Rem Digest Crimpro Rule111 Rights of The Accused PDF

REMEDIALLAWREVIEWDIGESTS(CIVPRO)TranquilSalvadorIII
Alcisso,Antonio,Arriola,Bernardo,Cajucom,Claudio,Dialino,Dizon,Escueta,Imperial,Martin,Martinez,Mendoza,Raso,Rosales,Sia,Venzuela
PART II
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil

actionpriortothecriminalaction.xxx
B. CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE

(RULE 111)
Since Balboa instituted the civil case prior to the criminal case, the
civilcasemayproceedindependentlyofthecriminalcaseandthere
is no forum shopping. Even under the amended rules, a separate
proceedingforrecoveryofcivilliabilityincasesofviolationofBP22
isallowedwhenthecivilcaseisfiledofthecriminalcase.Eventhen
theRulesencourageconsolidation.
1.BUNTIONGvBALBOA
Facts:
VicenteBalboafiled2casesagainstCarolineSiokChingTeng:
2.JOSEvSUAREZ
(1)acivilcaseforCollectionofSumofMoneyonFeb24,97based
onthepostdatedchecksissuedbyCarolinewithRTC.TheRTCruled
infavorofBalboaaffirmedbytheCA.
FACTS:
Sps. Suarez (Respondents) had availed of petitioner Carolina Joses
offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter
increasedto5%andrespondentswereforcedtoacceptduetotheir
financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day
fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done
under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the petitioners filed cases of
violationofBP22againstrespondentswherethelatterfiledmotions
to suspend hearings based on the existence of a prejudicial
question. Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest rates are
nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean
that the checks which are objects of BP 22 cases are not only fully
paidbutinfactoverpaid.
(2) criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 on July 21, 97. The MTC
acquittedTendbutheldhercivillyliable.TheRTConappealdeleted
theawardofcivildamages.
TheSpsChingTengnowcomestocourtchargingBalboawithforum
shopping.
Issue:W/Nitconstitutesforumshopping
Held:NO
Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that
one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. The
elementsare:(1)identityofparties;(2)identityofrightsandrelief
prayed for; (3) identity of 2 preceding particulars such that any
judgment in the other action would constitute res judicata or litis
pendentia.
ISSUE:
W/N a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of the
validityoftheinterestisdeterminativeoftheguiltorinnocenceof
therespondentsinthecriminalcase?No
RULING:
IntheHyattcaseitwaspronouncedthatthereisidentityofparties
and causes of action between a civil case for recovery of sum of
moneyandcriminalcaseforBP22.InthesaidcasetheSCappliedSC
Circ. No. 5797 effective Sept 16, 1997, which provides that the
criminalactionforviolationofBP22shallbedeemedtonecessarily
includethecorrespondingcivilactionandnoreservationtofilesuch
action separately shall be allowed or recognized. This was later
adoptedinRule111(b)ofthe2000RevisedRulesofCrimProcedure
(b)ThecriminalactionforviolationofBP22shallbedeemedto
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civilactionseparatelyshallbeallowed.xxx.
No. Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil action

involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; b) The resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or
invalidityoftheinterestrateisnotdeterminativeoftheguiltofthe
respondentsinthecriminalcase.Thecauseorreasonforissuanceof
a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP
22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check, which is
malumprohibitum,andnotthepurposeitwasissuedfor.
Theforegoinghoweverisnotapplicableasthecivilandthecriminal
actionswerefiledonFeb24andJuly211997,respectively,priorto
theadoptionoftheSCCircular.TheapplicablerulewasstillSec.1,
Rule111ofthe1985RulesofCourtSec.1.Institutionofcriminal
and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
actionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedlyinstitutedwiththe
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
C. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that

the accused is guilty of that crime. A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence, which needs to be presented only to engender a well
groundedbeliefthatanoffensehasbeencommitted,andthatthe
accusedisprobablyguiltythereof.
1.COMMUNITYRURALBANKvTALAVERA(borrowed)
FACTS:
Community Rural Bank (Bank for short) filed a complaint with the
prosecutors office of Cabanatuan charging several persons (the
accused)withEstafa.Afterpreliminaryinvestigation,6informations
for estafa were filed, 2 of which were raffled to the branch where
respondent,JudgeTalavera,presided.
Motion to Dismiss. It was also error for the Judge to grant the
Motion to Dismiss by relying merely on the resolution of the
prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In his Order, he
merelystatedthatthemotiontodismissismeritorious,andnothing
more. The Order failed to demonstrate an independent evaluation
orassessmentoftheevidenceagainsttheaccused.TheJudgeacted
withunduehastewhenhegrantedtheMotiononlyadayafterthe
reinvestigationwasconcluded.Thisleadstotheconclusionthatthe
judgedidnotpersonallyevaluatethepartiesevidencebeforeacting
on the Motion. The discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests
solelywiththecourt.However,mereapprovalofthepositiontaken
bytheprosecutionisnotequivalenttothediscretionrequired.Once
acomplaint or aninformationisfiledincourt, thejudgenotthe
prosecutorassumesfullcontrolofthecontroversy.Agrantofthe
motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself,
whichisasubjectclearlywithinthecourtsexclusivejurisdictionand
competence.WhenJudgeissuedthewarrantsofarrestwithoutbail
against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the
Information and the Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with
thelattersfindingsofprobablecause.Thus,thegrantoftheMotion
for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged
insufficiencyofevidenceposedaseriouscontradictionoftheearlier
findingofprobablecause.
TheaccusedappealedthefindingoftheFiscaltotheDOJ,whichthe
latter denied, so Judge Talavera issued a warrant of arrest with no
bailagainsttheaccused.
Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for
reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of arrest. Bank was not
notified of this motion. Judge granted the motion without any
hearingthereon.Whenthereinvestigationwasconducted,theBank
wasstillnotnotified.
The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the
reinvestigation reversed the earlier findings of the fiscal. On the
same day, a motion to dismiss was filed with Judge, which he
granted, and he also ordered the release of the accused. The Bank
wasnevernotifiedofanyoftheseproceedings.
BankthenfiledanMRarguingitwasdeprivedofdueprocess.Italso
askedthatthecriminalinformationbereinstated.Judgedeniedthis.
Now, Bank filed the present case charging Judge Talavera with
seriousmisconductandgrossinefficiency.
Finally,JudgegrantedbothoftheMotionsdespitetheobviouslack
of notice to the Bank and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively
depriveditofitsdayincourt.
Issue:DidJudgecommitgrossignorance?Yes
Motion for Reinvestigation. Judge should not have entertained the
motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas
already denied with finality the appeal of the accused, finding that
there was prima facie evidence against the accused. Under Dept
Order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from Resolutions in
Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations), a motion for
reinvestigation may be filed on the ground of newly discovered
evidenceandthismustbefiledbeforetheDOJSecretaryrulesonan
appealfromtheresolutioninapreliminaryinvestigation.Here,the
motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ
Secretary already denied their appeal with finality. Clearly,
therefore, Judge Talavera was wrong in granting the motion. Also,
there was no newly discovered evidence. Moreover, considering
thataprimafaciecasewasfoundtoexistagainsttheaccusedduring
thepreliminaryinvestigation,JudgeTalaverashouldhaveexercised
greatrestraintingrantingareinvestigation.Thecourtstressedthat
a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and
inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except to determine whether a crime has been
2.SERAGvCA(borrowed)
Facts:
Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. a mayoralty candidate in Iloilo was
shot. His driver Norberto Salamat was also wounded. Hence, a
criminal complaint for murder and attempted murder was filed
against Napao who was an incumbent mayor at that time and
Sebastian Serag. The prosecutor filed two informations: (1) for
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and (2) Attempted
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and
Napaoand7others.
The wounded driver Salamat and wife of the victim Ma.
Daisy Sibya filed before the provincial prosecutor a supplemental
complaint for murder, frustrated murder and violation of PD 1866
(Illegal possession of firearms) against Napag, Serag and 16 others.
Provincial Prosecutor issued an order finding probable cause for
murderandattemptedmurderwiththeuseofunlicensedfirearms.
Hence, an amended information was filed (to include the use of
unlicensed firearms). Napao and the other accused filed a petition
forreviewtoappealthesaidresolutionbeforetheDOJ.
The trial court found probable cause for murder and

attempted murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against the
accusedwhowerestillatlarge.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the
saidpetitionforreview,theproceedingsweresuspended.However,
the accused were still set to be arraigned. A day before the said
arraignment,theSecretaryofJusticeaffirmedwithmodificationthe
resolution and downgraded the charges from murder to Homicide.
ProvincialprosecutorwaslikewiseorderedtoamendtheAmended
Informationsaccordingly.
The wife of the victim, Daisy, filed an MR to appeal the
saidresolution.
In compliance with the order of the DOJ, provincial
prosecutor filed before the RTC a motion for leave to filea second
amendedinformationforhomicideandattemptedhomicide.Private
prosecutorsopposedthemotionandmovedfordefermentbecause
they said that Daisy had earlier filed an MR questioning the
resolution downgrading the charges. They said that it would be
prematuretofileamotionfortheadmissionofthesecondamended
information and for the court to admit the same. But the RTC still
granted the motion of the provincial prosecutor and admitted the
secondamendedinformationforhomicide.Theattemptedhomicide
case however was dismissed on the ground that it had no
jurisdictionoverthesaidcase.RTCsaidtheyhadnotreceivedacopy
ofDaisysMR.Hence,thecourtarraignedtheaccusedforhomicide,
whopleadednotguilty.
TakingintoaccountthefindingoftheDOJ,thecourtheld
that the finding of probable cause for murder against the accused
didnotbaritfromadmittingtheSecondAmendedInformationfor
Homicide.Likewise,thependencyofDaisysMRoftheResolutionof
theSecretaryofJusticewasnotavalidreasonforthedefermentof
thearraignmentoftheaccusedforhomicide.
The private complainant (Daisy) forthwith assailed the
orders of the trial court and the arraignment of the accused via a
petition for certiorari in the CA. She insisted that the admission by
theRTCoftheSecondAmendedInformationdowngradingthecrime
charged therein to Homicide and the arraignment of the accused
therein on June 6, 2002 were premature since the Secretary of
Justice had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of the
May20,2002Resolution.
CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding with
thecase.
Inthemeantime,DOJissuedaresolutiongrantingtheMR
of private complainant Daisy and set aside the resolution
downgraded the offense to homicide. The Secretary of Justice
opined that the killing of the deceased was, after all, qualified by
treachery.Secretaryalsosaidthathecannotbestoppedfromtaking
cognizance of the case and resolving the MR despite the
arraignmentoftheaccused.HedirectedtheProvincialProsecutorto
withdraw the Second Amended Information for Homicide and
Attempted Homicide and to file, instead separate Informations for
MurderandAttemptedMurder.
TheaccusedpetitionersfiledanMRofthesaidresolution.
They argued that, with their arraignment in the RTC and the MTC,
the Secretary of Justice should have denied the private
complainantsmotionforreconsideration.DOJdeniedsaidmotion.
Juan Napao and the other petitioners in the Department
of Justice filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the
November 18, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and
praying for the reinstatement of Resolution No. 258 (wherein the

