asCONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Course Syllabus1
A.Y. 2015 2016
Associate Solicitor Jose Angelo A. David
THE CONSTITUTION AND REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
1. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay Aklan [G.R. No. 211356, September 29,
2014]
- Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a
nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels
classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in
the
exercise
of
police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints
and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover,
the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers
to order the closing and demolition of establishments.
2. MMDA v. Bel-Air [G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000]
- Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority it
has no police power.
1

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958,

June 30, 1988]
- Right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security,
public health or public order, as may be provided by law.
- An order temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers
is constitutional for having been issued in the interest of the safety of
OFWs, as provided by the Labor Code.
- Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests
at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

- The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of
the retail business and free the citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and future.

Lutz vs. Araneta [G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955]

1 This syllabus is subject to change with notice at least three days prior to the next
scheduled meeting.

- The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for

the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power.
1

Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [G.R.

No. 78742, July 14, 1989]
- To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmerbeneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but
of the power of eminent domain.

Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

- The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. But
certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to
proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can
punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego[G.R. No.

89572, December 21, 1989]
- the subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit
of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
- The Court here ruled that the ban on transportation of carabao under
the assailed ordinance and their outright confiscation and disposal
without court hearing is a violation of due process hence it is an
invalid exercise of police power.
- We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal.

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-34915, June 24,
1983]

- An ordinance of Quezon City, under the guise of exercising police

power, prescribed that at least 6% of the totalarea of memorial parks
must be developed and set aside for the burial of paupers. The Court
held that such ordinance is not an exercise of police power but the
taking of private property for public use. Hence, to satisfy the
Constitution, there must be compensation.
- There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation
1

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)

-The police power of a State embraces such reasonable regulations
relating to matters completely within its territory, and not affecting the
people of other States, established directly by legislative enactment, as
will protect the public health and safety.
-While a local regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police
power of a State, must always yield in case of conflict with the exercise
by the General Government of any power it possesses under the
Constitution, the mode or manner of exercising its police power is
wholly within the discretion of the State so long as the Constitution of
the United States is not contravened, or any right granted or secured
thereby is not infringed, or not exercised in such an arbitrary and
oppressive manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent wrong and oppression.
-It is within the police power of a State to enact a compulsory
vaccination law, and it is for the legislature, and not for the courts, to
determine
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon, 43 Sup Ct 158 (1922)
-Limitations on the use of land through the police power have limits
and will be considered a taking under the eminent domain power when
the diminution in value of the property reaches a certain magnitude,
which depends upon the particular facts.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
4. RP v. Mupas [G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015]
-The procedural due process requirements in an eminent domain case
are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to present their
evidence before the commissioners whose findings (together with the
pleadings, evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case)
are reviewed and considered by the expropriation court. It is the
parties total failure to present evidence on just compensation that
renders the trial courts ruling void. The opportunity to present
evidence during the trial remains to be the vital requirement in the
observance of due process.
5. NPC v. Posada [G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015]
-Considering that eminent domain is the taking of private property for
public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to
be expropriated will not be for public use.
6. Secretary of DPWH v. Tecson [G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015]
- It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction
of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the
property owners sought recovery of the possession of their property.

- Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be
compensated if his property is taken for public use. There is a longstanding rule that where private property is taken by the Government
for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
7. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila [G.R. No. 14355,
October 31, 1919]
- Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated
by a delegate acting under a general grant of authority
- the Court said that [T]he very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
public character.
- The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it.
1

Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [G.R. No. L-18841,
January 27, 1969]
-the Court ordered the PLDT to allow the reconnection of telephone
lines of the Republic.

No cogent reason appears why Eminent Domain may be

availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property without loss of title or possession for
public use subject to just compensation
Case highlights that even services may be subjected to

eminent domain
- the Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent
domain, may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the Government Telephone System and
that of PLDT, as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation.
1

People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958]

- The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation.

Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi [G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
- Requisites (Republic vs Castellvi):

(a) expropriator must enter a private property

(b) entry must be for more than a momentary period
(c) entry must be under the warrant of legal authority
(d) entry is for public use
(e) the owner is deprived of enjoying his property
8. Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]
- where there is taking in the constitutional sense, the property
owner need not file a claim for just compensation with the
Commission of Audit; he may go directly to the court to demand
payment. Arbitrary action of the government shall be deemed a
waiver of its immunity from suit.
- As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession
of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is
one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of

possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient

nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available isfor the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the
price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
9. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995]
-The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec
10. Sumulong vs. Guerrero [G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987]
- public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the
public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit
or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and
the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but
also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973
Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain
and ensure adequate social services including housing
[Art. II, sec.
7]. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly
and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum, the general welfare
1

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.]
- According to Justice Black, term public use means one which
confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not confined to
actual use by public. It may also be said to mean public usefulness,
utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit.

EPZA vs. Dulay [G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987]

- P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794, and 1533 prescribed a formula for arriving at
just compensation in expropriation proceedings , dispense with the
need to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation. The
Court held that those decrees are unconstitutional and void for they
constitute impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
- The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail
over the court's findings

Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp. [G.R. No. 127820, July
20, 1998]
- The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
(1)
An ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.( 2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.( 3) There is payment of just compensation, as required

under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent

laws.( 4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted.
11. RP v. Heirs of Borbon [G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015]
-the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the
condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily,
if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and
is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount
of
just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power
of
eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.
Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court

POWER OF TAXATION
12. Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29,
1960]
- The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its
right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for
one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose.
13. Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L-4817, May 26, 1954]
- The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall
be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it
may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed
1

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-19201, June

16, 1965]
- The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished
from excise taxes

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
- While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educational
purposes, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.

