THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLONIAL DISCOURSE

ON AN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION
The case of the Spanish Philippines.

Mara Dolores Elizalde

Instituto de Historia, Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas (CSIC)

For Spain, the 19th century in the Philippines was a continuous experiment aimed at
devising a colonial model which, from multiple facetspolitical, economic, social,
strategic and international, would allow it to retain sovereignty of the islands. In this
context of an empire in the throes of attempting to redefine itself, a large number of
foreign observers wrote more than fifty accounts and reports in which they analysed the
colonial system established by Spain in the Philippines and the situation of the islands.
The images conveyed by these writings thereafter influenced the discourse that was
developed on the Spanish Philippines, and they were used in 1898 to justify a change of
hands in the colonial administration of the archipelago. This paper starts by inquiring
why so many accounts were written about the Philippines at that time and what it was
hoped to gain by them; it then goes on to examine what those foreign observers thought
of the Spanish colonial model; the third part looks at the extent to which the images
transmitted by those accounts were revived, magnified or modified as a result of the
Spanish-American war and the intervention of the United States or other powers in the
archipelago with the aim of liquidating the Spanish empire in Asia; and lastly, it
examines the extent to which those images and the way in which Spanish rule ended has
influenced the reconstruction of a post-colonial relationship between Spain and the
Philippines.

1. An empire in transition and in the throes of redefinition

The Spanish administration of the Philippines in the 19th century may be seen as a clear
example of an empire in transition, one that was making an ongoing effort to redefine
the colonial model.

Starting in the mid-18th century, various factors critically jeopardised Spains ability to
hold on to the archipelago: first, the crisis endured by the Philippines throughout the
century as a result of the bankruptcy of the colonial system that had prevailed there until
then; second, the British invasion of Manila in 1763 (in the course of the Seven Years
War); and third, the independence of the continental American empire, which brought
an end to the close relations sustained with New Spain, and also to the voyages of the
Galleon which for centuries had made the Philippines the lynchpin linking Asia with
America, giving them a very special place in the Spanish empire. In that difficult
situation, the colonial relationship between Spain and the Philippines was able to
survive thanks to the reforms undertaken by the Bourbons in the closing decades of the
18th century, which strengthened the administration, created new colonial institutions
and encouraged the move to an economy based on monopolies over indigenous tobacco
and alcohols, thus enabling the colony to go on financing itself1.

However, after the opening years of the 19th century, the sum of manifold
circumstancessuch as the resurgence of colonial expansion in Asia and the Pacific,
growing demand for tropical products, the desire of other powers to consolidate their
penetration of the Philippine archipelago, the high cost of maintaining the tobacco and
alcohol monopolies, or the strength of various currents in Philippine society which
pressed against the impositions and constraints of the colonial regimeunderlined the
need for yet another readjustment of the colonial model if Spain wished to remain in
that Asian archipelago.

Despite a number of discordant voices which recommended abandoning the islands in

view of the high cost that they entailed, it was always clear that Spain had no wish to
give up its sovereignty over the Philippinesand that this would affect its possessions
1

Josep M. Fradera, Colonias para despus de un Imperio, Barcelona, Ed. Bellaterra, 2005.

in Micronesia: the Marianas, Carolinas and Palaos. Spain was reluctant to give up its
empire in Asia and the Pacific, a complex and ever-changing fabric for which it had
been fighting since the 16th century. That then was the Philippines in the 19th century:
an ongoing process of experimentation to find a colonial model which would enable
Spain to hold its sovereignty over the islands and maintain a colonial relationship that
was acceptable inside and outside the colony.

From the beginning of the century on, it was insisted that the system must hinge upon a
centralised political power in which the Governor-General kept control over all the
levers of government and his powers were reinforced. This meant doing away with
many of the powers delegated to the Philippine elites, who had been responsible for
organising their own people politically, economically and socially, and making a move
to increase direct control over the population. The Filipinos not only saw the old model
of delegation of powersa model that had allowed a measure of balance in the islands
and room for everyone to actbrought into question, but in the midst of a liberal era
which proclaimed citizens rights, they found that there was no political will to confer
citizen status on them, and instead of seeing their possibilities of political participation
enhanced, they actually lost rights and faculties. The aim of the metropolitan power was
first and foremost to reinforce the machinery of government and strengthen colonial
governance, and to that end it did not balk at flouting the aspirations of the Filipino
people, especially when they could endanger its interests in the archipelago. These
circumstances elicited growing protest movements, which were harshly repressed, until
the Filipinos became convinced that they would never fulfil their aspirations through
peaceful negotiation and took up armed struggle against the Spanish authorities.

The tightening of control over the levers of power by the Governor-General also
brought into question the freedom of action allowed to the religious orders, and limited
the fields of activity which for centuries they had occupied in the Spanish
administration of the Philippines. The autonomy hitherto enjoyed by the provincial
authorities was similarly restricted because that autonomy all too often gave rise to
abuses and prevented taxes from reaching the Crown or the State. The modernisation,
rationalisation and regeneration of the colonial administration required an end to old
practices on which the government of the islands had relied for many years. This
sparked off a hard-fought, silent struggle for power among the various sector involved
3

in the system. The 19th century was dominated by the rivalry between reformists and
anti-reformists, and the debates about the lines that the reforms should not cross.

