1

RICHARD I. FINE
Prisoner ID # 1824367
2 c/o Men’s Central Jail
3 441 Bauchet Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
7

8
RICHARD I. FINE, Case No. CV-10-0048 JFW (CW)
9
Plaintiff,
10 OPPOSITION TO CALIFORNIA
11 vs. SUPREME COURT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
12

13
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
14 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;
15 SCOTT DREXEL, Chief Trial Counsel
of the State Bar of California; and THE Date: June 1, 2010
16
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Time: 10:00 AM
17 (only as a necessary party); Place: Courtroom 640
18
Defendants. 255 E. Temple Street,
Los Angeles, CA 90012
19

20 I. The Supreme Court’s Motion to Dismiss is frivolous and must be

21 stricken.
22
A. Fraud on the court is the exception to Rooker – Feldman.
23
The Motion of the California Supreme Court demonstrates the same
24
defect as the Motion of the California Sate Bar Defendants: both Motions do
25
not overcome the holding of Kougasian v. TNSL, Inc., 359 F.3d. 1136, 1141
26
(Ninth Cir., 2004) – “it has long been the law that a plaintiff in federal court can
27
seek to set aside a state court judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud.” (See
28

-1-
 1 Abatti v. C.I.R., 859 F.2d 115, 118 (Ninth Cir., 1988) – noting that “fraud on the
2 court must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to
3 improperly influence the court in its decision” [internal citation omitted].)
4 Kougasian is the exception to the Rooker – Feldman Doctrine, which
5 generally holds that federal district courts do not have subject matter
6 jurisdiction to review state court judgments. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the
7 case of Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Ind. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
8 (2005) interpreted the Rooker – Feldman Doctrine, holding that it “is confined
9 to cases of the kind from which it acquired its name: cases brought by state
10 court losers complaining of injustice caused by state court judgments rendered
11 before district court review and jurisdiction of those judgments.
12
B. Res Judicata is not applicable in the instant case.
13
Not only is there fraud upon the Court, as set forth in detail in the Verified
14

15 Complaint, but additionally, there is not any state court judgment upon which to
16
base res judicata.
17

18 There is no state court judgment because, under California Business and

19 Professions Code Section 6082, jurisdiction to review attorney discipline lies in
20 the California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal. In the case
21 of In Re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430 (2000), the California Supreme Court held that
22 attorney discipline matters are not a “cause” which must be decided “in writing
23 with persons stated” as required under Article VI, Section 14, of the California
24 Constitution.
25 Justice Brown, in her dissent at pages 466-470, demonstrated that
26 “judicial review” by the California Supreme Court does not exist, based upon
27 the majority decision in In Re Rose that disciplinary cases are not “causes”
28 under Article VI, Section 14, of the California Constitution, and based upon

-2-
 1 statements of the Court that it does not review State Bar disciplinary
2 recommendations.
3 Justice Brown further stated that the Court does not make a judgment in
4 individual disciplinary cases when it denies review, as follows in relevant part
5 at 22 Cal.4th at 466-470:
6
“As the court itself has acknowledged only recently, changes in
our own rules made in the wake of legislative amendments to the
7 administrative procedures governing bar discipline proceedings
8 ‘relieve the court of the burden of intense scrutiny of all disciplinary
recommendations’ (Cal. Supreme Ct., Invitation to Comment –
9
proposed adoption of Rule 951.5, Cal. Rules of Court (Nov. 23, 1999)
10 p. 2: see also Cal. Supreme Ct., Practices and Proc. (1997 Rev.) pp. 3,
11
18-19, 25-26.) Moreover, the matrix of grantable issues identified in
California Rules of Court, Rule 954 [footnote omitted] appears to
12 truncate the scope of our ‘review.’ Unless, by dint of skill or luck, the
13 issues are framed so they are deemed to fall within the ambit of Rule
954, an attorney facing suspension or disbarment from the right to
14
practice her profession gets no hearing, no opportunity for oral
15 argument, and no written statement of reasons – from this or any other
Article VI court. (Cal. Const., Art. VI, Section 14; hereafter Article
16
VI.) Instead, she gets a summary of denial of review, the one line
17 order ...”
18 “We should not, however, pretend the current legal order does
19
not mark a transformation in the attorney discipline process, one in
which a Constitutional touchstone – meaningful judicial review by an
20 Article VI court – has been jettisoned … under the new regime,
21 attorneys penalized for professional misconduct get less in the way of
genuine judicial review of discipline than licensed non-attorneys do
22
…”
23
“The contemporary anomaly is that history has produced less in
24 the way of judicial protection than our statutes give to, say,
25
veterinarians and cosmetologists. … As matters stand, and as the
majority opinion attests, it is a force of circumstance that obliges us to
26 make our peace with the new legal order. The majority goes about
27 that task studiously, employing the archaic lexicon of a bygone day to
describe the new and different contemporary reality.”
28

