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Wireless Networks

Dependability in
Wireless Networks
Can We Rely on WiFi?
WiFis dependability requirements are growing as its usage
spreads to public hotspots and personal home networks.
Authentication and confidentiality are crucial issues for
corporate WiFi use, but privacy and availability tend to
dominate

pervasive

usage.

This

article

discusses

dependability and its impact on WiFi usage scenarios.


iFishort for wireless fidelityis the
commercial name for the 802.11 products
that have flooded the corporate wireless
local area network (WLAN) market and are
becoming rapidly ingrained in our daily lives via public
hotspots and digital home networks. However, because
a technologys dependability requirements are proportional to its pervasiveness, newer applications mandate a
deeper understanding of how much we can rely on WiFi
and its security promises. So far, WiFi hasnt had the best
track record: researchers and hackers easily defeated its
first security mechanism, Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP).1 Although the 802.11i standard (which is also
known by its commercial name, WPA2) addresses this
failure and the larger issues of confidentiality and authentication,2 no ongoing standardization effort handles
WiFi availability, and problems with robustness mean
that a successful attack can block a network and its services, at least for the attacks duration. Another oft-neglected aspect of 802.11 networks is privacynot
payload confidentiality but node activity monitoring.
This kind of monitoring has value on its own (for example, for contrasting user identification and location), but
it also has a strong link to dependability in attacks targeted at a specific node.
To our knowledge, no current practical or theoretical framework handles WiFi dependability issues.
Moreover, no previous work has analyzed WiFi security from this viewpoint. Most research examines WiFi
confidentiality and authentication by explaining the
problems related to native 802.11 security (WEP and
shared-key authentication) and showing how inadequate such mechanisms are. The same effort hasnt been

PUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY

put into analyzing a wireless networks availability and robustness: in


fact, many denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against
WLANs are known, but so far only one research effort
describes the actual implementation of two DoS attacks
and possible countermeasures.3
In this article, we present an overview of WiFi vulnerabilities and investigate their proximate and ultimate
origins. The intended goal is to provide a foundation to
discuss WiFi dependability and its impact on current and
future usage scenarios. Although a wireless networks
overall security depends on the network stack to the application layer, this article focuses on specific vulnerabilities at the physical (PHY) and data (MAC) layers of
802.11 networks.

MARCO
DOMENICO
AIME, G IORGIO
CALANDRIELLO,
AND ANTONIO
LIOY
Politecnico di
Torino

The PHY layer


WiFi uses a single narrow-band radio channel on a public frequency. Radio communications are typically multiplexed and based on some combination of space,
frequency, time, and codingWiFi exploits the first
three. The available power range in WiFi devices allows
for cells with an average radius of less than 100 meters
(the exact value depends heavily on obstacles and antenna
directionality, ranging from hundreds of meters with
radio bridges to a few meters in closed rooms). Generally,
WiFi uses a limited pool of narrow-band frequencies on
unlicensed bands at 2.4 and 5 GHz.
Current WiFi networks rely on two different basic
coding techniques: the Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
(DSSS), which 11b and 11g devices use, and Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), which 11a
and 11g devices use. Nodes on the same frequency share a
1540-7993/07/$25.00 2007 IEEE

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY

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Wireless Networks

single channel, which the 802.11 MAC layer serializes


through random access and contention mechanisms.
These characteristics allow for several attacks, which well
discuss in more detail in the following subsections.

We must therefore accept that


interception is easy, especially
because radio coverage area cant
be delimited precisely.
Interception
Its not surprising that an attacker can intercept a radio
communication, but the threats relevance clearly depends
on the nature of the leaked information. Most cryptographic protocols address content eavesdropping but pay
little attention to privacy issues. The 802.11 standard
never uses mechanisms for preventing traffic analysis, so
its fairly easy to infer the number of talking nodes, their
identities (that is, some long-living identifier for each of
them), and whos talking to whom. This lets an attacker
violate user privacy, so we want to hide as much information as possibletaken to the extreme, we even want to
conceal an ongoing communications existence.
Content eavesdropping is still an issue if cryptographic
protocols arent used properly. Of course, the prologue of
any content-eavesdropping attack is channel selection.
Unfortunately, the limited number of channels and frequencies in WiFi devices make this step trivialmoreover, any 802.11 device has built-in capabilities to scan
and report activity on all available channels.
The 802.11 specification originally included a lowrate (1 to 2 Mbps) PHY layer that used a frequencyhopping transmission technique. Frequency-hopping
could make interception harder, but 802.11 designed it
for avoiding interferences only. It used 79 channels and a
set of 78 possible hopping sequences; the access point
(AP) broadcasts the hopping sequence and the dwell
time. Keeping the hopping information hidden makes
channel selection harder for casual attackers, but given a
limited number of channels and a static sequence, they
could easily recover the hidden sequence.
In general, todays narrow-band radio technologies
cant hide communication. Their spectral efficiency is
too low to support a sufficiently large number of highbit-rate channels over available bands, and its easy to scan
a small number of possible channels for ongoing communications. We must therefore accept that interception is
easy, especially because radio coverage area cant be delimited precisely. Physical anti-interception techniques
arent fit for common WiFi usage scenarios, so mechanisms at the MAC layer or above must prevent informa24