A large proportion of the Spanish authoritiesthe more aware politicians, the sectors
that wished to promote economic progress in the Philippines and not merely perpetuate
elite privilegeswere conscious of the need to introduce political, economic and
defensive reforms in the archipelago. That had been the verdict of all the analysts whose
opinions on the Philippines had been canvassed, from Francisco Leandro de Viana to
Sinibaldo de Mas, Segismundo Moret, Manuel Becerra, Antonio Maura or Vctor
Balaguer. And yet, despite that rational, conscious conviction, and despite the many
plans drawn up and reforms introduced, there was no eliminating a perpetual fear of
change. Any reform plan was viewed with deep suspicion and outright antagonism by
broad sectors who opposed any attempt at renewal. Conservative politicians and
soldiers, many members of religious orders, and circles in favour of maintaining the
status quo, all came out against any possibility or plan of reform. As a result, there was
a vague and general fear among the islands population of the unforeseeable
consequences that might ensue from reforms, and although the history of the 19thcentury Philippines was marked by constant changes and reforms, all were clearly
insufficient for what the occasion demanded. Thus the 19th century became a period of
constant struggle between reformists and anti-reformists, between reaction and progress.

In the course of the 19th century, the Philippines also experienced an essential transition
in the economic sphere. This period witnessed the change from a closed imperial model,
characterised by fiercely-controlled monopoliesbe it the Galleon and trade, be it
tobacco, indigenous alcohols or opiumto a new model of empire open to free trade
and foreign penetration; a model which, in the closing years of the century, when it was
no longer possible to restrain such foreign intervention, the government sought to
reorient towards protectionism and the defence of Peninsular Spanish interests over
those of any other group involved in the islands. There was also a transformation in the
model of taxation, and taxes were modernised and expanded, moving from a poll tax on
subject Filipino, mestizos and Chinese to the levying of a compulsory personal bond,
plus a direct charge on economic activitiesurban, industrial or commercialand a
land tax.

All this effort on the part of the Spanish authorities to redefine the colonial model
should be seen as an expression of their resolve to maintain Spains presence in the
Philippines and to reaffirm the Spanish empire in Asia. At that juncture the future
outlook of the Philippines was rosy, and it did not seem right to abandon them just at a
time of manifest international interest in China and South-East Asia. Although
possessed of fewer resources than the powers that were pursuing empire at the time,
Spain was ready to do battle in defence of its positions.

2. Accounts concerning the Philippines and diagnosis of a colonial model

Spain was not the only power to reassert its interest in those islands. In the course of the
19th century, the Philippine Islands aroused growing interest of the great powers with
colonial ambitions. When imperialist expansion was at its height, the Philippines was
seen as an archipelago strategically situated facing the China coast and on the
crossroads of several major transoceanic lines of communication. Its economy had been
diverted turned to the export of tropical agricultural products, for which there was a
burgeoning demand in the international market. Investment was needed in the
production and export of sugar, Manila hemp, tobacco, coffee and other such assets.
Also, Filipino consumers turned out to be potential market for Western manufactured
goods. For these developments to prosper, the infrastructures and communications
systems needed to be greatly improved. For all these reasons, traders, investors and
travellers from different countries were increasingly attracted by the Philippines.

Foreign residents living in the Philippines and travellers visiting the archipelago in the
19th century manifested their interest in the islands in a wide-ranging collection of
reports and accounts. There are over fifty accounts on the Philippines in the period
1850-1900, written by traders, colonial administrators, civil servants posted to Eastern
establishments, travellers through Asia, and scientists who studied Asian and Oceanic
societies. Most of these accounts and reports were written to explore and make known
an archipelago that was then opening up to international penetration and was viewed as
promising future opportunities. Most of their authors proposed taking advantage of the
economic possibilities that the archipelago offered and they believed were underexploited; they wished to see the islands completely opened up and free trade
5

established there; they favoured the advent of foreign traders and freedom for them to
conduct untrammelled trade with the Filipinos; to engage in the production and export
of tropical products; to import the products that were in demand in the islands; and to
gain a stake in the profitable investments that the Philippines needed. That being the
outlook, many of these writings were first and foremost guidebooks which explained the
situation in the Philippines and offered advice on how best to operate there. Others
purported to examine the case of Spains government of the Philippines as an example
for comparison with other colonial models in Asia. These writers reported the way in
which certain problems had been solved there, with a view to applying the lessons thus
derived to their own imperial experiences in similar situations. The result was a
painstaking analysis of the principal features defining the Spanish colonial rule over the
Philippines. Many of them also pointed out several factors that made the Spanish model
different to other colonial systems in Asia.

In that context, most of the writings analysed coincided in identifying a number of

features as definitive of Spanish administration in the Philippines. According to them,
the way in which colonisation began determined the ensuing colonial model, practically
in perpetuity. They explained that the prime consideration motivating the Spanish when
they settled in the Philippines in the 16th century was to conquer and evangelise the
islands, and those objectives determined that the colony be administered by a small
number of soldiers and priests. In this context the religious orders, entrusted with
evangelising the natives of the country, acquired immense power but had very little to
do with civil society2. They also insisted that Spanish colonisation lacked any primary