Ferrer v. Bautista [G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015]

-Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the
most effective instrument to raise needed revenues in financing and
supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.

-It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is

clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot
assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in
granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in the
interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation.
ARTICLE III THE BILL OF RIGHTS
14. PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills [G.R. No. L31195, June 5, 1973]
- right to free assembly and petition prevails over economic rights.
Section 1
Due Process of Law
15. Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
- The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has be
1

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres [G.R. No. 98050, March
17, 1994]
- an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where,
as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties,
there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process,
as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
- The Court here ruled that the ban on transportation of carabao under
the assailed ordinance and their outright confiscation and disposal
without court hearing is a violation of due process hence it is an
invalid exercise of police power.
- every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case,
as "the
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial."

Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]

- DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

Aniag vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994]

- twenty meters away from the gate of the Batasan, a truck was
stopped and searched. The motorists had not given any evidence of
suspicious behaviour nor had the searching officers received any

confidential information about the car. The Court held that the search
was not justifiable as a warrantless arrest of a moving vehicle as
there was no probable cause
1

Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989]
While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing
order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness.

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R. No. 46496, February
27, 1940]
- Requisites:

(a) Right to a hearing

(b) Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(c) Decision must have something to support itself
(d) Evidence must be Substantial
(e) Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected
(f) Tribunal, body, or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the facts and law of the
controversy
(g) Decision is rendered in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered
16. Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993]
- The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:
- (1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the
right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
1

Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA [G.R. No. 211362, February 24,

2015]
- Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was
notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given
the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo.
The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied
and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the
findings and recommendations.

17. Mortel v. Kerr [G.R. No. 156296, November 12, 2012]

-the Court declared that an exception to the rule
that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel is when the
negligence
of the counsel is so gross that the client was deprived of his day in
court,
thereby also depriving the client of his property without due process of
law.
-Indeed, we have reminded trial courts that
although there are instances when a party may be properly defaulted,
such
instances should be the exception rather than the rule and should be
allowed
only in clear cases of a litigants obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect
to
comply with the orders of the court. Without such a showing, the
litigant
must be given every reasonable opportunity to present his side and to
refute
the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law.
Equal protection of the Laws
18. People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
- BETWEEN A LAW WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION
and a
LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust
and illegal discrmmination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
1

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [G.R. No. L-29646, November 10,
1978]
PURPOSELY FOR THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE OF A
REGULATION .
Further, the assailed ordinance violates the equal
protection clause. To require a person to get a work permit before he
can be employed from the Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at will
is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to engage in
a means of livelihood.
Aliens once admitted cannot be deprived of
life without due process of law.

Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

- The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject
to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class.
For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958,

June 30, 1988]
- Right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security,
public health or public order, as may be provided by law. An order
temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers is
constitutional for having been issued in the interest of the safety of
OFWs, as provided by the Labor Code.
- The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion
that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it
was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are
being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some
fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case.

Himagan vs. People [G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994]

- The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar
as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

Quinto vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010]

- These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees
from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaigns is
unmistakable.

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935,

December 7, 2010]
- The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
- Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
- Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
- The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations

19. Almonte vs. Vazquez [G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995]
- Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of
the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation

10

Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. L-23794,
February 17, 1968]
- Ormoc City imposes a tax on Ormoc Sugar Central by name. Ormos
Sugar Central is the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The Court held
that such ordinance is not valid for it would be discriminatoory
against the Ormoc Sugar Central which alone comes under the
ordinance.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015)

- (1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs. (2) Four principles and
traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. 3)
The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of equal protection (4) The right
to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person,
and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex (5) While the
Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process
for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative
action before asserting a fundamental right.

Section 2 Searches and Seizures

20. People vs. Marti [G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991]
- In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
1

Stonehill vs. Diokno [G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967]

- Exclusionary Rule evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art.III,
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Fruit of
Poisonous Tree Doctrine).
- available to natural and artificial persons, but the latter's books of
accounts may be required to open for examination by the State in the
exercise of police power or power of taxation The right is personal
- the Court held that the following description is insufficient for it
amounts to a general warrant authorizing the officer to pick up
anything he pleases: Book of accounts, financial records,
vouchers...and other documents showing all business transactions....
The Court further held that the objection to an unlawful search or
seizure and to evidence obtained thereby is purely personal and
cannot be availed by third parties.

Soliven vs. Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988]

- the Court clarified the meaning of personally in the search and
seizure clause. It stated that in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of existence of probable cause, what is required is personal
determination and not personal examination.
- Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause

11

and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2)

if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
1

Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental [G.R. No. 81756,
October 21, 1991]
- . The examination conducted WAS GENERAL IN NATURE AND MERELY
REPETITIOUS of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable
cause upon which a warrant may issue."

Morano vs. Vivo [G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967]

- AS A STEP PRELIMINARY OR INCIDENTAL TO PROSECUTION OR
PROCEEDINGS FOR A GIVEN OFFENSE OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION,
not as A MEASURE INDISPENSABLE TO CARRY OUT A VALID DECISION
BY A COMPETENT OFFICIAL ,

Harvey vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988]

- In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence

Alvarez vs. CFI [G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937]

the search warrant must be based upon an application supported
by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an OATH
includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an
act faithfully and truthfully;

Mata vs. Bayona [G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984]

- Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach
them to the record.

