G.R. No.

115402 July 15, 1998

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J.
FINEZA, and LEE TEKSHENG, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a
complaint against his father, herein private
respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of
his parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim,
private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of
land registered solely in petitioner's name under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are
conjugal properties. Private respondent contends
that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but
was registered in petitioner's name only as a trustee
considering that at that time, the latter was then the
only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly,
private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots
to its rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal
regime during the pendency of the case, private
respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the
cancellation of said annotation which was denied
by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not
for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner
and (b) also to keep the property within the power
of the court pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed
the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition
to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily
contends that in the resolution of an incidental
motion for cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue
of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership
cannot be passed upon in a partition case,
otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack

of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He

argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT
would be improperly assailed in a partition case
and should be done through a separate suit. On the
contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of
ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is
not a probate or land registration proceedings
where the court's jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by
both parties are not at point, luckily for private
respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not
material to this case. The annotation of a notice
of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can
it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack
of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The
concept of no collateral attack of title is based on
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title. The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register
of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which
is represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a
parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from
a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof
of ownership of a piece of land. 7 Besides, the
certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. 8 Mere issuance
of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant
may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence

thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not

be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
petitioner's fears, his certificate of title is not being
assailed by private respondent. 9What the latter
disputes is the former's claim of sole ownership.
Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may
have become incontrovertible one year after
issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it does not
bar private respondent from questioning his
ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in
this case is the denial of the motion to cancel the
notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of
procedure 12 or
substance, 13 a
notice
of lis
pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds,
which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose
of molesting the title of the adverse party, or, (2)
when the annotation is not necessary to protect the
title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was
convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would
not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the
notice on the legally untenable grounds that such
annotation amounts to a collateral attack of
petitioner's certificate of title or that ownership
cannot be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be
emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to
the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties
are still locked in a legal battle to settle their
respective claims of ownership. The lower court
allowed the annotation pending litigation only for
the purpose of giving information to the public that
parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those
who deal with the property is forewarned of such
fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed
upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that until
and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect partition of the
property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice

of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which

requires the party seeking annotation to prove that
the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an action for
partition is one case where the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens is proper. 17
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of
the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is
to determine what are the properties acquired by
the spouses during their marriage. 18 In addition,
private respondent in his answer with counterclaim
prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots.
Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in
issue and each claimant must present their
respective evidence to substantiate their respective
allegations. 19 Considering that this is a partition
case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature
and extent of title" of the supposed claimant. 20 The
title referred to by the rule is the purported
ownership of the claimants and not the certificate
of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529,
although the latter may be considered in the
determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the
petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitionerappellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS
ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M.
DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN
CITY,respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for respondents.

AQUlNO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and
annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose
originals are existing and whose reconstitution was,
therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with
areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four
hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches,
Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the
name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as
shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594
and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the
registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not
destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the
preceding cancelled titles for those two lots,
namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832
and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust
Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when
Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665
Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a
petition dated November, 1967 for the
reconstitution of the title covering the abovementioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she was

the owner of the lot and that the title covering it,
the number of which she could not specify, was
"N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677).
The petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967
before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order
setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968.
The notice of hearing was published in the Official
Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three
conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were
furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54,
Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served
with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed
counsel for the Government, did not oppose the
petition. Laborada presented her evidence before
the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador in
his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the
petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a
transfer certificate of title which was not available
and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the
lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title
covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the
war. The plan and technical description for the lot
were approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration who recommended favorable action on
the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of
Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No.
915 in the name of Laborada. The order of
reconstitution was not appealed. It became final
and executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of
deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot
No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots
Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of
Land Registration approved the subdivision plan.
The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to

Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp.

