Basic and Applied Social Psychology

ISSN: 0197-3533 (Print) 1532-4834 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hbas20

Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments:

Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate
Geoffrey D. Munro , Peter H. Ditto , Lisa K. Lockhart , Angela Fagerlin ,
Mitchell Gready & Elizabeth Peterson
To cite this article: Geoffrey D. Munro , Peter H. Ditto , Lisa K. Lockhart , Angela Fagerlin ,
Mitchell Gready & Elizabeth Peterson (2002) Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments:
Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 24:1, 15-26
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15324834BASP2401_2

Published online: 07 Jun 2010.

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BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL

MUNRO
ARGUMENTS
ET AL.

BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 24(1), 1526

Copyright 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the

1996 U.S. Presidential Debate
Geoffrey D. Munro
Department of Psychology
St. Marys College of Maryland

Peter H. Ditto

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Department of Psychology and Social Behavior

University of California, Irvine

Lisa K. Lockhart
Department of Psychology and Sociology
Texas A&M UniversityKingsville

Angela Fagerlin, Mitchell Gready, and Elizabeth Peterson

Department of Psychology
Kent State University

The tendency for people to rate attitude-confirming information more positively than attitude-disconfirming information (biased assimilation) was studied in a naturalistic context. Participants watched and evaluated the first 1996 Presidential Debate between Bill Clinton and Bob
Dole. Regression analyses revealed that predebate attitudes but not expectations predicted
postdebate argument evaluations and perceived attitude change. Participants evaluated the arguments that confirmed their predebate attitudes as being stronger than the arguments that
disconfirmed their predebate attitudes, and they perceived their postdebate attitudes to have become more extreme than their predebate attitudes. Self-reported affective responses mediated
the association between predebate attitudes and postdebate argument evaluations. The role of
affect in information-processing theories and the significance of the findings for sociopolitical
debates are discussed.

By exposing people to opposing political viewpoints, public

debates like those preceding presidential elections are
thought by many to lead a significant percentage of people to
undergo a rational analysis of the full range of arguments
and, ultimately, to change their opinions. Certainly, it is not
difficult to call to mind historical examples of presidential
debates that seem to have had a significant effect on public
opinion. John F. Kennedys telegenic performance in his
1960 debate against Richard Nixon is thought by many to
have boosted him into the presidency. Similarly, many political pundits believe that Ronald Reagans strong outing versus Jimmy Carter in 1980 legitimized his candidacy and cata-

Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Geoffrey D. Munro, Department of Psychology, St. Marys College of Maryland, St. Marys City,
MD 20686. E-mail: gdmunro@smcm.edu

lyzed his victory 1 week later on election day. In fact, some

survey data support the anecdotal evidence by suggesting
that Reagans performance did indeed produce a significant
change in the opinions of those with relatively low levels of
political knowledge (Davis, 1982; Lanoue, 1992).
Considerably more data, on the other hand, suggest that
rather than changing peoples opinions, debates simply reinforce viewers prior attitudes (Bothwell & Brigham, 1983; E.
Katz & Feldman, 1962; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sears &
Chaffee, 1979). Sigelman and Sigelman (1984) even found
this to be true of the 1980 CarterReagan debate that was
thought to have had such a strong impact in changing voters
opinions. This research continued to investigate attitude
change and attitude reinforcement by studying the effects of
the first 1996 Presidential Debate in a setting that retained the
naturalism of a national opinion survey while controlling for
the confounds inherent in survey research.

16

MUNRO ET AL.

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BIASED ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDE

RESISTANCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL
INFORMATION
From a social psychological viewpoint, the finding that peoples political attitudes are resistant to change is not surprising. One of the hallmarks of social cognition research is that
when a person forms a belief, attitude, or expectation, that
cognition becomes relatively resistant to change regardless
of whether information presented subsequently supports or
refutes it. Research on the primacy effect (Asch, 1946; Jones,
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Langer & Roth,
1975; McAndrew, 1981), anchoring and insufficient adjustment (Cervone & Peake, 1986; Plous, 1989; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and the
belief perseverance effect (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980;
Jelalian & Miller, 1984; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975)
demonstrates that initial attitudes and beliefs often bias the
way that subsequent information is processed. Specifically,
rather than accommodating the new information, the new information is assimilated to the existing cognition. The seminal work of Hastorf and Cantril (1954) exemplifies the tendency of an existing cognition like a schema to bias the
interpretation of subsequent information. On viewing an especially rough and heated football game between rivals
Dartmouth and Princeton, Dartmouth students observed
more flagrant violations committed by Princeton players,
whereas Princeton students observed more flagrant violations committed by Dartmouth players. Presumably, the existing cognition that the football team representing ones
own university consisted of tough but fair sportsmen influenced the interpretations of the violence that ensued during
the game.
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) demonstrated that this effect generalized to the processing of sociopolitical information. They showed that peoples attitudes toward capital
punishment affected their evaluations of the methodologies
of two scientific studies, one with procapital punishment
conclusions and one with anticapital punishment conclusions. Participants displayed a biased assimilation of the
mixed evidence. Proponents of the death penalty appeared to
accept and integrate the results of the study suggesting that
the death penalty effectively reduces crime, but they seemed
to discount and reject the results of the study suggesting that
the death penalty does not reduce crime. Opponents of the
death penalty rated the studies in the opposite manner. In addition, Lord et al. showed that after reading and evaluating
the two studies, participants reported that their attitudes toward capital punishment had become more extreme. This
was termed attitude polarization.
The Lord et al. (1979) study has spawned a large body of
research and theoretical debate. Two issues in particular have
received a great deal of attention. First, having been studied
exclusively in the laboratory, it is difficult to know whether
biased assimilation would generalize to more naturalistic set-

tings. Second, theoretical debate has emerged as a result of

investigations attempting to uncover the causal mechanism
underlying biased assimilation.

THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF BIASED

ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDE
POLARIZATION
The basic effect first documented by Lord et al. (1979) has
been replicated with several different kinds of information
and a variety of issues. Although the original study found the
biased assimilation effect using methodologically detailed
descriptions of scientific studies, it has also been found using
much shorter evidence summaries (McHoskey, 1995), persuasive essays presented via audiotape (Zuwerink & Devine,
1996), and logical arguments containing a single premise and
conclusion (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Furthermore, the effect has been shown with a variety of issues including capital
punishment (Lord et al., 1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, &
Dowd, 1993; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995), the
safety of nuclear power (Plous, 1991), the ban on gays in the
military (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996), stereotypes associated
with homosexuality (Munro & Ditto, 1997), and theories regarding the JFK assassination (McHoskey, 1995).
In each of the aforementioned studies, however, the information presented to participants was either constructed or selected by the researcher(s). It is likely that the materials were
chosen so that opposing pieces of information would be
equally balanced and thus open to alternative interpretations.
In essence, the materials were selected because they would
maximize the possibility that biased assimilation would occur. One question posed in this research is, Will the biased
assimilation effect replicate in response to naturally occurring and potentially unbalanced information like the arguments presented in a political debate? The first goal of this
research was to determine whether or not biased assimilation
can be generalized to a more naturalistic setting using information presented in real time. Specifically, will viewers of
the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate rate the arguments of their
favored candidate more positively than the arguments of the
opposing candidate?
Another issue related to the external validity of biased assimilation and attitude polarization is the duration of the effects. Do the effects persist over time or are they limited to
the timeframe of the experimental session? If the effects are
shortlived and disappear soon after the participants exit the
laboratory, then the effect might simply be an interesting bias
found in response to certain materials presented in a laboratory context rather than a bias that might ultimately underlie
behavioral actions and hold important real-world implications. This research will further assess the external validity of
biased assimilation and attitude polarization by measuring
participants reactions to the information not only directly af-

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

ter the presentation of the information but also 1 week later.

The endurance of peoples reactions to a presidential debate,
of course, has important implications for actual voting behavior that occurs at the very least 1 week after the debate.

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BIASED ASSIMILATION: A COGNITIVE

OR MOTIVATIONAL PHENOMENON
In addition to the external validity question, biased assimilation and the original interpretation of the effect have been at
the crux of a recent theoretical debate. Biased assimilation was
originally presented by Lord et al. (1979) as a purely cognitive
bias consistent with the more general social psychological
finding that expectations bias the processing of subsequent information in a manner that serves to increase the probability
that the expectancy perseveres (Darley & Gross, 1983;
Duncan, 1976; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Merton, 1957;
Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder
& Uranowitz, 1978; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas,
1995; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Others have argued that
biased assimilation could easily have been interpreted as a
motivationally based bias (Aronson, 1989, 1992; Berkowitz
& Devine, 1989) consistent with cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957). Although the theoretical argument in support of the motivational interpretation was cogent and persuasive, it was also convincingly counterargued that without empirical evidence there is no need to expand on the more
parsimonious cognitive explanation (Lord, 1989, 1992).
More recently, empirical studies have begun to inform
this debate. Edwards and Smith (1996) showed that increased emotional conviction toward an issue is associated
with increased bias against arguments disconfirming ones
prior beliefs. Zuwerink and Devine (1996) found that resistance to change ones attitude was mediated by both thought
listings and self-reported affect. They concluded that attitude
resistance is both a cognitive and an affective phenomenon.
Finally, from data collected using a conceptual replication of
the Lord et al. (1979) paradigm, Munro and Ditto (1997) constructed a path model that was consistent with an affectivemotivational account of biased assimilation. In this
model, it was found that differential affective reactions to attitude-confirming and attitude-disconfirming information
mediated the effect of prior attitude on evaluations of the
quality of the information (i.e., biased assimilation).
Reframing the theoretical debate in terms of viewers reactions to a presidential debate, the central issue is the mechanism underlying peoples evaluations of the candidates and
their arguments. Is it a rational analysis in which the arguments are evaluated in relation to ones prior knowledge and
expectations about the debate? Or, is it an emotional process
in which the arguments are evaluated in relation to the affect
that is felt in response to the presentations of the particular
candidates? The expectancy view holds that those in favor of

17

a particular candidate expect that candidate to win, and any

information that disconfirms the expectation is processed in
a way that puts it at an evaluative disadvantage relative to information that confirms the expectation. In contrast, the affectivemotivational view holds that those in favor of a
particular candidate have positive feelings toward that candidate, and any information attacking the favored candidate
creates negative affect motivating the individual to evaluate
it more negatively than information supporting the favored
candidate. Consistent with the affectivemotivational account, research has shown that peoples emotional reactions
to presidential candidates are better predictors of overall voting preferences than are beliefs about candidates personality
traits and behaviors (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske,
1982).
Therefore, the second goal of this research was to examine whether or not emotional reactions to presidential candidates also predict evaluative reactions to the arguments
presented by the candidates during a political debate. To
examine the role of affect as a potential mediator of the link
between prior attitudes and evaluations of the debate arguments, participants emotional reactions to the presentations of the two candidates during the debate were
measured. Also, the role of expectancy in affecting evaluations of the debate arguments was investigated by measuring participants predebate expectations about the outcome
of the debate.