People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
- The version foisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary to
human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The
usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to
arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the
dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the every reason why
such a police operation is called a "BUY-BUST" operation. The police
poseur-buyer "buys dangerous drugs from the pusher and "bust"
(arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the
police officer

Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]

- Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested

People vs. Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991]

12

- Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an

absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
1

People vs. Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992]

- True, in some instances, this
Court has allowed government
authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search
warrant. Thus, (1) when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion; (2) when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws; (4) when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; (5) when it
involves prohibited articles in plain view; or (6) in cases of inspection
of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without
a search warrant.

Go. Vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992]
- The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."

Posadas vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990]

They suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The
said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

People vs. Mengote [G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992]

- It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even
if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer-could
clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he
may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997]
- Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

People vs. Aminnudin [G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988]

- The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing to comply Moreover, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so.

People vs. Malmstedt [G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991]

- While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects

13

of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was

sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused
was then and there committing a crime.
1

Espano vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998]

- An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

Papa vs. Mago [G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968]

- But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods , where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

People vs. Musa [G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993]

- It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain
view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent
from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must be

IMMEDIATELY APPARENT to the police that the items that they

observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.

Valmonte vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989]

- the Court held that not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of the case. Checkpoints are not illegal per se...
Routine inspection and few questions do not constitute unreasonable
searches. If the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of
becoming a search, this can be done when there is deemed to be
probable cause. In the latter situation, it is justifiable as a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle.

Microsoft Corporation v. Samir [G.R. No. 205800, September 10, 2014]

-Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could
very well serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed
up personally by the recipient and validated.
-The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses
were able to verify the information obtained from their confidential
source. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant.
21. Commerciante v. People [G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015]
-One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a
search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed.

14

-For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
22. Celedonio v. People [G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015]
-no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers
asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a general
inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records
did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the
stolen items were in Celedonio's motorcycle compartment. Neither was
there any showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or
rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any
force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made
the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle
compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the stolen
ones, he actually confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left
without any recourse but to take him into custody for further
investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable cause
that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any
explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into
consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police
had to immediately act on it.
23. Sydeco v. People [G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014]
-There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending
team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioners act of exercising
ones right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the
middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.
As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under
dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights
it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them
whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to
stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning
policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the
vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that
there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that
would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action.
24. People v. Mercado [G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015]
-The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
25. Del Castillo v. People [G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012]
- In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or
describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut,
20 meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence
is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure.
26. Manalili v. CA [G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997]

15

-Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
27. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
- the stop-and-frisk rule is stated thus: (W)here a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigation of this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
Section 3 Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
1

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995]
- The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996]
- The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999]
- he law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1)
that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played
in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape
are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.

Ople vs. Torres [G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998]

- the right to privacy being a fundamental right, the government has
the burden of proof to show that a statute (AO no. 308 in this case) is

16

justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly

drawn.
- A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if
not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations
by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. BUT WHAT IS NOT ARGUABLE IS THE BROADNESS, THE
VAGUENESS, THE OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO. 308 WHICH IF
IMPLEMENTED WILL PUT OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER.
1

Vivares v. STC [G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014]

- In this case, however, there is no showing that the students
concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that
that their post (status) on Facebook were published as Public
- STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which
the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it
appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the
picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said
pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it
was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according
to the standards of the school (to which the students and their
parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they
enrolled their children there).

28. Gamboa v. Chan [G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012]

- In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
- [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to
a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
- A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the
protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he
assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be
broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Governments
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioners
telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon
sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)

- The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was
no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By the invention
of the telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the purpose of

17

extending communications, one can talk with another at a far distant

place. The language of the amendment cannot be extended and
expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world
from the defendants house or office. The intervening wires are not
part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along
which they are stretched.

Section 4
Freedom of Expression
31. United States vs. Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]
- Bustos and several people sent complaint letters via counsel against
Justice of Peace Roman Punsalan, who charged them with libel.
- SC compared criticism of official conduct to a scalpel that relieves
the abscesses of officialdom
- Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good . Rising superior to
any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of Government
- PUBLIC OPINION should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy.
1

People vs. Alarcon [G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939]

- newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts.

Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R. No. L-82380, April 29,
1988]
- the tribunal upheld the primacy of freedom of expression over Enrile's
right to privacy, because Enrile was a public figure and a public
figure's right to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
Besides, the movie Four Days of Revolution (sabi ni Cruz) / A
Dangerous Life (sabi ni Nachura) / The Four Day Revolution (sabi sa
case) would not be historically faithful without including therein the
participation of Enrile in the EDSA revolution.
- Succinctly put, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
cannot be invoked resist
publication and dissemination of MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST.
The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right
to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing
of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside
the realm of legitimate public concern

Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999]
- A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION may be either absolutely privileged
or qualifiedly privileged. ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad
faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution
which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other
hand, QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre

18

belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without

any comments or remarks."
- FAIR COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
PUBLIC PERSON IN HIS PUBLIC CAPACITY, it is not necessarily
actionable.
1

Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]

- the denial of a permit to hold a public rally was invalid as there was
no showing of the probability of a clear and present danger of an evil
that might arise as a result of the meeting. The burden of proving
such eventually rests on the Mayor.
- retired J. JBL Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
march and rally on Oct 26, 1983 2-5pm from Luneta to gates of US
Embassy, and was denied by the Mayor due to Vienna Convention
Ordinance and fear of subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators.
- Held: no justifiable ground to deny permit because Bill of Rights will
prevail over Vienna Ordinance should conflict exist (none proven
because 500m not measured from gate to US Embassy proper) and
fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly- only clear and present danger of substantive evil.

