PHILOSOPHY AS UNIT 1 SPECIMEN PAPER:

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO SELECTED QUESTIONS

In writing the answers to past exam questions, I have naturally referred to AQAs
mark schemes (available on their website) as far as possible. However, my answers
should not be treated as carrying AQAs stamp of approval. They represent my
considered opinion as to how these questions might reasonably be tackled. The BPA
takes no responsibility for the examination performance of students who have used
these answers.
If you look at AQAs mark schemes, you will find that answers are presented largely
in note form. I have instead presented mine as essays, which is what students should
be trying to produce within the time constraints.
It hardly needs pointing out that there are a range of valid ways of tackling most of
the questions and mine represent, in each case, just one possible approach.

Question 1
(a) Explain what is meant by a priori and outline one reason why the a priori is
philosophically significant.
(15 marks)
A priori knowledge is knowledge that can be acquired independently of experience.
That vixen are female foxes is a piece of a priori knowledge, as you only have to
understand the concept of a vixen to know that a vixen is a female foxyou do not
have to have had experience of actual vixen. In contrast, that vixen work hard in the
rearing of their cubs is not a priori, but a posteriori knowledge, because to know this,
you cannot just examine the concept of a vixen; you have to either study vixen
yourself or acquire the knowledge indirectly from someone else who has studied them.
One reason why the a priori is philosophically significant is that it is immune to
sceptical doubts concerning the evidence of the senses. Descartes argued that such
evidence on its own would be useless for his project of reconstructing knowledge on
the basis of certainty, since any sensory episode could, for all he knew, be a dream or
hallucination. By attempting to establish truths that could be known a priorisuch as
his own existencehe hoped to avoid this pitfall. In fact, by producing a priori proofs
of Gods existence, he thought he could revalidate sense experience by arguing that
an all-good god would not deceive us about the existence of a physical world
apparently revealed by sensory evidence.
The above is a full enough answer, but here are a couple of alternative reasons for
the philosophical importance of a priori knowledge:
A different role for a priori knowledge is to be found in Kants work. For Kant, the a
priori represents the constraints that things must conform to in order to be possible
objects of experience for us. For example, according to Kant, we know a priori that
every event has a cause, since, in order to be experienced by us at all, objects have to
be part of a network of relations which includes time, space and causality.

Yet another view is that a priori knowledge is fundamentally linguistic in character,

that all statements capable of being known a priori are analytic. According to this
view, a priori knowledge is knowledge of linguistic conventions and their logical
consequences. (The example above about vixens would seem to bear this out.) This
might be held to have an important consequence for the nature of philosophy itself,
for since philosophy proceeds in an a priori fashion, it would appear to follow,
according to the view in question, that philosophers are simply engaged in analysing
the meanings of words.

(b) All ideas derive from the sense experiences which they copy. Discuss. (30 marks)
This was an important claim of David Hume. Hume thought that by the adoption of
this thesis, we could banish obscure, meaningless ideas from our discourse, since such
ideas cannot be traced back to experience in the way described by the thesis. Thus our
thinking would achieve greater clarity and would be free of metaphysical nonsense.
Hume supported the claim by appealing to the fact that people who lack access to a
particular realm of sense experience, e.g. sight in the case of the blind or sound in the
case of the deaf, are incapable of forming the corresponding ideasthey are unable to
form the visual and auditory images familiar to those able to see and hear.
However, as it stands, the claim cannot be accepted. Hume himself pointed out that he
could form the idea of a golden mountain without ever having come across one, in
which case there are ideas that are not copies of prior impressions. But Hume went on
to argue that his ability to form this idea does at least depend on his having had an
impression of things that are golden and things that are mountains. This suggests that
a weaker thesis might be acceptable: perhaps every idea that we have is formed by
compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing ideas which are copies of
previously experienced impressions. Even this may not be quite right, for as Hume
points out, a person may be capable of imagining a specific shade of colour that he
has never previously experienced, but Hume considers this exception too minor to
challenge the general thesis. An alternative response to the challenge apparently posed
by such cases would involve arguing that they are not really counter-examples to the
principle, provided that the terms augmenting and diminishing are understood in a
sufficiently broad sense. For presumably the image of an unencountered colour shade
can always be derived from a previously encountered one by augmenting or
diminishing one or more qualities of the latter (e.g. its degree of reddishness). So
understood, the principle would allow a great deal of extrapolation from the material
of experience. What it would disallow is an ability to imagine impressions that are of
a radically different sort from those actually encountered at any point in the subjects
life.
The thesis is really an empirical oneit must itself be judged by experiential
evidence. As a general statement applicable to all human beings at all times and
places, it could arguably never be wholly certain, since however often it was
confirmed in our experience, there would always be the logical possibility of finding a
counter-instance. On the other hand, the claim does have enough empirical support to
make it highly plausible. In other words, our evidence strongly supports the claim that

