UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

A Violent Symbiosis: Gangs, the State, and the Rise in Crime in So Paulo

by

Maria Carolina Ford

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEAPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JANUARY, 2015
Maria Carolina Ford 2015

Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the unexpected rise in violence in So Paulo after a decade of
consistent decline, from 2000-10. Using the Complex Adaptive System framework, this thesis
argues that the Primeiro Comando da Capital First Command of the Capital (PCC), the most
influential prison gang in Brazil, developed an accommodating relationship with the state,
making them both equally responsible for the rise in crime. The thesis is chronological, based on
the three major PCC rebellions/attacks since its creation, in 1993. Those moments represent the
break of an unstable truce between the state and the PCC, and are critical to reveal how the state
fails to curb organized crime. The constant crime rise after 2012, however, suggests that in the
long-term, the state has strengthened the PCC.

ii

Preface
I am Brazilian, and I moved to Canada in 2011.This thesis was motivated by my curiosity to
unveil the causes of crime in Brazil, and more specifically in So Paulo, where I grew up
learning how to explore and respect the city boundaries that are not on the map.
I still remember my professor at the Law school, a renowned criminal judge, receiving a phone
call from a source, in the middle of my class, telling him about the PCC curfew impositions
back in 2006. In less than half an hour, the entire university was evacuated.
Back in 2000, my family faced the loss of my grandfather, victim of a bank robbery. As a
citizen, I spent my years as a young adult sensing and negotiating spaces where I could feel safe,
but at the same time be outside of the bubble where most of the upper middle class is confined.
As a graduate student, I sought to explain, empirically, the actual actors and their roles in
dictating how violence operates in both the symbolic and physical spaces in So Paulo.

iii

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Dr. Pablo Policzer, who was always so kind and patient in his guidance. During
this process, Dr. Policzer pushed me to my very best, and, at each step of my thesis, amplified
my perspective and academic skills.
I also would like to thank the Department of Political Science of the University of Calgary for
my funding, as well as for being so accommodating with my personal journey and needs.
Finally, I appreciate the endless support of both the Department Manager, Ella Wensel, and of
the Graduate Administrator, Judi Powell, whose help always went well above their call of duty.

iv

Dedication
To my parents, Rosemary and Antonio Narciso, for putting my education in front of their own
dreams. To my husband, Derek Ford, for his patience and partnership.

Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Preface................................................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv
Dedication ............................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables List of Tables ............................................................................................ viii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix
List of Symbols, Abbreviations and Nomenclature .............................................................x
Epigraph ............................................................................................................................ xii
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1
1.1 The Problem ...............................................................................................................1
1.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................4
1.2.1 The Paradox of Crime Rise ...............................................................................5
1.2.2 Successful Public Policies ...............................................................................10
1.2.3 Unsuccessful Public Policies ...........................................................................13
1.3 Analytical Framework .............................................................................................16
1.3.1 Complex Adaptive System Framework...........................................................17
1.5 Methodology ............................................................................................................24
1.5.1 Narrative Analysis ...........................................................................................25
1.6 Chapter Outline ........................................................................................................25
2. BUILDING THE SYSTEM ...........................................................................................29
2.1 Background ............................................................................................................29
2.2 Origin of Organized Crime ....................................................................................33
2.2.1 The Party ..........................................................................................................35
2.2.2 Prison Expansion as a Response to Human Rights Violations ........................38
2.3 Leapfrogging Strategies .........................................................................................45
2.3.1 Bargaining Mutinies for Transfers ...................................................................45
2.3.2 Elimination of Rival Gangs .............................................................................49
3. TURF WAR IN THE CRIME WORLD ........................................................................54
3.1 PCCs Internal Crisis .............................................................................................57
3.2 Crime migration .....................................................................................................64
3.3 RDD .......................................................................................................................69
3.4 Cell Phones and Attorneys Arms Race ..................................................................73
3.5 The mega-rebellion of 2006 ...................................................................................75
4. KEEPING THE STATUS-QUO ....................................................................................76
4.1 The Attacks of 2012 ...............................................................................................77
4.2 Managing Sovereignty ...........................................................................................81
4.2.1 Engaging Members and Sympathizers.............................................................81
4.2.2 Ethos ................................................................................................................84
4.2.3 Street-level Influence .......................................................................................88

vi

5. COUNTER-FACTUAL ANALYSIS AND FINAL REMARKS .................................92

5.1 Counterfactual Analysis .........................................................................................93
5.1.1 Would the PCC have attacked in 2012 if ROTAs executions had not happened?
94
5.1.2 Would the PCC have attacked if the municipal elections had not happened? .97
5.1.3 A possible supplementary factor- Did the PCC benefit from Rio de Janeiros curb
in violence? ....................................................................................................100
5.2 Final Remarks ......................................................................................................108

vii

List of Tables List of Tables

Table 1. State-PCC CAS strategies from 1993-2001.................................................................... 33
Table 2. State-PCC CAS strategies from 2001-06........................................................................ 57

viii

List of Figures
Figure 1. Crime growth percentage in the last five years (2010-14) .............................................. 2
Figure 2: Jail population growth ..................................................................................................... 3
Figure 3. TIT FOR TAT between the state and the PCC.............................................................. 19
Figure 4. State-PCC CAS ............................................................................................................. 21
Figure 5. State-PCC CAS by levels of analysis ............................................................................ 22
Figure 6. The 10 Most Dangerous Prison Gangs .......................................................................... 34
Figure 7. Inmates at the So Paulo state: Evolution of transfers from the SPP to the SAP
(1994-2006). .......................................................................................................................... 43
Figure 8. Prison riots in So Paulo state (1990-Feb. 2001). ......................................................... 48
Figure 9. Dead prisoners in the state of So Paulo (1990-2010) .................................................. 52
Figure 10. PCCs hierarchical structure in prison ......................................................................... 60
Figure 11. PCCs organizational chart .......................................................................................... 61
Figure 12. Structure of the Civil Police in 2001 ........................................................................... 66
Figure 13. Cargo vs. bank robbery evolution in the state of So Paulo (2005-13). ...................... 68
Figure 14. Police officers killed on duty from 2011-2014............................................................ 79
Figure 15. Brazilian GDP (2000-2013) ..................................................................................... 110

ix

List of Symbols, Abbreviations and Nomenclature

Symbol
ADA
AUC
Barrio 18
BRICS
CAS
CDL
CRBC

CPI
CV
DAS
DEIC

DEPEN
DIG
DISCCPAT
DIVECAR

DTO
FARC
HTV
INFOPEN
LEP
MS-13
MOCO
NGO

Definition
Amigos dos Amigos Friends of Friends
Autodefesas Unidas de Colombia The United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
18 Street Gang
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
Complex Adaptive System
Comando Democrtico da Liberdade Democratic
Command of Freedom
Comando Brasileiro Revolucionrio da
Criminalidade Revolucionary Brazilian
Command of Criminality
Comisso Paralamentar de Inqurito
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission
Comando Vermelho Red Command
Diviso Antissequestro Antikidnapping Division
Departamento Estadual de Investigaes
Criminais State Department on
Criminal Investigations
Departamento de Investigaes sobre o Crime
Organizado Department on Organized Crime
Investigations
Departamento Penitencirio Nacional National
Prison Department
Diviso de Investigaes Gerais Division of
General Investigations
Diviso de Crimes contra o Patrimnio Division
of Crimes Against Property
Diviso de Investigaes sobre Furto e Roubos de
Veculos e Cargas Division against Car and
Cargo Robberies
Drug Trafficking Organization
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionrias Colombianas
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
High-valued Target Operations
Sistema Integrado de Informaes Penitencirias
Integrated System of Penitenciary Information
Lei de Execues Penais Criminal Procedures
Code
Mara Salvatrucha 13
Mexican Organized Crime Organizations
Non-governmental Organization
x

OAS
PCC
PROAR

PSDB
PT
RDD
ROTA
SAP
SS
SSP-SP
TCC
UPP

Organization of American States

Primeiro Comando da Capital First Command of
the Capital
Programa de Acompanhamento de Policiais
Militares Envolvidos em Ocorrncias de Alto
Risco Monitoring Program for Military Police
Officers Involved in High Risk Incidents
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
Brazilian Social Democracy Party
Partido dos Trabalhadores Workers Party
Regime Disciplinar Diferenciado Differentiated
Disciplinary Regime
Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar Tobias de
Aguiar Ostensive Patrol
Secretaria de Administrao Penitenciria
Secretariat of Security of So Paulo
Seita Satnica Satanic Sect
Secretaria de Segurana Pblica de So Paulo
Secretariat of Security of So Paulo
Terceiro Comando da Capital Third Command
of the Capital
Unidades de Polcia Pacificadora Peacemaker
Police Units

xi

Epigraph
There is no easy way to make sense of how public security in this wealthy and
global mega-city could have devolved into a clannish blood feud.
Graham Denyer Willis, So Paulo: Insecure Citizens, All Of Them

xii

1. INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Between 2000- 10 the homicide rate in the Brazilian state of So Paulo declined sharply. From
34.18 homicides per/100,000 in 2000, the rate fell to 10.49/100,000 in 2010, a steep 70%
decline. So Paulo state Governor Geraldo Alckmin celebrated the apex of this trend in 2011,
when for the first time since statistics started being compiled in 1999, the state presented a
murder rate of 10.08/100,000 per capita. The rate was close enough to 10, which the World
Health Organization (WHO) considers non-epidemic. By contrast, in the same year, the rate in
Rio de Janeiro was as twice as high at 24/100,000, and the national rate was 21/100,000. Other
crimes in So Paulo have also dropped, albeit not as sharply. Car robbery, for instance, has
dropped 24% in So Paulo over the decade.
Given this long- term decline in criminal violence, it was especially surprising to policymakers
and observers alike that the more recent crime rate has once again spiked sharply upwards.
The consolidated data to date (see Figure1) shows that first and second degree murder rates have
gone up 11.8% between 2010 and 2012 and is now 6.3% higher than the 2010 landmark. By
looking upon a broader category, of violent crimes (which includes, besides first and second
degree homicides, robbery, robbery followed by death, rape, and kidnapping) minus first and
second degree homicide rates, the data shows that by the end of 2014, these crimes would have
increased some 40 per cent.

Figure 1. Crime growth percentage in the last five years (2010-14)

Crime Growth Percentage in the Last Five Years

45
40

Crime Growth Per centage

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

-5
-10

Years
1st and 2nd Degree Homicides

Other Violent Crimes

Source: Data adapted from SSP-SP, 2014.

Note: The crime rates of 2014 were projected based on the first quarterly report.
These figures allow us to draw two conclusions: First, that the first and second degree homicide
rate spiked significantly in 2012, and then returned to previous levels, but is still higher than it
was in 2010.And second, in regards to the rest of violent crimes, that there is a constant increase
since 2010, especially after 2012. Despite the fact that the growth curve of first and second
degree homicides and other violent crimes behave differently, it is clear that the growth of
violent crimes resumed in the state of So Paulo, particularly after 2012.

Why did the crime rate suddenly spike upwards in 2012, after such a long period of decline? A
fact which makes the puzzle even more intriguing is that the jail population in So Paulo has
never been as large. Since 1995, jail population increased nearly four-fold in So Paulo, leading
the state to hold 40% of the inmates in the country. To illustrate this steady increase, in 2011 the
daily arrest rate was 26.04, and in 2012 it jumped to 81.85 (SAP 2012). Figure 2 shows that,
despite the remarkable expansion of the prison system, the rapid growth in jail population
contributes to a ballooning effect. Taking into account that the number of arrests and the jail
population has been increasing, it is incongruent that crime rates also have. More than
worrisome, these figures call for further research.
Figure 2: Jail population growth

JAIL POPULATION GROWTH

2007

2009

2010

100,034

180,059

170,916
101,774

2008

98,995

163,915
99,605

153,056

2006

95,585

90,696

144,430
88,992

138,116
2005

Prison System Capacity

154,696

Jail Population

2011

Source: Data retrieved from the National Prison Department (DEPEN), 2014.
Mass incarceration has been the kernel of So Paulos security policy. For a decade, its
efficiency has been uncontested more than that, it has been praised as the main reason of the

crime drop during between 2010-2010. The recent rise in crime, however, demonstrates that
jailing, in the long- run, was not a successful public policy1.
Thus, based on this dilemma, we posit the following research question: Why did the jail policy
fail to curb crime in So Paulo state?

Literature Review
The first section of the literature review discusses the paradox of the rise in crime, despite the
effort made in policing and correctional measures. Mass incarceration, high- value target
operations (HVT) and liken mano dura policies from all around the world, but especially in Latin
America, seem to be fomenting organized crime and drug trafficking, instead of curbing it. This
section debates the efficiency of zero tolerance policies, and argues that criminals are often not
solely responsible for the rise in crime. Furthermore, it reveals the negotiation between the state,
society and criminal actors as an unorthodox but often successful measure to contain crime and
drug trafficking.
The second part of the Literature Review incorporates the case of So Paulo into the broader
discussion presented in the first section, i.e., of zero tolerance security policies followed by crime
rise. There are two different explanations for the problem of violence in So Paulo. The first
defends that the last decades drop in crime in So Paulo is due to successful security public
policies. The second, on the other hand, rejects state efficiency and claims that the drop in the

It is worth noticing that mass incarceration is a public policy that reflects a legitimate effort from the government,
and its failure is not attributable to corruption. Despite the fact that corruption is present and plenty in the So Paulo
government, this study differs from the issues found in typical criminal networks inside the state. Drug cartels form
criminal networks with the state all over Latin America, including So Paulos neighbor Rio de Janeiro. However,
the government of So Paulo and the PCC are in a truly antagonistic relationship, and their interactions are of a more
complex nature of well- known state-gangs criminal rings.

homicide rate in So Paulo is actually attributable to the Primeiro Comando da Capital First
Command of the Capital, or simply the PCC, a powerful organized crime organization which is
in the core of this research. By the same token, this train of thought suggests that extrajudicial
executions should be blamed for the rise in the homicide rates after 2012. Despite more aligned
to the latter than to the former explanation, the present thesis points towards a third one, that the
state and the PCC are both equally responsible for the status quo of violence in So Paulo, be it
of low or high crime rates. Thus, the level of violence is a by-product of these agents
interaction.
1.2.1 The Paradox of Crime Rise
For the last decade, a few Latin American countries have employed heavy -handed policing
measures, or mano dura policies, intending to control endemic violence and tackle the drug trade
market. As a result of this all-out-war-against-gangs-atmosphere, except from Colombia,
organized crime managed to adapt and resist. Consequently, criminality has escalated after the
mano dura plans, with few poignant examples in the literature to prove it. The Global Study on
Homicide 2011 performed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows,
for instance, that according to the percentage of homicides by firearm in the sub-regions of the
world, the three first places are led by South America, Caribbean and Central America,
respectively (UNODC 2011, 10, fig.). Therefore, the region shares coincidental security policies
and disastrous results.
Jos Miguel Cruz (2012) has a relevant study on the Salvadoran gangs. After several years
process tracing gang members, the scholar documented the deterioration of the relationship
between the state and organized crime. El Salvador has two main transnational gangs (formed by
Salvadoran nationals who immigrated to the United States), the Mara Savatrucha Thirteen (MS5

13) and the Barrio 18 18 Street Gang, both having a total of 21,000 Salvadoran members.
According to the scholar, during the 1990s, these gangs perpetrated minor felonies, but since the
government followed Honduras in the implementation of mano dura plans, both gangs became
big- time mafia.
The overall homicide toll rose from 40/100,000 to 62/100,000 from 2003-06 in El Salvador; by
2010, it was 71/100,000. According to Cruz, the government carried out a series of iron fist
policies, such as a reform of the penal law to permit the imprisonment of suspicious-looking
individuals and the banning of young people grouping. These measures resulted in 30,000
arrests, ...which had the unintended effect of transforming prisons into new centers of gang
live (2012, 33). The scholar concludes that imprisonment policies played a crucial role in the
raise of violence in the country, That penitentiary, as well as many others overcrowded by
gangs affiliated with the same criminal network, ended up being a transnational node for
criminal activities(32). However, a recent truce between the government and the two
Salvadoran gangs in August 2012 facilitated by the Roman Catholic Church, managed to halt
the bloodshed.
In a six-month period, homicides dropped by 32 percent, kidnappings by 50 percent and
extortion nearly by10 percent. Besides having immediately removed 30 gang leaders to lessrestrictive conditions, the government promised to provide televisions and increase visiting
rights, among others. Despite being tenuous, the truce has been showing positive results so far.
Unlike mass imprisonment, a negotiated truce seemed to be effective in curbing criminality. The
pacts symbolic image is that of six gang leaders laying down their heavy weapons on the feet of
the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jos Miguel Insulza. All in

all, Cruz demonstrates how unorthodox security methods might successfully replace orthodox
ones in the fight against crime.
Mexico is another nation which has been suffering tremendously from violence brought by its
Mexican Organized Crime Organizations (MOCOs). Noel Maurer (2012) asks why there are
homicide rates around 40/100,000 in the Northern part of the country, where there had been a
significant drop from 17/100,000 in 1997 to a little under than 10/100,000 in 2007. After the
success of Plan Colombia and the closure of drug routes in the Caribbean, the Caldern
administration decided to dismantle drug cartels in Mexico, what, to the author, generated a
horizontalization in drug syndicates structure and, consequently, more crimes. In his words,
The sufficient condition for the violence explosion, however, was the Caldern
administrations crackdown on the cartels. The crackdown drove up the costs of the drug
trade, and caused the cartels to expand horizontally into new drug routes and new
criminal markets. Moreover, the arrests of cartel leaders caused internal organizations to
break down, allowing specialized divisions (such as the Zetas or La Lnea) to go into
business by themselves. The result has been an escalation of violence and a widespread
growth in extortion. (203, 15)

Following the same trend, Felbab-Brown (2012) argues against high-value target (HVT)
operations to combat organized crime. In a comparative study between Colombia and Mexico,
the author sought to understand the lessons that the latter can learn from the former. Her major
finding, which is in line with Maurers argument, is that breaking up the Colombian cartels was
only a successful policy because both the Medellin and Cali cartels had been functionally
destroyed before the deposition of their leaders (2012). Then, the lesson that Mexico should
have drawn from the Colombian case is that merely breaking up the cartels is insufficient; the
state needs to increase its presence in a multifaceted fashion (Felbab-Brown, 2012, 50).

Felbab-Brown also claims that counter-insurgency operations, which became popular after the
murder of Pablo Escobar, are not really effective, since replacing a drug trafficker is easier than
replacing a terrorist. Furthermore, not even in Colombia has the state filled the vacuum it left
after dismantling the cartels. The paramilitary groups Autodefesas Unidas de Colombia The
United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionrias
Colombianas Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) created a political umbrella
that should had been promoted by the state in the first place. The scholar suggests that targeting
the middle strata of drug cartel organizations, a policy already attempted by the United States
and United Kingdom, is a better strategy than targeting their leaders.
Finally, a recent report released by the Organization of American States (OAS) reencounters the
literature on law enforcement above. The report Drugs in the Americas (2013) provides a
detailed analysis of drug production, trafficking and distribution, as well as the relationship
between drug trade and organized crime. The facts are striking per se, but when considering that
the OAS is a Cold War designed institution with conservative contours, they become even more
powerful.
In sum, the report acknowledges that hard-line strategies such as war on drugs have failed2. The
document is structured in thematic scenarios and predicts an overall environment for the
continent between 2013 and 2025. First, the report claims that the problem lies neither on better
law enforcement nor on regulation framework, but on grass-root measuresthese range from the
well-known basic rights such as employment and education to harm-reduction programs and
legalization of drug possession.

Despite choosing to cite the OAS here, this is a widespread argument. The Global Commission on Drug Policy, for
instance, was the first influential group to provoke the debate (GCDP 2011).

The analysis, however, is far from being apologetic. Due to the legalization of cannabis, the
document states that organized crime is in decline, since it suffered from significant revenue
loss; notwithstanding, it points out that Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) are retrenching
into cocaine (OAS 2013, sec. Pathways). It also portrays the lack of consensus between
producer, transit and consumer countries. Producer countries reject the war on drugs promoted
by consumer countries outside of their borders, judging this as a hypocrite measure. Therefore,
the OAS points out a new tendency adopted by producer countries to tackle the issue
themselvesnegotiation.
Producer countries have been shifting their scarce resources to combat drug trafficking toward
damage limitation, letting cartels control the flow of drugs in return of social peace. Sometimes,
countries strike what commentators called tacit narco-pacts with drug organizations3. It is an
unconventional way of preserving countries sovereignty, since they internally deal with the
conflict. The report also states that this solution caused a drop in drug interdictions and dealer
arrests, plus a decline in murders in some areas (OAS 2013). Nonetheless, criminals rely on the
rise of drug consumption, due to lower prices, and on the consequent strengthening of narco
syndicates, which, without repression, increase their economic and political influence over
communities, becoming proto narco-states (OAS 2013, sec. Disruption). In the end, the report
discusses the advantages and drawbacks of narco-pacts and decriminalization, but makes a clear
statement about the failure of the war on drugs.
The works discussed in this section point towards two different directions. First, that heavyhanded policies aimed at security tend to be ineffective in curbing crime in the long-term. In fact,

James Bargent, InSight Crime, posted on May 23, 2013

some of these strict policies, such as mass incarceration, actually contribute to increase crime
rates. Therefore, criminals cannot be exclusively blamed for crime rise, since harsh security
policies also play a role in it. Second, the literature discusses how negotiation may play a
positive role in refraining criminality, offering an option to zero tolerance policies. The next
section brings the broader discussion to the state of So Paulo, where pundits disagree as to
whether the government plays either a positive or a negative role in trying to contain crimes.
1.2.2 Successful Public Policies
In regards to successful public policies, Goertzel and Kahn (2009) note that homicide rates
between 2001 and 2007 in So Paulo state dropped by half. Furthermore, they attribute this fact
to two different causes gun control legislation and more effective policing methods. In their
opinion, the turning point in the states criminal homicide rate came at the peak of this increase
of imprisonments (404). They observe that, if in the first quarter of 1996 the number of monthly
imprisonments was 18,602, it jumped to 30,831 in the first quarter of 2001, settling back to
approximately 23,000 a month after that (404). Worth noticing is that the imprisonment policy
described by the authors starts as a response to the mega-rebellion of 20014. All in all, they
attribute the homicide decline to successful security policies, against which criminals tend to
react,
The attacks by organized crime are a response to police crackdowns that have put large
numbers of offenders in crowded prisons and removed thousands of handguns from
circulation. These police measures have substantially lowered homicide and some other
violent crime rates. This does not generate dramatic new stories on television footage, but
it does make life safer for the average citizen or visitor to So Paulo. (Goertzel and Kahn
2009, 407)

In 2001 the PCC made its first public appearance, simultaneously mobilizing 29 state prisons in joint mutinies. This episode
became known as the mega-rebellion of 2001.

