Construction

Design Handbook

APPLICATION GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE ASSET REPLACEMENT OF

TRANSMISSION SYSTEM PROTECTION AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT

DH 01
Issue 2

Authorised by:
Technical Assurance Manager

Date:

29th June 2007

DH 01 Issue 2
June 2007

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DH 01 Issue 2
June 2007

APPLICATION GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE ASSET REPLACEMENT OF TRANSMISSION

SYSTEM PROTECTION AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT
Contents
1.

Purpose

2.

References

3.

Responsibilities

4.

Introduction

5.

Relay Equipment Buildings and General Site Arrangements

6.

Feeder Main Protection

7.

Supergrid Transformer Protection

10

8.

Shunt Reactor Tertiary and Earthing Transformer Protection

11

9.

Mesh Corner Protection

11

10.

Busbar Protection

12

11.

Circuit Breaker Fail Protection

12

12.

Bus Section & Bus Coupler Protection

13

13.

Circuit Breaker Relay Panels

13

14.

Fault Recorders

13

15.

Delayed Auto Reclose

14

16.

Ferroresonance Protection

15

17.

Capacitor Voltage Transformers & Power Line Carrier Coupling Equipment

15

18.

Substation Clock & Distribution of Timing

16

19.

110V DC & 48V DC Supplies

17

20.

415V LVAC Supplies

17

21.

Synchronising & Voltage Selection

17

22.

Information Management Unit (IMU)

18

23.

Supervision

18

24.

Testing Facilities

19

25.

Control Systems

19

26.

Circuit Breaker Replacement

22

27

Authorisation/Revision

23

Appendix 1

Emergency Close Requirements on Legacy SCSs

24

Appendix 2

Removal of Existing Power Line Carrier Equipment

25

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1.

PURPOSE
This design handbook has been compiled to offer guidance to suppliers when preparing Design
Intent Documents and completing engineering for all light current replacement, new build and asset
replacement work. It is not intended to direct suppliers to a particular solution.
This handbook also intends to clarify areas where National Grid requirements may be unclear.

2.

REFERENCES
PS(T)010, Application and Setting of Protection.
PS(T)055, Application & Setting of Systems that Perform Synchronising, DAR, Automatic Plant
Isolation and Ferroresonance Quenching.
TGN(E)184, Application and Setting of Protection.
TGN(E)205, Application & Setting of Systems that Perform Synchronising, DAR, Automatic Plant
Isolation and Ferroresonance Quenching.
TS 2.19, Ancillary Light Current Equipment.

3.

RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1

Alliances & Suppliers

It is the suppliers responsibility to produce a design fully compliant to National Grids technical
specifications. This document is intended to give guidance on the implementation and application
of these technical specifications.
For the purposes of this document the term Supplier is understood to include any Electricity
Alliance carrying out work on behalf of National Grid.

3.2

National Grid
It is National Grids responsibility to ensure the supplier is aware of all the relevant technical
standards and to review the design for compliance with these standards and the Substation Design
Specification requirements.

4.

INTRODUCTION

4.1

Principles
The principles of this Design Handbook are based on designs that deliver TS 2.24 and its
associated level three documents. The purpose is to facilitate the effective integration of substation
light current functions, IED's, bay and station functions for both asset replacement and "green field"
installations into a common vision of National Grids substation light current architecture.
After the protection equipment fitted to a circuit has been installed, whether on a new installation, a
switchgear project or a light current refurbishment project it must be left protected as a minimum to
the standards detailed in PS(T)010.
Emphasis will be placed on equipment to be installed pre-outage following a full system FAT and
SAT in advance of first circuit access. Engineered solutions are required that maximise multicore
cabling pre-outage avoiding the use of redundant equipment as marshalling points.
It should be realised that with the pace of change in the industry, guidance should be sought as to
the current status of any equipment list in terms of type registration.

4.2

Specific

4.2.1

Relays & Equipment configuration/setting

Where relays are used that have communications interfaces (e.g. an RS232 interface) the design
must allow easy access to the interface whilst the relay is in normal operations mode.

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To facilitate the calculation and issue of Protection Settings, relay details (type, range, rating etc.)
need to be included or issued, two months after the design freeze stage.
Relay calculations shall be submitted to National Grid at least 20 weeks ahead of the circuit
commissioning date to facilitate the issue of Thermal Rating data. All information should be
submitted in line with the timescales outlined in UKBP/TP106(E) & UKBP/TP107(E).
The supplier prior to the FAT shall apply all programmable software logic settings and power
system settings to the equipment. The relay settings calculations shall be submitted to and agreed
with National Grid prior to the commencement of the FAT. The process for managing numerical
relays is detailed in Commissioning Handbook 21, Management of Numerical Protection Schemes.
To facilitate the control system configuration, the Generic Equipment Model (GEM) information
should be submitted and agreed prior to the design freeze stage.
4.2.2

Drawings
To clarify and confirm the protection design the following diagrams must either be included within
or appended to the Design Intent Document (DID):

4.2.3

Main Connections and Protection key diagram.

Drawing showing the distribution of functions within a set of IEDs.

Tripping Arrangements
Current practises in tripping arrangements are such that only one self resetting trip relay per
tripping coil/system is used. All functions in a bay solution shall initiate a single trip relay per circuit
breaker trip system which shall then be used in the trip circuit, to minimise trip circuit supervision
wiring. For protection tripping functions there shall be no more than one trip relay between the
protection and the trip coil. This philosophy should be adopted as standard where the scope of
work allows.

4.2.4

Reduced Equipment
Bay solutions using numerical relays shall be employed. Where protection systems include an
integral intertrip facility, this shall be used to supplement the standard requirements for the type of
connection. Alarm, Indication and Control cabling to the Control function should utilise serial
connections where possible. This may be achieved with the use of appropriate protocol converters.
The distribution of facilities across equipment in the system shall comply with TS 2.24 and the TS
3.24 series of technical specifications.

4.2.5

Plant Protection
Preference will be given to the use of modern numerical protection with acceptable diagnostic
facilities to allow a 1 out of 1 protection to be applied.
For auto transformers the use of a restricted earth fault using external high impedance components
is not required. However where REF is a discrete low impedance algorithm in the overall protection
relay then it shall be enabled.

4.2.6

Setting Resistors
Where required circulating current protection Stabilising Resistors shall be replaced with ones of a
specific fixed value as determined by the particular application. It is not permissible to use variable
resistors.