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 1
*****
2
“… Review by a constitutional court, review by a real judge
whose allegiance is to the judiciary, to its standards and ideals – to the
3 rule, in short, of law. Review, moreover, that is seen, observed in the
4 form of reasoned judicial opinions, and in the ritual of oral argument.
In combination, these features make up hallowed ground, for they
5
comprise a signal feature of our democracy – the protection of an
6 individual from executive and legislative overreaching by neutral
7
magistrates, magistrates whose decisions are constrained by objective
principles of judicial reasoning and by precedent and whose rulings
8 are an open book. … THAT is the essence of the judicial function;
9 THAT is what is missing in the sui generis special proceeding over
which we exercise an inherent authority. (See, Maj. Opn., Ante,
10
Passim.)”
11
“… An attorney’s petition for review to the court marks the first
12 and only time in the disciplinary process that Article VI judges are
asked to enter the case.”
13

14
*****

15 “… [O]ne of the effects of the prior order [before the 1988

amendments to the State Bar Act] was the obligation of this court to
16
carry on its docket and decide – almost always after oral argument,
17 always by written opinion – at least 20 State Bar disciplinary cases
each term.”
18

19
*****
20 “Alas, attorneys faced with the loss of their livelihoods must now
make do with the State Bar Court – an entity performing judicial
21
functions but … exercising no judicial powers – our summary denials,
22 unless the petition can be said to satisfy the criteria of Rule 954 … We
23
have tinkered with our rules so that it appears that nothing has
changed. But these are only words; the reality is different. In point of
24 practice, in bar disciplinary cases in which we decline to grant review,
25 we issue a pro forma order executing the State Bar Court’s
‘recommended discipline.’ (See Rule 954(a).) … Still, we no longer
26
make an individual decision on the imposition of discipline. And the
27 situation is not much improved if review is sought and denied; the
28

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 1
Rule gives us no choice but to impose the recommended discipline.
(Rule 954(b).)”
2

3
As shown by Justice Brown’s dissent and references to the writings of
4 the California Supreme Court and the majority opinion, the California
5
Supreme Court does not decide the merits of a disciplinary case when it
6

7 denies the review. Due to such failure to decide the merits or the “cause”,
8
“res judicata” cannot apply. Res judicata is defined as – “rule that a final
9

10 judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is

11
conclusive as to the parties and their privies, and, as to them constitutes an
12
absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
13

14 cause of action.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Abridged, Sixth Edition.

15
As shown in In Re Rose, supra, a disciplinary recommendation is not a
16

17 “cause” under Article VI, Section 14, of the California Constitution and the
18
California Supreme Court did not address or decide the merits when it
19

20
denied Plaintiff’s Petition for Review as it was only determining whether to

21 grant the Petition under California Rules of Court, Rule 954, or its
22
successor Rule. Without a “cause” and decision on the merits, there could
23

24 not be a judgment. Without a judgment, the rule of res judicata could not
25
apply.
26

27

28

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 1
The rule of res judicata also cannot apply to the denial of a petition
2 for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, as the petition only
3
requests that the U.S. Supreme Court hear the case. The denial is not a
4

5 judgment on the merits. It is only a refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court to

6
take the case.
7

8 In summary, res judicata is inapplicable under the fraud-upon-the-

9
court exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine if res judicata did exist,
10
and it is inapplicable in this case because no judgment of the California
11

12 Supreme Court exists because no ”cause” exists under Article VI, Section
13
14, of the California Constitution, and the California Supreme Court denied
14

15 the Petition for Review on procedural grounds under the criteria to the
16
successor rule to California Rules of Court, Rule 954, under which it was
17

18
then obligated to order the “discipline” recommended by the State Bar who

19 had committed fraud upon the California Supreme Court.