10

According to Goertzel and Kahns argument, organized crime attacks are simply a response from
the criminals to the effectiveness of mass imprisonment. However, the 2009 article did not
foresee 2012 as a pivotal moment that caused an increase in crime rates. This thesis rejects the
efficiency of mass incarceration. However, it is harder to contest the effectiveness of gun control
legislation, also pointed out by Goertzel and Kahn.
By the end of 2003, the National Congress enacted the Law n 10.826/03, known as the law
against guns. The law imposed measures which sought to control the flow of firearms into the
country, and made it illegal to own guns that are not registered or to carry guns outside of ones
homes or business. Moreover, it instituted background checks for gun purchases and raised the
minimum age for gun purchases to twenty-five. Penalties for those overriding the law also
increased, including tougher fines and prison sentences. On the top of the national law, a
volunteer disarmament program took place in 2004, from which the state could buy back over
450,000 guns.
In 2004, for the first time in more than a decade, firearm mortality declined eight per cent from
the previous year at the national level. Firearm related hospitalizations also decreased 4.6 per
cent (Ministerio da Sade, 2012). The reversal of this trend encouraged an interdisciplinary study
(Marinho de Souza et al 2007) aimed at verifying the correlation between those changes and the
new legislation. For that, the scholars used the linear -regression approach similar to that used to
measure model mortality rates in the analysis of predicted hospitalizations. The effort undertook
resulted in interesting findings. Firearm-related deaths and hospitalizations are not well
distributed in the country (577). Whereas some Brazilian states such as So Paulo, Mato Grosso,
Sergipe and Paraba faced a decrease of more than 30 per cent in deaths, other ones, such as
Amazonas and Par (notorious by their land dispute) actually had their rates increased.
11

Notwithstanding, the total of averted potential deaths was 5,563 at the national level. The study
also identifies So Paulos success as an outlier, having the state the highest rates of gun buyback in the country: 188.8/100,000 per capita. The aforementioned scholars believe that the
state-level police promoted the disarmament program as well as strictly enforced gun control
laws. Whereas the average national rates arrest for firearm possession in 2004 was 40/100,000,
in So Paulo it was 50/100,000 (Marinho de Souza et al. 2007, 580-81).The trend in decrease of
firearm-related deaths, however, did not endure,

The evolution [of firearm-related deaths] along those decades was not homogenous.
Between 1990 and 2003 the increase was relatively systematic and regular, at an
accelerated pace: 7.3 per cent a year. After the peak of 39.3 thousand deaths in 2003,
figures, at first, dropped to approximately 36 thousand, but after 2008 they kept
oscillating around 39 thousand a year. The disarmament campaign, launched in 2004,
seemed to be a significant factor to explain this change. Data shows, however, that if this
policy could curb the trend of accelerated firearm-related deaths which prevailed in the
country, it did not have enough effectiveness to revert the process and decrease the
figures. (Weiselfisz 2013, 9-11)5
Besides demonstrating the limited effect of gun control measures, the Mapa da violncia 2013
also points to the fact that there are 3.8 million firearms in possession of criminals in Brazil
(Weiselfisz 2013, 9). Offenders, by definition, offend the establishment; and therefore would not
feel encouraged to join the governments buy-back program. Gun seizures, on the contrary, may
have disrupted criminal activities but, regardless of all efforts, disarming an arsenal close to four
million guns takes more than a law and a campaign. Public opinion also reflected populations
concern with gun control measures in a national referendum on arm collection.

Translation by the author. Note that all the translations from originals in Portuguese in this entire document were made by the
author, unless when otherwise specified.

12

Concerned with the possibility of deprivation of self-defence rights among armed criminals who
would not follow gun control legislation, nearly 65 per cent of Brazilians overwhelmingly
rejected a ban on firearms in October 2005. Despite the fact that only one per cent of the
population holds guns6, the 2005 referendum demonstrated that the vast majority praises for a
right that they do not exercise. In conclusion, gun control measures may not have caused a steady
drop in firearm-related deaths, but it has created some impact in So Paulos homicide drop, and
should compound the set of explanations to the phenomenon.
1.2.3 Unsuccessful Public Policies
An opposite interpretation of the problem comes from Feltran (2011), who disbelieves the
renowned achievements of paulista 7 security policies. Possibly the most compelling study on the
impact the PCC exerts at the streets belongs to this author. The sociologist spent over five years
performing a field work in the impovishered district of Sapopemba, in the East zone of So
Paulo, which has around 300,000 inhabitants. His work is of extreme significance because he
argues that the drop in homicide rates of the last decade is actually due to the PCC, the most
powerful Brazilian criminal organization today. To the author, a guideline imposed by the group,
of prohibition of murder in the streets, is actually the reason why homicide rates have dropped so
dramatically. Since the PCC has reached the monopoly of the crime world, it has also become
the maximum authority of this dominium.
Any execution must be pre-approved by the PCC leadership, and this mechanism turned murder
into a last resort solution. From this, one can deduce that the credits the government takes for

This figure is highly controversial. In Brazil, unlike in the United States, Switzerland or Canada, gun possession is very
stigmatized by society. Therefore, many of those who hold guns do it in secrecy, not even registering the weapon with the
authorities. The Mapa da violncia 2013 shows that there are approximately 8.5 million unregistered guns in Brazil
(Weilselfisz, 2013, 9).
7 Paulista is how people born in the state of So Paulo are designated.

13

curbing violence in the city actually belongs to the PCC. What the media calls the PCC factor8
is, in fact, Feltrans argument (2011), which also implies a total subversion of order, since
criminals would have a much higher impact enacting a set of laws than the state itself.
The public health report Decline in homicide rates in So Paulo, Brazil: a descriptive analysis
(Perez et al. 2011) shows the homicide drop all over the country, and notably in So Paulo. The
most important lesson to abstract from the report, which focuses on quantitative analysis, is that
the value of homicide rates increases significantly by disaggregating the variables. After
employing this technique in the homicide data of So Paulo city the study verifies that, despite
the general drop in homicide rates, the drop was more expressive in areas of extreme social
exclusion and among males aged between fifteen and thirty-four, exactly the areas and the age
group that the PCC influences the most. In the authors words, [the] data indicates, thus, that
the drop in homicide rates of So Paulo may have happened due a change in the pattern of
criminal and community violence (Perez et al. 2011, 24). If by disaggregating the variables the
report shows that the homicide drop affected more some age groups and communities, the Mapa
da Violncia de 2011 (Waiselfisz 2011) shows a dislocation of crime across the state of So
Paulo.
The Mapa da Violncia de 2011 (Waiselfisz 2011), confirms the homicide drop all over the
country, highlighting So Paulo as an outlier. However, the report identifies a dynamic
dislocation, of both dissemination and interiorizing (Weiselfisz 2011, 57) of homicide, which
is shifting from metropolitan areas to rural areasphenomena that can be seen in every state of

To see a couple examples of the use of the term, refer to Dias, Camila Nunes. Matemtica da Violncia The Maths of
Violence O Estado de So Paulo 04 Nov 2012. Web. 18 April 2013 and Rocha, Bruno Lima. Fator PCC, Desinformao e
Hipocrisia Oficial PCC Factor, Disinformation and Official Hypocrisy O Globo [Braslia], Blog do Noblat 14 Nov 2012. Web.
18 April 2013.
8

14

the country. This double process suggests two things: 1) that homicide is not dropping as much
as first perceived, but is actually moving towards the interior of the country; 2) in the case of So
Paulo, particularly, the interiorizing of crime coincides with the security policy of interiorizing
prison establishments. This thesis argues that this is not exactly a coincidence. This works since
the PCC rules the prison system9: by spreading the facilities, the government is also enlarging the
area where the PCC acts.
While Feltran draws on the PCC strength to justify the homicide drop of the last decade, Risso
(2014) holds the Military Police of So Paulo accountable for the raise in homicides after 2012.
In her diagnosis of the recent spurt in homicide rates in So Paulo city, Risso concludes,

An examination of the incidences of deaths due to police intervention in this case reveals
a significant involvement of police officers as perpetrators of intentional homicides in the
city of So Paulo. Of the overall total of cases with known perpetrators, the police were
responsible for 58.8 per cent of the homicides reported in 2012 and for 53.1 per cent in
the first half of 2013. Consolidated analysis of all intentional homicides in So Paulo
reveals that the police were responsible for 21 per cent in 2012, i.e., one in every five
killings in the city was committed by a police officer. In the first semester of 2013, it was
a lower proportion of 17.6 per cent. Despite the reduction observed in 2013, these data
reveal a totally unacceptable volume of deaths. It is critical to determine the
circumstances in which these shootings are taking place (2014, 8).

As perpetrators of violence, police officers are actually contributing to the increase in murders
after 2012.
The fact that 79% of these police officers were off duty by the time of the incident (Risso 2014,
8) suggests that these killings might be related to extra judicial motivations. Withal, by analysing
Police Incident Reports from January 2012 to June 2013 and highlighting the main

The PCCs domain over the prison system is explained in detail in this thesis, especially in Chapters 3 and 4.

15

characteristics of victims by perpetrator status, Bento and Rechenberg (2013) noticed that for the
occurrences that were reported as signs of execution, 95% were committed by unknown
offenders and 52.6% took place in the second half of 2012 (22). In addition, during this period,
79% of all the homicides are of unknown authors (Bento and Rechenberg 2013, figure 1).
According to the rationale of the second explanation, rule of law is subverted: to some extent, the
PCC would be responsible for the crime drop and the police force for its raise.
This projects intent, therefore, is to go beyond the dichotomy state effectiveness versus state
ineffectiveness by proposing a novel reasoning for the problem of criminality in So Paulo.
Neither the state nor the PCC can be blamed alone for the violence in the state. Willis (2014)
asks for a greater focus on urban informality in order to make sense of the puzzle. By resorting
to informal institutions and complex adaptive system methodological frameworks, this thesis
aims to respond to Willis challenge of explaining why So Paulo has become so violent.

Analytical Framework
Understanding the unexpected rise in violence in So Paulo requires a comprehensive analysis of
the problem, as well of the actors involved in it. The scholarship has been studying public
security policies, and organized crime separately, to make sense of violence. However, studying
the state of So Paulo and the PCC in isolation does not account to explain the phenomenon of
violence, because it is the interaction of these two agents that clarifies the puzzle of criminal
levels in the state.
Despite the fact that a couple of studies already suggest a causal relationship between the
expansion of the prison system and the PCC strengthening, (Dias 2011; Adorno and Salla 2007)
and that there is a study of violence in Brazil resorting to a network approach (Arias 2006), there
16

is not yet a study that focuses on the interaction of actors as being the core explanation of
violence in So Paulo. In this sense, this thesis proposes the use of Complex Adaptive System
framework in order to unpack the series of interactions between the state and the PCC, and,
therefore, explain the evolution of crime in So Paulo.
1.3.1 Complex Adaptive System Framework
Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is a theoretical framework that resorts to Darwinian
evolutionary principles for explaining an agents adaptive path. In this model, context,
relationship and agency matters. Hence, the study of agents considers interactions with the
surrounding environment, and, more importantly, it takes into account the dynamics of how a
certain agent responds to this environment. CAS has been employed in different disciplines,
from molecular biology to computer sciences, and represents a scientific movement towards the
understanding of entire systems, as opposed to the dissection of its parts,

The greatest challenge today, not just in cell biology and ecology but in all of science, is
the accurate and complete description of complex systems. Scientists have broken down
many kinds of systems. They think they know most of the elements and forces. The next
task is to reassemble them, at least in mathematical models that capture the key properties
of the entire ensembles. (Stogatz 2001, 268)

Because the problem of violence in So Paulo is ascribable to both the state and the PCC, the
CAS framework is a useful analytical tool to this single case study. Among various CAS models,
the most suitable to study the state-PCC system is the asymmetric predator-prey arms race10.
The system fits into a typical arms race in the sense that, An adaptation in one lineage (eg.

10

In this evolutionary model, two different species co-evolve in an arms race between the predator species and its
prey or between the parasite and its host (Vermej 1987). This model is an asymmetric arms race since the selection
pressure works on opposite sides.

17

predators) may change the selection pressure on another lineage (eg. prey), giving rise to
counter-adaptation (Ibid).
If this occurs reciprocally, an unstable runaway escalation or arms race may result (Dawkins
and Krebs 1979, 489). In this case study, the state fits in the predator and the PCC in the prey
roles. In the same manner, the state-PCC system fits into an asymmetric arms race since,

An asymmetric arms race might be called an attack-defense arms race. It is one in

which offensive adaptations on one side are countered by defensive adaptations on the
other. Swords get sharper, so shields get thicker, so swords get sharper still. Most of the
familial biological examples are asymmetric as in the predator-prey or the parasite-host
asymmetry. (Ibid. 491)

Identifying the state-PCC system as asymmetric sets forth an important implication, that is, that
the PCC has an inherent advantage over the state. According to the life-dinner principle, the
agent who is under stronger selection pressure than another tends to have advantage in that
particular arms race (Ibid., 494). More specifically, Dawkins and Krebs defend that a specialist
has advantage over a generalist.
In order to illustrate this idea, there is a series of arguments. First, whereas the PCC is fighting
for its existence, the state is just enforcing the law, and, at most, reinforcing its own legitimacy11.
Second, whereas the PCC is specialized in its own endeavors, the state has to combat crime in
general, including the PCCs rival gangs. The relationship between the state and the PCC is a
typical predator-prey one and the two actors make use of various strategies in order to
accomplish their goals. Since the PCCs primary goal is to survive, the group resorts to more

11

The validity of this argument could be easily contested if the government, in spite of the state, were considered as the predator,
since governments also fight for its survival in times of re-election. Refer to Chapter 4 for an illustration of how governments
reacted to the pressure made by the PCC in times of re-election.

18

adaptive strategies than the government. The life-dinner principle, thus, accounts for the
imbalance of strategies expounded by this thesis, which justifies the focus on the PCC rather than
the states strategies.
Nonetheless, during most of the time both players are resorting to a simple strategy: TIT FOR
TAT (see Figure 3). By applying Hollands genetic algorithm to the Prisoners Dilemma game,
Axelrod noticed that the population quickly evolved towards TIT FOR TAT, which is a strategy
of cooperation based on reciprocity (1997, 16).Cooperation derives from the threat of
retaliation, and this feature is present in the state-PCC complex system because defection is
usually too costly for both parties. Therefore, what is seen is that the constant game of TIT FOR
TAT keeps an unstable truce, which is eventually broken (illustrated in the system by the megarebellions of 2001 and 2006 and by the attacks of 2012, which will be further discussed).
Figure 3. TIT FOR TAT between the state and the PCC

State

TIT

TAT

PCC

19

Whenever there is a defection in the TIT FOR TAT game, it means that the system reached
unintended consequences. Those are not caused by accident. The system breakdown, from time
to time, relies on its complex nature, to which the CAS framework sheds light. Correspondingly,
Alxelrods typology of variety, interaction and selection (2001) are useful concepts to deduce the
state-PCC system behavioural patterns. The next section explains how these concepts are
incorporated into the analysis.
Additionally to recurrent terms, there are key CAS processes that permeate the entire analysis.
First and foremost, it is important to reiterate that this thesis is based on the study of the statePCC complex system, and not of its isolated parts. This system has two main agents, the state
and the PCC, that interact with each other in different spaces, using different strategies and
artifacts. Each of these agents also has its own population and sub-populations, of various types
and agents. The evolution of the state-PCC system, and the outcomes that it produces in crime in
So Paulo, depends on three main CAS processes: variety, interaction and selection.
Variety is a central feature of any population, since it increases its survival rates when facing a
threat. In the predator-prey state-PCC system, keeping variety within the population, as well
attacking each others variety, is a key success factor. Interaction, in its turn, is the most evident
process of the state-PCC system, and is responsible for its very creation: without interaction, the
main agents would not have formed a system. Lastly, selection is a key process for agents to
choose strategies and interfere in their own and each other populations. Variety, interaction and
selection, hence, are key CAS processes to the state-PCC system (see Figure 4), because in a
typical predator-prey CAS, predators are ultimately attempting to terminate the preys
population.

20

Before presenting the key CAS processes in more detail, there is the need to unpack the levels of
analysis in which they apply to. This work offers to explain violence in So Paulo through the
interaction of a complex system, instead of its isolated parts. Nonetheless, the understanding of
the system itself requires the analysis of variety, interaction and selection at different levels. In
this sense, the key CAS processes are applied in five different levels, since they may be used
intra and inter populations, with one agent trying to target the other. The different levels of
analysis, thus, are: 1) state-state; 2) state-PCC; 3) PCC- state; 4) PCC-PCC; 5) PCC- rival gangs.
Figure 4. State-PCC CAS

Variety

Selection

State

PCC

StatePCC CAS
System

Interaction

CAS Key Processes

Main Agents

CAS

In sum, variety, interaction and selection, and its underlying mechanisms and principles,
incorporate the analysis of the state-PCC complex system (see Figure 5) to decode their
strategies separately, but without losing site of the holistic approach.
In order to unravel this puzzle, it is important to understand that much of the crime in question
involves a complex set of relationships between the police and a particular group of organized
criminals, the PCC.

21

Figure 5. State-PCC CAS by levels of analysis

State- StateState PCC

Recombines and
increases the
variety of the
police forces and
the prison system

Constructs barriers
with prison
transfers to isolate
PCC's leadership,
curbing interaction

PCCPCC
Recruits members
and fellows by
strict selection

PCC- PCCState Rivals

Promotes riots to
obtain prison
transfers and
remove
interaction
barriers

Removes barriers
with prison
transfers to create
interaction
between the PCC
and its enemies

Selected the RDD

as a different
strategy

Redistributes the
stress of the
system interacting
and negotiationg
with the PCC

Decrease variety
through violence

Keeps hegemony
through specific
prison rules

Redistributes the
stress of the
system interacting
and negotiating
with the state

1.4 Argument
On May 28 2012, a special police force called Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar Tobias de
Aguiar Ostensive Patrol (ROTA), notoriously known for their brutality, allegedly killed 5 men
in a car pack who belonged to the PCC. Because of this disruption, the gang reinstated
previously existing rules of engagement for dealing with the police. One of these states that if
a policeman captures one of its members and executes instead of arresting him, then the PCC cell
22

in the region will kill city police officers. After this has occurred, crime rates in the state spiked.
The peak of violence was in October, when murder rates rose 80%, compared to the previous
year.
Despite still engaging in its activities drug trafficking being the most profitable one the
PCC was not openly disturbing or terrorizing the population since 2006, the year of the groups
biggest wave of attacks. Since then, the media and most of the pundits assumed that the gang had
been contained by the government. Contrary to the official discourse, however, the gang was
never close to being dismantled. The shift in the nature of the attacks, aimed primarily at police
officers, highlight that the criminal organization not only still has teeth, but has the power to
show them. This means that, in So Paulo, between 2006 and 2012, low crime rates and illegality
coexisted harmoniously, in a bizarre accommodating relationship. Thereby, the research question
opens up analysis of the interaction between the state and this gang.
Second, this study finds a positive relationship between the expansion of the prison system and
the growing strength of the PCC. In bief, the research showed that: a) despite the fact that there
were low crime rates in the state until the attacks of 2012, the PCC had never been stronger; b)
despite the unprecedented expansion of the prison system in So Paulo, the quality had not
improved and there is still prison beds deficit; c) in practice, the PCC rules the prison system,
and used its hegemony over other gangs to expand its influences from prison to prison; d) the
PCCs power is not exclusive to the prison system on the contrary, prisons operate as a
fortress to the gang, from where the PCCs values, principles, commands and rules emanate and
reverberate; e) the PCCs control over prisons counts on the leniency of the state, which, afraid
of inevitable rebellions, allowed the group to overtake the system; f) if, in the first decade of the
century, violence dropped in So Paulo, it was due to a frail accommodating relationship
23

between the state and organized crime, at which both, side by side, formed a racketeering
network.
In short, this project argues that jails have not curbed crime in So Paulo. Instead, and contrary
to what they were assumed to do, they strengthened the very organization they were supposed to
stop12. Since the research reveals that prisons are the primary locus for the PCCs evolution, the
expectation that its concrete walls would prevent the gang expansion is a fallacious idea.
Adaptive behavior in prison is maladaptive behavior outside explains Marieke Liem (Gudrais
2013), who argues that imprisonment refrains inmates to cope on the outside. All in all, this
single case study lends evidence to another unsuccessful mass incarceration policy.

Methodology
The methodology behind this project consists in process-tracing and narrative analysis. Counterfactual analysis is employed in the conclusion to consider competing explanations. In order to
employ these methods, the research relies on secondary sources (books, biographies, theses,
dissertations, reports, journal articles, press media articles, and even investigative novels) and on
primary sources (governmental data, general studies on violence produced by competent Nongovernmental Organizations, NGOs, and other institutions, consolidated statistics, and
governmental press releases). In order to account for competing explanations to the problem and
to verify the boldness of this hypothesis, Chapter 5 also employs counter-factual analysis.

12

The creation of criminal organizations as a nefarious and unintended consequence of incarceration policy is a
problem that extrapolates to other regions on the globe. There is evidence, for instance, that the Islamic State (ISIS),
was actually created inside of Camp Bucca, in southern Iraq, an American War Prison. Camp Bucca was a focal
point to the group, since it put in contact terrorists from all over who could very hardly meet under any other
circumstances. The American government also color-coded daitenees uniforms by their importance, which enabled
the inmates to create what would later be Isis hierarchy (Chulov 2014).