4.2.7

Commissioning
Commissioning shall be in line with UKBP/TP106(E). Maximum use of Factory testing should be
considered to reduce on-site commissioning time. The proposed commissioning philosophy and
methodology shall be included within the DID.

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4.2.8

Temporary Protections
The supplier shall make provision for engineering that will enable temporary commissioning
protection to be installed and commissioned. The supplier must also provide, install and remove
when finished with any temporary protections required to meet any Emergency Return To Service
(ERTS) requirements and for stage 2 commissioning works.

4.2.9

Trip Circuit Wiring

The supplier must supply calculations and carry out site testing that demonstrates that the circuit
breaker close and trip coils will reliably operate with a minimum of 87.5V across the coil. The
following points must be taken into consideration:

4.2.10

The formal calculations which are to be submitted for client review must be listed within the
DID. This list should include calculation reports for the CB trip and close circuitry of all existing
and new Circuit Breakers which are being worked on.
Post Design Freeze the supplier shall submit the calculations for review by National Grid.
These calculations should demonstrate that the CB trip and close coils receive sufficient
voltage for reliable operation i.e. a minimum of 87.5V. This is under minimum battery conditions
at the battery terminals as stated in TS 3.12.4 (93V for dispersed relay rooms and 102V for
Central Relay Rooms). The maximum trip and close wiring resistance in series with the trip and
close coils will form part of these calculations. This calculation must be from the contact
furthest away from the coil being considered.
During installation and Stage 1 commissioning, SCT 01 and SCT 26 (or the Suppliers
approved equivalents which must incorporate fully the requirements of SCT 01 & SCT 26)
shall be completed in full. This will confirm that the trip and close circuits conform to the
proposed design.
SCT 01 requires a check that the trip coil operates at 87.5Volts using a trip coil tester. These
testers are normally used by Asset Management staff during maintenance and the latest ones
manufactured by RES Ltd use the Substation battery as a source of supply and have a
constant voltage output variable from 5 - 95% of the input voltage. These can be used for
setting the source voltage to either 102V or 93V in a safe and controlled manner thus
representing the minimum battery state after 6 hours.
SCT 26 requires a trip to the CB from ALL initiating contacts and must be adhered to. It also
requires instantaneous volt drop measurements across the trip wiring and trip coil with suitable
UV trace recorders or storage scopes connected. This test is at normal battery voltage (125V)
but should be repeated at the minimum 6 hour value (93V or 102V) and in both cases the
voltage across the trip coil must not be less than 87.5V.
SCT 26 also refers to Transmission Design Memorandum 3/35 Site Tests to Confirm
Satisfactory Operation of Circuit Breaker Trip Coils, and provides guidance on the
requirements to be met or which can be accepted for existing installations.

Use of Opto Isolated Inputs on Modern Relays

The majority of modern IEDs make use of opto-isolated status inputs. Due to the very low burden
of this type of status input they are particularly vulnerable to inadvertent operation by induced
voltages on the wires/cables they are connected to. The supplier must ensure that suitable
precautions are taken to ensure that all IED status inputs are not vulnerable to operation by
induced voltages and that the requirements of TS 3.24.4, clauses 4.42 & 43 are fully met.
Where possible status inputs should not be energised by contacts connected to long runs of cable,
particularly ones running adjacent to power cables or between substations (i.e. HV & LV sites). If
unavoidable suitable measures must be taken such as fitting loading resistors to the status inputs
or using interposing relays to isolate them.
Where double pole switching is utilised, drain resistors must not be fitted across the contacts
switching the negative side of the supply.

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5.

RELAY EQUIPMENT BUILDINGS AND GENERAL SITE ARRANGEMENTS

5.1

Present Status
All relay equipment buildings are in reasonable condition. Some substations employ a centralised
relay room with others utilising dispersed type relay rooms. In both cases there are varying
amounts of spare capacity for new equipment.

5.2

Objectives
To maximise pre-outage work, reduce the risk on delivery during outages by installing equipment
and cabling and site function testing all prior to the outage.
This can be effected by use of existing relay room spare capacity where possible. If no spare
capacity exists consideration should be given to utilising other spare accommodation on site, relay
room extensions or a pre-fabricated / portable relay room.
Guidance will be given, if required, at the tender stage although equipment location will depend
upon current and future proposed works.
Total replacement of light current equipment will require new accommodation with cabling direct to
the plant marshalling kiosks.
Piecemeal replacement may reuse existing accommodation and cables but the extent of reuse will
depend on outage and Emergency Return to Service (ERTS) time constraints.

5.2.1

Dispersed Relay Rooms

At sites with dispersed relay rooms, a total replacement of protection and control equipment using
a 19" mounting arrangement is preferred. New swing rack cubicles meeting IP50 atmospheric
protection rating should replace existing swing frames. Retain the terminal marshalling racks and
refurbish where old larger terminal blocks are used. Modern terminal blocks are smaller and will
increase the space for additional terminations.
Any distributed high impedance busbar protection relays should be retained unchanged along with
back tripping relays where possible.
The re-use of any existing modern electronic relays will be highlighted in the enquiry document.

5.2.2

Centralised Relay Rooms

At sites with a centralised relay room, a total replacement of protection and control equipment
using a 19" mounting arrangement is preferred. New swing frame cubicles meeting IP50
atmospheric protection rating should replace existing TPS 6/12 swing frames. Where it is not cost
effective or there are outage constraints then to avoid re-cabling, arrangement can be made to reuse the existing back boxes. In this case retain the terminal marshalling racks and refurbish where
old larger terminal blocks are used. Modern terminal blocks are smaller and will increase the space
for additional terminations.
Where relay panels are removed their associated back boxes must be cleared of all terminals,
wiring and cabling. Redundant back boxes must not be used as marshalling points.
The re-use of any existing modern electronic or numeric relays will be highlighted in the enquiry
document.

5.2.3

Cabling
Over filling the existing cable trenches should be avoided. New cables should not prevent the
removal of redundant cables in the future. Also, redundant cables should be removed from the
cable trenches inside buildings and within 10 metres of building entries and marshalling kiosks and
other plant termination points.

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The condition of any multicore cables must be assessed to ensure they are suitable for re use. In
particular where cables are clamped or cleated the area around and under the clamp or cleat must
be inspected to ensure there is no damage to the cable. Cables that have V.I.R. insulation or those
that are unsuitable and/or unsound should be replaced.
For new installations consideration must also be given to segregation of signals between multicore
cables. As a minimum the following signals should be allocated to separate cables:

240/415V AC supplies.
110V DC supplies.
48V DC supplies.
First and second supplies must also be run in separate cables.
CT connections.
VT connections.
DC trip, alarm, control, & interlocking signals can be allocated to the same cable but first
and second tripping systems must be run in separate cables.
Transducer mA output signals. These must also be allocated to screened twisted pair
cable.