Al carcter de la original conquista y prematuro gobierno regular de las Filipinas se deben las
dificultades que ahora impiden el que se desarrolle este pasPero fue muy diferente en las Filipinas,
donde un pequeo cuerpo de soldados, acompaados de misioneros celosos, desarrollaron el propsito
de convertir los indgenas al cristianismo. Esos frailes adquirieron poco a poco gran influencia sobre los
indios. Los intereses comerciales predominaron entre los holandeses, y entre los aventureros ingleses
siempre imper tambin la inclinacin al comercio, unido al deseo de ocupacin territorial. A los
espaoles debe concedrseles que su sistema propio religioso, sea cual sea su valor, nunca ha sido
olvidado. La autoridad y jurisdiccin eclesistica se hallan, por la administracin espiritual, como
incrustadas en la mquina del gobierno y obligaciones ordinarias de la vida... John Bowring, A visit to
the Philippine Islands, 1859. (Una visita a las islas Filipinas, Manila, Printed by Ramrez y Giraudiez,
1876), pp. 84-85.
NOTE: In the case of the authors analysed in this paper, the edition in brackets is the one used here. The texts
consulted in Spanish have been left in that language to respect the original.
Produce extraeza el considerar que las colonias espaolas no hayan atrado gran numero de
peninsulares para establecerse en ellas. Es que el espritu nacional de la pennsula ibrica ha dejado de

economic motivations, and that neither the development nor the economic exploitation
of the islands were among their basic objectives3. This was not entirely true given that
one of the purposes of Spains eastward expansion was to search for a route whereby to
penetrate the spice market and to acquire territories where these coveted spices and
precious metals were to be found. They did not find as much of them in the Philippines
as they had hoped, and it was long before they hit upon an economic model that would
make the islands profitable. But that was an essential requirement if the Spanish were to
stay. Wealth must be found to cover costs, as colonisation could not be sustained by
evangelisation alone. Resources were needed to finance it. The problem was that the
system that was eventually devised, the Manila Galleon, did nothing to develop the
islands but was sustained only by an economy of brokerage between Asia and America.
That agency economy made it possible to finance the colonising enterprise, but it did
practically nothing to develop the internal economy of the islands, even although that
was essential to supply the food, commodities and labour necessary for overseas trade
to function.

On that basis, the foreign observers judged that the colonial government imposed by
Spain in the Philippines was an obsolete model, founded on aims, ways and institutions
that were very well for the 16th century but in the 19th century were outdated and
unsuited to the nature of modern empires. The administration, then, was antiquated and
recalcitrant, burdened by centuries of bad practices, in which abuses and corruption
were rife. They therefore believed that reforms were urgently needed if an effective,
competitive colonial model was to be achieved. It was essential to remedy the lack of a
properly-defined policy, the absence of a master plan, the feebleness of resources, and
the absence of economic guidelines and material means capable of spurring the islands
ser aventurero?...La Espaa parece ahora dormida, como descansando satisfecha despus de haber
tomado su parte en la hermosa historia del progreso humano, Bowring, Op. Cit., pp. 94-95.
3

In forming the new colonies, Charles V was not guided by the ambition to increase territorial
possessions or accumulate new wealth; he possessed enough of theses to satisfy all his wishes; but if the
monarch was contented, the Christian in him could not rest as long as there remained gentiles to convert:
that was the first goal of the conquest of the Philippines. Vast armies were no longer sent to gorge
themselves with treasures in a new El Dorado: three hundred soldiers and a small number of religious
sufficed to establish Spanish domination solidly in these islands and to maintain it up to the moment of
writing. What European nation would be capable today of continuing the work of Charles V? ... If ever
England became mistress of the Philippines, with the exclusively mercantile spirit coming to replace the
disinterested practices of the Spanish people, this magnificent colony would soon be lost to the whole of
Europe. Jean Baptiste Mallat, Les Philippines. Histoire, geographie, moeurs, agriculture, industrie et
commerce des colognes espagnoles dans l'Oceanie, 1846 (Manila, National Historical Institute, 1983), pp.
507-508.

development. It would also be necessary to redefine the functions of the colonial

authorities, which possessed less powers than was advisable given the distance between
Spain and the Philippines. They pointed out that for many years the Governor-General
had suffered from a lack of real power with which to deal with other more powerful
circles, both in Spain and in the archipelago. They therefore recommended
strengthening the powers of the Governor-General, granting him more autonomy and
decision-making capacity, and rendering him less dependent on the metropolis. His
relations with Madrid had to be modified and the systems of communication improved.
In the metropolis there was frequently insufficient knowledge of the situation on the
ground, resulting in bad decisions. Lack of information, distance and the need to await
instructions made it difficult to operate with the requisite precision and rapidity.
Moreover, to enable the Governor-General to operate on a sounder basis, it would be
wise to set up a board of advisors composed of experts familiar with the islands4.

British administrators also noted a need to remedy the lack of training of Spanish
colonial officials and the poor sense of vocation and paucity of stimuli in the
performance of their duties. A posting in the Philippines was a mere step along in their
career, often compulsory and unwanted, in which they simply hoped they could last out
and that it would not be too long. In addition, the constant shuffling of positions meant
that they were never long in their postings, and before they had the chance to get to
know the Philippines archipelago it was already time to move on to the next posting.
The end result was little local knowledge, excessively frequent changes in decisive
positions and instability of policies and guidelines5.
4