Pita vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989]

- SC declared that the determination of what is obscene is a judicial
function.
- The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is
being asked to pronounce what "OBSCENE" means or what makes for
an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs.
Kottinger, the Court laid down THE TEST, in determining the existence
of obscenity, as follows:
"whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication
or other article charged as being obscene may fall." "ANOTHER TEST,"
so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency." Kottinger hastened to say,
however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case," and that ultimately, the
question is to be decided by the judiciary.

Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001]
- Sec. 1 of RA No. 9006, the Fair Election Act says that surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen(15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven days before an election. The provision is challenged as violative
of freedom of expression. The Court held that as prior restraint, the
rule is presumed to be invalid. The power of the Comelec over media
franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space and
the right to reply as well as to reasonable rates of charges for the
use of media facilities for public information and forums among
candidates. Here the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute and
substantial. Nor does the rule pass the O'Brien test for content related
regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while

19

allowing other types such as editorials, etc. and (2) the restriction is
greater than what is needed to protect government interest because
the interest can be protected by narrower restriction such as
subsequent punishment.
1

Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 208062, April 7,
2015]
- the constitutional desire to "guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service" is the same intent that animates the Constitutions
investiture in COMELEC of the power to "supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary."
32. 1-United Transport v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015]
-A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of
censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than
others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity
makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure
Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected
speech on the basis of its content.
"the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their
privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this
captive audience."
33. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015]
-The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
-Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been
said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty
to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of
communication that conveys its messageas clearly as the written or
spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any
more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections
like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to
deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be
silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
-The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of
matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated
in the Austriacase such as "proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and
other activities withattached religious significance."
Assembly and Petition
34. Primicias vs. Fugoso [G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948]
- The respondent mayor could only reasonably regulate, not absolutely
prohibit, the use of public places for the purpose indicated.
- The respondent mayor could only reasonably regulate, not absolutely
prohibit, the use of public places for the purpose indicated. the

20

condition of Manila at that time did not justify the mayor's fears. there
was no clear and present danger. decided in 1947.
- If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such
place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. Power
of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition
1

Malabanan vs. Ramento [G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984]

- (several students were suspended for 1 year for conducting
demonstration in the premises of a university outside the area
permitted by the school authorities) SC emphasized that the students
did not shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the
schoolhouse gate, and permitted the students to re-enroll and finish
their studies.

De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999]
- as held that for the right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances to be upheld, like any other
liberty, it must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to
prejudice the public welfare.

PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills [G.R. No. L31195, June 5, 1973]
- right to free assembly and petition prevails over economic rights.
- THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, OF
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has been sustained.

Bayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006]

- (f) the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response Policy is null and void.
Respondents are enjoined from using it and to strictly observe the
requirements of maximum tolerance.
- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is NOT AN ABSOLUTE BAN
OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES BUT A RESTRICTION THAT SIMPLY REGULATES
THE TIME, PLACE AND MANNER OF THE ASSEMBLIES. This was
adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,[20] where the Court referred to it
as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

Section 5 Freedom of Religion
1

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]

- religion is defined as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator.
- It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, not mere RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.

Garces vs. Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]

- There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the
barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is
wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to
determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change
its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church that
action would not violate the Constitution because the image was
acquired with private funds and is its private property.

21

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila [G.R. No. L-9637, April 30,
1957]
- the constitutional guarantee of free exercise carries with it the right to
disseminate information, and any restraint of such right can be
justified only on the ground that there is a clear and present danger
of an evil which the State has the right to prevent; Hence, City
ordinance imposing license fees to on sale is inapplicable to the
society

Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996]
- Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality
already on ground.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu [G.R. No. 95770, March

1, 1993]
- SC reversed Gerona vs Sec. of Educ. , and upheld the right of
petitioners to refute to salute the Philippine flag on account of their
religious scruples. To compel students to take part in a flag ceremony
when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom.
- SC holds that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises

Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]

- Compelling State Interest test [Estrada vs Escritor]
- the constitution's religion clause's prescribe not a strict bu
abenevolent neutrality (which recognizes that government
mustpursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time,
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits
- benevolent neutrality could allow for accomodation morality based on
religion provided it does not offend the compelling state interest test.
- two steps (as regards the test):

inquire whether respondent's right to religious freedom

has been burdened; and
ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious belief.

Perfecto v. Esidera [A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015]

-Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
-Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with
another person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of
her religious expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to
any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of
how civil marriages are treated in that person's religion.
35. Imbong v. Ochoa [G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

22

- The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects
to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
- Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
- Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend
a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does
not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included
in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or
reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide
on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
Section 6 Liberty of Abode and of Travel
36. Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
- The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the right to leave,
reside and travel within ones country but it does not include the right
to return to ones country.
- NOTE: Court warned that this case should not create a precedent
because Marcos was a class in himself.
- he right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights , which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.
1

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
- Bail posted in a criminal case, is a valid restriction on the right to
travel. By its nature, it may serve as a prohibition on an accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines where orders of Philippine
courts would have no binding force.
- The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. The result of the obligation assumed
by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused
from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend
beyond that of the Philip

23

Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991]

- Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.