chargesagainstthemweredowngraded).
The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion with the trial
court for the withdrawal of the Second Amended Information for
homicideandforthereinstatementoftheAmendedInformationfor
murder.However,inviewofthetemporaryrestrainingorderissued
bytheCA,thetrialcourtsuspendedtheproceedings.
CA eventually issued an order nullifying the order
downgrading the offense. It also issued an order nullifying the
arraignment. Of course, the accusedpetitioners questioned this
sayingCAactedwithGADLEJwhenitissuedtheordernullifyingtheir
arraignment. They insist that the CA should have dismissed the
petition of Daisy for being moot and academic because they were
alreadyarraigned.
ISSUE:
W/NtheCAcommittedGADLEJ?No,petitionisdenied.
HELD:
TheappellatecourtsnullificationoftheJune6,2002and
July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the arraignment of the
petitioners on June 6, 2002 are wellfounded. Section 13 of DOJ
CircularNo.70reads:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved
party may file a motion for reconsideration within a non
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
resolutiononappeal,furnishingtheadversepartyandthe
Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and
submitting proof of such service. No second or further
motionforreconsiderationshallbeentertained.
The private respondent (Daisy) received a copy of
Resolution No. 258 of the Secretary of Justice downgrading the
charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide and
attempted homicide. She had the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before June 6,
2002. it behooved the RTC to suspend the proceedings until after
the Secretary of Justice had resolved such motion with finality,
including the consideration of the motion of the Provincial
Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information
for homicide, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926, and the
arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in fact,
premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to filesuchmotionforthe
admission of the Second Amended Information since the Secretary
ofJusticehadnotyetresolvedthesaidmotion;afterall,hemaystill
reconsiderResolutionNo.258,whichhedid,effectivelyreversinghis
previousrulingandthusrevertingtotheoriginalchargesofmurder
andattemptedmurder.
Accordingly,werulethatthetrialcourtinacriminalcase
which takes cognizance of an accuseds motion for review of the
resolutionoftheinvestigatingprosecutororforreinvestigationand
defersthearraignmentuntilresolutionofthesaidmotionmustact
ontheresolutionreversingtheinvestigatingprosecutorsfindingor
on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such
resolutionisalreadyfinalinthatnoappealwastakentherefromto
theDepartmentofJustice.
In fine, the RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate
haste when it granted the Provincial Prosecutors motion for the
admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide,
ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 926 for attempted
submitted to the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not
subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges
befiledagainstpetitionerathislastknownaddress.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the letter

transmitted by the BSP constituted the complaint and hence was
defectiveforfailuretocomplywiththemandatoryrequirementsof
Section3(a),Rule112oftheRulesofCourt,suchasthestatementof
address of petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover,
petitionerarguedthattheofficersofOSI,whowerethesignatories
tothelettercomplaint,werenotauthorizedbytheBSPGovernor,
muchlessbytheMonetaryBoard,tofilethecomplaint.
TheRTCdeniedit.TheyruledthattheassailedOSIletterwasnotthe
complaintaffidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the
requirementsundertheRulesofCourt.Itwasbutacoverletter,and
merelycontainedasummaryoftheaffidavitswhichwereattached
toit.Itdidnotcontainanyavermentofpersonalknowledgeofthe
eventsandtransactionsthatconstitutetheelementsoftheoffenses
charged. The RTC held that the affidavits, which were attached to
the OSI letter, comprised the complaintaffidavit in the case. Since
theseaffidavitsweredulysubscribedandsworntobeforeanotary
public,therewasadequatecompliancewiththeRules.Oncertiorari
the CA agreed. These complaintaffidavits complied with the
mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court they were
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and subsequently
certifiedbyStateProsecutorFonacier,whopersonallyexaminedthe
affiants and was convinced that the affiants fully understood their
swornstatements.
Issue: Which was the complaint, the letter or the affidavits? Was
therecompliancewithRule112,sec.3[a]oftheRulesofCourt?
Held: 1. The letter was not intended to be the complaint, as

envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of
personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of
any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge
oftheactsofpetitioner.Werulethattheseaffidavits,nottheletters
transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since
these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who
executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial
compliancewithSection3(a),Rule112oftheRulesofCourt.
TheCourtisnotunawareofthepracticeofincorporatingallallegationsin
onedocumentdenominatedascomplaintaffidavit.Itdoesnotpronounce
strictadherencetoonlyoneapproach,however,fortherearecaseswhere
theextentofonespersonalknowledgemaynotcovertheentiregamutof
detailsmaterialtotheallegedoffense.Theprivateoffendedpartyorrelative
ofthedeceasedmaynotevenhavewitnessedthefatality,inwhichcasethe
peaceofficerorlawenforcerhastorelychieflyonaffidavitsofwitnesses.The
Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal
letter.
Therulehasbeenthat,unlesstheoffensesubjectthereofisonethatcannot
beprosecuteddeoficio,thesamemaybefiled,forpreliminaryinvestigation
purposes, by any competent person. The witnesses who executed the
affidavitsbasedontheirpersonalknowledgeoftheactscommittedbythe
homicide based on Resolution No. 258 of the DOJ Secretary, and

arraignedtheaccusedthereinforhomicide.QuotingtheCA:
Public respondent also erroneously found that the
pendencyofthemotionforreconsideration,andtheother
reasons given, not compelling for the court to defer its
action on the motion to admit. As earlier stated,
Department Circular No. 70 places the duty upon the
appellantandthetrialprosecutortoseetoitthat,pending
resolutionoftheappeal,theproceedingsincourtareheld
inabeyance.
Itshouldbeconsideredthatthemotiontodeferwaseven
withtheconformityofthepublicprosecutorandtheappearanceof
the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the
2000RulesonCriminalProcedure,towit:
Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
institutedinthecriminalactionpursuanttoRule111,the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecutionoftheoffense.
All these facts taken together, there appears to be an
undue haste on the part of the public respondent in admitting the
second amended informations for homicide and attempted
homicide and ordering the arraignment of the private respondents
tothesaidinformations.AsaresultoftheassailedOrdersissuedby
public respondent, the private respondents were arraigned for
homicideandattemptedhomicide.
TheDOJcannotbestrippedofhisauthoritytoactonand
resolve the aforesaid motion of the private complainant on the
Prosecutors insistence that the accused be arraigned on June 6,
2002.Indeed,underSection7ofDOJCircularNo.70,theSecretary
of Justice may resolve the said motion despite the arraignment of
thepetitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of
Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the
sametobepatentlywithoutmeritormanifestlyintended
for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantialtorequireconsideration.
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due
course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any
arraignmentmadeafterthefilingofthepetitionshallnot
bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of
review.
3.SORIANOvPEOPLE
Facts:Sometimein2000,theOfficeofSpecialInvestigation(OSI)of
theBangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP),sentalettertotheChiefState
Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter attached five affidavits, which
wouldserveasbasesforfilingchargesforEstafathruFalsificationof
Commercial Documents and violation of the DOSRI law against
HilarioSoriano.
Thesefiveaffidavitsstatedthatacertaincouple,thespousesCarlos,
appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural
BankofSanMiguel(Bulacan),Inc.(RBSM),buthadneverappliedfor
nor received such loan and that it was petitioner, who was then
president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the
proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been
authorized by RBSM's Board and no report thereof had ever been
purchaseorders,(2)itdidnotorderorreceivetheitemscoveredby
thepurchaseorders,and(3)itwouldnotpayMDECanyamount.
petitioner fall within the purview of any competent person who may
institutethecomplaintforapubliccrime.
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an

affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document having
beensworntobythelawenforcerasthenominalcomplainant.Torequire
otherwiseisaneedlessexercise.Afterall,whatisrequiredistoreducethe
evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may
justify the initiationofaninvestigation,the preliminaryinvestigationstage
canbeheldonlyaftersufficientevidencehasbeengatheredandevaluated
whichmaywarranttheeventualprosecutionofthecaseincourt.
2. Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP
Governor or the Monetary Board to file a case against Soriano, we
holdthattheNCBAdoesnotapplybecausetheBSPdidnotinstitute
the complaint but merely sent the affidavits of the complainants
[theofficers]totheDOJ.
3. We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was
charged werepublic crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated
by any competent person with personal knowledge of the acts
committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the
affidavitsclearlyfellwithinthepurviewofanycompetentperson
whomayinstitutethecomplaintforapubliccrime.
Appealdenied,MotiontoQuashremainsdenied.
Thus, KBC Bank filed a complaint for estafa against Lee and Lim.
State Prosecutor Subia found the existence of probable cause and
recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and
Lim.
Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were
filed with the RTC.After finding probable cause, Judge issued
warrantsofarrestagainstLeeandLim.
Lee and Lim filed a petition. for review with the Department of
Justice(DOJ)challengingthestateprosecutorsresolution.
In his Resolution, DOJ Secretary Perez directed the withdrawal of
theinformationsfiledagainstLeeandLimholdingthatthefacsimile
messageconstitutedhearsayevidencebecausecontentsofthesaid
message was not of personal knowledge of KBC Bank, but of Otto
Versand,whichdidnotpresentaswornstatementduringthetrial.
Thereafter,CityProsecutorSibucao,filedamotiontowithdrawthe
informations against Lee and Lim, which was granted by the RTC
(throughanorder).However,onappeal,theCAsetasidethisorder
forthewithdrawalofinformations.Hence,thispetition.
4.SAMUELLEEvKBCBANK
Issues
Facts
1.
Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a
$1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank).KBC Bank is a
Belgiancorporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.For
this loan, Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and director of
MDEC,executedapromissorynoteinfavorofKBCBankandadeed
of assignment transferring all of MDECs rights over Confirmed
Purchase Order No. MTC548 to KBC Bank.Confirmed Purchase
Order No. MTC548 was allegedly issued by Otto Versand, a
company based in Germany, and covered shipments amounting to
$1,863,050.
2.
Ruling
1.Yes.Theissueofadmissibilityofthefacsimilemessageshouldbe
ventilatedduringthefullblowntrialandnotduringthepreliminary
investigation.
MDECobtainedanotherloan,amountingto$65,000,fromKBC
Bank.For this second loan, Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and
assistantsecretaryofMDEC,executedapromissorynoteinfavorof
KBCBankandadeedofassignmenttransferringallofMDECsrights
over Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC128 to KBC
Bank.Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC128 was also allegedly
issued by Otto Versand, and covered shipments amounting to
$841,500.
The Court said that whether the facsimile message is admissible in

evidenceandwhethertheelementofdeceitinthecrimeofestafais
present are matters best ventilated in a fullblown trial, not in the
preliminary investigation.InAndres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the

