defendants, no one has ever falsely
stated that Plaintiff is a member or leader of the Ku Klux Klan. (Exhibit B Affidavit of James
Edwards).
Defendants imply in their Brief that because some politically left-of-center organizations
opine that Plaintiff is racist or white supremacist, that Defendants are given carte blanche to

15

say whatever they want about Plaintiff irrespective of whether Defendants statements are true or
not. This yellow journalism defense is in accordance with neither the law nor common sense.
Like Defendants in the instant case, the defendant in Buckley unsuccessfully tried to allege
that the plaintiff is libel-proof and that the statements made against the plaintiff are not actionable.
Buckley at 888. Said the Second Circuit of Buckley:
Mr. Buckley, despite the fact that he has spent a life in politics as a principal
spokesman for a controversial political position and is eminently prominent,
obviously may be the target of libel; his reputation, however capable he may be of
answering false and defamatory attack with the communications resources at his
command, is nevertheless one that could suffer under the onus of defamation. The
victims of the era of McCarthyism who had occupied positions of prominence in
the radio, television and cinema fields are ample proof of that. The doctrine of
libel-proof defendants that our Cardillo [v Doubledy & Co., 518 F2d 638 (CA 2,
1975)] case enunciated is a limited, narrow one, which we will leave confined to
its basic factual context.
Buckley at 888-889.
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff is a racist white supremacist whose reputation, therefore,
cannot be injured by Defendants calling him a leader of the Ku Klux Klan. (Defendants Brief, pp
17-18). A virtually identical case was reviewed in 1996 by the Supreme Court of Montana, which
saw fit to rule that summary judgment being granted in the defendants favor by the trial court was
improper because a jury must decide whether the plaintiff was in fact defamed.
In Roots v Montana Human Rights Network, 275 Mont 408, 411-412; 913 P2d 638 (Mont
1996) (attached as Exhibit C),
[The plaintiff] was well known by the general public as an ultra right-wing political
activist [who] authored a publication entitled Whites and Blacks 100 Facts (and
One Lie), which is advertised for sale nationally. The publication lists facts about
African-Americans, such as: blacks have low I.Q.'s due to small foreheads; they
have never invented anything; and they are more likely to have syphilis than whites.
[The plaintiff] is a columnist in the Jubilee, wherein one of his columns states that
the Holocaust was a hoax.

16

[The plaintiff] has been the subject of numerous news reports by a local television
station and a newspaper concerning his right-wing beliefs and criminal record.
[The plaintiff] has been convicted of felony possession of an illegal firearm and
misdemeanor resisting arrest. [The plaintiff] was a member and president of the
Young Republicans at Eastern Montana College and was the subject of numerous
articles which appeared in the college's newspaper during 1993 and 1994. [The
plaintiff] supported people who are openly members of the KKK and attended
several meetings held by the Montana militia. [The plaintiff] filed for a state senate
seat but did not qualify as a candidate because of his felony conviction.
The controversially right-wing Roots plaintiff sued the defendant in that case because the
plaintiff was falsely accused by the defendant of being a membermuch less a leaderof the Ku
Klux Klan. Roots at 411. The Roots plaintiff was permitted to proceed to trial despite clearly
having a right-wing reputation arguably more controversial than Plaintiff andunlike Plaintiff
despite having a felonious criminal record.2
To support Defendants contention that Plaintiffs reputation is so poor that Plaintiff is
libel-proof, Defendants mainly rely on the tabloid representations of the radically leftist Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and Anti-Defamation League (ADL). (Defendants Brief,
passim). The SPLC and ADL have been sued for engaging in horrific tortious conduct against
their political adversaries and have even been alleged to induce mentally unhinged people to
commit acts of violenceincluding mass shootings. See Quigley v Rosenthal, 43 F Supp 2d 1163
(D Colo, 1999) (ADL sued by Catholic family for disparaging them as anti-Semitic during a
vicious campaign of harassment); Quigley v Rosenthal, 327 F3d 1044 (CA 10, 2003) (Judgment
of jury in excess of ten million dollars against ADL not overturned on appeal); Family Research
Council. Southern Poverty Law Center Linked to FRC Shooting in Chilling New Interrogation
Video.