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tion leakage, from content eavesdropping to identity


tracking and traffic analysis.

Injection
Radio transmission, as well as reception, cant be confined
in a restricted area, so WiFi relies on logical access control
mechanisms for authorized access. However, this heavily
limits the validity of well-established security tools such as
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems, so authorized traffic is instead validated as it flows over the
wireless link (the security perimeter is now spread across
every network link). In practice, though, this activity constrains the upper network layers in their attempt to provide specific security mechanisms. As a solution, the
MAC level could provide data source authentication for
every transmitted frame by identifying the source as a specific node or as a member of a trusted group.

Jamming
Radio communications are subject to jamming, which is
cheap and easy to do in a narrow-band channel such as the
one WiFi devices occupy. Jamming can make corporate
WLANs unavailable, which is certainly annoying, or even
block a residential phone network or hospital medical infrastructure, which is much scarier. The WiFi nodes
themselves can easily detect a jam because each station already monitors channel quality for AP and bit-rate selection, but locating the actual attacker is a different story.
WiFi sails on unlicensed industrial, scientific, and
medical (ISM) bandsin these bands, networks of devices subject to independent authorities can coexist in
the same area and share the same communication channel. The WiFi MAC layer handles overlapping cells, but
doesnt guarantee fairness in the presence of dishonest
nodes. Even worse, transmissions are vulnerable to interference by any technology that exploits popular ISM
bands, from Bluetooth devices to microwave ovens.

Locating mobile nodes


Wandering through a wireless world, an attacker can easily track MAC addresses and build a database that lists
wireless nodes, their locations, and their movements,
even for wearable devices such as PDAs. Although a
wireless nodes exact position might be hard to get, its
much easier to detect its presence in a large area. If the device is a personal one, this could even help someone track
the device owners locationfor example, a burglar
could discover when a target property is empty while
staying comfortably outside its perimeter and without
performing a physical examination.
No effective solution exists yet for localizing wireless
intruders, even in networks of moderate dimension. Although some recent commercial products can coordinate
APs to detect and point out naive static attackers (such as
unauthorized APs), the radio medium is intrinsically

Wireless Networks

hard to map, and intruders typically arent collaborative


(they can individually spoof, move, change transmission
power, use directional antennas, exploit multiple coordinated probes, and so on without any help).

is twofold: power-conservation features and their protection become vital, and any security mechanism must be
carefully evaluated against its energy cost.

Access control

Although it inherits the underlying PHY layers insecurity, the 802.11 MAC layer adds some peculiar weaknesses of its own. Its dangerous features are that it
implements a shared channel, can have a star or mesh
topology, and must synchronize among different parties,
making it much more complex than Ethernet. These
three broad categories leave the network open to several
different vulnerabilities.

To control access, the network must classify wireless


nodes into trusted and untrusted sets and update them in
real time. Nodes fast and long-range mobility makes
radio network topology highly dynamic: both the set of
nodes forming the network and their connectivity can
change rapidly over time. To allow for quick topology
change, the network must implement and carefully secure two basic network functionsneighbor discovery
and node associationbut, perhaps not surprisingly,
some past and present security flaws in WiFi are related
to discovery and association mechanisms. The problem
lies not in selecting a suitable authentication mechanism
but in enrolling and managing proper credentials. Current authentication infrastructures for wired networks
arent designed to match tight cost and usability constraints, but these two factors might be even more important than the overall security level in WiFi usage
outside of LANs.