56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763
of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast,
single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street,
Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition
dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of
the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No.
918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She
alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available.
She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the
title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like
the first petition, the second petition was sworn to
on the same date, November 16, 1967, before
Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not
filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was
not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on
Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for
hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's
petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's
petition was published in the Official Gazette. It
was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan
City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed
adjoining owners (22, Consolidated Record on
Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of
hearing were served upon the registers of deeds of
Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would
be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed
lost title and who could certify whether the original
of the title was really missing.
9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge
Salvador. It was not opposed by the government
lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon,
Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969
granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the
allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued
to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner
Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title
was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes
were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The
technical description of the land the plan were

approved by the Commissioner of Land

Registration who submitted a report recommending
the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to
reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the
name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the
register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R) dated August 27,
1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the
issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca
Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and
a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco,
Manila, which was the same address used by
Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the
address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No.
918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued
to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A
Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for
P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R
was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34,
Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two
petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the
reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent
thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge
Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the
titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation
were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining
orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer
and Commissioner of Land Registration from
accepting or recording any transaction regarding
Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a
common lawyer, filed separate answers containing
mere denials. The Commissioner of Land
Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he
interposed no objection to the issuance of the
preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a
joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation
and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they

pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in

good faith and for value.

appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned

urban land with considerable value.

14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not

bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the
two cases holding that the State's evidence was
insufficient to establish its ownership and
possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that
Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering
Corporation were purchasers in good faith and for
value and, consequently, their titles are not
cancellable and annullable.

The crucial and decisive fact, to which no

importance was attached by the lower court and the
Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes,
L.B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid
and existing Torrens titles in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly
reconstituted in the names of Laborada and
Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that
the two titles were destroyed during the war.

Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose

reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in
conformity with law, could not be attacked
collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles
and their derivatives have the same validity, force
and effect as the originals before the reconstitution"
(pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The
State appealed.

That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and

monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It
was a stultification of the judicial process. One and
the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and
then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the
cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully
reconstituted titles.

15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower

court's judgment, held that the orders of
reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969
could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970,
when the petitions for annulment and cancellation
of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if
there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then,
as between two innocent parties, the State, as the
party that made possible the reconstitution, should
suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section
101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered
owner may lose his land "by the registration of any
other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the
appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial
court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of
the reconstituted titles which, although issued with
judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and
forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the
reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677
and C-763, were simply devices employed by
petitioners
Laborada
and
Bombast
for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal

The existence of the two titles of the Government

for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the
evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged
ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be
given any credence. The two proceedings were
sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith.
Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be
countenanced and cannot be the source of
legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
certificates of title that are missing and not
fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a
patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates
of title that are on file and available in the registry
of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil
Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they
are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the
purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are
actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do
not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory laws
are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in
these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26

to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing

(See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and
Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453,
480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of
his land, to undermine the stability and security of
Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of
registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in
good faith and for value is indefensible because the
title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably
shows that such title was reconstituted. That
circumstance should have alerted its officers to
make the necessary investigation in the registry of
deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could
have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set
aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases
Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set
aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and
subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise
declared void. The register of deeds is directed to
cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby
declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918
of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of
deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private
respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust
and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of
Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the
reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when
the record shows beyond doubt that the land in
question, per its technical description and location,
is covered already by another title actually
subsisting in the office of the corresponding
register of deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to
underscore my considered view that considering
the records that the various offices of the
government having to do with the matter should
keep regularly, like the Land Registration
Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the
corresponding Register of Deeds, only bad faith
and bad faith alone can give occasion to
occurrences like what happened in this case. The
Torrens system of land registration was conceived
to give every duly registered owner complete peace
of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed
of any right over the same in the manner allowed
by law that he would be safe in his ownership and
its consequent rights. The provision about recourse
to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act
for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously
"steal" lands nor to open opportunities for
chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in
the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other
national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not
a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable
pro forma certificates of other officials concerned. I
would go as far as to require oral testimony of the
said official, unless this be very inconvenient,

subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his

records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office
of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his
been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the
registered owner in favor of a person from whom
the petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled
around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance
of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated
right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty
and integrity, in the interest of our country and
people at large.

# Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust
and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of
Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me
inconceivable how any court can order the
reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when
the record shows beyond doubt that the land in
question, per its technical description and location,
is covered already by another title actually
subsisting in the office of the corresponding
register of deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to
underscore my considered view that considering
the records that the various offices of the
government having to do with the matter should
keep regularly, like the Land Registration
Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the
corresponding Register of Deeds, only bad faith

and bad faith alone can give occasion to

occurrences like what happened in this case. The
Torrens system of land registration was conceived
to give every duly registered owner complete peace
of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed
of any right over the same in the manner allowed
by law that he would be safe in his ownership and
its consequent rights. The provision about recourse
to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act
for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously
"steal" lands nor to open opportunities for
chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in
the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the
reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other
national catastrophe is a function that deserves the
most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not
a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable
pro forma certificates of other officials concerned. I
would go as far as to require oral testimony of the
said official, unless this be very inconvenient,
subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his
records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge
to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office
of the Register of Deeds covering the same land
claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his
been lost, absent any showing of voluntary
transfers or other lawful transmission by the
registered owner in favor of a person from whom
the petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled
around and it behooves every official of the
government whose functions concern the issuance
of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated
right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty
and integrity, in the interest of our country and
people at large.

G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband

MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy,
as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number
of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said
wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March,
1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the
torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant
presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now
occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under
the torrens system. The description of the lot given
in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of
December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate
granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They

immediately presented a petition in the Court of

Land Registration for an adjustment and correction
of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower
court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant's land, they failed to make any objection
to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in
the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is
registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and
the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the
theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that
the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. In other words,
by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on
which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their
name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied
by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be
applied to the defendant himself. Applying that
theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a
petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert
and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to
see that some one else was not having all, or a
portion of the same, registered? If that question is
to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole
scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration,

in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent

thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would
seem that once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su
casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for
the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil.
Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an
action and the result is final and binding upon all
the
world.
It
is
an
action in
rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey
Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez,
29
Phil.
Rep.,
31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co.vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more
in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
All the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and
there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the
burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit
persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again
litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt
upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does
not already have a perfect title, he can not have it
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered.
The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the
exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence
of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title can
not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct

proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed

by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the
Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy.
There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is
nothing in the Act which indicates who should be
the owner of land which has been registered in the
name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree
ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same
between the same parties .In view of the fact that
all the world are parties, it must follow that future
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can
be no persons who are not parties to the action.
This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which
are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions
which need not be dismissed at present. A title once
registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse,
open, and notorious possession. Registered title
under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title,
once registered, is notice to the world. All persons
must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered
in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by
express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent
discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case
of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry,
2
Q.S.C.R.,
193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield,
7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R.,
152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1
W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can

be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of

construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of
prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified
by holding the latter of the two certificates of title
to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also
the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of
the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in
discussing the general question, said: "Where two
certificates purport to include the same land the
earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and
that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who
was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof. While the acts in this country do
not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect
of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title"
(p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the
decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree
of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason,

in any court,except for fraud, and not even for

fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree
of registration can not be opened for any reason,
except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in
a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the
land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law
contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory
provision which governs the right of the ownership
of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that
when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land.
The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code
are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in
the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a
rule for governing the effect of a double
registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which
we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system,
we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not
overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee.
He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus
(the predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders,
to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.

They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold
that lands with torrens titles are above the law and
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental
purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land
cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense
incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may
lose a strip of his registered land by the method
adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after
the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the
position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable.
It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize
such damages, taking into consideration al of the
conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties to avoid them. In the present case, the
appellee was the first negligent (granting that he
was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner
he can not complain) in not opposing the
registration in the name of the appellants. He was a
party-defendant in an action for the registration of
the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in
1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose
such registration, and the subsequent entry of a
default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions
as the ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the
land upon which the wall is located, his failure to
oppose the registration of the same in the name of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever
closes his mouth against impugning the validity of
that judgment. There is no more reason why the

doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied

to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration
under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That
is the rule between original parties. May this rule
be applied to successive vendees of the owners of
such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of
the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers
his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser."
The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that
he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first
reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third
parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would
be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections. In the present case Teus had his land,
including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is
used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him
to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold
their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent
purchaser," would such purchaser be included in
the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used
in said sections? Under these examples there would
be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said
sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded
as innocent purchasers, should be protected under
the provisions of said sections? These questions

indicate the difficulty with which we are met in

giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included
in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate,
his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is
never issued until it is recorded. The record notice
to all the world. All persons are charged with the
knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing
with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must
be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is
so well established that it is scarcely necessary to
cite authorities in its support (Northwestern
National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629;
Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded
such record is constructive notice of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286,
289;
Orvis vs. Newell,
17
Conn.,
97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey,
20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of
Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by
proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a
record would be destroyed. Such presumption
cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge
of what the record contains any more than one may
be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record
contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.

Any variation would lead to endless confusion and

useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here
requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face
of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to
be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when
third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by
the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona
fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that
all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law;
that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact
that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however,
is
mandatory
and
obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow
the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law,
may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent
purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another,
not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said
sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to
such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase
"innocent purchaser should be applied to such a
purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the
record of the first original certificate. The rule
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of
land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in

nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the

portion of the land included in another earlier
original certificate. The rule of notice of what the
record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By
reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior
original certificate and in a name other than that of
the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize
the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited
only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the
torrens system. When land is once brought under
the torrens system, the record of the original
certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is
notice to all the world. That being the rule, could
Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of
that part of the land included in his certificate of the
appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example,
that Teus had never had his lot registered under the
torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the
appellee and had included in his deed of transfer
the very strip of land now in question. Could his
vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record
of the original certificate of the appellants
precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained
any right by reason of the registration of the strip of
land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule
of notice resulting from the record of the title of the
appellants, the question must be answered in the
negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are
more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496
than the rule contended for by the appellee. We
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the
later certificate, and his successors, should be
required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case
of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest
the holder of the first certificate who has been
guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be
permitted to rest secure in their title, against one
who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and
who had full and complete knowledge of their
rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained
in the public record and the knowledge with which

he is charged and by reason of his negligence,

should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such
purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first
certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend
to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are
inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the
record under the torrens system, supersede all other
registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and
recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone
can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the
real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the
judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to
the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made
in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the
appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

G.R. No. L-13479

October 31, 1959

MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffsappellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING
CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee UP.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land located in Quezon City containing an area of
about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
alleging that for many years prior to March 25,
1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors
have been in actual, adverse, open, public,
exclusive and continuous possession as owners of
the land in litigation; that they have been
cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits
exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the
year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes
thereon; that in 1955 defendant People's Homesite
& Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto
claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property,
while the other defendant University of the
Philippines began also asserting title thereto
claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No.
9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants
are not innocent purchasers for value, having had
full notice of plaintiff's actual possession and claim
for ownership thereof; and that the inclusion of
plaintiff's property within the technical boundaries
set out in defendants' titles was a clear mistake and
that at no time had defendants' predecessors ininterest exercised dominical rights over plaintiff's
property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the
Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the complaint states no cause of action; that it is
barred by the statute of limitations; that the court

has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the

event the motion is not granted, defendant is
separated from the case and be impleaded in a
separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a
reply alleging that the complaint on its faces alleges
a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which
the court could render a valid judgment. Defendant
People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the
other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to
which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November
20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose
Pearanda filed a motion for intervention which
was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December
11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing
the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action and that it is already barred by the statute of
limitations, leaving unresolved the other points
raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From
this order plaintiffs took the present appeal.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its
face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on
which a valid judgment could be rendered against
defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint
alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the
sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in
1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to
plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in
Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been
actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of
the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in
1955 defendants began asserting title to the land
claiming that the same is embraced and covered by
their respective certificates of title; that defendants
acquired their respective titles with full notice of
the actual possession and claim of ownership of
plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered
innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has
been placed under the operation of the Torrens
system since 1914 when it has been originally
registered in the name of defendant's predecessorin-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
defendant People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation acquired from the original owner a
parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's

property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No.