<http://www.frc.org/newsroom/southern-poverty-law-center-linked-to-frc-shooting-in-

See also Flynn v The Associates Press, 401 Mass 776; 519 NW2d 1304 (1988) (Racist plaintiff
sued defendant for falsely being accused of having Ku Klux Klan membership, but case was
dismissed due solely to statute of limitations defense.).
2

17

chilling-new-interrogation-video>. Accessed 21 May 2016. Deferring to the SPLC3 and ADL to

decide who is a right-wing extremist of ill repute makes about as much sense as deferring to the
John Birch Society to decide who is a communist. See Gertz.
Defendants allege that Plaintiff is a friend of David Duke (Duke) and imply that Plaintiff
can be called a Klansman through guilt-by-association. (Defendants Brief, p 4). Defendants are
blowing the Duke connection way out of proportion, because Duke ran for governor of the State
of Louisiana as a Republican in 1991 and received 671,009 votesor thirty-nine percent (39%)
of all votes cast.4 Plaintiff resides in the State of Tennesseea southern state, and Duke is more
popular in the Southand therefore mainstreamthan Defendants would like to have this
Michigan Court believe.5 Supporting or being a friend of Duke does not inherently make one a
member or leader of the Ku Klux Klan or any other organization engaged in criminal activity.
It is not factually true that Plaintiff is libel-proof as far as Plaintiffs political activism is
concerned. (Exhibit B Affidavit of James Edwards). Since the evidence must be considered in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffthe nonmoving partyfor purposes of Defendants Motion
for Summary Disposition per MCR 2.116(C)(10), Plaintiffs Affidavit trumps Defendants libelproof argument.

For more information about the SPLC, see Profiteers of Hate The Southern Poverty Law
Center A Special Report. The Social Contract Journal, Volume 20, Number 3. Spring 2010.
Accessible at <http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc_20_3/index.shtml>.
4
This Court can take judicial noticeper MRE 201of public elections. See Wolverine Golf
Club v Hare, 24 Mich App 711, 715, fn 2; 180 NW2d 820 (1970).
5
Segregationist Governor George Wallace won the 1972 Michigan Democratic primary with 50.96
percent of the vote, and Donald Trump won the recent Michigan primary with 36.5 percent of the
voteand Defendants purport that Trump and his supporters are racist. (Defendants Brief, p
13). In light of allegedly racist politicians performing well in Michigan elections now and
yesteryear, Defendants cannot logically contend that supporting said politicians political views
renders one libel-proof as a political leper. That which is mainstream is clearly not libel-proof.
3

18

d. Defendants Motion For Summary Disposition Per MCR 2.116(C)(10) Must Be Denied
Because The Evidence Defendants Attached To It Is Inadmissible
As set forth supra, Defendants must support their Motion for Summary Disposition per
MCR 2.116(C)(10) with admissible evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(6); Maiden at 120.
Other than submitting as proofs to support Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition
Plaintiffs Complaintwhich must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
correspondence exchanged between the Parties attorneyswhich is irrelevant and inadmissible6,
much less hearsay, and two articles Defendants published that mention Plaintiffone of which
is completely irrelevant in the instant case, Defendants only attached to their Brief an affidavit
from the Manager of Litigation Support who works for Defendants attorneys law firm.
(Defendants Brief, Ex G). The affidavit attached to Defendants Brief is not admissible evidence
because a legal assistant is merely an agent of an attorney and representations and arguments of
counsel in their Briefs do not constitute record evidence. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456,
474; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); North River Ins Co v Endicott, 151 Mich App 707, 714; 391 NW2d
454 (1986) (an affidavit signed by a counsel stating only that the content of the motion is true to
his knowledge is insufficient for purposes of supporting a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants are not entitled to summary disposition per
MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10).
Whether a privilegesuch as whether the published derogatory statement constitutes
opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, or is substantially true, or if the plaintiff is libel-proofexists is a

See M Civ JI 2.04(2)(a) (The lawyers statements, commentaries, and arguments are not
evidence.).
6

