Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
CASE DIGEST in
Practical Areas in Legal Ethics (PALE)
Submitted by:
3rd yr. LLB students
S.Y. 2015-2016
LIST OF CASES
Cases from January to December 2010
Atty. Elmer Solidon Vs. Atty. Ramil Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February
24, 2010
Rural Bank Of Calape, Inc. (Rbci) Bohol Vs.Atty. James Benedict Florido
A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010
Spouses Virgilio And Angelina Aranda Vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda,
A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010
Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. Vs Judge Maria Clarita Tabin, A.M. No. Mtj-091736, July 25, 2011
Valentin C. Miranda V. Atty. Macario D. Carpio, A.C. 6281, September
16, 2011
Dalisay Capili Vs Atty. Alfredo Bentulan, A.C. No. 5862, October 12,
2011
Urban Bank, Inc. Vs Atty. Magdaleno Pea, G.R. No. 145817, October
19, 2011
Elpidio Tiong Vs Atty. George Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 12,
2011
Corazon Nevada Vs Atty. Rodolfo Casuga, A.C. No. 7591, March 20,
2012
Re: Report On Financial Audit Conducted At MCTC, Santiago-San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Cresencio C. Milla Vs. People Of The Philippines And Carlo V. Lopez.
G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012.
Hector Trenas Vs. People Of The Philippines. G.R. No. 195002. January
25, 2012.
Luis P. Pineda Vs. Neil T. Torres, Sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court In Cities,
Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027. January 30, 2012
Concerned Citizen Vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, Etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907.
January 31, 2012.
Re: Verified Complaint Of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman Of The
Board/CEO Etc. Against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. 11184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, Etc. Vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-112926, February 1, 2012
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February
8, 2012.
Aida R. Campos, Et Al. Vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan,
Agusan Del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012.
Sps. Democrito And Olivia Lago Vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br.
43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012.
Office Of The Adrministrative Services, Office Of The Court
Administrator Vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.
Martin Lahn III And James P. Concepcion Vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li.
Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Nesa Isenhardt Vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15,
2012.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Atty. Rene Medina, Et Al. Vs. Judge Victor Canoy, Et Al. A.M. RTJ-112298, February 22, 2012.
Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City,
Isabela Vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, Same Court.
A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Go, Et Al. A.M. No. MTJ-071667, April 10, 2012.
Maria Vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Araya. A.M. No. P-12-3053, April
11, 2012.
Attys. Gonzalez, Et Al. Vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, April 16, 2012
Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April
16, 2012.
Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. Vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-092720, April 17, 2012.
In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 In G.R. Nos.
145817 And 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan Vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk Of Court II,
MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18,
2012.
Ramoncito And Juliana Luarca Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC,
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato,
MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Evelyn J. Jailorina Vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San
Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012.
In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012
Dr. Ramie G. Hipe Vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court,
Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012.
Re: Complaint Filed By Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes
And Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-123058, April 25, 2012
Leticia Jacinto Vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, Metc, Br. 40, Quezon
City A.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Re: Report Of The Judicial Audit Conducted In The Regional Trial Court,
Branches 72 And 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June
13, 2012
State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang And Ms. Victoria SunegaLagman Vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba
City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012
Rhea Airene P. Katague, Et Al. Vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br.
48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012.
Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin Vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process
Server, Municipal Trial Court In Cities, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Manuel G. Villatuya Vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10,
2012.
Lambayong Teachers And Employees Cooperative, Represented In This
Act By Its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso Vs. Carlos P. Diaz, In His
Capacity As Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-062246, July 11, 2012.
Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo And Jun Basilio Vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro
A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012
Murphy Chu, Et Al. Vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, Metc,
Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.
Criselda C. Gacad Vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal
Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva
Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.
Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk Of
Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July
17, 2012.
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. Vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360,
July 24, 2012.
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco, A.C. No. 6116
August 1, 2012
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116,
August 1, 2012
Emilia O. Dhaliwal Vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390,
August 1, 2012..
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., Represented By Gabriel H.
Abad Vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012
Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don
Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental Vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC,
Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-123080. August 29, 2012
Manolito C. Villordon Vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal
Trial Court In Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August
10, 2012
Mariano T. Ong Vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk Of Court, RTC, Br. 32,
Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
Re: Complaint Of Leonardo A. Velasco Against Associate Justices
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January
15, 2013
Re: Verified Complaint Of AMA Land, Inc. Against Hon. Danton Q.
Bueser, Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013
Kareen P. Magtagob Vs. Judge Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No.
11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
Re: Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) Of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C.
No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Sps. Arcing And Cresing Bautista, Et Al. Vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No.
5530. January 28, 2013.
Fe A. Ylaya Vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30,
2013
Anastacio N. Teodoro III Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760.
January 30, 2013
Geoffrey Beckett Vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24,
Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Anastacio N. Teodoro Iii Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales A.C. No. 6760,
January 30, 2013
Re: Request Of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban For ReComputation Of His Creditable Service For The Purpose Of ReComputing His Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12,
2013
Erlinda C. Mendoza Vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013
Patrocinio V. Agbulos Vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February
18, 2013
Ray Antonio C. Sasing Vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20,
2013
Civil Service Commission V. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, Et Al., A.M. No. SCC-0811-P, June 18, 2013.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Julian Penilla V. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4,
2013.
Czarina T. Malvar V. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., Et Al., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013.
Joseph L. Orola, Et Al. V. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860,
September 11, 2013.
Mariano Agadan, Et Al. V. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385,
November 11, 2013.
Mamasaw Sultan Ali V. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, Et Al., A.M. No. MTJ03-1505, November 27, 2013
Sps. David Williams And Marissa Williams V. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C.
No. 7329, November 27, 2013.
Judge Manahan V. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013
Cabuatan V. Atty. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013
Conchita Baltazar,Et Al. V. Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091,
December 11, 2013
Rose Bunagan-Bansig Vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera A.C. No. 5581 Jan.
14, 2014
Rose Bunagan-Bansig V. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581,
January 14, 2014.
Edgardo Areola V. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January
15, 2014.
The Conjugal Partnership Of The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo And Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo (Both Deceased), Substituted By Their Heirs, Namely:
Herminia, Pastora, Heirs Of Fructiosa, Heirs Of Raquel, Evangeline,
Vicente, Jr., And Armand, All Surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188.
January 15, 2014.
Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera V. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069,
January 20, 2014.
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino V. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3141. January 21, 2014.
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,
Etc., Et Al./Re: Report On The Financial Audit Conducted In The
Metropolitan Trial Court Etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118Metc. January 21, 2014.
Atty. Solidum, Jr. Failed To Fulfill This Duty. Natividad P. Navarro And
Hilda S. Presbitero V. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January
28, 2014
Edgardo Areola Vs. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza A.C. No. 10135. January
15, 2014
Natividad P. Navarro Vs. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum Jr., A.C. 9872, January 28,
2014
Carlito Ang V. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5,
2014.
Wilberto C. Talisic V. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12,
2014
Adelia V. Quiachon Vs. Atty. Joseph Adora. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June
4, 2014
(Formerly Cbd Case No. 12-3615
Atty. Alan F. Paguia V. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4,
2014.
Gershon N. Dulang V. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014
Adelia V. Quiachon V. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4,
2014
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.
Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.
Erlinda Foster Vs. Jaime Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ATTY. ELMER SOLIDON VS. ATTY. RAMIL MACALALAD, A.C. NO. 8158,
February 24, 2010
FACTS:
In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil
Macalalad for the latter to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned
by the Solidons in Borongan, Samar. They agreed for a fee of P80k. Solidon
gave P50k as downpayment to Macalalad and the remaining P30k shall be
paid after Solidon shall receive the title over the said property.
But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave
an update to Solidon. It turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to
register the land.
Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon
alleged that Macalalad neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him
despite efforts from Solidon to communicate with Macalalad.
In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition
because Solidon failed to update him and that Solidon never gave the
documents he was asking for.
Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad
to be suspended for three months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
HELD:
Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his clients
cause. This is a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his
clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee. Further, there is also
negligence when he failed to update his client about the status of the case.
Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot
shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was
the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of the case. Even if the
client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main
responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to
acquire the required information. The act of receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services in handling Solidons case, and subsequently failing,
without valid excuse, to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated
Canon 18, he also violated Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidons
money. It appears he failed to return Solidons downpayment of P50k. A
lawyer, when he fails to render legal services, shall immediately account for
and promptly return the money he received from his client. Hence, on top of
the recommended 3 months suspension, Macalald was suspended for an
additional 3 months or for a total of 6 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be sanctioned by the court.
HELD:
From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold
and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious,
competent and
diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate
attention, care, and time to all the cases heis handling. As the spouses Aran
das counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said
spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or
defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses
Aranda. Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even
admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings
because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared
responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsels primary
duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which
have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make
an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between
counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case,
as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is
elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact
details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with
each other. Again, address is simply unacceptable.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a
member of the legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to
exercise due diligence in handling his clients case but in fact abandoned his
clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer. On a final note, it must be
stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether or not it is for a fee or free. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended a 6 month suspension. This was adopted by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge.
HELD:
No. But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of
the judiciary, she should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of
an investigation. She should always appear impartial this did not happen
when she interfered with the investigation and when she borrowed the
records as well as when she was at the mediation center inquiring about the
records of the case. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious
motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was
using her office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to
conduct the medical examination as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while Judge Tabins concern over the safety of her nephew and
the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have
disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of
the court. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the
Filipino culture, she, being a judge, should bear in mind that she is also called
upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire
Judiciary.
Deeds (RD) of Las Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration
and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
Complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT).He was surprised to discover that the same
had already been claimed by and released to respondent on. Complainant
talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's
knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first
pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property in exchange for
which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once
again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Carpio violated Canon 20
HELD:
Yes. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would
legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives
what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a
lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were
never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of
all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case
and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for
the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay
respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of
additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit
has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used
as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his client." The principle of quantum
meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his
services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for
his services, as much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the parties
had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the
respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already compensated by
such agreement.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to
his client and imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said
title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered
to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Bentulan should be disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The lapse of ten years from the alleged misconduct does not bar
the filing of this case. Ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to
disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. These
proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits
in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the
defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of
the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers
expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law.
In preparing and filing the appeal brief, the question of whether or not
Bentulan was paid his legal services is of no moment. As a lawyer, he owes
fidelity to both cause and client, even if he is not paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Further, if he believed that Capilis case was
unmeritorious, he should have advised Capili accordingly.
The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal
constitutes inexcusable negligence. This violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall service his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
FACTS:
In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to
Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was
occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea
had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the said occupants,
knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize
Pea. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Pea
to negotiate with the tenants. Pea had to barricade himself inside the
property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so
that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Pea then had a phone
conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Pea explained
to him the situation. In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from
Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Pea also asked that he be paid
10% of the purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed
over the phone on the condition that Pea should be able to settle with the
tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Pea also asked that said
authorization be put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as
regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written
authorization released by UBI). Pea was able to settle and relocate the
tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally under
the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to UBI for the latter to
pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation
of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million.
But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea filed a complaint for recovery
against UBI.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a contract
of agency created between and UBI and that Pea is entitled to the 10% fee
plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial
court awarded him P28 million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It
ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea is entitled to
payment but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit, Pea should only be paid P3 million.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28
million.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable.
Pea is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent
of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit. In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony
of Pea, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that
Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written
authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to
negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of
agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should
be paid.
Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be
applied. In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his
services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Pea
didnt have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering. Hence,
he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is also entitled
to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property, to wit, P1.5
million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for
settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.
FACTS:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses
Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two
years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair.
Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he
heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo
confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship.
Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which
was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that
they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave
Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case
against Florendo.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.
HELD:
No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis
case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of
undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the
offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the
ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendos act of having an affair with
his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the
trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful
and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be
also said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely a moment of
indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two years.
Florendo was suspended for 6 months.
ISSUE:
What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin
considering his conviction?
HELD:
Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of
falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great
caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Yes. It was established that Atty. Dimaguing submitted a false and fabricated
piece of evidence because it did not contain proof that the same was filed
with the HLURB nor was there proof that the other party was notified. He
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that: Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule
16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. A lawyer's
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. He is
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered to return
to complainant said amount of P311,819.94 with legal interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Mariano Pefianco be suspended from the practice of
law.
RULING:
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional
or in their private capacity. In the present case, respondent's defense that
forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied
by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar. Respondent did not deny abandoning
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress whom he begot four (4) children.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows
protected
by
the
Constitution
and
affirmed
by
our
laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." However, the court finds the charge of engaging in illegal
money lending not to have been sufficiently established. Respondent Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco is found guilty of violation of the Lawyers Oath, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and suspended from the active practice of law
one (1) year
GERLIE M. UY VS. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, A.M. No. MTJ-071666, September 5, 2012
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for
"gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence,
neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO
against Presiding Judge Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana,
Negros Occidental.
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
JAVELLANAS DEFENSE
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
In Trespass to Dwelling
-
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD:
YES. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious
mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending. Respondent was fully aware,
since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of trust with
respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and
that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment
case xxx To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum
shopping for the second case (annulment case) and state that there is no
pending case involving the same or similar issue would constitute
misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to
advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate
assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a
predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and
obedience to the law. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against
resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and
can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has
been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994. In engaging in forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. To
our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh
in light of all the circumstances of this case Lawyers are also censured for
minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or the client. As
earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to
obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. It
also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the
complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for
resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand
should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales personal file in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS vs. ATTY.
ROSELLER A. VIRAY
FACTS :
The case stemmed from a Complaint filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against
respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly
notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in violation
of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by
complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the
signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian
Anton. Complainant added that she did not personally appear before
respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that
respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said
falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property
registered in her name to that of Dollente.
ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of his indiscretion in admitted having
prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his client?
RULING: The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers
commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents without requiring
the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this
practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent
affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of
the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may
be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the partys free act and deed. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public
performs, to wit: x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe
and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn
oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their
offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that
recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six
months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself
prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without the
personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with
competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use
of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an
instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is
meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year.26 WHEREFORE, the Court
finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is
false.
