Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Submitted to:
Submitted by:
JOAN B. BUENO
LIST OF CASES
EDGARDO AREOLA VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA A.C. NO. 10135.
JANUARY 15, 2014
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS, A.C. NO. 9317,
JUNE 4, 2014
(FORMERLY CBD CASE NO. 12-3615)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA V. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, A.C. NO. 9881, JUNE
4, 2014.
A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS vs. ATTY.
ROSELLER A. VIRAY
A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013 VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA
LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA, CELEDONIO
ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, vs. ATTY.
ANGELITO VILLARIN
CARLITO ANG V. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, A.C. NO. 4545.
FEBRUARY 5, 2014.
A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 GLORIA P. JINON vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E.
JIZ
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) months.
ISSUE: 1. Atty. Mendoza is guilty of her attorneys oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of CourtNo for lack of evidence 2. Atty. Mendoza is guilty
of violating Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
ResponsibilityYes.
HELD:
1st Issue No. The Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty.
Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees.The Court agrees with the IBP that
Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He
is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint
on behalf of his co-detainees, but it is apparent that no document was
submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.
Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements, especially as regards
Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money. 2nd issue Yes. Atty. Maria Vilma
Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mendoza
admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. Atty. Mendoza made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics
such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. Atty. Mendozas improper advice
only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be
free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is
uncalled for. It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. Penalty: penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely Basis of the Penalty: In several
administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondents length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or
her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other
to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that
"it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were
ever communicated to complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed
it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was
also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision.
Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant
Complaint5 against respondent.
filed
the
instant
disbarment
HELD:
The court said no.
The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03
FACTS:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound
named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the
following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr.
And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo
Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners
save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times
Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on
matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate,
assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of
complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former
did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving
legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among
neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into
for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All
homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu
filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief
that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case,
was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit
was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent,
were dismissed.
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this
time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu
had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles
directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to
Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to
respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12
December 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrative complaint for dishonesty against Atty.
Molina will prosper?
HELD:
The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to
administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden
of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without
factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in
this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare
allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing
that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is
presumption of good faith.
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. The failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of the Court, which is under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
The certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified
xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient
to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him
unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. And respondents cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution
is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to
comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof." In View of all foregoing , the judge
finds respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, guilty of grossly immoral
conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
FACTS:
HELD:
The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that
Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and
taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers
on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal
carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation
or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly
suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set
for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary
the same act and took pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after the
afternoon examination.
On the same day, Padilla reported Tiongsons actions to Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, who immediately
investigated the report. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre subsequently executed
separate affidavits confirming Tiongsons actions. Upon demand by the OBC
to explain, Tiongson admitted that he brought his digital camera inside the
bar examination room. He explained that he did not surrender his new digital
camera to the badge counter personnel because the counter personnel
might be negligent in handling his camera.
In a Memorandum dated 16 November 2011 addressed to the CA Clerk of
Court Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongsons
designation as head watcher for the remaining Sundays of the bar
examinations.
In a Resolution dated 10 April 2012, the Court, upon recommendation of the
Committee on Continuing Legal Education and Bar Matters, required
Tiongson to file his comment. In his Comment dated 25 May 2012, Tiongson
restated his admission that he brought his digital camera inside the bar
examination room. Tiongson reiterated his explanation for bringing his
camera and apologized for his infraction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiongson is liable for misconduct?
HELD:
The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is
the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is
satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the
established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson
committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct
only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with
substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to
uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be
an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary.
A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014 JULIETA B. NARAG vs. ATTY.
DOMINADOR M. NARAG
FACTS:
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she
accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who
was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a
member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an
amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) a 17year old first
year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already
abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent denied
the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were
mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her
concoct stories against him. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a
Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined
that the respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he
abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that
the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Reopening of the
Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the
Decision was filed by the respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he
was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as he
was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce
additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no substantial arguments to
warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the motion
with finality in the Resolution dated September 22, 1998. On November 29,
2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar.
The respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and
remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his
wife Julieta and their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at
their residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated
affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the
truth of the respondents claim. The respondent averred that he has been
disbarred for 15 years already and that he has been punished enough. He
alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating
osteoarthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his arthritis
and his right knee injury. He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine
Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various
rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted the
various recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his
petition for readmission.
respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had
already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal
profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display
unassailable character. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
.Whether or not the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does
applies in disbarment cases.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the
disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
by the parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the
Municipality of Real, Quezon.7
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
(Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation 8 dated
November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinens notarial commission
and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year. 9 The report
indicated that per Atty. Rinens admission, the subject deed was prepared in
his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of
forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the
deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinens failure
to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the
inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the
execution; 1995 when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the
notarial book x x x."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rinen be disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
The Court said yes.