24

Galliher and Cain (1974) acknowledge that most of the studies on mafia rely upon secondary
sources and primary data instead of questionnaires, interviews and ethnography, due to
methodological constraints involved in researching organized crime. The same thought applies to
this thesismethods such as field work and interviews were discarded for time constraint and
safety issues.
1.5.1 Narrative Analysis
Narrative analysis deserves further explanation, since it is the core method of this thesis. The
method was chosen since it allows working with many variables in a small n study and unfolding
to what extent the entire argument rests upon the validity of each causal linkage. Further,
narrative analysis shows sensitivity to detail, process, and causal complexity, narrative analysis
entails a major shift towards disaggregation, along with a highly self-conscious focus on the
historical sequences in which these disaggregated elements appear (Mahoney 1999, 1164). This
project aims at analysing and processing various elements of an adaptive system. Narrative
analysis is a suitable tool to identify and debrief the adaptive strategies, the causal chains of
which they are part, their points of intersection and their unfolding processes that are consistent
with a broader, overarching macrocasual argument.

Chapter Outline
The chapters portray an analysis of the paulista prison system (and the complex adaptive system
that grows within it, in three different moments 2001, 2006, and 2012. Each of these moments
coincides with an unstable moment of the system: the so- called mega-rebellions of 2001 and
2006, and the attacks of 2012. That being said, it is important to clarify that the chronological
landmarks were chosen not only to narrate the evolution of the PCC, but, foremost, to help to
25

debrief parts and interaction mechanisms of the state-PCC CAS. Therefore, the periodization
adopted in this thesis was determined in compliance with the CAS analysis. As previously
mentioned, all three landmarks reflect a crisis in the system. Notwithstanding, prior to each
crisis, the state-PCC system experienced expansion.
Chapter 2, Building the System, which landmarks the mega-rebellion of 2001, depicts the
creation of the state-PCC system. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first,
Background, provides an outlook of the prison system before the PCCs creation, in 1993. The
chapter first examines the roots of organized crime in Brazil, and identifies how prisons have
been used as hubs for its creation and reproduction, pattern that goes back to the 1970s.
Following that, the chapter addresses human rights abuses from the authorities and their
relationship with the role played by the PCC in representing the incarcerated population against
the government. Next, the section assesses how the expansion of prisons was first designed as a
solution to an overcrowded system, and how this measure failed to solve the problem of
overpopulation due to the coexistence of authoritarian and democratic initiatives in public policy.
The second section of Chapter 2, Leapfrogging Strategies, shows how the PCC took advantage
of an expanding, although constantly overcrowded, prison system, for employing strategies to
strive. This is achieved by analysing how the PCC bargained with the state promoting prison
riots in exchange for transfers, and, most importantly, its nefarious implications in expanding the
group. The chapter follows by showing how the incarcerated population changed over time, and
it identifies violence as a crucial strategy for the PCC to eliminate rival gangs and promote
selection.
Chapter 3, Turf Battle in the Crime World, which landmarks the mega-rebellion of 2006, shows
the expansion of the system. The second moment marks the mega-rebellion of 2006, the apex of
26

tension between the state and the gang. This is when most of the active interactions between the
state and the PCC took place, marking a phase when state attempted several different strategies
to try to curb the group. Chapter 3 first draws on the PCCs internal crisis to explain how the
group adapted its organizational chart to a more horizontal structure, assuring enough variety in
its population to react to state measures against its top echelon. The chapter explains how the
state adapted its organizational chart as an attempt to curb the PCCs highly profitable activities,
and how the PCC managed to overcome these restrictions by exploring new enterprises, in a
mechanism here named crime migration.
The chapter, then, assesses how the state exploited its resources, by creating a more severe
modality of prison transfer the Regime Disciplinar Diferenciado, the Differentiated
Disciplinary Regime, or RDD. Then, the chapter identifies how the partnership between the
state of So Paulo and the federal government in building federal maxi- prisons to curb the
organized crime, ended up by failing. Through the federal maxi- prisons, the PCC has now
expanded to other states, in a process that mimics what already happened in So Paulo. The
chapter concludes by conducting the analysis of the arms race between the government and the
PCC on the use of cell phones and attorneys in the prison system.
Chapter 4, Keeping the Status Quo, which landmarks the attacks of 2012, marks the
consolidation of the system. It begins by analysing how the PCC resorts to symbols, soft power
and a unique ethos to perpetuate its hegemony in and out the prison system. Despite the fact that
the PCC reigns in the criminal world, there are constant threats, coming both from the state and
from other minor gangs, which put at stake the PCCs position. This chapter, then, examines a
series of rules created by the group to foster and keep the flow of interaction among criminals,
from inside and outside of the prison system.
27

Chapter 5, Counter-factual Analysis and Final Remarks, examines a series of counter-factual

questions, which aim to verify as to whether some variables have a causal relationship or a
simple correlation with the PCCs resurgence in 2012. Despite the fact that this research focuses
primarily on the state-PCC interaction as the primary explanation for the crime rise in So Paulo,
there are possible competing explanations to the puzzle. The section analyses a series of counterfactuals to the attacks of 2012, because this is the landmark of the crime rise and, therefore,
represents the PCCs influence in the spike in crime. Lastly, the Final Remarks outlines the
limitations and contributions of the thesis and invites the scholarship to further explore this
thesis theme.

28

2. BUILDING THE SYSTEM

The First Command of the Capital, PCC, founded in the year of 1993 in a huge and tireless fight
against the oppression and injustices of the concentration camp that was the Taubat Custody
Prison, has as its motif Freedom, Justice and Peace
-PCC Statute, article 11

2.1 Background
This chapter first assesses the origins of organized crime organizations in the Brazilian
dictatorship (1964-85). While focusing primarily on the creation of the state-PCC system, the
first part of this chapter argues that, from the beginning, there is an intricate relationship between
imprisonment and the PCC. Before addressing the creation of the government-PCC system, a
brief historical account of the prison system under the states full domain is necessary to
understand the context within which the gang originated. In sequence, the chapter addresses how
the PCC managed to expand and become hegemonic in the prison system.
The study of the origins of organized crime in Brazil is conducive to this research since there are
many parallels between the contexts in which the first criminal organizations and the PCC were
created. First and foremost, both the first Brazilian criminal organizations and the PCC
originated inside of the prison system. In both cases, criminal organizations were founded in
opposition to an abusive prison system, in which human rights violations was an ongoing issue.
Also, prisoners who were specialists in bank heists became the heads of organized crime, and
passed their know-how onto the rest of the prison population (Leeds 1996).
The shared roots between the first criminal organizations and the PCC in jails stands out,
however, because in both historical moments organized crime was an unintended consequence of
an abusive prison system. Despite in a different fashion, the prison system overrode human rights
29

both during the Brazilian dictatorship and the PCC creation. In the first case, human rights
violation occurred because the government treated political prisoners as common criminals, and
because jail conditions were precarious. In the second case, however, an overcrowded prison
system was an enough condition for the rise of organized crime in So Paulo.
The first section of this chapter, then, draws a parallel between the origin of the first organized
crime organizations in Brazil, during the dictatorship, and the rise of the PCC, identifying an
overcrowded and abusive prison system as the link between the two periods. Also, it identifies
that the misuse of the prison system, in both periods, generated unintended consequences,
culminating in the strengthening of organized crime. During the dictatorship, the misguided use
of the prison system occurred by mixing political and criminal groups. Twenty years later, by the
creation of the PCC, an inconsistent policy of prison expansion without quality improvement had
the PCC building as the counterpart.
The chapter is laid to explain how the misled policies including the prison system enabled the
creation of organized crime, first during the Brazilian dictatorship and then in So Paulo, two
decades later. Drawing this parallel is important not only to delineate the coincidences between
the two historical moments, but also because the inheritance left by the dictatorship led the state
to implement ambiguous prison policies over the following decades. Post-dictatorship, the prison
system expansion was two-folded: for some governors it had a humanizing purpose, aimed at
distressing an overflowing system by the creation of prison beds; for other governors, however,
the expansion of the prison system represented only the infrastructural arm of a broader project
of mass incarceration. The inconsistency of this policy, then, offered the PCC the conditions to
expand among the prison population.

30

Once the background which allowed the PCCs creation has been described, the chapter draws
on the strategies the PCC used to grow in an expanding prison system. The second section of this
chapter, Leapfrogging Strategies, seeks to demonstrate how the group expanded hand by hand
with the prison system, and how the misleading strategies chosen by the government ended up
contributing to its growth. The premise of the constitution of the state-PCC CAS system is that it
was created in prisons. Overall, the prison system in Brazil enabled the emergence of well
organized groups, and it was later dominated by the PCC, starting from So Paulo. This section,
Leapfrogging Strategies, accounts for the evolution of the state-PCC CAS system until 2001,
when the first mega-rebellion and major disruption in the system took place.
This section intends to unveil the strategies that the state used in an attempt to curb the PCCs
expansion, as well as the PCCs strategies to expand. Considering that both parties depend on
interacting with each other in order to achieve its goals, and that this a typical predator-prey
CAS, each action one part takes (TIT), will be replied with a reaction by the other (TAT). The
TIT FOR TAT game, however, is employed at many levels during the first stage of the system
(1993-2001), when the interactions happened to be more intense. During that period, the section
analyses the CAS interactions at the state-PCC, PCC-state, and PCC-rival gangs levels.
First, at the state-PCC level, the section shows how the government made use of prison transfers
as a strategy to curb the PCC expansion. The state transferred PCC leaders (TIT) to try
demobilize the groups structure and to generate conflicts between PCC members and other rival
groups. In return (TAT), the PCC promoted prison riots to protest against those transfers. Prison
transfer is a bi-directional strategy as, at the PCC-state level, the PCC also resorted to transfers to
achieve its goals. Interestingly, the PCC purposefully promoted prison riots (TIT) demanding
transfers (TAT), because the group desired to increase the groups range and the variety of its
31

members. Prison transfers, thus, is a double-edged strategy, because both the PCC and the state
used it to seek different objectives.
In regards to the key CAS processes outlined in Chapter 1, prison transfers affect the interaction
patterns among inmates, in the sense that they both construct and remove barriers in the physical
space. From the states standpoint, transfers impose barriers to interactions among some agents,
who are separated and placed in different spaces. From the PCCs standpoint, however, the
transfer intentionally provoked by uprisings remove physical barriers between inmates who were
formerly doing time in different facilities. Therefore, prison transfers are a strategy that alters
interactions by constructing and removing barriers. Also, aware that some prisons offer better
conditions than others, inmates follow this sign and force transfers to a more conducive facility.
Side by side with interaction, variety is a process involved in the strategy of prison transfers.
While the state believed transfers would decrease the PCCs variety, the PCC used them to
increase it. Finally, the section studies the strategies at the PCC-rival gang level. The PCC, once
again, resorted to prison riots (TIT) to promote enough instability in the prison system in order to
select the agents among the prison population. By promoting riots, the PCC intended to
overthrow and demobilize the rival gangs, as well as to select allies and separate them from
enemies. Riots targeting rival gangs would end up either reflecting as prison transfers
(abovementioned) or would escalate to murders (TAT), practice part of the selection process.
Besides selection, the attacks of the PCC against rival gangs also affected interaction processes.
The PCC draws on some tactics used by its rival gangs to overthrow them. The group copies
enemies strategies, but adapts them to its own rational. This way, the PCC imposed its
sovereignty over rival gangs, but without excluding traits and strategies that were proven to be
successful to strive in the prison system before. Table 1 summarizes all the strategies, at different
32

levels, that were present during the first phase of the state-PCC CAS system, between 1993 and
2001. As it follows, the chapter explains in detail what this preview discusses.

Table 1. State-PCC CAS strategies from 1993-2001

Level
State

TIT

TAT

Transfer Riot

Strategy
Decrease Variety/ Construction of Barriers

PCC
PCC- Riot

Transfer Increase Variety/ Remove Barriers

State
PCC- Riot

Murders Selecting Agents

Rival

2.2 Origin of Organized Crime

The relationship between imprisonment and the strengthening of organized crime organizations
is not new nor exclusive to So Paulo. Examples of gangs originated inside of the prison system
abound, but most impressive is the fact that they spilled over to the outside and, eventually, to
other countries. Figure 6 shows the10 most dangerous world prison gangs, including those whose
members are present in more than one countrys prison system.
What makes the Brazilian case stand out is that organized crime in Brazil was originated by the
encounter of leftist political prisoners with common prisoners in prison establishments13. Leeds
(1996), argues that organized crime is a product of the dictatorship. Leftist political militias once

13

A very similar story applies to Colonial Vietnam, at the prison of Poulo Condoro, in Con Son island. By arresting
members of the Indochinese Communist Party in the same part of Poulo Condoro, the party gained strength and
recruits, wrote its own manifesto and ran its own indoctrination class in the prison. Since most of the leadership and
lower ranks that later defeated the French and the Americans met at Poulo Condoro, this prison became known as
the communist university.

33

financed themselves with bank robberies, what required understanding of sophisticated security
systems. Political inmates slowly started to pass forward their knowhow about organized
sophisticated crimes along with their political awareness to regular prisoners, with whom they
shared jails.
Figure 6. The 10 Most Dangerous Prison Gangs

Source: Connoly 2013.

Overtime, this process led to the creation of organized crime in Brazil. Leeds analysis of the
origins of organized crime in Brazil allows one to infer that the state acts as enabler: In an
effort to protect society from the two perceived evils of common criminals and leftist political
militants, the Brazilian state inadvertently created the form of organized crime against which
now seems compelled to protect society (51). Leeds goes further, and states that in Brazil there
are two oppressive forces against the population: drug organizations and the security forces. To
her, what justifies police abuses today is that, during the dictatorship, the state assigned a
military role to a civilian police force, which has been carried out until now.
An investigative journalist, Amorim (2011), has added more to Leeds argument. By unfolding
the origins of the Comando Vermelho Red Command (CV) group from Rio de Janeiro, the first
34

and still the largest Brazilian criminal organization, Amorim allows his reader to imply that there
is a pattern in the origin of criminal organizations in Brazil. The CV was created inside of the
Ilha Grande prison, the first maximum- security prison of the country designed to receive
political prisoners during the military dictatorship (1964-1985)14.The nickname of the Ilha
Grande jail was Devils Caldron, an analogy to the Devils Island prison colony, from the book
and namesake film Papillon (1973). Invisible to human right observers, prisoners faced the worst
possible living conditions, and decided to fight against it. Yet twenty years later, the creation of
the PCC also derives from a context of human rights abuse in prisons.
2.2.1 The Party
The PCC was created in an abusive prison facility. The gang was appealing to other prisoners
since its creation was based on class struggle against the state, what became the PCCs flagship.
There are two different versions about the creation of the gang; nonetheless, both are poignant
examples of a group of prisoners who got together willing to react to unbridled state power.
According to a statement of one the PCCs founders, Geleio15, the PCC was created during a
soccer match at the Anexo da Casa de Custdia de Taubat, on August 31, 1993. The teams that
were playing were the First Command of the Capital (whose players were inmates from the
capital of the states) and The First Command of the Country (whose players were from the
countryside). After some provocation, such as I will drink your blood, Geleio broke the neck
of one of his adversaries. The fight resulted in another death of a member of the First Command

14

Secluded in an island (Ilha Grande), the facility was built during the First Republic (1889-1930) as a sanitary surveillance
checkpoint for people with typhoid fever and tropical diseases coming from Europe and Africa, respectively. In the 1920s, it was
transformed in a prison for the elderly and prisoners about to complete their sentences, and only in 1960 it turned into a high
security prison.
15 The eight founders of PCC are; Jos Mrcio Felcio, AKA Gelio Big Jello; Mizael Aparecido da Silva, AKA Miza; Cesar
Augusto Roriz Silva, AKA Cesinha; Wander Eduardo Ferreira, AKA Cara Gorda Fat Face; Isaas Moreira do Nacimento,
A.K.A., Esquisito Weirdo; Ademar dos Santos , AKA Daf Faith and Antonio Carlos dos Santos , AKA Bicho FeioUgly
Beast. From those, the first three played an important role in the expansion of the group and only Gelio remains alive.

35

of the Country. Afraid of reprisals on the part of correctional officers, the teammates of the First
Command of the Capital agreed amongst themselves that any offense directed to one of their
members would be taken as an offence against the entire group. This self-protection agreement is
popularly understood to be the mythic foundation of the PCC.
A version told by Jozino (2005) disputes this myth with another story. By September 2, 1993,
eight inmates at the Anexo da Casa de Custdia de Taubat killed two prisoners and threatened
another five, if the prison administration did not attend their needs. They demanded for the end
of cell ransacks, more sports, paid-work opportunities, and the dismissal of the director Jos
Ismael Pedrosa16. Led by the group of eight, 130 prisoners played Russian Roulette with jail
guards until the military police took over the prison. Regardless of which story accounts for its
formation, the fact is that the PCC was born in an authoritarian jail facility.
Taking custody only of inmates with prior disciplinary issues, the Anexo da Casa de Custdia de
Taubat was notorious for human rights violations. Prisoners were locked in the cells for twentythree hours a day. During the remaining hour of sunbathing, talking was not allowed. Among the
abusive measures, the staff beat prisoners with iron bars; introduced bugs in their meals or
rationed it to surviving limits; kept the flushing valve of toilets outside of the cells activating
them according to their will; and left the cells with inhumane sanitary conditions. The prison was
only shut in 2003, but ten years before, as a product of this hostile environment, the PCC was
created.

16

Prison director Pedrosa kept his job in the Casa de Custdia de Taubat for years after the PCC creation. The PCC, however,
murdered the director in 2005.

36

Besides the number 1533, representing the alphabetic position of its initials17, the PCC has the
yin and yang symbol printed in its flag. The Chinese symbol, representing opposite and
complementary energies attaining balance, is a telltale sign of how the group deals with the good
and the evil. The Machiavellian maxim the ends justifies the means applies to the PCC,
since the group guiltlessly resorts to violence in order to justify the fight of inmates against the
government. The gang, also self-entitled as The Party18, was created to unite all the prisoners
against their common enemy, the state. The allegoric image refers to the fight of the oppressed
against oppressors, marked by social exclusion and brutality. Opposing the state, thus, is part of
the gangs raison dtre.
Kenney and Fincknauer (1995), in their all-inclusive handbook on criminal organizations,
detected other groups that have also arisen from within prison facilities, such as The Mexican
Mafia, the Black Guerrila Family, and the Aryan Brotherhood. Interestingly, while all these three
groups are ethnically homogenous, having their ethnical identity as their primary bonding
feature, the PCC is defined by alterity19, and the other in this relationship is the state,
specifically its repression arm the prison system. Salla (2008) concurs with this view: In
Brazil, the organized crime that was established within the prisons had as aggregating factors the
practice of criminal actions, the condition of the prisoners as individuals and even some social
identification due to the belonging of most prisoners to poor strata of the population (373). The
Party, hence, was built as opposed to the state, and its identity relies on this opposition.

Until the latest spelling reform of 2009, the letter k was not part of the Portuguese alphabet, what explains the fact that 15 is
the correspondent number to the letter p.
18 This is a widespread denomination of the PCC, and therefore I will employ this name as a synonym for the group for now on.
19 For a better understanding of the alterity or otherness process, refer to Emmanuel Lvinas who coined the term, in Alterity and
Transcendence ([1970] 1999).
17

37

2.2.2 Prison Expansion as a Response to Human Rights Violations

The foundation of the PCC, in 1993, represented the creation of a force around which all
prisoners could deposit their hopes in order to claim their rights for better imprisonment
conditions. Notwithstanding the representativeness of the PCC, the first significant changes that
the government made in the prison system were a response to its own deeds. To this point, the
complex system state-PCC has not yet been created, and the government of So Paulo still sets
the security-policy agenda20. However, if at first the state did not have to deal with the PCC, it
had to deal with an inconsistent tradition in security policy, which fluctuated between
authoritarianism and democratic values.
Leeds (1996) and Amorim (2011) showed how the dictatorship influenced the creation of
organized crime in Brazil by incarcerating political and regular prisoners in the same facility.
This section demonstrates how the dictatorship legacy, as well as the attempt to move away from
it, resulted in conflicting public policies. The bandwagon effect between authoritarian ruling and
progressive democratic measures among governments jeopardized the state public policys
continuity and coherence. As a consequence, this dissonant state, later in the 2000s, proves to be
incapable of repressing an undivided and consolidated PCC, as Chapter 3 explains.
The prison system has been on the top of the states agenda since 1970, when there was the first
Comisso Parlamentar de Inqurito Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) about the
penitentiary system at the national level. The Lei de Execues Penais Criminal Procedure
Code (LEP) of 1984 was the main outcome of the Commission. Enacted in the redemocratization backdrop, the law represented a great advance in terms of human rights,

20

In regards to the Brazilian jurisdiction, the federal government enacts an unified penal code for all the states,
whereas it is a state government jurisdiction to employ and manage prison facilities and other security issues.

38

guaranteeing several Constitutional rights for inmates. The LEP has never been fully
implemented, such discrepancy there is between the expected rights and the Brazilian social
reality. The LEP, however, was representative of a brief political period in which human rights
were the kernel of security policies, especially in Rio de Janeiro and So Paulo.
In Rio, during Leonel Brizolas first office as a governor (1983-87), the military police was
forced to change its approach towards favelas21 dwellers. The governor strictly prohibited his
forces to ransack houses without a warrant. For the first time this Constitutional protection has
been enforced in impoverished neighborhoods, representing a human rights breakthrough. At the
same time, Franco Montoros office in So Paulo as a governor (1983-89) prohibited the ROTA
forces to patrol the citys outskirts, protecting the inviolability of poor workers who are very
often treated and misjudged as criminals. The humanization of security policy initiatives
implemented during Brizola and Montoro governments did not last, though. The 1980s was the
lost decade for Latin America. Restrictions imposed by the Washington Consensus brought
Brazil to unprecedented inflation levels and massive unemployment, in a context of stagflation
which countered the Phillips curve22.
Alongside with economic struggle and social exclusion, criminality increased in Brazilian major
cities, becoming a deep-rooted social problem. In So Paulo, the 1986 elections for governor
brought harsh policing back to the agenda. The elected governor Orestes Qurcia invited Luiz
Antonio Fleury Filho to command the Secretary of Security. Since Fleury succeeded Qurcia as
a governor, for eight consecutive years (1987-1995), he printed his personal conservative style in

21

Term used to designate slums or shanty towns, in urban areas.

