DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS

225TII INFANTRY
DIVISION,
IA, No. 5200
SEPTBMBER
3, 1918.
Pursuant to the dispositions made by General Headquarters concerning the experiences in the last defensive engagements, the followmain points for anti-tank operations are set fortl~. Regimental
talion, and company and battery cornmanclers are enjoined to give
their respective troops thorough instruction on these points :

A. IN GENERAL
The infantry must be insistently instr~cteclthat encay tanks
in themselves have no figlrting powers whatever, and that their
shooting is inaccurate; their effect is principally a moral cffoct.
Bxgerlencc has shown tliat infantry on its own initiative, with the

LESSONS LEARNED I N A N T l - T A N R F1 G H T I N G
cut off just the smie as, lor csamplc, nlnclii~~c-gun
crews that have
been stoppcel in our rcar by tanks (as has often lmppened); they are
citl~rrt1cr;tn)ycclbyour firc or put out cf action by 011.j. hrompt counter
:~ttaclr. l h t so much the inorc is i t absolutely esscntial that tlic
infantry isai~ltainthe s1i;upcst observation totvi~rtltho front, in orcler
io rccogdih in tiine and to bring u~lclcrdcstrucWvc fire the enemy
illat nlay be clangerous to us-thc cncmy ipfantry-which either
follo? ,close behind the tanlrs or else after a considerable interval.

R. TRRBXIIAVIOR
O F TIT15 XN~~ANTRII AND ,I\'~ASUIIIW
TO
II
BE TAKENFOR COMBATTING
ENKMV
'~ANKS
I: T h e ilafnlztry conzhafs tanks at closa rnqp-son nletms at
rnost-with
armor-piercing ammunition, and a t still closer rang(:
wit11 Iland grcnacle balls (two hitnd grenadc heads bound with tvirp,
to another hand grenadc) by throwing thc lattcr on the citterpillar
chains or against the perpendicular surfaces of tltc tank. Handgrcnade balls will be copio~~sly
pl:~Ccclalong the line of 1nail-i resistance
(Nauptruiecierstnltdslinie) whicll is cspccially exposcd to tankattacks,
m d in the rcar weas (alcrng lines, in machhic-gun ~ncsts). Single
hand grcnarics arc without elfect. When tanlrs arrivc a t our lines in
spite of precautions, infmtry will give way to eithcP sirlc.
Expcricnce Lcachcs that i d a n t r y often opens fire too sou11, ancl
shoots wild. Hence the principle: Only by well-ninced Blre nt close
m z g e can t d i s bc put out of action. The nzen mnst bc instructed
with picturcs exactly a t what points thc tanlrs arc vulncrnblc to ulcir
wcapcms.
2 . Measures of n passive matzwd.-Tank
traps cIistriL~utcc1in
rlopth Ior blocking tho Mosclle Valley roacl ih question, tlw lJcy-et\hay^.--Norroy road, swamping l h c 'L'rcp VallQy, blowing up of roads
leading out of villages, briilgcs, laying out mine-fields wltliin the
scctor, arc Jready unclcr w:~y. 'Tho Commaaclcr of Pioacel-s is made
responsible for the clircction and speccly executicnl of the work. Maps
oI thc worlcs undcr construction (passive tank dcfcusc) iu conaectioil
with thc active tank tlelCnsct(Art., M. G's., 'L'. M's.) will br @yyn t o 111o
units.
C. CONCLUSIONS
In all cnenzy attaclts in which tanlrs are ngecl the cnemy infantry
rcmains our principal opponent, Tanlrs will be attenrlccl to by our
scar cloienses, By rcason of tllcir smoll fighting powers thcy are
unable t o execute an encircling movement, o r to gain any tactical
advantage. Every ntcitns must, tbcrclore, be used to raise tho confidence of our infantry in our woapons and moans of clofcnse. Divisions that have becn atlaclrctl many iirnes by tanlrs dcclare that the
infant~y,bcforc thc first tanlc attaclc, considers tllc tarlks as much
worse than they redly arc. The sple~lcliclfire effect ol our defensive
means, which has dcstroyecl one tank after anothcr, has taught thcm
better. Thcrcfore, thc men mtlst tmclcr no circunlstntlces losc thcir

ncrvc upon the first appearance of tanlrs. Further, whcn tanlts hava
broken through our positions, these positions must still be clefended
according to arclers; in no case cloes the breaking through of tanks
offer a reason for withdrawal. This must be nmde thoroughly clear
to every infantryman.
(Signed) JUNG.