20

21

22
C. The Verified Complaint states facts sufficient to prove the legal
theory of fraud upon the Court against the actionable
23 Defendants.
24
The Verified Complaint demonstrates that Defendants State Bar of
25
California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; and Scott Drexel,
26
Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as the
27
“State Bar Defendants”) committed fraud upon the California Supreme Court
28

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 1 (who was named as a defendant as a necessary party only) by knowingly filing
2 a false Notice of Disciplinary Charges, a false Recommendation of the State
3 Bar Court Hearing Department, which is part of the State Bar, and a false
4 Recommendation of the State Bar Review Department, which is part of the
5 State Bar.
6 The Verified Complaint further shows that the State Bar Defendants acted
7 in conjunction with judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court through a secret
8 complaint by Bruce E. Mitchell to retaliate against Fine for having exposed and
9 challenged the judges for having taken illegal payments from LA County, who
10 was a party in cases before them, in violation of Article VI, Section 19, of the
11 California Constitution, in violation of Canon 4D(1) of the California Code of
12 Judicial Ethics, in violation of CCP § 170.1, and in violation of Canon 2 of the
13 Code of Judicial Ethics, and not disclosing such illegal payments in violation of
14 Canon 3E(2) and not disclosing such illegal payments on their Form 700
15 Statement of Financial Interests.
16 The case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App. 4th 630
17 (2005), review denied 12/23/08, specifically held that the payments from LA
18 County to LA Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19, of the
19 California Constitution, as shown in the Verified Complaint.
20 The Verified Complaint also showed that:
21  Sheldon Sloan, Board of Governor member and State Bar President
22 (2006-2007), would benefit from Plaintiff Fine being inactive and
23 disbarred as he (Sloan) represented Marina Pacific Associates (Jerry
24 B. Epstein) in a case opposing clients which Fine represented;
25
 Jeffrey Bleich, Board of Governor member and State Bar President
26
(2007-2008), a partner of Munger, Tolles and Olson, would benefit
27
from Fine being inactive and disbarred as Munger, Tolles and Olson
28
represented LA County in lease extension negotiations with Del Rey

-7-
 1 Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North (Jerry
2 B. Epstein) while Fine was representing clients, in a lawsuit against
3 LA County and Epstein, opposing the illegal re-development of the
4 Del Rey Shores apartment complex upon which the lease extension
5 was based; and
6
 Laura Chick, a Board of Governors public member, former LA City
7
Councilperson and then-LA City Controller, would benefit from Fine
8
being inactive as Fine was representing clients opposing the Playa
9
Vista Development and the City of Los Angeles and had exposed
10
Laura Chick as having allowed a $5,000 “behest” given in her name
11
from the lobbyist for Playa Vista one day after she, as Controller,
12
released a report in favor of Playa Vista and while such report was
13
being actively considered, which was a violation of the Political
14
Reform Act.
15
The Verified Complaint further showed that Richard A. Honn, the State
16
Bar Hearing Department judge who was acting in the “stead” of the Board of
17
Governors of the State Bar, did not disclose that, during the time he was
18
“presiding” over Fine’s disbarment case, he was a member of the Board of
19
Governors of the Southern California Special Olympics with a representative of
20
LA County, and that LA County gave $30,000 to the Southern California
21
Special Olympics.
22
The Verified Complaint additionally showed that Richard A. Honn, all of
23
the members of the Review Department of the State Bar Court, the Board of
24
Governors of the State Bar, and the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar had all
25
taken a joint position against a First Amendment challenge to the “moral
26
turpitude” statute (Business and Professions Code Section 6106) under which
27

28

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 1 the State Bar prosecuted Fine, prior to such prosecution and during the time that
2 Fine was fighting such prosecution.
3 The Verified Complaint specifically showed that the State Bar knew that
4 each of the counts upon which a recommendation for disbarment was made to
5 the California Supreme Court was false and a fraud upon the Supreme Court
6 and protected under the First Amendment to the United Sates Constitution.
7 Further, the State Bar knew that Counts 2, 4 and 17 against Fine, which alleged
8 false statements, were not only false themselves but were dismissed by the State
9 Bar Court Hearing Department, not appealed by the Sate Bar Chief Trail
10 Counsel, and illegally reinstated, without notice or hearing, by the State Bar
11 Review Department in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
12 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Rule 305 of the State Bard Court Rules of
13 Procedure, and the State Bar Act.
14 The Verified Complaint showed that the State Bar Defendants deliberately
15 concealed the truth from the California Supreme Court in order to deceive the
16 Court, and did deceive the Court, which, based upon such fraud, denied Fine’s
17 Petition for Review, resulting in an automatic order of disbarment under the
18 California Rules of Court.
19
D. Judges are prohibited from receiving payments from a party
20 who might appear before them under California law, and must
21
recuse themselves if they have received such payments.