Section 7 Right to Information

37. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
- Personal interest is not required in asserting the right to information
on matters of public concern. What matters constitute public
concern should be determined by the court on a case to case basis.
- In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973
Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the
State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents,
papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for
policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law
1

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
- Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits to insured
government employees.

Province of Cotabato vs. The Govt. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral

Domain [G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
- Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have
intended.
Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights

Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. NO. 132601, October 12, 1998]
- SC held that making the Lethal Injection Manual inaccessible to the
convict was unconstitutional.
- Paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power
to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review
and approval thereof.
Being a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not
promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making
authority under R.A. No. 8177.

Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government [G.R. No.

130716, December 9, 1998]
- Public concern (def.) writings coming into the hands of public
officers in connection with their official functions Ill-gotten wealth is,
by its nature, a matter of public concern. Privileged communication:

24

(1) national security, (2) trade secrets, (3) criminal matters pending in
court,
- There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions:
- (1) national security matters and intelligence information (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.
1

Akbayan v. Aquino [G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008]

- The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be
kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with
the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.

Section 8 Right to Form Associations

38. SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 85279, July
28, 1989]
- right to organize does not carry with it right to strike
- Thus , while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes
the right of government employees to organize , it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
1

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union [G.R. No. L-25246,

September 12, 1974]
- SC upheld the validity of RA 3350, exempting members of a religious
sect from being compelled to join a labor union

In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon [A.C.

No. 1928, August 3, 1978]
- Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member.

Section 10 Non-Impairment Clause

1

Rutter vs. Esteban [G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953]

- The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium
statute lies in the determination of THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION OF
THE REMEDY. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
39. Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L24670, December 14, 1979]
- The lots in question not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA was a
main traffic artery. The resulting activity, noise and pollution are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
route.

25

Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

- The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom
to enter into "lawful" contracts . Contracts which contravene public
policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in
this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for
money; it form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely
free from the regulatory power of the state.

Ganzon vs. Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450, July 25, 1983]

- Mortgage contract without which it cannot exist as an independent
contract. The mortgage lien in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is
inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien
on the property.
To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond
would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam.
This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of
the mortgagee under the mortgage contract .

Section 12 Custodial Investigation

40. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436
- called the Miranda Doctrine (Miranda vs Arizona)
- Miranda Doctrine prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently.
- Purpose of the Doctrine: In Miranda v Arizona, the US Supreme
Court established rules to protect a criminal defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination from the pressures arising
during custodial investigation by the police. Thus, to provide
practical safeguards for the practical reinforcement for the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the Court held that the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
- Requisites of the Miranda Doctrine

(1) any person under custodial investigation has the right to

remain silent;
(2) anything he says can and will be used against him in a
court of law;
(3) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and
(4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires.
1

Gamboa vs. Cruz [G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988]

- The Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the
person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his
behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not
be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

26

41. People vs. Macam [G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994]
- A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings.
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
1

People vs. Judge Ayson [G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989]

- Thee rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons.

People vs. Pinlac [G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988]

- The right must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat
to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution.
He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms.
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain,
and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed"
of his rights

People vs. Bolanos [G.R. No. 101808, July 3, 1992]

- Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police
patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation
may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of
his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3

42. People vs. Andan [G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997]

- Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has
operational supervision and control over the local police and may be
deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andans
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted
as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate
his constitutional rights.
- Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited
43. Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994]
- The right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since
the procedure is not within the ambit of custodial investigation. A
person may be subject to malversation of funds even in the absence
of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund
shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with convincing
justification
44. People vs. Dy [G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988]

27

- The sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm"

signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral
confession.That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The fact of
Appellant's surrender is further borne out by the Order of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, categorically reciting that "no
warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the
reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the
complaint."
1

People vs. Alicando [G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995]

- Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt
of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial
court in convicting the appellant. It is now familiar learning that the
Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled
confession or admission as provided under Section 12 paragraphs (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. It is not only the uncounselled
confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence
derived therefrom

De Castro vs. People [G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015]

-Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
-the occasion for the exercise of the new right and the protections that
it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to police
interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of
his freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is
underway that the certain procedural safeguards takes over the
person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning.
45. People vs. Gallarde [G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000]
- The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of
counsel, being purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination
46. People vs. Samus [G.R. No. 135957, September 17, 2002]
-even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under
the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellants
failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible
in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution,
because it was given under custodial investigation and was made
without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to
object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility.
47. Ladiana vs. People [G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002]
- Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the
duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter
incurred no criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for
the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be

28

disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner

argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of
self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument
deserves scant consideration. Therefore, petitioner can no longer
invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime
charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been
established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and
the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from
the fact of death
48. People vs. Escordial 373 SCRA 585
-that [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. He contends that he was subjected to
custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain
silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence,
he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained
from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellants
rights under this provision.
Republic Act No. 7438
Section 13 Right to Bail
Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court
49. Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 213847, Augsut 18, 2015]
-Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt,
or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
-All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
-The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence,
from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized
50. Basco vs. Rapatalo [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997]
- When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the
judge.