METHOD
Participants
Seventy undergraduates (34 women and 36 men) at a medium-sized state university received course credit for their
participation in the study. Of the 70 participants, 60 were
successfully contacted by telephone before the second presidential debate. All analyses include only those participants
that completed the measure in question.
Procedure
The first debate between Democratic President Bill
Clinton and the Republican challenger Bob Dole took
place on October 6, 1996. Participants arrived at the experimental session half an hour before the live broadcast
of the ClintonDole debate. During this time, participants
completed consent forms as well as several measures assessing attitudes toward the election, feelings toward the
candidates, and expectations about which candidate would
win the debate. The television was turned off so participants were not exposed to any of the media predictions or
commentaries that occurred immediately prior to the debate. The live broadcast of the debate was then projected
on a film screen in a medium-sized classroom at precisely

18

MUNRO ET AL.

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the time when the debate started. Participants were instructed to watch the debate and evaluate the arguments of
each candidate to the best of their abilities. At the end of
the debate, the television projection was immediately terminated so that none of the postdebate media analyses or
commentaries was presented to participants. Therefore,
the arguments presented by each candidate during the debate were presented in real time as the debate was happening. After the debate, participants completed a set of
postdebate measures. Participants were then asked to provide their first names and telephone numbers if they would
agree to be called in the coming weeks to answer several
more questions. All participants provided this information.
Between 7 and 10 days later, participants were called and
asked to respond to a set of follow-up measures.

Predebate Measures
Before the debate, participants responded to three sets of
questions assessing (a) interest and involvement in the presidential campaign, (b) attitudes regarding the election and
feelings toward the candidates, and (c) expectations regarding the debate.

Involvement assessment. Participants responded to

four questions assessing their interest and involvement in the
presidential campaign. The first question was, Would you
have watched the presidential debate even if this experiment
had not been offered? on a scale ranging from 1 (absolutely
yes) to 3 (dont know) to 5 (absolutely not). The next three
questions assessed emotional involvement in the campaign,
strength of feelings about the election, and the amount of
knowledge participants felt they had about the platforms of
the candidates. Participants responded on 9-point rating
scales where higher numbers indicated a greater amount of
the construct. These three items were found to have acceptable interitem reliability ( = .80) and were thus averaged into
one involvement index.

Attitudes and feelings assessment. Prior attitudes

toward the upcoming election were assessed by having participants indicate their current position about the presidential election on a scale ranging from 4 (strongly favor
Clinton) to 0 (unsure or neither) to +4 (strongly favor Dole).
Two items assessed feelings toward the candidates, How do
you feel about Bill Clinton (Bob Dole) as a person? on scales
ranging from 4 (strongly dislike) to 0 (no feelings) to +4
(strongly like). After reverse scoring the feelings toward
Clinton measure, these three items were averaged into one
predebate attitude composite ( = .73), where negative numbers indicate more favorable attitudes and feelings toward

Clinton and positive numbers indicate more favorable attitudes and feelings toward Dole.

Expectancy assessment. Participants expectations

regarding the outcome of the debate were assessed with the
question Who do you think will win the debate? on a scale
ranging from 4 (definitely Clinton) to 0 (neither Clinton nor
Dole) to +4 (definitely Dole).

Postdebate Measures
Immediately following the debate, participants responded
to four sets of questions assessing (a) evaluations of the debate, (b) affective reactions to the debaters, (c) cognitive responses generated during the debate, and (d) postdebate political attitudes.

Evaluations of the debate. The first set of questions

assessed biased assimilation by measuring evaluations of the
debate itself. The first question was, In your opinion, who
won the debate? with a rating scale ranging from 4 (definitely Clinton) to 0 (neither Clinton nor Dole) to +4 (definitely Dole). The next two questions assessed the quality of
the arguments of the two debaters using the questions, How
strong were the arguments presented by Clinton (Dole)? and
How convincing was Clinton (Dole)? with rating scales
ranging from 1 (very weak/unconvincing) to 9 (very
strong/convincing).
Affective reactions. The third set of questions assessed
affective reactions to the two debaters, To what extent did listening to Clinton (Dole) make you feel? Participants responded to the items angry, irritated, happy, and
pleased on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).
Cognitive responses. Participants were asked to list
any thoughts or feelings you had while listening to the arguments of Clinton (Dole). After writing each thought or feeling, they indicated with the appropriate symbol whether the
thought or feeling was favorable (+), unfavorable (), or neutral (0) toward the argument.
Postdebate political attitudes. Participants responded
to several questions assessing the degree to which their political
attitudes had changed as a result of watching the debate. First, as
a measure of perceived attitude change, they rated how much
the arguments presented in the debate caused my opinion about
the presidential election to move on a scale ranging from 4
(strongly toward supporting Clinton) to 0 (no change) to +4
(strongly toward supporting Dole). A question that paralleled

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

the predebate attitude assessment was also included. Participants rated their current positions about the presidential election
given the arguments presented in the debate.

