Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding
the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the
purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and
testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25,
1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings:
Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of
accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22,

1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses
of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco,
Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of
1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task
Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana
submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981
(Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination,
the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer
chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia
testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was
assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was
among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTINARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same
bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven
buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of
the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her
he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana
inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at

home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness
was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs.
"B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and
pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and
time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The
marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs.
"F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because
as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981
and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic
bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside
her seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus
stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had
to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the
bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obia
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date
which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl.
Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused
whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused.
Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified
by Pat. Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat.
Obia and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was
stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he
was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a
kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted
a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can
be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag
of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago,
the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo

City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia he approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus.
Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while
Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle
to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and
he was there when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the
woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not
well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri
bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obia,
(Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to
Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE
OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF

THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS
WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz,supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107

June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to
as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a
late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902.
1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.
2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his

lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
3

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.
5

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
--------------Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
8

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
10

11

12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
13

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed
inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to

act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not
only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying
recognition and acceptance in our case law. The present Constitution declares that
1

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
3

The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search
of his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate arrest.
4

An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant,
an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:
5

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." And it has been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate
control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
6

Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in
cases of "search of a moving vehicle, and "seizure of evidence in plain view." This was the
pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention
to Moreno v. Ago Chi; Alvero v. Dizon, Papa v. Mago, and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S.
8

10

11

12

13

If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those
justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is
engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it
is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit
of the poisonous tree. In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion,
is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." But the right against an unreasonable search
and seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly
decided not to invoke it.
14

15

16

There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these
established principles. However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may
properly be derived from the proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just
cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain,
however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's
person and the things in his possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search warrant everytime
they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one considering that
searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the
norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words of
the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of
the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera)
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First
Division. There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking
from an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an
informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the
informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the
PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do
so and therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search
of Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal;
17

and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against
Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different
conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988), the accused boarded a "Victory
Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was
carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by Obia, an INP member "on Detached Service with
the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obia's suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and
without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that it
contained camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of
marijuana with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at
Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obia accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a
policeman, and announced his intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana
because of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea "Please go with me, let us
settle this at home" he brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package
in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held the
warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.
18

In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990), two police officers and a barangay
tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there)
but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified
themselves as peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing
one kilogram, more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person,
Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as
amended. Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless
arrest and a proper warrantless search incident thereto.
19

The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In
contrast" toAminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and
obtention of a search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed to
the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant .
. . To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC
officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to
get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing
a crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.

Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al.,
decided on August 2, 1990, and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.
20

21

In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao
Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he
suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody.
The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could produce
no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search
without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he
had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court
in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio, a 1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the
search.
22

In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles
on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As
expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks
and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific
examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and declared that, as in Tangliben,
supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the
time of their arrest. Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin in which,
as aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected
criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had
sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the
Court found that the officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former would be
using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed
out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high seas whose route
and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise
alter its course, or select another destination.
23

24

25

The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho
Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an
undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo
to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea
and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they
were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been
tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo,
loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of
white crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim
were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness.
Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions
raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citingManipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267

(1986), held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the
dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by
a planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country; that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
26

27

In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were
found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of
marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been
positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive
action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when
accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at
a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a
legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable
divergence of views among the members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved
on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by
an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for
which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and
the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search
disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless
arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was
being or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal,
since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body
and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first
undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An
arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an
unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy
bears" in the luggage found in his possession an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even
remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation. He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had
the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice," and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not
does it appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The
soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the investigation of Malmstedt, without
28

counsel. The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution
clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence against him.
29

The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of
the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him
"for any purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing
remains of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his
defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar
axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the
paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from
private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession
of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective
of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective
might be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of
the guilty, and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even
if truthful or otherwise credible.
30

I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant
on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application
to the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and
seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih
v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my
dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.

Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial
court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak
crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search
and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That
fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize,
the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal
search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1,
which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by
an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice. In the
case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the
route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited
drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept
it.
1wphi1

The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent
discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's
suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the
probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay
them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
1avvphi1

If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome
the accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with
outlawed evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accusedappellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo
with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest
because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be

more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal
Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding
the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) reads:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND

NOLI CARILLO of the crime of VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the Municipality of Mendez,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being private persons not authorized by law did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their
possession, custody and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12 gauge home made
shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver (sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1)
plier use (sic) in the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any permit or
license from competent (sic) authority.
CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.
Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, with the prosecution and
the defense presenting their respective witnesses and evidence to support their divergent versions
of the events leading to the arrest of the appellants.
A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Eladio
Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates that on the day in
question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya,
also of the Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on
routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive
bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they
came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to
pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, specifically a cement
pavement or porch leading to the same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants,
Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told
that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a
noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38
revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid license
to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's permission to scour
through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms
and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which,
thereafter, became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question, alleging that they
were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even subjected to physical and mental
indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence,

contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and
other police authorities.
After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed decision dated 18 April
1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused
Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty
provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment
shall be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F" in evidence
considering that those are illegally seized evidence;
2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally seized evidence are
firearms as contemplated in Presidential Decree No. 1866; and
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the arresting officer's
testimonies which are patently contradictory and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3
First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of the Constitution,
the relevant portion of which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) . . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches
and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search
warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among

these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. 4 and Coolidge vs. New
Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence. 6
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo
to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge
therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the
house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.
SEIZED FIREARMS FROM CARILLO
With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the
firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless arrest may be
undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard
bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
"offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held in People of the
Philippines v. Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT
ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF." 8
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of the peace officer
of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to
the records resolves said query.
Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants who were then asked
concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge on the waist of

Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's
professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. Consequently, under the
facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid
arrest.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the statute's coverage does not
extend to firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The Court does not agree.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law
makes no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the possession of even a part of a
firearm is sufficient to come within the prohibitive ambit of the statute.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
maintaining that these were inconsistent with each other, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that
the entire incident was a contrivance on their part. Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in
the statement of the prosecution witnesses that there were only three (3) individuals in the vicinity
(aside from the peace officers) as opposed to the testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a
hostile witness, that aside from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other people in the
vicinity, such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings easily shows that the two
(2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta, testified in a straightforward and candid
manner, categorically identifying the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and
clearly narrating the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has given no possible
reason or motivation for these peace officers to make false accusations against the appellants.
Absent the presentation of such defense evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should
deserve full credence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in Criminal Case No. NC-267
finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal
Possession of Firearms as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia found in the
possession of the appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional
and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association
whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,

was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other
rights
----------------In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege
that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of

unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a
review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints
was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police
Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy
Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as follows:
[1]

[2]

That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a
hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
[3]

At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits

A, A-1, and A-2, while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities
were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they
arrested petitioner.
[4]

[5]

At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police

officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio,
the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that
on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury
Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslimlooking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug
Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
[6]

Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and

observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then
approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
petitioners front waist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3
where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave
it to his commander.
[7]

[8]

On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due

to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade
somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw
petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was
aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions;
however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted
that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon
Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not
creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and
his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the
grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.
[9]

Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990,

petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla for
investigation.Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent
and independent counsel.Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan
manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance
of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession (Exh. E),
there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession
of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and
booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade
to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination.
[10]

[11]

On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners

confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence.
[12]

Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal

duties included, among other things, the examination of explosive devices,
testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991
from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a
grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing
his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary
examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major components consisting
of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present, and concluded that the

grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding. On even date, he issued a

certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11
August 1991.
[13]

Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in

Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo,
Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived
and ordered all males to stand aside.The policemen searched petitioner and
two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was
arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he
was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot
wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo sa
akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth
and said, [y]ou are the one who shot me. Petitioner denied the charges and
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other
police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was
once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only
in court when it was presented.
[14]

The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner
was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that
a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an
investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature.
The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner
and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is
not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.
[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner
was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily
admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February
1994, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced
him to suffer:
[19]

[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than
THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he
was appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued
a notice to file briefs.
[20]

[21]

In his Appellants Brief

that:

[22]

filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS
A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.

In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to
absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. As such, the search was illegal,
and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
[23]

In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
the trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto.
[24]

In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the
court a quothat the grenade was planted by the police officers; and second,
the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from
petitioners possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court
focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade seized
from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest
as petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
[25]

We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade
and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking
in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of
terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We
need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite
bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is simply too preposterous
to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to
rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received
intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu
chased petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August 1990;
and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation
of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an
offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and
dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for
Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming
numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot
conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement
with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be
the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of
everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will
ordinarily act.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v.
Mengote, which petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial
differences, to wit:
[26]

[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone
[at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here
the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the
series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence
reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza
Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious
movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal
knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact
that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in
apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition
and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND
LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.

In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding

the validity of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that he was attempting to commit a crime, as
the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was standing at the
corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very
fast and looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Finally,
petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that
of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals
miscomprehended the latter.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the
challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the
petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on
grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial court was:

jurisdictional

[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY
(30) YEARS OFRECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who
shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since
the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section
9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. The term
life imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of
1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
includereclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution.
[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial
courts decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the
Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been
rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly
brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioners Brief for the Appellant,

the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the
Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that
the prosecution failed to establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade
was found in and seized from petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not
identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned
it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the
commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand,
the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred
to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy
not immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or
on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what
Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his
testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the
grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made
to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that
the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law
enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of
evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days
earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda,
and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then
considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore
easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against
common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the
police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must
have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes
moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade
during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission
was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following

his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a
lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent
and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it
executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the
arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
[31]

[32]

Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section

5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view;(4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (6) a "stop and frisk."
[33]

[34]

[35]

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a
stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an
appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on
the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stopand-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the
process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
[36]

[37]

[38]

MINOR
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of

petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case,
plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental
to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stopand-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as
laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ***
[39]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
[40]

[41]

Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was
invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise
diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and
search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony,
contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his
companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk.Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly
declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion?
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.[42]

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that

petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet
aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any
bulging object in [sic] his person.
[43]

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners

rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his
further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, and Martinez, JJ., concur.