19

question of law for the court. Prysak v RL Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1; 483 NW2d 629 (1992); New
Franklin Enters v Sabo, 192 Mich App 219; 480 NW2d 326 (1991). However, if the facts needed
to make that determination are disputed, they must be submitted to a jury. Bufalino v Detroit
Magazine, 433 Mich 766; 449 NW2d 410 (1989).
Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition should be denied in its entirety, a period of
time for discovery should occur, and the instant civil action should proceed to trial by jury as was
respectfully demanded by Plaintiff. (Exhibit A Plaintiffs Complaint, p 12).
In light, however, of legal authorities making it abundantly clear that falsely calling
someone a member of the Ku Klux Klan is inherently defamatory, and Plaintiffs Affidavit
evincing that Plaintiff has a reputation to protect and that Plaintiff is not a member or leader of the
Ku Klux Klan, Plaintiff does pray that this Court will grant partial summary disposition in
Plaintiffs favor per MCR 2.116(I)(2) by decreeing that the derogatory statement at issue in the
instant civil action does not constitute mere opinion nor rhetorical hyperbole nor is substantially
true and that Plaintiff is not libel-proofthereby precluding Defendants from raising such
affirmative defenses when Defendants are made to file their forthcoming answer to Plaintiffs
Complaint. No material dispute as to the facts exist as to these issues and the law and admissible
evidence conclusively show that Plaintiff is entitled to partial judgment as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

Dated: May 26, 2016

/s/ Kyle James Bristow

Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
Attorney for James Edwards
20

EXHIBIT A
Plaintiffs Complaint

db

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT FOR WAYNE COUNTY
CIVIL DIVISION
JAMES EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16 Hon.

v.
THE DETROIT NEWS, INC.,

- NO
16-004874-NO
FILED IN MY OFFICE
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK
4/18/2016 12:10:58 PM
CATHY M. GARRETT

and
BANKOLE THOMPSON,
Defendants.
There is no other pending or resolved civil action arising out
of the transaction or occurrence alleged in the complaint.

BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

By: Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
(W): www.KyleBristow.com
Attorney for James Edwards

PLAINTIFFS VERIFIED COMPLAINT

(JURY TRIAL DEMAND ENDORSED HEREON)

NOW COMES James Edwards, by and through the undersigned attorney, and hereby
propounds upon The Detroit News,!Inc.!(TDN),!Bankole!Thompson!(Thompson)!(collectively!
Defendants), and!this!Honorable!Court!Plaintiffs!Verified!Complaint:

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiffa conservative radio talk show host who is a supporter of the presidential
candidacy of Donald Trumpis suing Defendants for publishing false and defamatory materials
about Plaintiff; to wit: Defendants falsely stated on the website of The Detroit News and in the
printed version of said newspaper that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klandespite Plaintiff
not even being a member of the repugnant organization.
II. PARTIES
2. Plaintiff is an adult natural person who is a resident of the State of Tennessee.
3. TDN is a for-profit corporation existing by and through the laws of the State of Michigan,
which maintains as its resident agent The Corporation Company, 30600 Telegraph Rd., Ste. 2345,
Bingham Farms, MI 48025.
4. Thompson is an adult natural person whoupon information and beliefresides at 65
Winder St., Detroit, MI 48201.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court enjoys subject matter jurisdiction over the instant civil action because the
controversy involves a dispute of over twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00). Const 1963, art
VI, 13; MCL 600.605; MCL 600.8301(1).
6. This Court enjoys personal jurisdiction over Thompson because Thompson is now and will
be present and/or domiciled in the State of Michigan when he is served with process. MCL
600.701(1) and (2). Furthermore, Thompson did and caused an act to be done in the State of
Michigan resulting in the actions for tort alleged herein. MCL 600.705(2).
7. This Court enjoys personal jurisdiction over TDN because TDN is incorporated under the
laws of the State of Michigan. MCL 600.711(1).
2