19

haps reflecting public opinion of Clinton as a more gifted

communicator than Dole, participants reported expecting
that Clinton would probably win the debate (M = 1.63).
Bivariate correlations between the predebate measures are
also displayed in Table 1.1

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Follow-Up Measures
Beginning 1 week after the first debate, participants were
called by telephone and asked to answer several more questions regarding the debate. Of those who were contacted, all
agreed to participate. Sixty of the 70 participants present at
the debate were contacted. Those that were not contacted by
the day of the second 1996 Presidential Debate (October 16,
1996) were not called again.
During the follow-up telephone interview, participants responded to two sets of questions that were analogous to those
presented after the debate. First, they responded to several
questions assessing their evaluations of the debate, including
their opinion about who won the debate and the quality of the
arguments presented by each debater. Second, they were
again asked a set of political attitude questions assessing how
much they perceived their opinions to have changed because
of the debate and their current position regarding the election. No affective reactions or cognitive responses were obtained at the 1-week follow-up interview.

RESULTS
Overview of Analyses
There were three goals for organizing the data analyses.
First, a group of descriptive analyses was conducted with the
aim of providing a characterization of this sample regarding
opinions concerning the presidential election. Second, regression analyses were conducted to determine whether responses to the predebate measures predicted postdebate reactions. Third, a group of mediational regression analyses was
conducted to examine the role of affective reactions during
the debate as potentially important components of any effect
of the predebate measures on postdebate reactions.

Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive analyses conducted on the predebate measures
indicated that the distributions did not deviate greatly from
the assumptions of normality. As can be seen in Table 1,
participants as a group scored near the midpoint of the
scales measuring whether they would have watched the debate (M = 3.54) and their involvement in the election (M =
4.74). The predebate attitude index reflected the United
States voting population in that Clinton was rated more favorably and liked more than Dole (M = 0.91). Also, per-

Association of Predebate With Immediate

Postdebate and Follow-Up Measures

To assess the association between the predebate and

postdebate measures, multiple regression analyses were
conducted. For each postdebate variable, the four predebate
variables (watch, involvement, predebate attitude, and expectancy) were simultaneously entered as predictor variables. There are two effects in particular that bear special
mention. First, the biased assimilation effect would be supported if predebate attitude significantly predicts evaluations of the debate. Second, the disconfirmed expectancies
argument would be supported if expectancy significantly
predicts evaluations of the debate. The disconfirmed expectancies argument suggests that those in favor of Clinton, for
example, expect Clinton to win and any information that
disconfirms this expectation (pro-Dole or anti-Clinton arguments) is processed more deeply and evaluated more critically than information that confirms the expectation
(pro-Clinton or anti-Dole arguments). The other two variables were included in the analyses to determine whether
ones involvement in the election or likelihood of watching
the debate might predict postdebate measures in a way that
would clarify the debate evaluation process.2

Biased assimilation. Biased assimilation was assessed by examining responses to the debate evaluation measures. First, the question assessing which candidate partici-

1Several of the predebate measures were correlated. Most notably, the

predebate attitude index is positively correlated with the expectation measure
(r = .39). No attempt to combine the expectation measure with the predebate
attitude index was made, however, because of the important theoretical distinction between the two constructs. Furthermore, collinearity diagnostics
indicated that collinearity among the predebate measures was not a problem
for the subsequently presented regression analyses. Tolerance values were
always .74 or higher, and the variance inflation factor never exceeded 1.35.
2In addition, hierarchical regression analyses with the interactions between the predebate measures entered as a second step were conducted.
These analyses were specifically aimed at exploring any interactions involving the involvement variable. Given that past research suggests that
attitude strength moderates biased assimilation (Pomerantz, Chaiken, &
Tordesillas, 1995), it seemed reasonable to test for the possibility that
predebate attitudes bias participants evaluations of the debate only for
people with strong involvement in the presidential campaign. However, no
significant interactions were revealed. The hierarchical regressions and
variable interactions will not be discussed.

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20
TABLE1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearsons Correlations of Predebate, Postdebate, and Follow-Up Measures
Measures
Predebate measures
1. Watch
2. Involvement
3. Attitude
4. Expectancy
Postdebate measures
5. Perceived winner
6. Quality index
7. Positive affect
8. Negative affect
9. Positive cognitive responses
10. Negative cognitive responses
11. Perceived attitude change
12. Actual attitude change
Follow-up measures
14. Perceived winner
15. Quality index
16. Perceived attitude change
17. Actual attitude change
ap

< .05. bp < .01.