Hijacking
Man-in-the-middle attacks are a traditional threat
against access control solutions. Although its easy for attackers to intercept wireless traffic and inject an attack, it
isnt trivial to hijack a wireless channel. The attacker
must ensure that the two victims cant talk directly, thus
the targets must either lie outside each others radio
range or be desynchronized. An attacker can try to jam
the receiver while still being able to access the transmitted trafficfor example, by using directional antennas
or a set of two probes near the sender and the receiver
(attackers can always use a coalition of nodes that utilize
a different unmonitored frequency to cooperate). Alternatively, the attacker can force the two targets over to
two distinct frequencies and continue to relay traffic between themdoing so makes it easy for the attacker to
manipulate them. Such threats are avoidable only by including spatial and frequency information in the victims
authentication mechanisms. Although secure distance
verification is an active research topic,4 WiFi authentication ignores this problem because it doesnt convey any
spatial or frequency information. This still holds for the
802.11i standard.

The MAC layer

Shared channel
When many nodes use the same channel, their traffic
must be distinguishableaccordingly, 802.11 networks
use a MAC address as a static station identifier. But even if
communication is encrypted, the header must remain in
the clear for delivery reasons, which makes statistical traffic analysisand identity trackingfeasible.
A shared channel also implies a shared bandwidth,
thus transmission speed lowers if several nodes use it simultaneously. It might seem that limiting the number of
users per cell would guarantee an adequate bandwidth
per node, but this doesnt really work because the 802.11
MAC layer allows the coexistence of many independent
cells on the same physical channel, each with its own
nodes. The 802.11e standard deals with providing quality
of service over WiFi networks via traffic prioritization
mechanisms, but these mechanisms rely fully on the existing MAC layer, its rules, and, more important, its vulnerabilities. As such, the proposed quality-of-service
mechanisms dont enforce availability.
Additionally, the WiFi medium has strict access
rules because its shared, and the 802.11 MAC layer
works properly only when the nodes observe specific
access rules (such as timing, physical and virtual channel sensing, and back-off times). Unfortunately, its
easy to violate these rules and cause network malfunctions because many off-the-shelf devices ship with spe-

Although its easy for attackers to


intercept wireless traffic and inject
an attack, it isnt trivial to hijack a

Energy

wireless channel.

Batteries are a key enabling factor for mobility in radio


networks, but a limited energy supply can easily become
a perfect target for availability attacks. Although breakthroughs in energy production technology will hopefully
mitigate this problem, the short-term impact on security

cial test modes thatif turned onlet the user access


the WiFi medium without respecting timing constraints. We describe our experience with a continuous
transmission mode in 802.11b cards later, but a differwww.computer.org/security/

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY

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Wireless Networks

ent strategy is to set a high noise threshold so that the


channel is perceived to be free regardless of other
nodes activity: in both cases, the device transmits and
violates access rules. This trick can easily defeat the

the AP acts as a gateway toward a well-established security infrastructure, whereas the native 802.11 ad hoc
mode relies only on a static shared secret.

Synchronization

Anything thats simple in a wired


environment must be emulated with
special frames in the wireless world.
clear channel assessment function of the DSSS-based
802.11b standard (researchers have shown the DSSS
physical layer to be particularly sensitive to access violations5), but we can also apply the general concept to
OFDM-based 802.11a. Customization of a devices
firmware can fully subvert the MAC layers rulesunfortunately, programmable MAC and radio layers are
already used in research activity.
The 802.11 standard also uses a logical mechanism to
assess if the channel is free or busy; it implements this
mechanism with every frame of the protocol, and includes a duration field that indicates channel occupation
time in microseconds. This field implements a virtual
channel-sensing mechanism that can cope with signal
collisions from hidden terminals. Unfortunately, cryptographic mechanisms cant protect such information
cheaply due to its broadcast nature. This situation opens
up a new vulnerability because an attacker can mangle
the duration field and fool a station into believing that the
channel is busy when its actually free (more information
about this and other attacks appears elsewhere3,6).