Courtheldthat:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of [the
prosecutions] evidence.The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiaryinnatureandisamatterofdefense
thatmaybepasseduponafterafullblowntrial
onthemerits.
MDEC defaulted in the payment of these 2 loans. KBC Bank sent a

letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of Confirmed Purchase
Order Nos. MTC548 and WC128.However, Otto Versand sent a
facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the
Whether or not the issue of admissibility of the facsimile

messagemaybeproperlyventilatedduringthefullblown
trialandnotduringthepreliminaryinvestigation.YES
WhetherornotJudgeDumayasoftheRTC,inorderingthe
withdrawaloftheinformationsagainstLeeandLim,ailed
tomakehisownevaluationandmerelyreliedonSecretary
Perezsrecommendation.YES
In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or

accusation, as well asthe admissibility oftestimonies
andevidence,are better ventilated during trial proper
thanatthepreliminaryinvestigationlevel.
ASSESSMENTOFTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD.IN
OTHER WORDS, THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
WAS BASED UPON CONSIDERATIONS OTHER
THANTHEJUDGESOWNPERSONALINDIVIDUAL
CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO CASE
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.THUS, THE TRIAL
JUDGE IMPROPERLY RELINQUISHED THE
DISCRETIONTHATHEWASBOUNDTOEXERCISE,
AND THE ORDERS DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2004
AND 29 JUNE 2004 ARE INVALID FOR HAVING
BEENISSUEDINGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION.
2.Yes,JudgeDumayasoftheRTC,inorderingthewithdrawalofthe
informationsagainstLeeandLim,failedtomakehisownevaluation
andmerelyreliedonSecretaryPerezsrecommendation.
JudgeDumayasorderreadsasfollows:
In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his order, did not (1)
positively state that the evidence against Lee and Lim is
insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the case, (3)
assess whether Secretary Perezs conclusion is supported by
evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary Perezs
recommendation,(5)embodyhisassessmentintheorder,and(6)
state his reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the
informations.
This Court, after an indepth scrutiny of the

argumentsraisedbytheprosecutionandprivate
complainant, finds the contentions of the
prosecutiontobesufficientandmeritorious.
Accordingly,theMotiontoWithdrawInformationfiledby
the Prosecution is hereby granted and the two (2)
informationsforthecrimeofEstafapenalizedunderpar.2
(a)oftheRevisedPenalCodeareherebywithdrawnfrom
thedocketofthiscourt.
JudgeDumayasfailuretomakehisownevaluationofthemeritsof
the case violates KBC banks right to due process and constitutes
graveabuseofdiscretion.Thus,JudgeDumayasordergrantingthe
motiontowithdrawtheinformationsisvoid.
TheCourtreiterateditsrulingsonseveralcases,suchasthatfound
5.OKABEvGUTIERREZ(borrowed)
inCovs.Lim:
Once a case is filed with the court, any
dispositionofitrestsonthesounddiscretionof
the court.The trial court is not bound to adopt
theresolutionoftheSecretaryofJustice,sinceit
ismandatedtoindependentlyevaluateorassess
the merits of the case.Reliance on the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone
would be an abdication of its duty and
jurisdictiontodetermineaprimafaciecase.The
trialcourtmaymakeanindependentassessment
ofthemeritsofthecasebasedontheaffidavits
and counteraffidavits, documents, or evidence
appendedtotheInformation;therecordsofthe
publicprosecutor,whichthecourtmayorderthe
latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by
theaccusedatthetimethemotionisfiledbythe
publicprosecutor.
FACTS:
Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in the

complaint that Maruyama entrusted to Okabe a sum of money for
thelatter,whowasengagedinthebusinessofdoortodoordelivery,
toremittothePhilippines.Okabefailedtoremitsuchamount.
nd
The complaint for estafa was filed with the 2 assistant

cityprosecutorforpreliminaryinvestigation.Duringthepreliminary
investigation,bothOkabeandMarumayaweregiventhechanceto
adduce evidences/affidavits on their behalf. The 2nd assistant city
prosecutor found probable cause and issued a resolution and the
correspondinginformation.AppendedtheretowastheMaruyamas
complaint affidavit. These documents were forwarded to the city
prosecutorforapproval.
Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay. A

warrantofarrestwasissuedbutOkabewasabletopostbailinthe
amount of 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave the
PhilippinesforJapan.Upontheinstanceoftheprosecution,ahold
departureorderwasissuedbythecourt.
Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of

probable cause. She claims that the documents attached to the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor were insufficient to
warrantafindingofprobablecause.Shecontendsthatitbehooved
the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial
courttoenableittodeterminethepresenceorabsenceofprobable
cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant; (b) the counteraffidavit of Okabe and those of her
witnesses;(c)thetranscriptsofstenographicnotestakenduringthe
preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented
duringthesaidinvestigation.
XXXX
[T]HE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT POSITIVELY STATE
THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS WASINSUFFICIENTFORAPRIMA
FACIECASE, NOR DID THE AFOREQUOTED
ORDER INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS
OF THE CASE BASED ON AN EVALUATION OR
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthetrialcourtjudgeshouldhaverequired
the production of the affidavits of Maruyamas witnesses, their
documentary evidences, stenographic notes of the preliminary
investigation and Okabes counteraffidavit for the purposes of
determiningprobablecausefortheissuanceofthewarrantofarrest
YES
Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused from

questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct of preliminary
investigationNO
HELD:
ThecaseofWebbvDeLeonandHovPeoplesaythatfor
the purposes of determining the existence or nonexistence of
probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, the
judge should not rely solely on the said report. The judge should
considernotonlythereportoftheinvestigatingprosecutorbutalso
theaffidavit/affidavitsandthedocumentaryevidenceoftheparties,
thecounteraffidavitoftheaccusedandhiswitnesses,aswellasthe
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. This rule is now
embodiedsection8(a)ofRule112(butwhichissection7(a)inour
codal) which mandates that an information filed in court shall be
supported by affidavits and counteraffidavits of the parties and
their witnesses, other supporting documents and the resolution of
thecase.Thereasonforthisruleisbecausethelawaimsnotonlyto
acquit the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from
falsechargesandfromthestrongarmofthelaw.
Section26oftheRule114saysthatanapplicationforor
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validityofhisarrestorthelegalityofthewarrantissuedtherefor,or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminaryinvestigationofthechargeagainsthim,providedthathe
raisesthembeforeenteringhisplea.Thisisacurativerulebecause
modifiedthepreviousrulingsoftheSCsayingthatpostingofbailisa
bar to challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative and
procedural in nature, it applies retroactively. It must favor Okabe.
Besides,everywaiverofarighttoquestionthevalidityofanarrest
mustbeunequivocallyestablishedbytheconductoftheaccused.In
this case, the series of acts by Okabe point to the conclusion that
she was insistent about the fact that the arrest was ordered with
insufficientfindingofprobablecause.Infact,sheimmediatelyfileda
motionforjudicialdeterminationofprobablecause.
D. ARREST
examination.Therewas,therefore,nomotiveforthepoliceofficers
toframeupappellant.Theidentityofappellantasthepersonwho
sold the dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in
possessionoftheshabucannotbedoubtedanymore.Suchpositive
identification prevails over appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.
These defenses have been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor,fortheycaneasilybeconcoctedbutdifficulttoprove,and
theyarecommonandstandarddefenseploysinmostprosecutions
arisingfromviolationsoftheCDDAof2002.
1.PEOPLEvDELEON
FACTS
Rodante De Leon was convicted for violation of Secs. 5 (sale) & 11
(possession), Art. 2 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts
(CDDA) of 2002. A confidential informant went to the office of the
AntiIllegal Drug Special Operation Task Force of the Novaliches
Police in QC reporting the illegal activities of De Leon. A buybust
team was then created with PO2 Magcalayo as poseurbuyer and
PO2Collado,etal.toassisthim.Lateratnight,theteamwenttoSta.
Monica, Novaliches where the informant introduced Magcalayo to
DeLeonasbuyerofshabu.ThepolicemanaskedwhetherDeLeon
hadshabu,towhichhesaidyesandaskedhowmuchhewouldbuy.
Magcalayo gave the money and, in return, De Leon gave him 1
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Magcalayo
thenscratchedhishead,whichwasthesignalfortheothersthatthe
transaction has already been consummated. Thereafter, De Leon
was arrested. The buybust money was recovered. De Leon was
handcuffed.Uponfrisking,Colladofoundanotherplasticsatchet.De
Leon was then brought to the police station for investigation.
Collado placed his initials on the sachet found. The evidence was
then turned over to another police, PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a
requestforlaboratoryexamination.Collado,Magcalayo,and2other
police then brought the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Mandaluyong.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a

graveoffense,thepresumptionofregularity in theperformanceof
official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibilityofwitnessesshallprevailoverappellant'sbareallegation.
(2)NO.TheIRRoftheCDDAof2002provide:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled
Precursors
and
Essential
Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratoryequipmentsoconfiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered,for
properdispositioninthefollowingmanner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
sameinthepresenceoftheaccusedortheperson/sfrom
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Departmentof Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shallbeconductedattheplacewherethesearchwarrant
isserved;oratthenearestpolicestationoratthenearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that noncompliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
oversaiditems...
De Leon questioned the legality of the buybust operation

conducted.Healsoclaimedthattheprosecutionfailedtoprovethe
chainofcustodyoftheconfiscateditems.
ISSUEs
(1)Whetherthebuybustoperationwasvalid.
(2)Whetherthechainofcustodywasviolated.
RULING
(1)YES.Abuybustoperationisaformofentrapmentwherebyways
andmeansareresortedtoforthepurposeoftrappingandcapturing
the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regardtoconstitutionalandlegalsafeguardsisundertaken.
A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain

exceptions.Thus,contrarytotheassertionsofappellant,Sec.21of
the foregoing law need not be followed as an exact science. Non
compliancewithSec.21doesnotrenderanaccused'sarrestillegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
Here, the evidence clearly shows that the buybust operation

conductedbythepoliceofficers,whomadeuseofentrapmentto
captureappellantintheactofsellingadangerousdrug,wasvalid
andlegal.Thedefensehasfailedtoshowanyevidenceofillmotive
on the part of the police officers. Even appellant himself declared
thatitwasthefirsttimehemetthepoliceofficersduringhiscross
determinationoftheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused."
compartmentoftheBMWcar.Whenfrisked,therewasfoundinside
the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an
unlicensedAMTCal.3809mmautomaticBackupPistolloadedwith
ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the
following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white
crystallinesubstancewithatotalweightof29.2941kilograms,which
substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride,aregulateddruglocallyknownasshabu;(b)cashin
the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical
scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Thenandthere,Wangresistedthewarrantlessarrestandsearch.
Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the
integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The
chainofcustodyofthedrugssubjectmatterofthecasewasshown
nottohavebeenbroken.Thefactualmilieuofthecaserevealsthat
afterPO2Magcalayoseizedandconfiscatedthedangerousdrugs,as
wellasthemarkedmoney,appellantwasimmediatelyarrestedand
broughttothepolicestationforinvestigation,wherethesachetof
suspected shabu was marked with "NM." Immediately thereafter,
theconfiscatedsubstance,withaletterofrequestforexamination,
was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Chemistry
Report No. D12402003 dated November 9, 2003, the specimen
submitted contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one Engr.
Jabonillo,aForensicChemicalOfficerofthePNPCrimeLaboratory,
whosestipulatedtestimonyclearlyestablishedthechainofcustody
ofthespecimenshereceived.Thus,itiswithoutadoubtthatthere
wasanunbrokenchainofcustodyoftheillicitdrugpurchasedfrom
appellant.
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his

acquittalandthedismissalofthethree(3)casesagainsthimforlack
of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecutions evidence against him. Due to the demurrer, Judge
Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the assailed Resolution granting
Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for
lackofevidence.
Issue:
WhetherornotWangswarrantlessarrestwasvalid?
2.PEOPLEvLAGUIO
Ruling:
Facts:
No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal

Procedureonwarrantlessarrestprovide:
LawrenceWangwaschargedonthreeseparateinformationsfor1)
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 2) Illegal Possession of
Firearmsand3)ViolationoftheComelecGunBan.Policeoperatives
of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the
DepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernmentarrestedSPO2Vergel
de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
popularly known as shabu. Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. . In a separate
operation that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were
arrestedwhiletheywereabouttohandoveranotherbagofshabu
to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and
JosephJunioinformedthepoliceoperativesthattheywereworking
astalentmanagerandgymnastinstructor,respectively,ofGlamour
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and
JosephJuniodidnotdisclosetheirsourceofshabubutadmittedthat
theywereworkingforWang.Theyalsodisclosedthattheyknewofa
scheduled delivery of shabu and that their employer (Wang) could
be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The
police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the
illegaldrugactivitiesofRedentorTeckandJosephJunio.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace

officeroraprivatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arresta
person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commitanoffense;
b)Whenanoffensehasjustbeencommitted,andhehas
probablecausetobelievebasedonpersonalknowledgeof
facts or circumstances that theperson tobearrested has
committedit;and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
servingfinaljudgmentoristemporarilyconfinedwhilehis
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
fromoneconfinementtoanother.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto;(b)arrestofasuspectwhere,basedonpersonalknowledge
ofthearrestingofficer,thereisprobablecausethatsaidsuspectwas
theauthorofacrimewhichhadjustbeencommitted;(c)arrestofa
Wang,whowasdescribedtotheoperativesbyTeck,cameoutofan
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. Police officers
approachedWang,introducedthemselvestohimaspoliceofficers,
asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang,
immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or

temporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending.
observedthatValdez,whoappearedsuspicioustothem,seemedto
be looking for something. Thus, they approached Valdez but he
purportedly attempted to run away. The tanods chased Valdez,
arrested and brought him to the house of Brgy. Capt. Mercado.
Bautista testified that it was Mercado who instructed him to open
Valdez bag, where the mariajuana leaves were found. Aratas and
OrdoocorroboratedBautistastestimonyonmostmaterialpoints.
On crossexamination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself
broughtoutthecontentsofValdezbagbeforethelatterwastaken
to Mercados house. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados
house, it was Valdez himself who brought out the contents of his
baguponordersfromMercado.Forhispart,Ordootestifiedthatit
washewhowasorderedbyMercadotoopenValdezbagandthatit
wasthenthattheysawitscontents.Valdezdeniedthecharges.He
basically alleged that while hewas walking after alighting from the
bus,witnessOrdooallegedlyapproachedhimandaskedwherehe
wasgoing.Ordoothenpurportedlyrequestedtoseethecontents
ofhisbagandValdezacceded.ItwasatthispointthatBautistaand
Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
Valdeztestifiedthathewasrestrainedbythetanodandtakentothe
house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they
reachedtheirdestination.AtMercadoshouse,hisbagwasopened
bythetanodandMercadohimself.Theytookoutanitemwrapped
innewspaper,whichlaterturnedouttobemarijuanaleaves.Valdez
denied ownership of the marijuana. The RTC found Valdez guilty.
TheCAaffirmedtheRTCdecision.
ISSUE:W/Nthedrugswereseizedpursuanttoalawfulwarrantless
arrestthatwouldmakethedrugsadmissibleasevidence?(NOTE:
Valdezneverraisedtheirregularityofhisarrestbeforearraignment,
buttodeterminetheadmissibilityoftheseizeddrugsinevidence,it
is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which
yieldedtheallegedcontrabandwaslawful.)
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the seized marijuana is inadmissible as

evidence.
Section5,Rule113oftheRulesonCriminalProcedureprovidesthe
only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a
warrant.1Itisobviousthatbasedonthetestimoniesofthearresting
barangaytanod,notoneofthesecircumstanceswaspresentatthe
time Valdez was arrested. By their own admission, Valdez was not
committinganoffenseatthetimehealightedfromthebus,nordid
he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanods did not
haveprobablecauseeithertojustifyValdezwarrantlessarrest.For
the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this SC ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime;and(2)suchovertactisdoneinthepresenceorwithinthe
view of the arresting officer. Here, Valdez act of looking around
aftergettingoffthebuswasbutnaturalashewasfindinghiswayto
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto

under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitacrime;and(2)suchovertactisdoneinthe
presenceorwithintheviewofthearrestingofficer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifestanysuspiciousbehavioronthepartofprivaterespondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police.HewasmerelywalkingfromtheMariaOrosaApartmentand
wasabouttoentertheparkedBMWcarwhenthepoliceoperatives
arrestedhim,friskedandsearchedhispersonandcommandedhim
toopenthecompartmentofthecar,whichwaslateronfoundtobe
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offensethen.Therefore,therecanbenovalidwarrantlessarrestin
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arrestingofficers,isnotsufficienttoconstituteprobablecausethat
wouldjustifyaninflagrantedelictoarrest.
Neithermaythewarrantlessarrestbejustifiedunderparagraph(b)
ofSection5.Whatisclearlyestablishedfromthetestimoniesofthe
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
informationthathewastheemployerofRedentorTeckandJoseph
Juniowhowerepreviouslyarrestedandchargedforillegaltransport
ofshabu.TeckandJuniodidnotevencategoricallyidentifyWangto
be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante
delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of
shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is
onlyafewhoursthereafter,andthatWangmaybefoundinMaria
Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers
conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment,
hoping to find a person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstancesdonotsufficientlyestablishtheexistenceofprobable
causebasedonpersonalknowledgeasrequiredinparagraph(b)of
Section5.
3.VALDEZvPEOPLE(borrowed)
FACTS: In 2003, Valdez had in his possession and custody dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in cellophane and newspaper page,
withoutfirstsecuringthenecessarypermitorprescriptionfromthe
propergovtagency.HewasthenchargedwithviolationofSec.11
ofRA9165.Onarraignment,Valdezpleadednotguilty.Duringtrial,
the prosecution presented the testimony of the 3 barangay tanods
(Bautista,AratasandOrdoo)whoarrestedValdez.Whilethethree
wereconductingtheroutinepatrolduringthenightoftheincident,
theynoticedValdez,luggingabag,alightfromaminibus.Theythen
Section5.Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withouta
warrant,arrestaperson:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense;
(b)Whenanoffensehasjustbeencommittedandhehasprobablecausetobelievebasedonpersonal
knowledgeoffactsorcircumstancesthatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedit;and
(c)Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescapedfromapenalestablishmentorplace
whereheisservingfinaljudgmentortemporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending,orhasescaped
whilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
10
hisdestination.Theallegationthatheattemptedtorunawayasthe
tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construedasadequatetochargethetanodwithpersonalknowledge
that Valdez had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attemptingtoengageincriminalactivity.Moreimportantly,Valdez
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the
barangaytanodwhentheyapproachedhim.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, the

conclusionwillnotbeanydifferent.Itisnotunreasonabletoexpect
thatValdez,walkingthestreetatnight,afterbeingcloselyobserved
and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to
fleeattheirapproach.Flightperseisnotsynonymouswithguiltand
mustnotalwaysbeattributedtoonesconsciousnessofguilt.Alone,
and under the circumstances of this case, Valdez flight lends itself
just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious
one. The supposed acts of Valdez, even assuming that they
appeareddubious,cannotbeviewedassufficienttoincitesuspicion
ofcriminalactivityenoughtovalidatehiswarrantlessarrest.Ifatall,
the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the
prevailing backdrop of the case was a stopandfrisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on Valdez behavior.
However, a stopandfrisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer
clothing,andshouldbegroundeduponagenuinereason,inlightof
the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrantthebeliefthatthepersondetainedhasweaponsconcealed
abouthim.
Accordingly, Valdez waiver of his right to question his arrest

notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the
search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. As in
Peoplevs.Baclaan,theSCruledAwaiverofanillegalwarrantless
arrestdoesnotalsomeanawaiveroftheinadmissibilityofevidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches
and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search
ofmovingvehicles(2)seizureinplainview(3)customssearches(4)
waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
consideredlegitimateifeffectedwithavalidwarrantofarrest,the
RulesofCourtrecognizepermissiblewarrantlessarrests,towit:(1)
arrestsinflagrantedelicto,(2)arrestseffectedinhotpursuit,and,
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners. Thus, when Valdez was arrested
without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committingacrimenorwasthearresteffectedinhotpursuit.Verily,
it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless
search conducted on Valdez was incidental to a lawful arrest. Even
granting that Valdez admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances andhence, is considered no
consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee. As aresult, Valdezlack of objection to the searchand
seizureisnottantamounttoawaiverofhisconstitutionalrightor
avoluntarysubmissiontothewarrantlesssearchandseizure.
4.ROLITOGOvCA(borrowed)
FACTS: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan and Rolito Go had a near
collision incident in San Juan. After that, Go alighted from his car,
walkedoverandshotMaguaninsidehiscar.Gothenleftthescene
but a security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to get his
licenseplate.
On July 8, 1991, Go , with 2 lawyers, presentedhimself before San
Juan Police Station to very news reports that he was being hunted
bythepolice.Hewasdetained.Aneyewitnesstotheshootingwas
able to positively identify him as the gunman. That same day, a
complaint for frustrated homicide was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. He was informed, in the presence of
his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigationbutthathemustfirstsignawaiveroftheprovisionsof
Article125oftheRPC.Gorefusedtosignthewaiver.
Initially,hewasreleasedonbailbutCAissuedanOrderwhereinthe
bail grant was recalled so Go had to surrender himself. He was
detainedagain.
CA said that Go's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense
for which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly
committed."Whenheshowedupatthepolicestation,wasalready
an existing manhunt for him; he was positively identified by an
eyewitness.
Solicitor General argues Go was validly arrested without warrant
because his identity as the gunman had been sufficiently
established, was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan
Police Station. The Solicitor General reliesIn the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v.Ramos, et
al.wheretheSCupheldawarrantlessarrestasvalidalthoughmade
14daysafterthekilling.
Go argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station 6 days after the shooting.
Thus the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he
was arrested. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest.
Section7,Rule112oftheRulesofCourtwhichestablishestheonly
exceptiontotherighttopreliminaryinvestigation,isnotapplicable.
ISSUE:WONtherewasalawfulwarrantlessarrestNO
First, the reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General
uponUmilv.Ramosis,inthecircumstancesofthiscase,misplaced.
InUmil v.Ramos there was a valid warrantless arrest because the
offense (subversion) constituted "continuing crimes." Here, the
offensewasmurder,notacontinuingcrime.
Secondly,thewarrantless"arrest"doesnotfallwithinthetermsof
Section5ofRule113ofthe1985RulesonCriminalProcedure.Go's
"arrest"tookplace6daysaftertheshooting.The"arresting"officers
obviously were not present at the time petitioner allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after be
11
reasonablyregardedaseffected"whentheshootinghadinfactjust
been committed". Plus, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the gunman.
Thepolicemerelyreliedonthestatementsofanallegedeyewitness.
**On Preliminary Investagion: WON Go had effectively waived his
righttopreliminaryinvestigation.NO
FromtheverystartGodemandedthatapreliminaryinvestigationbe
conducted. It wasnt waived when he incorrectly filed an omnibus
motionforreleaseandpreliminaryinvestigationwiththeProsecutor
(shouldbefiledwiththeRTC).Plus,theProsecutorhimselffiledthe
samewiththeRTCdaysafterfilingtheinformationformurder.
12
Thematterofdeterminingwhetherornottheevidenceisstrongisa
matterofjudicialdiscretionthatremainswiththejudge.Underthe
present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory.
Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor
should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought. In case an
application for bail is filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the
followingduties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,

notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
requirehimtosubmithisrecommendation;
2.Wherebailisamatterofdiscretion,conductahearingofthe
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refusestopresentevidencetoshowthattheguiltoftheaccusedis
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion;
3.Decidewhethertheguiltoftheaccusedisstrongbasedonthe
summaryofevidenceoftheprosecution;and
4.Iftheguiltoftheaccusedisnotstrong,dischargetheaccused
upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be
denied.
Based on the abovecited procedure and requirements, after the

hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whethersuchevidenceisstrongenoughtoindicatetheguiltofthe
accused.
Inthiscase,respondentJudgecompliedwiththeforegoingduties.A
hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution was given the
opportunity to present its evidence; respondent Judge based her
findings on the prosecutions evidence; respondent Judges Order
grantingtheaccusedspetitionforbailcontainedasummaryofthe
prosecutions evidence; and since it was her conclusion that the
evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not strong, the petition for
bailwasgranted.
nd
2.Admin.MatterNo.RTJ041820(2 case)YES,judgeliable.
To justify her granting bail in the three criminal cases, respondent