29

hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce

evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail

People vs. Judge Donato [G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991]

- charged with rebellion, a bailable offense, Salas nevertheless agreed
to remain in legal custody during the pendency of the trial of his
criminal case. The Court held that he does not have the right to bail,
because bu his act he has waived his right.
- Salas has, however, waived his right to bail in the criminal case. In
agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the
trial of his criminal case, he has expressly waived his right to bail

Baylon vs. Judge Sison [Adm. Matter No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995]
- Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for
the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory
questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of
guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
- Bail posted in a criminal case, is a valid restriction on the right to
travel. By its nature, it may serve as a prohibition on an accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines where orders of Philippine
courts would have no binding force.

Government of the U.S. vs. Judge Purganan [G.R. No. 148571,

September 24, 2002; December 17, 2002]
- the Court held that extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Hence,
since bail is available only in criminal proceedings, a respondent in an
extradition proceeding is not entitled to a bail. He should apply for a
bail in the court where he will be tried.

Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Olalia [G.R. No. 153675, April 19,
2007]
- An extraditee cannot be deprived of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
- New standard: clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence.
- Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Section 14
Criminal Due Process
51. Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1988]
- It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the
complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such

30

investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary

investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.
1

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986]

- More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is
at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had
pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law
and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor

Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]

- DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b)
that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard;
and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

Presumption of Innocence
52. People vs. Dramayo [G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971]
- Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that
culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence
be one of conviction.
1

Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

- for the purposes of disqualification in an election, section 4 of BP Blg.
52 says that the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be prima facie evidence of such fact (disqualification). The
Court held that this provision violates the guarantee of presumption
of innocence. Although filing of charges is only prima facie evidence
and may be rebutted, the proximity of elections and consequent risk
of not having time to rebut the prima facie evidence already in effect
make him suffer as though guilty even before trial.

Marquez vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]

- One is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of
an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified
because he is a "fugitive from justice,
- The disqualification is based on his flight from justice.
- Flight= guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged
disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of
innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven
his guilt.

53. Corpus vs. People [G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]

31

- Equipoise rule: applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced. This favours the accused.
54. Feeder International Line vs. CA [G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991]
- A corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who
is an accused in a criminal case.
Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel
55. People vs. Holgado [G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]
- Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the
court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform
the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is
unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of
his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
1

People vs. Agbayani [G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]

- The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a
grievous error to proceed by sentencing the accused without due
process of law and this is not complete, when the accused is denied
the right recognized by said rule. The records must show
compliance therewith or that the accused renounced his right to be
assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice and
remove all doubt that if the accused had waived said right, he was
fully informed before giving his plea of its consequences. Omission
by courts whether voluntary should not truly be censured but also
condemned.
56. Amion vs. Judge Chiongson [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]
- Moreover, Amion was not deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together
with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. Finally, there is no denial
of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's
desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous
trial system. The administrative complaint is dismissed.
Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
57. People vs. Quitlong [G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998]
- Complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
- Information must
1. state the name of the accused;
2. the designation given to the offense by the statute;
3. a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the
offense;
4. the name of the offended party;
5. the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;
6. the place where the offense has been committed.
58. Pecho vs. People [G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996]

32

- Under the Rules of Court, when there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint of information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or
of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
1

Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984]

- The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery
under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of
as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so
that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be
informed.

Borja vs. Mendoza [G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977]

- Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution. The Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned
so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal
offense he has to face

Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial

1 People vs. Tee [G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003]
- The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and
secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
59. Flores vs. People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]
- The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be
availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of
the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced
60. Conde vs. Rivera [G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924]
- Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom
61. Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz [G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973]
- Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to assure litigants of his
being fair and just;
- What a trial requires is an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
62. Garcia vs. Domingo [G.R. No. L-30104, July 25, 1973]
- Trial held in air conditioned quarters is not a violation of a public trial
as it is still open to anyone who wishes to witness the proceeding

33

63. In re: request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph
Estrada [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001]
- the Court held that the propriety of the Estrada trial involves the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial... With the possibility of losing not only the
precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to
make absolute
1

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE

MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL. [A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011]
- Right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,
that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of
the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere
fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

64. People vs. Mapalao [G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991]
- "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are
present; (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused
has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do
so is unjustified.
- The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial
on a particular date of winch he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present during that trial.
65. People vs. Valeriano [G.R. Nos. 103604-05, September 23, 1993]
- it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the
constitutional duty of the court to acquit them
Right of Confrontation
1. United States vs. Javier [G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918]
- Confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential
66. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987]
- The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who
should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is
permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in
poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels
and must shroud their spite in secrecy.
- That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted
unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save
only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying
declaration.
Right to Compulsory Processes
67. Roco vs. Contreras [G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005]
- In determining whether the production of the documents described
in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the

34

production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and

secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to
justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of
all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted
with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show
up, will not be enforced.
Section 15 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
68. Lansang vs. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971]
- 2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b)
"public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
69. Jackson vs. Macalino [G.R. No. 139255, November 24, 2003]
- The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a
person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which he is detained.
- Court: quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration
Rules on Habeas Data
Rules on Writ of Amparo
Section 16 Right to a Speedy Disposition of Cases
70. Padua vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988]
- It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be
reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may
be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only
after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially
where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any
part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if
at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to
present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the
defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
71. Flores vs. People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]
- Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at
the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The
Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where
the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the
fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by
private individuals. Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is
entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or
the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
Section 17 Right Against Self-Incrimination
72. United States vs. Tan Teng [G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912]
- If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control] in whatever form exercised, then it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all
the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law
to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the
evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it

35

is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but

testimonial compulsion.
73. Villaflor vs. Summers [G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920]
- since the kernel of the privilege was the prohibition of testimonial
compulsion, the Court was willing to compel a pregnant woman
accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being tested for
pregnancy. Being purely a mechanical act, it is not a violation of her
constitutional right against self-incrimination
1

Beltran vs. Samson [G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]

- The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute
when claimed, maybe waived by any one entitled to invoke it.