A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 GLORIA P. JINON vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E.
JIZ
FACTS:
Gloria P. Jinon (Gloria) engaged the services of Atty.Leonardo E. Jiz (Atty. Jiz)
on April 29, 2003 to recover a land title which was a subject of dispute with
her sister in law Viola J. Jinon (Viola), for which she immediately paid an
acceptance fee of P17,000.00. In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured
the transfer of the title in Gloria's name. Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions,
remitted the amount of P45,000.00 to answer for the expenses of the
transfer. However, when she later inquired about the status of her case, she
was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling
the same. Moreover, when she visited the property, which has been leased
out to one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been
collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to October 2004, which
amounted to P12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals, Atty. Jiz gave
her only P7,000.00, explaining that the balance of P5,000.00 would be added
to the expenses needed for the transfer of the title of the property to her
name. The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal
services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of the amounts of P45,000.00 and
P5,000.00 through a letter dated September 22, 2004, which has remained
unheeded. Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover the land
title from Viola and effect its transfer in Glorias name, and has failed to
return her money despite due demands. Hence, the administrative complaint
praying that Atty. Jiz: (1) be ordered to reimburse the total amount of
P67,000.00 (P17,000.00 acceptance fee, P45,000.00 for the transfer of title,
and P5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the property); and (2) be meted
disciplinary action that the Court may deem fit under the circumstances. In
his Answer, Atty. Jiz asseverated that he was not remiss in his legal duties to
Gloria. Denying liability to reimburse Gloria for any amount, much less for
P45,000.00,he claimed that he had rendered the corresponding legal
services to her with fidelity and candor. Hence, he prayed that the complaint
against him be dismissed. After the investigation, Commissioner Cecilio A.C.
Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva) of the Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found Atty. Jiz to have
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary. During the
hearing of the administrative case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter,
Atty. Kristina Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the administrative
case filed against her. Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some
piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her
daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to
speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the
paper given by Judge Malanyaon. When the principal counsel of the
complainants, Atty. Zamora, arrived, she inquired regarding the personality
of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyers bench beside Atty.
Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and
manifested that he was the counsel of the respondents counsel. Atty.
Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaons sitting with
and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary,
to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular
rule that prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers bench.
He insisted that he was merely assisting her daughter, who just passed
the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend
herself. The Court administrator reiterated a recommendation by
recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
misconduct and fined P 50,000.00.
ISSUES: Whether or not the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge
RULING: The Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur,
administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him
with a fine ofP40,000.00 The Court held, that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the following
reasons set below: First was Judge Malanyaons occupying a seat beside his
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the hearing. Such act
displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to
thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wifes cause. That
impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial
officer was presumed to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an
incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have
acted with greater circumspection and selfrestraint, simply because the
administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be
partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of
suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his
part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing himself. Second was Judge
Malanyaons admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his
daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching
his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the
counsel of the respondents counsel upon his presence being challenged
by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for
having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded
on a filial duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough
reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting
judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being
all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was
the private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,
Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition
is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full
time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must
accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire
period of his incumbency as a judge. To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon
engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wifes
administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or
posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he
prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria,
collaborating counsel of the complainants principal counsel, should produce
his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily and knowingly,
in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the
counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his
response to the query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to
Atty. Malanyaon thereat. Third was Judge Malanyaons admission that he had
already engaged in the private practice of law even before the incident now
the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that it is strange
for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing
law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife
and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal
problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on
their behalf. He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the
prohibition against the private practice of law during his incumbency on the
Bench. Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical
injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would give no ground for
reproach is always worthy of condemnation. We should abhor any
impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. Fourth was Judge
Malanyaons display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his
reaction to the opposing counsels query on his personality to sit at the
counsel table at the hearing, to wit: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah,
of the respondents counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And
so what?!! Judge Malanyaons uttering And so what? towards the opposing
counsel evinced his instant resentment towards the adverse parties counsel
for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel
of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after
he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he
was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all
times. It is true that the challenge of the opposing counsel might have
slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that he was still
a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint.
He thereby ignored the presence of the hearing officer, appearing to project
that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion rightly
called for from him and the others just because he was a judge and the other
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
side was not. He should not forget that a judge like himself should be the last
person to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued tyrant. Judge
Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial
obligation to assist his daughter, then only a neophyte in the Legal
Profession. We would easily understand his insistence in the light of our
culture to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family members and
other close kin, even risking our own safety and lives in their defense. But
the situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer
who came under the stricture that uniformly applied to all judges of all levels
of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private practice
of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his
wife or daughter or other members of his own family.
REX POLINAR DAGOHOY vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, A.C. No.
7944, June 03, 2013
FACTS:
Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in
connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the father of
complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted of theft
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte.
According to the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San
Juans failure to file the appellants brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San
Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the CAs order of
dismissal.6 The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful
in dealing with him and Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that
Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real status of Tomas
appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for committing gross
negligence, in connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA)
HELD: Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath
that requires him to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of
(his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to (his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, We deny Atty. San Juan's motion to
lift the order of suspension. Atty. San Juan's self-imposed compliance with the
IBP's recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension was premature.
The wordings of the Resolution dated April 16, 2012 show that the Court
merely noted: (1) the IBP's findings and the recommended penalty against
Atty. San Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the case back to the Court for its
proper disposition. The IBP findings and the stated penalty thereon are
merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline
erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct.
23 Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the
recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the
Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper
subject of implementation or compliance.24 WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court resolves to: 1. NOTE the Report and Recommendation
dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar Confidant; 2. SUSPEND from
the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for
violating his Lawyer's Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely; and 3.
DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan in the letter dated August
28, 2012 that he be allowed to return to the practice of law.
PENA VS. ATTY. PATERNO, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina
C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Notarial Law. Complainant , the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C,
Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244, Register of Deeds
of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon.
The complainant alleged that she gave respondent her owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as
collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the
safekeeping of respondent for seven years. Despite repeated demands by
complainant, respondent refused to return it. Yet, respondent assured
complainant that she was still the owner.
Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her
property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight
years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan
application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said
property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that
the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan
application.
In the course of investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Krausto sell
complainant's land to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced
by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the
property described therein to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd. for
P200,000.00. Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale
in her presence inside her office. However, respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct
examination, but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not denying
that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. Estrella Kraus'
affidavit supported respondent's defense.
Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party,
Anita Pea, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in
fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover,
respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register. Recommended that
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the
notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that
respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary
public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence showing
that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by(a)
deceiving complainant Anita C. Pea; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and
Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in
his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
HELD:
As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice
of law, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial
commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually
REVOKED.
1. The respondent, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. was found GUILTY of gross
misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyers Oath. 2. The
Court hereby imposed upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. 3. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and 4.