SD

3.54
4.74
0.91
1.63

1.18
2.06
1.76
1.36

.41b
.04
.18

.27a
.10

.39b

1.26
1.82
1.11
2.37
1.26
1.26
0.16
0.33

2.43
3.52
4.20
3.83
2.92
2.87
2.43
1.56

.31
.28a
.34b
.29a
.10
.15
.17
.13

.53b
.59b
.68b
.72b
.61b
.58b
.50b
.07

0.90
1.33
0.10
0.00

2.23
3.57
2.21
1.68

.28a
.28a
.11
.13

.61b
.61b
.41b
.03

.09
.13
.11
.03
.12
.08
.10
.12
.07
.07
.28a
.26a

10

11

12

.28a
.21
.24a
.25a
.28a
.26a
.01
.05

.79b
.81b
.75b
.69b
.57b
.57b
.54b

.76b
.78b
.76b
.63b
.49b
.50b

.86b
.73b
.63b
.59b
.56b

.72b
.62b
.53b
.48b

.83b
.65b
.50b

.59b
.43b

.33b

.30a
.23
.06
.05

.79b
.83b
.41b
.50b

.76b
.83b
.43b
.39b

.83b
.80b
.59b
.50b

.67b
.75b
.50b
.41b

.66b
.72b
.53b
.35b

.60b
.60b
.42b
.24

.57b
.60b
.49b
.19

.44b
.47b
.40b
.65b

13

14

15

16

.81b
.56b
.38b

.54b
.46b

.38b

Downloaded by [Laurentian University] at 19:01 22 April 2016

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

pants thought won the debate (perceived winner) was

examined. Second, a Clinton quality index and a Dole quality
index were created by averaging responses to the questions
assessing ratings of the strength of the arguments and convincingness of each debater, Clinton r(70) = .78, p < .001; Dole
r(70) = .69, p < .001. In accordance with past research (Lord
et al., 1979; Munro & Ditto, 1997), these two indexes were
then combined into a quality index difference score by subtracting the Clinton quality index from the Dole quality index.
For both of the biased assimilation measures, predebate
attitude was the only significant predictor (perceived winner: = .46, t[69] = 3.98, p < .001; quality index difference
score: = .57, t[69] = 5.15, p < .001).3 A summary of the
regression analyses can be found in Table 2. Those who
held more favorable predebate attitudes and feelings toward
Dole were more likely to have perceived Dole to have won
the debate and rated the arguments of Dole more favorably
relative to the arguments of Clinton. Supporting the biased
assimilation effect, prior attitudes bias participants
postdebate ratings of who won the debate and their evaluations of the arguments presented during the debate. On the
other hand, the disconfirmed expectancies argument was
not supported as expectancy did not uniquely predict evaluations of the debate.

Affect. Affective reactions to the two debaters were examined by creating two factors out of the four affect items.
The items happy and pleased were highly correlated
(Clinton: r[70] = .84, p < .001; Dole: r[70] = .83, p < .001) and
were thus averaged into a positive affect index. Similarly, the
items angry and irritated (Clinton: r[70] = .73, p < .001;
Dole: r[70] = .81, p < .001) were averaged into a negative affect index. Affect difference scores were created by subtracting each of the two Clinton affect factors from the corresponding Dole affect factors.
For both affect difference scores, predebate attitude was
the only significant predictor (positive: = .66, t[69] =
6.65, p < .001; negative: = .71, t[69] = 7.42, p < .001).
These analyses indicate that those who held more favorable
prior attitudes and feelings toward Dole reported more positive and less negative affect in response to Dole relative to
Clinton. A regression summary table can be found in the
top half of Table 3.
Biased cognitive elaboration. Biased cognitive elaboration was assessed by examining self-coded positive and
negative cognitive responses generated toward each debater.

3In addition, the Clinton quality index and the Dole quality index were an-

alyzed independently. The results were identical to those of the perceived

winner measure and quality index difference scoreonly predebate attitude
was a significant predictor.

21

Positive and negative cognitive response difference scores

were created by subtracting each type of response generated
after listening to Clinton from each type of response generated after listening to Dole.4
For both cognitive response difference scores, predebate
attitude was a significant predictor (positive: = .62, t[69] =
5.77, p < .001; negative: = .58, t[69] = 5.11, p < .001).
Those who held more favorable prior attitudes and feelings
toward Dole reported more positive and less negative
cognitions in response to Dole relative to Clinton. In addition, for the positive cognitive response difference score, ratings of the likelihood that participants would have watched
the debate was a significant predictor, = .23, t(69) = 2.10, p
< .05. Those who reported a greater likelihood that they
would have watched the debate reported more positive and
less negative cognitions in response to Clinton relative to
Dole. A summary of the regression analyses can be found in
the bottom half of Table 3.

Attitude change. In practical terms, the most important measures assessing the actual effects of the debate on
viewers political opinions were those measuring attitude
change. The first attitude change measure was the degree to
which participants perceived their opinion to have moved as
a result of the debate (perceived attitude change). Predebate
attitude was the only significant predictor of perceived attitude change, = .59, t(68) = 5.02, p < .001.5 Those who held
more favorable prior attitudes toward Dole were more likely
to have perceived their postdebate attitudes as having
moved in the direction of Dole. The perceived attitude
change measure can be contrasted with an actual attitude
change measure created by subtracting responses to the
postdebate measure from responses to the predebate measure of participants current attitudes toward the election.
The regression analysis on the actual attitude change measure revealed no significant predictors (see Table 4 for a
summary).
One-week follow-up measures. The follow-up measures were submitted to the same analyses as reported earlier
with one exception. For each follow-up measure the analogous immediate postdebate measure was entered as a predictor variable in addition to the four predebate measures. For
example, for the follow-up measure assessing perceived winner, the predebate measures watch, involvement, predebate
attitude, and expectancy as well as the immediate postdebate

4A neutral cognitive response difference score was also created and analyzed, revealing no significant effects. It will not be further discussed.
5The inconsistent degrees of freedom for all analyses involving the immediate postdebate measure assessing perceived attitude change are a result of the choice of one participant not to answer that question.