LESSONS LEARNED IN RECENT ANTI-TANK FIGHTING

No. 322 SWT. 18.

Not to be taken i d o the front line Ivenches

A widc use is to be made of the megaphone and of the signal of

attention by buglc. Wireless: the post must bc occnpiecl day and
night. Visual signals: bengal flares used up t o now are too wcalr for
use in foggy weather. Stacks of fire wood, sprinlclccl with gasoline,
kerosene and other inflammable liquids will be lighted at particularly
suitable points. Streams of fire will be shot vertically ancl rcpcateclly
by tho flame projectors. Mobile observation systems : motor-cyclists,
cyclists, cavalry patrols and telephone shall be usccl. A large nnmbcr ol megnphoncs and bugles will be in rcadinc~swithin the villages.
Tank Trenches.
Tllcsc will be prepnrecl in t h c l a w s through which tlzc tank is
obligcil t o pass, across tlic cntirc width of the road (at lcnst fivr
nmtcrs) and be well conccalcd by camoufiage; tlic boarding mnst bc
such t h a t only light vehicles, ~vcighingfour tans a t the most, can
cross thcm. If possible, the clitches are to be filled with watcr to a
tlcpth of two meters as the water stops the motor, or anti-tank mincs
placccl a t the bottom with an automatic clcvicc for clischarging.
'She routcs available for hoavy artillery will be dearly ~narkctlout.
Awli-2nn.W Bawiers.

l~ermancntbarriers which nligllt hinder our own traflic will not

bc constructecl unncccsserily. The new Vrencll tanlrs, sniall moilcl,
arc only 1.70 meters widc. Obstacles will conscqncntly l ~ cconstructetl. Care will be taken t h a t the concrcte blocks arc firmly sct;
otherwise Lhe tank will displace thcm. Thc tank cnnnot bc stoppctl by
bloclis lcss than two nietcrs high. I t is ntlvisnhlc tlm1 n ditch onc
lnclcr c1cc.p he (lag in h n t of llw slapping l h r k in suvh n wag that

GERMAN E S T I M A T E O F T A N K S

i t forms an acutc angle a t tlic brtsc with tlic concrctil l h c k :inti tll;lt
the stopping block bc sturltlccl with rails or T-irolis in the ilircction fronl
whicl~tlic knlk is cspcctecl. (Sce sltclrll.)