ordinary human beings are unable to form images of a radically different kind from
those that they have encountered within the course of their actual experience.
It has been suggested that the thesis is untenable, since if all my ideas derive from my
sense experience and all your ideas derive from your sense experience, it follows that
we can never share the same idea, as we cannot have the same sense experience, and
this is an absurd conclusion. However, the conclusion does not in fact follow. For
consider a situation where I have an impression of red and you also have an
impression of red, but they both happen to be of the very same shade of red. Maybe
my impression and your impression are not literally the same thing, in the strict
numerical sense, but that does not stop them being qualitatively the same, i.e., the
same type of thing. Similarly, the ideas that they give rise to can also be qualitatively
the same.
But what about ideas that are not of sensory impressions but of other things, such as
physical objects? Is the idea of a physical object an idea of some sensory impression
of it, say its appearance? But if I look at the object at a different angle from you, or
further away, I will get a different impression of its appearance. Then, according to
Humes thesis, we will have different ideas of the object when we recall it in memory.
Yet surely my idea of the object can in some very basic sense be the same as yours.
Things get even worse when we consider abstract ideas of things that cannot be
perceived, e.g., truth or equality. Since these things cannot be perceived by the senses,
there are no sense impressions for them to be copies of. Of course an empiricist can
maintain that they have their source or origin in impressions, but not that they are
actual copies of impressions. If, instead of saying that all ideas derive from the sense
experiences which they copy, we say that all mental images derive from the sense
experiences which they copy, we get a much more plausible thesis. The thesis is
therefore best understood as constituting a limitation on what we can imagine, not on
what we can think. On the other hand, it is not clear whether this interpretation would
fit the views of the early empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, as these
writers tended to think that all ideas were mental images.

Question 4
(a) Explain and illustrate the claim that if God is eternal then he cannot be omniscient.
(15 marks)
To say that God is omniscient means that he knows everything. To say that he is
eternal means that he is independent of time (contrasting with his being everlasting)
and therefore not susceptible to change. For God, past present and future are by Him
comprehended in His stable and eternal presence (Augustine).
However, unless God knows what time it is now then God cannot know which of the
following propositions is true: Christ will be crucified or Christ has been crucified.
Therefore God is omniscient if and only if he knows the time now. If God knows the
time now, then what God knows is susceptible to change. Therefore he cannot be
eternal.