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
warning to the respondent and that the next case would be dealt more
severely
the Court of Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was
not among those furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment hence it is
crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of Appearance with the Court
of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. Respondent
assured the Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case,
nevertheless, later on Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the
fact that he was not one of the parties furnished with a copy of the Entry of
Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the Respondent. x x x
ISSUE: Is respondent can be held liable for his gross negligence and inaction
against his clients case?
RULING: Yes, It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of
respondent to handle her case which was then on appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he
will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Complainant also
established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the
latter merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling
her case. Thus, complainant was surprised when she received a notice from
the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal had been abandoned and
her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and executory. This is a
clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the
status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients'
request for information. The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently
provides: Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Canon 18 A
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x Rule
18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is SUSPENDED from the
practice o law for one year effective immediately, with WARNING that a
similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to
this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let a copy of this Resolution
be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar,
and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA BALTAZAR,ET AL. V. ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, JR ., A.C. NO.
9091, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in
connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants
signed a contract of legal services, where they would not pay acceptance
and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mendoza
admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. Atty. Mendoza made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics
such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. Atty. Mendozas improper advice
only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be
free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is
uncalled for. It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. Penalty: penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely Basis of the Penalty: In several
administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondents length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or
her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other
things, have had varying significance in the Courts determination of the
imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive
in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of
livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and
the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to
modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
FACTS:
claims that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised
her of the status of the land.
Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned
the terms of the loans as he claimed that the interest rate of said loans at
10% is unconscionable.
Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against
Solidum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.
HELD: Yes.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro
is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo
case.
that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA,
Presbiteros interest was not fully protected because the property Solidum
mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth
P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only P150,000.00. Clearly,
Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidums ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
In his Comment, respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is
merely using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the
defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to
accede to his wishes.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation finding
respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that
respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an
instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale
executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a
pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gupana is disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation
of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary
public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
from the practice of law for one year are in order.
between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in
his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized.
His clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered the
parties to his office for the administration of oath. 6 The deed contained his
certification that at the time of the documents execution, "no notary public
was available to expedite the transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid
by the parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the
Municipality of Real, Quezon.7
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
(Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation 8 dated
November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinens notarial commission
and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year. 9 The report
indicated that per Atty. Rinens admission, the subject deed was prepared in
his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of
forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the
deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinens failure
to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the
inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the
execution; 1995 when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the
notarial book x x x."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rinen be disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public?
HELD:
The Court said yes.
In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the
parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts
a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the
identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he were disqualified from being commissioned
as a notary public for one year.
ISSUE:
.Whether or not the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does
applies in disbarment cases.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the
disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from
the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary
civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit
does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged
to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on
behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only
suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiongson is liable for misconduct?
HELD:
The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is
the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is
satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the
established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson
committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct
only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with
substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to
uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be
an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary.
A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014 JULIETA B. NARAG vs. ATTY.
DOMINADOR M. NARAG
FACTS:
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she
accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who
was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a
member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an
amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) a 17year old first
year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already
abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent denied
the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were
mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her
concoct stories against him. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a
Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined
that the respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he
abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that
the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Reopening of the
Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the
Decision was filed by the respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he
was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as he
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and
the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise
forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the
respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still
committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other
than his wife. Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will
wherein he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is quite
immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his
ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from later on executing
another last will and testament of a different tenor once he had been
readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the Court is not convinced that the
respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had
already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal
profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display
unassailable character. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound
named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the
following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr.
And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo
Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners
save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times
Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on
matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate,
assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of
complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former
did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving
legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among
neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into
for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All
homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu
filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief
that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case,
was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit
was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent,
were dismissed.
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this
time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu
had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles
directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to
Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to
respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12
December 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrative complaint for dishonesty against Atty.
Molina will prosper?
HELD:
The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to
administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden
of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without
factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in
this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare
allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing
that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is
presumption of good faith.
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against
Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November
1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn
B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to
having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution
dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to
such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers
(PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when
the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the
judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction
over her. Ampongs motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampongs petition and affirmed her
dismissal from service on the ground that she never raised the issue of
jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped
from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc
denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal
from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the
OCA, which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampongs
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
HELD:
The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that
Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and
taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers
on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal
carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation
or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly
suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set
for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary
case filed before the Regional Trial Court (R TC). Complainant charges
respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision on 26
November 2007. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in
its Decision dated 25 July 2008. 3 On 24 October 2008, the NLRC also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf.
A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it
affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA
Decision was received by respondent on 23 November 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask
respondent about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there
was no decision yet. Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in
respondents office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed a mailman
delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon.
Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the envelope and
was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CAs
Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but
to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that
"it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were
ever communicated to complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed
it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was
also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision.
Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant
Complaint5 against respondent.
filed
the
instant
disbarment
HELD:
The court said no.
The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this
Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate
penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the
withdrawal of the charges.
ERLINDA FOSTER VS. JAIME AGTANG, A.C. NO. 10579, December 10,
2014
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
FACTS:
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a
realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtangs acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee.
He also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the
judge and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to
Agtangs demands.
various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his
personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster,
being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtangs
negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out
that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned
out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked
Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she
filed an administrative complaint against Agtang.
IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return
the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed
from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be
suspended for three months only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD:
No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light.
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the
high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by
court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and
even had the temerity that it was all the clients idea. . A lawyers failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various
amounts from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he
could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his
client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to
pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at
all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in
his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty
to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed
from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the
Court is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive
respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly
with the Court.
latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on
behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only
suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one month. Nestor
Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No.
9116, March 12, 2014.
Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the
Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000, failed to perform his
obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling
of complainants lot. The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren
admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case
for the titling of complainants lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for six months.Stephan Brunet and
Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10,
2014.
Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. The Supreme Court held that once a lawyer takes
up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite
the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing
of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full
payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorneys fee. Such
justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from
liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that
complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the
insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron
obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed
incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. A lawyer should
never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence
renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from
three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended from
the practice of law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M.
Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was
filed against Atty. Cabucana, Jr. for falsification of public document. The
requirement of personal appearance of the affiant is required under the
Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of
2004. The Supreme Court held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr.
should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the
truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the partys free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was
found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as
a notary public for two years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014.
Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge
Larida, Jr. was charged for committing various anomalies and irregularities.
The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of
locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders.
Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and
regulations issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts,
to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his
Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit
the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma
to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding
Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the
responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed
employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr.
contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to
take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.
to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of
partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and
judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were
grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to
adduce proof indicating the judges predisposition to decide the case in favor
of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was
filed against Judge Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit
that he had a number of cases pending for decision, some of which the
reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a
primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised
and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently
mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. A
member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement;
he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and
demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory
period for disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case within the
required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge
Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative
sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-121806, April 7, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge
Austria for impropriety for posting her details as judge in Friendster and
posting a picture with an indecent attire for the publics consumption. The
Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited
from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them
in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. However, Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this available for
public viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br.