1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant
University of the Philippines likewise acquired
from the same owner another portion of the land
which embraces the remainder of the property for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was
issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land
in question has been registers in the name of
defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under
the Torren's system and that notwithstanding what
they now claim that the original title lacked the
essential requirements prescribed by law for their
validity, they have never taken any step to nullify
said title until 1957 when they instituted the present
action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43
years before they woke up to invoke what they now
claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in
1914 the registration of the land in the name of
defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this
cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be
set aside within one year after entry on the ground
of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496;
Apurado vs. Apurado,
26
Phil.,
581;
Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp.
1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the
expiration of the one-year period within to review
the decree of registration, the decree as well as the
title issued in pursuance thereof becomes
incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The
purpose of the law in limiting to one year the
period within which the decree may be reviewed is
to put a limit to the time within which a claimant
may ask for its revocation. If after title to property
is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the
one-year period to set aside the decree, the object
of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the
indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated
(Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint
alleges that defendants acquired their respective
titles with full notice of the actual possession and
claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the
land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint
for such averment is sufficient to establish a cause

of action against defendants. This contention

overlooks the fact that the land in question is
covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that
defendant People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation bought the portion of the property in
question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime
in 1955 for which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the
complaint to show that when it acquired the
property said defendant knew of any defect in the
title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or
encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to
defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise
acquired the portion of the property on question
sometime in 1955 from its predecessor-in-interest
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462
was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the
complaint to show that when it acquired the
property it knew of any defect in the title appealing
on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrace.
Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be
purchasers for value and in good faith and as such
are entitled to protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following wellsettled principle: "A person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to
defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens
System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64
Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622;
Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for
reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended,
their right however to bring the instant action may
be considered barred by laches for not having taken
the action seasonably after title to the property had
been issued under the Torrens system. It appears
that the property in question was originally
registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on
October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their
claim thereto when they brought the present action.
In the recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty
Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954),
September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco

Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein

could have raised the issue of the validity of the
certificate of title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928,
when the foreclosure sale in her favor was
confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years
afterwards, and their action (if any) now should be
held by their own laches and negligence."

in effect it was represented by its predecessor-ininterest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the
property. It may therefore be said that in the two
case there is not only identity of subject matter but
identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint
on the ground of res judicata.

Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred

in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res
judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records
in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in
support of their contention the principle that a court
cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other case even when such case had been
tried by the same court and notwithstanding the
facts that both cases may have been tried before the
same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not
absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as
noted by former Chief Justice Moran:

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed,

with costs against appellants.

In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice

of proceedings in other causes, because of their
close connection with the matter in the controversy.
Thus, in a separate civil action against the
administrator of an estate arising from an appeal
against the report of the committee on claims
appointed in the administration proceedings of the
said estate, to determine whether or not the appeal
was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of
the record of the administration proceedings.
Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending
is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration.
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the
trial court on this matter is merely technical
because they do not dispute the fact that appellant
Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case,
is the same person who filed the application in
Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration
of the same parcel of land which application was
denied by the court. It appears that in the
registration case the oppositors were the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co.,
and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University
of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case,

G.R. No. 165427

March 21, 2011

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari
filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against
respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the
September 14, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA
had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of
Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole
owner of the properties involved in this suit and
awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a
common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship
developed until petitioner gave birth to
respondents son on October 12, 1979.3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
respondent, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services
company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired
during the said period and were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. The lands are briefly described
as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located
at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located
at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses
Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."6