(b) Consider the strengths and weaknesses of the ontological argument. (30 marks)
I shall consider the ontological argument in Descartes version. This starts with the
definition of God as a supremely perfect being. It then notes that existence is a
perfection. Necessarily, a supremely perfect being has every perfection and therefore
must possess the perfection of existence. Therefore necessarily, God exists.
This argument has several strengths. It offers certainty that God existsits conclusion
is not merely probable. It also appears to reveal something about the nature of God as
a necessarily existing entity (unlike the ordinary entities encountered in the empirical
world). Also, its definition of God is clear and simple and probably acceptable to all
theists.
Unfortunately, the argument itself is invalid. Its essential error is to suppose that if
something is defined to be X then it must actually be X. In particular, the argument
supposes that if something is defined as existent, or has a definition that entails
existence, then it must exist. But this is not the case. I can define a paradoxiquare as
an existent round square. Paradoxiquares exist by definition, but it does not follow
that paradoxiquares exist (full stop). What we can say is that if A is defined to be X,
then if As exist, they must be X. It follows that if paradoxiquares exist, then they exist,
and if God (as defined by Descartes) exists, then he existshardly an Earth-shattering
conclusion.
It might objected that in some areas at least, truth by definition does constitute
genuine truth, at least if a condition of consistency is satisfied. For example,
geometers define a triangle as a polygon with three sides. Provided there is no hidden
inconsistency in this, it does appear that this is enough to establish the truth that
triangles have three sides. In a different sphere, it could be argued that there are
fictional truths established by a kind of stipulation. For example, Sherlock Holmes did
live at 221B Baker Street, as Conan Doyle stipulated this to be the case in his novels.
According to this view, we can refer to objects that dont existHolmes had all the
properties Conan Doyle attributed to him, though obviously no such person existed in
reality.
However, it should be clear that the advocate of the ontological argument cannot
appeal to such examples to defend the idea that if something exists by definition, it
must exist. For in these cases the truths involved are of a special sort that do not imply
actual concrete existence. The geometers definition of a triangle may guarantee the
truth of the claim that triangles have three sides, but not when this claim is taken as
being about concrete reality. (In the pure geometers sense, there are no triangles in
concrete realitysuch objects would have sides of zero thickness, which no concrete
objects have.) Even more obviously, Conan Doyles statements in his Sherlock
Holmes novels do not guarantee that Holmes actually exists or existed in concrete
reality. So while we can use definitions, as Descartes does, to show that God exists,
the latter cannot be taken as asserting actual existence in concrete reality. This might
seem to invite a counter-response in the form of the following question: if God
exists does not assert actual existence in concrete reality, then what does it assert?
Surely that is the whole point of saying that God exists. But if we glance back at the
earlier examples, we find that we can distinguish between actual existence in concrete
reality and existence in a purely conceptual sense. Some polygons exist; others

donta polygon with both nine and ten sides is an example of a polygon that does
not exist. But exists here clearly does not mean actual existence in concrete reality,
for neither object has this kind of existence. It must be attributing existence in some
more conceptual sense. Similarly, even in the Sherlock Holmes novel, some
characters exist and others do notHolmes wife is an example of a character who
does not exist. Again, exists cannot mean here actual existence in concrete reality.
So we can distinguish between actual existence in concrete reality and purely
conceptual existence. Descartes argument, if it establishes anything, establishes only
that God has conceptual existence.

Question 5
(a) Identify and briefly explain two characteristics that distinguish persons from
nonpersons.
(15 marks)
Rationality might be considered a distinguishing feature of persons. This is the ability
to make ones beliefs and ones actions conform to reason.
It might also be said that a person must be able to exercise autonomy in her actions,
i.e., she must be able to make free choices that her genuinely her own. In this way she
can shape herself through her choices and goals and will be morally responsible and
accountable for her actions. In virtue of these things, she may possess certain rights,
e.g., the right not to be coerced.
Both criteria suggest that personhood is a matter of degree. For example, a young
child is not as fully a person as an adult, since she has less of an ability to exercise
either rationality or autonomy.

(b) How convincing is the claim that bodily continuity is a necessary and sufficient
condition for personal identity over time? (30 marks)
Note: Some students may find the discussion of Williams thought experiment in this
answer too difficult, but brighter students at least would benefit from exposure to
these ideas.
The claim is that a person existing at t1 is the same person as a person existing at t2 if
and only if the former has a body that is physically continuous with the body of the
latter. This claim appears reasonable, as there is a clear everyday sense in which we
do identify people by reference to their bodies. And it does seem to be bodily
continuity that is important, rather than the literal sameness of the bodies involved, for
biologists tell us that all the cells in our bodies are regularly replaced, but each of us
still thinks we are the same person after such replacements.
In fact, it seems quite implausible to suppose that continuity of the whole body is
necessary for personal identity. Suppose the brains of two people, A and B were
removed from their bodies and As brain was put in Bs body and vice-versa. A would
then find himself in what was previously Bs body and B in what was previously As
body. The situation is thus not a brain transplant, but a body transplant (more