22

MUNRO ET AL.
TABLE 2
Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Biased Assimilation Measures
B

SE B

0.98 (0.22)
0.63 (0.35)
0.17 (0.07)
0.18 (0.06)
0.13 (0.07)
(0.59)

1.70 (1.17)
0.16 (0.12)
0.20 (0.14)
0.14 (0.10)
0.24 (0.17)
(0.08)

.46** (.28**)
.10 (.04)
.15 (.05)
.06 (.03)
(.63**)

7.05 (0.66)
1.13 (0.30)
0.01 (0.07)
0.15 (0.12)
0.36 (0.05)
(0.76)

2.37 (1.93)
0.22 (0.20)
0.28 (0.22)
0.19 (0.15)
0.33 (0.26)
(0.10)

.57** (.15)
.01 (.03)
.09 (.07)
.12 (.02)
(.72**)

Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables

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Immediate postdebate (follow-up) perceived winner

Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Perceived winner
Immediate postdebate (follow-up) quality index difference score
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Quality index difference score

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived winner: R2 = .32, MSerror = 4.24;
follow-up perceived winner: R2 = .69, MSerror = 1.67. Immediate postdebate quality index difference score: R2 = .38, MSerror = 8.21;
follow-up quality index difference score: R2 = .71, MSerror = 4.05 (ps < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.

TABLE 3
Summary of Regression Analyses for Affect and Cognitive Response Measures
Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables
Positive (negative) affect difference score
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Positive (negative) cognitive response difference score
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch

SE B

7.07 (7.54)
1.57 (1.54)
0.05 (0.10)
0.27 (0.19)
0.28 (0.03)

2.52 (2.23)
0.24 (0.21)
0.30 (0.26)
0.21 (0.18)
0.36 (0.31)

.66** (.71**)
.02 (.04)
.13 (.10)
.08 (.01)

9.27 (7.20)
1.02 (0.94)
0.22 (0.13)
0.24 (0.10)
0.56 (0.34)

1.91 (1.98)
0.18 (0.18)
0.23 (0.23)
0.16 (0.16)
0.27 (0.28)

.62** (.58**)
.10 (.06)
.17 (.07)
.23* (.14)

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate negative affect or negative cognitive responses analyses. Positive affect difference score: R2
= .50, MSerror = 9.40; negative affect difference score: R2 = .53, MSerror = 7.29; positive cognitive response difference score: R2 = .41,
MSerror = 5.32; negative cognitive response difference score: R2 = .35, MSerror = 5.72 (ps < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.

measure assessing perceived winner were all entered simultaneously as predictor variables. If the predebate attitude index
does not significantly predict the follow-up measure, then it
would suggest that predebate attitude does not have any additional effect during the 1-week delay. If the predebate attitude
index does significantly predict the follow-up measure, then
it would suggest that predebate attitude does have an additional effect on the follow-up measure over and above the immediate postdebate effect. If another predebate measure significantly predicts the follow-up measure, then it would
suggest that a delayed effect is present that does not appear
until after the immediate postdebate assessment.

The two biased assimilation measures revealed somewhat inconsistent findings. On both measures, the analogous immediate postdebate measures were significant
predictors (perceived winner: = .63, t[59] = 7.15, p <
.001; quality index difference score: = .72, t[59] = 7.55, p
< .001). In addition, predebate attitude was a significant
predictor on the perceived winner measure, = .28, t(59) =
3.05, p < .01. However, neither predebate attitude nor any
other predebate measure was a significant predictor on the
quality index difference score, = .15, t(59) = 1.46, p < .15
(see Table 2 for a summary). Therefore, for each measure,
the strong positive correlation between the follow-up mea-

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

23

TABLE 4
Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Attitude Change Measures
Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables

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Immediate postdebate (follow-up) perceived attitude change

Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Perceived attitude change
Immediate postdebate (follow-up) actual attitude change
Constant
Predebate attitude
Expectancy
Involvement
Watch
Actual attitude change

SE B

2.28 (0.77)
0.81 (0.40)
0.40 (0.05)
0.00 (0.14)
0.17 (0.63)
(0.30)

1.73 (1.67)
0.16 (0.17)
0.21 (0.21)
0.14 (0.14)
0.24 (0.24)
(0.12)

.59** (.33*)
.22 (.03)
.00 (.13)
.08 (.34*)
(.32*)

0.35 (1.64)
0.07 (0.01)
0.09 (0.17)
0.07 (0.03)
0.10 (0.35)
(0.69)

1.31 (1.13)
0.12 (0.10)
0.16 (0.14)
0.11 (0.09)
0.18 (0.16)
(0.10)

.08 (.01)
.08 (.14)
.09 (.04)
.08 (.25*)
(.65**)

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived attitude change: R2 = .31,
MSerror = 4.36; follow-up perceived attitude change: R2 = .37, MSerror = 3.37 (ps < .001). Immediate postdebate actual
attitude change: R2 = .03, MSerror = 2.50 (p = .73); follow-up actual attitude change: R2 = .49, MSerror = 1.58 (p < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .01.

sure and its analogous immediate postdebate measure suggests that the biased assimilation effect remains after 1
week. Furthermore, the perceived winner measure revealed
predebate attitude to be a significant predictor over and
above the predictive power of the analogous immediate
postdebate measure. This suggests modest support for a
longer lasting effect of predebate attitude on evaluationsa
bias that continues to occur even beyond the immediate reactions to the debate information.
The attitude change measures also revealed inconsistent
findings with regard to the predictive value of predebate attitude. For both the perceived attitude change and actual attitude change measures, the analogous immediate
postdebate measures were significant predictors (perceived
attitude change: = .32, t[58] = 2.53, p < .02; actual attitude change: = .65, t[59] = 6.58, p < .001). In addition,
the likelihood that the participant would have watched the
debate measure was a significant predictor for both attitude
change measures (perceived attitude change: = .34, t[58]
= 2.65, p < .02; actual attitude change: = .25, t[59] =
2.18, p < .001). These findings indicate that those who reported being less likely to watch the debate perceived their
attitudes to have changed in the direction of Dole 1 week
after the debate and their attitudes did change in the direction of Dole (as assessed by the prepost measure of actual
attitude change). Because this variable was not associated
with the attitude change measures immediately after the debate, these effects represent a delayed effect. Finally,
predebate attitude was a significant predictor of perceived
attitude change, = .33, t(58) = 2.33, p < .03 (see Table 4
for a summary). This indicates that those who had more favorable predebate attitudes and feelings toward Clinton
(Dole) perceived their attitudes to have moved in the direction of Clinton (Dole) 1 week after the debate. Again, this

effect of prior attitude on perceived attitude change 1 week

after the debate represents a continued change over and
above that explained by the analogous immediate
postdebate measure.