Topology
We can set up WLANs in two different modes corresponding to two distinct network topologies: the infrastructure mode, in which an AP centrally coordinates the
network, which in turn assumes a virtual star topology,
and the ad hoc mode, which has no centralized coordination and a mesh topology.
In the infrastructure mode, the AP is the single required element in the network: if the AP falls, the whole
network is blocked. Recent commercial solutions mitigate this single point of failure through fault-tolerance
mechanisms. APs can increase their transmission power
and cover a broader area after discovering a neighbor AP
has vanished. A straightforward attack against an AP consists of flooding it with false authentication requests to
exhaust its buffers and make it refuse any other legitimate
access to the network. This drawback is balanced by the
fact that a network with centralized coordination is easier
to manage from a security standpoint than a fully distributed one. Networks in the infrastructure mode, for example, can benefit from 802.1X authentication because
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Anything thats simple in a wired environment (such as


network cables plugged into wall sockets) must be emulated with special frames in the wireless world, which can
lead to problems when synchronizing state transitions between two or more entities (such as client and AP, or two
peers in an ad hoc network). As in any system in which
two or more parties must remain synchronized to work, a
successful desynchronization forced by an attacker leads
to a system malfunction. This problem is especially acute
for WiFi network features such as authentication and association, power saving, and level 2 cryptography.
Authentication and association. WiFi provides associ-

ation and authentication mechanisms to distinguish


among unauthorized nodes. The first attempt at implementing it included a basic MAC-layer authentication
that exploited special frames and could either be null or a
WEP-based challenge response. Because WEP was so
easy to defeat, a new security layer was added but isnt
compulsory. After the basic open authentication, it performs the real authentication and uses normal data frames
(like any other application).
As straightforward as they seem, these solutions are
flawed because the mechanisms lack protection: the open
authentication doesnt include any security, whereas
WEP performs only client authentication (the AP
doesnt authenticate itself to the client), paving the way to
man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, the logout
mechanism isnt protected, thus allowing DoS attacks.
Moreover, the deauthentication frame isnt, in fact, authenticated, not even with the extra extensions in the
802.11i standard, so its easy to attack the network with
packet-injection techniques.3
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP; RFC
2284) suffers from similar vulnerabilities and had to be
fixed for WiFi usage: only EAP methods that provide
mutual authentication are allowed (thus we can use EAPTLS but not EAP-MD5), and a further exchange (the
four-way handshake) was added to prove authenticity of
the AP when separated from the authentication server.
As a result, our robust security network lacks robustness: the EAP logout mechanism (the EAP-Logoff
frame) is unprotected, and successful desynchronization
of the basic 802.11 authentication also clears EAP authentication. Depending on the actual EAP method, the
authentication process can take up to 12 times longer
than the basic 802.11 open authentication.
Power-saving capabilities. When a station is about to
go into power-saving mode, it first synchronizes with

Wireless Networks

other parties (stations or APs) to buffer its traffic. To break


this synchronization, an attacker can induce any state
transition triggered by an unprotected event. The powersaving mechanism is thus vulnerable to attacks such as
traffic stealing (an attacker claims another stations traffic),
artificial delay (traffic for the target is buffered even if the
station isnt in power-saving mode, which is especially
dangerous for time-critical traffic such as multimedia
streams), and sleep deprivation (preventing a station
from going into power-save mode by continuously sending traffic to it). In our experience, the 802.11 MAC
layer is quite effective at limiting sleep deprivation: a station cant be forced to violate its power-conservation policy. The impact of other attacks depends on the type of
traffic the target station exchanges.3
Cryptography at level 2. We arent concerned here
with classic cryptographic vulnerabilities, such as
those found in WEPrather, weve found that even
unbreakable cryptographic mechanisms offer a vulnerable side because they might require computational and energy resources that are quite large for
small and mobile devices. The Temporary Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), the patch the 802.11i
standard provided for WEPs weaknesses, adopts simple algorithms to match available computing power.2
Because this also creates a weakness, TKIP employs
countermeasures if it suspects an attack: the attacks
targets must stop exchanging traffic, shut down any
existing security association, and re-establish new
ones. However, these countermeasures could also become a DoS mechanismdoing so ultimately
depends on how easy it is to mount a man-in-themiddle attack.
Eliminating or limiting cryptography doesnt necessarily yield a better global power budget because the energy that cryptography requires is just a fraction of that
used for radio communication.7 The energy related to
wireless activity is accounted for not only in the WLAN
card itself but also in the rest of the platform (mainly the
CPU and I/O bus). The processing of an incoming
packet requires both the CPU and I/O bus for power,
but if a packet is discarded, only the WiFi device requires full power. Thus, discarding invalid incoming
packets as soon as possible is vital for mitigating a flooding attacks impact. Because packet verification occurs
after packet acknowledgment, an attacker can always
make the WiFi device turn on its own transmission circuitry. However, this exposure is negligible due to the
ACK frames shortness and the comparable power consumption of WiFi-receiving and transmitting modes.
This choice avoids imposing hard timing constraints on
cryptographic operations and allows software implementations in the driver besides the hardware ones on
the card.