Judge insists that she did so because of her belief that
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is merely a precursor
andthereforethesalethereofisnotacapitaloffense.Thisopinion
isblatantlyerroneous.
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165 to

determine the nature of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Aplain
readingofthelawwouldimmediatelyshowthatmethamphetamine
hydrochlorideisadangerousdrugandnotacontrolledprecursor.
Methamphetamine hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which are considered
dangerous drugs. This is further strongly manifest in Section 11 of
R.A.No.9165,whereinitisspecificallyprovidedthatthepossession
of dangerous drugs, such as methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, is punishable with life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10M, if the quantity thereof is 50
grams or more. Furthermore, had respondent judge kept herself
abreastofjurisprudenceanddecisionsoftheCourt,shewouldhave
E. BAIL
1.MABUTASvPERELLO
FACTS
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two

complaintsagainstrespondentJudgePerello.
Admin.MatterNo.RTJ031817(1stadministrativecase)
MabutasofPDEAcomplainedofcertainirregularitiescommittedby
respondentJudgeinthegrantofbailtoaccusedOmadan.Omadan
was charged with Violation of RA 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and
controlof57.78gramsofMethamphetamineHydrochloride(shabu),
with no bail recommended. Respondent judge explained that the
bail was granted because the prosecutions evidence of Omadans
guiltwasnotstrong.
nd
Admin.MatterNo.RTJ041820(2 administrativecase)
Prosecutor Togononon charged respondent Judge of partiality,

serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law,
concerning the latters grant of bail in four criminal cases for
Violations of R.A. No. 9165 pending before her. Respondent judge
issuedanordergrantingmotionforbailwithouthearing.Asst.City
ProsecutorFranciscofiledMR,arguingthatsincethecrimecharged
is a capital offense, bail is not allowed as a matter of right, and a
hearingisindispensable.RespondentJudgedeniedthemotion.
RespondentJudgeexplainsthatshedidnotconductanyhearingson
the motions/petitions for bail because the crimes charged are not
capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein was
minimal. They all involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu.
RespondentJudgebelievesthatunderR.A.No.9165,shabuisnota
dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the
sellingoflessthan5gramsispunishableonlywithimprisonmentof
12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge
maintainsthatbailisamatterofrightandahearingisnotrequired.
ISSUE:w/nrespondentJudgemaybeadministrativelyheldliablefor
thegrantofbail.
HELD:
1. Admin.MatterNo.RTJ031817(1stcase)NO,judgenotliable.
Under RA 9165, possession of 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life
imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense. As such, bail
becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of
theRulesofCourtstates:
No person charged with the capital offense, or

an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
ofthestageofthecriminalprosecution.
13
HELD:
been apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases

decided by the Court, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
hadalwaysbeenconsideredasadangerousdrug.
Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug,

regardlessofquantity,thesale,trade,administration,dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu is punishable by
lifeimprisonmenttodeath.Beingacapitaloffense,itisincumbent
uponrespondentJudgetoholdahearingonthepetitions/motions
forbailfiledbytheaccusedthereintodeterminewhetherevidence
ofguiltisstrong.Tograntanapplicationforbailandfixtheamount
thereofwithoutahearingdulycalledforthepurposeofdetermining
whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross ignorance
orincompetencewhosegrossnesscannotbeexcusedbyaclaimof
goodfaithorexcusablenegligence.
No. Thus, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Bail is
eitheramatterofrightorofdiscretion.Itisamatterofrightwhen
theoffensechargedisnotpunishablebydeath,reclusionperpetua
or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion
perpetuaorlifeimprisonment,bailbecomesamatterofdiscretion.
Similarly,ifthecourtimposedapenaltyofimprisonmentexceeding
six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except [that] when
anyoftheenumeratedcircumstancesunderparagraph3ofSection
5,Rule114ispresentthenbailshallbedenied.
Inthefirstsituation,bailisamatterofsoundjudicialdiscretion.This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraphofSection5,Rule114ispresent,theappellatecourthas
thediscretiontograntordenybail.Anapplicationforbailpending
appealmaybedeniedevenifthebailnegatingcircumstancesinthe
thirdparagraphofSection5,Rule114areabsent.
2.LEVISTEvCA
FACTS:
LevistewasconvictedbytheRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCityfor
the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminatepenaltyofsixyearsandonedayofprisionmayoras
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.HethenappealedtotheCA.Pendingappeal,hefiledan
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advancedageandhealthcondition,andclaimingtheabsenceofany
riskorpossibilityofflightonhispart.
In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal

where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of
itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the
second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has
no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely,iftheappellatecourtgrantsbailpendingappeal,grave
abuseofdiscretionwilltherebybecommitted.
The CA denied his application for bail. It said that in the matter of
bailpendingappeal,thediscretiontoextendbailduringthecourse
ofappealshouldbeexercisedwithgravecautionandonlyforstrong
reasons. It ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. According to it, Leviste failed to show that he suffers from
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial
willpermanentlyimpairhishealthorputhislifeindanger.
Giventhesetwodistinctscenarios,therefore,anyapplicationforbail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellatecourtmustdeterminewhetheranyofthecircumstancesin
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretionorstringentdiscretioninresolvingtheapplicationforbail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assumingtheappellantscasefallswithinthefirstscenarioallowing
theexerciseofsounddiscretion,theappellatecourtmayconsiderall
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity
andjustice;onthebasisthereof,itmayeitherallowordisallowbail.
TheCAalsoconsideredthefactofpetitionersconviction.Itmadea
preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie
determination that there was no reason substantial enough to
overturntheevidenceofpetitionersguilt.
Petitioner then filed a MR and now questions as grave abuse of
discretion(Rule65)thedenialofhisapplicationforbail,considering
that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under thethird
paragraphofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourtwaspresent.
Basically, Leviste claims that in the absence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant
sentencedbytheRegionalTrialCourttoapenaltyofmorethansix
yearsimprisonmentshouldautomaticallybegranted.
Thus,afindingthatnoneofthecircumstancesinSection5,Rule114
is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sounddiscretionapproach.Moreover,historically,thedevelopment
overtimeoftheRulesOnCriminalProcedurerevealsanorientation
towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It
indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail
pendingappealshouldbeallowednotwithleniencybutwithgrave
caution and only for strong reasons. After conviction by the trial
court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
theconstitutionalrighttobailends.46Fromthenon,thegrantofbail
issubjecttojudicialdiscretion.Attheriskofbeingrepetitious,such
discretionmustbeexercisedwithgravecautionandonlyforstrong
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the
ISSUE:
Inabailapplicationpendingappealofaconvictionwithasentence
ofmorethansixyears,doesthediscretionarynatureofthegrantof
bailpendingappealmeanthatbailshouldautomaticallybegranted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
ofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourt?
14
may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by
death,reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment. After hearing, the
courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge
should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of
the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of
evidencefortheprosecutionwhichcontainsthejudgesevaluation
of the evidencemay be considered as an aspect of procedural due
processforboththeprosecutionandthedefense.
trialcourt,allowanceofbailpendingappealshouldbeguidedbya
stringentstandards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong
support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
languageofSection5,Rule114oftheRulesofCourt.
3.DOMINGOvPAGAYATAN(borrowed)
FACTS:
TheBureauofImmigration(BOI)BoardofCommissioners
(BOC)issuedSummaryDeportationOrder(SDO)No.ADD2001057
against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he
was an overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peaflorida was also a fugitive
fromjusticesincehestoodindictedin theUnitedStatesforhealth
carefraudwhichresultedinmorethan$1,376,000.00lossestothe
U.S.FederalGovernment.NoappealwasfiledwiththeOfficeofthe
President.TheSDObecamefinalandexecutor.
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused

Peaflorida without conducting a hearing despite his earlier
pronouncement in the Order denying bail as he considered the
crimetheaccusedPeafloridawaschargedwithtobeanonbailable
offense.Themanifestationoftheprosecutorthatheisnotreadyto
presentanywitnesstoprovethattheprosecutionsevidenceagainst
theaccusedisstrong,isneverabasisfortheoutrightgrantofbail
without a preliminary hearing on the matter. A hearing is required
even when the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interposeanobjectiontothemotionforbail.
Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice of

Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida. On the
scheduled hearing, Judge Pagayatan denied the P40,000 bail
recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional
releaseoftheaccusedonthegroundthatthecrimePeafloridawas
charged with involved large scale estafa, a nonbailable offense.
Judge Pagayatan ordered the commitment of Peaflorida to the
Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However,
later on that same day, the BOI received information that
respondent judge had allowed the release from detention of
Peaflorida without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording
prior notice to the BOI ofsuchaction. Commissioner Domingo was
appalled not only by the respondents employment of legal
subterfuges in ordering the release of Peaflorida whose Summary
DeportationOrderhadalreadybecomefinalandexecutory,butalso
by the respondents bad faith in deceiving them into surrendering
thecustodyofanundesirablealienfederalfugitivetotheProvincial
JailatMagbay,SanJose,OccidentalMindoro.
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the

defensethatitwouldbefairandjustifthecourtwouldfixthebail
bondfortheprovisionalreleaseoftheaccusedatP250,000doesnot
justify the granting of bail without a hearing in a case involving a
nonbailable offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set
forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Respondent judge should have ascertained personally
whether the evidence of guilt is strong and endeavored to
determinetheproprietyoftheamountofbailrecommended.Todo
away with the requisite bail hearing is to dispense with this time
testedsafeguardagainstarbitrariness.
Although the Domingo failed to prove that Judge
Pagayatanhadpriorknowledgeoftheexistenceofthedeportation
order or was informed by theBOI of such order, respondent judge
cannot escape administrative liability by invoking unawareness of
thedeportationorder.Absentevidenceofmalice,respondentslack
of knowledge of the deportation order will only free him from
administrative liability for gross misconduct but not for gross
ignoranceofthelawfordisregardingtherulesonbail.
Asaresult,CommissionerDomingofiledalettercomplaint
withtheOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator(OCA)chargingPagayatan
withgrossignoranceofthelaw.
In his Comment, Judge Pagayatan explained that the
prosecutionandthedefensejointlymanifestedthatitwouldbefair
and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00 and that he
granted the motion to fix bail; and that at the time he issued the
order fixing the bail bond, he was not aware that a deportation
orderhasalreadybeenissuedbytheBOI.
4.LACHICAvTORMIS
In its Evaluation Report, the OCA recommends to the