22

In Economics, the Phillips curve accounts for an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation.

39

security policies, being the Carandiru Massacre of 199223 the most critical moment of his
government. After this peak of police brutality, pressures from public opinion forced Fleury to
change his Secretary of Security. Michel Temer, who previously occupied this position by the
end of Montoros government24, was chosen for the office. This political shift can be perceived
by the number of deaths caused by the police from 1,470 deaths in 1992 to 409 in 1993
(Caldeira 2000). This figure stabilized, but in 1997, already during governor Covas mandate25, it
dropped again to 253 deaths caused by police officers.
The Carandiru Massacre, to date, is the worst episode of human rights abuse in recent Brazilian
history. To some extent, the foundation of the PCC is a consequence of the Carandiru Massacre
one year before. One of the triggers of the riot that caused the Carandiru Massacre was the
overcrowded prison system. In the massacre aftermath, both the prison population and the state
felt compelled to address this issue: the prison population by promoting more riots and mutinies,
leaded by the PCC, and the state by expanding the prison system. While the next section of the
chapter accounts for prisoners reactions, this section explains how, at first, the expansion of the
prison system was part of a human rights approach in security policy.

Four different jails formed the Carandiru complex: Casa de Deteno Detention House, Penitenciria do Estado State
Penitentiary, Presdio Especial da Polcia Civil Special Civil Polices Prison and Penitenciria Feminina da Capital Female
Penintentiary of the Capital. The complex had capacity for 3,250 inmates, but in 1992 the occupancy surpassed 7,000. In
October 1992, a rebellion broke out and the police riot squad entered to contain it, summary executing 111 prisoners. The episode
is known as Carandiru Massacre and was the worst human rights violation of the nations modern history. The notorious
Pavilion Nine of the Casa de Deteno held, alone, 2,100 inmates, and was the core of the riot. Nowadays, only the Presdio
Especial da Polcia Civil and the Penitenciria Feminina da Capital are still opened. The Penitenciria do Estado has become a
Female Prison and Casa de Deteno was demolished, giving space for a park, called Parque da Juventude. The trial of the
involved authorities finished in April 2013, twenty years and six months after the massacre. Nineteen police officers were
condemned to a hundred and fifty six years of jail reclusion each, being twelve years for each of the hundred and eleven prisoners
murdered in the episode.
23

Michel Temer is the current Vice-President of Brazil, at Roussefs tenure.

The list of governors of So Paulo in since the re-democratization in the Republic period is the following: Andr Franco
Montoro (1983-87), Luiz Antonio Fleury Filho (1991-95), Mrio Covas (1995-2001), Geraldo Alckmin (2001-06), Cludio
Lembo (2006-07), Jos Serra (2007-10), Alberto Goldman (2010-11), and Geraldo Alckmin (2011-present).
24
25

40

Governor Covas election in 1995 represented an attempt to curb police brutality. Covas
humanistic platform consisted in creating an ombudsman for the police forces, a recycling
human rights program for police officers involved in risky situations, the Programa de
Acompanhamento de Policiais Militares Envolvidos em Ocorrncias de Alto Risco Monitoring
Program for Military Police Officers Involved in High Risk Incidents (PROAR) and, mainly, in
investing public resources into new prison facilities. The intention was to transfer prisoners from
overcrowded police stations to proper rehabilitation facilities. In 1993, when the PCC was
created, the majority of the inmates were held in police stations and public jails, under the
control of the Secretaria de Segurana Pblica de So Paulo Secretariat of Security od So
Paulo (SSP-SP). Police stations usually have a couple cells with limited capacity, with the
purpose to keep whoever is arrested in the act of committing a crime for a maximum of fortyeight hours. Each cell used to have up to a hundred prisoners, who had access to precarious
sanitary conditions, no sunbathing or work opportunity, as laid down in the Federal Constitution.
Using police precincts and public jails permanently do not affect only the prisoners. The cells are
usually too close to entrance doors, contributing to escapes and threatening citizens who are
pressing charges at the site. In case of defection, the chance of a violent conflict is also higher.
Police stations are controlled by the Civil Police26, who are armed all the time and have no
training for this kind of custody. Correctional guards, conversely, carry only batons and are
trained for rehabilitation and re-entry support. While a police officer is trained to repress, a

26

There are two different categories of city police in Brazil, both at the state level. The military police is in charge of arrests and
combating, whereas the civil police (a plain clothes force) is in charge of police investigation. There is a clash between the two
forces, and many specialists claim that this force division is one of the major security pitfalls in the country. The military police
usually omits information from the civil police. According to the military police, while they take high risks in the streets, the civil
police take credits of their work after the arrest. That been said, the end of the militarized police is currently a hot topic in Brazil,
deeply discussed by the press, during the 2014 presidential elections and during public demonstrations in the cities of Rio de
Janeiro and So Paulo since mid-2013.

41

correctional officer is trained to recover. By the end of 1995, 45.5%27 of the inmates of the state
were under the custody of the Secretariat of Security and these improvised conditions.
By the beginning of 1998, the first year of the second term of governor Mrio Covas, the
situation started to change. Attuned with co-partisan President Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
federal and state government worked together to transfer the majority of the inmates from the
custody of SSP-SP to the Secretaria de Administrao Penitenciria Secretariat of Penitentiary
Administration (SAP), created in 1993 (the same year as PCC) to deal exclusively with the
prison system. This effort has worked, since in 2011 only 3.33% of the prison population was
under the custody of the Secretariat of Security.
The Secretariat of Penitentiary Administration, created after the Carandiru Massacre, gained
autonomy in 1999 under the administration of Secretary Nagashi Furukawa. The physical
expansion of the prison system first transferred the majority of inmates from the custody of SSPSP to SAP. The benefits brought by this necessary measure, however, were obfuscated by the
absolute growth of prisoners. Figure 7 shows that while the government managed to transfer
40% of the prison population to proper facilities from 1994 to 2006, the gross number of inmates
increased by162%, creating a new spiral deadlock in the system.
The Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) has
been uninterruptedly in power at the state level in So Paulo since 1995. The expansion of the
prison system, hence, has also been a steady policy since then. Yet, the intentions behind this
policy varied across time, depending on the political orientation of each governor and the
security backdrop each one faced. If the expansion of the prison system started under the

27

(Secretaria de Segurana Pblica, 2013).

42

humanitarian bias of Mrio Covas, governor Alckmin28 used the expansion as a heavy- handed
policy.

Figure 7. Inmates at the So Paulo state: Evolution of transfers from the SPP to the SAP
(1994-2006).

Source: SAP, 2013.

Despite the efforts to transfer prisoners to adequate facilities, the increment on the prison

Source: Dias (2011, 106)

population worsened the overcrowding problem. Once again, the bandwagon between
progressive and authoritarian measures contributed to an uncoordinated security policy in So

28

During the 2014 elections, governor Alckmin was re-elected for another four -year tenure.

43

Paulo. There is no clear evidence on what spurred mass incarceration in Brazil in this period, but
Federal Bill of Hideous Crimes, enacted in June 1990, might have contributed to the process.
This is because the Bill of Hideous Crimes unbalanced the flow of prisoners in and out of the
prison system, regulated in Brazil by a program called penalty progression.
Penalty progression is a right granted to all prisoners, assuring that the state lessens restrictions
progressively. It currently comprises three different regimes: a) Closed. Applicable to first-time
offenders sentenced to eight or more years of reclusion or to recidivists sentenced to four or more
years of reclusion. Inmates must be incarcerated in either medium or maximum security jails, in
cells of at least 6m. b) Semi-closed. Applicable to first-time offenders sentenced to four to eight
years of reclusion and for recidivists sentenced to less than four years of prison. The inmate must
be incarcerated in the same place during he or she performs some professional activity. Jails are
specifically designed for work purposes, and usually are industrial warehouses or agricultural
colonies. For each three days of work, one day of sentence is reduced from the tally. c) Workrelease, applicable to first-time offenders sentenced to less than four years of prison. The trusted
inmate is allowed to work outside his/her place of confinement and return only to sleep and
during weekends. Under this regime, jails are of minimum security and flophouses.
Penalty progression takes place according to two requirements. Firstly, an objective requirement,
based on jail time, and secondly, a subjective requisite, based on inmates behaviour. Until 1990,
all prisoners had the right to progress from closed, to semi-open and finally to work-release
regime after doing one-sixth of their sentence in each regime. The Bill of Hideous Crimes,
however, prohibited penalty progression for certain crimes. Robbery followed by death, rape,
kidnapping and other crimes are part of the list, but one hideous crime in particular is directly
related to this research drug trafficking. At the same time of the consolidation of Drug
44

Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in So Paulo, penalty progression was forbidden for drug
dealers. The outcome was not the decrease of drug smuggling, but the inflation of inmates in the
prison system.

2.3 Leapfrogging Strategies

All the elements that enabled the rise of the state-PCC system are now laid: a prison system in
expansion; a state that can no longer resort to extreme violence to rule the prisoners after the
Carandiru Massacre; a new gang willing to echo prisoners demands and a growing influx of
prisoners enabled the PCC to expand beyond any expectations. Between 1993 and 2001, the PCC
expanded throughout the prison system and, at the same time, eliminated its rival gangs. During
this first phase of the system, prison transfers and mutinies were the preferred strategies.
This section argues that the PCC provoked mutinies to reach two goals: to wipe out rival gangs
and to transfer key members to other facilities, which allowed them to spread. Hence, mutinies,
violence against enemies and prison transfers worked as variation, interaction and selection
strategies to the group. Like any other evolving biological organism, the new-born PCC needed
variety in its population. At the beginning, the group infiltrated into as many jails as possible, in
order to increase its population, and, consequently, the variety among its individuals.
Simultaneously, the PCC eliminated its rival gangs, thus selecting those who should remain
alive (sometimes figuratively, sometimes literally) in their environment, the prison system. In
a classic survival of the fittest Darwinist fashion, the PCC adapted and evolved.
2.3.1 Bargaining Mutinies for Transfers
Combating an overcrowded system has been on the top of PCCs ideological agenda. Since the
group foundation, the PCC promptly realized that it could be also used as a political strategy. By
45

claiming unbearable living conditions, the PCC promoted prison mutinies in order to relocate
prisoners according to its interests, in two different fashions: by spreading leaders among the
state and by expelling its rivals. By using only one strategy, mutinies, the PCC accomplished the
increase of its variety, selecting the agents of the prison population and changing interacting
mechanisms with rival gangs. By provoking prison transfers, the PCC removed physical barriers,
and, consequently, transformed the system interaction pattern itself. Bargaining mutinies for
prison transfers, then, is an effective adaptive strategy that influences, at once, the groups
variety, interaction and selection.
Meeting the PCCs demands, at first, seemed to be a win-win game. On the one hand, prison
riots are hard to contain and, since the Carandiru Massacre, the use of violence against prisoners
was avoided by any government. On the other hand, leaving prison riots unattended often
resulted in bloodsheds, with several killings inside the prisons. This catches the medias and
human rights organizations attention, providing a bad reputation to the government. The
administration soon noticed that prison transfers could avoid bad public relations, and started to
comply with the PCCs transfer demands.
The heterogeneity of the prison system might have influenced the PCCs plea for transfers. In
So Paulo, even prisons at the same regime category vary tremendously from one another. If
prisoners cannot have the freedom of the streets, they believe that they will be better off in
facilities where discipline is not so strict, where the group exerts a total hegemony and where the
state cooperates with their practices. This lack of standardization of the prison system
empowers and grants autonomy to prison directors, but also encourages organized groups to
bargain for transfers, like the PCC did. Accordingly, the PCC sought for more advantageous

46

imprisonment conditions for some of its members, by changing interaction patterns from the
inside.
The complexity of the state-PCC system is such that both agents might make use of the same
strategy to achieve opposing goals. The PCC caused mutinies to get members transferred to:
increase variety, spread its leadership and move to jails where the discipline is less strict.
Alternatively, the government also resorted to the same strategy, prison transfers, hoping to
demobilize the group. For several times, the government spontaneously transferred PCC leaders
to prisons controlled by other gangs in order to: weaken the gang; as a reprisal for attempted
escapes; and spread the PCC leadership, following a divide to conquer rationale. Interestingly,
from the states standpoint, prison transfers represent a way to decrease interaction among the
PCCs population, whereas the PCC used it as a way to spread members.
Regardless of who employed the strategy, the impact of transfers proportioned an unstable, but
accommodating system, in which state and the PCC profusely interacted during the 1990s. The
agents kept the TIT FOR TAT cooperation game regularly until 2001, when the Party decided to
defect. In February 18 of that year, 29 prisons in the state of So Paulo promoted a riot at the
same time; there were 20 deaths. The prisoners used the strategy of uprising on a Sunday, during
family visitation; children and women became hostages, aggravating the situation. Besides
human losses, the PCC showed its manpower, with the inmates suspending flags depicting the
organizations acronym from the inside of jail bars. This did make clear who ruled the prison
system. This episode is known as the mega-rebellion of 2001. The trigger of the mega-rebellion
was a number of transfers of key-members of the organization mainly from the Carandiru
complex to rural areas.

47

The mega-rebellion of 2001 was the first moment of instability of the system. However, the
tension did not escalate right after its episode. The mega-rebellion was not just a punctual
defection, but also symbolized a shift in the system. In 2001, the PCC had already imposed its
hegemony over rival gangs, and no longer needed to spread its population across the prison
system for variety and selection purposes. Prison transfers, at this point, no longer represented a
crucial strategy to the group, which then reacted to the governments transfer impositions. By the
same token, riots and mutinies had also became a less powerful strategy, what explains the
significant decrease in jail rebellions in the state after 2001. Figure 8 indicates that the number of
prison riots significantly increased during the 1990s, and steeply declined after 2001, when the
group had imposed its supremacy over other gangs. The mega-rebellion of 2001, in February,
would add more 29 riots to this year. However, after showcasing the magnitude of its power to
the state and society, the PCC left behind mutinies and transfers as its main adaptive strategies.
Figure 8. Prison riots in So Paulo state (1990-Feb. 2001)

Source: Data Bank of the Center for the Study on Violence (NEV-USP), 2010.
48

2.3.2 Elimination of Rival Gangs

Since its foundation, the First Command of the Capital aimed not to be the first, but the only
command of So Paulo. By the time when the PCC was created, there was only one other gang in
the paulista prison system, the Seita Satnica Satanic Sect (SS). The Satanic Sect was first
created as a religious group related to black magic, whose primary objective was to develop
worships for devil forces. Later, the SS shifted to organized crime, and used to employ cruel
tactics to impress its adversaries: the most notorious ones are hanging enemies heads as trophies
and extracting their hearts.
From all the rival gangs against which the PCC had to battle, the SS was the cruelest and the
oldest. The remaining organizations were created after the PCC, and in opposition to the PCC.
Despite fierce, or perhaps exactly because it was such an unorthodox organization, the SS was
always small in terms of its affiliated members. The PCC, then, had no problems to spread its
domains over the prisoners, especially because it carried a political message, the fight of the
oppressed prisoners against of the oppressor state. Notwithstanding, the new group imposed its
ways over a domain where longstanding conduct rules prevailed, causing dispute and animosity.
Two groups were created in the 1990s to counterpart the PCC the Comando Democrtico da
Liberdade Democratic Command of Freedom (CDL), created in 1996, and the the Comando
Brasileiro Revolucionrio da Criminalidade The Revolutionary Brazilian Command of
Criminality (CRBC), created in 1999. A third gang was created only in 2003, the Terceiro

49

Comando da Capital Third Command of the Capital, or TCC29 by two of the eight PCCs
founders, Geleio and Cesinha.
The PCC took years to overthrow the rival gangs. Fights, assaults and murders always had a
commonplace cause, at a first glance: betrayal, infidelity, disrespect to prison rules, tattletale, etc.
Behind the lex talionis, though, there was the clear objective of reaching supremacy in the prison
system, by selecting the agents of its population. The PCC employed the same cruel tactics of its
rival SS, resorting to decapitation and heart extractions of its enemies. Percival de Souza (2006,
64) describes a barbeque promoted by the PCC in a farm in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do
Sul. By then, the so-called brothers offered enemies hearts as treats to Paraguayan drug dealers.
The PCC employed cruel methods to be commensurate with the SS, the cruelest gang in the
prison system. Thereupon, it changed the interacting mechanisms among the prison population
by incorporating the cruelty and violence that originally belonged to the SS. The
spectacularization, however, was not restrained to the violent methods, but also to the
mobilization they brought.
Most of rivals deaths happened during prison riots, for several reasons. Even when a riot is
mobilized by the prisoners with clear political intent, i.e., to protest against bad living conditions
in the prison system, the tense environment works as an incentive for coming into terms with
rivals. Also, during mutinies, peoples attentions are dispersed and prison guards are either trying
to contain the rampage or have become inmates hostages. This facilitated impunity after the
murders, since no one would witness against the PCC. In other occasions, though, a murder
would trigger the riot, when other prisoners started protesting against it. Either way, the number

29

Unlike the name suggests, a second command of the capital does not exist. The denomination Third Command of the Capital
was made to reinforce this group opposition to the PCC, as a reminder that they are not the only sovereign command of So
Paulo.

50

of murders during prison riots is a good indicator of how the PCC selected members among the
prison population.
Figure 9 shows that, since the creation of the PCC in 1993, prisoner deaths steadily escalated,
illustrating a moment when the group was both fighting against rival gangs and pushing the
government to obtain transfers. The apex of the trend happened just before the mega-rebellion of
2001 and was followed by a stability period, which shows that the PCC had won the dispute
against other gangs. The tension caused by internal conflicts was back in 2005, culminating in
the attacks of May 2006, which is further explained in Chapter 3.
According to the report Democracy, Human Rights and Prison Conditions in South America
(Salla et al. 2009), these numbers may be underestimated. By comparing figures provided by the
Sistema Integrado de Informaes Penitencirias Integrated System of Penitenciary
Information (Infopen), the statistics area of the Departamento Penitencirio Nacional National
Prison Department (DEPEN), with those one provided by the state Master Plan, it is possible to
see that the former figures are completely miscalculated compared to the latter. What is
surprising is the fact that every state is responsible to send its data annually to the Infopen, which
suggests that states might be underscoring its rates for self-promotion at the national level.
Whereas Infopen registered 79 deaths and escapes during 2006-07 in the paulista prison system,
the state Master Plan registered 657 (Salla et al. 2009, 127-128, Table 13). In spite of the data
gap between the state and national level, Figure 9 accounts for the longitudinal trend.
Besides the death toll, the cause of prisoner deaths also indicates a collective intent behind the
murders. Dias (2011, 160-161) reports that, between 1990 and 1993, the deaths were mostly
caused by personnel quarrels and to punish rapists.

51

Figure 9. Dead prisoners in the state of So Paulo (1990-2010)

Source: Infopen, 2011.

From 1994 onward, there had been signs of decapitation and cannibalism among the deaths, in
addition to a few deaths at a time, which expresses collective aggression. The contention process
was slow and territorial, resembling a feudal dispute; the PCC conquered its hegemony cell by
cell, block by block, prison by prison.
The tally of this war resulted in the total elimination of two of PCCs four rivals: the CDL,
whose members were murdered one by one, was extinguished, and the SS ended as a gang; the
group returned to its origins and remains as a small religious organization. In its turn, the TCC
lost most of its power, both due to the losses to the PCC and due to the internal losses of its
leaders The CRBC was weakened to a point that does not represent any competition to the PCC,
but is still its major rival today.

52

Altogether, it is estimated that, today, the PCC controls 137 prisons from the 154 existing in the
state of So Paulo (Serapio 2014). From the remaining penitentiaries, the CRBC runs three, the
TCC runs one and the carioca gang Amigos dos Amigos Friends of Friends (ADA)30 runs
another one. The 13 prisons left are neutral, what all the system should supposedly be. Turf
battles, bloodshed, foot-soldiers recruitment...Were prison facilities feuds, the PCC would be the
lord. The trajectory of the PCC in So Paulo is of state-making. If, as posits Tilly (1985), war
makes states, the PCC elimination of rival gangs was a crusade that assured the paulista prison
system as its realm against other gangs,
In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a
substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of
warmen, arms, food, lodging, transportation supplies, and/or money to buy them
from the population within that territory. The building up of war-making capacity
likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction, if successful,
entailed the elimination, neutralization or cooptation of the great lords local rivals; thus,
it led to state making. As a by-product, it created organization in the form of tax
collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus, it again led
to state making. (Tilly 1985, 183)

All in all, 2001 marked the end of a period of interactions and accommodation of the state-PCC
Complex Adaptive System (CAS). This system was formed by the use of riots, elimination of
rival gangs and prison transfers as strategies. The next chapter will assess what strategies both
the state and the PCC used to try to overcome each other in a second moment, when the PCC
was already sovereign in the prison system.

30Carioca

is how people born in Rio de Janeiro are designated. The ADA is a gang created between 1994 and 1998 and is the
major CVs enemy in Rio de Janeiro.

53

3. TURF WAR IN THE CRIME WORLD

I chose certain people and divided the power. Besides here and there, I am out. As soon as I
shared the power, the pyramidal was over.
Marcola, PCCs supreme leader31

This chapter aims to provide a scope of the many strategies used by the government of So Paulo
to try to curb the PCC, followed by the strategies used by the PCC to conform to these
constraints. The second landmark, 2006, represents a moment when the group had already
established the hegemony in the prison system. By then, the PCC was able to unfold its
enterprises to the streets. First, however, the chapter demonstrates how the group had to adjust to
internal challenges. Once the PCC eliminated its rival gangs, it faced an internal crisis. As a
response, the group passed through a selection of its own population and opted for a more
decentralized chain of command, which provided even more variety to its population.
This is followed by an analysis that centers on the organizations outstanding power to adapt.
Though many of its leaders and members remained confined, the PCC managed to overcome the
states impositions, and prisons ended as headquarters for its outside operations. To illustrate this
argument, the chapter draws on the police remodeling and its consequence, the mechanism of
crime migration; the RDD; and the arms race of cell phones and layers. Once again, a megarebellion promoted by the PCC symbolizes the failure of the government strategies and the
PCCs strength, but this time, in 2006, it expanded to the streets.