If harricrs arc constructetl out of agricultural nmchiaes i t is

necessary to join tlic~utogether with a qenntity of iron wire; take
advantage of tlic pointed nletal parts, snch as harrows, cic., which
will c ~ t c hin thc caterpillar tread. Tllcsu kind of barricrs will fulfil1
their purpose only if constructed on narrow roads to a depth of 10
t o 20 meters. Strctcliccl iron wirc is useloss ns tlie tuilr rolls over it,
Trnprovisecl barricrs arc made of barricades with vi~rioushandy
rnatcrial os of stopping blocks fornzcd out of trce-trunks inzhctltled
in thc ground and coverctl with earth or slonc.
A vehicle placcd across the road can only stop tlic Lank if of large
size and loaded with stone. Small orclin~ryvchiclcs arc not suificient.
All barriers can stop thc prugcss of the t a r ~ kfor a longer or ~ h o r l c r
pcriod only; tlicy cannot stop i t dcfiuitcly nor destroy it. lJnr this
reason tlic system of passiva dcfensos will ho complcmcntetl by
pwticularly uctivc clcfcnsivc mctl\ods.
3. A c n v e Dr'.
rE hNSE
*
The effcct of S aznnwmition is nil; that of T i :i~laa~unitlon
(armorpiercing) against tanks of ncw n~otlclis doubL[ul. "l'lir bulltlt of thi?
anti-tank riflc passcs Illrough the present arurror p h t r ;&t
n maxirnum
&tance of goo motors; it is nccrssary, tlicrcforc, to lot tllo el~tlks
approach. Groups of anti-tank siflcls will ba Eolmctl; tlicsc .rvoapnns
will be cntrustad only to experioncccl :md cud-hcitclotl riflemen.
Bomb-tlvowcss will br, couritetl on only Ins clu~ncr*hits in vosy
vulncmablc parts of tha tnnlr.
I g M trcncli rnortars pierce t l ~ carn~or-pldc;spcchl soft-nosotl
projectiles have just bceu i~~trocli~ccd.
Li ortlor to dinii~lisllclispcrsion, tlic firing is to bo cltrtie Srarn Lhc plxlfami as much ns yoasiblo.
t
of tmlis. C;ootZ r c a ~ ~ larc
l s ol,Cairzed
Guns t m the ~ r c a t c scnemics
with tho field gun nmlel 196 using brass ccirtrlclgc c;isr. ITp LO rgoo
mctcrs every artillcry projcclilc is cll'ct'livr; for tlistanccs over 1500
lnetcrs soft-nosed proicclilcs will he uscrl, On ~ c c o n n of
t its Io\v r i l t ~
of fire the field modd 1x6 is lcss suilalh. SZrcl r w t r i r l p ~t-;~st~s
:n.c
not si~iisfactoryas thcy jn ni l o o frcqucully.

Ilxccllcnt results are obtained with flamc projectors by directing

tho firc on the loop-holes. This weapon is particularly suitablc for
the defcnse of villages. The crcw awaits thc tank under covcr bchind
tlie honsos, ctc. One army proposes, when the terrain is provided
with good points for observation, to group all the means for active
tlcfense i n such a way as to form anti-tank redoubts. All thc means
for active defonso arc collected there under thc sole commancl of an
energotic officer, all men being rcsolvcd to hold out to .the last and to
destroy all thc tanlrs coming witliin range. The composition of such
rctloubts would be : one or two guns, one or two light trench nzortars,
two macliinc guns, three or four anti-tank riflcs, one or two flame
projectors; obstacles will be constructccl around the group.
The tanks arc always follo\vccl by hostile infantry ancl oftcn by
cavalry.
Tllc main point to be observed in ilefcnsc is that nobody lose his
hcad :wtl that cvery nnit bc held firmly in hi~ntlby an encrgctic lcadcr.

GERMAN ESTIlVTATE OF TANKS

C:otnnzeqbt by G c r r n m (1flicrr.s of the .pth I*rzfnutvv l?~girncwt,

28th IJiuisiow.

'L'hc Germim Army untlercstimatecl thc value of tanlcs, r~ndtherefore when we have necrlrtl them tlicrc havc bccn none available. Thc
iirst tanlrs intmclucecl by tllc British carlier in tlic war worc so licavily
constructccl and so slow in movemcnt that from our point of view
thcy were practically valuclcss. 170s these reasons, the German
Govcmment consiilered the employment and construction of tanlcs
of no aclvantage, but in thc course of time the British sleadily irnprovetl
on their original ~nncl~ines
until they now arc in possession of an
rxtreu~zclyeikctivc wcapon against which wc havc an inacleqnatc
ckfcnse consisting mercly of light field gnns wllicli a t best arc
impracticable. I t has talccn us a long tinle to realize what; powerful
weapons tanks really arc, so that now, wlicn i t is probably too Into.
we are attempting to bring up, t o tlic line machines that measure up
to tlic British stanrlartl but which in actual practice arc far below it.
'I.'lm failure of our own original tanlts was cxcnscil by the phasc "Only
t11c)sc troops wllo liavc lost thcir 17GrVC ncerl tho support of lanlrs",
nurl having pcrsuarlctl oarselvcs tlmt this was I r n c wc ni;~rlcno fnrllin
IMP 01 our r l ~ ~ n ~
c ~s ~y n s t ~ ~ i c i i o n s .