Parece que no hay legislacin que defina los poderes del virrey o capitn general; pero cuando
cualquier asunto de importancia de halla en discusin, se da parte a Madrid. El capitn general debera
ser revestido de amplios poderes, mediante, por supuesto, la responsabilidad personal en el ejercicio de
los mismos. Debera estar rodeado de un consejo compuesto de personas entendidas. Muchas cosas
ocuparan, como es natural, la atencin de ese grupo, y por necesidad tendra que cooperar a una buena
administracin atendiendo todos los asuntos, formando estadsticas de la tierra y poblacin, que
contribuiran a una divisin ms satisfactoria de las provincias, distritos y pueblos, as como a la
distribucin de las cargas pblicas, Bowring, Op. Cit., p. 89.
5

Functionaries in English And Dutch possessions are especially educated and instructed for their
difficult mission, they accede to the post by strict examination and they rise through the ranks of the
colony step by step, attaining the highest positions if they are fit to fill them. How different from the
Philippine employees! Fedor Jagor, Travels in the Philippines, 1874 (Manila, Filipiana Book Guild,
1965), p. 112.
For that reason these observers recommended acquiring more training as colonial administrators, studying
the characteristics of these countries and learning their languages: Una de las ventajas para la influencia
que poseen los misioneros, y con la cual no cuenta la mayora de los funcionarios civiles, es el

Foreign observers further underlined the lack of full control over the archipelago,
drawing attention to the fact that there were wide areas where there was neither
dominion nor surveillance, and how that encouraged the proliferation of loopholes in
the colonial regime, opening up a whole world of possibilities for other agents to
operate. Such possibilities may not have been legally sanctioned, but the Spanish
scarcely had the means to oppose them.

Another major subject in the analysis of the colonial model was that of the religious
orders. Most of these writers believed that the religious congregations played too
prominent a role in the colonial machinery. They thought that this peculiarity was due to
the way that the colonisation had operated from the outset, and also to the shortage of
civil servants that perpetually burdened Spanish government in the Philippines. They
praised the work that the clergy performed as interlocutors of the Filipinos and as
mediators between colonisers and colonised. They also acknowledged their role in
educating the inhabitants6. But at the same time they considered that the involvement of
conocimiento de los idiomas del pas...Uno de los mejores medios para acrecentar la eficacia de la
accin administrativa de los departamentos civiles serla hacer que sus funcionarios aprendieran los
idiomas del pas, Bowring, Op. Cit., pp. 198-199.
6

He encontrado bastantes frailes objeto de especial respeto y afecto, y en realidad lo merecen como
guardianes y restauradores de la paz de las familias y como protectores de los nios en sus estudios, y
por otra parte asociando sus esfuerzos al bienestar de sus respectivos pueblos, Bowring, Op. Cit., p.
105.
For the Indios, the padre or the priest is a father, a friend, a censor; they listen to him on every occasion
and have the greatest confidence in him...Nevertheless, the Indios were endowed with enough
intelligence to understand the superiority of the fathers and the advantage they could draw from their
teaching, either for cultivation of the soil or for their industrial works; thus the attachment of these
people to their benefactors became stronger from day to day and the influence of the missionaries more
important, Mallat, Op. Cit., pp. 241-247.
The Spanish parish priest was consulted by the native in all matters: he was, by force of circumstances,
often compelled to become an architect to build the church in his adopted village-, an engineer to make
or mend roads-, and more frequent a doctor. His word was paramount in his parish, and in his residence
he dispensed with that severity of conventuals discipline to which he had been accustomed in the
Peninsula... In his own vicinity, when isolated from European residents, he was practically the
representative of Government and of the white race as well as of social order, John Foreman, The
Philippine Islands, 1890, 1899 and 1906 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), pp. 217-218. This
writer also highlighted the generosity of their work among the Filipinos and recounted the cases of
several friars whom he had known personally. However, he was highly critical of the evil practices of
some, which he also narrated in detail from his own experiences. In addition, he noted that not all
Spaniards appreciated the work of the orders in equal measure, but that opinions were very much divided.
He stressed that the progressives sought to oppose their preponderant position in the Philippines,
requested that they be made to withdraw to their monasteries and devote themselves to strictly religious
duties, and demanded that they be barred from performing political or educational functions. He also gave
a detailed analysis of the cost of the religious orders in the Philippines and highlighted the economic

the clergy in the administration of the islands had considerably complicated the
government of the archipelago by introducing a religious element in the colonial
relationship. Moreover, some religious orders had become too deeply involved in the
economy of the islands, which sometimes placed them in a difficult and not readily
justifiable position. They had also got their hands on some levers of power, which the
orders resisted cutting back when the Spanish administration sought to reduce them.
Foreign observers were aware of the frequent clashes and the divergence of interests
between the political and spiritual authorities. For that reason most foreign observers
counselled tying the authority of the missionaries more firmly to that of the State and
keeping government separate from religious missions7.

The authors of these accounts and reports also paid special attention to the world of the
Filipinos. They were curious about the way in which they had become integrated in the
colonial system, acting as delegates of the Governor-General upon appointment as
gobernadorcillos of their villages. They noted that in this way they retained their
functions as the organisers of the political, economic and social life of their subjects
while taking responsibility for ensuring that the rules laid down by the colonial
authorities were adhered to. They noted that this system allowed for the upkeep of
Filipino ways and customs. Also, the legal status granted to the principalas by
recognition of their role with their subjects had rendered the colonial system easier for
these elites to accept. On the other hand, they also observed that in respecting the
organisation and even the language of the Filipinos an opportunity had been lost to
assimilate them more into Western culture. According to these observers, this would
have allowed the population of the islands to aspire to more educational development.
This notion provided an opportunity to highlight the backwardness of the Filipinos8.
The most frequently-recurring image in most of the writings discussed here is one of

power that they enjoyed thanks to their landholdings, which they rented to farmers, and to the sale of
certificates and other religious privileges.
7

El gobierno no puede esperar cooperacin por parte de los misioneros en medidas que tiendan a
disminuir la autoridad eclesistica o su jurisdiccin; y sin embargo, la sujecin de esa autoridad al
Estado, y sus limites donde quiera que interviene en el bienestar publico, es la gran necesidad y el
problema de mas importancia que debe resolverse en Filipinas, Bowring, Op. Cit., p. 199.