22 California Code of Judicial Ethics (Canon 4D(1)) states:

23 (1) A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that
24 (a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge’s judicial
25 position, or
26 (b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuous
business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely to
27
appear before the court on which the judge serves.
28

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 1 The Advisory Note specifically refers to “persons likely to appear before
2 the judge personally or before judges on the judge’s court.” It also states: “this
3 rule is necessary … to minimize the potential for disqualification.”
4 The Advisory Note further states:
5
“Participation by a judge in financial and business dealings is
subject to the general prohibitions in Canon 4A against activities that
6 tend to reflect adversely on impartiality, demean the judicial office, or
7 interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. Such
participation is also subject to general prohibition in Canon 2 against
8
activities involving impropriety or the appearance of impropriety and
9 the prohibition of Canon 2B against the misuse of the prestige of
10
judicial office. In addition, a judge must maintain high standards of
conduct in all of the judge’s activities, as set forth in Canon 1.”
11

12 The Supreme Court’s argument (at page 10, footnote 10, of its
13 Memorandum) equating LA County to the executive, legislative and judicial
14 branches of the state and federal government, and making LA County the
15 “employer” of the state-elected judicial officers who are part of the judicial
16 branch of the state government, is not only frivolous, specious and without
17 merit, but also demonstrates a total lack of knowledge of the American system
18 of government.
19 The “absurd result” mentioned in such footnote would be that LA County
20 would be the “sovereign” over state-licensed judges.
21 In the state and federal courts, LA County and every other county is a
22 “party”, not one of the three branches of government.
23
E. CCP § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(I)(iii) and Canon 3E of the Code of
24 Judicial Ethics mandate the recusal of judges who take
payments from LA County.
25

26 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(I)(iii) states in

27 relevant part:
28

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 1
“A judge shall be disqualified if … a person aware of the facts might
reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be
2 impartial.”
3
Canons 3E(1) and (2) state in relevant part:
4
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
5 which disqualification is required by law.
6 (2) In all trial court proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the
record all information that is reasonably relevant to the question
7
of disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure Section
8 170.1, even if the judge believes that there is no actual basis for
disqualification.
9

10
The case of Michael v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Co., 88
11
Cal.App.4th 925, 937 (2001), set forth the standard for disclosure and
12
disqualification as follows:
13
“Like the Commonwealth Corp. disclosure rule, the standard for
14 disclosure under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(c), is objective.
15
The facts that must be disclosed are those which might cause a
reasonable person to entertain a doubt that the appraiser would be
16
impartial. Moreover, the statutory test does not require actual bias.
17 Where a reasonable person would entertain doubt whether the
appraiser or arbitrator was impartial, the appellate courts are not
18
required to speculate whether bias was actual or merely apparent, or
19 whether impartial consideration of the evidence or dispassionate
20
decision of the matter would have led to the same result. (Roitz v.
Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723
21 (1998).”
22

23 The Supreme Court’s Memorandum deliberately misleads the Court by

24 arguing that judges who received payments from LA County did not have to
25 recuse themselves in cases where LA County was a party before them.
26
F. The Supreme Court Memorandum deliberately misleads the
27 Court in its characterization of the holding in the Sturgeon case.
28

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 1 At page 3, footnote 2, of the Supreme Court Memorandum, the
2 Memorandum states in relevant part:
3
“The Sturgeon decision specifically found that the payment of local
judicial benefits was … [not] a basis to seek recusal of a judicial
4 officer receiving such benefits. Id. at 637-39.”
5
This statement is false. There is no finding in the Sturgeon decision that
6
the payments of local judicial benefits was not a basis to seek recusal of a
7
judicial officer receiving such benefits. The truth is that the issue was not even
8
raised in the Sturgeon case, as shown by a review of the opinion.
9
Further, at page 1-2 of the original opinion the Court of Appeal stated:
10
“Section 19 article VI of the California Constitution requires the
11 legislature prescribe compensation for judges of court of record. The
12 duty to prescribe compensation is not delegable. Thus the practice of
the County of Los Angeles (County) of providing Los Angeles
13
County Superior Court Judges with employment benefits, in addition
14 to the compensation prescribed by the legislature, is not permissible.”
15