CA U S E S OF DEFEAT OF THE I X d GERMAN ARMY

ORGAMXZATXON OF REGIMENTAL PINENWERFER COMPANIES-THEIR USE TO COMBAT TANKS

tmlrs a t clistanccs of from 200 to 300 meters. Practice firing should

also hc conducted with medium and heavy M. W. upon the lanes
tl~ro11g11
which tanlcs must follow.

THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE IId GERMAN ARMY

I t is apparent from various signs that t h e Gcrnu~ncommand
found that divisional hf, W. conipanics do not meet the nccds of the
1wescnt warfarc, and with a view t o releasing n ~ c nfor inhntry scrvicr
has ilccidctl to abolish divisionttl M. W. companies and form rcgi..
nicntal companies.
From a captured German c.locumont of August ~ 7 t iht is cviclcut
h a t this reorganization is basccl on the following principles :
1st. Assignment of the personnel from tllc i1ivision;~lronqmnies
;tn~ongthe reginwntal companics.
zrl, Using tllc esistiug rcsonlccs of tllc inlnntry R4. I\", dctacllments for the formation of rcgimcntnl coiiipanics.

I t seems that bcsiclcs lllc itlca of ameliorating t11t~tlolicicncy in

lllc inlantry pcrsonncl, tllc Ccsnxm high con~mantlin fonning tllcwb
rcgimcntal M.W. companies has had in nsintl forming spucinl units
co~1ntcr a illcans of combat that is giving il: Inure and nztrrr
anxiety.
An orclcr of I,uciontlorff clatecl August 7, IQIN, is quotctl :
"In order t o eI~cctivclycombat tanks t21c grcntcst ilqwrtiznc~
must be attachcd to the iustrl~ctiollof the persor~nclin thc us^ of
ligl~tM.W, with flat trajcctorics mcl itnti-hnlr rifles.
More than one soldicr of tllc g J l a n t U. \V. forces will rcgrcl
seeing tho divisional companies tlissolvccl; howcvur, T :mi suro tllitt
ovary o m fainilar will1 the tactical conditions which maltc this c l i i ~ n g ~
imperative will rcjoicc in seeing tho beginning of n morc iutiintitc
ini ion with the infantry. Tllc fight agsinst tanlcs, wllicll is assaxniug
nu extraorclinary iiuportancc, bccomos the first cnusi(1w~tionof N. W.
~lnits.''
'l'hc Sollowing armament is given to rCginicntal M. W, cslnpanios :
2 111cdium M.W.
t) light M. W.
9 anti-tank riflcs.
'l'hc n~ccliumM. W. arc cxclnsivoly iutcnclctl lor position 'ivnrIt2rc
wit11
nncl dcfcnsive warfare. All illc light M. W, must Iw ~~rrwitlctl
flat trajectory carriages.
'
I
h
mcn should have* pmctic-r in firing ligllt M,W, against wondcu