Court that respondent be fined P5,000 for Gross Ignorance of the
Law.
FACTS
Defendant Domugho was apprehended and was brought to the
policestationforbookingandcustody.AfewdayslaterComplainant
wasflabbergastedtolearnthatshewasreleasedfromconfinement.
ComplainantinquiredfromthepolicestationifanOrderofRelease
was issued by the court. Complainant learned that accused was
releasedbecausetherespondentjudgecalledthepolicestationand
toldthedeskofficerthattheaccusedhadpostedacashbailbond
andmayalreadybereleased.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Pagayatan was guilty of gross ignorance of

the law in granting the bail of the accused without conducting a
hearingYES
HELD:
Undertherulesonbail,ahearingismandatoryingranting
bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A hearing is
indispensableforthecourttoasksearchingquestionsfromwhichit
15
Upon investigation by complainant, the police blotter showed no

entry that an order of release was received by the police. Only a
notationthattheaccusedhadputupacashbailbondwasentered
therein.
5.SERAPIOvSANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Complainantalsoassertedthatitwasimproperfortherespondent
judge to receive the cash bail bond as the function belongs
exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of Court. She claimed that
respondentjudgecommittedanactofimproprietywhenshecalled
thepolicestationtoverballyorderthereleaseoftheaccused.Itis
vexing further that no copy of the release order was found on the
dayofrelease.
An administrative case was filed against MTCC Judge Tormis. After

investigation, Executive Judge Dumdum of the RTC of Cebu City
recommended that she be fined P20K or suspended for 3 months.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred but
recommended that Judge Tormis be suspended for three months.
The SC found Judge Tormis guilty of gross misconduct, suspended
himfromofficefor6monthswithoutsalaryandotherbenefitsand
sternlywarnedthatarepetitionofthesameorsimilaractsshallbe
dealtwithmoreseverely.
Respondent judge denied the charges of complainant. She

maintained that she issued the Order of Release after the accused
postedacashbond.Sheclaimedthattheaccusedwasreleasedby
virtue of the Order of Release and not on the basis of her alleged
telephonecalltothepolicestation..
However,beforeJudgeTormisreceivedacopyofthejudgment,the
same had been downloaded from the web site of the Court and
disseminatedtothelocalmedia.Shewasapprisedbyherstaffthat
her 6month suspension was published in 2 local newspapers and
calledforherousterfromthejudiciary.
TheOfficeoftheCourtadministratorfinedandsuspendedthejudge
after finding several inconsistencies in her alibi. Even the arresting
officerdeniedreceivingacourtorderforrelease
Thus, Judge Tormis requested for a certified true copy of the

judgment but she received a copy of the Resolutionrequiring the
partiestomanifestwhethertheywerewillingtosubmitthecasefor
resolutionbasedonthepleadingsfiled.Thisledhertoconcludethat
thecasehadnotyetbeenresolvedandthejudgmentpromulgated,
thus, she filed a Manifestation on the same datepraying for a
reinvestigationandtobeallowedtopresentadditionalevidence.
ISSUE:W/nthejudgeisadministrativelyliable.
HELD:Yes.
ISSUE: W/N the request for reinvestigation and to be allowed to

presentadditionalevidenceshouldbegranted?
Respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the
accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively
liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedurespecifiesthepersonswithwhomacashbailbondmaybe
deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the
provincial,cityormunicipaltreasurer.Ajudgeisnotauthorizedto
receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in
hisoffice.
RULING:YES.RemandedtotheOfficeoftheExecutiveJudgeofthe
RTCofCebuCityforfurtherproceedings
RATIO:
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must be
examinedwithadiscriminatingeyeforitsconsequentialeffectsare
bynaturepenalincharacter,suchthattherespondentjudgestands
tofacethesanctionofdismissal,disbarment,orsuspension.Incases
wherethechargesinvolvedaremisconductinoffice,willfulneglect,
corruptionorincompetency,thegeneralrulesastoadmissibilityof
evidence in criminal trials apply and the culpability of the
respondentshouldbeestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubt.
The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having

abusedherjudicialauthoritywhenshepersonallyacceptedthecash
bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making untruthful
statements in her comment and during the investigation of the
instantadministrativecasewithintenttomisleadthisCourt.
By corruption, the judge undermined and adversely reflect on the
honesty and integrity of the system as an officer of the court; she
also betrayed a character flaw which speaks ill of her person.
Makingfalserepresentationsisavicewhichnojudgeshouldimbibe.
As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the
lawandweaveanexamplefortheotherstofollow
Thus, as in criminal cases where the dictates of due process is

observed with utmost stringence, the respondent judge in this
administrative complaint should likewise be given full opportunity
uponreasonablenoticetodefendherselfandtoadduceevidencein
support thereof for the Court will not allow itself to be an
instrumentthatwoulddestroythereputationofanymemberofthe
benchbypronouncingguilton thebasisofincompleteevidenceor
merespeculation.
16
F. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
thathecouldhaveseenorheardthekillingofRenato;and(3)
therearediscrepanciesbetweenthelistofdetainees/prisoners
andthepoliceblotter.AccordingtotheSandiganbayan,there
isaprimafaciecaseagainstCrisostomo.
Clearly,theSandiganbayanhadnobasistoconvictCrisostomo
because the prosecution failed to produce the evidence
necessarytooverturnthepresumptionofinnocence.
The deafening silence of all of the accused does not

necessarilypointtoaconspiracy.Inthefirstplace,notallofthe
accusedremainedsilent.Calingayanputhimselfonthewitness
stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police
investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken
the morning following Renatos death. Secondly, an accused
has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt
frombeingcompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.
Ajudgmentofconvictionmustbepredicatedonthestrengthof
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. The circumstantial evidence in
this case is not sufficient to create a prima facie case to shift
theburdenofevidencetoCrisostomo.Thesupposedwaiverof
presentation of evidence did not work against Crisostomo
because the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomos guilt
beyondreasonabledoubt.
Crisostomosnonappearanceduringthe22June1995trialwas
merelyawaiverofhisrighttobepresentfortrialonsuchdate
onlyandnotforthesucceedingtrialdates.
Crisostomosabsenceonthe22June1995hearingshouldnot
havebeendeemedasawaiverofhisrighttopresentevidence.
Whileconstitutionalrightsmaybewaived,suchwaivermustbe
clearandmustbecoupledwithanactualintentiontorelinquish
the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or
even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of
theprosecution,Calingayan,andCalingayanscounsel.
Ifnowaiveroftherighttopresentevidencecouldbepresumed
from Crisostomos failure to attend the 22 June 1995 hearing,
withmorereasonthatflightcouldnotbelogicallyinferredfrom
Crisostomos absence at that hearing. Crisostomos absence
didnotevenjustifytheforfeitureofhisbailbond.Abailbond
may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the
accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of
Courtand,despiteduenoticetothebondsmentoproducehim
beforethecourtonagivendate,theaccusedfailstoappearin
personassorequired.Crisostomowasnotspecificallyrequired
bytheSandiganbayanortheRulesofCourttoappearonthe22
June 1995 hearing. Thus, there was no basis for the
1.CRISOSTOMOvSANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Crisostomo,amemberofthePhilippineNationalPolice,andothers
were charged with the murder of Renato, a detention prisoner at
the Solano Municipal Jail. Crisostomo pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued.
ThepresentationofevidenceforCrisostomosdefensewasdeemed
waived for his failure to appear at the scheduled hearings despite
notice. Crisostomo and 1 coaccused were found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan,whiletheotherswerestillatlarge.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of
Crisostomo?
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when they found him guilty despite their own admission that
there was no direct evidence showing his participation in
Renatosdeath?
HELD:
1.
YES.Sandiganbayanhasjurisdiction.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the

applicableprovisionoflawisSection4ofPD1606,asamended
byPresidentialDecreeNo.1861(PD1861),whichtookeffect
on 23 March 1983. The amended provision provides that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committedbypublicofficersandemployeesinrelationtotheir
office where the penalty is higher than prision correccional.
Since the the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, jurisdiction was properly exercised
bytheSandiganbayan.
2. YES. Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ. Crisostomos guilt

wasactuallynotprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt.
No direct evidence linked Crisostomo to the killing of Renato.

Theprosecutionreliedoncircumstantialevidencetoprovethat
there was a conspiracy to kill Renato and Crisostomo
participated in carrying out the conspiracy. Circumstantial
evidenceconsistsofproofofcollateralfactsandcircumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
accordingtoreasonandcommonexperience.
Insum,theSandiganbayanbelievedthatCrisostomotookpart
in the conspiracy to kill Renato because of these three
circumstances: 1) Crisostomo as the jail guard on duty at the
time of Renatos killing had in his possession the keys to the
maindoorandthecells;(2)Crisostomowasinsuchaposition
17
SandiganbayantoordertheconfiscationofCrisostomossurety
bondandassumethatCrisostomohadjumpedbail.
Ratio:
In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be
deemed gross must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an
accused to be heard. In this case, however, records show that
counsel actively participated in the crossexamination of the
witnessestotesttheircredibility.Thefactthathedidnotchooseto
presentotherwitnessesdidnotaffectanyofAndradassubstantial
rights.Counselmighthavevalidreasonsforchoosingnotto.
Andrada was present during the hearing. If he believed that his

counsel de parte was not competent, he could have secured the
servicesofanewcounsel.Havingdecidedtoretaintheservicesof
his counsel during the entire proceedings, he must be deemed
boundbyanymistakecommittedbyhim.Thelongstandingrulein
this jurisdiction is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness,
the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the
proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce
evidence,tosummonwitnesses,andtoarguethecase,unlessthey
prejudicetheclientandpreventhimfromproperlyrestinghiscase,
donotconstitutedgrossincompetenceornegligence.TheSCfound
that the counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith or so
carelessandnegligenceofhisdutiessoastoseriouslyprejudicethe
substantialrightsofAndrada.
2.ANDRADOvPEOPLE(borrowed)
Facts:
An Information was filed with the City Prosecutor of Baguio City
charging Andrada with frustrated murder. During the hearing,
evidence for the prosecution showed that a group of policemen
dropped by a restaurant for a snack. While one of the policemen
was talking to a woman who passed by their table, Andrada
approachedhimandscoldedhim.Andradawasadvisedtogohome
because he was drunk. When Adrada left, one of the policemen
heardhiscompanion(theonewhospoketothewoman)moaningin
pain and found him sprawled on the floor while Andrada was
hacking him on the head with a bolo. Andrada ran away but was
arrestedinawaitingshed.Theybroughthimbacktotherestaurant
where they recovered the bolo. Witnesses were interviewed and
theypointedtoAndradaastheculprit.
Andrada interposed selfdefense and invoked the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender. His version was that while
theyweredrinkingbeerwithahospitalitygirlinsidetherestaurant,
three military men occupied the table next to them. Without any
warning or provocation, two of them approached him, slapped his
face several times and pointed their guns to his head because he
was so boastful. Fearing that he might be killed while being
dragged outside, Andrada pulled out his bolo (wrapped in
newspaper)andswungitatthetwomenandranaway.
The RTC found him guilty. The CA found him to be entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, as he was only 17
years old at the time of the incident. On a petition for review on
certiorari before the SC, Andrada claimed that his right to due
processwasviolatedbecauseofthegrossnegligence/incompetence
ofhiscounselwho:1)Failedtopresentallthewitnesseswhocould
have testified that he is innocent; 2) Failed to present the medical
certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim; 3)
Didnotnotifyhimtoattendthehearingwhenoneofthepolicemen
wascrossexamined,and4)Failedtosubmitamemorandum.
The OSG counters that there was no violation of his right to due
processsincehewasrepresentedbycounselofhisownchoosing.If
the counsels performance and competence fell short of Andradas
expectation, then he should not blame either the trial court or the
CA.
Issue: Whether Andrada was denied due process due to his

counselsgrossnegligence/incompetenceNO
3.OLIVARESvCA
Facts:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 (AntiChild
Abuse) for touching the breast and kissing the lips of Cristina
Elitiong,a16yearoldhighschoolstudentemployedbytheformer
in making sampaguita garlands during weekends. The trial court
found him guilty; was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now alleges
that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the
informationtheageoftheprivateoffendedpartyandtheessential
elementsoftheoffenseforwhichheisbeingcharged.
Issue:
Whether Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610
consideringthe allegedviolationoftherightto beinformedofthe
natureandcauseoftheaccusationagainsthim?
Held:
Yes. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A
complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
theoffendedparty;theapproximatedateofthecommissionofthe
offense;andtheplacewheretheoffensewascommitted.
18
Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the

crimeintheinformation,thefailuretodosoisnotanirremediable
vice.Whenthecomplaintortheresolutionbythepublicprosecutor
whichcontainthemissingavermentsisattachedtotheinformation
and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively
cured,andtheaccusedcannotsuccessfullyinvokethedefensethat
hisrighttobeinformedisviolated.
the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new
counselfailedtoappearatthesubsequenthearings.
Astothecontentionthat theminorityofCristinawasnotproperly
alleged in the information, the SC ruled that: Petitioner was
furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the
information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the
complainant.
HELD:Petitionercontendsthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveappointed
acounseldeoficiowhenhiscounselconsistentlyfailedtoappearfor
hiscrossexamination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counselde oficiofor the
accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the
services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No
such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment
andthentrialwithacounselofhisownchoice.Worthnoting,when
the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived,
and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his
counselwasinexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by
counselde parteat the arraignment and trial, the trial court could
not be deemed dutybound to appoint a counselde oficiofor the
continuationofhiscrossexamination.Indeed,afterhisinitialcross
examination, the trial court granted the petitioners motion to
postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of
another counsel. The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired
lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficientlegalbasisforthetrialcourttoorderthestrikingfromthe
records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment
upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure
toappearofdefendantscounselatthetrialmayevenbetakenasa
deliberateattempttodelaythecourtsproceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a counselde oficioin a
situationlikethepresentcasewouldbediscretionarywiththetrial
court,whichdiscretionwillnotbeinterferedwithintheabsenceof
grave abuse.This Court is convinced that the trial court had been
liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself.
We think that such liberality removes any doubt that its order was
taintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
ISSUE:Waspetitionerdeprivedofhisrighttocounsel?(NO)
True, the information herein may not refer to specific section/s of