Where signals are being sent between different sites, for example between the HV and LV sides of
transformers the first and second trip systems must be allocated to separate cables. Ideally these
cables should be physically separated by at least 5 meters to prevent accidental damage to both
and be run in separate ducts/trenches from any parallel power cables.
Fibre Optic interconnections, supplied by the Contractor, are preferred between dispersed
equipment locations to provide electrical isolation and noise immunity.
Fibre optic cabling shall be installed and protected to the applicable TS.
6.

FEEDER PROTECTION

6.1

Feeder Main Protection

6.1.1

Present Status
Feeder first and second main protections are generally a mix of original electro-mechanical relays,
hard wired; modern electronic relays, hard wired and modern electronic relays wired to 19"
mounting arrangement.

6.1.2

Objectives
To completely replace the feeder main protection equipment within the relay room with TS 2.24
designed equipment 125VDC versions now being the standard. Any existing modern electronic
relays that are considered serviceable should be recovered and returned to National Grid stores to
support the availability of the system. Guidance will be given during the design stage of the
contract as to any EMIs (TDCs) that may be relevant to the latest equipment.
Remote (ENCC or SCP) protection IN/OUT switching is not required on new installations unless
required as a function of unlocking a protection as a result of communication failures. On SCS only
installations where protection IN/OUT switching exists these facilities should be migrated to the
new SCS. It shall only be added to protections that require the comms unlocking functionality.
However each main protection should be fitted with a test / normal switch to enable all its outputs
to be isolated.

6.1.3

Non Unit blocked overreach distance protection

National Grids preferred arrangement is that where non-unit distance protection with integral
communications is being installed it should be configured as a blocked overreach scheme if the
signalling between ends allows and the scheme is available within the equipment.

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In the event of blocking channel failure the protection should automatically revert to plain distance.
No blocking In/Out controls would be required in this instance.
An additional alarm should be raised from each end IED (1837 1ST BLOCK CHNL or 1859 2nd
BLOCK CHNL Flty/Hlthy).
6.1.4

Zone 2 override
Where blocked overreach distance protection cannot be fitted a switchable facility allowing for
instantaneous zone 2 reach shall be provided on all plain distance protections on all bay solutions.
This shall be named "Zone 2 Override" and shall allow DAR in all cases. The requirement can be
met by either overriding the zone 2 timer and causing an instantaneous zone 2 trip output without
DAR lockout, or by extending the zone 1 reach to a setting group which shall be set to the normal
zone 2 reach setting.
Remote In/Out switching of the above (to ENCC) shall be provided at the source end of any circuit
configuration where an SGT could remain on load fed from that substation. This does not include 4
switch mesh configurations. Transformer feeders where the remote zone 1 reach normally extends
into the transformer impedance do not require this remote facility.

6.1.5

GPS Timed Differential Protection

Separate GPS clocks and aerials should be provided for each GPS timed differential protection
supplied. It is not permissible for relays located on different circuits to share the timing signal from
one clock. Where a double unit protection arrangement is provided on a circuit each unit protection
must have its own clock.
The siting of GPS aerials shall be verified by a GPS survey. Installed equipment shall be monitored
for a period of not less than one month to confirm GPS integrity.
All aerials and associated receivers shall be clearly labelled with the circuit and function being
supported. In addition the aerial installation must be suitably guarded to prevent interference by
personnel.

6.2

Feeder Intertripping & Protection Signalling

6.2.1

Present Status
A mix of old and modern intertripping equipment and there associated protection interfaces.

6.2.2

Objectives
To replace any old intertrip equipment, protection-signalling equipment and associated interfaces.
Where possible use should be made of integrated intertripping and protection signalling facilities.
See 4.2.4 above. Where possible equipment utilising digital rather than analogue circuits should
be fitted. Fibre Optic cabling should be used for cross-site transmission where possible. The fibre
optic interface unit will need to be located as close to the Cable & Wireless (C & W) Service as
possible.
Test facilities shall be provided in line with the TS requirements.
Note:

Transformer disconnectors operating in the fault interfering mode require current and
voltage interlocks to be fitted following the addition of a second intertrip channel.
Power Line Carrier (PLC) intertripping equipment should be located adjacent to the circuit
relay panels. Standalone intertripping equipment that connects to the C & W service should
be located in the telecommunications room.
If the carrier equipment is not to be used consideration on the method and cost of removal
should be highlighted during the design stage.

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Operating frequencies and codes for dedicated intertripping equipment need to be

confirmed with National Grid.

6.3

Feeder Common Protection

6.3.1

Present Status
Feeder common protections (e.g.: system back-up, trip relay reset, overload and phases
unbalanced alarms etc.) are generally a mix of original electro mechanical relays, modern
electronic relays and modern electronic relays wired to 19" mounting arrangement.
There is an array of secondary bypass systems currently installed tailored to specific site
arrangements or requirements. I.e. circuit breaker bypass schemes.

6.3.2

Objectives
Replace with TS 2.24 designed equipment 125VDC versions now being the standard. Overload
alarm relays do not require replacing. Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.
Depending on the usage/usefulness remove secondary bypass arrangements where installed and
replace with new systems as detailed.

7.

SUPERGRID TRANSFORMER PROTECTION

7.1

Present Status
A typical relay room houses the following relay panels

SGT Overall Protection.

SGT HV Protection.
SGT LV Protection (Located with LV relay equipment).
Transformer End Protection (where there is an operational need to back energise).
HV Connections Protection.
LV Connections Protection.

The equipment is generally a mix of original electro mechanical relays, modern electronic relays
and modern electronic relays using a 19" mounting arrangement. Traditionally, SGT LV equipment
has been housed within Distribution Network Operator (DNO) buildings.
7.2

Objectives
To completely replace with TS 2.24 designed equipment 125VDC versions now being the standard.
The location of the SGT LV protection panel (i.e. on National Grid or DNO premises) should be
discussed & agreed with National Grid prior to the agreement of the DID.
With any circulating current protection, a calculated performance report will must be prepared by
the Contractor before equipment is ordered, to allow the correct value and thermal rating of any
resistor, Metrosil and relay range and setting values to be determined (See PS(T)010). Information
to produce calculated performance reports should be collected during the site visits and included in
the contract stage DID.
Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.