According to the reports of tllc oIGcers sent by the High Commancl

into the zono of battle of tho IId Army, the dcfetlt of this army is due
to t h e following Eacts:
I. 'rho troops dlowcd thc~usclvcsto be talrcn by surprisc by
c~tts~clrs
of t;ullcs in large nunzbcis, ant1 above all, lost all cliscipli~lc
when ttmks, which llad succccdccl in brealring through owing lo a
~ r n t w a or
l artificial log, appeared suclclenly bchincl tl~eni.
2. '1'11~' nclvanccd zonc of combat as well as the positions and
scctors n ~ o r cin tlic scar had neither positions nor supplcnzcntary
tlcfcnscs suficient to offer a metllodical resislance.
3, l3atLalir)nsin reserve and the reserves of larger units ilicl not
11i~vc
euou~11i~rtilloryirnmctliatclv available to enable tlleni to oppose
atltlilional arlillcry rosist:tncc against the cncmy nncl t:~nlrs~vllic11]lad
1)roltcn through.
'l'l~c following is I-horcfore ticccssary :
I, As I lmvc alrcncly prcscribcil in my onlcr In Nn. 9 . 7 ~ 8secret,
,
op., Angust 8, i t is nccessnry to take niorc care than I)c.forc to fiml
out tllc tlisposition LIE tllc cnclny by taking prisancrs, by matching tlw
terrain l r o n ~special observatories of the ccntew of information, by
norid rcconnaissancc, by listening posts, etc. In the prcscnt situation
we must oxpect surprise nttaclts in other scctors or the front.
?'he grcatcst vigilance is necessary nt d;~ybrcalr. and cluring tho
ct~rlyhours ol tlw inoming, as surprisc attaclcs arc gcrren~llyslartctl
:LC tlds t h e , Inr the tcnsion of the night p x l u c e s a certain rclasntion of t h r nerves and slrengtb of thc men. Ilcct!nC csporicncc llns
p u ) v ~ dt1111t an iilq~cctionoS tll(>trot)11s ixt this tinw is p:~rlicularly
nccvss:lry.

be attachcd to the defense agajnst tanlcs and. the tmops' dislilrc of

digging should be overcome in every way possible.
II in certain places in the advanced zoae, in an activc scctor and
bcfore a vigilant enemy, the organization of trenches am1 the siting
of supplementaly defensive positions is of neccssity a slow opcrntion,
commanding oficers must, nevertheless, sec t o i t that the infantry
digs itself in quiclcly, and protects itself by supplementary clefenscs,
so small works conceded from view will change littlc by little into
continuons clemants and finally into lines.
But i t is absolutely necessary that work shoulcl go ahcntl more
rapidly on the terrain further back, which is not altogetlicr under fire
of the enemy artillery. Above d l attention must bc paid lo Lhc
construction of points of support n ~ ~ t u a l lflalllcing
y
caclr other, in
organizing with networlrs of wire cntanglencnts for a detcrminctl
clcfense, of villages, farms, woocls, and roads, a ~ l destnblishing antitank clefenscs. Even in rear positions continuity must bc sought for
(fire support, visual comlmmication ctc.). It is beyond all rcason
to assnmc that ttanlcs, having pcnetratccl aclvauccd positiotzs witlrout
lneeting either obstacles or resistance, shoulcl bc ablc to continuc
several lrilometers on the roads or alongside of them, right n p to
divisional headquarters.
3. The idea that troops even though surronnclecl slroulcl, in
clofault or othcr orders, clcfcnd their battlc scctor to the vcry last
n1an and t o the very last cartriclgc, sccrns to havo been cntircly 6)sgotten. The cnemy who executes an e~lcircliugnzoveaicnt is hinrrclr
turncd, and a11 parls of a break through must be closecl,
Our Inen are not justified in falling back wl~cnsi~lglctnnks urld
cnvalry cletachn~entsbreak tllrougl~ 'L'hey will be put o u t of action
by skilful1 tactics of tho rcservcs.
A largc numnber of our troops fight badly against tanks. Tn4:
structlon on this subjcct should be pushed.
a. A tank: falls an casy prey to artillery of all mlibms. Tlic
first thing ncccssary is that part of the Ficld Artillcry s l d l not be
in fortified c~nplaccments,which lattcr makcs thc use of each gun in
any clirection impossilAe, It slzould be placccl in such a position tlzi~L
it can assist in repulsing a, tanlc attack as well as a cavalry attack,
that is to say, in thc open or on the cclge of woods with aground observation station near by, The rcmnining artillery clemcnts should also
be clisposcd in such a lrlanncr that their guns may tlcfeutl thcmsclvcs
against thc tanlrs.
In addition single guns shonltl be lalrcn several kilometers belzii~il
the principal line of rcsistance, t o sc~cllpoints as are particularly
importmt, the entrance to villages, etc. Thc duty of tllesc RUIIS IS
to put out of action rluicltly and a t short rmge such tanlcs as ~ n ~ y
11avr 1)rolron through. Opcnin~ fire prcrnilt~~rrly
warns t h e tank.