8. Venue is proper with this Court for the instant civil action because said civil action seeks
damages for personal injury, Defendants conduct business in Wayne County, State of Michigan,
and the original injury occurred in Wayne County, State of Michigan. MCL 600.1629(1)(a)(i);
Yono v Carlson, 283 Mich App 567; 770 NW2d 420 (2005).
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
9. Plaintiff is the hostand has been since 2004of The Political Cesspool (TPC), which
is a conservative radio talk show syndicated exclusively by Liberty News Radio Network and
broadcast on its home station of WMQMa Christian radio station. TPCs website is accessible
at <www.thepoliticalcesspool.org>.
10. Plaintiffthrough TPChas interviewed a number of interesting personalities over the
years, including but not limited to Anthony Cumia, Patrick Buchanan, Hutton Gibson, Lt. Gen.
Hal Moore, Congressman Walter Jones, Sonny Landham, Rev. Jesse Lee Peterson, Ted Nugent,
Dr. Paul Craig Roberts, Gary Sinise, Ray Stevens, Dr. Alveda Kingthe niece of Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., Ezola Foster, and Dr. Paul Gottfried.
11. Plaintiff has appeared on national television to offer commentary about conservative
political philosophy. CNN, for example, described Plaintiff as a!conservative!talk!radio!host
when Plaintiff was interviewed by said television news network.
12. Plaintiff is a church-going family man who has no criminal record whatsoever. Plaintiff
was!named!an!Honorary!City!Councilman!of!Memphis,!Tennessee,!where!TPC!has!received!a!
certificate of recognition by the Memphis City Council for outstanding contributions to the
community.
13. Plaintiff is not now, nor has he ever been, a member or leader of the Ku Klux Klan.

14. Upon information and belief, the Ku Klux Klan is a racist organization which has been
responsible for kidnappings, beatings, bombings, murders, and other heinous crimes throughout
American history.
15. The American public widely construes the Ku Klux Klan to be repugnant.
16. Upon information and belief, Thompson is a left-wing activist who writes opinion pieces
for The Detroit News, which are published by TDN on its website and in the printed versions of
its newspapers. Thompson is not a fan of Donald Trump.
17. On

March

17,

2016,

TDN

published

on

its

website

at

<http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2016/03/16/jewish-leaders-trumppresidency/81887632/> and on Page 1B of the printed version of its newspaper an opinion piece
written! by! Thompson! entitled,! Thompson:! Jewish! leaders! fear! Trump! presidency! (The!
Article).!!(Exhibit!A! Thompsons Original Article).
18. In the Article, Thompson pertinently wroteand TDN published,!Of particular note to
some in the Jewish community is the unprecedented support the Trump campaign has received
among white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and its leaders like James Edwards,
David Duke and Thomas Robb, the national director of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in
Arkansas.!!(Emphasis!added.)
19. Defendants stating that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan is a false statement of fact
and not opinion.
20. Defendants stating that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan is a false statement of fact
and not rhetorical hyperbole.
21. Defendants stating that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan is neither true nor
substantially true.

22. Defendants do not enjoy a constitutional right to publish to third-parties with actual malice
the false statement of fact that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
23. It is not a matter of public concern for Defendants to falsely publish to third-parties that
Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
24. Neither Thompson nor TDN contacted Plaintiff before stating as a fact in the Article that
Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan to verify the accuracy of the statement.
25. Prior to the publication of the statement by Defendants on March 17, 2016, that Plaintiff is
a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, no other legal entity or natural person has alleged Plaintiff to have
such involvement in said racist organization.
26. Upon information and belief, prior to the publication of the Article, no third-party relayed
to Defendants that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
27. Defendants had no reason to believe that Plaintiff is a leadermuch less a memberof
the Ku Klux Klan at the time Defendants published the Article.
28. As!of!April!6,!2016,!the!Article!was!liked!897!times!by!Facebook!users,!which!has!widely!
disseminated the Article to third-parties. (Exhibit B Screenshot of Facebook Dissemination).
29. Upon information and belief, tens of thousands of people read The Detroit News!daily!
printed newspaper.
30. Upon information and belief, thousandsif not tens of thousandsof people access The
Detroit News!website.
31. Thompson maintains a publicly accessible profile on <www.Twitter.com> at
<https://twitter.com/bankiet>. As of April 17, 2016, said Twitter profile had seven hundred eight
(708) followers, who receive notice whenever Thompson publishes a post on said Twitter profile.