7.3

Back up Protection Settings at Operational Interfaces

Following a number of National Grid internal reviews various issues surrounding the application of
back up protection settings have been highlighted.
The main concern is grading with downstream DNO back up protection with the following
functions:-

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SGT HV 2 stage Overcurrent

SGT LV Overcurrent (where applied)
SGT LV Earth Fault
SGT Standby Earth Fault on double wound transformers (sometimes known as
unrestricted earth fault)

The approach that should be followed is: 1.

2.
3.

4.

Review the existing setting and calculate the existing operate time. This review should take
due cognisance of the type and characteristic of the old relay.
Using the new current setting (amps) as per policy calculate a new setting based on the
operate time from 1.
Using the highest Overcurrent and Earth Fault setting from interface user (DNO or Genco)
ensure positive discrimination (at least 400ms) between proposed setting and interface
setting and a clearance time of less than 2.4 seconds.
Refer any inconsistencies back to National Grid for further investigation.

National Grid will make available both the existing settings and the highest interface user setting at
sites where transformer protection replacements are planned. Please request this information if it is
not forthcoming.
8.

SHUNT REACTOR - TERTIARY AND EARTHING TRANSFORMER PROTECTION

8.1

Present Status
At some sites shunt reactors have been connected to the 13kV tertiary winding of some Supergrid
Transformers or in some cases direct to the HV busbars. In these instances, the brick building
housing the associated Shunt Reactor Protection Relay Panel and the Tertiary and Earthing
Transformer Protection Relay Panel are at best damp and at worst have rainwater leaking in.

8.2

Objectives
To locate new relay panels with TS 2.24 designed equipment in the vicinity of the existing
Supergrid Transformer Relay Panels (i.e. Centralised Relay Room or Dispersed Relay Room).
Repair or protect the fabric of existing cubicles so they may be retained as marshalling cubicles,
i.e. retain existing cabling and provide new multicore cables to the new location of the new relay
panels.
With any circulating current protection, a calculated performance report will need to be prepared by
the Contractor before equipment is ordered, to allow the correct value and thermal rating of any
resistor, Metrosil and relay range and setting values to be determined (See PS(T)010). Information
to produce calculated performance reports should be collected during the site visits and included in
the contract stage DID.
Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.

9.

MESH CORNER PROTECTION

9.1

Present Status
A typical relay room houses relay panels containing Mesh Corner Protection - Original electro
mechanical relays hard-wired.

9.2

Objectives
To replace with TS 2.24 designed equipment 125VDC versions now being the standard. Mesh
Corner Protection should be installed as part of the integrated suite of panels pre-outage. Feeder
End Protection will be included as a matter of course and may be contained within Mesh corner
and/or feeder protection.

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Where numerical mesh corner protection is being installed the use of disconnector auxiliary
switches in the current transformer ac circuitry must be avoided. Busbar replicas should be formed
internally within the equipment using digital inputs to indicate the plant position to the mesh corner
protection.
10.

BUSBAR PROTECTION

10.1

Present Status
a)

Centralised Relay Room Arrangement.

Busbar Protection A - Installed when substation commissioned.
Busbar Protection B - Added later in 1970's.
Both A & B Protections are electro mechanical relays hard wired.

b)

10.2

Dispersed Relay Room Arrangement.

Original electro mechanical relays hard-wired. Relays for each circuit located in the
respective dispersed relay room. Bus Section dispersed relay room houses additional
Common Busbar Protection.

Objectives
Busbar protection will only be replaced where a full Site light current equipment replacement is
undertaken or the extent of the work justifies a full system replacement. Where it has been
determined necessary to replace the busbar protection the methodology will be as follows:
a)

Centralised Relay Room Arrangement.

To install, pre-outage, complete Busbar Protection with TS 2.24 designed equipment.

b)

Dispersed Relay Room Arrangement.

To replace with TS 2.24 designed equipment with distributed bay units located in each
blockhouse

c)

Commissioning Handbook No. 24, Commissioning of Numerical Busbar Protection gives

details of some of the issues which must be considered when installing and extending
numerical busbar protection systems.

The complete methodology to engineer the replacement of the busbar protection and the
installation stages should be clearly outlined in the DID.
At double busbar substations when the work is restricted to refurbishment of a circuit only the
current check & timer relays should be replaced. The back tripping relays should be left in situ. All
necessary links etc should also be provided.
Where numerical busbar protection is being installed the use of disconnector auxiliary switches in
the current transformer ac circuitry must be avoided. Busbar replicas should be formed internally
within the equipment using digital inputs to indicate the plant position to the busbar protection.
Where the substation busbar protection is being replaced in its entirety the Circuit Beaker Fail
functionality should be migrated into the new numerical busbar protection.
11.

CIRCUIT BREAKER FAIL PROTECTION

11.1

Present Status
Most Circuit Breaker Fail protection equipment was added in the late 1970's and is in reasonable
condition. These relays are electronic & electro mechanical type hard wired.

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11.2

Objectives
Circuit Breaker Fail Protection will only be replaced where a full Site light current equipment
replacement is undertaken or the extent of the work justifies a full system replacement. Where it
has been determined necessary to replace the circuit breaker fail protection the methodology will
be as follows:
Centralised Relay Room Arrangement and Dispersed Relay Room Arrangement:
To replace CBF relays with TS 2.24 designed equipment where the work is restricted to feeder
replacement for that circuit at the time of the feeder outage. When the protection fitted to a circuit
within a double busbar substation is being replaced the current check and timer relay functions
should be migrated into the new IEDs and connected into the existing back tripping system.
Note: Some modern busbar protections have CBF included in their systems. Other considerations
are outlined in 4.2.4 above.

12.

BUS SECTION & BUS COUPLER PROTECTION

12.1

Present Status
Bus Section Protection equipment is generally a mix of original electro mechanical relays hard
wired, modern electronic relays hard wired and modern electronic relays wired to 19" mounting
arrangement. The existence of Commissioning Overcurrent protection on Bus Section circuits
needs to be determined at the site visit, as the installation programme has been inconsistent. Mesh
circuit breakers are considered to be Bus Section breakers in this context.

12.2

Objectives
To completely replace the protection equipment within the relay room with equipped with TS 2.24
designed equipment. Also, add Commissioning Overcurrent protection to 19" mounting
arrangement.
Commissioning overcurrent shall be installed with local (panel mounted) IN/OUT switching.
Software or internal logic selection of Commissioning Overcurrent relays is not acceptable.

13.

CIRCUIT BREAKER RELAY PANELS

13.1

Present Status
Circuit breaker relay equipment is generally original electro-mechanical relays hard wired.