Retrieved from Marcolas statement to the CPI do Trfico de Armas Arms Trafficking Parliamentary Inquiry
(2006).
31

54

This chapters analysis over the employed strategies is in three levels state-state, state-PCC
and PCC-PCC. At the first level, state-state, the police force attempted to change its
organizational structure in order to tackle organized crime. The new organizational chart was
based on the reform of a major police department Departamento Estadual de Investigaes
Criminais State Department on Criminal Investigations (DEIC), and created specialized
precincts by crime (TIT). The government hoped to combat organized crime with organization
and sophistication. In regards to the key CAS processes, this strategy aimed at recombining the
variety of state agents to better allocate their talents and resources.
Consequently, the PCC and other criminals developed and migrated to different crime
modalities, still not repressed by specialized precincts. This so-called crime migration (TAT),
then, is how the PCC adapted and reacted to the police new organizational chart. Because of
crime migration, the state has been constantly chasing the PCC, trying to conform its own
organizational chart to new creative ways of perpetrating crimes. Criminals adapt faster than the
state, which, constrained by the law and bureaucracy, tends to lag behind.
At the PCC-PCC level, the strategies employed were also to recombine their variety, plus to
select some agents. Once the group overthrew the rival gangs, the PCC passed through a phase of
internal disputes. The group had to select the agents of its population and, at the same time, took
the opportunity to re-structure its organizational chart, becoming more attuned to its new
uncontested dimension in the crime world. Hence, the PCC selected agents and recombined its
variety at the same time. The strategies related to these processes were murderers and member
expulsions (TIT). As the outcome of this internal cleansing, former PCC members created rival
gang TCC. Also, the new leadership implemented a new organizational chart in the group,
shifting the groups hierarchy from a pyramidal to a cellular structure (TAT).
55

In the third level of analysis, state-PCC, the chapter draws on the creation of the RDD, a more
sophisticated punishing and transferring system, as the ultimate strategy the state attempted
against the PCC. The RDD, like the prison transfers analyzed in the previous chapters, aims to
decrease the PCC variety and to select the groups agents, especially by isolating the leadership
from the rest of the groups population. Once again, the state is impaired to achieve its goals,
since the outcomes of the RDD are not the ones the state first desired. Instead of selecting the
PCC agents and decreasing the gangs variety, the PCC leadership acquired a strong symbolic
status among the group members. This happened because they managed to resist to the regimes
harsh conditions (TAT). Another unintended consequence related to the RDD is that the prison
transfers, now nationwide, managed to spread the PCC to other states
(TAT).
If the RDD did not manage to decrease the groups variety, it serves to redistribute stress in the
system. Although in a weaker manner than projected, the RDD serves the state as a bargaining
chip to negotiate with the PCC. This also unintended consequence of the RDD (TAT) has a
crossed effect. First designed to decrease the PCCs variety and select its agents, the RDD now
redistributes some stress between the state and the PCC instead. This way, whenever the state
needs the PCC to comply, say, when there is a media scandal involving PCC attacks and lack of
control of the state, it releases some prisoners from the RDD in exchange for cooperation. In
contrast, transferring PCC members to the RDD is also a way that the state has to enforce the
groups cooperation in some matters. As a bargaining chip used to redistribute stress in the
system, then, the RDD is a strategy which activates the interactions of the major agents in the
system and plays an important role in keeping the system equilibrium.

56

Lastly, the chapter also explains how the RDD represents an attempt to restrain cell phone
communication among the PCC inmates, since the RDD jails are provided with cell- phoneinterception technology. Once again, the PCC bypasses the state by using lawyers to send and
bring back messages between prisoners, being able to keep the interaction between the outside
and inside of the prison system with no major impacts. Table 2 summarizes the strategies and
processes agents used at the many levels to reach their goals.

Table 2. State-PCC CAS strategies from 2001-06

Level
State- State
PCC- PCC

State-PCC

TIT
DEIC
restructure
Murders/
Expulsions

TAT
Crime
Migration
Creation of
TCC/ Cellular
Structure

RDD/
Intercepting
Cell Phones

Increase of
Leadership
Symbolic
Status/ Increase
of Organized
Crime Variety
in the National
Level/ Neckties
Syntony

Strategy
Recombine
Variety
Recombine
Variety/
Selection of
Agents
Selecting
Agents/
Redistributing
Stress

3.1 PCCs Internal Crisis

Chapter 2 analysed how the PCC used the elimination of rival gangs as part of a selection of
agents, and prison transfers in order to increase its variety. Once sovereign in the prison system,
the PCC had enough variety within its population to promote innovations and changes in its
57

structure. Likewise, abundant variety might trigger a process of internal selection, with
individuals seeking to achieve higher positions in the hierarchical structure. Between 2002 -04,
the PCC went through a process of internal selection caused by bountiful variety; the outcome
was a more horizontal and functionalist organization.
Two of the eight original PCCs founders (Geleio and Cesinha, who later formed rival gang
Third Command of the Capital) were expelled from the organization by the end of 2002, starring
a vengeance story32 that completely changed the PCC internal structure. Geleio and Cesinha
were self-denominated generals within the PCC hierarchy, and their expelling gave rise to the
second echelon of the group and its new leader, Marcola, who remains in charge today.
The PCC loosened its hierarchical structure as it enlarged its influence in what is called the
crime world33 in Brazil. The crime world encompasses all spheres involved in criminal
activities, both in the prison system and the streets. Therefore, the first significant change in its
organizational chart is the addition of an entire sector responsible for keeping order and the
ongoing business in the streets. The second, and even more important change, is that the groups
organizational chart moved from a pyramidal shape to a cellular shape in its hierarchy after its
reconfiguration.
The structure was set as follows: generals (Gelio and Cesinha), the supreme commanders;
general pilot, the maximum authority of a determined jail; block pilots, the maximum authority

The expelling was catalyzed by the murder of Marcolas wife and lawyer, Ana Maria Olivatto, in October 2002. Her murderer
was Cesinhas brother-in-law. There are many versions to explain why Cesinha and Geleio got involved in this murder. One is
that Ana Maria had found that Cesinhas wife was cheating on him, and wired her cell phone in a setup. Another is that Ana
Maria has discovered that Geleio was convicted by rape, a highly stigmatized crime, even among criminals. Finally, the police
defends that Ana Maria may have anonymously denounced the existence of a car-bomb in front of So Paulos stock exchange,
frustrating a robbery commanded by the generals of the PCC. After his wifes death, Marcola called for vengeance- Cesinhas
brother- in- law was killed and the generals were expelled from the PCC.
33 Feltran (2008, 93) defined the expression crime world, widely used in Brazil, as the group of codes and sociabilities
established around the illicit business of drug trafficking, robbery and theft.
32

58

of a prison block; soldiers, all the remaining inmates; and street pilots, PCC members in the
street with authority in this domain. It is worth noting that the street pilots were picked by the
generals, and they stayed in the very bottom of the chain of command, below the entire prison
system structure. At this first stage, the PCC was a prison gang, and the street pilots were
a mere linkage to the outside world, responsible for smuggling guns and other goods to the
prison.
Under the pyramidal structure, the PCC members were subjected to very strict rules. The
generals decided all the groups steps and strategies from within the jail. Orders were sent to the
top down, and there was no room for collective agreements. As notes Geleio, We [generals]
were the founders, we spoke the last words, and the remaining were pilots. And they were simply
pilots, carrying our message forward. There was not such a thing like two, three [pilots]
consulting twenty opinions. We had the last word. (Brazilian Congress 2005). The PCC was a
very centralized organization, and, as the rest of its population grew, this structure started being
questioned.
Yet another feature of the dictatorial style is that all the PCC members were forced to pay a
monthly fee to the gang. Since most of the members were incarcerated, this fee represented a
heavy burden on the inmates families. In addition to having to survive without the support of
their primary breadwinner, inmates family members struggled to pay the PCCs monthly fee.
This unpopular policy also raised suspicion upon the generals, who were accused of illicit
enrichment. Summed to the vengeance story and authoritarianism, the monthly fee contributed to
the crisis that changed the PCC structure.

59

Figure 10. PCCs hierarchical structure in prison

Generals
General Pilot
Block Pilots
Soldiers
Street Pilots
Source: Data adapted from Dias 2011, figure 1.
Note: The nomenclature used here is self-entitled by the group.

From 2002-04, the PCC internal crisis took place. The PCC selected its fellows and members by
murdering enemies from other gangs. Those who could escape from it either affiliated to the
TCC or sought protection with the state to move to a different jail. Only a few prisoners
remained neutral or dominated by other gangs. Once again, the state constructed barriers by
transferring dissidents. In this instance, the government had the advantage of employing this
barrier strategy, since prisoners were genuinely seeking for help. Furthermore, Federal Law
9,807/99, enacted to regulate the Victims and Witnesses Protection System, set the plea bargain
mechanism in Brazil, which the government of So Paulo widely used during the PCCs internal
crisis. Albeit, the effect of all the transfers did not change the situation in the long-term, since the
PCC adapted to a more complex and evolved structure.

60

If the PCCs internal crisis only lasted about two years, it took until 2006 for the gang to
completely restructure its organization. The new structure is larger, more complex, and business
driven, and still reflects the very expansion of the gang (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. PCCs organizational chart

Source: Data adapted from Dias 2011, figure 5

Not only does the new organizational chart mirror a more professional organization, but it also
depicts a more democratic structure. Whereas echelons were not abolished, the cellular structure
61

still provided great autonomy for the members. The democratization process resonated in the
addition of the word equality to the PCCs motif, which became Peace, Justice, Freedom and
Equality (Biondi 2010, chap.2).
The first element of the PCCs organizational chart, the nomenclature used, shows a more
democratic approach towards its members. Syntonys34 is what the group call their departments,
and the musical connotation of the term implies the existence of a leadership which cares about
synchronizing the organization, in spite of ruling it. Each Syntony is autonomous to a point, as
long as the Fine Syntony, i.e., the PCC supreme leaders, are still able to coordinate, to tune the
destiny of the organization. A second feature that shows a less centered organization is the
cellular structure, divided according to two criteria: functional and geographic. The cellular
structure is built upon a business rationale, as opposed to a personal perspective.
The geographic division of the gangs shows two things: first, that the PCC expanded to at least 5
other Brazilian states35. Second, it points to the fact that, in So Paulo, where the organization is
more developed, the group has expanded its domains to the streets, encompassing now the entire
crime world, expressed by the General Syntony of both the Penal System and the Streets. In
regards to the functional division, the chart represents an organization which divides its
operations between profitable and paternalistic activities. Once again, this division resonates the
business-driven rationale now present in the organization, but without leaving behind its primary
motivation, taking care of the incarcerated population.

This term reflect the original in Portuguese (sintonia) and was translated as syntony by Willis (2014). Even
though tuning would probably be a better term instead, I keep the term in the original to be consistent with the
literature.
35 There is strong evidence, however, that the PCC acts in 16 Brazilian states (Folha de So Paulo 2011): Alagoas,
Bahia, Cear, Maranho, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraba, Pernambuco, Piau, Rio Grande
do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Sergipe, So Paulo and Tocantins.
34

62

The PCCs profitable activities are co-ordinated by the Progress Syntony. The gun sector deals
with all kinds of property crimes, such as bank robbery, cargo robbery and kidnapping, among
others. Moreover, the gun sector is responsible for rentals of expensive large-size weapons and
for lending guns to members recently released from jails (Willis 2014), in order to help them to
resume their activities. The most profitable activities, though, are drug trafficking, which assures
a monthly income of R$8 million36, and the raffles, which raises R$2 million to the group every
month.
Raffles serves to four different purposes: profit, money laundering, indirect membership fees and
community bonding. First, the PCC purchases houses, cars and other assets. Then, it sells raffle
tickets for two months to inmates, their families and friends, and to the community members
where the group is more present. Finally, every two months, the group draws the raffles, paying
an average of R$600,000 in prizes and raising R$2 million in profits. Raffles are also an indirect
way of charging monthly fees from the incarcerated population. Inmates can contribute buying as
many tickets as they can afford, instead of having to pay a monthly flat rate, measure now
abolished under the new structure. Raffle, thus, is an effective activity, both monetarily and
symbolically.
That been said, a further look into the Bogeyman Syntony helps to understand the scope of the
PCCs democratizing process. Monthly fees, considered as extortion by the inmates, are no
longer mandatory. However, now that the PCC contingent in the streets is considerably large37,
the group no longer relies on inmates payments. Even though monthly fees are optional, all the

Since 1994, Real (R$ Reais, in plural) has been the Brazilian currency. Today, 1 Real is worth approximately
0.5 dollar.
36

37

It is estimated that, in the state of So Paulo the PCC has 6,000 members in jails and other 1,800 in the streets. In other states,
altogether, it is known that they have at least 2,398 members (Serapio 2104).

63

streets members must pay between R$600 and R$1,500 per month to the Party, in order to keep
in good stands with the organization. Payment delays and omissions can result in penalties and
even in expelling. For this reason, the Bogeyman Syntony illustrates that there are clear
limitations on the PCCs democratizing process, which still entails accountability. While the
remaining cells of the structure will be further expounded both in this chapter and in Chapter 4,
this is enough evidence to demonstrate that the PCC used the new cellular structure to select its
internal agents. Furthermore, the new functionalist organizational chart illustrates how the PCC
recombined the variety in its population, optimizing its human resources.

3.2 Crime migration

Whilst the PCC recombined its variety, the state, in like manner, recombined its own. In the first
decade of the 2000s, the state of So Paulo remodelled the investigative police organizational
chart, in an explicit attempt to respond to organized crime,

The new century has shown that the So Paulo state security police needed a more
extreme and accurate combat against organized crime; a combat that gathered
investigative tradition and the technology provided by the judiciary police. In this
context, in October 2001 the acronym DEIC returns, but this time under a new
denomination: Department on Organized Crime Investigation. (Polcia Civil de So Paulo
2014)

The state had to remodel its own structure to tackle the emerging problem of organized crime; to
respond to a hegemonic PCC which is en route to specialization and, finally, to combat new
crime modalities.
The first signal of innovation in the crime world was seen between the late 1980s to mid- 2000s,
when kidnapping became banal. At the beginning, criminals only targeted well-off citizens,
64

performing long and complex kidnappings38. Since the 2000s, however, outlaws started
employing express kidnappings, a cruel modality of carjacking, against the middle classes as
well. In response to this, the Secretary of Security of So Paulo created in 2001 a special force
called Diviso Antissequestro Anti-kidnapping Division (DAS). Besides the homicide
department, DAS was the only other dedicated to an exclusive crime. DAS has been successfully
conducted, since in 2010 the kidnapping rate has decreased by 80%, compared with the late
1980s.
The creation of DAS, by Decree 46,078/2001, was soon followed by a major reform in the
investigative police. Decree 46,149/2001 re-structured DEIC. The Department of Crimes against
Property was replaced by the Department on Organized Crime Investigation (DEIC), which has
many specialized sub-divisions and special precincts, according to different crimes. The Diviso
de Crimes contra o Patrimnio Division of Crimes against Property (DISCCPAT), is now
under the new DEIC, and side by side with DAS are the Diviso de Investigaes sobre Furto e
Roubos de Veculos e Cargas Division against Car and Cargo Robberies (DIVECAR) and the
Diviso de Investigaes Gerais Division of General Investigations (DIG), with their
respective sub-divisions, as Figure 12 shows39. This model of specialized precincts is a police
attempt to face the new phenomena of centrally-run organizations.

38

Three particular kidnappings of business-man in Brazil became internationally known. The first kidnapping
happened in 1989, being the victim the entrepreneur Ablio Diniz. The second was of the entrepreneur Roberto
Medina, in 1990, and the third of the adman Washington Olivetto, in 2002. As a consequence of the first two
emblematic kidnappings, the Congress enacted a law for hideous crimes (Lei de Crimes Hediondos n 8072/90),
typifying extortion through kidnapping as a crime with stiffer sentences.
39
Since 2001, the Investigative Police organizational chart has changed substantially. By Decree 57,555/2011,
DEIC has returned to be the Department for Crimes against Property, and DAS was closed.

65

Figure 12. Structure of the Civil Police in 2001

Division of Crimes against Property
(DISCCPAT)
Robberies precinct
- Jewelry theft precinct
- Special robberies precinct- Including house and condo
thefts
- Theft precinct
- Bank robbery precinct
- Special armed force against robbery
(GARRA)

Division Against Car Robberies

(DIVECAR)
-Vehicles robbery and theft precinct
- Cargo robbery precinct
- Fraude precinct
- Car detailing precinct

Division of General Investigations

(DIG)
Precincts:

Anti- Kidnapping Division

(DAS)

- Crimes against the public trust

- Inter- Provintial Investifgation precint (POLINTER)

Department on
Organized Crime
Investigation (DEIC)

- Two Anti- Kidnapping precincts

- Rackeetering nets
- Anti-piracy
- Eletronic crimes

Source: Data retrieved from Polcia Civil de So Paulo (2014).

The success of each precinct in curbing its designated crime, however, does not represent the
entire success of the corporation. The remodeling of investigative policing, in the arms race
context, triggered the reaction of the crime world. Constrained by the police, criminals found
other more complex and sophisticated means, but, most of the time, simply unheard of and
creative criminal modalities, which gave rise to a mechanism here called crime migration.

The first explicit crime migration was from bank to cargo robberies. Like the political prisoners
who fostered the creation of organized crime in Brazil and the first generations of the Comando
Vermelho gang in Rio, PCC leaders are mainly big time bank robbers. The large economic
windfall sponsored by bank robberies allowed the organization to expand its apparatus in its first

66

and second phases. Through large investments in security, private banks contained this crime.
Paixo (1987) defends that the development of the first criminal organizations in Brazil, the
Falange Vermelha40 in Rio and Serpentes Negras in So Paulo, was actually driven by what he
calls modernization of metropolitan criminality (1987, 77). Paixo argues that the
sophistication of protection mechanisms, such as alarms, cameras and other electronic devices
enhanced the organization required for criminal acts, thereby contributing more to the
development of organized gangs.

As a consequence of the improvements in banking security, criminals migrated to cars and cargo
robbery. The state responded to it by creating the Division against Car Robbery (DIVECAR),
under DEICs umbrella. Both bank and cargo robbery, though, are still part of the PCCs most
profitable activities, which has also specific departments to manage them. Crime migration is not
exclusive to the PCC, though. Small criminal cliques also change their activities to avoid police
repression. During the 2000s, the state has seen various crime waves: carjacking, jewel stores
robberies, condo robberies and the latest, restaurant robberies. Despite the effort of creating
specialized precincts, the police lags behind, because criminals adapt.

Furthermore, crime migration put at stake the notion of crime drop. The repression of a
determinate crime is quickly followed by the rise of a new criminal activity. Crime rates, thus, do

40

The CV is the first criminal organization if Brazil, but the CV itself derives from disputes among different
factions in the Ilha Grande prison. Allocated in different pavilions, there were the Falange Zona Sul (South Zone
Phalanx), Falange Zona Norte or Falange Jacar (North Zone or Alligator Phalanx) and the Falange Vermelha or
Falange LSN (Red or LSN Phalanx). After years of rivalry, the Red or LSN Phalanx imposed its supremacy, and
founded the CV, in 1979 (Amorim 2011, 70-72). It is noteworthy that the other name of the Red Phalanx, LSN, is an
acronym which stands for Lei de Segurana Nacional Security National Law, referring to the Decree 898/69,
enacted in the apex of the military dictatorship. This decree equalized political to common criminals. The LSN
Phalanx was named after this decree, and represents the pavilion where political and common criminals shared jails,
in the Ilha Grande prison.

67

not exactly drop, but fluctuate from crime to crime. Keeping track of those changes is hard; there
is no available data for jewelry store robberies, for instance, despite the fact that there is a
specialized precinct to combat this crime. Notwithstanding, since 2005 the SSP-SP has been
releasing the figures on bank robbery and cargo robbery, separate from general robberies. Figure
13 is representative of crime migration, showing the fluctuation between activities; further, it
accounts for two of PCCs many expertise bank and cargo robbery.In summary, the states
attempts to recombine its variety (TIT), led the criminals to the mechanism of crime migration
(TAT). The result is not the decrease of violence, but the sophistication of both investigative and
criminal strategies and the increasing complexity of the state-PCC CAS system.

Figure 13. Cargo vs. bank robbery evolution in the state of So Paulo (2005-13)

9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

500
400
300
200
100
0

Year
Cargo

Bank

Source. Data retrieved from SSP-SP/SP (2014)

68

Bank Robbery

Cargo Robbery

Cargo vs. Bank Robbery Evolution

3.3 RDD
The Differentiated Disciplinary Regime, or RDD, was specifically designed to contain the PCC
leaders. The RDD is strict, and, in practice, every prisoner under this regime is isolated from the
outside world. This measure clearly impacted the PCC leadership, giving to the state a strong
bargaining chip in negotiating with the group. From all the strategies the state ever employed
trying to curb the PCC, the RDD is by far the most effective. That being said, the PCC could still
overcome the restraints imposed by the RDD.
Initially, the RDD was designed as an agent-selection tool. The underlying rationale was that the
group would be dismantled by isolating the heads of the organization. After decentralizing,
however, the PCC could manage to keep up with its operations even after the deployment of its
leaders. Hence, what started as a selection tool (TIT), actually turned out to be a much weaker
bargaining chip that the state has to negotiate with the PCC. The RDD became a way to activate
interactions with the PCC, a strategy to redistribute the stress in the system (TAT). With the
RDD, the government can punish the PCC, but it can simultaneously ease the tension of the
system by releasing some leaders from confinement when needed and by restoring the pax in
the prison system41.
The RDD was created after the attacks of 2001 by a SAPs internal resolution, but two years later
it was incorporated into the federal legal system42, for a number of reasons. First, the RDD was
received as a breakthrough strategy that could expand nationwide. Second, the implementation of
the RDD requires intelligence, facilities and investment that the state of So Paulo could not
afford alone, without the support of the federal level. Third, the constitutionality of the RDD is

41
42

This expression was coined by Salla (2006).

Resolution 26, SAP and Law 10,792/2003.