- it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the

case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and
it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or
produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create
this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
74. People vs. Gallarde [G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000]
- The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of
counsel, being purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination
75. Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968]
- At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case
may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to
take the witness stand.
76. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [G.R. No. L-25018, May 26,
1969]
- that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been
absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers
as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation
of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a
principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly
result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
- It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed
the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether
physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis
on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to
Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also
with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to
a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy."
77. Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994]
- But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a
number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the
development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;
and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to
safeguard the values that underlie the privilege.

36

- the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of

values demands that the right against self-incrimination and the right
to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws
that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must
necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.
The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
Section 18 Right Against Involuntary Servitude
Section 19 Prohibited Punishment
78. People vs. Estoista [G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953]
- Republic Act. No. 4 is constitutional. It does not go against the
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment having
due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to curb
79. People vs. Esparas [G.R. No. 120034, August 20, 1996]
- Death penalty; Constitutional
- Courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor
specific and well defined criminal acts;
- Congress has the power to re-impose the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes; This entails:
1) define and describe what heinous crimes mean;
2) specify and penalize by death only crimes that qualify as heinous;
3) Congress be move by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Despite absence, courts can automatically review Esparas death sentence.
80. Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]
- [Issue on Lethal Injection]
- Lethal injection is not a cruel and degrading punishment.
- Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
- The lack of particularity in the details of dose administration does not
amount to it being cruel and degrading.
- Other laws in conjuncture with the death sentence law must be
harmonised with the law it seeks to implement

Section 20 Non-Imprisonment for Debt

81. Serafin vs. Lindayag [A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30, 1975]
- A simple loan is not criminally punishable.
82. Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
- Gravamen of BP22: act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
Section 21 Double Jeopardy
83. People vs. Obsania [G.R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968]
- When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason
that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the
merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

37

- In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only

with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of
his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if
the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
84. Paulin vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993]
- Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express
assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection
against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted
upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
- Dismissal is not equal to acquittal.
85. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy [G.R. No. 151912, September 26,
2005]
- Double Jeopardy rule exception:
1.) if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence
2.) On the denial of the right to speedy trial.
A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since
such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
86. Lejano vs. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011]
- General rule: judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, however, a
motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved
the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
87. Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 95642, May 28, 1992]
- A prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. There is no double
jeopardy when one is prosecuted in an admin case and a criminal
case. He can be acquitted in one, yet prosecuted in the other.
88. People vs. Balisacan [G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966]
- Existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The
accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that
he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required
him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has
been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there
can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal.
89. People vs. City Court of Silay [G.R. No. L-43790, December 9, 1976]
- Revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the
very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of
merits.
90. Esmea vs. Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981]
- Revival of a case that was dismissed without the consent of the
accused would constitute double jeopardy.
- In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their
right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its

38

termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed

consent to the dismissal of the case.
- Dismissal was due to incapability of the complainant to furnish
evidence
91. People vs. Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]
- The mere filing of two informations charging the same offence is not
an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the
first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
termination of the case without the consent of the accused
92. People vs. Tampal [G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995]
- Dismissal = acquittal -> cannot ensue as the state did not violate
rights to a speedy trial
93. Melo vs. People [G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950]
- There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which
was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of
Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is
identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it
necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information.
94. People vs. Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977]
- if after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the
crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new ofense
95. People vs. Relova [G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987]
- Even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first
charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge
was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
- The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should
bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as
that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
Section 22 Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

CITIZENSHIP
Read and memorize:

Citizenship provisions under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions

Commonwealth Act No. 63 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED

39

Commonwealth Act No. 625 - AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE
OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON
WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Commonwealth Act No. 473 - AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED
TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND
FORTY-EIGHT.
Republic Act No. 530 - REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 - AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATION
Republic Act No. 9139 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Republic Act No. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS
AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
Republic Act No. 9225

Section 2

Co vs. House of Representatives [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]

- As to the matter of citizenship the Court ruled in Ongs favor citing
the following reasons:Ongs father was already naturalized while he
was just 9 years oldOngs mother was a Filipina plus the fact that a
lot of instances transpired after he reached the age of majority than
reinforces the fact that he elected Filipino citizenship.That the fact
that his brothers citizenship was in fact already answered favorably
by the Constitutional Commission itself.As to the issue of residence,
again the court ruled in Ongs favor holding that he never had any
intention to abandon his domicile of origin despite having stayed in
Manila to study or pursue his personal career.

In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching [B.M. No.
914, October 1, 1999]
- Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of
fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over

96. Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
- By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a
Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when
she reached the age of majority.
97. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
- Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him

40

from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
98. Republic of the Philippines v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, 15 February
2012
- There is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the
direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under
Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to
file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry,
i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief
prayed for by the respondent.
99. Ma v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
- We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage,
being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now
say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship
has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election
beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts
of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been
done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a
century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine
public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of
Philippine citizenship.
100. Republic of the Philippines v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7,
2013
- No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a
Philippine citizen: He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not
less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
- Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her
profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her
family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her
husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife
were able to raise all their five children, provided them with
education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens
of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and
wifes lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can
resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this
is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the
only country she has known since birth.