On March 16, 18, and 21, 2016, Thompson published hyperlinks to the Article so as to encourage
third-parties to read it.
32. On! April! 5,! 2016,! Plaintiffs! attorney! sent! a! demand! for! retraction! to! Defendants! in!
accordance with MCL 600.2911(2)(b). On April 12, 2016, Defendants published on their website
and in their printed newspaper a retraction of their false and defamatory statement of fact that
Plaintiff is!a!leader!of!the!Ku!Klux!Klan:!!Clarification: James Edwards, the Memphis-area host
of the radio show The Political Cesspool has no formal position with the Ku Klux Klan. He has
informed The Detroit News that he believes a March 17 opinion column about his support of the
presidential campaign of Donald Trump left the impression that Edwards served in an official
capacity with the Ku Klux Klan.!!(Emphasis!in!original.)
33. Thompson! never! published! on! Thompsons! Twitter! page! a! retraction! of! the! false! and!
defamatory statement he made about Plaintiff.
34. Defendants retraction of their actionable, false, and derogatory statement of fact about
Plaintiff does not make Plaintiff whole again.
35. Defendants publicly defaming Plaintiffa conservativeby falsely stating that he is a
leader of the Ku Klux Klan is no less actionable than it would be for a conservative to defame a
liberal by falsely alleging that they are a communist. See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F2d 527
(CA 7, 1982), cert den, 459 US 1226 (1983) (jury awarded a liberal person compensatory damages
of $100,000.00 and punitive damages of $300,000.00 against a conservative group for disparaging
the plaintiff as a communist).
36. Due!to!Defendants!tortious!conduct,!Plaintiff!has!and!will!continue!to!suffer!damages!with!
regards!to!Plaintiffs!feelings!and!reputation for being disparaged, embarrassed, and shamed by
Defendants.

37. Due to the wantonly depraved, callous, malicious, and reckless harm committed against
Plaintiff by Defendants, an award of exemplary and punitive damages against Defendants in
Plaintiffs!favor!is!justified.
V. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
DEFAMATION (LIBEL PER SE)
38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if each is fully set forth herein all preceding
paragraphs of this Complaint.
39. Defendants made an unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning Plaintiff; to
wit: Defendants stated that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
40. Defendants published their unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning
Plaintiff to third-parties; to wit: Defendants published in their printed newspaper and on the
website of TDN that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
41. Defendants published their unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning
Plaintiff with actual maliceknowledge that it was false and/or with reckless disregard of whether
or not said statement was false; to wit: Defendants had no reason to believe, did not verify with
Plaintiff or third-party sources, and simply invented for sensational yellow journalism purposes in
order to disparage the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku
Klux Klan.
42. Defendants communication about Plaintiff is inherently defamatory; to wit: Defendants
alleging!that!Plaintiff!is!a!leader!of!the!Ku!Klux!Klan!tends!to!so!harm!Plaintiffs!reputation!that!it!
lowers!Plaintiffs!reputation!in!the!community!or!deters!others!from!associating!or dealing with
Plaintiff insofar as said statement holds the Plaintiff up to hatred, scorn, contempt, and/or ridicule.

43. Defendants!act!of!publishing!the!false!and!defamatory!statement!that!Plaintiff!is!a!leader!
of the Ku Klux Klan has directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries.
44. Defendants committed against Plaintiff the tort of common law libel per se.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court will (1) enter!judgment!in!Plaintiffs!favor!
against Defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount that exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000.00) for general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages, (2) award Plaintiff costs and
reasonable!attorneys!fees!Plaintiff!incurred!to!bring!forth!and!litigate!the!instant!civil!action,!(3)!
award Plaintiff statutory interest on any money judgment rendered by the Court pursuant to MCL
600.6013, and (4) award any other relief as is warranted by law or equity.
COUNT II
DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION (LIBEL PER SE)
45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if each is fully set forth herein all preceding
paragraphs of this Complaint.
46. Defendants made an unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning Plaintiff; to
wit: Defendants stated that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
47. Defendants published their unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning
Plaintiff to third-parties; to wit: Defendants published in their printed newspaper and on the
website of TDN that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
48. Defendants published their unprivileged, false, and defamatory statement concerning
Plaintiff with actual maliceknowledge that it was false and/or with reckless disregard of whether
or not said statement was false; to wit: Defendants had no reason to believe, did not verify with
Plaintiff or third-party sources, and simply invented for sensational yellow journalism purposes in
order to disparage the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku
Klux Klan.
8