69

highly questionable, and enacting a Federal Law was the way the state found to increase its
legitimacy.
The implementation of the RDD involves maximum- security facilities, highly trained personnel
and, therefore, a significant financial investment. The state of So Paulo can only sponsor 170
places at the RDD at a time, which is close to nothing compared to hundreds of thousands of
prisoners in the system. Prisons hosting RDD prisoners are located in very remote areas, to
prevent escapes; are equipped with cell phone signal blockage technology and severe
surveillance. In So Paulo, there is only one maximum- security prison, the Centro de
Readaptao Penitenciria (CRP) Presidente Bernardes Prison Rehabilitation Center (CRP)
Presidente Bernardes. The Presidente Venceslau II penitentiary, although not fully equipped to
host RDD prisoners, also works as a makeshift placement for them. Setting the RDD forth at the
national level, then, was crucial to assure its implementation.
Federal maxi- jails are under DEPENs and the Ministry of Justices custody. They are designed
to receive prisoners on the verge of suicide or affiliated with terrorist groups. In fact, they host a
transient prisoner population, i.e., drug lords which are later going under trial at their jurisdiction
of origin. So far, there are five federal maxi- prisons43, being the first one inaugurated in 2006.
Each federal prison is provided with 22hs confinement, specialized teams to identify drugs and
explosives at visitors clothing, metal detectors and 24hs surveillance in each of the 208
individual cells. These so-called Supermax provide a relief for the paulista prison system, but
also allow criminals from different provinces to interact. The Supermax prisons remove

The federal maxi prisons are: Penitenciria Federal de Catanduvas Catanduvas Federal Prison, in the state of
Paran; Penitenciria Federal de Campo Grande Campo Grande Federal Prison, in Mato Grosso do Sul;
Penitenciria Federal de Porto Velho Porto Velho Federal Prison, in Rondnia; Penitenciria Federal de
Mossor Mossor Federal Prison, in Rio Grande do Norte; and Penitenciria Federal de Braslia Braslia
Federal Prison, in Distrito Federal.
43

70

geographical barriers by shortening the physical distance of prisoners spread all over the country.
The PCC expansion to other Brazilian states coincides with the creation of the Supermax, and
one of the reasons for this coincidence is that the state facilitated the interaction of drug lords at
the national level.
Elevating the RDD to the federal sphere was also a way to grant more legitimacy to a
controversial measure. The RDD is applicable to prisoners accused of subverting the order of a
prison facility; who represent a threat to either a prison or society in general; and suspects of
being part of a criminal organization. Once under the RDD, prisoners are deprived from sun
bathing, education, work, and family member visitations; and, still, from contact with any other
inmate for the period of 22hs a day. The RDD regime may last up to 360 days, and can be
renewed once for another 360, or up to one sixth of the sentence, whichever comes first. The
constitutionality of the RDD is contested because it is considered to go against human dignity
(Constituio Federal article 1, III), to be inhumane (Ibid. article 5, III), and cruel (Ibid. article 5,
XLVII). Moreover, the length of the RDD disrespects the UN treaty for Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, to which Brazil abide.
Before the RDD, prisoners could be submitted to so many restrictions only for 30 days (LEP
1984, article 58). The actual implementation of the RDD, regardless of its legality, is a heavyhanded policy for those submitted to it. Nonetheless, if the RDD could affect individuals, it did
not significantly affect the PCCs operations. The RDD failed to select agents for two different
reasons. First, the PCC cellular structure could handle the burden of the continued absence of its
leaders. Second, the RDD grants prestige to those prisoners who overcome it, reinforcing the
symbolic status of leaders who are temporarily cast away from the organization.

71

If the PCC horizontal structure prevented the RDD from disabling its operations, it was the
endurance of its leaders what transformed the RDD regime into a symbolic reinforcement of
their authority. Marcola, the number one in the PCC, spent over six years in total under the RDD.
The RDD transformed Marcola into an avid reader of political philosophy, and, therefore, made
him the most knowledgeable and respected member of the organization. In rare interviews,
Marcola often makes prophetic statements about the future of So Paulo, by quoting renowned
authors, such as Marx, Sun-Tze and Rousseau. Marcolas resilience and endurance under the
RDD rendered him the status of a legend in the group44.
Since only the most wanted criminals are under the RDD, the PCC members who end up facing
the regime gain respect in the group. Dias (2009) argues that the legitimacy derives from the fact
that those individuals clearly reject the state authority. Salla, in his turn, downplays any positive
outcomes of the RDD, the passage of inmates by these facilities of severe regime invest them
with more respect and prestige towards the prison population, empowering even more the
organized crime leadership (2006, 278).
Although the RDD did fail to select PCC agents, the regime is apposite as a mechanism to
redistribute stress in the system. In moments of intense stress in the system, the state might either
punish the PCC by transferring some of its leaders to the RDD, or, sometimes, bargain with the
group by releasing some members from that regime. During an interview for a scholarly journal,
the former Secretary of Security of So Paulo Nagashi Furukawa says that, by the time he left the
position, after the attacks of 2006, all the 170 vacancies in the regime were occupied. As soon as
the next administration took office, there were suddenly only thirty prisoners under the RDD,

44

In February 2014, however, the police frustrated a mega operation that the PCC was planning to rescue Marcola by
helicopter from the penitentiary Presidente Venceslau II.

72

is it possible that the behaviour in other prisons improved so much that there is no more need
to send anyone else there [to the RDD], or is there perhaps some sort of agreement, that no one
will be sent there as long as peace is maintained? (Miraglia and Salla 2008, 33). Suffice only to
say that the RDD is the best tool the state has to hinge its negotiations with the PCC. The RDD is
a discretionary tool, therefore flexible enough to articulate the state and the PCC dynamically.

3.4 Cell Phones and Attorneys Arms Race

The RDD also provoked an arms race for resources inside of the prison system. As for the PCC,
the RDD caused a selection of strategies (TAT). Before the RDD, the group used to smuggle cell
phones into the facilities, which were used by the leaders and pilots to reach members confined
in other prisons and to establish a connection with members in the streets. The calls were made
from pre-paid cell phones used to call collect to a central facility ran by PCC fellow women,
who, from there, would redirect their calls, either to other smuggled pre-paid phones or landlines.
Periodically, the centrals landlines would be shut down from lack of payment, and new centrals
could be open without leaving much trace behind. Alternatively, the Party used a cell phone
which works through radio satellite, considered much safer (Porto 2007, 74).
The mega-rebellion of 2001 was fully articulated by cell phones, which demonstrates the
importance of this resource in the group. Under the RDD, however, prisoners are completely
isolated, and the facilities are protected with cell- phone- blockage- shields. Visitors are also
prohibited, and the prisoners have no contact with each other. With the RDD, the state hoped to
cut any communication between the PCC leaders and the outside. Notwithstanding, the RDD
forced the PCC to select a different communication strategy, which has been proving to be
effective until now.
73

Right to an attorney is a constitutional guarantee of every prisoner, and the PCC started using it
as a strategy to bypass the restrictions brought by the RDD. Prisoners have the right to see their
lawyers regularly, and the state is forbidden to monitor their conversations. The PCC, then,
resorted to attorneys to deliver communication between prisons and from prisons to the outside,
who became known as carrier pigeons (Porto 2007, 75). In federal prisoners, lawyers could
also report messages from other inmates to their clients, in the following fashion: female layers
would write notes on their breasts, and male lawyers on their shoulders. Because these attorneys
are clearly exceeding their duties, the PCC had to find a way to rely on their services without
having to resort to coercion or bribes. Lawyers are now critical to the interface between the
leaders and the rest of the organization, and had to become part of the group.
The Neckties Syntony, i.e, the law deparment, was added to the PCCs functionalist structure
with the purpose of keeping an open line of communication among prisons and between prisons
and the outside. Neckties are lawyers who work exclusively to the PCC, and who have the
double duty to legally represent PCC members and to bring information back and forth. The
neckties are individuals who early in their lives showed academic potential, but who had no
financial possibilities to afford long years of schooling before joining the work force. Most of the
times with their family consent, the PCC finances neckties Law school in exchange of a
promise: working for the organization by their graduation.
This way, the neckties are tied with the PCC for life, for duty and gratitude. The Neckties
Syntony illustrates how the PCC protects the neckties and their families, by providing them with
the opportunity of social mobility. The expected client/service provider relationship is subverted
when the PCC sponsors the neckties, who become the gangs clients. This market of protection
(Gambetta 1993) elevates the PCC to the status of a true Mafiosi organization. In sum, the arms
74

race that the RDD caused by harnessing cell phones with technological advancements had the
creation of the Neckties Syntony as its counter-part. This selection of strategy involves only
human resources based on the trade of protection, but attained to override the RDD restrictions.

3.5 The mega-rebellion of 2006

The attacks of 2006, like the mega-rebellion of 2001, were also motivated by transfers of PCC
leaders to maxi-prisons to the countryside. The dimension of the attacks is tantamount to the
rigour of the RDD. In 2001, common prison transfers triggered the mutinies; this time, the PCC
reacted against transfers to the RDD. The hardship of the RDD made this mega-rebellion
proportionally bigger than the 2001 one. The logics behind PCCs mega-rebellions lays bare on
revenge, and the attacks of 2006 are the ones that better illustrate it. Once again, the attacks
represent a moment when the PCC defects on cooperating with the state. The redistribution of
stress proves to be ineffective, and the frail equilibrium of the system is broken.
Regardless of its immediate causes, the insurgency represented a break in system balance. It was
also an opportunity for the PCC to showcase its supremacy in the crime world. In 2006, they
raised 72 prisons, again in a synchronized riot, and also went to the streets, burning buses,
shooting at police departments and imposing curfews on the general population for the first time.
The attacks of 2006 abound in representativeness, because the attacks are performed both in the
prison system and in the streets, showing the groups expansion compared to 2001.

75

4. KEEPING THE STATUS-QUO

The rabbit runs faster than the fox, because the rabbit is running for his life while the fox is only
running for his dinner
Aesop (Dawkins and Krebs 1979, 483)
The landmark for this chapter is 2012, the year of the latest PCC attacks. Those attacks were
responsible for enlightening this research. Not only do they mark a defection in the implicit
cooperation of the TIT FOR TAT game, but also they indicate the change in the crime rates in
the state. The attacks of 2012 show, once again, the PCCs manpower, and the subsequent rise in
criminality points to the failure in the long-term public security police through mass
incarceration.
This chapter, then, defends that the third crisis of the state-PCC CAS system shifted, to date, its
balance of power toward the PCC. Whereas the attacks of 2012 triggered the overall rise in crime
in the state of So Paulo, the trend could only keep sustainable due to the consolidation of the
PCC as hegemonic in the crime world. Therefore, the rise in crime is attributable to two factors,
that are equally important to the phenomena: first, the wave of attacks of 2012, which allowed
the PCC to defect the system; second, to the PCCs grassroots work in keeping the status quo in
the crime world. By the end of 2012, even though the wave of attacks was over, the state-PCC
system has permanently shifted toward the PCC. The attacks of 2012 were the tipping point of
the system, since the rise in crime rates has not stopped since then.
The chapter is divided into two major sections, each one accounting for the two components of
the crime rise. The first explains the attacks of 2012, the defection of the TIT FOR TAT game
that has disrupted the systems equilibrium. The second seeks to demonstrate how the PCC

76

maintains the status quo in the crime world, which allowed the gang to overcome the states
constraints and expand its criminal activities after 2012.
This chapter, then, after explaining the attacks of 2012, seeks to unveil the soft power the PCC
employs both inside and outside of the prison to rule the crime world from 2006 onward. This is
the moment that its second hierarchical structure is completely formed. The crime rise after the
attacks of 2012 demonstrates that the PCC is sovereign in the crime world, and that the attempts
to contain the group have failed thus far. The crime world is a competitive and unstable symbolic
space, so this chapter explains how the PCC manages to keep its position uncontested. The
answer lays on the PCCs prison rules and symbolic effects that activate interactions in the crime
world, reasoning the fundamental role that prisons play in enabling the gangs domain.
To keep the status quo, the PCC resorts to many strategies, except for violence, which seems
counter-intuitive at first. The sub-sections engaging members and sympathizers, ethos and street
level influence, illustrate the PCCs philosophy of violence as a last resource. Sparks & Buttons
(1995) detect that rules are only effective if the prison population consider them legitimate, and
that is exactly how the Party keeps its hegemony over the crime world.

4.1 The Attacks of 2012

Between October 24 and November 12, 2012, a series of murderers took place in the city of So
Paulo. One hundred and fifty-four people were killed; 93 were police officers, 70 of them being
off duty. The police investigative division found, in a prison facility, two lists containing names
of 80 policemen to be murdered. The anonymous order was to execute police officers whenever
they were off duty because their families would not receive a pension; the command was that
two police officers would be killed for each PCC member that was killed by police forces during
77

the battles. At this point in the conflict, the PCC imposed curfews on a few districts, terrorizing
the population at the outskirts of the city. They also randomly shot civilians. In response to this,
the Secretary of Security resigned and the federal government sent 30 million dollars to So
Paulo in an attempt to contain the wave of violence.
The wave of violence started on May 28, 2012, when ROTA, a special elite police squad, killed
5 men in a car pack who belonged to the PCC. Having members executed was enough to rage the
Party, which, in the lex talionis fashion, started executing policemen in retribution. This time,
however, the TIT FOR TAT went too far, and the gang carried out police executions for months,
murdering a total of 106 police officers in 11 months. It is worth noticing that 2012 had the
lowest rate of police officer killed on duty in the past four years (Figure 14), but the off duty
killings rate was epidemic. This discrepancy demonstrates the informality of the state-PCC
system, which operates beyond laws and hidden (as much as possible) from the general public.
Also, the contrasting numbers show that the attacks of 2012 were strictly related to the state and
the PCC affairs, and not to the general issue of violence in the state. The attacks of 2012
represented the private affairs of the agents of the system, who could no longer redistribute stress
without defection.
The dimension of the attacks of 2012, however, can be seen in comparative terms. The SSP-SP
does not release the number of police officers killed of duty, nor does any other public office.
However, by comparison, the attacks of 2012 killed 17 times more policemen off duty (in
relative numbers) than the state of Texas during the same year, the American state with the
highest rate of police officers killed off duty (Lima Dantas 2012).
The private settlement between the PCC and the state is reinforced by two facts. The fashion in
which the police officers were executed, and the timing of the attacks.
78

Figure 14. Police officers killed on duty from 2011-2014

Police Officers Killed on Duty

25

20

15

10

0
2011

2012

2013

Civil PoliceMilitary Police

2014

Military Police

Source: Data retrieved from SSP-SP (2014)

Note: The crime rates of 2014 were projected based on the first quarterly report.
Even though the ROTA executions took place in May, the apex of the police officer killings
happened in October, month of municipal elections in So Paulo. The Party, which never lost
sight of its first motif, used the attacks to disrupt the municipal elections. In 2012, a
representative of the PSDB party, Jos Serra, was running for mayor of So Paulo. The PSDB
has been consecutively running the state of So Paulo for the past two decades, consequently for
all the PCCs existence. To the group, the state is confounded by the political party, and the Party
does all it can to break the PSDBs hegemony in the state. Another poignant example of this was
the frustrated attempt to kidnap PSDB governor Geraldo Alckmins son in February 2014.
The municipal elections affected the timing of the attacks, but the attacks outcomes were
affected by it. Jos Serras contender was Fernando Haddad, who ended up being elected mayor.
Haddad belongs to the Partido dos Trabalhadores Workers Party (PT), President Rousseffs
79

party, and which is PSDBs major rival. While the attacks were rampaging in the months prior to
the election, the federal government offered help to governor Alckmin to try to curb them, at
both financial and in personnel levels. Governor Alckmin denied all the offers until December,
when the attacks were virtually over, in a clear way to prove that he could handle his states
issues alone. For several reasons, including the wave of the attacks and the bad repercussion that
it brought, Fernando Haddad won the polls. Regardless of the elections outcome, the argument
is that the PCC was trying to target the state in its most direct representation, governor Alckmin
and the PSDB.
Finally, the attacks of 2012 gave rise to a spike in crime because the system finally reached the
peak of stress, which could not be redistributed anymore. If in 2001 and 2006 the state created
different strategies to combat the PCC, in 2012 the attacks were not punished with anything but
the transfer of its masterminds to the RDD. Furthermore, the unstable truce that took place since
2006 might have come to an end exactly because it had reached its optimum point, leading to an
inevitable fall.
Whether the system reached its peak of productivity or not, the fact is that, between 2006 and
2012, the state-PCC system did not suffer any disruption or defection. However, this veiled truce
came at a cost. During these years, the state was lenient in letting the PCC take over the crime
world, by using the prison system as its fortress. The recent crime rise was triggered by the
attacks of 2012, but its foundation lays on the PCCs capability of keeping the dominant status
quo within the crime world. This phenomenon is explained in the next sections.

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4.2 Managing Sovereignty

The core idea of this section is to demonstrate how, after reaching the hegemony of the crime
world in So Paulo, the PCC managed to keep its power uncontested among criminals. The
control over criminals is kept through work routines and symbolisms. Work routines promote
labor division, accountability and respect outside and mainly inside of the prison system.
Symbolisms, such as the baptism ritual and the prestige of membership, are key to keep the
groups legitimacy in ruling the crime world. This section is divided into sub-sections accounting
for the ways in which the group resorts to soft-power: engaging members and sympathizers;
ethos, and street-level influence.
4.2.1 Engaging Members and Sympathizers
Becoming part of the Party is neither random nor automatic. On the contrary, membership is
considered an honour, so new members are carefully scanned through a selective process. The
PCC only wants skilled and trustful people as part of the organization, to keep it as an exclusive
club. Then, how can the PCC exert control over practically all the prison system population, as it
does nowadays? Every PCC member is called brother, whereas all the sympathizers are called
fellows. If only a small part of the prisoners are brothers, all the rest are fellows; otherwise, the
individual will be automatically considered as an enemy. Hence, if membership is not automatic,
fellowship is, at least for the prisoners who care about their bodily integrity.
Fellowship is a mechanism that automatically encompasses and virtually subdues every criminal
under the PCCs domain. The same way a new-born is granted a name and nationality, a criminal
in So Paulo is a PCC fellow because he operates his activities in the PCC area. This statement
does not want to reactivate the debate about stateness or parallel state (ODonnel 1993; Arias
2006). Instead, it means that the PCC sways the conceptual space of criminality in So Paulo.
81

The affiliation process is ritualized. A new member must be invited to join the gang by a
godfather, who becomes a co-signer of the new members reputation and behaviour. If the
sponsored criminal breaks a fundamental rule, his godfather will be held accountable for it, and
might be expelled from the organization. Therefore, the godfather acts as a link between the new
member and the organization. The standard procedure, however, is an invitation followed by
baptism. Usually, well-off criminals are most welcomed to join the PCC, since they can afford to
provide the group with more financial contribution. Skilled robbers are also wanted, especially
when they have some expertise, such as driving skills, IT, or any other niche of specialty. A
refusal to an invitation is well-accepted by the Party, as long as the criminal still obeys its
commands as a fellow.
The next step is the baptism ritual. Even though there is some controversy as to whether this
ritual still applies to date, during the first phase of the group it was a common practice. The
baptism could take place in two different fashions: either both the novice and the godfather shed
some blood in a glass of water and drink it; or the new member pours some drops of animal
blood (rats and doves) and drink them too. Salvatore Lupo (2009) notices the similarity between
the initiation rituals of mafia gangs and the masonry, in which the presence of blood is crucial.
Besides symbolizing fraternity, the bloody ritual also indicates rupture to any other previous
organization, being the moment when the reborn swears his faith to the new family. Finally,
blood also represents a lifetime connexion. In this context, murdering traitors is suddenly
justified, since they supposedly broke a life commitment.
What follows the ritual is the reading of both the PCC`s statute and the set of rules, also called
disciplina discipline. The discipline is related to the brothers behaviour. Every fellow is
under the imposition of the discipline, the moral code of the crime world in So Paulo.
82

Notwithstanding, brothers should be role models, and therefore their behaviour is completely
regulated by the gang. After 2006, when the PCC reached hegemony, the discipline was fully
embraced, and the rules became even stricter. Brothers, for instance, cannot be addicted to any
psychotropic substance, owe money or have an affair with another members wife. Biondi (2010)
also identifies other features that should be incorporated to their behaviour, such as humbleness,
self-control and charity. In sum, a brother must always put the organization in front of his45
personal wills. The discipline is so important to keep the organization under control that
discipline also names a position in the chain of command of the PCC. Every district of So Paulo
and every prison have a few disciplinarians, i.e., people ensuring that the PCC statute is in force.
After complying to follow the discipline of the command, the new brother will finally be
registered. His godfather will write down his full name, the area of the city from where he
comes, the godfathers name, and the last three prisons where the inmate was. The registration
will be forwarded to higher hierarchies of the Party until it reaches the central book- keeper of
the organization the Book-keeping Syntony. This part of the baptism has nothing
distinguishable, though. Registration is a mandatory procedure for any new inmate in all the
prisons controlled by the PCC. The widespread registration process shows two things: that
fellowship is indeed an automatic process; and that the prison is an emblematic feature of the
history of any criminal, since the information about the last three facilities where he has been is a
requirement to registration.

45

I have been using the pronoun his because that is no record of female members at the PCC. Some female lawyers
and relatives are part of the network that is indirectly related to the PCC, but women are not considered brothers.

83

4.2.2 Ethos
The goal of this section is to unveil the symbolic mechanisms through which the PCC exerts its
kingpin in the prison system. The Party has the required political savvy and survival skills to
command a system of inmates. For that, the PCC merges two techniques: it holds the monopoly
of force in prisons but also conquer prisoners hearts and minds, imposing a particular ethos that
puts an end to scuffles, assaults, vengeance and homicides, in and outside of prisons. The
monopoly of force inside the prison system is ascribed to the lack of the monopoly of force of
the state. From 1999 to 2010, the proportion inmate/jail guard increased 65 percent (SAP 2103),
which, in fact, represents a deficit 65% higher, in a system already precarious in terms of human
resources. The government invested in the expansion of the prison system, to the detriment of its
quality.
Besides the numerical disparity, correctional officers are easily bribedeither voluntarily or
under daunting threats to their families. The average monthly wage of a correctional officer in
So Paulo is roughly $1,288.00, whereas in Canada it is $4,600.00. Considering the purchase
power parity (PPP) of the two nations, living goods in Brazil are also 26 percent more expensive
than in Canada46. Those figures show how unappreciated this career is in Brazil; a great part of
correctional officers also work as police moon-lights to increase their income. Low wages,
coupled with exposure to violence make correctional officers extremely vulnerable to corruption.
With the lenience of the state, prisons are self-governed by the prisoners. Cooking and cleaning
are part of inmates duties, in most of the units of the state. Experience has shown that delegating
those activities encourages disposition to work, tidiness and organization within a facility.