13.2

Objectives
To replace with NGTS 2.24 designed equipment.
The contractor must be aware of the rating and suitability of the output contacts of circuit breaker
control relays in view of the wide range of CB control schemes and CB close coil ratings. Other
considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.

14.

FAULT RECORDERS

14.1

Present Status
Dedicated fault recorders are installed on the majority of 400 & 275kV feeder circuits.

14.2

Objectives
Replace with NGTS 2.24 designed equipment. Generally the integral fault recording and event
logging facilities within equipment forming part of Standard Bay Solutions should be utilised.
Dedicated standalone fault recorders are not required unless specifically specified by National Grid.

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Where removal of feeder monitoring from a fault recorder leaves only bus coupler, section and
SGT inputs on the recorder these should be transferred to spare inputs on other existing fault
recorders on site and the recorder removed. The recorder should not be left in situ with a limited
number of inputs. Where no existing fault recorders are available, the circuit fault recorder shall be
relocated in a suitable relay room (such as the Bus Section) and the coupler, section and SGT
inputs reconnected. This can also be used for future refurbishments on other feeder bays. An
alternative is to use spare fault recorder trigger inputs on the new IEDs as long as the IED has time
synchronisation via a GPS signal in this case it is acceptable to dispense with monitoring
transformer neutral current.
Note: A C & W circuit may be required for a connection to an on-site IMU (if required). Sites with
integrated system monitor requirements (ISM) are specified separately and are to be installed with
facilities independent from the fault recorder.
Integrated functionality of protection relays shall be used as fault recorders where they meet the
NGTS requirements and the information can be presented at the IMU (if installed). The
requirements are detailed in TS 3.24.71.
Remote fault recorder event extraction is normally provided via the IMU. For sites where there is no
IMU then no remote fault record extraction shall be provided.
15.

DELAYED AUTO RECLOSE

15.1

Present Status
Original electro mechanical relays, hard wired.

15.2

Objectives
a)

Double Busbar Substation.

To replace Delayed Auto Reclose (DAR) with TS 2.24 designed equipment on a per circuit
basis at the time of a feeder outage. The DAR relay will have integral synchronising facilities
that will replace the existing site facilities. This relay will carry out both the manual and
automatic synchronising.

b)

Mesh Substation.
To install, pre-outage, complete mesh substation Delayed Auto Reclose with TS 2.24
designed equipment.
The transfer of DAR to the new equipment can be done by either taking a complete site DAR
outage or transferring each mesh corner from existing to new Delayed Auto Reclose on a
per mesh corner basis during short consecutive mesh corner outages.
This is site dependent and the site status is identified in the Substation Design Specification.
The supplier must be aware of the rating and suitability of the output contacts of circuit
breaker control relays in view of the wide range of CB control schemes and CB close coil
ratings.
The DAR interlocking facility (Trip Relay Reset) should be considered and novel solutions
offered to emulate this functionality.
The DAR facility should include DAR synchronising, auto isolation, LV DAR and
ferroresonance where possible to simplify and reduce the interfacing requirements.
Consideration should also be given to the use of solutions that utilise information available
from other equipment such as the SCS to achieve the DAR functionality.
The existing manual synchronising arrangements should be left in place.

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16.

FERRORESONANCE PROTECTION

16.1

Present Status
A mix of CEGB SW Region designed equipment and early GEC designed equipment hard wired.

16.2

Objectives
To replace this equipment with TS 2.24 designed equipment.
All mesh corners with a transformer connected and a feeder having the ability to ferroresonate with
that transformer (or other arrangements with plant connected to the line and the feeder is on a
double circuit tower line), require as a minimum a Ferroresonance alarm facility.
Where the feeder is > 10 km in length further measures are required to either lock out the DAR or
quench the ferroresonance:

The preferred method is an F4 scheme. Suitable earth switches will probably not be
available on protection refurbishment schemes. This method should therefore only be
implemented on switchgear contracts unless otherwise advised by National Grid.

For protection or DAR refurbishment on 275kV sites, an F2B scheme should be provided
as the default option with the provision for an upgrade to an F3 scheme via a setting
change (assuming auto operation of SGT HV disconnectors is controlled by the DAR unit).

For protection or DAR refurbishment on 400kV sites, an F3 scheme should be provided as

the default with the provision for downgrade to an F2B scheme via a setting change.

The above mentioned setting changes are dependent on the design quenching capabilities of the
disconnector. For information on scheme description see TS 3.24.17, TS 3.24.80 & TGN(E)086.
17.

CAPACITOR
EQUIPMENT

17.1

Present Status

VOLTAGE

TRANSFORMERS

&

POWER

LINE

CARRIER

COUPLING

400kV line traps are generally in good condition.

275kV line traps may require refurbishing viz.:
Condition of varnish on end sheets

Is casting single or double door type

Condition of tuning capacitors within line traps

Many coupling equipments were installed at the time of the original installation and may be
deteriorating in a hostile environment.
Determine type and condition of co-axial cable. CVT fuse boxes and CVT marshalling kiosks may
be deteriorating in a hostile environment. Original Anaconda connection between the coupling
equipment and CVT may be deteriorating in a hostile environment. High frequency earthing may
not exist or if installed not always be to the required specification. EMIs (TDCs) may need carrying
out to increase the burden on the CVTs.
In general, for all line traps, the requirements of drawing 95/52182 shall be carried out.

17.2

Objectives
If specified in the contract replace all secondary equipment on a like for like basis with modern
integrated and type registered units.
400kV line traps - Refurbish as necessary, or replace with a new line trap.

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275kV line traps - Refurbish as necessary, or replace with a new line trap.
Note: A Casting base with double doors is essential if a wide band unit is a requirement.
Replace old AEI, EEC or GEC original coupling units with equivalent equipment.
To replace co-axial cable if not to the latest specification and replace CVT fuse boxes and CVT
marshalling kiosks if deteriorating due to hostile environment.
Replace Anaconda connection with modern equivalent if coupling equipment is changed. Add high
frequency earthing if none fitted or modify if not to the required specification.
CVT burden resistors must be added in line with the relevant TDCs to prevent Ferroresonance and
pre-load it to at least 50% of rating on old style CVTs in order to improve accuracy.
17.3

High Frequency Earthing/Corona Rings

Where Line Traps are being removed as a consequence of protection refurbishment, their
associated line coupling equipment and tuning inductor must also be removed. Earth bars should
replace the tuning inductor and make the final connection to earth, providing earth continuity to the
secondary side of the CVT. The requirements are detailed in TGN(T)18 & TDC 255.
The photographs in Appendix 2 illustrate the requirements, although reference must be made to
TGN(T)18 for further details. These show a link being added to short out the tuning inductor
connections, and a final earth connection being made where the coupling equipment is normally
connected. Failure to fit these earth bars could result in catastrophic failure of the CVT.
Where line traps are being removed the busbars shall be made good and ancillary items
such corona rings shall be fitted. All three VTs shall be left with the same primary
connections.
Further to this on circuits where this work is being carried out, all CVTs should be fitted with High
Frequency earthing where it is not installed already.
These issues must be raised as a point for discussion at the commissioning panel and noted within
the minutes.