accurately, a body-minus-brain transplant). Each person goes where his brain goes.
The most that can be claimed, then, is that continuity of a certain part of the body,
namely the brain, is necessary for personal identity.
But even this can be questioned, as a thought experiment of Sydney Shoemakers
shows. Shoemaker imagines a Star-Trek-style teletransporter which:
records the exact molecular content of a persons brain and body;
destroys the brain and body;
sends the recorded information as radio signals to a distant location;
uses the information to make an exact replica of the original brain and body at
this location.
Intuitively, the original person and the replica are the same person. Imagine you were
going to be teletransported. You might be worried about the safety and reliability of
the technology, but it is unlikely that you would be worried that if the technology
worked O.K., it might be someone else who emerged at the other end and not you.
But continuity of the body (including the brain) is not satisfied herethe body is
destroyed and a replica created. So it seems that not even continuity of the brain is
necessary for personal identityin other words, there can be personal identity without
brain continuity.
But what about the claim that brain continuity is sufficient for personal identity. Could
there be brain continuity without personal identity?
This can be addressed using another thought experiment. Suppose there were a way to
take all the information in the brain of a person A (memories, personality traits and
so on) and transfer it to the brain of another person B, and similarly take all the
information in Bs brain and put it into As brain. After the process, who is A and who
is B? Is A now the person who has As original brain (call this person the A-brainperson) or is he the person who has Bs original brain (the B-brain-person)? Have A
and B swapped brains (and bodies) or have they swapped brain content?
Bernard Williams, who presented this thought experiment, made it more vivid by
specifying that before the swapping process, A can choose which of two possible
outcomes will occur afterwards: either the A-brain-person will get $10,000 and the Bbrain person will be tortured or the B-brain-person will get $10,000 and the A-brainperson will be tortured. Assuming that A is going to choose selfishly, which option
should he choose?
As Williams points out, when we first encounter this case, we tend to feel that A
should choose the B-brain person to receive the money. After all, when the swapping
is done, the B-brain-person has all of As psychological traits, including As memories.
He will certainly think of himself as being A. And if, before the swap, A does make
this choice and the choice is put into effect, the B-brain-person will afterwards
remember choosing in this way and will think he chose correctly. So surely the Bbrain person is A and (by similar reasoning) the A-brain-person is B. This seems to tell
us that continuity of the brain is not sufficient for personal identity. (The B-brainpersons brain is continuous with Bs brain as it was before the swapping, but he is
not B.)

But Williams then presents another sort of case. Suppose I have been kidnapped by an
evil scientist, who tells me that tomorrow morning I am going to be tortured. In
addition, before this happens, all my memories will be replaced by a completely
different set of impressions of my past. I would of course be afraid of the torture and
the prospect of having all my memories replaced beforehand would not reduce my
fear, but would, if anything, increase it. But this suggests that the evil scientist was
indeed right to describe the person who was going to be tortured as methe fact that
the content of this persons brain is not that of my original brain does not prevent it
from being my brain. So it suggests that brain continuity is, after all, sufficient for
personal identity.
But, as Williams points out, this is really very puzzling, since this case appears to be
in all essential details identical to the earlier one involving the A-brain-person and Bbrain person. The only difference is that in the new case, the memories that I am given
are not specified as having come from someone else. But it is not easy to see why this
difference should be relevant.
We have given different answers in two cases that appear to be in all relevant respects
identical. This paradox suggests that questions of personal identity can be more
perplexing than we may have suspected. It may even prompt the thought that in cases
of this sort there is no right answerno fact of the matter about whether the later
person is me or someone else.