41

- Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of

extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a
unity of allegiance among family members.
101.

In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552 (1974)
- 'It is not enough for an applicant for naturalization not to be a
financial burden upon the community. He must, also, have a
"lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." And this
qualification has been construed to mean, not only that he is not a
beggar, a pauper or indigent, but, also, that his financial condition
must be such as to permit him and the members of his family to live
with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard
of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this
stage of our civilization.

102. Chua Kian Lai v. Republic, 158 Phil. 44 (1974)

- 1. One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner
"must be of good moral character". That circumstance should be
specifically alleged in the petition (Secs. 2[3rd] and 7, Com. Act No.
473). The State, in its brief, notes that Chua Kian Lai did not aver in
his petition that he is a person of good moral character. He simply
made a blanket allegation that he had "all the qualifications required
of Commonwealth Act No. 473" (6 Record on Appeal). That general
statement is not sufficient.
- 2. The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his
petition "his present and former places of residence" (See. 7, Com.
Act No. 473). The fact that the petitioner testified during the hearing
on all of his former places of residence did not cure the deficiency of
his petition (Lo vs. Republic, 111 Phil. 1036). Non-compliance with
that important requirement renders the publication incomplete and,
consequently, affects the court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. It warrants the dismissal of the petition (Go vs. Republic, L20558, March 31, 196,"), 13 SCRA 548; Pe vs. Republic, L-20375,
January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 99).
- 3. Petitioner, a businessman, who has ten children, five of whom were
still dependent on him for support in 1961, when he testified, and
whose annual income was P6,500, cannot be regarded as having a
"lucrative trade" (Sec. 2[4th], Com. Act No. 473).
103.

Li Tong Pek v. Republic, 122 Phil. 828 (1965)

- Under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess "some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify him
to become a Filipino citizen (Section 2, par. 4, Commonwealth Act No.
473).

104. Chiu Bok v. Republic, 245 Phil. 144 (1988)

- Since lucrative income is to be reckoned with as of the filing of the
application for naturalization petitioner's net income for the year
1967, when the application for naturalization was filed, which is
P9,651.25, should be determinative.
105. Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011
- Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV,
1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line
of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for

42

candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino

citizen
106.

Edison So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007

- Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into

the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges
of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by
which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
- A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and
the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently
discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon
any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or
conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the
government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more
reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
Section 3
107. Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago [G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989]
- Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioners Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was
held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
108. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]
- The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and
the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could
do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and
PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation
109. Labo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]
- The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may
have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election.
The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
- Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country
he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.
110. Republic vs. De la Rosa [G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994]

43

- The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a

citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to
serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to
vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of
hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing,
and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of
the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
111. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289,
October 4, 1971
- Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
112. Bengzon III vs. HRET [G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001]
- In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However,
he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
- Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship
113. Altajeros vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004
- The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of
repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation
retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May
10, 2004 elections

44

Section 5
114. Aznar vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990]
- The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and thereby
qualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent
had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided under
C.A. No. 63 namely: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By
express renunciation of Citizenship; and (3) By subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
Thus, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned herein above or
by any other mode of losing Philippine Citizenship
115.

Mercado vs. Manzano [G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999]

- The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

116. Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012

- Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
- The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5.
- The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian
citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer
authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
117. Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009
- There was no material misrepresentation in his COC. Although Ty has
lost his domicile when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen, the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts proved that
he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for at least 1 year prior to elections as stated in his
COC. COMELEC went on to explain that the term residence is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence or the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
118. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares Vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700. March 8, 2016
- Yes. (A) Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioners parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant
in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
features. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos

45

such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in
the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioners parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. (B) It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do
not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their
newborn babies behind. (C) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a
class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. In other words, the
constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency
and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. In sum, all of the international law conventions
and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers
from a misfortune not of their own making.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Read Magallona, Merlin M., Fundamentals of Public International Law, C&E Pub. (2005)
pp. 243 270
(pp. 271 289 are extra reading matters not included for the recitation but may be
included in the final exam)
Human Rights Treaties in Philippine Jurisprudence
119. Boris Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-4254, September 26,
1951
- the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution
entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings
are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property,
birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art.
8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9); etc.
120. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
- Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled
to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is
no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance,
our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a
deceased individual.
- It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional
or human rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the
issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr.
Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for
the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted long before
his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be
buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from
birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.

46

121. Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
- The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty,
122. ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
- That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these
evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very
broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Human Rights in Action
The Commission on Human Rights
Read and memorize Article XIII, Section 17 to 19
123. Carino v. CHR, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
- Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by
each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.
124. Simon v. CHR, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
- The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not
be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the

47

Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred

only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned
in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including
a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights
and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
125. EPZA v. CHR, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992
- The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The Writ of Amparo
126. Infant Julian Yusa v. Atty. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
- The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
127.

2. Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012

- Elements of forced disappearances:
a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

128. Canlas v. NAPICO Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June

5, 2008
- Writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

48

- The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of

rights protected by the writ. Their claim to their dwelling does not
constitute right to life, liberty, and security
129.

Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

- The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should
not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art.
III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order
should be likened to the production of documents or things under sec.
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which
an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody
or control.

The Writ of Habeas Data

130. Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
- First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied
only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
131.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

- for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between theright to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.

The Ugly Scars of the Marcos Regime:

An Ongoing Quest for Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition
Read and memorize Republic Act No. 10368 Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013
132. Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
133. Republic v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007

49