Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and
blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the
1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also
clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's
presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the
government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of
the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that
left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There
were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the
message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over
military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian
government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211

September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R.

MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS
MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR
YIGUEZ
and
PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO
DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Executive
Secretary,
Secretary
of
Justice,
Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos.
There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr.
Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel
government of their own on the areas they effectively control while
the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands.
There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest
power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but
also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful
in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.

CORTES, J.:

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated
foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos
and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at
economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office,
have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the
masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
has remained elusive.

Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance.

While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the
political, economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution
and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her
ascension to and consilidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political
leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7
by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos
loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an
aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin,
January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family.
The Petition
1

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case
of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and
who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a
class by itself.

(4)
Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with,
has the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it
was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may
controvert the same?
c.
Is the President's determination that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health
a political question?

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to

order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.

d.
Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the
return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health,
have respondents established such fact?

The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise
of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

3.
Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the
President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos
and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in
performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum
for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would

depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1.
Does the President have the power to bar the return of
former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right
of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Is this a political question?

2.
Assuming that the President has the power to bar former
President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines,
in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

a.
Has the President made a finding that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b.

xxx

(1)
Have the requirements of due process been complied with
in making such finding?
Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3)

Has there been a hearing?

xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within

the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law.

Assuming that she has made that finding

(2)

xxx

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to

impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the
2

President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized

her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government,
there must be legislation to that effect.

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or

not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to
travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional
rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the

right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is

whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the
right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the
face of the determination by the President that such return and
residence will endanger national security and public safety.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question

is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of
what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question
is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial
and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its
nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court
can not consider it.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

1)
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence.
2)
own.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to

return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This
is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can
decide.

Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to

return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even
if their return and residence here will endanger national security
and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this
Honorable Court can decide.

3)
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary
to protect national security, public order (order public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners

Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and
establish their residence here? This is now a political question
which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the
exclusive authority and competence of the President of the
Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp.
297-299.]

4)
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the
issue in this case involves a political question which is nonjusticiable. According to the Solicitor General:
3

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to

national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they
cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally

connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to
one's country, a totally distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate
and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art.
13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be
free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which
rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals or enter
qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived."
[Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to
travel.

Section 4.
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal,
military, or civil service.
Section 5.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and
family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of
Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba,
King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El
Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented
by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary
Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp.
26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights

specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of

the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view
this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the
parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow
confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case
within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v.
Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v.
Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed
the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise
thereof, respectively.

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the
issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the
right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between
executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue
before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the

right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
4

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of

whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is

vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive
power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commanderin-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power
to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a

need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution
of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first
resolve whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the
Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or
not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain

powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend
that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of
"executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has
enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly
denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum
for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind
the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally
patterned.**

Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers
of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139
(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11,
"[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided
in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a
grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power
which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If
this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred
members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United

States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To
those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those
who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable
leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision
realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words:
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
5

States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers,

17871957, pp. 3-4.]

presidential system of government and restored the separation of

legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by

the different persons who held the office from Washington to the
early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to
Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at
any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." [At 30.]

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power"

is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial

Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution.
it remained of course, an agency of government subject to
unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But,
more than most agencies of government, it changed shape,
intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each
President's distinctive temperament and character, his values,
standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies,
compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the
entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a
chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of
the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the
constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President.
Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal
obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the
confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the
nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or
weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987

Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the
issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and
the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and
the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding
the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or

what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and
the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the
extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with
explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into
the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead,
but through numerous amendments, the President became even
more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto
Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of

the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with
the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by
the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether
the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not
judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either
of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do
6

fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of
government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a
social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest
the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by
the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers,
the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them."
[Art. II, Sec. 1.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his

enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it
would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in
the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other. ....
xxx

xxx

xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may

disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far
from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210211.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons

who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought
to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are
neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched
in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general

welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or
the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra,
at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit
in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the
President].

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance

of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
7

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American
Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when
no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is
not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that
follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.

safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such

request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec.
1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General
that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally
left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there
remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of
which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the
people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot,
for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action
may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it
may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the
grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of
the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in
the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines
"as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and
as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising
respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws."
[House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does
not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's
sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our

determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners
show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial
review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved,
the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide
a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the

Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
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paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining

"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in
Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA
4481 that:]

rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder

with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials,
to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it
goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to
him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of
such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not
to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act [At 479-480.]

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may

be contained. The military establishment has given assurances
that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is
the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to
be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State,
that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation
of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation
in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot
shirk from that responsibility.

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or

not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she
has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which
stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents
were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's
decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend
that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,
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widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting

precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is
easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the

President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by

the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the
state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

SO ORDERED.

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