1).
c%)~r

' I ' r t ~ dmort;vs

~
givc the sitlllr rcsi~lts. 'I'llcir lack of prc( I ~ W ; L iiri*
I ~ ~aH
t short rangrt.

111

:ltltlition, inlnutry will gct out of t11v way to permit tlle firc

OF t h e arlillcry a r i t l of thix lrclnrli mork~rs,unrl will take up tlie fight

against the rllcnty illfiullry, \.irllich g c i l ~ ~ r dfollows
ly
quite L: disklncc
t
bcliintl tllc tarilzs. 'l'lic use of nv~chitirguns against tsnlrs ; ~ lollg
ruugt* is Ear1)irldcn; it is uwlcss il~lilW[LS~CSa~n~nl~x~itioll.
11.
I:iti:~lly r l o 110t f o r g ~/t ~ I S S ~~YO~~CO I ~ S Cbarricildes,
S,
tro11chcs,
clrstruction of lwidgl% ntltl of mads, placing of fougasscs and contact
mines. Ilvcn iE L~ICSC cltlfenscs :m bmlrcn clown, or crossed by the
tanks, t1ic.y will ~it~vc~.Llioli~ss
delay tliem oncl n ~ a k eour work of dcfcnse
easier. 'l'hc greatvst r r ~ ~ c ~ u r a g e ~ ~
should
z c t l t be given to the active
t ~tlic
r l lconstruction
~
of thesc works.
:LI~(I
i t ~ v w t i vg~liilts
~ ~ of ~ ~ l l > i ~ lin

ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE

In our last account of opcrntions on t h e Wcstern Front (paxiqdilct
No. 3 "Lessons 'Taught by the Attack of March ~ 1 s t " )we clcnlt with
tllc beginning of the grcat offensive which the Rritisll Army has succeeded in maintaining from tlie beginning of August down l o the
present date. I t is already clear that this operation will mnlr as onc
of the outstanding features of the war. 3'0s sustainecl vigor, for thcx
great material a d mechanical nleans emnployecl, for its clccisivr
influence on the Gcrinan army hi France, its iaiportancc can hardly
be exaggerated. And Anlcrican clivisions [lave shown u p to great
advt~ntagcin fighting among tlic I3ritish. I3ut for tlie nioment nv
have not tlic space a t our disposal tu give :~tlequatcaccount ol tlwsc
cvcnts and must come rapidly to what concerns inorc iinm~diatrly
the American Army viewed. as n whole.
For bcl~inilthe working out of the strilring opemiions o f thr last
three months on the front, wr must not losc sight of Ilic fact that
behincl Lhe line of battle a nlilitary event was occuring of quite as
much significance as the combats tl~cn~sclvrs.'Llis was t h e fonnation of the American Arniy. I-Iowcver grcat a par1 our troops ancl
our cnininancl may have playccl during tllc critical moment whru t h r
title tunled in July, wc were then still playing an undeveloped part
in the war,-mcrcly llelpiilg our allics with a division llorc i ~ ~$1t l
division there. Since then, wcclc by wcclc, througll the height of t11c
struggle, deteriniilecl policy and hard work were mpitlly aggrcg:~ling
our divisions into what became abon 1the miclclle or thc closc o f AugusL
tlic First American Arnzy.
Without discussing the reasons for this, it had long bee11 r~rrangrtl
t1i:~I:when forinccl our armies slioulrl operate on that part of Lhc Front
which may roughly be describccl as lying to thc east of the Argonnr.
In that direction wcre some outslanrling features: the ancient lortrcss
of Vercl~m,the scene of the terrific Ggliting of 1 9 ~ 6 ;t11c remarlmblr
salient of St. Mihicl, one of the strong points of the (;ernznn line in
li'rance; and just back of the Gcrman linc the Bricy lirlils which 1i:~vc
been one of the grcat factors in Lhc conilurt ol operations and just by
tl~einMetz, the grcat aclvancc concentration point which (Ecrnmny for
a gm~erationpast h t ~ helcl
l
like the point of a sword towartls I'nris.
I t was natural that i t shoulcl hxvo bcon in this direction that thosr
rcsponsiblc for the hnuclling ol our First Arniy shoul~lI ~ a v cInolwl.
Thc Chrm;~nposilion a t St. Milliol prcscutrd a rrii~:~rlcnl~lc
winbination of natural and military features.
The Cotes de Meusc., bordering iliat rivrr on Llic cast, lomi ;I
strilring chain of hills rising a l ~ u u t450 feet w r y sharply Irom llir
P
arc
hilcuse valley lo thr wrsl and thr 1Vocvrc.s 011 ll1r casl. ' S ~ hills