In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the
parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts
a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the
identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he were disqualified from being commissioned
as a notary public for one year.
A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS vs. ATTY.
ROSELLER A. VIRAY
FACTS :
The case stemmed from a Complaint filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against
respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly
notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in violation
of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by
complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the
signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian
Anton. Complainant added that she did not personally appear before
respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that
respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said
falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property
registered in her name to that of Dollente.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of his indiscretion in admitted having
prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his client?
RULING: The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers
commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents without requiring
the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this
practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent
affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of
the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may
be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the partys free act and deed. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public
performs, to wit: x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe
and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn
oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their
offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that
recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six
months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself
prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without the
personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with
competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use
of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an
instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is
meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year.26 WHEREFORE, the Court
finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of Mandaue
City, Cebu.
In his Comment, respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is
merely using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the
defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to
accede to his wishes.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation finding
respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that
respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an
instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale
executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a
pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gupana is disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation
of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary
public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
time he received the amount until fully paid within sixty (60) days from
notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for
having been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with respect to the legal
services he had undertaken to perform for his client, Gloria.
HELD: YES. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in neglecting his
clients case and misappropriating her funds. He is found having clearly
violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 16 A LAWYER
SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxx xxx xxx
RULE 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. xxx xxx xxx CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx RULE 18.03 A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx xxx xxx Atty. Jiz is
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely
and is ordered to return to complainant Gloria P. Jinon the full amount of
P45,000.00 with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of demand on
September 22, 2004 up to the finality of the decision and 12% per annum
from its finality until paid.
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, received an
Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a
counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
affidavit to attest to such fact. Using the affidavit from Atty. Bancolo, Tapay
and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the
same, presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's
instructions. Tapay and Rustia later on filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to
a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. The complainants also maintained that not
only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people. In their answer, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants
before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff
to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However,
due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
After investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her
Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code and recommended that Atty. Bancolo
be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary
of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor
lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia
were signed by his secretary, notwithstanding his tolerance. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Atty.
Bancolo is suspended from the practice of law for one year effective upon
finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The complaint against
Atty. Jarder is dismissed for lack of merit.
gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service.
RULING:
The Court held that the judges were guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of
duty and gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed from the service. The
Court listed the following liabilities of the judges: First, Judges Necessario,
Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
The actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v.
Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence,
ignorance, and carelessness. Second, The judges were also found guilty of
neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones
attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of
the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage
documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was
made for marriages performed on different dates. Third, Judges Necessario,
Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his
or her embassy. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are
required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of
duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the
documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities
would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract
marriage. Lastly, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of
gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect
to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. Moreover, the Court
held that the respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in
the performance of their duties. The Court previously said that Ignorance of
the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity. In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered
a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an
ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and
more importantly of justice. The Court further said that the actuations of
these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
REX POLINAR DAGOHOY vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, A.C. No.
7944, June 03, 2013
FACTS:
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in
connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the father of
complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted of theft
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte.
According to the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San
Juans failure to file the appellants brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San
Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the CAs order of
dismissal.6 The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful
in dealing with him and Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that
Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real status of Tomas
appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is liable for committing gross negligence, in
connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA)
HELD:
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath that
requires him to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his)
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
(his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, We deny Atty. San Juan's motion to lift
the order of suspension. Atty. San Juan's self-imposed compliance with the
IBP's recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension was premature.
The wordings of the Resolution dated April 16, 2012 show that the Court
merely noted: (1) the IBP's findings and the recommended penalty against
Atty. San Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the case back to the Court for its
proper disposition. The IBP findings and the stated penalty thereon are
merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline
erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct.
23 Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the
recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the
Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper
subject of implementation or compliance.24 WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court resolves to: 1. NOTE the Report and Recommendation
dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar Confidant; 2. SUSPEND from
the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for
violating his Lawyer's Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely; and 3.
DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan in the letter dated August
28, 2012 that he be allowed to return to the practice of law
his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. A lawyer's
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. He is
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered to return
to complainant said amount of P311,819.94 with legal interest.
He insisted that he was merely assisting her daughter, who just passed
the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend
herself. The Court administrator reiterated a recommendation by
recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
misconduct and fined P 50,000.00.