En el caso de los ms prsperos ejemplos de colonizacin por los ingleses, las razas indgenas han
desaparecido por completo, o progresa su extincin, mientras que la infusin de sangre espaola, no solo
ha permitido el aumento de la clase indgena, sino que ha sido insuficiente para cambiar o ligeramente
mejorar sus caracteres nacionales, Bowring, Op. Cit., p. 87.

10

backward tribes, racial distinctions, savage customs, lazy workers and so forth, which
simply underlined the need to help these peoples achieve a desirable measure of
progress, which the Spanish had been incapable of providing. These writers continually
stressed the need for a long learning process until the Filipinos should become capable
of self-government, and they underlined the desirability of example and guidance from
a superior nation, which would lead them to the civilisation and progress that the
Spanish had been incapable of bringing to them. Such images, presenting indigenous
peoples as unschooled children, were recurrent in the colonial discourse of the time and
are duly reflected in these writings.

Not all the observations in these writings are accurate. And not all the comments are
fair. But by broadcasting these images, which would eventually inform the view of the
Spanish administration received by the general public, they were paving the way for
future action. Such images could serve as the basis for a denunciation of bad
government in the archipelago and for solid-seeming arguments to justify the need for
the islands to change hands if their progress were to be assured. In this way they were
lending credence to a discourse that could justify an intervention in the Philippines by
any other colonial power that felt itself capable of remedying these ills, introducing
proper administration of the islands and their inhabitants and promoting their progress,
while taking advantage of the manifold economic possibilities that they presented. That
discourse would eventually be translated into action by those sectors in the United
States that were prepared, first to demand, and then to defend, US interference in
Filipino affairs.

3. The utilisation of created images

The context was, then, one in which the need for reforms was very much present. That
fact was known both inside and outside the Philippines, but so far the situation had not
led anyone to question Spanish sovereignty, beyond a realisation that this was an empire
in flux, with critical problems at its core (which could cause a collapse), but one that
still had chances of renewal. But as yet the status quo remained unquestioned. The
debate over a possible change of hands in the colonial administration was still to come.

11

Two events altered this situation: first the Filipino revolution of 1896; and second the
Spanish-American war of 1898.

In the 1896 revolution, various sectors of the Filipino people rose against Spanish
colonial rule, initiating an inexorable movement for independence, in advance of Asia
as a whole. International opinion saw the rebellion as a denunciation of Spanish misrule,
of the intransigence, abuses and injustice of their colonial rule, and also of the position
of the religious orders in the organisation of the islands. The great powers responded to
these accusations but not in support of Filipino demands for full independence. After
all, virtually every great power had an empire and colonial interests to defend, and to
support such demands could jeopardise their own colonized. Only a very few sectors in
various countries supported Filipino self-government. What most foreign governments
did was take advantage of these accusations to stress the need for a change of colonial
administrator in the archipelago, thus leaving the field clear for another power or
powers to intervene in the Philippines. The intention, then, was not to put an end to
colonial rule and create a new, independent State, but simply a transition between
empires, a change of hands.

In response to these early claims of the desirability of a change of colonial administrator

in the Philippines, the Spanish discourse was very different. Following the end of the
insurrection and the signing of the Pact of Biac Na Bat, the Spanish authorities
propounded the argument that this marked the start of a new era in relations with the
Filipinos. No-one was thinking of an end to the Spanish presence; the talk was rather of
a new future9. The reformist/anti-reformist debate was considered closed. It was time to
undertake the reforms needed to maintain the colonial regime, without delay. It was
announced that there would be a strict selection and proper training of administrative
personnel, measures to achieve a properly-organised colonial army and a welldefined foreign policy that will forewarn us of possible threats10. Several of these
9

That was the thrust of the first speech by general Primo de Rivera, Governor-General of the islands and
negotiator of peace with the Filipinos after Biac Na Bat on 23 January 1898, where he announced the
end of the insurrection and publicly proclaimed the future fortunes that awaited the islands. The Gaceta
de Manila reported his triumphant speech to the Filipino people and announced the grant of a pardon to
all those on trial except those already condemned by the courts, who would have to seek pardon from the
king.
10

In the words of Francisco Silvela, then Conservative leader, in January 1898, when proposing
improvements for the Philippines to the Cortes.