46

Primary data retrieved from (SAP 2013, Living in Canada 2013 and Economist 2012 under Big Mac Index).

84

Whoever holds the position of the cook and the janitor is usually popular and respected inside
prison facilities. Furthermore, they are strategic positions. The janitor is an important interlocutor
among the inmates; going from cell to cell to clean, the janitor carries news, secrets and all sorts
of information. The cook, in his turn, has unlimited access to blunt objects in an environment
where any kind of sharp objects are forbidden and might smuggle weapons and cell phones into
the prisons within food containers that arrive in his kitchen.
Besides grooming prison guards and holding key positions, the PCC also imposed a new set of
moral rules that have changed a long-standing tradition. Sexual harassment, at PCC prisons, is
strictly forbidden. As part of the prison culture world-wide, inmates use rape to demoralize,
subdue and dominate new prisoners, rapists and enemies in general. Since violence became
monopolized by the PCC, this practice is no longer acceptable. Since 198447, prisoners in Brazil
have the right to private visits in their cells, but this federal legislation had first to be regulated
to be enforced. By the time the PCC was created, this law had not yet been enacted, and private
visit was a discretionary decision of each prison director. The Party had always claimed for the
full implementation of this right in the system, and finally in 1999 the state regulated48 private
visits. The PCC took the credits in So Paulo for this achievement, and used this prerogative to
regulate sexual habits in prisons.
Today, prisoners who have any kind of sexual relationship with other men are considered
homosexuals. This label was only given to men who were passive in a sexual intercourse before
that. To the PCC, private visits no longer justify homosexual intercourses, and therefore it

LEP, Law of Criminal Executions, article 41, X.

Resolution number 1 of the Conselho Federal de Poltica Penal e Penitenciria National Bureau of Penal and
Penitentiary Policies.
47
48

85

rearranged social roles in the prison according to its new ethos. The sexual regulation put end to
fights and murder for partners in prisons. As a consequence, the prison system is more family
oriented, but, mainly, more business orientated. Today, fights and disputes are seldom, and
business-related. Regulating the sexual lives in prisons was one way the PCC found to empty
causes of disagreement in the system that go beyond its control.
Another poignant example of the influence of the group over the system was the prohibition of
crack-cocaine in prison facilities. During the 1990s, the drug which is now a health epidemic
problem in the Brazilian society was already a major health concern inside the prisons of the
state. The best-seller novel-memoir Estao Carandiru, whose author is a physician who spent
years volunteering at the Carandiru complex (Varella 1999), unveils how this drug havocs lives
and disturbs a highly vulnerable place. But if Varella raised awereness to crack-cocaine
consumption inside of prisons from a medical perspective, the PCC, in stark contrast, abolished
the drug from prisons from a business and political stand-point.
Substance abuse is a major concern for the PCC because it puts the monopoly of force at stake.
Drug addicts, aiming to fulfil their needs, cannot be trusted. Following a chain of command is
extremely hard when bodies are craving for a fix, since addicts tend to affiliate with whoever is
willing to provide drugs immediately to them. Debts related to drugs, furthermore, used to be
paid in a very specific way in Brazilian prisons. Prisoners in debt due to drug abuse confessed for
other inmates crimes as a payment. Murders, brawling during riots, besides weapons and other
illegal objects confiscated during ransoming, any crime or felony inside of a prison was blamed
to a prisoner in debt. This mechanism challenged true accountability, and the PCC needs to make
inmates accountable to hold the monopoly of force in the system.

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Rules are stricter for the brothers; expel is the penalty for those who fault their own rules.
Brothers cannot consume any drug substance, except for alcohol and marijuana in parties and
special occasions. All the aforementioned rules are part of a conservative ethos called the
proceder procedure (Marques 2006) by the gang members. The procedure refers to an
unwritten set of rules that is actually the discipline of the group; the way the members proceed,
their behaviour, defines their and the PCCs identity. The PCC brothers explained what the
procedure is as being the right side of the wrong life (Marques 2006, 96).
The procedure became imperative only after the PCC conquered the hegemony of the crime
world. Having achieved supremacy, any sort of violent act provokes disturbance and might put in
check the position the gang took over a decade to reach. If, in the past, the PCC resorted to
several violent acts to overtake the prison system, now the gang assures that any use of violence
is restricted and used only as last resort. Brodeur (2002) refutes the use of violence as a common
feature of organized crime, since most of the gangs make only an instrumental use of savagery to
ensure their position and survival. Violence, in this sense, becomes meta-violence, instead of an
essential attribute of gangs. The hegemonic PCC, hence, uses violence as meta-violence, and
controls brothers and fellows by a conservative ethos, the procedure.
The procedure alone does not account for the respect that prisoners pay to the gang. With no
other strong groups to join or follow, inmates identify with the PCC due to another kind of ethos,
the one called the warrior ethos (Zaluar 1999, 12). The anthropologist defends that poverty and
constraint are only two factors, among several others, which contribute to criminal behaviour.
According to her, crime does not grow only from extreme deprivation; the youth also seeks to
express the warrior ethos, which consists in the expressive use of violence, a casual attitude
toward death and appreciation for guns as symbols of status.
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Furthermore, affiliation with a gang offsets the larger social inequities and inability to participate
in a consumer-driven culture resulting from a deeply stratified society. This is a key point to
capture the fundamental reason why people join a criminal organization. Even though gang
members may have already engaged in criminal behaviour before, becoming a gang member
carries an extra symbolic weight, since it allows them to feel part of a larger body. This is likely
true of most PCC members, supporting this notion that gang membership is measured beyond
monetary profits that may arise.
4.2.3 Street-level Influence
The prison system is the gangs headquarter, but its ethos extends to the streets. Prisons are the
physical space where the ethos is created and first implemented, to then expand to the conceptual
space of the streets. Prisons are limited by concrete boundaries, which facilitates control, like the
panopticon designed by Bentham. In contrast, streets have no boundaries, and their only possible
delimitation, the districts, make reality even more complex. In the particular case of So Paulo,
districts have their own codes, and are very different from each other. In addition, there is a
regional cleavage among the zones of the city being a gang member at the East zone means to
be embedded in a very different backdrop than at the South zone, for instance. The street-level
influence the PCC exerts is due to the monopoly of drug trafficking in the state. Since the PCC
eliminated the rival gangs, there is no other big-time competitor in drug distribution in So
Paulo. Every drug transaction is, to some extent, related to the PCC, unifying the city zones
around the gang, despite their differences.
Cunha (2003) bases her studies in the Portuguese drug market and its aftermath on society,
which she claims to be unusual. The similarities to So Paulo, however, are worth expounding.
To her, we should conceive the retail drug market as a continuum to other legal and illegal
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markets, based on family and neighborhood social networks. Thereby, Cunha challenges
Goffmans notion of total institution (2001), showing how prisons nowadays transcend physical
boundaries. To her, drug smuggling is the primary cause for that, because drug cartels inside of
prisons usually resort to relatives and friends to keep their business active, by smuggling
smokes, money, food, information, drugs, weapons and more in and out of the prisons.
From a different perspective, Telles and Hirata also posit an explanation to the PCCs ability of
operating both inside and outside of the prison system. Their work focuses on marginalized
districts and try to understand why not only do honest citizens accept, but also comply with
PCCs illegal activities and presence in their daily routine. As a consequence of their research,
the scholars created the concept of lateral mobilities (Telles and Hirata 2010, 40), expressing a
misty reality in which differences between what is legal and illegal barely exist. The authors
posit that the state poorly reaches these marginalized districts, and the population is constantly
deprived from assistance and delivery of public goods.
Meanwhile, the PCC is present in these places, regulating the crime world, recruiting cohorts,
materially patronising the community and performing drug trafficking activities. Thus,
involvement with the gang is commonplace. Telles and Hirata also point out that the residents of
these areas often perform illegal activities, after their legal day jobs, in order to earn a
supplementary income to the household, without which they could not meet minimal living
conditions. Lateral mobilities, then, is how the authors call this moral plasticity, justified by a
pauperized life.
The racketeering network the PCC created, thus, involves entire communities in a complex ring.
Despite involving multiple locations and actors, however, violence is dictated according to the
PCC ethos. The most influential rule, in fact an informal institution the PCC implemented, is the
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debates. They are ad hoc judgements of brothers, fellows and everyone involved with the crime
world that set the destiny of those who break the PCC ethos. Judgement among peers is not a
novelty; however, they were circumstantial and punctual. The PCC, especially after 2006,
established an informal institution with the debates.
The debate has been largely studied by scholars (Feltran, 2010b, Biondi 2010, Marques 2010,
Telles and Hirata 2010, Hirata 2010) and is also known by the media as the crime jury. The
central idea of the debate is to reach the truth by discussions and arguments. Feltran (2010b)
points to three different levels of debates, depending on the gravity of the transgression. The first
one, designed to solve daily problems, takes place where the occurrence happened with local
brothers as witnesses and judges. The second level of debates is designed for moderate offenses,
and should be judged by brothers from another district, what often happens by the use of a cell
phone. The third level of debates involves life- and- death sentences and is judged by brothers of
higher echelons; since many of them are in jail, these debates also may happen by the use of cell
phones, in jails where they can still receive reception and be easily smuggled.
It is noteworthy that the debates always seek for a consensual decision, enhancing egalitarianism
among the brothers. For the first and second instances, sentences may be given by vote majority.
The third instance (equivalent to the Supreme Court of a legal judicial system), however, must be
reached by consensus, due to the gravity of death penalty. If third instance does not respect the
principle of judgment among peers because higher hierarchies are involved, the consensus
mechanism restores the sense of democracy. The debate is in the kernel of the PCCs monopoly
for two reasons: it concentrates the fate of every criminal, regardless of their membership status,
and keeps an internal feeling of democracy for the brothers. Biondi (2010 chap.4) argues that the
institutionalization of the debate brought as a consequence the de-individuation of group
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members. In this process, brothers might lose self-awareness, but the collective entity gains
strength.
Finally, the regulation of the crime world ended up impacting So Paulos crime rates during the
2000s. This happens because all problems and deviations of the crime world must be scrutinized
by the PCC, and also because the latter employs death penalty as the last resort49. The PCCs
input at the paulista homicide drop is exactly what Feltran (2010a) calls the PCC factor. Besides
the afforestated monopoly mechanism that legitimates Feltrans argument, the fact that homicide
is a crime based on grudge and vengeance also contributes to its validity. The debates put an end
to the revenge chain, centralizing the judicial authority of the crime world.

49

The PCC penal system is very particular and intricate to its ethos. Wooing a married woman, for instance, is a
deviation punished by death. The conservative tone of the PCCs rules has no correlation with religion, on the
contrary. The newly created churches in Brazil, trans-literally named Neopentecostal, have an ambiguous
relationship with the PCC. They do traditionally play an important role in the prison system, by converting criminals
who eventually leave the crime world. At the same time that the PCC charges the religious denominations for the
use of cells, the gang uses the church to punish ex-members with religious conversion (Dias, 2008a and 2008b).

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5. COUNTER-FACTUAL ANALYSIS AND FINAL REMARKS

And to emphasize that the prison is not simply a shield against delinquency but a double-edged
sword: an organism for coercion at once criminophagous and criminogenic which, when it
develops to excess, as in the United States in the past quarter-century or the Soviet Union during
the Stalinist period, comes to mutate into an autonomous vector of pauperization and
marginalization
Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity

This thesis sought to explain the steady drop followed by an unexpected rise in crime in So
Paulo after late 2012. The research revealed that the crime rates in the state reflect the interaction
between two major actors, the state and the PCC, an organized crime organization. Also, it
shows that neither actor, alone, is responsible for the present crime rates, but that they derive
from an unstable accommodating relationship between both parties. Even though this thesis
focused on this hypothesis, it acknowledges the existence of competing explanations for the
problem. These competing explanations are hereby taken as counter-factuals, and intend to prove
as to whether the attacks of 2012 are actually a landmark that depicts a new trend for crime rise
in So Paulo.
The attacks of 2012 are significant to the extent that the crime started to rise after them. Since the
attacks of 2012 mark a defection and is an unintended consequence of the state-PCC CAS
system, it is representative of the entire system. Hence, proving its role in the crime rise in spite
of competing explanations allows the audience to infer that, analogously, the state-PCC CAS
plays a role in the phenomenon of crime rise. The counter-factual analysis considers the ROTA
execution, municipal elections and Rio de Janeiros implementation of pacifying police units as
competing explanations to the attacks of 2012. Later, the thesis final remarks promotes a

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discussion on the contribution of the study to the field. In addition, it tries to anticipate the next
steps of the state-PCC system.

5.1 Counterfactual Analysis

This section straddles the boundaries of the collapse of the state-PCC system in 2012. The
argument here is that the system collapsed, because the crime rise after the attacks of 2012
signals the end of a longstanding implicit cooperation, and shifts the balance in favour of PCC.
The assumption of a collapsed system also derives from the fact that time has elapsed enough
since the start of the implementation of the mass incarceration public policy; this allows an
analysis of its long-term ineffectiveness. The section draws on a series of counter-factual
analysis to confirm as to whether the attacks of 2012, followed by the rise in crime rates, could
have causes other than the hereby defended collapse of the state-PCC CAS system.
Whereas large-n studies can be tested as experiments, single-case studies have to rely on
different methods. This session is of extreme importance, since it will test the validity of this
chapters main argument, that the PCC has been overriding the security public policies in the
long-term. In other words, the attacks of 2012 followed by the rise in crime rates prove that the
mass incarceration policy has failed. As any theory, this one should be able to be falsified to be
credible. Counterfactual analysis, thus, is how this theory is hereby tested. The novelty of the
fact, the secrecy to which the subject of violence is approached, coupled with the lack of
specialized literature on the topic, put at stake the boldness of this project. Thereafter,
counterfactual analysis seems to be the most appropriate method to tackle a problem surrounded
by a speculative grey zone: Counterfactual analysis can aid inductive theorizing. The analyst
examines history, trying to predict how events would have unfolded had a few elements of the
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story been changed, with a focus on varying conditions that seem important and/or manipulable
(Van Evera 1997, 25).
Along these lines, the following question will serve as a template to test some possible
independent variables: Would the PCC have attacked in 2012 (also the dependent variable or Y)
if X had not happened? I identified three possible determinants without which the outcome may
not have existed, being a) ROTAs execution and b) municipal elections. A supplementary factor
to take into account, even though it is not directly related to the attacks of 2012, is the curb in
violence in Rio de Janeiro.
5.1.1 Would the PCC have attacked in 2012 if ROTAs executions had not happened?
One way to answer this question is by comparing the causes of 2012s attacks to the motivations
of previous attacks, in an attempt to find a behaviour pattern. I must protrude, though, that what I
denominate as causes are actually immediate causes to these events, since the problem
underlying the PCC is much more complex than the triggers I sought to reveal in this session.
The first demonstration of force from the PCC was the mega-rebellion of 2001. The trigger of
the mega-rebellion was a number of transfers of key-members belonging to the organization
from the capital to rural towns, mainly from the Carandiru complex. The attacks of 2006, like the
mega-rebellion of 2001, were also motivated by transfers of PCCs leaders to maxi- prisons in
the interior of the state, but, this time, under the RDD. The attacks, hence, were proportional to
the rigour of the RDD.
The logics behind the PCC crime waves lays bare on revenge, and the attacks of 2006 are the
ones that better exemplify it. In March 2005, one year prior to the mass rebellion of seventy-two
simultaneous prisons and the beginning of the attacks, the step-son of PCCs leader, Marcola,
was kidnapped. The author of the crime was Police Chief Augusto Pea, from the city of Suzano,
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in the greater So Paulo. Marcolas step-son was released in the end, after the ransoming
payment of R$300,000.00. The kidnapping only came into public in 2008. Police Chief Augusto
Pea was also involved in the negotiation to release a prisoner, a PCC member, for the bribe of
R$40,000.00. His team collected the money, but never released the prisoner. In a vengeful
operation, PCC members attacked the police station under Peas control in February 2006, and
killed seven policemen.
One year elapsed between Marcolas step-son kidnapping and the attacks of 2006. The rebellion
of 2006, with 72 prisons in riot simultaneously, was definitely a carefully articulated enterprise.
In the meantime, the government became aware of PCCs plans. The date for the riots was
Sunday, May 14, Mothers Day, but due to information leak, the riot started two days before,
Friday, May 12, surprising the authorities50. In fact, when assured about the PCCs plans, local
prison authorities called DEIC to report PCCs plans. In the eve of the attacks, when testifying at
the department, Marcola made mention about his step-son kidnapping, and called for vengeance,
I will not let it lie51.
In accordance to a study promoted by Harvard School of Law (International Human Rights
Clinic 2011), corruption and extortion were the causes of 2006s attacks. After having surveyed
dozens of police inquiries, visited prison facilities and interviewed authorities, researchers
concluded that police officers behaviour in Marcolas step-son kidnapping and countless other
circumstances are what actually promoted the groups insurrection. Furthermore, the study

Christino defends another version of the facts. In that year, the governor prohibited visits in the Mothers Day,
and, to the author, this is was what had triggered the riot, since the maternal holy figure plays a crucial role inside
the jail system. This version is not accepted here since evidence show that the governor has only forbidden visits
when he already knew about the PCCs riot plans for that day.
51
Manso, Bruno Paes. Achaque de Policiais Causou Ataques do PCC Police Officers Extorsions Caused P.CC.s
Attacks O Estado de So Paulo 09 May 2011. Web. 18 Apr. 2013.
50

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concludes that the major authorities of the state were not aware of Marcolas step-son kidnapping
and, worst of all, that the Secretary of Penitentiary Administration and the Secretary of Public
Security of the state of So Paulo did not share investigative information between themselves.
So far, prisoners transfers, police corruption and extortion were the highlighted causes. All three
of them point out to the direction that the PCC promotes attacks/rebellions in response to a
state`s measure. Either because it goes against the gangs interests (in the case of the transfers) or
because the criminals were retorting abusive conduct of police authorities (in the case of
corruption and extortions), the PCC acts were calling for vengeance. The answer to the counterfactual question, though, draws on one more fact the PCCs statute.
PCCs statute was enacted by the creation of the group, but has only come into public knowledge
after the mega-rebellion of 2001. Like any other statute, the document sets principles and rules of
conduct to the gangs members, in seventeen different articles. By August 2012, however, right
before the conflicts between the group and the state aggravated, the PCC released a reformulated
statute. The new rule is fairly similar to the previous one, since the principles and main ideas
were re-written with a different word disposition. Nevertheless, the only substantial difference is
the inclusion of article eighteen,

Every member has the duty to act with serenity upon oppression, murder and cowardice
caused by prison guards, military and civilian police. When exterminations, extortions
and acts of cowardice are proven to be true we will deal an eye for an eye. If a life is
taken through these mechanisms, the members of the vicinity should get together and
give back the same treatment. Life is paid with life and blood is paid with blood. (PCC
Statute 2012, article 18)

This commandment, anticipating the bloodshed of police officers in the streets of So Paulo, is
understood as meaningful. If ROTAs acts of police brutality had not existed, it is unlikely that
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the wave of attacks would have started. PCCs underlying logics of revenge presumes that a
reaction is preceded by an action. In contrast, if an act of police brutality is hereby considered
mandatory to have had triggered the attacks, any other act of police brutality (of the same
magnitude) would had worked as a trigger. In short, the PCC probably would have not attacked
in 2012, except for vindicating a case of police brutality, which, in this specific case, were the
ROTAs executions. It is important to highlight, though, that ROTAs executions are simply the
immediate cause of the problem. ROTAs brutality is, in fact, an intervening cause. Being the
structural problem A and PCCs attacks of 2012 B, ROTAs executions would be q, as an
intervening explanation of how structural problems manifest: AqB.
5.1.2 Would the PCC have attacked if the municipal elections had not happened?
According to the section above, the retaliation promoted by the PCC against ROTAs executions
was necessary to restore honour and to put in practice the directives of the gang. Therefore, most
likely the PCC members would have murdered a number of police officers regardless of the
electoral period. However, these acts of violence could have been delivered via retail, instead
of wholesale trade. Violence is part of citizens daily lives in Brazil, and people only realize
the egregious figures when crime records are tabulated by the media once in a while52. The PCC
decided to counter-attack in 2012 in an articulated, pre-empted fashion; the PCC wanted to be
seen and heard, and the commotion during the elections is not a mere coincidence.
There is plenty of evidence that the PCC wittingly designed its attacks of 2006 during the
electoral period, which created a pattern to be repeated in 2012. In 2006, the attacks happened in

52

Simmel`s concept of blas attitude (Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms) explains the indifference
towards violence in the metropolises of Brazil. If people seem anesthetized in regards to violence, it is because
violence is so abundant that people resort to the blas attitude to protect themselves from overwhelming stimulation
to their senses.

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May, but were originally planned to occur at some point between May and October of that same
year. In October of 2006, there were presidential elections in Brazil, and the PSDB candidate,
Geraldo Alckmin, governor of So Paulo by the occasion (and currently as well) decided to run
for president. He resigned as a governor to be able to run for president53, leaving office in the
hands of Cludio Lembo, who had never occupied and executive position before.
Ideally, the PCC wanted to attack on June 6, 2006. Firstly, it is the anniversary of the groups
foundation; secondly, 06/06/06 elucidates to the Devil`s number, 666, playing a symbolic role.
Two factors contributed to anticipate the attacks: the transfers of the inmates to the RDD and a
wire interception made by the police of the state of Mato Grosso, revealing PCCs intentions.
Nevertheless, May was still in the estimated timeframe, and the attacks clearly jeopardized
Alckmin, who lost the elections54. Nagashi Furukawa, Secretary of Security by the time, has
declared in an interview (Miraglia and Salla 2008, 34) that some anti-PSBD material was found
inside of the jails in the state. Among others, the flyers had a No to Geraldo Alckmin for
President as one of its statements.
The Secretary goes on, saying that the transfers only happened because the authorities were
positive that the attacks would occur in August. What no one expected was the PCC to react that
quickly in response to the transfers, anticipating the attacks to May. Haphazardly, Furukawa
admits that, if the attacks had happened in August, as first planned, they would have echoed
during the entire month of September, leaving no change for Alckmin on October first, the date

53

Article 14, 6 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil predicts that occupants of executive positions (president,
governors and mayors) must resigned six months before the elections in order to run for other offices.
54
Alckmins candidacy did not strive for many other reasons, and the security crisis in So Paulo only played a
secondary role in his loss. The context in which the winner candidate, Lula, was elected, was favourable to him due
to historical factors that extrapolate the purpose of this thesis.