16 The opinion stated at page 33:

“We have been unable to identify any enactment of the legislature
17
which prescribes the judicial benefits the county pays its judges”.
18

19
With respect to the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, the
20
opinion stated, at pages 35-37 in relevant part:
21 “Both section 69894.3 and the audit and credit procedures set
22
forth in Lockyer-Isenberg are also ineffective as legislative
prescriptions. They do not require the payment of benefits, let alone
23
set any standard or safeguard which regulate the size or conditions
24 under which they should be paid. … Indeed, without violating section
69894.3, or Lockyer-Isenberg, the county could, in any given year,
25
deprive its judges of mega-flex benefits and continue to provide them
26 to other employees.
27
“… There is also the difficulty posed by the last phrase of
28 section 3, “as a result of this act.” That phrase undermines our ability

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 1
to conclude that, by way of Lockyer-Isenberg, the legislature intended
to affirmatively prescribe these benefits for Superior Court judges …
2 because the benefits provided by the county are compensation within
3 the meaning of section 19, article VI of our Constitution, and because
this record does not establish those benefits have been prescribed by
4
the legislature, the trial court erred in granting the county’s motion for
5 summary judgment.”
6
Knowing the Sturgeon decision did not hold that Lockyer-Isenberg
7
allowed the LA County payments to the Superior Court judges, the Supreme
8
Court Memorandum deliberately misleads the Court (at page 12, lines 4-6) by
9
stating in relevant part:
10
“Local judicial benefits were statutorily authorized by the Lockyer-
11 Isenberg Trial Court Act of 1997, California Government Code
Section 77,000, et seq.”
12

13 It further made the false statement (at Supreme Court Memorandum, page
14 11-12 in relevant part) that the Sturgeon case:
15 “… held that the payment of local judicial benefits by the County of
Los Angeles to judicial officers of the Superior Court of California,
16
County of Los Angeles, was not constitutional per se. In so holding,
17 the California Court of Appeal emphasized that:
18
The payment of local judicial benefits by the county of Los
19 Angeles was unconstitutional only because the duty to set
compensation for state judicial officers was a non-delegable
20
duty imposed upon the State Legislature.”
21

22 As shown by the language from the Sturgeon decision, a vast

23 contradictory impasse exists between the truth as set forth in the Sturgeon
24 decision and the representations of the Sturgeon decision made by the Supreme
25 Court Memorandum to this Court.
26 G. Senate Bill SBx2-11 establishes the criminal conduct of the LA
27 Superior Court judges by taking the LA County payments and
violating Article VI, Section 19, in its attempt to reinstitute the
28
unconstitutional payments.

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 1 The Supreme Court Memorandum argues (at page 12, lines 12-14) that
2 Senate Bill SBx2-11, set forth partially in footnote 11, negated a reason for the
3 judges who were receiving LA County payments to recuse themselves. The
4 opposite was true. Senate Bill SBx2-11 on its face gave retroactive immunity
5 from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to the judges
6 who took the payments for the act of taking the payments. Senate Bill SBx2-11
7 identified these judges as criminals by giving them immunity.
8 Senate Bill SBx2-11 did not, however, give them immunity from the
9 crime of obstruction of justice for presiding over a case where the county was a
10 party; immunity was limited to “benefits provided to a judge under the official
11 action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the
12 ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.”
13 Thus “criminals in judicial robes” were presiding over cases where the
14 county who gave them the criminal payments was a party before them.
15 Unfortunately, neither the U.S. Attorney General, the California Attorney
16 General, the District Attorney nor the Commission on Judicial Performance has
17 performed their functions and prosecuted the judges.
18 The second part of Senate Bill SBx2-11 reinstated county payments as of
19 May 21, 2009 at the same level as existed on July 1, 2008, with a 180-day
20 termination notice. This part violates Article VI, Section 19, as the counties can
21 stop paying the judges while continuing to pay county employees. The
22 Sturgeon court found this fact alone a reason that Lockyer-Isenberg violated
23 Article VI, Section 19; to wit, the Sturgeon Court stated at page 35:
24
“Indeed, without violating section 64894.3, or Lockyer-Isenberg, the
county could, in any given year, deprive its judges of mega-flex benefits
25 and continue to provide them to other employees.”
26