licavily wuorlctl and ikcply cut by ravines in all tlirectiuns; in otlicr

words what. will1 good clr.~inagcand dense u~iclcrbrushthey arc admird > l y :~cla~pLetl
for tlefelise in truuclz warfare. The Gcnnan positions
strctclicd froirt n conical Id11 just suutli of St. Mihiel, the Camp iles
lioinnus, right along the Cotes for about 20 lalis. nortliwarcl a t which
p h t they desccnclctl ~zortheastcrlyinto the lowlanils. St. Millie1
itself lay a t the b o t t o n ~of a natural cup and sul'ferecl throug1~)uicompnr:ttively little damage save from aerial boir~bartlment. The JVocvrcs
is the n tturol counterpart of the cllain of hills,-an ill drained lowlantl
full oC niarslics ant1 pontls, ill atlaptccl to clefensivc works, and indcccl
to a n y Eom of n~ilitaryoperations. Immediately cast ol St. BiIihiel,
lio~vevcr,iL prc)j~ctings p r of hills reduced the widtli t r I this tlistrict
to only a few lrilonietcrs of bad ground beyond mliicli, still moving
about tluq east, onc renclieil the next rise of hills, Lortlcring on tho
Moselle., I k m i St. hIiliic1 to the Moselle is about 30 lrnis.; ratlicr more
than olne-half of this t1ist;~nccis clifticult ground, but roughly r~bout
midway a fairly gootl front could be found where troops could be
hantllcc~in the attack and where clcfensive positions wcre not too
strong.. ' This p i ~ r tof the southorn lace of the salient was therefore
clearly id$icated a s a poinl: of attaclc.
Coming. now to the lines of com~nunicntionwithin the salient,
tlie map intlicatecl in the clearest possible way that an attack from
lllc soutll face should be ~ i l n c da t reaching %hiancourt extending as
far t o thc west as possible in the direction of Vigneulles. 'I'hcse two
points were tho knots of roads controlling the apex of the salient some
I:! or 15 Icilonzc~tcrssoutheasterly towards St. Mihiel. Assunling a
reasonable clcgpc of success i t was apparent, lzowcver, that Thiaucurt multl be q 6 x c easily rdnchcd than Vigneulles, while tlie imin
road St. Mihicl-Vigneulles woulrl give thc Gerninns a sufficient incans
lor witliilrawiug their troopb if leEt uninterruplecl long enough. 'Vhc
clucs"tian tluxefor~arose wliclhcr it might not bc possible to force the
~ m t . h c r ncntl oI tllc Gcrn~a.nrlposition across tlic Cotes do Meuse ant1 t o
1)rcak tlimugh along the~hillssoutlleasterly some 13,000 yards from
new Lcs Kparges t o Vigneulles. 111this way the cl~anccsof cutting tlic
main Gcrnx~nline r)l co~smunicatioriwould bc ilclublcd.