12

measures had been suggested by foreign observers and had been called for by the
Filipino rebels. And again, both the message from the Crown read by the Regent Queen
Maria Cristina of Habsburg on 20 April and the instructions given by prime minister
Mateo Prxedes Sagasta to the new governor of the islands, Basilio Augustn, who took
up his duties at that time, stressed the need for improvement of conditions in the
archipelago to avert future discontent, and the aim of including all sectors of society
in public administration, giving them their right and proper place in the management of
public affairs. For instance, in the early months of 1898 a Consultative Assembly for
the Philippines was created to advise the Governor-General on political and
administrative matters, drawing its members from representatives of
principal

the islands

institutions along with twenty Filipino personalities, including several

prominent members of the enlightenment11. In addition, a move was made to discharge

Spanish troops and replace them with Filipino volunteers. Milicias de voluntarios
indgenas were formed, whose members could be promoted up to the rank of colonel12.
At the end of May the Cortes debated the possibility of granting the Filipinos the
parliamentary representation they so strongly demanded. However, these measures
came too late. While these decisions were being made, the risings continued in the
Philippines; the nationalist leaders started talks with the Americans and the British in
Hong Kong and Singapore to discuss the future of the islands; and the United States
prepared for its decisive intervention in the archipelago. This last circumstance would
spell the end for the Spanish empire in Asia.

The Spanish-American war changed everything. The first battle in the struggle between
Spain and the USA, sparked off by Cuba, took place in Cavite Bay, and that inevitably
brought the Philippines in to the conflict. There were several putative reasons for the US
intervention. An American desire simply to gain a naval base in the islands; support for
Filipino aspirations of independence; or a change in the administration of the islands,
which might be partial or complete and might involve one or more powers. That set of
possibilities, all of which seemed feasible on that 1 May at Cavite, took the lid off. All
11

This advisory board met only once, on 28 May 1898, and there Alejandro Paterno called for a high
degree of autonomyquasi-independencein return for Filipno fealty.
12

Prominent Filipinos like Po del Pilar, Enrique Flores, Artemio Ricarte, Baldomero Aguinaldo or Felipe
Buencamino were appointed to lead these militias. Volunteers for this corps were promised exemption
from personal taxation and other monetary advantages.

13

kinds of rumours became rife and the powers openly showed their real aspirations. The
summer and autumn of 1898 were the scene of secret negotiations over the future of the
Philippines and the islands of Micronesia.

It was during those months of uncertainty, when it became necessary to justify the
annexation of the annexation of the Philippines to American public opinion, that the old
images of Spanish misrule were brought out and dusted off. The old analyses were used
to highlight the worst features of Spanish colonial rule and so justify a change of
government. This ruined Spains image in the Philippines for many years. The
inefficacy of Spanish administration, the extent of the abuses and corruption, the lack of
economic stimuli that prevented development of the islands and the excessive
interference of the religious orders were all brought up once again. The Americans, who
had been severely critical of Spanish colonial policy in the Caribbean since the war of
Cuban independence in 1895, extended their criticisms to the Philippines, making much
of the cruelty of the Spanish yoke. The black legend about Spain, so widely bruited in
the United States in the late 19th century, identified the colonial regime with absolutist
policies, military arbitrariness, religious intransigence, despotism, brutality and
corruption. For much of the American populace in 1898 Spain was an exotic and
picturesque country, but a dark and backward one labouring under the weight of
centuries-old anachronismsabsolute monarchy, the Inquisition, the cruelty of the New
World conquestwhich still persisted in its society. In such conditions, the best thing to
do was to take advantage of the war against Spain to free the Filipinos from so nasty a
regime13.

That change in the discourse regarding Spanish administration was not only evident in
the United States, but also in Great Britain. If we look at the papers of British consuls in
the Philippines in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s we find that their relations with the
colonial authorities were close, easy and mutually cooperative, as evidenced by the

13

This black legend can be followed through a series of works: Richard Kagan, Prescotts Paradigm:
American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain, American Historical Review, April 1996;
Gerald F.Linderman, The Mirror of War. American Society and the Spanish American War, 1974; the
image conveyed by books on Spanish history (Ruth Elson, Guardians of Tradition: American School
Books of the Nineteenth Century, 1964; William Prescott, Henry Charles Lea); accounts by American
travellers in Spain (Hobart Chatfield Taylor, William Howe Downes, Henry Martin Field, Edgard Everret
Hale, James Russell Lowell).

14

correspondence between Consul Farren and Governor Nozaragay14, between Viceconsul Loney and Governor de la Gndara, and several examples more. The
conversations between them, invariably cordial and respectful in tone, concerned free
trade, protection of British merchants, and the struggle against taxation or against
excessive regulation by the colonial authorities15. But in 1898 the British discourse on
Spanish rule changed. During the Spanish-American war the British began to talk of
the savage cruelty of the Spaniards to the natives, of the impossibility of the United
States handing Luzn back to the bloody barbarities of Spain, and of their fear for the
14

The relationship established between consul Farren and Governor-General Nozagaray is apparent from
a report drafted by the former on the occasion of the latters departure ffrom the islands: His Excellency,
Lieutenant General de Nozagaray, the present Captain General of the Philippines, leaves this
appointment to proceed to Europe I have known six captains general here since my arrival in 1844 to
open the first official relations of Her Majestys Government with these possessions. The have all been
men of good intentions some with capabilitiesand one of them, the late Marques de Solana, was a man
of very considerable talent and energy but none united in I character so many personal qualities, for
administering the Government of these possessions, effectively, prosperously and harmoniously, as the
Captain General who is about to leave us, nor has any of them left with such a strong and general
feelings of sympathy, respect and regret as is sustained by all classesSpaniards, Foreign and Natives
for General Nozagaray. The National Archives (Kew, Great Britain), 9 January 1860. From Consul
Farren to Lord John Russell.
15