27

28

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 1 The Court found that giving the county the option of providing the
2 benefits, without a limitation on the kind or amount, the Legislature did not set
3 a standard for the benefits.
4
H. The Supreme Court Memorandum misleads the Court as to the
5 due process holding in the Caperton case.
6
The Supreme Court Memorandum (at page 11, lines 18-21) falsely stated
7
the test for due process violations that the U.S. Supreme Court used in the case
8
of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009). The test
9
was originally set forth in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) at 532, cited in
10
Caperton at Slip Opinion page 7, as follows:
11
“Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
12 average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
13
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies
14 the latter due process of law.”
15
Citing to Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), the Supreme
16
Court in Caperton stated at Slip Opinion page 8:
17
“The court stressed that it was not required to decide whether in fact
18
[the justice] was influenced.” Id., at 825. The proper constitutional
19 inquiry is ‘whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court
20
of Alabama ‘’’would offer a possible temptation to the average …
judge to … lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true”’”.
21 Ibid. (Quoting Monroeville, supra, at 60, in turn quoting Tumey,
22 supra, at 532) …”
23
The Supreme Court continues, at Slip Opinion page 13:
24 “In defining these standards the court has asked whether, ‘under a
25
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness’,
the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
26 practice must be forbidden if the gravity of due process is to be
27 adequately implemented.’ Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47.”
28

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 1 The Supreme Court found that “the possibility of bias rises to an
2 unconstitutional level”, stating at Slip Opinion page 16, in relevant part:
3
“… just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,
similar fears of bias can arise when – without the consent of other
4 parties – a man chooses the judge in his own case. And applying the
5 principle to the judicial election process, there was a serious, objective
risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal. … Due
6
process ‘may sometimes bar judges who have no actual bias and who
7 would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
8
contending parties.’ Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. The failure to
consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with
9 the imperatives of due process. We find that Blankenship’s
10 significant and disproportionate influence – coupled with the temporal
relationship between the election and the pending case – “’” offer a
11
possible temptation to the average … judge to … lead him not to hold
12 the balance nice, clear, and true. “’” …”
13
Caperton, supra, supports Plaintiff Fine’s position that the LA Superior
14
Court judges must be recused. In the first instance, LA County has “bought”
15
the entire LA Superior Court by paying criminal and unconstitutional payments
16
to all of the judges. LA County has therefore “chosen the judge in its own case
17
without the consent of the other party.” Under Caperton, supra, this alone is
18
cause for recusal.
19
In the second instance, LA County has made criminal and unconstitutional
20
payments to the LA Superior Court judges of $46,433 per year, or 27% of their
21
$178,800 annual state salary. Both the fact that the payments are criminal and
22
unconstitutional, combined with their high percentage value in relationship to
23
the judge’s state salary, and the proximity in time with the LA County cases
24
before the judges, mandate their recusal.
25
A further factor mandating recusal is that the payments are “bribes”
26
inasmuch as they are criminal under Senate Bill SBx2-11. Under the case of
27
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) – “a judge receiving a bribe from
28

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 1 an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of
2 justice.”
3
II. The California Supreme Court was named as “a necessary party”
4 without any charging allegations against it, rendering arguments of
5
Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity as frivolous and without
merit.
6

7 The Supreme Court Memorandum (at page 4, footnote 6) admits that the
8 Supreme Court was named in paragraph 16 of the Verified Complaint as a
9 “necessary party.” Although the Supreme Court Memorandum is replete with
10 false statements that the Verified Complaint has charged the Supreme Court
11 with fraud upon the Court, meaning fraud upon itself (see Supreme Court
12 Memorandum, page 3, lines 5-8, page 4, lines 12-16, and footnote 6, page 9,
13 lines 5-6), the Supreme Court Memorandum does not (and can not) cite one
14 criminal allegation made by Plaintiff against the Supreme Court.
15 Further, the Supreme Court Memorandum admits (at page 13, line 8) that:
16 “Fine simply names the court as a party defendant in this action.” It goes on to
17 state (at page 14, lines 3-4): “Fine simply fails to allege any fact establishing
18 the personal involvement of any member of the court in the alleged deprivation
19 of his civil rights.”
20 Once again, the Supreme Court Memorandum has been shown to make
21 these false statements to the Court by falsely stating that the Supreme Court is
22 an active defendant in the case when it admits that it is only a “necessary party”
23 without any charging allegations in the Verified Complaint.
24 As shown in In Re Rose, supra, the State Bar disciplinary proceeding
25 results in a sui generis proceeding before the Supreme Court which is not a
26 “cause” under Article VI, Section 14, of the California Constitution. The
27 Supreme Court does not act as a court of law and does not make a judicial
28 decision over a case or controversy; i.e. “cause.” It only decides whether it will