Upper levels
Applications that deal with personal information are
extremely vulnerable to data capture and disclosure.
At first glance, home banking might seem to be the
most sensitive application, but most banks provide secure access through their SSL channels. The real issue
here is privacymost services typically arent protected in the network stacks upper layers and carry information that attackers can use to profile and track
potential victims.
Vulnerabilities typically narrow the available bandwidth, and a narrow channel incurs delays that can hurt
real-time servicesas noted earlier, multimedia streams
in particular are very sensitive to delays in packet delivery
because they directly affect quality of service. A possible
defense could be to make upper-level protocols able to
handle the radio links unavailability. This is a key research
field in networking,8 and the typical goal is to distinguish
between congestion and unavailability due to the radio
mediums coarse and variable nature.

Lab experience
The analysis weve presented so far raises a key question:
how real are the threats weve outlined? To answer that
question, we built some attack tools that exploit a few of
the vulnerabilities discussed here and tested them against
a small WiFi network in our labs. Every test had three key
objectives: to understand whether the attack could really
be implemented from commercial off-the-shelf components, to determine the actual effects on WiFi activity,
and to figure out how to isolate the attack with an intrusion detection module.
All the attacks we tested use off-the-shelf hardware
and open source device drivers, and are fairly easy to do.
We needed a bit of expertise to design them, but we believe anyone with adequate knowledge of Linux and
wireless networks can use them effectively. Under some
attack conditions, the target network was completely
blocked for the tests whole duration. A packet capture
engine could detect almost all the attacks, and all of them
introduced various anomalies in network behavior.

All the attacks we tested use


off-the-shelf hardware and open
source device drivers, and are fairly
easy to do.
Deauthentication and EAP-Logoff
We implemented our attacks via the libwlan open source
packet injection library and gradually raised the injection
rate of spoofed frames. The network was blocked at a rate
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of one spoofed frame every second for the deauthentication attack and every two seconds for the EAP-Logoff attack. The re-authentication time was approximately 35
ms for 802.11 open authentication and grew 12 times for

Clearly, location verification must


also be secured, but node location
with the current 802.11 technology
is a complex problem.
the EAP-TLS authentication method. The observed
anomalies were a high number of deauthentication/
EAP-Logoff frames followed by a new authentication/
EAP-Start sequence.

MAC-level jamming
Our version of the jamming attack consisted of a special test mode already available in the devices we used,
which gave us continuous transmission regardless of
MAC-level access rules. This caused constant collisions
with every other station in the cell, which was then totally blocked. Because colliding stations back off and
dont transmit for some time, we didnt need to perform full-time jammingwe only had to send small
bursts of noise. Our tests showed that a 10 percent jamming period was enough to halt transmission in a cell,
and as a side effect, most of the devices cleared their association information after missing a small number of
beacon frames from the AP. The jamming effect
spanned across three adjacent WiFi channels, but this
attack didnt require packet injection techniques and
thus was hardly detectable with a network-layer intrusion detection system.