2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The
Court held that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of
proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this case,
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the
following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility;
(b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every
employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-133132, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with
misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for failing to act on a writ of execution. The Supreme Court held that
the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment
has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30
days, is mandatory. Contrary to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one
return of writ of execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other
report to the court. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of
justice because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts.
Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for
simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v.
Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No.
P-13-3123, June 10, 2014.
Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An
administrative complaint was filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The
Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the
efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those
traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the
litigants. In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution.
Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure
which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite
this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years later. While
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy
disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court
has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been
understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time
due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for
disbarment when on its face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in
International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice
Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form
and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In
fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then,
after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same
although not in complainants favor. Based on the Complaint and the
supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the
respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to
respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required
complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing
of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on the
pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainants mistaken notion,
not all petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage.
Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion either to
proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective
responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can
proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the
case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty.
Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in
Del Mundo v. Capistrano that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal
profession, the court and society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with
CBDs directives for him to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend
hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also his disrespect
for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a
lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of
the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of
the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E.
Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of
land title, but not used for the purpose, should be returned to the client
immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure
to return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latters demand,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and professional
ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to
keep and maintain a general docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has
not reformed. He has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and he
appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received.
Mr. Teves repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper
public service which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted
with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The
OCA found that the court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep
track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr. Teves as the
Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the
members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves
repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases
pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an
efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary
responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed
to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status
of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars for her failure to comply with her duty to provide an efficient court
management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of
docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the
warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the
accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the
opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November
15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal
cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge
is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with
the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under
Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits;
(2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis
work history which reflects how she performed her judicial functions. We find
that there are several administrative cases already filed against her, with
most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her
inability to properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past
infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she
committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella
M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente,
an inhibition must be for just and valid reason. Complainants mere
imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the Court with
extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno
F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the
judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of
decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are
resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide
and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The
mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate.
Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of
the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants
the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting
magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City
and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in
resolving the cases pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his
residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not
absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a
single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An
inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the
following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the
reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the
delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous
circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first
infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15 years in the service. The
Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent judge
exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Courts directives as
contained in the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a
justification for the delay. Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was
suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months.
Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in
cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the
Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another
violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to
avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that
she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even
prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella
M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative
matter was instituted against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial
audit conducted after his retirement. According to the Supreme Court, for it
to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must
be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee.
This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the
holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once
jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the
public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the
case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively barred the Court from
pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his
tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and
regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions
committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint
against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.
Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Private
respondents were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA
dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present certified true
copies of the documentary evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule
130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Run After the
Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as
counsel for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the
elementary rules shows that the case against respondents was doomed by
design from the start. This stance taken by the lawyers in government
service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive
branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from
whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not
close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the governments
goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and
similar activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS
lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. People of the Philippines v. The
Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013
Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of
Atty. Baez, Jr. in connection with the recovery of their properties from
Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal services, where they would
not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the
docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract,
complainants would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and
entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the
withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case
against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien was the legal problem preventing them from
enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in
a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon
all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his
services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract
for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to
enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the
thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus
void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to
a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus,
the Court held that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Baez,
Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty.
Macapagal. He was charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T.
Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The
Supreme Court issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint
of Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals Justice Veloso. The Resolution
directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of
indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after
Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The
complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main
cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of
Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should
have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. If they doubted the
legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute
for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so
within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his
client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to
encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to
impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified
Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re:
Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty.
Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for
violation of the Lawyers Oath due to the latters failure to pay a loan. The
Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct. The deliberate
failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. The prompt payment of financial obligations is
one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and
issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of
Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or
private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or
proceedings should be immediately notified of any mandatory
disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in
any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification
or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that
the disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B.
Rallos, for alleged acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s)
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio
Abarintos and Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel
Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T.
Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CAJ/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving
the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members
of the Supreme Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a
member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with.
Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past
two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and
standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should
be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been informed of
any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous
practices unsuitable to a member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate
to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been
shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re:
subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A.
Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano & Evangeline
J. Lozano-Endriano against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-113-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases. In
Section 3, it provides that, Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is
substantial evidence. For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required
to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense charged against her. In
the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules
of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative
investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No.
6368, June 13, 2012.
Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is
a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat
to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges
on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar
case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do
was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.
Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012.
Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients
cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to
fulfill this duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband,
they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on
ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44
requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know
this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the
facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code
provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer
from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from
his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did
not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person
assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of
the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge
Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks
of court have no authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness
of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Compliance with
the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels. And whether
these conform to the rules concerning substance and form is an issue that
only the judge of the court has authority to determine. The duty of clerks of
courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely
ministerial. Although they may on inspection advise the parties or their
counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file, which may
be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the
filing party refuse to receive the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that
court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as
courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos was counsel in a case before
Teves branch. He was an officer of the court who expressed a desire to have
the presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see and consider the
same. Teves arrogated onto himself the power to decide with finality that
the presiding judge was not to be bothered with that motion. He denied Atty.
Ramos the courtesy of letting the presiding judge decide the issue between
him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu, Jr., an employee of the
judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and right of others at
all times, and his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are absent in this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official
duties as a light offense, the penalty for which is reprimand for the first
offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the second offense, and dismissal for
the third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave
misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court
meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution
of October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided these cases and warned
Teves to change his ways more than a year after the September 8, 2008
incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored
with respect to that incident the warnings given him in the subsequently
decided cases. Still those cases show Teves propensity for misbehavior.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such act would open the
floodgates to fraud by court personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court,
regardless of the reason is not among respondents duties. A legal
researchers duty focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting
memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial,
and keeping track of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court
held that courts have the inherent power to amend and control their process
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. But such power
rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only perform adjudicative
support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the
power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher. It is
well to remind that court personnel are obliged to accord the integrity of
court records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the
dispensation of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena,
Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M.
No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, promulgated by the Civil Service Commission
through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the
Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to
the presence of mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a firsttime offender, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the
respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be
visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the laws concern for
the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment
brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Considering that this is respondents first offense in her twenty-two (22)
years of service in the Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere
apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same mistake in
the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the only one
supporting her five children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a
period of six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth
Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio
City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and
passed the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her
constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
against him, he should be held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the
penalty of reprimand.
Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk
of Court. Instead of strictly observing the required number of working hours
in the civil service, he left his post in the middle of the day to attend a social
event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter the judges
chambers while under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a
direct violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly
Section 1, Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, which states: Court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours. Judge Ethelwolda
Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of Court, MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P12-3035, June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a
grave offense. The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave
because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the
same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service
regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct
offenses, but both may be committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards
of public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public
office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these
standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws, so
that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles. This Court, in
the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, should articulate and apply
these principles to its own personnel, as a way of bridging actual reality to
the norms we envision for our public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite
respondent Kasilags resignation, more than two years after he was directed
to file his Comment. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be
answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of
separation from service may no longer be imposed, there are other
penalties which may be imposed namely, the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There are no mitigating
circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying
detract from the notion of public accountability, as implemented by our laws.