For example, in December 1858 the foreign traders in the Philippines sent a note to the GovernorGeneral: With the greatest deference and respect, we make so bold as to suggest the following reforms to
Y.E., in the conviction that you will consent to give it the full consideration that we believe they merit.
And after fifteen pages of explanations, they concluded: These are some of the reforms and suggestions
that we ask Y.E.to consider. in the hope that in proposing them we share Y.E.s desire to raise the
Philippines to that pre-eminent position that they deserve in view of the richness of their soil, the variety
of their products and their outstanding topographical position, The National Archives, 11 December
1858. The foreign traders to the Governor-General. Signed: Ker and Co., Nicolay Richardson and Co.
Phillips Morre & Co., GN. Michell, Jenny & Co., Eugster Labhar & Co., Holliday Wise & Co., Smith
Bell & Co., JK. Smith, Guibard et fils.
Consul Farren highlighted the fact that the foreign traders should so address the Governor-General with a
single voice, thus demonstrating the high esteem in which they held the latters public character, and their
confidence in the effort that he was making to bring prosperity to the archipelago. I have resided as
H.B.M. Consul upwards of 14 years in the Philippines, where, as when at Damascus as H.M. Consul
General for Syria, it has been the gratifying distinction of my public career, to open the first relations of
official internationality with Great Britain. This is the first time I have known of the foreign commercial
body here, spontaneously addressing and as a body, a Captain General of these possessions, on their
commercial interests, and as the medium they have chosen, and acquainted as I am with their personal
sentiments, I have a very lively satisfaction in assuming Y.E. that this circumstance is a particular
evidence of their high estimation of Y. E. public character and their confidence in your solicitude for
public prosperityIn the spirit of these general observations on its details, I have the honour to preset to
Y. E. the accompanying memorial of the British & Foreign Merchants, in the belief, that as a calm,
unexaggerated, faithful and reasonable exposition regarding the interests of Foreign Commerce here, it
will engage the solicitude attention of Y.E, The National Archives, 24 December 1858, Consul Farren to
General Fernando de Nozagaray, Governor-General of the Philippines.
The matter was not confined to mere gestures of good will. Some months later, the British consul himself
reported how after examining the proposed measures the Governor-General had recommended to Madrid
that they be implemented. H.E. stated to me that the memorial, alter being submitted to the
consideration of the different departments and official committees of the Government here, had been
favourably reported on by them and been sent by H.E. to Madrid, recommended by him for adoption.
The National Archives, 6 February 1860, Consul Farren to Lord John Russell.

15

future of the priests held in captivity, whose debaucheries, robberies and cruelties
which they and their predecessors have for many generations perpetrated on the
peaceful villagers are now being ruthlessly repaid16. That discourse clearly chimed
with the story the Americans had been spreading to justify not only their intervention
but also their remaining in the Philippines, but it was a volte-face from the tone with
which the British had hitherto spoken of Spanish rule.

To make matters worse, a negative image was broadcast of the Philippines themselves .
In order to justify US conduct and ignoring of Filipino demands, stress was placed on
their savagery and their organisation in backward tribes lacking political and social
maturity. They were presented as unschooled children, a people in need of a more
mature nation to teach them the advantages of democratic institutions and to lead them
to eventual self-government following a period of guardianship. And who better to fulfil
that mission than the United States? This construction of so pejorative an image of the
Filipinos would likewise have a long-lasting effect on the way in which that people
were viewed by the international community.

4. Considerations on colonial succession in the Philippines

What questions do these events raise? Firstly, there is the question of the causes, which
can help us to understand why the colonial administration of the Philippines changed
hands, why the transition from one empire to another.

In the first place, there is the weakness evinced by Spain as an imperial metropolis over
the course of the 19th century, a situation that arose from the political instability in the
Peninsula during that period. For Spain the century was characterised by a succession of
16

The whole story of political peculation, from the Governor Generals (with one or two bright
exceptions) downwards, and the savage cruelty to the natives is too long to relate, and is now, happily, a
tale of the past, for it should be impossible for the United States to hand back Luzon to the bloody
barbarities of SpainThere are also many priests in captivity, and I fear the debaucheries, robberies
and cruelties which they and their predecessors have for many generations perpetrated on the peaceful
villagers are now being ruthlessly repaid. The National Archives, 19 October 1898. From H. Lampton,
Captain H.M.S. Powerful, to E.H. Seymour. Lampton was the first commander of the British squadron
that sailed to the Philippines to protect British subjects and observe the course of the war.

16

different political regimes, all of them failures; by the build-up of tensions and the
outbreak of internal wars which prevented Spain from devoting to the colonies the
attention and the investment that they needed; by the lack of sufficient economic
potential to assure the success of any overseas adventures; by the lack of a strong, wellequipped navy and army; and by the fragility of its international position, bereft as it
was of powerful allies to shore up its interests17. These circumstances militated against a
firmer policy in the Philippines.

In second place, was the inability of the colonial administration to evolve and
modernise at the rate the times demanded. It was also manifestly incapable of
acknowledging the progress of Filipino society, of integrating the Filipinos in the
system, or of satisfying their aspirations at least to a minimum degree, and not just in
the closing years of the 19th century but from the earliest decades of that century, when
the Cortes of Cadiz launched the debate on the legal situation of the colonies. And it is
not that reforms or reformists were lacking. Quite the contrary; there were stout
reformists and numerous reform plans were drawn up. But these were not implemented
with sufficient conviction. The prevailing emotion was fear of change, fear of what
change might bring, and fear also of the reaction of the most intransigent sectors. In the
face of these threats, it seemed safer to maintain the status quo and pay no heed to calls
for change; not to make room for new trends and new social groups; not to negotiate,
not to settle, and not to give way. In short, not to evolve, failing to see that such a
position was impossible to sustain, a course of wilful suicide in the long term, which
unexpectedly for Spain suddenly became a very short term for which the metropolitan
power was quite unprepared.