18.

SUBSTATION CLOCK & DISTRIBUTION OF TIMING

18.1

Present Status
Equipment currently installed supports transmission timing from the MSF signal (ex Rugby source).
It is distributed using serial transmission to the onsite SCS or METRO, the OMS (PE) where
installed and provides clean contact half-hour timing pulses to other equipment such as fault
recorders. The aerial for the radio clock is fitted internally or externally near the telecomms room.

18.2

Objectives
Where identified the equipment is to be replaced with TS 2.24 designed equipment. This will
provide a timing source synchronised to GPS. GPS aerials require line of site to the sky and need
to be fitted externally. The supplier must carry out a survey to ensure that the aerial can locate
signals from sufficient satellites.
Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.
For total site refurbishment of light current equipment the preference is for all relay equipment that
requires a timing source to utilise the station clock, which itself may need to be installed.
For feeder replacement specific GPS aerial and receivers can be used with individual feeder
equipment. Separate GPS clocks are required when both main protections fitted on a feeder are
unit protections.

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19.

110V DC & 48V DC SUPPLIES

19.1

Present Status
There is an agreed programme to replace most 110V dc batteries, chargers and distribution boards
by Maintenance Delivery - Electricity. There is a mix, some battery cells have recently been
replaced whilst others are still quite old. Where new battery cells have been replaced the
distribution boards are still of an old design.

19.2

Objectives
During all activities involved in this contract the existing and final battery loads are to be assessed.
Distribution boards can be extended where required but only after assessments of load and
capacity have been carried out and point to design acceptance.
Where necessary batteries should be replaced with new TS compliant units. The guidance within
Operational Engineering & Safety Bulletin (OESB) 14/2000, Issue 2, 01/02/2001 must be followed.
This states that:

When the installation is a substation central/common battery where dedicated battery room
accommodation exists to facilitate open rack mounting, Plant cells are to be used. This
also applies when existing systems deploying VRLA batteries are being replaced.
All new sites designed with common substation batteries must be specifically configured to
safely accommodate and ventilate Plant technology as stated.
Smaller capacity installations which are to be accommodated where space and ventilation
is at a premium, for example in blockhouses, telecommunications rooms, LVAC rooms etc
may employ VRLA cells as an alternative to Plant cells.
Whenever batteries are replaced, the charger/distribution boards must be assessed to
ensure that they remain suitable for the specific characteristics and performance of the
new battery.

Where 48V batteries and chargers have been rendered partially or completely un-used by work on
this contract the contractor shall rationalise on the remaining units. The redundant units shall be
disposed of in an approved manner.
20.

415V LVAC SUPPLIES

.

20.1

Objectives
LVAC board extensions or spare way equipping may be required as part of this contract,
assessment of load and capacity must again be carried out beforehand.

21.

SYNCHRONISING & VOLTAGE SELECTION

21.1

Present Status
In most installations a Brush Syscheck Relay is used for synchronising. A Syscheck relay is
provided for each synchronised breaker. A voltage selection scheme is used to switch the incoming
and running volts to the selected Syscheck. A synchronising interface unit (a Microsol unit for
METRO installation or an SCS function for SCS equipment) is used to pass remote control signals
to the Syscheck to close the circuit breaker under the different synchronising closure modes.

21.2

Objectives
Where identified the equipment is to be replaced with TS 2.24 designed equipment. The newly
installed schemes should meet the requirements of TS 3.24.60.
When refurbishing protection on double busbar circuits the synchronising should be transferred into
the new bay solution for both manual synchronising and DAR.

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When a new control system only is being installed on a double busbar bay or on a mesh substation
the manual synchronising should reside within the bay controller and the existing system retained
for use by the DAR relays.
21.3

Synchronizing Voltage Monitoring

Incoming volts MCB auxiliary contacts should be used circuit by circuit to both inhibit all close
commands (both manual and automatic) on the specific circuit IED (but not the emergency close)
and also raise a site alarm. No fuses or links should be left in any bay specific synchronising
scheme wiring and all MCB auxiliary contacts should operate the above-mentioned functions.
The alarm to be raised should be
1828 Site

CTRL SYS ABNORMOn/Off

42208 SYNCH VT SUPLY

Flty/Hlthy

Monitoring of running volts is achieved by applying the above to all VT supply sources.
For mesh sites the above shall apply but operation of the MCB on the line VT shall inhibit all close
commands (both manual and automatic) on the IEDs on all adjacent local circuit breakers. The
close inhibition shall only apply when the line disconnector is closed.
Note that all close commands includes both synchronising and non-synchronising close
commands.
Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.
22.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT UNIT (IMU)

22.1

Present Status
Limited number of IMUs installed at present. Current method of collecting information is with the
use of standalone system that has dial-up access to specific devices such as SCS, fault recorders,
metering, etc.

22.2

Objectives
If scope of work includes the SCS replacement then an IMU with TS 2.24 designed equipment
should be installed.

23.

SUPERVISION

23.1

Present Status
Specific relays used to supervise individual relays and equipment. Separate schemes to provide
VT, CT, DC Supply and Trip supervision facilities.

23.2

Objectives
Where identified, the equipment is to be replaced with TS 2.24 designed equipment.
The
preference for VT and CT supervision is that the supervision facility is integrated with the
equipment that utilises the VT or CT input. The watchdog of the powered IED can undertake DC
supply supervision function.
Other considerations are outlined in 4.2.4 above.

23.3

CT Supervision
With respect to CT supervision the following requirements apply: For all relays with single three phase direct CT inputs (i.e. no resistors and auxiliary switches
and one three phase CT) then the CT supervision shall be disabled,

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For all relays with > one direct three phase CT input then the CT supervision shall be a
differential measurement and shall be enabled.

For all relays with > one direct CT input where the CT supervision is not a differential
measurement, but the protection setting is sensitive then the CT supervision shall be
disabled.