R.A.7610allegedtohavebeenviolatedbythepetitioner,butitisall
toevidentthatthebodyoftheinformationcontainsanavermentof
the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner which
unmistakablyreferstoactspunishableunderSection5ofR.A.7610.
As to which section of R.A. 7610 is being violated by petitioner is
inconsequential.Whatisdeterminativeoftheoffenseistherecital
of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.
4.LIBUITvPEOPLE(borrowed)
FACTS: Accused Libuit is charged with Estafa with with abuse of
confidence.ComplainantDomingodelMundodeliveredandbrought
hiscartothemotorshopandownedand/oroperatedbyJoelLibuit
and Julius Libuit for repair of its damaged parts, which car was
receivedbyJoseBautista,thenmechanicinthesaidmotorshop.
However, it was alleged that accused Joel Libuit, once in
possessionofthesaidcar,withintenttodefraudandwithabuseof
confidence, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated
insteadofcomplyingwithhisobligationordutytoreturnordeliver
therepairedcartoDomingodelMundo.
5.MAGTOLISvSALUD(borrowed)
Accused(Libuit)testifiedondirectexamination.However,
his defense counsel, Atty. Mendoza, withdrew from the case after
his initial crossexamination. On motion of the accused, the
continuationofhiscrossexaminationwasresettogivehimtimeto
engage the services of another counsel. The petitioner eventually
securedtheservicesofAtty.Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to
appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, the trial
court issued an Order striking from the records the petitioners
direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on
thebasisoftheevidencealreadyonrecord.
In the CA, accused claims that he had been deprived his
righttocounsel.However,theCAheldthattheRTCneverdeprived
the petitioner of his right to counsel as he was represented by a
counseldeparte,Atty.Mendoza.Whensaidcounselwithdrew,the
RTC allowed the resetting of the petitioners crossexamination to
givehimtimetoengagetheservicesofanothercounsel.Itordered
(Actually, hindi ko alam kung ano yung related sa Rights of the

Accusedsacasenato.MoreonEvidencesiya.)
FACTS: In a criminal case, Lagua was found guilty by the RTC of
homicide. On appeal, Lagua filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail,
whichtheCAgranteduponpostingtherequiredbond.Laguasbond
wasapprovedinaResolutionwhichwasbroughttotheOfficeofthe
Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Madarang, for promulgation. Around
thattime,respondentSaludsunusualinterestonthecasebecame
noticeable and he started making inquiries about the case. When
Atty. Madarang finally directed the typing of the Order of Release
Upon Bond, Salud went to the formers office and assisted in
arranging and stapling of the papers for release. It was he who
ultimately serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua
casetotheNationalPenitentiary.
19
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a

certain Melchor, who introduced herself as Laguas relative, asking
her how much more would they have to give to facilitate Laguas
release.Thecalleralsoinformedherthattheyhadsoughtthehelp
of a certain Valdez of the RTC where the criminal case originated,
but were told that they still had a balance to be paid to Justice
MagtolisandAtty.MadarangthroughSalud.
The respondent's claim that the admission of the text messages as

evidenceagainsthimconstitutesaviolationofhisrighttoprivacyis
unavailing. Text messages have been classified as ephemeral
electroniccommunicationunderSection1(k),Rule2oftheRuleson
Electronic Evidence, and 'shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is
now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his
counsel,alreadyadmittedthathewasthesenderofthefirstthree
messagesonAtty.Madarang'scellphone.
Then, Atty. Madarang called the RTC, pretending to be Laguas

relative, and asked for Valdez, who turned out to be the Process
Server of the RTC. She was informed that Valdez was not there at
thetimeandremindedherabouttheheroutstandingbalance.After
makingthecall,shecoordinatedwiththeActingChiefoftheMailing
Section, Ms. Secarro. She got Saluds number from Secarro and
started texting him about the same time Sacarro did. Again, she
represented herself as a relative of Lagua. Most of Saluds text
messages were stored in Atty. Madarangs cellphone. After
discoveringthecorruptactsofSalud,Atty.Madarangaccompanied
him to Justice Magtolis, where out of the confrontation, it was
discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the
Resolution and Order of Release upon Lagua and his counsel. An
administrative complaint for inefficiency and gross misconduct was
thusfiledbyJusticeMagtolisagainstSalud.
As ratiocinated in Nuez v. CruzApao, Ephemeral electronic

communicationsshallbeprovenbythetestimonyofapersonwho
wasapartytothesameorwhohaspersonalknowledgethereof'.
Inthiscase,complainantwhowastherecipientofthesaidmessages
and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the
cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from which
themessagesoriginatedwashers.Moreover,anydoubtrespondent
mayhavehadastotheadmissibilityofthetextmessageshadbeen
laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the
veracityofthetextmessagesbetweenherandcomplainant.
6.HERRERAvALBA
During the hearings, witnesses narrated their experiences with the

respondent wherein the latter also tried to help them with their
casesafterpayingacertainamount.
Facts:
Alba, represented by his mother, Armi Alba, filed before the RTC a
petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner.Thelatterdeniedthatheisthebiologicalfatherandthat
hehadanyphysicalcontactwithrespondentsmother.Albafileda
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate
the proceedings.Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further
argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self
incrimination.
ISSUE: W/N Salud should be guilty of inefficiency and gross

misconduct.YES.
HELD/RATIO:Thecomplainantinadministrativeproceedingshasthe
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial
evidence.Ifacourtemployeeistobedisciplinedforagraveoffense,
the evidence against him must be competent and derived from
direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and
speculationcannotbegivencredence.Thus,ifthecomplainantfails
to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere
conjecturesandsuppositions,theadministrativecomplaintmustbe
dismissedforlackofmerit.However,inadministrativeproceedings,
thequantumofproofrequiredtoestablishmalfeasanceisnotproof
beyondreasonabledoubtbutsubstantialevidence,i.e.,thatamount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The findings of
investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given
great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the
mannerofthewitnessesastheytestified.
RTC granted the motion to conduct the DNA paternity test on

petitioner Albas mother. Petitioner filed an MR asserting that
under the present circumstances, the DNA test would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the
requisitespecimenunconstitutional.MRdenied.Thecasereached
theSCviaPetitionforReview.
Issue/Ruling:W/NDNAPaternitytestingisviolativeoftherightsof
anaccusedagainstselfincriminationNO
Ratio:
Todeterminethecredibilityandprobativeweightofthetestimony
ofawitness,suchtestimonymustbeconsideredinitsentiretyand
notintruncatedparts.Todeterminewhichcontradictingstatements
ofawitnessistoprevailastothetruth,theotherevidencereceived
must be considered such as the actuations of the respondent
contrarytoanormalpersonsreactions.
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no

person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing
violates his right against selfincrimination. Petitioner ignores our
earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to
20
1.
testimonial evidence. As held by the RTCs Order with Approval,

obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from
therespondentinapaternitycasewillnotviolatetherightagainst
selfincrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
communicative in essence taken under duress. The right against
selfincriminationisjustaprohibitionontheuseofphysicalormoral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant,notanexclusionofevidencetakenfromhisbodywhenit
maybematerial.Assuch,adefendantcanberequiredtosubmitto
a test to extract virus from his body; to submit substance emitting
from the body; to put on clothes for size; to submit for pregnancy
test,sincethegistoftheprivilegeistherestrictionontestimonial
compulsion.
2.
HELD:
1. Petitioner contends that the CA resolved her motion for
reconsideration only after three (3) years from its filing. Such
inactionviolatesherrighttoaspeedydispositionofhercase.
2
UnderArt.IIISec.16 ofthe1987Constitution,anypartytoa
case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the
administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However,
the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarilybeaflexibleconcept.InapplyingtheConstitutional
guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstancesofeachcase.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to

speedytrial,isdeemedviolatedonlywhentheproceedingsare
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
whenunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrialareaskedforand
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
periodoftimeisallowedtoelapsewithoutthepartyhavinghis
case tried. To determine whether the right has been violated,
the following factors may be considered: (1) the length of the
delay;(2)thereasonsforsuchdelay;(3)theassertionorfailure
to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
causedbythedelay.
Inthiscase,thedelaywassufficientlyexplainedbytheCA:The
orginal ponente of the decision of Petitioner Yulos case
(Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul) retired during the pendency
of the motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997.
However, the case was assigned to the Associate Justice
MercedesGozoDadoleonlyonFebruary28,2000andbrought
toherattentiononMarch2,2000.WenotethatittookJustice
GozoDadole only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the
motion.Clearly,shedidnotincuranydelay.We,therefore,rule
that there has been no violation of the petitioner's right to a
speedytrial.
2. TheelementsoftheoffensepenalizedbyBatasPambansaBlg.
22 are: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
applyforaccountorforvalue;(2)theknowledgeofthemaker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
paymentofthecheckinfulluponitspresentment;and(3)the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficientfundsorcreditordishonorforthesamereasonhad
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stoppayment.
7.YULOvPEOPLE
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1992, Petitioner Yulo and Josefina Dimalanta
went to the house of Private Complainant Roque in Caloocan City.
Their visit was for Josefina to endorse Petitioner Yulo as a good
payor so that the latters checks can be encashed. In view of this
endorsement, Private Complainant Roque enashed the following
checks:(a)EquitableBank(EB)CheckNo.237936for
P40,000.00, postdated September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No.
237941 for P16,200.00; and (c) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
CheckNo.656602forP40,000.00,postdatedNovember18,1992.
WhenPrivateComplainantRoquepresentedthechecksforpayment
to the drawee banks, they were dishonored. The EB checks were
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds," while the BPI check was
stamped"AccountClosed.SincePrivateComplainantdidnotknow
the address of Petitioner Yulo, she immediately informed Josefina
aboutthedishonoredchecks.ThelatterrepeatedlyassuredPrivate
Complainant Roque that that she will relay the fact of dishonor to
PetitionerYulo.
When there was still no payment, Private Complainant Roque

lodgedacomplaintagainstPetitionerYuloandonAugust23,1993,
three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan City Prosecutor
withtheRTCBr.130forviolationofBP22.
When arraigned, Petitioner Yulo pleaded not guilty to the charge.

