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Non-dualistic Sex
Josef Mitterers Non-dualistic Philosophy in the
Light of Judith Butlers (De)Constructivist Feminism
Martin G. Weiss University of Klagenfurt martin.weiss/at/aau.at
>Context Josef Mitterer has become known for criticizing the main exponents of analytic and constructivist philoso-
phy for their blind adoption of a dualistic epistemology based on an alleged ontological difference between world and
words. Judith Butler, who has developed an influential model of (de)constructivist feminism and has been labeled a
linguistic constructivist, has been criticized for sustaining exactly what, according to Mitterer, most modern philosophy fails to acknowledge: namely that there is no ontological difference between objective facts beyond language and
the discourse about these facts. >Problem In the scholarly discussion on non-dualism, two main questions have
been raised: Where does Mitterers basic consensus, i.e., the starting-point description, come from? and: What does it
mean, to say that further descriptions change their object? >Method Comparative analysis of the core concepts of
Mitterers and Butlers work in the context of the history of ideas. >Results Butlers conception of a performative
production of objectivity through discursive and non-discursive iterated practices can be interpreted as an illustration
of Mitterers claim that descriptions change their object. The problem of where Mitterers starting-point descriptions
come from can be solved by adopting Butlers concept of culturally inherited practices. >Key words Non-dualism,
constructivism, feminism, body, sex, gender, hermeneutics, performativity, Josef Mitterer, Judith Butler.
Introduction
In his recently republished Das Jenseits
der Philosophie (Mitterer 2011a), a programmatic outline of a non-dualistic approach to
epistemology, first published in 1992, Josef
Mitterer accuses the heroes of contemporary
analytic and constructivist philosophy
from Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard van
Orman Quine to Benjamin L. Whorf and
Thomas S. Kuhn of (implicitly) promoting
an inconsistent word-language dualism. According to Mitterer, all the above-mentioned
authors share the basic idea that the objective world and the language with which we
talk about the world pertain to two different
ontological realms; in other words, that language always refers to non-linguistic objects
beyond language. Independently of precisely
how the relation between words and things
may ultimately be conceived as representa-
tion, image, interpretation or even construction the core dualistic principle remains
the same: words refer (in some way or another) to non-linguistic things.
This dichotomy, which is at the origin of
all epistemological problems, can be traced
back to at least Plato for its naturalistic version, and to Kant for its more constructivist
one (Weber 2005). Plato established the first
systematic doctrine of two worlds by introducing the ontological distinction between
the realm of unchangeable, everlasting, objective ideas located in the topos hyperuranios, intelligible only rationally on the one
hand, and the realm of their ephemeral material representations, accessible only sensually on the other.
A more constructivist version of epistemic dualism is offered by Immanuel Kant
in his dichotomy of the inaccessible thing
in itself (Ding an sich), which lies beyond
all qualities and concepts and the appearing
phenomena shaped by the cognitive apparatus of the subject namely its forms of pure
intuition (space and time), and its conceptual
categories (quality, quantity, relation, modality) , which molds the thing in itself into
an epistemic object accessible to subjectivity.
Mitterers critique
of dualism
Mitterer makes the claim that the dualism underlying modern epistemology is
inconsistent because self-contradictory
although his critique would also apply to
the historic versions of Plato and Kant. The
reason for this, according to Mitterer, is that
every form of epistemic dualism, the naturalistic as well as the constructivist models,
needs to distinguish between the object
and the description of the object, which
ultimately results in a self-contradictory
conception of the object. In fact, dualism
on the one hand defines the object as that
which is completely unknown, i.e., radically
inaccessible before its description, but on
the other hand as the entity that the description describes, i.e., as the entity represented
by its description. Mitterer argues that the
object of dualism beyond, i.e., prior to, any
description is simply inconceivable. This is
because if we take an object and try to purify
it from all descriptions, we will not reach the
objective object before description but mere
nothing. A similar critique has been put forward by Friedrich W. J. Schelling in relation
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Constructivist Foundations
vol. 8, N2
Non-dualism and
hermeneutics
Mitterers position thus reechoes the
hermeneutical insight that in everyday life,
as well as in science, we do not deal with
pure, meaningless, i.e., empty, objects,
which are simply inconceivable, but with
meaningful descriptions. This is also true for
the extreme case in which the first startingpoint description (the description so far)
might seem meaningless and lead to a description from now on, expressing the fact
that the description so far is not describable
at all. This is so, because even if we encounter a non-further-describable starting-point
description, to describe it as such is still
a further description of the indescribable
as indescribable. To describe something
as not describable is still to describe it as
something. We always already deal with descriptions and not with pure objects beyond
description. Hermeneutics claims that as rational beings we cannot escape description,
i.e., understanding. We are doomed to understand and are surrounded by meaningful
entities, even if we do not know what they
mean. What we cannot encounter is a pure,
i.e., meaningless, object beyond meaning.
The starting points of descriptions are thus
not meaningless, pure objects, but tacit
(Weber 2010: 20), pre-predicative meaningful descriptions (so far), which may then
in a second stage get explicitly described
in predicative assertions, i.e., descriptions
(from now on). Explicit asserting descriptions from now on are about starting-point
pre-predicative descriptions so far.