For all other cases the CT supervision facility shall be enabled.

23.4

Trip Circuit Supervision

With respect to trip circuit supervision the following requirements shall apply:

Where a single IED is being used to monitor two trip circuits, NG require a further alarm to
be brought out from the watchdog. This should indicate that the trip circuit supervision
function is no longer available.

The following alarm shall be provided and shall be included in the GEM:Raw alarm :- "TRIP CCT SUPVN FLTY/HLTHY" Grouped as:- "SITE PROT ABNORMAL
ON/OFF".

24.

TESTING FACILITIES

24.1

Routine Trip Test Facilities

All Main Protection IEDs shall be fitted with a lockable trip test facility to simulate all required
outputs for a Main Protection trip test (including auto switching). Note that a Main Protection IED is
one which carries out a Main Protection function such as transformer protection, mesh corner
protection, and reactor protection.
The trip test shall be possible with the relay in TEST mode but not overriding any functionality
blocked by this mode (see below).

24.2

Test /Normal Facilities

Each IED is required to be fitted with a Test/Normal switch to enable it to be isolated prior to work
being carried out.
For feeder protections with integral intertripping, the test/normal switch shall disable all trip outputs
in that IED and there is no requirement for a separate DTT Out/In switch.
A channel test facility is not required on relays which monitor the integrity of the communications
channel continuously and which provide signalling statistics automatically.
For all protections with remote relays the following basic Test/Normal functionality is required:1. With one relay in test, all trip outputs are physically blocked by the switch and all remote
communication blocked with the exception of the relay in test signal to remote peers.
2. With all relays in test, 1. above applies but all remote communication should continue as normal.
3. With one relay in test, Feeder unit protection relays should prevent the remote relays(s) from
outputting a differential trip.
4. With one relay in test, Feeder non-unit protection relays should allow the remote relays(s) to
operate normally including remaining in blocked mode.

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24.3

Test Points for On Load or Stage 2 Commissioning Checks

As the modern protection test blocks cause the CT circuits to be shorted out when a test plug is
inserted it is difficult to use them for on load or stage 2 commissioning tests as the Voltage cannot
be monitored unless the CTs are shorted out. The test block & plug design should therefore
enable the CT circuits to be maintained when a plug is inserted to monitor the circuit volts.
Alternatively provision should be made within the suppliers designs for suitable test points or
terminal blocks where connections can easily be attached to monitor circuit volts for the purposes
of on load and phasing out checks.

25.

CONTROL SYSTEMS

25.1

Plant Interface Engineering for New or Modified Control Systems

The Contractor will determine the drawings required to carry out the works from the drawings /
records held at each site.
Where the existing plant interface is found to be incomplete for control & data acquisition purposes,
the required interface is to be designed & provided by the supplier. This may include the supply of
ancillary equipment.
Where synchronising is required on Circuit Breakers, this shall be provided within the Substation
Control System functionality or by utilisation of an external scheme using Type Registered
equipment.
The suppliers proposed methodology for the transfer of the plant connections from the existing to
the new control system shall be agreed in advance with National Grid.
The design should recognise that there may be considerable delays between transferring circuits
and it will be necessary to operate the site with the control of circuits split between the existing and
the new control systems. The transition strategy shall be agreed in advance with National Grid and
must be managed to ensure there is no disruption to operational facilities.
In addition to the transfer of facilities to the new Substation Control System the contractors
engineering package will need to take account of the following:

That a certain number of defined facilities will need to be maintained on the old Substation
Control System for ENCC purposes until after the final data switch date. This will normally
be scheduled after the completion of the last circuit outage.

The recovery of any temporary wiring or redundant equipment after the final data switch
date

Where it is necessary to derive analogue signals from transducers, the Supplier shall provide or
replace the transducers (as necessary) to ensure the overall design life of fifteen years.
The supplier needs to be aware that an Emergency Return To Service (ERTS) Request may be
made by National Grid at any time whilst access to the Grid System is being permitted. The
Contractors design at each site should take account of the ERTS times quoted for particular
circuits within any specific contract.
The supplier must design the works at each site to take account of any site-specific restrictions
(particularly those related to safety matters, such as exclusion zones).
In order to cater for future expansion at each substation all works should result in the removal of as
much equipment (i.e. wall boxes / cubicles / panels etc.) as possible. Suppliers are requested to
engineer the works to achieve this objective, however it is recognised that this may result in the
provision of additional, new cabling direct to plant items.

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25.2

Synchronising Interface to TS 3.24.60

TS 3.24.60 specifies the synchronising requirements to be provided for new and Control System
replacement sites. It does not specify the complete Circuit Breaker Close control requirements nor
does it give guidance on the configuration requirements necessary to meet the needs of National
Grids Control Centre computer, the IEMS. The following sections detail these issues.

25.2.1

Circuit Breaker Close Requirements.

Circuit Breaker close requirements fall into two categories:
1. Closure is never conditioned by a synchronising relay and simple OPEN/CLOSE controls
only are required. These controls simply cause the energisation of IPO/IPC relays as
appropriate and feedback signals are provided by the circuit breaker double point plant
states.
2. Circuit Breaker closure is normally conditioned by on-site synchronising functionality
Closure via the synch function is covered by TS 3.24.60. IEMS OPEN/CLOSE controls
appear the same as for the non-synch breaker above and feedback signals are provided
by the circuit breaker double point plant states. In this case however the CLOSE control is
conditioned by on-site equipment. No other feedback is required. Circuit breakers of this
type however require an additional Emergency Close control. This feature is not covered
by TS 3.24.60.
The Emergency Close control issued by the IEMS results in the energisation of the IPC relay
completely by-passing the on site synch function. In this case however it is not possible to use the
circuit breaker double point plant state for IEMS feedback purposes. A pseudo bit generated by
the SCS should provide feedback for this Emergency Close control. This bit should normally
return a state of Emergency Close OUT (1) to the IEMS. When it is becomes necessary to send
an Emergency Close control the IEMS will drive the standing bit 1 to 0, and the SCS will output a
control pulse to the appropriate circuit breaker IPC. The SCS should respond by setting the
pseudo bit, temporarily to Emergency Close IN (0) (providing the confirmatory feedback to the
IEMS). After a period of say 2 seconds the SCS should reset the pseudo bit to Emergency Close
OUT (1), in readiness for the sending of the next Emergency Close control from the IEMS. When
the circuit beaker closes the normal (CLOSED) double point plant state will sent to the IEMS.
The required grouping strategy for the TS 3.24.60 indications/alarms is as follows:
PER

INFORMATION

(At SCP)

CB

CB

SYNCH IN
PROGRESS
SYSTEM SYNCH IN
PROGRESS
SYNCH FUNCTION

CB

SYNCH VT FAIL

CB

VALUE (event list)

On (1) / Off (0)
IN / OUT

(At ENCC)

PER
N/A

VALUE (GI74)
On (1) / off (0)
Not Required

IN / OUT

CB

IN/OUT

FLTY/HLTHY

SITE

ALARM/OFF

SITE

CNTRL SYS ABNORMAL

ON/OFF
CNTRL SYS ABNORMAL
ON/OFF

NB: ENCC SITE = One grouped alarm per voltage level

25.2.2

Emergency Close Requirements on Legacy SCSs.