The Underlying Mechanisms of Biased

Assimilation
The analyses presented thus far establish that (a) prior attitudes are associated with evaluative reactions to the debate
arguments and (b) expectancies are not uniquely associated
with evaluative reactions to the debate arguments. The next
goal of the analyses was to investigate the role of both positive and negative affect as possible mediating factors.
Those in favor of Clinton, for example, may have negative
affective reactions to any information attacking Clinton or
supporting Dole, thus motivating those individuals to negatively evaluate that information in comparison to information supporting Clinton or attacking Dole. If this affective
account of biased assimilation were true, positive and negative affect would mediate the link between prior attitudes
and debate evaluations.
To conduct the mediational regression analyses, the recommendations put forth by Baron and Kenny (1986) were
followed. Three regression equations were created for each
potential mediator. First, the immediate postdebate quality
index difference score (the most widely used measure of biased assimilation) was regressed on predebate attitude.
Predebate attitude significantly predicted the quality index
difference score, = .59, t(69) = 5.99, p < .001.
Second, the potential mediators (positive and negative affect difference scores) were regressed on predebate attitude
in two separate analyses. Predebate attitude significantly pre-

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24

MUNRO ET AL.

dicted both positive and negative affect difference scores.

The more favorable prior attitudes were toward Dole, the
more positive affect was reported in response to Dole relative
to Clinton, = .68, t(69) = 7.71, p < .001; and the more negative affect was reported in response to Clinton relative to
Dole, = .72, t(69) = 8.59, p < .001.
Third and most important, the biased assimilation measure was simultaneously regressed on the potential mediators
and predebate attitude. Predebate attitude no longer significantly predicted quality index difference scores for either the
analysis assessing positive affect as the potential mediator (
= .14, t[69] = 1.25, p = .22) or the analysis assessing negative
affect as the potential mediator ( = .06, t[69] = 0.51, p =
.62). In contrast, both of the potential mediators remained
significant predictors of quality index difference scores (positive affect: = .66, t[69] = 6.11, p < .001; negative affect:
= .74, t[69] = 6.67, p < .001).6
To assess the role of affect as a potential mediator of biased cognitive elaboration, the same strategy was repeated
in four separate mediational analyses using positive and
negative affect difference scores as potential mediators between predebate attitude and positive and negative cognitive response difference scores. Predebate attitude
significantly predicted both the positive and negative cognitive response difference scores (positive: = .60, t[69] =
6.25, p < .001; negative: = .58, t[69] = 5.80, p < .001).
As reported previously, predebate attitude significantly predicted both potential mediators, positive and negative affect
difference scores. Finally, when each dependent variable
was simultaneously regressed on predebate attitude and the
potential mediators, positive and negative affect were significant predictors (all || > .54 and p values < .01),
whereas predebate attitude was not (all || < .13 and p values > .05). In total, the mediational analyses indicate that
the positive and negative affect difference scores meet the
criteria of true mediators (Baron & Kenny, 1986) between
predebate attitude and biased evaluations and cognitive
elaborations of the debate.

DISCUSSION
Considering the importance of the U.S. Presidential Election,
it is comforting to believe that presidential debates sway
some significant portion of the voting public toward the candidate with the stronger political arguments. The results of

6The mediational analyses were repeated several times using perceived

winner, the Clinton quality index, and the Dole quality index as dependent
variables in the place of the quality index difference score. The results were
virtually identical to those reported for the quality index difference score in
that both positive and negative affect difference scores were found to be true
mediators between predebate attitude and whichever measure of biased assimilation was used as the dependent variable.

this research paint a somewhat less idealistic picture. First,

people seem to process the arguments in a biased manner by
evaluating the reasoning of their predebate favored candidate
more positively than that of their predebate opposed candidate. Second, rather than being a rational analysis of the logical arguments presented in the debate, debate evaluations can
hinge more on peoples affective responses to the debater.
Each of the major findings and the significance of the findings in terms of past research and theory are discussed next.
Biased Assimilation
Supporting a host of laboratory studies, this research demonstrates that the biased assimilation effect can be found in a
setting involving the presentation of naturally occurring information not specifically constructed to reveal the phenomenon. The regression analyses consistently showed that participants viewing the first 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate did
indeed undergo a biased assimilation of the arguments presented in the debate such that arguments confirming prior attitudes were rated more positively than arguments
disconfirming prior attitudes. Rather than evaluating the arguments in a fair and objective manner based on their logical
validity, our prior attitudes bias the manner in which we evaluate the arguments leading us to favor those arguments that
support the prior attitudes.
Furthermore, not only did prior attitudes predict argument
evaluations and the perceived winner immediately after the
debate, but also the immediate postdebate measures predicted the analogous follow-up measures. These results suggest that biased assimilation is not a transient reaction to
carefully constructed laboratory materials that disappears
shortly after the presentation of those materials. On the contrary, there was some support for the possibility that prior attitudes not only have an immediate effect on judgments of
the perceived winner but also a delayed effect. Although we
did not collect data on participants postdebate exposure to
media commentary, one could speculate that this delayed effect is a result of participants assimilation of any media
commentary viewed during the period between the end of the
experimental session and the follow-up questioning.
One question that remains unanswered is the question of
symmetry. Although the regression analyses revealed that
the biased assimilation effect was significant for the entire
sample, the inability to easily determine the objective winner
of the debate precludes us from knowing whether or not a
subset of unbiased participants exists. It is entirely possible
that a truly objective analysis of the arguments would reveal
Clinton (or Dole) to be the consensus winner. If so, one could
make the argument that those who favored Clinton (or Dole)
prior to the debate are actually not displaying the biased assimilation effect. Without being able to objectively determine the outcome of the debate, the symmetry and strength
of the bias in the face of unbalanced information remains hidden. Future research could address this important question by