49. Defendants communication about Plaintiff is implicitly and inherently defamatory; to wit:
by alleging that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, Defendants imply that Plaintiff either
approves of and/or is involved with racist terroristic acts committed by said organization, such as
kidnappings, beatings, bombings, murders, and other heinous crimes, and this implication tends to
so!harm!Plaintiffs!reputation!that!it!lowers!Plaintiffs!reputation!in!the!community!or!deters!others!
from associating or dealing with Plaintiff insofar as said implication holds the Plaintiff up to hatred,
scorn, contempt, and/or ridicule.
50. Defendants!act!of!publishing!the!false!and!defamatory!statement!that!Plaintiff!is!a!leader!
of the Ku Klux Klan has directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries.
51. Defendants committed against Plaintiff the tort of common law defamation by implication
(libel per se).
WHEREFORE,!Plaintiff!prays!that!this!Court!will!(1)!enter!judgment!in!Plaintiffs!favor!
against Defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount that exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000.00) for general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages, (2) award Plaintiff costs and
reasonable!attorneys!fees!Plaintiff!incurred!to!bring!forth!and!litigate!the!instant!civil!action,!(3)!
award Plaintiff statutory interest on any money judgment rendered by the Court pursuant to MCL
600.6013, and (4) award any other relief as is warranted by law or equity.
COUNT III
INVASION OF PRIVACY (FALSE LIGHT)
52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if each is fully set forth herein all preceding
paragraphs of this Complaint.
53. Defendants broadcast to the public in general a communication about Plaintiff; to wit:
Defendants published on their website and in their printed newspaper that Plaintiff is a leader of
the Ku Klux Klan.
9

54. The communication Defendants broadcast to the public about Plaintiff placed Plaintiff in
a light which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; to wit: the reasonable person
would be highly offended to be alleged to be a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
55. The communication Defendants broadcast to the public about Plaintiff was false; to wit:
Plaintiff is not now, nor has Plaintiff ever been, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
56. Defendants published their statement which placed Plaintiff in a false light with actual
maliceknowledge that it was false and/or with reckless disregard of whether or not said
statement was false; to wit: Defendants had no reason to believe, did not verify with Plaintiff
or third-party sources, and simply invented for sensational yellow journalism purposes in order to
disparage the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump that Plaintiff is a leader of the Ku Klux
Klan.
57. Defendants!act!of!placing!Plaintiff!in!a!false!light!by!alleging!that!Plaintiff!is!a!leader!of!
the Ku Klux Klan has directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries.
58. Defendants committed against Plaintiff the tort of common law invasion of privacy (false
light).
WHEREFORE,!Plaintiff!prays!that!this!Court!will!(1)!enter!judgment!in!Plaintiffs!favor!
against Defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount that exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000.00) for general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages, (2) award Plaintiff costs and
reasonable!attorneys!fees!Plaintiff!incurred!to!bring!forth!and!litigate!the!instant!civil!action,!(3)!
award Plaintiff statutory interest on any money judgment rendered by the Court pursuant to MCL
600.6013, and (4) award any other relief as is warranted by law or equity.