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 1 “hear” a petition for review based upon criteria set forth in the California Rules
2 of Court. If it denies the petition, under the California’s Rules of Court, it is
3 mandated to order the disciplinary action recommended by the State Bar.
4 Under this procedure, the Supreme Court is not acting as a court of record,
5 nor is it acting as an administrative agency. However, it is a necessary party to
6 the lawsuit as an injunction against the State Bar Defendants will void and
7 annul their Recommendation and preclude them from reinstituting their action.
8 The injunction will not be effective unless the Supreme Court also removes its
9 Order which was based upon the fraudulent Recommendation of the State Bar
10 Defendants.
11 The California Supreme Court has a history of refusing to remove orders
12 after they have been voided and annulled. In the case of Fine v. Superior
13 Court, 97 Cal.App. 4th 651 (2002), the California Supreme Court refused to de-
14 publish the decision after affirming a contempt conviction after the contempt
15 conviction was voided and annulled in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding
16 of Fine v. Superior Court, USDC case No. CV-02-4647. This action violated
17 the U.S. Supreme Court cases of U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) – no
18 court has the authority to validate a void order…, and Valley v. Northern Fire
19 & Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) – a void order is a void order at all times, it
20 cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passing of
21 time. The order is void ab initio.
22 As a matter of note, the lawyer for the Superior Court in both the state and
23 federal habeas corpus cases was Kevin McCormick, who resisted the removal
24 of the state case after the contempt order was voided and annulled.
25
III. Injunctive relief can be obtained.
26

27
Plaintiff Fine incorporates by reference his arguments set forth in his

28
response to the State Bar Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

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 1 Further, the Court is respectfully reminded that USDC case No. 08-CV-
2 2906 JFW(CW) seeking declaratory relief that the California “moral turpitude”
3 law and the “involuntary inactive enrollment” law were unconstitutional, was
4 dismissed without prejudice due to the Younger Abstention Doctrine. The
5 availability of such declarative relief on its own establishes a basis for
6 injunctive relief in this suit as the State Bar argued against any constitutional
7 arguments being made in its Recommendation, even though it did not have the
8 jurisdiction to rule on such. (Cal. Const. Art. III, Section 3.5.)
9

10 Conclusion
11

12 As shown herein, the California Supreme Court defaulted, did not seek a
13 court order to be relieved of the default, and filed a late frivolous, meritless
14 Motion to Dismiss replete with false and misleading statements.
15 The California Supreme Court is nothing more than a “necessary party.”
16 It should have filed a timely response stating that they would abide by the
17 Court’s decision regarding the State Bar Defendants.
18 Instead, it has violated the Court Rules, violated Business and Professions
19 Code Section 6068(d) by making false statements to the Court, and has filed a
20 frivolous and meritless motion for the sole purpose of harassing and oppressing
21 Plaintiff Fine.
22 Plaintiff Fine respectfully requests that a default be entered and that the
23 California Supreme Court’s Motion to Dismiss be stricken.
24

25
Dated this ___ day of May, 2010 Respectfully submitted,
26

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BY: ____________________________
28
RICHARD I. FINE,

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 1
In Pro Per
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 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
3 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4

5
I am Fred Sottile. My address is 2601 E. Victoria Street, # 108, Rancho
6 Dominguez, CA 90220. I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party
7 to the above-entitled action.
8 On May ___, 2010, I served the foregoing document described as
9 OPPOSITION TO CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S MOTION TO
10 DISMISS on interested parties in this action by depositing a true copy thereof,
11 which was enclosed in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, in the United
12
States Mail, addressed as follows:
13

14 Lawrence C. Yee Michael Van Loewenfeldt

Mark Torres-Gil KERR & WAGSTAFF, LLP
15
Tracey L. McCormick 100 Spear Street, 18th Floor
16 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA San Francisco, CA 94105-1528
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
17
180 Howard Street
18 San Francisco, CA 94105-1639
19
I certify and declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
20
States of America and the State of California, that the foregoing is true and
21
correct.
22
Executed on this _____ day of May, 2010, at Rancho Dominguez,
23
California.
24

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____________________________________
26
FRED SOTTILE
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