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of the elections. All in all, the attacks of 2006 were purposefully planned to impact the results of
the presidential elections, which reinforces the hypothesis that the 2012 attacks did too.
The municipal elections of So Paulo in 2012 were highly disputed, with an outlier candidate,
Celso Russomano, appearing in the second place of vote polls until the week prior of the
elections. Russomano started his career in the 1990s as an investigative journalist on television,
covering violent crimes in equally violent suburbs, in a sensationalist fashion. A decade after, he
was elected as a Member of Parliament, and his extreme-right discourse to combat crime was
also complemented by neo-pentecostal religious views. Russomano ended up being in the third
place in 2012, but the unexpected support that he received demonstrates how sensitive the
citizens of So Paulo fell in regards to violence.
Jos Serra (PSDB) and Fernando Haddad (PT) were the candidates of the runoff elections. Serra
had the support of the governor Alckmin, whereas Haddad was backed by president Rousseff
and by her popular predecessor, Lula. The PSDB decided for Serras candidacy, since he is
extremely experienced and was a certain bet for mayor. Serra also disputed the last presidential
elections against Rousseff and lost in the runoffs, which made the elections an important
personal matter for him. In contrast, Haddad is a law school professor who had never been
directly elected to a position in the Executive before. Notwithstanding, Haddad won.
During the attacks, governor Alckmin (PSDB) was reluctant to accept any sort of help coming
from the federal government (PT), since admitting the state could not manage the situation
would impair Serras campaign. Alckmin has only accepted intelligence support and R$30
million from the Ministry of Justice to curb the attacks when Serra had already lost the run for
mayor. Noteworthy is that, by then, the attacks have ceased as well. It is impossible to affirm that
the PCC only attacked because there were elections. However, there is enough evidence to prove
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that the elections worked as a catalyst condition, magnifying the attacks. Thus, if the municipal
elections had not happened, the PCC might not have attacked and, if it had chosen to, the attacks
would have caused much weaker impacts. The electoral period does not comprise the theoretical
explanation, but is definitely a condition variable, an antecedent variable, which activates the
studied mechanism. Back to the arrow diagram, being A the structural problem or the
Independent Variable; B the PCCs attacks or the Dependent Variable; q ROTAs executions or
intervening variable; the electoral period would be C, or the antecedent variable:
AqB
x
C
5.1.3 A possible supplementary factor- Did the PCC benefit from Rio de Janeiros curb in
violence?
Since 2008, the approach to tackle violence in the city of Rio de Janeiro has changed. In a
process that erupted in an internationally broadcasted persecution in late 2010, Rios
government, in alliance with the federal government and the military, started taking over Rios
favelas in an attempt to pacify them. The government installed permanent police units, the so
called Unidades de Polcia Pacificadora Peacemaker Police Units (UPPs). The police, feared
by the population as an exogenous force that entered in the favelas heavily armed and only
during conflicts, is now a constant model, engaged in the hardship of dwellers daily lives.
The UPP model was first considered by sociologists to be the most appropriate security measure
Rio ever took, because they change the forces image towards the population. The UPPs promote
several educational activities, such as soccer games with young teenagers and police officers,
and is not constraint to repressing crime. Monetary incentive based on performance is also

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applied: police officers may earn up to US$3,500.00 in bonuses for reducing crime. Alongside
with the UPPs, a land registry reform is underway. Citizens can now obtain formal registry for
their de facto property, curbing land turf battles as a collateral effect.
So far, there are 31 UPPs in Rio, imposing a hardship to the CV and other cartels. One
hypothesis for the PCC upsurge may be related to a shift in the drug trafficking routes for this
while. In this scenario, a shift in drug trafficking routes would have empowered the PCC, making
it possible a force demonstration like the attacks of 2012. Both the CV and the PCC were created
inside of prison walls, twenty years apart. Furthermore, members of the CV who were
imprisoned in So Paulo have influenced paulista prisoners in relation to organized crime,

In coalition with the Comando Vermelho CV and PCC we will revolutionize the
country inside and outside of the prisons and our military wing will be the terror of the
powerful men, of the oppressors and tyrants who use the Anexo de Taubat and the
Bangu I at Rio de Janeiro as a societys revenge instrument manufacturing monsters.
(PCC Statute 2012, article 17)
More intriguing than the direct allusion to the CV at article 17, is the PCCs motto Peace,
Justice and Freedom identical to the CV one. There is no doubt left about the good
relationship between the two groups, but to what extent are they connected? The CV has a
coincidental creation with the PCC, but a different aftermath. Dias (2011) and Christino (2003)
refute any plausible parallel between the structure, modus operandi and direct mutual influence
between the two gangs, arguing that the CV failed to establish its domains in So Paulo and,
therefore, could not have sponsored by any means the creation of PCC. Nonetheless, Coelho
(2005) has a work on CVs leaderships that presents an argument regarding the transition of the
group from inside to outside of the prison.

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Coelho argues that the CV lost its influence over incarcerated masses by the time its leadership
shifted from being bank robbers to drug lords. To him, bank robbers did not have any other
source of income by the time they were arrested, and could focus in the prison matters, such as
prison rights and playing a political role in that environment. In contrast, drug dealers usually
keep their operations running even inside of the jail, and therefore do not pay attention to
institutional violations and other inmates needs. Thereto, drug dealers tend to flee outside of
prisons more often, due to their monetary power, and their only connection with the prison world
is renumeration. In accordance with Coelho, the material provided by drug dealers, such as
infrastructural improvement for prison facilities, parties and social gathering promotion, in
addition to the promise of a career in drug trafficking, does not directly conflict with public
power.
Notwithstanding its merits, Coelhos argument cannot be generalized. In the case of the PCC,
which had the same evolution (leadership shifting from bank robbers to drug dealers) as the CV,
the statement does not apply. Drugs are an income source that has not diverted the PCCs
attention over the prisoners; on the contrary, it seems that the financial upgrade gave boldness to
the PCC. In addition, the latest attacks of 2012 show that the PCC is not avoiding any conflict
with public power. Lessings approach, however, might better fit to the reality hereby studied.
By examining the Comando Vermelho, he concludes that the domain exerted by the gang over
the prison actually facilitated its control over individual drug dealers, diminishing the
competition in this market (Lessing 2008). The author also states that prisons allow the
socialization of new members, in terms of shared values and morals. Lessings study was only
concerned to decipher the mechanisms of Comando Vermelho, but it is not so far-fetched to

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draw parallels with the PCC. The true nature of the relationship, though, indicated by the term
coalition at the statute, gives a hint on the matter.
In fact, the two organizations are fond of each other, but are totally independent. The CV and the
PCC, then, formed a brotherhood, with no interference in each others market or business, but
coexisting in peace. Whenever a gang member is arrested in the neighbour state, he will be
protected and respected in the prison controlled by the other group. This mutual respect,
however, attests the individuality of the two organizations. Dowdney (2004) captured a
distinguished feature of the CV that proves how different the two gangs are. Membership in the
CV is involuntary and automatic, depending on the jail the inmate is at or the community where
someone lives. Every individual who resides in a favela the CV controls is automatically
affiliated to the gang, be he/she a member, an independent drug dealer or a simple resident,
regardless to any effective connection to the group. Dowdney (2004, 184) noticed, by studying
young mens behaviour in Rio, that they referred to every dweller of the favelas where they lived
in as belonging to the gang. The PCC, differently, has a very strict membership system, which in
absolutely nothing resembles the CV totalitarian affiliation.
This analysis teaches that it is actually hard to find the acting boundaries of a gang which is
virtually everywhere. Even harder, then, is to identify the actual active members of the CV, and,
subsequently, their possible business partners. Nevertheless, the media suggests that a recent
investigation from the Intelligence of the Federal Police55 indicates that the PCC became a crackcocaine supplier for the CV, what transforms their alliance into that of mutual empowerment.

Ramalho, Srgio. PCC- Traficantes Cariocas tm Parceria com Faco PCC- Carioca Drugdealers have
Partnership with the criminal Faction DefesaNet [Braslia] 12 Nov 2012. Web. 09 April 2013.
55

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In order to better understand the supply chain in Brazil, an overview of the multiple routes of
drug trafficking is required:
1- Colombia. Until recently, Colombia was the major cocaine supplier of the country,
responsible for 60% of all the cocaine arriving in Brazil. The drug would cross the rivers
and roads of the states of Amaznia and Par, pass by Rio and finally reach So Paulo. In
the last two stops, some amount is saved for the internal local market, before being sent
to the United States and Europe, many times via Africa.
2- Peru. Around 10% of the cocaine reaching Brazil comes from Peru. It goes through the
states of Amaznia, Par, Mato Grosso, Paran and finally reaches So Paulo. Most of it
is sent abroad through the ports of Paran and So Paulo.
3- Bolivia. This country supplies 30% of the cocaine reaching Brazil. It passes through the
borders of Rondnia and goes straight to Paran and So Paulo, where it is exported
through ports as well.
4- Paraguay. This country supplies marijuana, which passes through the states of Mato
Grosso do Sul, before finally reaching So Paulo. After saving the bulk for internal
consumption, the remaining drug follows to Paran, from where it is exported.
5- Suriname. This is a very specific trade that happens in the Northern area of the country.
Brazilian drug syndicates exchange drugs for heavy artillery in the states of Amap and
Par.
6- Polgono da Maconha The Marijuana Polygon. The state of Pernambuco, in the semiarid Northeastern region of the country, grows marijuana that is fully focused on the
internal market. After leaving Pernambuco, the drug passes through Minas Gerais, Rio de
Janeiro and finally reaches in So Paulo.
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The Suriname route will be disregarded, as it touches upon the problem of arm trafficking and
goes beyond the object of this research. From the five remaining routes, three (Peru, Bolivia and
Paraguay) do not even pass by or has Rio as a final destination. The other two (Colombia and
The Marijuana Polygon) only pass by Rio, but has So Paulo as the final destination. If the
routes originally did not contemplate Rio, any curb on drugs there would not have affected
trafficking routes. In regards to the two remaining routes, the final destination has always been
So Paulo, and any change would be in the sense of overflowing the paulista market with drugs
that would not be purchased in Rio, and not changing a drug trafficking route per se.
Being Rio de Janeiro and So Paulo only 429km apart and having all the roads of Minas Gerais
connecting the three states, any change in the route trafficking should be considered easily
achievable. However, it was not apparently necessary. The UPP policy really impacted crime in
favelas, but not the business keeping the drug syndicates active. From the favelas, drug sales
came to the roads, where dealers deliver drugs by appointment and use cell phones and
motorbikes as working tools. The marijuana price, despite the UPPs, was not marked-up,
contradicting the rules of supply and demand56. This accounts for the route coming from the
Marijuana Polygon. Any possible shift in the Colombian route, depends not solely on Rios or
Brazilian dynamics, but on the international drug trafficking operations.
The Plan Colombia has significantly changed the panorama of the cocaine supply market.
Colombian cartels were replaced by Mexican syndicates in the distribution for the United States
and other countries, such as Costa Rica and Ecuador, are replacing it as suppliers. In accordance

Gomide, Rafael. Preo da Maconha no Rio Contraria a Economia e no Sobe Marijuana Price in Rio
Contradicts Economy and Does not Raise IG [Rio de Janeiro] 02/06/2012. Web. 04/24/2013.
56

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with The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Since 2007, cocaine
production has shown a clear downward trend, mainly due to the declines of production in
Colombia, which also continued in 2010. Cocaine production fell by some one sixth [sic] over
the 2007-2010 period. (UNODC 2012, 37).
Colombia did lose space in the international trafficking. As a consequence, so did the drug route
departing from this country. The likelihood, then, is that the cocaine departing from So Paulo is
now supplying Rios market, instead the other way around. So far, the drug route arrow diagram
goes against the first assumption, working in the direction So PauloRio instead of RioSo
Paulo. Notwithstanding, there are still some factors to take into account.
The PCC could only have benefited from the curb in drug trafficking in Rio if the market in Rio
had been actually affected by the UPPs implementation. Misse (2011) detects three different
movements in crime caused by drug seizures and drug trafficking repression. First, drug dealers
would shift to other crimes, such as armed robberies and bank robberies for supplementing the
missing market; second, if there is any window in the repressive measures, a sudden spike in car
robberies rates is to be expected, since dealers rob vehicles to maximize their activities; third,
mark-up prices on drugs drive drug users to pick pocket and other minor offenses, in order to
afford their vice. The author found that in the recent years regular crime rates have increased in
Rio, but claims that there is no evidence that it has any relation to drug seizures. Instead, Misse
affirms that drug syndicates whose favelas were occupied are moving to other locations under
their control, where the communitarian police are not present yet (Misse 2011, 24).
In addition, Weaver (2012) points that while the culture of corruption, violence and inefficiency
exists, the UPPs are going to be obfuscated. The author makes this statement referring to the
militias, paramilitary groups formed by military police officers, firefighters, jail
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officers and private security guards combating the organized crime. However, militias do not
provide safety for favelas dwellersthey sell it. Public servants act in their own interest and
surcharge residents for essential services that they monopolize, such as gas, transportation and
cable TV. Therefore, UPPs help to shun the drug syndicates, but violence is now being commited
by a new actor57.
Militias are still known to raise funds for political campaigns; also, politicians do not consider
militias as a threat, since the latter combat the organized crime by their own. In 2006, Rios
mayor by the occasion, Cesar Maia, stated that between drug cartels and militias, the latter is the
lesser of two evils and that militias are a way of communitarian self-defense. The Center of
Studies on Violence of the University of Rio de Janeiro (NUPEVI-UERJ) showed the
exponential growth of militias. In 2005, they controlled only 10% of the favelas in Rio;
increasing to 41.5% in 2009. At the same time, the CV lost some territorial influence: in 2005 the
group controlled 53% of the favelas, and decreased to 38.8% in 2009. The most alarming figure,
though, is about the neutral favelas: if they were 8.6% in 2005, in 2009 only 1% of all favelas in
Rio are freed from an external subservice control.
Despite the fact that hills under the control of militias are not their primary targets, the UPPs also
work to dismantle them. On the top of that, the congress has enacted a federal law (Law 12,720
of 2012) which predicts reclusion from two to four years to militia members, typifying them as a
criminal organization. Notwithstanding, as Weaver (2012) states, the militia phenomenon
illustrates how the problem in Rio is deeply rooted state enemies are replaced in a fast pace.

57

There is evidence that the first militias were created during the 1970, during the military regime. However, they
only became expressive in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

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The factors analysed, altogether, do not point to the direction that there was a possible shift in
drug trafficking apt to have empowered the PCC. Drug trafficking in Rio does not seem to have
been truly affected, since the sales left from top of the favelas down to the streets. Drug
syndicates in Rio, on the contrary, seemed to have been disorientated for a while, but the influx
coming from So Paulo assured that the market did not run out of stock. Therefore, there is not
enough proof to guarantee any correlation between the curb in drug trafficking in Rio and a
possible empowerment of the PCC in So Paulo. Likewise, there is not enough proof to refute it
either, since the issue deserves a time series analysis to be conclusive. However, what really
discredits any causal relation is none of the facts formerly presented, but the fact that, actually,
the PCC did not need any more empowerment in order to perform the 2012 attacks.

5.2 Final Remarks

This thesis intends to shed light on the problem of violence by the single case study of crime in
So Paulo. By analyzing the steady drop in the crime rates during the 2000s followed by the
unexpected rise in crime after 2012, it found that the problem lies in the interaction of the state
and the PCC, the two agents forming a Complex Adaptive System. The CAS framework, then, is
an approach that enables the understanding of crime in So Paulo, by proposing a dynamic and
bifocal perspective. Under this perspective, both the PCC and the state are equally responsible
for the problem of crime in So Paulo, which will remain unexplained, unless it is treated in its
complexity.
This study suggests that criminality, being such a complex social problem, shall be understood as
a living and multidimensional issue. Hence, static solutions, such as increment of prison beds,
will fail in the long- run, when applied to dynamic problems, such as the crime in So Paulo. In
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regards to the future of the state-PCC CAS system, there is no evidence that this dynamic will
disappearnor there are signs that it will reach an optimum point, because the optimum point
itself is always somewhat unstable,

The adaptive solution to the model has an interesting implication: the system
adapts to a precipice. Recall that the maximum productivity of this system is
associated with a critical value and that such values imply that small deviations
can result in a substantial decrease in yield. Thus, adaptation leads the system to a
state that is both optimal and fragile. (Miller and Page 2007, 104)

As a consequence, there is no possible way to foresee longer periods of truce between the state
and the PCC, nor when the system tends to defection or equilibrium, exactly because this
adaptive system is under constant motion.
This study has one clear limitationit does not take into account the role that economic factors
might have played in the crime rise after 2012. Since 2011, the Brazilian GDP has been under
the three per cent mark. Between 2003 and 2010, Brazils GDP was always above 3% a year,
except for 2009, which reflected the 2008 economic global crisis. Even then, however, the
country had a 0.9% growth, an outstanding achievement considering the global context. After
2010, when the GDP reached a 7.5% GDP (last experienced only during the 1970s, in a period
called Milagre Econmico Economic Miracle), the country economic growth has been smaller
than expected, having the lowest growing rates among the BRICS nations.

109

Figure 15. Brazilian GDP (2000-2013)

Source: Advanced Financial Network (ADVFN) Brazil (2014).

The correlation between the spike in criminality in So Paulo and the slow Brazilian economic
growth is plausible, and merits further research. Furthermore, establishing this parallel is a task
that the present thesis could not accomplish, due to its complex nature. Notwithstanding, this
study shows that the PCC has consolidated its domain in the crime world back in 2006, during a
still prosperous economic scenario. The interactions between the state and the PCC, and the
systems subsequent development, to some extent, are independent from economic factors,
providing this study with validity. Further research in the role that economy might play in the
latest crime raise, then, would enrich this thesis argument, instead of compromising it.
In spite of the aforementioned limitations, this thesis could manage to identify two major
phenomena. First, that crime derives from the interaction between the state and the PCC; second,
that the policy of mass incarceration has failed over time in So Paulo. From this perspective, it
invites the scholarship and policy makers to treat crime in So Paulo (and, perhaps, in places
110

with similar settings) as an ongoing process, to which rigid remedies tend to cause a negative
effect. There could be an array of possible recommendations to the problem of crime in So
Paulo rather than strict measures, such as negotiation, drug decriminalization and informal
solutions. However, the very Brazilian legislation offers relief to the problem of jail inflation and
the consequent PCC empowerment.
The recent UN Report of the working group on arbitrary detention on its visit to Brazil (18 to 20
March 2013) (2014) points to the fact that 43.5 percent of the Brazilian detainees are awaiting
trial in pretrial detention, and concludes One worrying trend observed by the Working Group
was that deprivation of liberty is being used as the first resort rather than the last, as required by
international human rights standards. (par. 83). Moreover, the group denounces that in So
Paulo, pretrial detention was not sufficiently justified in 93 per cent of the cases, in which judges
evoke the argument of keeping the public order in order to prolong detention (par.77).
Even though the law does not stipulate a maximum jail time in preventive detention, the
jurisprudence understands it should stay within the period of 80-120 days. However, pretrial
detention holds almost half of the Brazilian prison population. In a clear advance, the amendment
made by the Criminal Procedure Code in 2011 stipulates that preventive detention is a last resort,
and is solely applicable to crimes punished with more than four years of imprisonment. By the
same token, Law No. 12,403 on Precautionary Measures, also approved in 2011, proposes
alternatives to pretrial detention such as house arrest, bail and electronic monitoring. Pretrial
detention, though, still seems to be the preferred punishment, despite the fact that it goes against
the law.
The National Council of Justice promoted a task force between 2010-2011, in which reviewed
more than 295,000 cases across the country, resulting in the release of 22,000 prisoners (Report
111

of the Working group on arbitrary detention 2014, par. 64). This task force demonstrates that
some 7.5 per cent of the Brazilian jail population is illegally arrested and, worse, vulnerable to
the influence of organized crime. In So Paulo, where the jail population is approximately
202,000 people, there are only 16,000 subjected to alternative measures. Large numbers of
people accused of minor offenses, such as petty thefts, end up spending more time on remand
(more than 100 days in custody) than the jail time predicted for this crime.
One possible recommendation to the state of So Paulo, thus, would be the shift of
investments from the expansion of the prison system toward the judicial system. First, there
are too few judges: while Germany has 24 judges for every 100,000 people, So Paulo has only
6/100,000. Second, there should be more public defendants able to attend the incarcerated
population, usually deprived from the means to afford an attorney. Brazil has only 5,500 public
defendants, which leaves room for the PCC to implement strategies as the neckties syntony to
serve a population in need.
Third, the Brazilian Congress should re-consider the instances of judicial review, which produces
costly and long trials. Fourth, trials using an electronic interface could be a great solution to save
resources in transporting inmates to court and could expedite the number of trials exponentially.
Last, but not least, there is the need for more task forces to review processes. In So Paulo, only
92,000 cases were reviewed so far.
The aforementioned recommendation intends to deal with the problem of overpopulation in the
jail system, which motivated the creation of the PCC in the first place. Less overcrowded prisons
cause less ill-treatment from the government, which would lessen the Partys legitimacy as the
representative of wronged daitenees. Furthermore, less detainees, if not necessarily represent less
PCC brothers, represents with no doubt less PCC fellows. Once the prison system is the PCCs
112

realm and fortress, the less prisoners, the less people there are under the PCCs influence.
Shifting investments towards the judicial system is only one among various possible measures
that the government could take. However, tackling overpopulation by expediting the judicial
system seems more reasonable, since the legal framework to employ alternative measures
already exists, and it prevents criminals who only committed minor felonies from joining
criminal rings.

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