10

Respectfully submitted,
BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

/s/ Kyle James Bristow

Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
(W): www.KyleBristow.com
Attorney for James Edwards
Dated: April 18, 2016

11

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Pursuant to MCR 2.508(B)(1), Plaintiff hereby respectfully demands a trial by jury as to
all triable issues of fact in the instant civil action.
Respectfully submitted,
BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

/s/ Kyle James Bristow

Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
(W): www.KyleBristow.com
Attorney for James Edwards
Dated: April 18, 2016

12

VERIFICATION
I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and
belief. MCR 2.114(B)(2)(b).
/s/ James Edwards
James Edwards
Plaintiff
Dated: April 18, 2016

13

EXHIBIT A
Thompsons Original Article

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EXHIBIT B
Screenshot of Facebook Dissemination

EXHIBIT B
Affidavit of James Edwards

EXHIBIT C
Roots v Montana Human Rights Network,
275 Mont 408; 913 P2d 638 (1996)

275 Mont. 408 (Mont. 1996), 95-490, Roots v. Montana Human Rights Network
Page 408
275 Mont. 408 (Mont. 1996)
913 P.2d 638
Roger ROOTS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
The MONTANA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 95-490.
Supreme Court of Montana.
March 21, 1996
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 15, 1996.
[913 P.2d 639]
Page 409
Appeal from the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of
Yellowstone; The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.
Page 410
Roger Roots, Billings, pro se.
Calvin J. Stacey, Stacey & Walen, Billings, John G. Crist, Dorsey & Whitney, Billings, for
Respondent.
TURNAGE, Chief Justice.
Roger Roots filed a complaint in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County,
alleging that the Montana Human Rights Network (MHRN) defamed him by publishing a booklet in
which it described him as an organizer for the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The court granted summary
judgment for MHRN. We vacate and remand.
The issue is whether summary judgment was proper.
MHRN is a private nonprofit Montana corporation. In May 1994, it published a booklet entitled
A Season of Discontent, in which it described Roots as "Roger Roots, Billings Ku Klux Klan
organizer."
A month later, Roots brought this action for defamation and "invasion of privacy/malicious
harassment/creation of a climate of fear." He originally named four defendants. By the time of the
ruling herein appealed, the action had been narrowed to a libel case against MHRN.
The District Court described Roots as a man who
has become well known by the general public as an ultra right-wing political activist. [He] authored
a publication entitled Whites and Blacks 100 Facts (and One Lie), which is advertised for sale
nationally. The publication lists "facts" about African-Americans, such as: blacks have low I.Q.'s
due to small foreheads; they have never invented anything; and they are more likely to have
syphilis than whites. [Roots] is a columnist in the Jubilee, wherein one of his columns states that
the Holocaust was a hoax.
[Roots] has been the subject of numerous news reports by a local television station and a
newspaper concerning his right-wing beliefs and criminal record. [He] has been convicted of felony
possession of an illegal firearm and misdemeanor resisting arrest. [He] was a member and

president of the Young Republicans at Eastern Montana College and was the subject of numerous
articles which appeared in the college's newspaper during 1993 and 1994. [He] supported people
who are openly members of the KKK and attended several meetings held by the Montana militia.
[He] filed
Page 411
for a state senate seat but did not qualify as a candidate because of his felony conviction.
The District Court ruled that Roots is a public figure for limited purposes. It concluded,
therefore, that to succeed in this [913 P.2d 640] action, he must prove not only the falsity of the
statement that he was an organizer for the KKK, but also, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the MHRN acted with malice in publishing the statement.
The court ruled that Roots had not met his burden of showing that the statement was false or
that MHRN acted with malice. It granted summary judgment for MHRN.
Was summary judgment proper?
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and any affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. This Court
reviews a summary judgment decision under the same standard as that used by the district court
in making the decision. Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214.
Roots accuses MHRN of defaming him by naming him as a KKK organizer in its booklet A
Season of Discontent. Defamation is defined as either libel or slander. Section 27-1-801, MCA.
Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing which exposes a person to hatred,
contempt, ridicule or obloquy; causes the person to be shunned or avoided; or tends to injure the
person's occupation. Section 27-1-802, MCA.
The right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution places
limits on the application of state defamation laws. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376
U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. A public figure cannot recover damages upon a claim for
defamation without a showing of actual malice. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26.
This standard also applies to limited purpose public figures, or persons who have voluntarily
injected themselves or are drawn into a particular public controversy and become a public figure
for a limited range of issues. See, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct.
2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789.
In this case, the District Court ruled as a matter of law that Roots was a public figure for
limited purposes
because he ran for public office, was the president of the Young Republicans, published a
controversial book, and appeared as a
Page 412
regular columnist in the Jubilee and as the subject of numerous newspaper and television reports.
Our review of the record convinces us that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether Roots became a public figure for a limited purpose or remained a private figure involved
in matters of public concern.
The First Amendment protects statements of opinion on matters of public concern where they