It could not, of course, havc heen Inrscc~za t the tiinc when the
opcmtion was plantzed wllcther or not the C~crn\i~n
command would
decide to mdce a fig111 lor the salicnt. Tllc general situation gave
some i~lclicationa s to what was probnblc; and tlic claily work of tlic
Zntelligcnce Section cnablerl our IIigll Command to lcccp the closcst
sort of check on tho eize~ay'siutcntions in this regard. Still it tvns
necessary t o plan the operation 011 the basis tllat a consiclcrablc
aniount of rcsistnncc would have Lo be overcome. I t WLS also of the
utiuost inzporta~nci~
t l ~ n lllic linc 'Tllia~~conrt-Vig~~c~~lles
shoalil bc
rfnched with gre:bt r,~pirlily,1)ccnusc cvery llonr that tlw rontlu rcinzinctl o p u ii~cautthnL just so many Inore (:rrnz;~n troolrs could lic

1%

BULLETIN FOR FIELD OFFICJiRS

brought out of the salient. Tllercforc i t was important t o use t h e

fullest number of troops that could be usefully enlployecl under any
conclitions; and it was equally important t o surprise the enemy.
The surprise element was most succcsslully murkeil, nncl in rnorc
tlmn one way. Sufiice it to say t h a t the attack came off about q8
hours before it had been anticipated by the enemy and that our movement on the western face towards Vigiieulles was apparently not Soreseen a t all. Our Staff functioned rcmarltably well, The attack been
along familiar lines on thc rzth. At r o'cloclr: in the morning an
intense artillery preparation was opened, followed soon after dawn by
the advance of t h e infantry. Meanwhile, however, the Gcr111aus hail
becoine aware of the imillinence of the dangcr and having clcternzinccl
upon withdrawal rather tllan deleasc, orders wcrc issued for the move
went to take place on the very night selected for our attack; and our
artillery preparalion came a t the worst possible mo~lzcntfor thc
Germans, upsetting their acljusti~lcnts for retreat. 'The encnly a t
this moment had in position the following divisions : 77th R, roth,
5th Lw., rgzcl and part of thc 35th A X .
Undcr the conclitions already noted, and in view oE tllc k ~ c t h a t
with one exception the German divisions ~vcrcthird class, a strcmg
rcsistniice was hardly to be expected. The aclvancc of our troops
procectlecl with great success, The attack on the suuth facc of 111~
salient with seven clivisions in linc between Ricllccourt nntl Vcy en
I-layo, 14 Irilomcters, reachecl Thiaucourt and n consitlcwblc tlistaucr
west by the 1;1tc afternoon. On the wcstcrn facc the (;cr~unusolfcrctl
vary littlc rrsistance, but on the otlicr hantl t h ~
grtm~clwas so
naturally strong ancl the woolls so C ~ C I ~ S that
G
the I L ~ V ~ L I ~wils
O C 11w
rapicl. TIM1 evening the progress n~nilrlrft the divisions cup~gotl
only about llalfway t o Vignculles.

On the 13tl1, the opcrtttion oil tho suuthern face coi~sistctlin Iitllr
more than mopping up and closing in on the scconcl Gcrinnn linc of
clcicnse, n linc which ran roughly nortl~wcstwnrclsfrom I'agny on t1w
Moselle n t an average clistancc of from 5 t o xo Bms, back of the first
line. On tllc other side, the i~clvnllcotowards Vigncullrs was resuil-rcd.
Our infantry rcncllcd tlic edge of t h e l~illsjust north oI Vigncullcs nl
about h d l past ten in tho morning and Vigacullos itself ;L few li(wr!;
Inter. This marlred the find rwliing oTC oC thc St. Mihirl siilitwl.
The rcsnlt of the opcratio;l :ISa wliolc was t o str:~ighLcn11111 Allicrl
line betwccn the Nloselle and tho Argonnc in such :Lwily ;IS t o give! ;I
front facing Bricy mlrl Metz. It gave our 1 s t Anuy :LII i u v i ~ l ~ ~ ; t l ~ l ( ~
cxpcrioucc in large troop movcnients ant1 corn1)ii~atl; ~ t t ~ l iI1.
glins,
netted a total of i~bont15,ooo pris011ers ~vi1.hovw IWO li~i~~clr(\(l
machine gnns and. n-rortars, rolling stock ant1 o llwr 111~Icricl.