Multimedia performance
By forging the appropriate frame (for example, an
empty data frame with the power management bit set),
we could make AP believe that the victim was in
power-save mode so that it could start buffering traffic
for it. This caused delays in traffic delivery, which especially hurt our real-time trafficin fact, we could stop a
Real-Time Protocol (RTP) flow with this attack. Of
course, the victims precise behavior depends on the
power-save modes device driver implementation. But
some drivers always react upon receipt of the traffic information map (TIM; its part of every beacon frame
and announces the presence of buffered traffic) and tell
the AP that theyre not in power-save mode, thus mitigating the attacks effects. Other drivers ignore the TIM
if the station isnt in power-save mode and thus suffer
the attacks whole effects.
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hus far, weve made it clear that WiFi isnt ready for
critical applications, mainly because of its intrinsic
robustness problems. But next-generation wireless networks need modern security features, and WiFi will have
to provide extensions and changes to maintain its supremacy among the various wireless data technologies.
Jamming attacks have so far gone unstopped, and their
effects are devastating. Researchers have suggested various approaches to thwarting them,9 but a recent approach to detecting them is to monitor the channel and
share what each node sees, to create a global view of
the network.10 The idea is to detect the jam via node cooperation because a single node cant distinguish jamming from channel saturation. Any approach that
improves wireless networks anonymity could also help
with robustness: the traffic related to a specific node
would be more difficult to select and jam.10,11
At the physical level, a new radio technology that can
greatly help with robustness problems is ultra wide band
(UWB).12 Despite some standardization delays, its expected to hit the mass market soon as a radio layer of the
USB wireless extension. UWB could potentially exploit
its extreme large bandwidth to hide communication
channels by coding or frequency hopping, which makes
interception harder and jamming at least more manifest.
Unfortunately, current UWB standardization efforts for
wireless personal area networks are heading toward a
fully shared MAC layer, which removes any formerly
available potential benefits. Nevertheless, UWB still offers a key security property: it supports fine-grain location of transmitting nodes. In general, knowledge of
exact locations can help prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, and inconsistencies between a nodes actual position and the one the peer perceives can point out the
presence of an attacker in the middle. Clearly, location
verification must also be secured, but node location with
the current 802.11 technology is a complex problem.13
In corporate environments, some proprietary commercial solutions for attacker location are available, but
theyre based on the coordination of several homogeneous, centrally managed APs.
The main research issue is how to design a robust secure wireless channel, but this field lacks both theoretical
and practical literature. The general problem here is how
to identify and reject fake events at the MAC level. In
some cases (such as with man-in-the-middle attacks),
the MAC layer can quickly identify malicious events by
making security mechanisms aware of specific wireless
information, such as frequency, location, or distance. We
can easily extend some 802.11 frames (notably, the ones
for cell advertisement, node authentication, and association) to carry additional pieces of information. We can
address other vulnerabilities, such as the deauthentication attack, with short-term fixesfor example, a
spoofed deauthentication frame can be detected (and

Wireless Networks

discarded) by waiting for further traffic from the victim.


We can extend the same trick to mitigate similar vulnerabilities in EAP.
When trying to generalize the approach to detecting
fake MAC-level events, the natural direction is to extend
classic intrusion detection techniques for typical wireless
mechanisms.14 In general, anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques are the most likely to be widely applied to wireless networks because they can detect new
and previously unknown attacks. Anomaly detection is
especially important in wireless networks because theyre
used with mobile nodes and in many different scenarios
that have different security policies. Anomaly detection
typically uses data-mining techniques and requires cooperation among all the nodes in the network, especially for
traffic monitoring and event correlation.15 However,
data mining isnt needed when an attacks characteristics
are well knownits easy to detect the desynchronization attack, for example, by looking at some statistical
property of the resulting traffic.
Naturally, we advocate more research that ultimately
builds robust and opaque wireless channelssuch features will help WiFi become a fundamental building
block for critical applications. Research is ongoing in the
use of WiFi technology in industrial environments.16

Acknowledgments
The work described in this article is part of the activities performed at the
e-security joint lab between the Politecnico di Torino and the Istituto
Superiore Mario Boella. We especially thank Daniele Mazzocchi for
his many useful discussions on wireless network security.

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Marco Domenico Aime is a research assistant of computer engineering at the Politecnico di Torino. His research interests include
wireless network security, trusted computing, and dependability analysis of large systems. Aime has an M.Sc. and a PhD in
computer engineering from Politecnico di Torino. He is a
member of the IEEE and the ACM. Contact him at marco
domenico.aime@polito.it.
Giorgio Calandriello has an M.Sc. in computer engineering
and is a PhD student in the same field at the Politecnico di
Torino. He started working on wireless security with his masters thesis, exploring the issues of dependability and denial-ofservice attacks. Contact him at giorgio.calandriello@polito.it.
Antonio Lioy is a professor at the Politecnico di Torino, where
he leads a research group active in information systems security.
His research interests are in the fields of network security, PKI,
and policy-based system protection. Lioy has an MSc in electronic engineering and a PhD in computer engineering. He is a
member of the IEEE and the IEEE Computer Society. Contact him
at lioy@polito.it.
www.computer.org/security/

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY

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