During trial, Petitioner Yulo admitted having issued the checks in
questionbutclaimedthatshemerelylentthemtoJosefina.Inturn,
Josefina delivered the checks to her friend who showed them to a
jeweler as "show money." It was understood that the checks were
nottobedeposited.Petitioner Yulovehementlydeniedhavingany
transaction with Private Complainant Roque. Furthermore,
PetitionerYuloclaimedthatwhensheissuedthechecks,sheknew
she had no funds in the banks; and that she was aware that the
checkswouldbedishonoredifpresentedforpayment.
TheRTCfoundPetitionerYuloguilty.Onappeal,theCAaffirmedthe
decisionoftheRTC.
ISSUE:
OnappealtotheSC,PetitionerYuloraisedthefollowingissues:
Allpersonsshallhavetherighttoaspeedydispositionoftheircasesbeforealljudicial,quasijudicial,
oradministrativebodies.
21
Whether or not the CA violated her right to speedy trial

(RELEVANTISSUE)NO
Whetherornotherguiltwasprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt
YES
In the case of Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of

President Corazon Aquinos Libel Case, the SC concluded that live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed considering the prejudice it poses to the defendants right
to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of
justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and
the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied
bylessdistracting,degrading,andprejudicialmeans.
Theprosecutionwasabletoprovealltheelementsofthecase.
Petitioner Yulo admitted having issued the three dishonored
checks for value. Her purpose was to encash them. She also
admittedthatatthetimesheissuedthechecks,shewasaware
thatshehadonlyP1,000.00in heraccountwiththeEquitable
BankandthatherBPIaccountwasalreadyclosed.Significantly,
whatBP22penalizesistheissuanceofabouncingcheck.Itis
notthenonpaymentofanobligationwhichthelawpunishes,
but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored
upon presentment for payment. The purpose for which the
check was issued and the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance are immaterial. What is primordial is that the issued
checks were worthless and the fact of worthlessness was
knowntothepetitioneratthetimeoftheirissuance,asinthis
case. This is because under Batas PambansaBlg. 22, the mere
actofissuingaworthlesscheckismalumprohibitum.
The SC had another unique opportunity in the case of Re: Request

RadioTVCoverageoftheTrialintheSandiganbayanofthePlunder
Cases Against the Former President Joseph Estrada to revisit the
question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
inaacriminalcase.Itheldthattheproprietyofgrantingordenying
the instant petition involves the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused,ontheotherhand,alongwiththeconstitutionalpowerofa
courttocontrolitsproceedingsinensuringafairandimpartialtrial.
Thepetitionwasdenied.However,inresolvingtheMR,itprovideda
glimmer of hope when it ordered the audiovisual recording of the
trialfordocumentarypurposessubjecttotheconditionssetbythe
SC.
8.PETITIONFORRADIOANDTELEVISIONCOVERAGEOF
THE
MULTIPLE
MURDER
CASES
AGAINST
MAGUINDANAOGOVERNORAMPATUAN(borrowed)
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people, including 32 journalists and
mediapractitioners,werekilledwhileontheirwaytoShariffAguak
in Maguindanao. This tragic incident, which came to be known as
MaguindanaoMassacre,spawnedchargesfor57countsofmurder
andanadditionalchargeofrebellionagainst197accused.Notethat
therewasatransferofvenue.ThecasesarebeingtriedbyPresiding
JudgeJocelynSolisReyesofRTCQuezonCity.
Note:Theindicationofseriousrisksposedbylivemediacoverage
to the accuseds right to due process was left unexplained and
unexplored in Aquino and Estrada. So the SC thought that
compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a
workablesolutiontosuchconcernwhilemaintainingtheunderlying
principlesheldinAquinoandEstrada.
On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the

Philippines (NUJP), ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA
Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from
variousentities,andmembersoftheacademefiledapetitionbefore
theSCprayingthatlivetelevisionandradiocoverageofthetrialin
these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
governthebroadcastcoverageandtheuseofdevices.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre

cases apart from these earlier cases is the impossibility of
accommodating even the parties to the cases (private
complainants/familiesofthevictimsandotherwitnesses)insidethe
courtroom.IntheEstradacase,theSCheldthatacourtroomshould
have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible,andnottoolargeastodistractthetrialparticipantsfrom
theirproperfunctions.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines (NPC)

and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed a petition
prayingthattheSCconstituteRTCQuezonCityasaspecialcourt(to
focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre Trial), and allow the
installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video
camerasthatshallbeamtheaudioandvideosignalstothetelevision
monitorsoutsidethecourt.
Evenbeforeconsideringwhatisareasonablenumberofthepublic
who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject
criminalcasesisthattheproceedingsalreadynecessarilyentailthe
presence of hundreds of families.It cannot be gainsaid that the
families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much
interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the
proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial
participants.It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution
andthedefensehavelistedmorethan200witnesseseach.
ISSUE:
WONtheabsolutebanonlivetelevisionandradiocoverageofcourt
proceedings should be lifted? YES, but subject to the guidelines to
beissuedbytheSC.
Theimpossibilityofholdingsuchjudicialproceedingsinacourtroom
that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainantsoraccused,isunfortunateenough.Whatmoreifthe
RULING:
22
right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general

publicbeallowedtowitnesstheproceedingasittakesplaceinside
the courtroom.Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperativeofatransparent,openandpublictrial.
and the exclusivity of the access to the media

entities.
Thehardwareforestablishinganinterconnection
or link with the camera equipment monitoring
the proceedings shall be for the account of the
media entities, which should employ technology
thatcan(i)avoidthecumbersomesnakingcables
inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the
unnecessaryingressoregressoftechnicians,and
(iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technicalglitches.
Ifthepremisesoutsidethecourtroomlackspace
forthesetupofthemediaentitiesfacilities,the
media entities shall access the audiovisual
recording either via wireless technology
accessible even from outside the court premises
orfromonecommonwebbroadcastingplatform
fromwhichstreamingcanbeaccessedorderived
tofeedtheimagesandsounds.
Atalltimes,exclusiveaccessbythemediaentities
totherealtimeaudiovisualrecordingshouldbe
protectedorencrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a

particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof where
Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
[27]
Court applies, and where the trial court
excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses
fromthecourtroom,ininstanceswhere,interalia,
thereareunresolvedidentificationissuesorthere
are issues which involve the security of the
witnesses and the integrity of their testimony
(e.g.,thedovetailingofcorroborativetestimonies
ismaterial,minorityofthewitness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the

parties,orderonlythepixelizationoftheimageof
thewitnessormutetheaudiooutput,orboth.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast

of the proceedings, no commercial break or any
other gap shall be allowed until the days
proceedings are adjourned, except during the
period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the
publicisorderedexcluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the

audiooutputfromtheongoingproceedings,the
proceedingsshallbebroadcastwithoutanyvoice
overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
thematthestartorattheendofthescene.Any
commentaryshallobservethesubjudiceruleand
besubjecttothecontemptpowerofthecourt;
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and

televisionoftheMaguindanaoMassacrecases,theSClaysdownthe
following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in
AquinoandEstrada:
(a)AnaudiovisualrecordingoftheMaguindanao
massacre cases may be made both for
documentarypurposesandfortransmittaltolive
radioandtelevisionbroadcasting.
(b)Mediaentitiesmustfilewiththetrialcourta
letterofapplication,manifestingthattheyintend
to broadcast the audiovisual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan
tocarry out the same, with an undertaking that
theywillfaithfullycomplywiththeguidelinesand
regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedingsuntilpromulgationofjudgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be

allowed.No media entity shall be allowed to
broadcasttheproceedingswithoutanapplication
dulyapprovedbythetrialcourt.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be

installedinconspicuouslyinsidethecourtroomto
provideasinglewideanglefullviewofthesalaof
thetrialcourt.Nopanningandzoomingshallbe
allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or
downplaying incidents in the proceedings.The
camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly
designated official or employee of the Supreme
Court.The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light
rays.Signallightsorsignsshowingtheequipment
is operating should not be visible.A limited
numberofmicrophonesandtheleastinstallation
of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be
unobtrusively located in places indicated by the
trialcourt.
The Public Information Office and the Office of

the Court Administrator shall coordinate and
assistthetrialcourtonthephysicalsetupofthe
cameraandequipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audiovisual recording

from inside the courtroom to the media entities
shall be conducted in such a way that the least
physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping
withthedignityandsolemnityoftheproceedings
23
(h)Norepeatairingoftheaudiovisualrecording
shall be allowed until after the finality of
judgment, except brief footages and still images
derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes
based on the recording, only for news purposes,
which shall likewise observe thesub judicerule
and be subject to the contempt power of the
court;
(i)Theoriginalaudiorecordingshallbedeposited
in theNationalMuseumand the Records
ManagementandArchivesOfficeforpreservation
andexhibitioninaccordancewithlaw.
(j)The audiovisual recording of the proceedings

shall be made under the supervision and control
ofthetrialcourtwhichmayissuesupplementary
directives,astheexigencyrequires,includingthe
suspension or revocation of the grant of
applicationbythemediaentities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee

which shall forthwith study, design and
recommend
appropriate
arrangements,
implementing regulations, and administrative
mattersreferredtoitbytheCourtconcerningthe
livebroadcastoftheproceedingsprohacvice,in
accordance
with
the
aboveoutlined
guidelines.The Special Committee shall also
report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest
technology that would meet the herein
requirements.It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of
informationandcommunicationtechnology.
(l)All other present directives in the conduct of

theproceedingsofthetrialcourt(i.e.,prohibition
on recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be
observedinadditiontotheseguidelines.
Indeed,theSCcannotglossoverwhatadvancestechnology
has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key
constitutional precepts into the workable context.
Technologypersehasalwaysbeenneutral.Itistheuseand
regulation thereof that need finetuning. Law and
technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of
the various rights herein involved, within the contours of
definedguidelines.
24

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REMEDIALLAWREVIEWDIGESTS(CIVPRO)TranquilSalvadorIII

reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil

B. CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE

No. Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil action

committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that

The trial court found probable cause for murder and

praying for the reinstatement of Resolution No. 258 (wherein the

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the letter

Held: 1. The letter was not intended to be the complaint, as

homicide based on Resolution No. 258 of the DOJ Secretary, and

A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an

The Court said that whether the facsimile message is admissible in

preliminary investigation.InAndres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the

MDEC defaulted in the payment of these 2 loans. KBC Bank sent a

Whether or not the issue of admissibility of the facsimile

In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or

This Court, after an indepth scrutiny of the

Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in the

The complaint for estafa was filed with the 2 assistant

Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay. A

Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of

Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused from

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a

De Leon questioned the legality of the buybust operation

A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain

Here, the evidence clearly shows that the buybust operation

Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his

No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace

prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or

HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the seized marijuana is inadmissible as

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto

Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, the

Accordingly, Valdez waiver of his right to question his arrest

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,

Based on the abovecited procedure and requirements, after the

To justify her granting bail in the three criminal cases, respondent

Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165 to

Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two

Prosecutor Togononon charged respondent Judge of partiality,

Under RA 9165, possession of 50 grams or more of

No person charged with the capital offense, or

been apprised that in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases

Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug,

In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal

The herein respondent granted bail to the accused

Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice of

The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the

In its Evaluation Report, the OCA recommends to the

ISSUE: Whether Judge Pagayatan was guilty of gross ignorance of

Upon investigation by complainant, the police blotter showed no

An administrative case was filed against MTCC Judge Tormis. After

Respondent judge denied the charges of complainant. She

Thus, Judge Tormis requested for a certified true copy of the

ISSUE: W/N the request for reinvestigation and to be allowed to

The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having

Thus, as in criminal cases where the dictates of due process is

F. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

The deafening silence of all of the accused does not

Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the

2. YES. Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ. Crisostomos guilt

No direct evidence linked Crisostomo to the killing of Renato.

Andrada was present during the hearing. If he believed that his