In line within the new TS 3.24.60 for simplified synchronising there is now a requirement for an
emergency close control command. As stated above a pseudo bit generated by the SCS should
provide feedback for this control.
However a number of National Grids current population of SCSs (i.e. pre NICAP) cannot provide
a software generated feedback indication for the above mentioned control.
To overcome this problem at these sites it is necessary for the bay solution provider to engineer a
mechanism for providing this feedback for the emergency control command.

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This solution should be engineered in regardless of the manufacturer of the existing SCS type
present on site.
National Grid considers the following sketch in Appendix 1 to be a possible design solution.
25.3

Automatic Tap Change Control (ATCC)

In designing ATCC solutions, the following shall be considered:

Provision of an ATCC system at a site requires that all necessary (SGT) circuits are
connected to the point of control of the ATCC functionality (plus information from LV
busbars).

National Grid requires suppliers to outline within the DID a detailed explanation of how the
transfer from any existing ATCC system at a site to the ATCC functionality with the new
control system will be accomplished without any degradation in the tapchanger facilities at
the site, with testing intentions for any temporary wiring installed and how removal of such
temporary wiring will be achieved.

The Contractor will be required to design and implement graphical interfaces for use with the
Substation Control Point, based on the site Operation Diagrams. Sample graphical interface
designs must be submitted as part of the DID.
25.4

Interlocking
When carrying out SCS replacement work when the existing equipment contains software
interlocking a suitable strategy must be developed to transfer the interlocking from the old to the
new system. The methodology for transferring the interlocks must be fully outlined in the DID and
agreed with National Grid prior to the commencement of any transfer.
Full site interlocking must be available throughout the period of transfer from the old to the new
system.

26

CIRCUIT BREAKER REPLACEMENT

This section applies to both circuit breaker replacement and CB control scheme
replacement.

26.1

400kV Circuit Breakers

Generally all existing 400kV circuit breakers are fitted with duplicate tripping systems. These
facilities must be maintained when the circuit breakers and/or the protection equipment are
replaced. Any new equipment must be fitted with these facilities.
Circuit breakers with 3 phase tripping facilities must be fitted where possible. This is to reduce
complexity within the tripping circuitry, as single-phase mechanisms require two independent trip
circuits per pole. This complexity is particularly bad at Mesh substations.

26.2

275kV Circuit Breakers

All new 275kV circuit breakers are specified with duplicate tripping facilities. However a large
percentage of older 275kV air blast & bulk oil circuit breakers are fitted with a single trip coil. This
particularly applies to those installed in the 1950s & 60s.
When replacing such a circuit breaker the new one shall have duplicate trip coils in compliance with
TS 3.2.1. Where the existing system is fitted with a single tripping system the trip circuits must be
re-engineered to form duplicate trip circuits in line with the TS 3.24 series of specifications. This
applies to all circuit types: i.e. feeders, transformers, bus sections, bus couplers, mesh circuit
breakers etc.

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When replacing the protection on a circuit fitted with a single trip coil circuit breaker the protection
trip circuits must be fully duplicated. This includes providing functions such as trip circuit
supervision, simulated trip test facilities and isolation links for both trip circuits. However the trip
contacts should be arranged to operate the single coil with the circuit being readily convertible to
duplicate tripping if the circuit breaker is replaced.
It is possible to convert some of the single trip coil circuit breakers to duplicate coils if so desired,
but this work must be carefully considered. In particular type JW420 bulk oil circuit breakers are
fitted with a second trip coil to allow the circuit breaker to be used for high speed auto reclose. This
facility is not used on National Grids system and is not suitable for use as a second trip coil without
mechanical modification as the coil does not cause the circuit breaker to fully latch. If it is
necessary to use this coil as a second trip coil agreement must be obtained from the relevant
National Grid project engineer to carry out this work. The design and method of modifying the trip
latch must also be agreed with National Grid prior to the work being commenced. Generally if a
protection refurbishment is carried out on a circuit fitted with a JW420 with a single trip circuit it
should be returned to service with the same trip circuit in service.
26.3

Simulated Trip Test Socket Facilities

A Simulated Trip Test Socket as described in TPS(standard) 12/57 is required for each trip circuit,
i.e. for trip circuit 1 and trip circuit 2. This will normally take the form of a yellow STTS socket, but
an alternative arrangement may be installed by agreement from National Grid. The facility should
provide the functionality to operate the trip circuit and provide an operation indication without
tripping the main circuit breaker.

27.

AUTHORISATION/REVISION

Rev N

Date

Author

Revision Details

Authorised by

20/01/06

A J Chamberlain

First Issue, previous documents

& CDCs combined into DH.

Keith Harker

29/06/07

A J Chamberlain

General Update to take account

of project experiences.
Additions shown in red.

Keith Harker

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DH 01 Issue 2
June 2007
APPENDIX 1: EMERGENCY CLOSE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGACY SCSS

S C S I/O
U nit

S C S I/O
U nit

Synchronising
IED

C B C lose +

SCS +

C B C lose -

SCS -

Synchronising
IED

Synchronising
IED

IPC

CB
Em ergency
C lose +

EC
Aux

CB
Em ergency
C lose CB
Em ergency
C lose indication

C om m on

Sketch to be used for guidance

only and does not represent a fully
engineered solution

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APPENDIX 2: REMOVAL OF EXISTING POWER LINE CARRIER EQUIPMENT.

Coax removed from this

terminal may also have a
spark gap to earth. (Also to be
removed).

Series Tuning
unit to be
removed

Blanking
plate to
be fitted

New tinned copper link to be fitted.

Original size fitted was 1x 12.5 mm

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DH 01 Issue 2
June 2007

Existing
earth bar.

Earth link to be fitted

1x12.5 mm Tinned
copper, after removal
of coax/spark gap.

Page 26 of 26