In third place, was the dynamism of Filipino society, various sectors of which were
calling for a new political order, recognition of broader rights, an end to inequality with
peninsular Spaniards, new economic opportunities, and more power to decide on their
own future. The failure to acknowledge these aspirations led Filipino nationalists first to
rebel against the colonial regime and later to commence the struggle for independence.

17

Recent studies (Prados, Palafox, Fusi) have shown that Spains situation was not as exceptional as
historians have traditionally painted it. In 1875 Spain commenced a process of modernisation and
progress which brought it close to the European standards of the time. However, elements of weakness
and instability still persisted and Spain was not counted among the elite of the most powerful nations.

17

In fourth place, was the development of an economy in the islands in which Spain had
very little part and constituted more of a problem than a means of solution. On the one
hand the wellsprings of the export-oriented agricultural economy that predominated in
the islands at the end of the century were not in Spanish hands, and nor were they
controlled by the colonial authorities. And on the other hand, the Filipino economic
elites and foreign traders and investors forged new bonds, for which Spain was a drag
rather than a help. Moreover, Spain was not the preferred market for Filipino exports.
The upshot of all these circumstances was that the economic interests of the Filipinos
increasingly diverged from those of Spain.

And in fifth place, were the currents in international relations which threatened Spains
position in the Philippines. Stronger countries than Spain pursued their interests in Asia
and the Pacific and looked for strategic areas over which to extend their influence. The
powers embarked on a massive process of expansion and a sharing out of the last areas
still open to colonisation. In this context the prevailing question was why should old
colonial powers which no longer had the strength to maintain their hold on muchcoveted territories be allowed to retain sovereignty. In the case of the Philippines,
Spains hold on the archipelago was threatened by the imperialist expansion of three
new powers in that part of the world: Germany, the United States and Japan. Any one of
these would be prepared to take over Spains position as colonial administrator of the
Philippines. It was simply a matter of awaiting the right opportunity.

That opportunity came with the Spanish-American war. There were several factors
which fundamentally influenced the course of the conflict. First was the US intervention
in the Philippines and its decision, which was debated in the course of that summer, to
annex the whole of the archipelago. Second was the secret negotiation initiated by
Germany to acquire the Spanish islands in Micronesia, in an effort to defend its own
interests in the area and achieve a fairer share-out of the Spanish possessions. Third was
the international fear of Japanese expansion, which it was thought best to contain. And
fourth was the position of Great Britain, which still held sway on the seas and had major
interests in the India-China axis, and which backed up the United States in the new role
that it proposed to play in the area. The British government believed that the Americans
would support their open-doors policy vis--vis China and that thanks to the extension
of the Anglo-Saxon special relationship to this area, it would gain an ally there. Given
18

those circumstances, with so many adverse factors, Spain had very little chance of
retaining its hold on the Philippines and was forced to bring an end to a colonial
relationship that had lasted more than three centuries.

A second question also arises in connection with the way in which the colonial
succession took place. Clearly, the colonial relationship between Spaniards and
Filipinos would eventually have come to an end in any case. However, the break need
not have been so traumatic. It could have proceeded at a natural pace and the end of
colonial rule could have been achieved on the basis of a new relationship with the
Filipinos without foreign interference. There would probably have been time for that.
The Filipino desire for independence was clear, but no timetable had been drawn up. In
the end, the Philippines remained a colony for almost half a century morebe it
remembered nonetheless that this was at the cost of a gruelling war against the
Americans, who finally prevailed thanks to their superior resources, which Spain
lacked.

But even so, had the colonial regime ended differently, it would have been much easier
to set the post-colonial relationship between Spaniards and Filipinos on a new footing:
without the writings that accompanied the change of sovereignty from Spain to the
USA; without the images purveyed; without black legends; and without the tales spread
by the US administration about how bad Spanish rule had been. In fact, in the case of
Spain and the Philippines the problems inherent in any long-standing colonial
relationship were compounded by these exaggerated images, touted by the Americans to
justify their intervention in the islands. Subsequent factors were Spain's ambiguous
position during the Second World War and its support for the axis powers, which
included Japan, the new invader of the Philippines, and the ties of complicity between
the Franco and Marcos dictatorships.

It has taken us a long time to begin to set the relationship between our two societies to
rights, and the process continues. It was necessary to wait for democracy to take root in
both countries before the relationship could be resumed on a new footing, in which we
are capable of looking at the past objectively, without false rhetoric, and recognising
that despite the many mistakes made, there were strong ties linking the two societies.
Nevertheless, despite the efforts made and some advances, and despite the speeches
19

made by senior politicians from both countries and frequent state visits, the Filipinos
still view the erstwhile colonial power with a degree of suspicion. This situation
undoubtedly has very much to do with the way in which the colonial relationship
endedthe final fireworks, the deliberately distorted images, the stereotypes and the
discourses fashioned at the close of the 19th century and the demise of the Spanish
empire in Asia.

20