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

varying the objective quality of the arguments on either side

of the debate. An argument quality manipulation could effectively assess the symmetry and strength of the biased assimilation effect by determining how much, if it all, argument
quality moderates biased assimilation.

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Affect and the Evaluation of Sociopolitical

Arguments
It is not difficult to recall instances of political discussions
ending in heated arguments and damaged relationships.
Sociopolitical positions on subjects like abortion rights, tax
increases, and welfare seem to be able to turn up the fire underneath people. This is true both in the pleasing feeling of
knowing your position has been validated by others and the
unease that arises when your position is being attacked. This
research empirically supports the conjecture that
sociopolitical arguments are processed in a less than purely
rational, logical manner by indicating that the evaluation of
sociopolitical arguments is strongly associated with affect.
First, predebate attitude, a composite of participants current positions regarding the election and their feelings toward the two candidates, uniquely and significantly
predicted each of the postdebate evaluation measures. People
seem to have difficulty dissociating their feelings toward the
candidates not only from their positions regarding the election (Abelson et al., 1982) but also from their evaluations of
the information presented by the candidates. If we hold positive feelings toward a presidential candidate, we also tend to
rate their arguments positively. On the other hand, negative
feelings toward a candidate are associated with negative argument evaluations. Although the predebate attitude composite consistently predicted debate evaluations, the
expectancy measure consistently failed to uniquely predict
debate evaluations. Therefore, no support for the
disconfirmed expectancies account of biased assimilation
was found in this research. It should be noted, however, that
expectancy and predebate attitude were significantly correlated. Future research could be aimed at investigating the nature of this relation.
Second, differential affective reactions to the favored and
opposed candidate were shown to mediate the link between
prior attitudes and peoples evaluations and cognitive elaborations of the arguments of the debaters. The desire to perceive the arguments as being supportive of the attitude may
create specific affective reactions when the arguments are
initially perceived as being unsupportive. These emotions
then influence the manner in which the arguments are processed. Attitude-disconfirming arguments produce increased
negative and decreased positive affect leading people to generate a greater number of negative and fewer positive
cognitions on the way toward more negative overall evaluations of the arguments. Attitude-confirming arguments, on
the other hand, produce increased positive and decreased
negative affect, more positive and fewer negative cognitions,

25

and more positive overall evaluations of the arguments.

Mediational analyses are, of course, not a substitute for
well-controlled experimental research demonstrating a
causal role for affect, but they do suggest that the data are
consistent with the affective-motivational account (Munro &
Ditto, 1997).
Attitude Change in Reactions to
Sociopolitical Debates
Although there is a bias to more positively evaluate ones
predebate favorite, this does not necessarily influence opinions. In support of past research (Miller et al., 1993; Munro
& Ditto, 1997), opinion change in the form of polarization
was found for the measure of participants perceived attitude
change, whereas no opinion change was found for the measure of actual attitude change. Of course the actual attitude
change measure is limited in its assessment of polarization
because of the possibility of ceiling and floor effects (Lord et
al., 1979; Miller et al.). Those with strong predebate attitudes
toward the candidates would be constrained by the scale
from reporting a more extreme attitude after the debate.
Given these findings, this research suggests at the least that
sociopolitical debates produce no change in the opinion of
viewers as a group and at the most that debates reinforce peoples predebate opinions.
Conclusions
This research suggests that viewers of major sociopolitical
debates like those between the democratic and republican
candidates for U.S. president are biased by their predebate
feelings and attitudes toward the candidates and the emotional reactions that ensue. However, the 1996 presidential
campaign featured an incumbent seeking re-election during
times of economic prosperity. Therefore, viewers may have
been less motivated to think deeply about the arguments
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) than they might have been under a
period of economic crisis. Similarly, data were collected
from college students who because of their generational or
developmental cohort may be less willing or able to critically
analyze political information. Instead, they may have relied
on superficial characteristics like their feelings toward the
candidates. Therefore, it would be premature to suggest that
debates never lead viewers to change their opinions to the
candidate with the stronger logical arguments. Still, although
the circumstances surrounding future debates might create
very different reactions, one also has to wonder whether televised media images, sound-bites, and political spin-doctoring havent tipped the scales toward more superficial and
emotional responding at the expense of thorough and
thoughtful analysis. Ultimately, this research poses the question of whether or not the ideal function of public debatesto provoke a thoughtful analysis of opposing argumentsmight not be better served.

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