We apply the law as it is written. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jaime
Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila. A.M. No. P-082573, June 19, 2012.
Jr. RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC,
Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-10-2867, June 19, 2012
Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court
defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker who
had no authority to take custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs
of his office mates, let alone case records. Yet, respondent, taking advantage
of his position as a Utility Worker and the access to the court records and
documents which such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on
the proper administration of justice by taking case records outside of the
courts premises and preoccupying his office mates with the time-consuming
task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions constitute grave
misconduct which merits the penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his
resignation, the Court found it proper to instead impose on respondent the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal
liability he may have already incurred.
As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the
Court deemed it proper to order complainant to explain why she should not
be disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent failure on her part to
exercise due care in the custody of the said case records. Our courts of
justice, regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice, cannot
afford and does not have the luxury of offering excuses to litigants for
negligence in its role of safekeeping and preserving the records of cases
pending before it. The consequences of such failure or negligence, if there
be any, are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved but worse,
for our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin
D. Cardeno, Utility worker I, Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No.
P-12-3036, June 20, 2012.
Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and
processes. There was a valid substituted service of summons in this case. As
a rule, personal service of summons is preferred as against substituted
service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the process server
if personal service cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of
substituted service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service
of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
instead of disposing the case only after being prompted to file a comment on
the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless deemed it proper to reduce
the fine, considering the existence of factors that mitigated the commission
of the offense, namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b) his delay in the
disposition of the case resulted from his serious medical conditions. Leticia
Jacinto vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved withinthree months from the date they are submitted
for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the
receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, within which to render judgment. As a general principle,
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters
pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the
disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts.
In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more
reminds all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions
and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. Prompt disposition of
cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases
is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be
imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty
and responsibility that her position requires. The case was submitted for
resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed
the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained
unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010.
More than four years after being submitted for resolution, the case was still
awaiting decision by respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide
the case within the 30-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule
on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed,
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
respondent even failed to decide the case within the three-month period
mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve
cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to
report and request for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for
which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00. Given
that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty
of suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon
respondent, for her undue delay in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum
amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe
Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012.
Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the
contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by
Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition
for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated
with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was
justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor
Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action.
However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA
enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12,
2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CAs disquisition is clear and categorical. In
complete disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen
proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in
court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking State
Prosecutor Comilangs explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring
his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his
attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1,
2007 Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days
imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his nonfiling of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance
before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in
finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued
subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of
preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them
properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover,
refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt,
as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive
order issued by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belens
actuations cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law
or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt
notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction
demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for
which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our
conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of
the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law.
Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous
infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been
severely warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to mete
the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to
be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State
Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs.
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ10-2216, June 26, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against
judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in
nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme
Courts Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is
in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his
actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of
General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order, sent under
Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence
that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could
not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard
considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo
summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants.
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General
Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned
for gross ignorance of the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt,
she betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic procedural rules
such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to
move ex parte to have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the
court (through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case
for pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion. The
respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the case to
her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she
should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their
answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not moved
in the respondents court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards
of competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in
her handling of the petition for contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should
be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears stressing that
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge
Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012.
Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the
main cases. The allegations in the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the
allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion to Expunge Motion for
Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated November 13, 2002 and the
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus
Motion filed in the main cases. These were in fact decided already on
October 19, 2011. The Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly
refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main
cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly
worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. The charge is purely
conjectural and the Court, in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No.
6332 has already ruled that the charge has no extrinsic factual evidence to
support it. Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and
Maria Loudes P.A Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno
M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case
disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more
than four months since the last submission of the parties position paper. The
pretrial Order was purportedly issued on 26 January 2010, or more than three
months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that within five days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled Guidelines to
be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreAtty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the
Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously
rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the
rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The
Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and
justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was
held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. 910, as amended must
have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the
involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would
not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence
of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambons case
does not render him eligible to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First,
Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement since he was less
than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service
requirement not having been in continuous service with the Judiciary for
three (3) years prior to his retirement. Second, Judge Macarambons
resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and
volition. Thus, the ruling in Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case
since his resignation was voluntary. Third, there are no exceptional reasons
to justify Judge Macarambons request. Judge Macarambon failed to present
similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and sufficient
accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age
requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the
time he left the Court Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and
79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in the age of
retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to
the COMELEC upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No.
910, as amended, he may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents
he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
requirements under the said law. Re: Application for Retirement of Judge
Moslemen Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19, 2012.
Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against
Atty. Rinen for falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which
allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. In Bautista v.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to
the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts
a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the
identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a
failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public for one year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C.
No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana
of forgeries and falsifications in the notarization of certain documents. The
Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana administratively liable under Section 1 of
Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, for violation of his
notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria
Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly
executed on April 29, 1994.
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation
of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary
public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
from the practice of law for one year are in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James
Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
Service. An administrative complaint was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of
a Metropolitan Trial Court for unauthorized/unexplained absences and other
infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn over the partial settlement
amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn over the
payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court held that
the acts of Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It
implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise
fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that
is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong
result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.
However, Salamancas dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit
court funds because the money she received from the litigants did not
acquire the status of court funds as no official receipt therefor was issued by
her. While Salamancas complained acts involved technically private money,
the deceit she pulled off disrupted the publics faith in the integrity of the
judiciary and its personnel. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of
her public office and violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, Section 4(c) which commands that public
officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D.
Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-133119. February 10, 2014.
Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN). Sheriff Collado was charged with failing to disclose in her SALN
for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits, among others. The
Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all public officials
and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their
assets and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption, as well as
at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such
disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the
affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and
balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of
income.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, all other
assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the
like, should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN. In this case,
however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of her
time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose
the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly,
Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713
and thus should be held administratively liable for said infraction. Angelito R.
Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903,
February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De
Vera for soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court.
The court held Susbilla-De Vera guilty of the most serious administrative
offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust and confidence of the
people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the public
to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead others to believe
that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to
influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the
expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had
deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the
complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew. Section 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel
from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from service. Veronica F.
Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against
respondents who are employees of the Court of Appeals for transacting
with partylitigants with a pending case before the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court held that the court personnels act of soliciting or receiving
money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving
money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a
court employee. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court
personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates
that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot
take advantage of the vulnerability of partylitigants. In this case,
respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV
and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014.
Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed
against Judge Rojo for notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty. Fortun himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a
matter of public interest, media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et
al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.
Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less
than the Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and employees
should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for public office is a
public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the
Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they
must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they
are officers of the Court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or
omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty
of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil Docket Clerk for
the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July
7, 2008 Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a
Friday, he should not have proceeded to mail the same; but instead, should
have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the herein
complainant. Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was
mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to
him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate
lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates
that Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and
with diligence. Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the performance of his
duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office.
Esguerras acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards
required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra,
Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967.
February 13, 2013.
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a
hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that [T]he
requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the
issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
requiring him to comment on the said application within the period of not
more than ten (10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on
the application for injunctive writ, since the so-called new and substantial
matters raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in
the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents
Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on the
said application, at the time when the said subsequent matters were
already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S.
Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public
records of indubitable integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against
judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to
be offered by the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative
proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by
indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The
complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth
during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made against
him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he
reared fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly
failed to abide by Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine
Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no
clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and
betting, he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting
cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect
due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be
individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should
behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and
not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.
Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent
motion alone or with another member present. There is nothing in the
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required the Division Clerk
of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present
regular members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe.
The complainants would have been correct if the absent member of the
Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other members. This
implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or
with another member present, provided that the action or resolution is
submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the
Division for ratification, modification or recall.
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage
of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve
his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are
passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the
rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main
controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere
interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of things
prior to the RTCs Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez,
Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon
M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19,
2013.
Judge; government employee vis--vis government officer; liberal treatment
upon retirement claims of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice
Panganiban requested that the government service which he rendered from
January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its
Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can
meet the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to
retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government employee
includes any person in the service of the Government or any branch thereof
of whatever grade or class. A government officer, on the other hand, refers
to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance
of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description
and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a
governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ
Panganibans government service as legal counsel and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal
treatment in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1)
waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or death
while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave
credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for
retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years
of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement
upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering
legal counseling work for a government body or institution as creditable
government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of
Re-Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12,
2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for
damages in the exercise of judicial functions. The court held that Judge
Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of
the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and is
punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a
relative by affinity within the sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have
inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as mandated by Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the
court explained that in civil actions for damages, judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do in the exercise
of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers
and jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E.
Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs.
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 072618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M.
No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.
said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of
Batingweds application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is
personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial
Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondents explanation that he is
burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of
his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I
and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep
and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act.
His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial
commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano
Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11,
2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to
give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to
submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the courts
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several
opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the
judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As
an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his
language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo
Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of
grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme
Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct.
Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement on any material fact
and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in
2003 which resulted in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless,
respondents acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned
government agencies/officials. Respondents deportment under the
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted
authority to travel until February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work
on February 16, without securing an extension of his authority to travel
abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and
Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for
an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be
received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the
original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond
the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a
position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay abroad.
Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series
of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without
approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to
the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel
Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio
City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held
administratively liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court
laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
(1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking
for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There
must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalnas petition is not
supported by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore,
must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et
al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013.
Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump
sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010,
Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946
which provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits,
among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received
1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April
2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated
January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the law accommodates the
heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity
benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not
entitled to the survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that
Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer
needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January
2011 to April 2012 amounting to 1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the
past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who received
survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such
pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic
Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K.
Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.
and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the
complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as
the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due
diligence in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a
lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact
formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a
lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy
v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per
se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar
to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without
any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf
of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No.
6475. January 30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against
Atty. Cefra for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The court held that Atty. Cefra
was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants case. His acts in the
present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his
duties as an officer of the Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. In addition, a lawyer has the duty to keep the client informed of
the status of his case. Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as
shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of
documentary evidence within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to
comply with the two orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal offer
of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion
or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision; (4)
He failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial
measure to contest the RTCs decision which was adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and inattention
to his duties as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has
repeatedly held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps.
Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No. 5530.
January 28, 2013.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent
likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors
and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed ways such as: (1)
Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3)
Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from the Municipal Local
Government Office.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the
IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish
priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines
of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support to his children in compliance with the Decision dated
February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time
respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer
product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of
dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation
Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways as in this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was,
however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements. Florence
Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for
Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22,
2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official
duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court are primarily
responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and
writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are
charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court,
issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies
of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the
judgment on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him since there is no finding of strong reasons to rule
otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he
desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously
granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent.
Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu
City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their
judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case
against her should be dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be
reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as not to give the
impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge
Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The
Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge
should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge
cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional
time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her
time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that
may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific
to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to
disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance
with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large
volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for
her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to
Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure
to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The
Supreme Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need
to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept
that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance
of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge Balumas gross
inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the
reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re:
Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge,
Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355,
September 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases
submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at
the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge Soriano
has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Sorianos
unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions,
and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory
retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated.
Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Sorianos inefficiency in managing his
caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of the
records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or
reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was
responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October
22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and
inexcusable negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of
which the complainants were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable
negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients
cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object
or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference
towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of
his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut
the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a
lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case
entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his clients cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v.
Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of
gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his
part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to
attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court
found that the respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause since he: (1) failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice
beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his clients cause while
the grave coercion case against them was pending. Maria Cristina
Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8,
2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for
grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that
since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she
also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities
attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal
documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate
transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the
category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
the
consultation,
then
the
professional
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and
18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale
covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of
sale over the same property in favor of another person. It is a core ethical
principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was
disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny Obias,
A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was
accused of receiving payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the
money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December
2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of
Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government Officials and
Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance
payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial
fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that
payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of
Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an
official transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court.
Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for
judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover,
the issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be construed as having
been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only remitted
the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed
judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had been filed against her.
Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe
Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No.
P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue
presented in this case is whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154 applies
to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject
provision which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior
clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among
others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.
To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined
power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court
personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted
that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative
supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety,
where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be
considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial
remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or
denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to
the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with,
except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v.
Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio /
Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-112259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.
for
money.
The
Code
of
Professional
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence
in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty.
Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012.
Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to
protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The
Court cited the case of In Re: Sotto and ruled that One of the qualifications
required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good
moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar
clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral
principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of
professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty
of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the
preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its
powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily
abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but
also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may
either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest
acts. This rule provides that in any of the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral
conduct;(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyers oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and
discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No.
9074, August 14, 2012.
Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined
for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent
violated the Lawyers Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C.
No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
are expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times .
An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public officers,
especially those in the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Manolito C.
Villordon vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the
failure to give attention to a task or the disregard of a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas: The Court
cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens
the peoples confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration
of justice. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public
servants must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the
constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda
of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to
Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of
Court clearly mandates the sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and
when necessary, periodic reports, with the court which issued the writ of
execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the court immediately
after the judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied 30 days after the officers receipt of the
same, said officer shall file a report with the court stating the reasons
therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall periodically file with the court a
report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until said
writ is fully satisfied or its effectivity expires. The officer is further required to
furnish the parties with copies of the return and periodic reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution
of a writ do not excuse respondents total inaction. Neither the Rules nor
jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by
sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an
empty victory for the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that
they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost
dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in
accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they
should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as
speedily as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of
sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads,
Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a
counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is
so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved
client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner was given
opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by the
court. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former
counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.
Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No.
188726. January 25, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings
with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise,
of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the
first offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules, dismissal carries with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Thus, the
respondent is dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take the
Civil Service Sub-professional Examination on her behalf. Concerned Citizen
vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012.
Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a
sheriff performs a very sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is
duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of
execution, and should, at all times show a high degree of professionalism in
the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was
promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution of court writs
and processes in courts and to better serve the public good and facilitate the
administration of justice. Paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 12
provides that All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court
processes and execute all writs of their respective courts within their
territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same circular
provides that No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the
assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place.