3. A 300-square meter real estate property located

at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No.
RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property
located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT
No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located
at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by
TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in
Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983,
petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in
the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4,
Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to
Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour
and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In
1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership
by executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights
be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over
the three other properties will go to
respondent.12However, when petitioner wanted
additional demands to be included in the partition
agreement, respondent refused.13 Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in
Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and
respondent started to live together as husband and
wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and
worked together as business partners, acquiring real
properties
amounting
toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent,
in
his
16
Answer, however, denied petitioners claim of
cohabitation and said that the properties were
acquired out of his own personal funds without any
contribution from petitioner.17

During the trial, petitioner admitted that although

they were together for almost 24 hours a day in
1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to
his wife usually in the wee hours of the
morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they
acquired the said real estate properties from the
income of the company which she and respondent
established.19
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the
properties were purchased from his personal funds,
salaries,
dividends,
allowances
and
20
commissions. He countered that the said
properties were registered in his name together
with petitioner to exclude the same from the
property regime of respondent and his legal wife,
and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said
properties since his legal wife was then a heavy
gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased
the said properties as investment, with the intention
to sell them later on for the purchase or
construction of a new building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the
RTC decided to give considerable weight to
petitioners own admission that the properties were
acquired not from her own personal funds but from
the income of the manpower services company
over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA
asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of onehalf of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued
that the trial courts decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to
collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to
thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the
appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the
following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the
certificates of title covering the subject realties is,
to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity

of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in

the appealed decision, the record shows that what
the trial court determined therein was the
ownership of the subject realties itself an issue
correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim
of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored
her cause of action for partition. It bears
emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to
original and not to subsequent registration as that
availed of by the parties in respect to the properties
in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said
principle to the case at bench is even more
underscored by the admitted falsity of the
registration of the selfsame realties in the parties
name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants
imputation of reversible error against the trial court
for supposedly failing to make the proper
delineation between an action for partition and an
action involving ownership. Typically brought by a
person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom
the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action
for partition may be seen to present simultaneously
two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether
the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property
sought to be partitioned and, second assuming
that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the
issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the
court must initially settle the issue of ownership for
the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property without first making a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition
of the properties. This is precisely what the trial
court did when it discounted the merit in
appellants claim of co-ownership.26
Hence, this petition premised on the following
arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition
case.

II. The partition agreement duly signed by

respondent contains an admission against
respondents interest as to the existence of coownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by
the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership
based on self-serving claims of exclusive
ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership
which cannot be outweighed by respondents selfserving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a
question of fact, which we feel has been squarely
threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the
findings of the lower courts on the said matter
absent any showing that the instant case falls under
the exceptions to the general rule that questions of
fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction
in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be
summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a
settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed
properties was collaterally attacked in the action for
partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from
repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v.
Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the
determination as to the existence of co-ownership
is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit
is taken up with the determination of whether or

not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is

proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may
end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper
in the premises and an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that
"the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall
be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and
an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. x x
x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is
one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a coowner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely
and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect
a partition of the disputed properties. 30 More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the
claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even
have any rightful interest over the subject
properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership
subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it
would not.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title

cannot be collaterally attacked,32 but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law
means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented
by
that
document.34 Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably
used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle
of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter only
serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece
of land. The certificate cannot always be
considered
as
conclusive
evidence
of
36
ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate
of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say,
registration does not vest ownership over a
property, but may be the best evidence
thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the
initial partition agreement serves as an admission
against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to
have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a
party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent
with the facts alleged by him.38 Admission against
interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act,

declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve
matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical
and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily
made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests,
otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called
Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement
of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the
right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners
argument would be to allow respondent not only to
admit against his own interest but that of his legal
spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled
co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.
Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did
not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing
the need to amend the same to include other
matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally
refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do
not subscribe to the trial courts view that
respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the
trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that
respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the
services of his counsel to defend his interest as to
entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys
fees. But we note that in the first place, it was
respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner
that she has a right over the involved properties.
Secondly, respondents act of representing himself
and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate

attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal

obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent,
therefore, has no one but himself to blame the
consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in
the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the
disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim
his legal wife may have filed or may file against
him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees
in respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.