do not contain a provable false factual connotation or where they cannot reasonably be interpreted
as stating actual facts about an individual. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990), 497 U.S. 1, 1820, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 17-18. The statement that Roots is an organizer for
the KKK contains a factual connotation which may be proven false. The statement can also be
reasonably interpreted as stating an actual fact about Roots. We conclude, as did the District
Court by implication, that the First Amendment does not shield MHRN from this action.
The District Court relied upon Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986), 475 U.S. 767,
106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783, for the rule that the plaintiff in a defamation action concerning a
matter of public concern has the burden of proving the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.
In cases in which the fact finding process is unable to conclusively resolve whether the statement
is true or false, the plaintiff's action must fail. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776, 106 S.Ct. at 1563.
When summary judgment was entered in the present case, though, the fact finding process
had not yet been completed. While discovery had been conducted, trial had not yet been held. We
conclude that the District Court's reliance upon Hepps was misplaced.
As the party moving for summary judgment, MHRN bore the burden of establishing the
absence of genuine issues of material [913 P.2d 641] fact. Matter of Estate of Lien (1995), 270
Mont. 295, 298, 892 P.2d 530, 532. The facts MHRN adduced in support of its statement that
Roots was a KKK organizer establish that Roots shared viewpoints with the KKK. They do not
necessarily establish that he was an organizer for the KKK. Any factual inferences which can be
drawn must be resolved in favor of Roots, the nonmoving party. Lien, 892 P.2d at 532.
Roots filed affidavits in which he denied having ever organized meetings or rallies or
distributed literature for the KKK, and stated that he had "never ordered, requested, or urged any
human being to join the Ku Klux Klan [or] ... support the Ku Klux Klan." He also filed an affidavit by
his friend John Abarr, who stated:
Page 413
That I am a member of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, National Office in Harrison, Arkansas....
That Roger Roots has resisted all attempts by me to get him to join the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan.
While the affidavits filed by Roots do not definitively disprove that he is an organizer for the
KKK, they demonstrate an issue of fact as to the truth or falsity of the statement.
Because the record discloses genuine issues of material fact as to whether Roots is a public
figure for limited purposes and as to the truth or falsity of MHRN's description of him as an
organizer for the KKK, we hold that entry of summary judgment for MHRN was improper. The
judgment for MHRN is therefore vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GRAY, TRIEWEILER, LEAPHART and ERDMANN, JJ., concur.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT FOR WAYNE COUNTY
CIVIL DIVISION
JAMES EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE DETROIT NEWS, INC.,
and
BANKOLE THOMPSON,
Defendants.

BRISTOW LAW, PLLC

By: Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
Attorney for James Edwards

 Case No. 16-004874-NO


 Hon. Kathleen Macdonald











HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ AND
COHN, LLP
James E. Stewart (P23254)
Leonard M. Niehoff (P36695)
Andrew M. Pauwels (P79167)
315 E. Eisenhower Pkwy., Ste. 100
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
(P): (734) 418-4256
(F): (734) 418-4257
(E): jstewart@honigman.com
(E): lniehoff@honigman.com
(E): apauwels@honigman.com
Attorneys for The Detroit News, Inc., and Bankole
Thompson

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Kyle James Bristow, affirm that I am an attorney of record for a party to the abovecaptioned civil action and that on May 26, 2016, I served a true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs
Brief in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition upon James Stewart
(<jstewart@honigman.com>), Leonard M. Niehoff (<lniehoff@honigman.com>), and Andrew M.

Pauwels (<apauwels@honigman.com>) by submitting the same to the Courts Electronic Filing

System and requesting electronic service thereof upon said attorneys.

/s/ Kyle James Bristow

Kyle James Bristow (P77200)
P.O. Box 381164
Clinton Twp., MI 48038
(P): (248) 838-9934
(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com
Attorney for James Edwards
Dated: May 26, 2016