It is clear that respondents act of implementing the subject writs in San
Fernando City, when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles
City, is a violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of authority.
While respondent claimed that he personally informed the OCC of San
Fernando City, he, however, failed to prove that he made written notice as
required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of the copies
of the court processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice
requirement. The requirement of notice is based on the rudiments of justice
and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the
execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T. torres,
sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P12-3027. January 30, 2012
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very
delicate function as the custodian of the funds and revenues, records,
property, and premises of the court. He is liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue delay
in the remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes
misfeasance. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the
goal of an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith
can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full
accountability for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92
mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the
Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized
government depository bank which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The
respondents failure to remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. Moreover, the failure of a public
officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima
facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property
to personal use. Re: Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, SantiagoSan Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of
resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. A judges failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will
make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered
untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be imposed only when
the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and
norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of
procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. Re: Verified
complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against
Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty,
and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R.
No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.
Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers
are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge
motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at
the expense of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for
using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for
Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his
malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in
fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition
of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer
be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently
cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter disregard of his
duties and responsibilities to the Court.
Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M.
No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as
judicial officers entrusted with the delicate function with regard to collection
of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Delay in the
remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff:
first, to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all
persons claiming under him vacate the property within three (3) days;
second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all
persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal
belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the
improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to
execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ
and every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its
effectivity expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties:
he unilaterally gave the occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days
provided by the Rules, to vacate the property; when he did evict the
occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal effects was
padlocked, therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements
introduced on the property; finally, respondent failed to make a return on the
writ of possession after he implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure
to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No.
P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an
employee should submit in advance, whenever possible, an application for a
vacation leave of absence for action by the proper chief of agency prior to
the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that Dacsig had
failed to acquire the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or
explanation for failing to obtain the necessary authorization for his leaves.
Thus, he is guilty of taking unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A)
(17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
provides that the penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first
offender is suspension for six months and one day to one year. Judge Andrew
P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, MagddelaNagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in
summary procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than
30 days after the last answer has been filed. Considering that no preliminary
conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently
failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should
accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literatos inaction in Civil Case No.
632 for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of an
ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack
of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the
palm of a judges hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively guilty of
gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in
rendering a decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato,
Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April
25, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a
judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with
the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination.
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Courts
pronouncements. He did not file the required comment to the Courts showcause resolutions despite several opportunities granted him. His willful
disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions constitutes grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and
integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded
several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long
pending before his court and to comply with the directives of this Court, but
he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This continued
refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that
he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he
purports to belong. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued
decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been
paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4)
hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision.
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on
the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such
cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the
document. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial
acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of
documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the
notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed
on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a
public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need
for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not
be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act.
A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts
they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in
ascertaining the true identities of the parties executing the document before
them, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as this Court will
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
deal with such cases more severely in the future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No.
7880, April 11, 2012.
Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its
focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership
in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the
case.Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements
indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross
ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage
under the old Civil Code provisions. Respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July
10, 2012.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The lawyers final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment
follows as a consequence of the lawyers conviction of the crime. Atty.
Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24,
2012.
Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite
appellants brief amounted to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v.
Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to protect his clients
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of
respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the
progress of his implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of
duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task
expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged
with the knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions
on the writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as well with the
knowledge of what they are bound to comply with.Sheriffs are expected to
know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the
court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all
times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their
duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court
is
misconduct
that
warrants
disciplinary
action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48,
Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital
to the administration of justice. A process servers primary duty is to serve
court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part by ensuring
that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. Unjustified
delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. All employees in the judiciary should
be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is through the
process server that defendants learn of the action brought against them by
the complainant. It is also through the service of summons by the process
server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is
therefore important that summonses, other writs and court processes be
served expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent
performance of ones public duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every
government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty will
always use this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great
prejudice of public service
The Court has defined dishonesty as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not
only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by
the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. It was never alleged, much less established,
that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to
commit said errors or to favor any party or litigant. Hence, he was found
guilty only of negligence in the performance of his tasks, and not of
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
people in the judiciary. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC,
Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was
promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the
cases that it covers. The respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the
way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case. Under
Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary
conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed. The respondent set the case for preliminary conference at a
time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period. Another of the
respondents procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date
of the preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his
authority in expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound
practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the
proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary
postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the
performance of their solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue
delay in the administration of justice erodes the peoples faith in the judicial
system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of
justice in this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however unfair,
of ulterior motives on the part of the Judge. Judges should always be mindful
of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law. Murphy
Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon
City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes,
Jr. was charged for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship between
an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations
due his client is per se a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes,
Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013
Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was
fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all
the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the
relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount
in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to
Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years. Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty.
Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The
burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on
the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power
only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further
presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge their
burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a much
later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending
the ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and
conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O.
Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are
officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth
and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any
falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts
and their clients. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C.
No. 6942, July 17, 2013.
Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty.
Respondent, a court stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in
connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of causing
another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead.
Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned.
The Supreme Court held that the respondents resignation from the service
did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this
administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening
resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was
still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility
for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her
eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her
disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be
perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of
dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is
imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound
discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 021321-P, July 16, 2013.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After
considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court
also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the
respondents work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension.
Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of suspension from service.
Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV,
RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of
cases. As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act
with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the
law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence
ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he
can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in
him and the institution he represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of
cases. Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges
and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do
is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the
Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonells failure to
decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and
credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge
Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have
greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial
judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court
reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re:
Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for
Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando,
La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal
constitutes inexcusable negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L.
Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief resulting in the
dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the
Court cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client
in failing to provide him a copy of the case records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San
Juans control and is a task that the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that
filing an appellants brief within the reglementary period is critical in the
perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of the appellants brief
are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and
responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali
failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required of an employee
in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil
Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali,
et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the
public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to
believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of
his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainants family
completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected
from the premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court
Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server,
RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to preserve
decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In
that case, the court held that court employees are expected to be paragons
of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but also
in their personal dealings, including business and commercial transactions to
avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates
that public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-011448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within
the jurisdiction of their courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons
21 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity
and probity in the performance of their duties. Ignorance of the law is a mark
of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance
thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with
this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon
assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she
becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of
justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et
al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held
that the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy,
considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties,
powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure
that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent
them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote
the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept
that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby
suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of
his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but
extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same,
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016
public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not
a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by
parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment
that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was
intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant
to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What
is being penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document despite the
absence of one of the parties. A notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe
the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence
of the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs.
Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service.
Where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III
and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No.
7430, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being
part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose
decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases. While a judge may not always be held liable for
ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded
insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together
with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would
clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to
the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter
Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service. Given the total absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it
appear he was at the office on February 26, 2010 when he was in fact absent
still prevails. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary.
Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr.
PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016