But what exactly are these starting-point
descriptions which Mitterer calls descriptions so far, rudimental descriptions
(Rudimetrbeschreibungen), objects of indication (Angabe Objekte), starting-point
objects (Ausgangs-Objekte) basis-consensus (Basiskonsens), and starting-point
consensus (Ausgangskonsens) (Mitterer
2011a: 72ff; Mitterer 2011b: 127, 151,
112) from which all our further descriptions start? Mitterer has been criticized for
his strict linguistic approach, which does
not take into account the role practical experience plays in epistemology (Ofner 2008;
Janich 2010; Gadenne 2008). Despite this,
it seems plausible that Mitterers startingpoint descriptions, the pre-conditions of
If one accepts this hermeneutical interpretation of Mitterers starting-point descriptions, i.e., their identification with the
primordial, practical, implicit, hermeneutical meaning that represents the condition
for all later explicit predicative descriptions,
one may take this analysis a step further and
Non-dualism
Non-dualism and
(de)constructive feminism
Hence, whereas Rubin still argues within the framework of classical dualism, distinguishing an objective material here, the
biological fact (sex) , and a socio-cultural
interpretation of this biological fact (i.e.,
gender), Butler questions the alleged objectivity of the biological fact, suggesting that
sex is at least as much the product of iterated
practices as gender.
In the wake of Nietzsche, Derrida and
Foucault, Butler advocates the priority of
discourse and language conceived as form
of practice over alleged objective facts.
This is because for her, language represents
the inevitable medium of all experience.
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The body posited as prior to the sign, is always To claim that discourse is formative is not to
posited or signified as prior. This signification pro- claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively
duces as an effect of its own procedure the very
body that it nevertheless and simultaneously
claims to discover as that which precedes its own
action. (Butler 1993: 30)
In accordance with Mitterer, Butler emphasizes that the notion of an object outside of discourse is inconceivable because,
if taken seriously, it would be completely
impossible to speak or refer to it in any
way since an object beyond language cannot be grasped by any concept. Nothing
could be said about the object beyond language, not even that it is beyond language.
Every attempt to speak about it would, in
the framework of dualism, not only be selfcontradictory but also transform the allegedly objective object beyond discourse into
a linguistic phenomenon. Every reference
in dualism to an object beyond discourse
paradoxically destroys the idea of such an
object. Objects are necessarily implicitly
conceived as discursive phenomena by explicit and discursive assertion of their nondiscursive character. Otherwise no linguistic reference to them would be possible,
not even to say that they are outside of lan-
Constructivist Foundations
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plainly that the options for theory are not exhausted by presuming materiality, on the one
hand, and negating materiality, on the other. It is
my purpose to do precisely neither of these. To
call a presupposition into question is not the same
as doing away with it; rather, it is to free it from
its metaphysical lodgings (Butler 1993: 30)
Non-dualism
Explaining Mitterer
with Butler
The best possibility to answer two questions that have been put forward in regard to
Mitterers work (in part by himself) would
perhaps be to take into account Butlers
theory of performativity, i.e., the concept
of materialization. These two questions are:
Where do starting-point descriptions come
from? and: What triggers the change in their
further descriptions?
The basis-consensus, i.e., the startingpoint descriptions, are the dominant contingent preconceptions opinions about what
is objective in a given historically and culturally framed language community. Therefore,
singular or deliberate act, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse
produces the effects that it names. The regulatory norms of sex work in a performative fashion
to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more
specifically, to materialize the bodys sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the
consolidation of the heterosexual imperative.
(Butler 1993: 2)
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188
Mitterer and Butler, although demonstrating at a theoretical level the inconsistency of dualism, i.e., objectivism, assert
that the reference to allegedly objective objects beyond language is (still?) unavoidable
(Mitterer) and perhaps even useful (Butler).
Whereas Mitterers admission that we have
to make concessions to the still dominant
dualistic/objectivistic ideology is comprehensible despite the risk of opening an
intellectual gap between philosophy and
common sense within the philosopher her-
Constructivist Foundations
vol. 8, N2
Martin G. Weiss
is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Klagenfurt and member
of the Life Science Governance Research Platform of the University of Vienna. His publications
include: Gianni Vattimo. Einfhrung. Mit einem Interview mit Gianni Vattimo (2012); and Bios
und Zo. Die menschliche Natur im Zeitalter ihrer technischen Reproduzierbarkeit (2009).
Conclusion
I have tried to show that Butlers key
concept of materialization, with which she
describes the performative (always mutating) construction of pre-discursive entities
within discourse, means naturalization,
i.e., the gradual solidification or sedimentation of certain contingent descriptions. Butlers question is: What are the mechanisms
that transform a contingent description into
a seemingly unchangeable eternal fact? How
are descriptions stabilized, i.e., naturalized,
materialized to the point of being regarded
as unquestionable facts?
According to Butler, the stabilization of
descriptions is achieved by means of permanent iterations of performative acts. The
continuous repetition of the same performative act is what produces the effect of objectivity, i.e., materiality.
But the same mechanism that serves to
produce allegedly stable descriptions is also
the archimedic point that enables the destabilization of already naturalized interpretations. For facts to remain stable, they need
to be iterated continuously and reproduced
in performative acts, and because no repetition ever equals its predecessor, the mechanisms of stabilization are essentially unstable. The necessity to iterate the descriptions
continuously in order to naturalize them
in itself undermines this attempt, as every
repetition of a description slightly changes
the description. Paradoxically, the same acts
that aim at producing naturalized facts end
up denaturalizing the same facts. Precisely
because the factual must be continually reproduced, i.e., stabilized by means of the
endless repetition of performative acts, di-
Non-dualism
vergent acts (and every repetition is different from its precursor) can destabilize and
change reality:
Construction not only takes place in time,
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Note: All translations from German are made
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