ISSUES: Whether or not the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING: The Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur,
administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him
with a fine ofP40,000.00 The Court held, that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the following
reasons set below: First was Judge Malanyaons occupying a seat beside his
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the hearing. Such act
displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to
thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wifes cause. That
impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial
officer was presumed to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an
incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have
acted with greater circumspection and selfrestraint, simply because the
administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be
partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of
suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his
part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing himself. Second was Judge
Malanyaons admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his
daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching
his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the
counsel of the respondents counsel upon his presence being challenged
by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for
having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded
on a filial duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough
reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting
judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being
all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was
the private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,
Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition
is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full
time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must
accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire
period of his incumbency as a judge. To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon
engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wifes
administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or
posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he
prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria,
collaborating counsel of the complainants principal counsel, should produce
his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily and knowingly,
in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the
counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his
response to the query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to
Atty. Malanyaon thereat. Third was Judge Malanyaons admission that he had
already engaged in the private practice of law even before the incident now
the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that it is strange
for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing
law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife
and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal
problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on
their behalf. He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the
prohibition against the private practice of law during his incumbency on the
Bench. Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical
injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would give no ground for
reproach is always worthy of condemnation. We should abhor any
impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. Fourth was Judge
Malanyaons display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his
reaction to the opposing counsels query on his personality to sit at the
counsel table at the hearing, to wit: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah,
of the respondents counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And
so what?!! Judge Malanyaons uttering And so what? towards the opposing
counsel evinced his instant resentment towards the adverse parties counsel
for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel
of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after
he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he
was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all
times. It is true that the challenge of the opposing counsel might have
slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that he was still
a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint.
95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and TeodoroMarcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime,
Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate,
Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she
sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be inventoried
and settled in accordance with law. In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of
Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by Manuela over the
same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They
alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to
Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names. The
commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata
over the other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he
instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding
No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty.
Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping
and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one
month from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar
offense would merit a more severe penalty. The Board of Governors of the
IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. In a resolution dated
December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and
thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES, Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision
in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in
another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum
shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as
follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and
(c) identity of relief sought. Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales
committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending. Respondent was fully aware,
since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of trust with
respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and
that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment
case xxx To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum
shopping for the second case (annulment case) and state that there is no
pending case involving the same or similar issue would constitute
misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to
advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate
assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a
predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and
obedience to the law. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against
resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and
can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has
been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994. In engaging in forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. To
our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh
in light of all the circumstances of this case Lawyers are also censured for
minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or the client. As
earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to
obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. It
also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the
complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for
resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand
should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales personal file in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
REX POLINAR DAGOHOY vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, A.C. No.
7944, June 03, 2013
FACTS:
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in
connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the father of
complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted of theft
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte.
According to the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San
Juans failure to file the appellants brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San
Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the CAs order of
dismissal.6 The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful
in dealing with him and Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that
Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real status of Tomas
appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its dismissal.
imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Rules of Court?
RULING: The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension
to three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the
following factors: a. Respondent is a first time offender; b. It is undisputed
that respondent merely accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings
due to her lawyers unavailability; c. It is likewise undisputed that respondent
had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from
Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first
appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that
he acted in good faith; and, d. Complainants admit that respondent did not
acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use
against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his
subsequent engagement with Emilio. 2. The Court also served the ruling as a
warning to the respondent and that the next case would be dealt more
severely
misconduct for violating the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for six months for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and
transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, The
IBP-CBD decided that the respondents violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. On
April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration and asked that the
penalty of suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days,
or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Motion
for Reconsideration Upon Leave of Office. The IBP Board of Governors
denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Respondent
filed a second Motion for Reconsideration which was no longer acted upon.
.According to the IBP, the respondent committed professional negligence
under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17
and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE: Is Atty Quintin P. Alcid Jr. Guilty of gross misconduct?
RULING:
1. The respondent, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. was found GUILTY of gross
misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyers Oath. 2. The
Court hereby imposed upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. 3. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and 4.
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her
case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were
already filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and waiting
notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty.
Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and
discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27,
2005, no petition has yet been filed for her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility
RULING: This court finds that Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of
his sworn duty as a member of the bar. In his Manifestation and Petition for
Review, he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzettes case as
well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only
pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach
his lawyers oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the
only means of his and his familys livelihood. He also prayed that the
adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00
representing the amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of
the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the
IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the appropriate penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. As stated under
Canon Law, CANON 16 A lawyer shall not hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. RULE 16.01 A
lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client. RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. RULE 18.03
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 A
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Furthermore, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may
come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them
separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be
returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed
on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross
violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly
violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is
by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar. Respondent did not deny abandoning
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress whom he begot four (4) children.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows
protected
by
the
Constitution
and
affirmed
by
our
laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." However, the court finds the charge of engaging in illegal
money lending not to have been sufficiently established. Respondent Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco is found guilty of violation of the Lawyers Oath, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and suspended from the active practice of law
one (1) year