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About MSDI & Missouri State U..

For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent
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other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus assures that a typical 2-week debater
gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we emphasize the
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Our program is a high-impact academic experience with an exceptional alumni
network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more information

**FISA Court Reform


1AC Inherency
The USA Freedom Act recently passed and included a number
of reforms to the FISA Court system, including a limited role
for an amici and appellate review, but issues remain.
Jodie Liu Wednesday, June 3, 2015, 5:29 PM So What Does the USA Freedom
Act Do Anyway?
Now that the Senate has passedand the President has signedthe USA FREEDOM
Act, we thought it might be a good idea to recap what exactly the new law does and
does not do. Thanks to efforts by Senators Patrick Leahy and Mike Lee, among
others, to defeat proposed amendments to the bill, the version passed by the
Senate is the same as that which passed the House a couple weeks back. See our
summary of the bill from a couple weeks ago for a detailed account and a
comparison to the previous Senate bill proposed by Senator Leahy nearly a year
ago. But heres a quick overview of the key provisions of the bill that yesterday
became law. Under Title I, the bill bans the current system of bulk collection under
Section 215. Instead, it requires that the government base any applications for call
detail records on a specific selection terma term that specifically identifies a
person, account, address, or personal device in a way that limit[s], to the greatest
extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent with
the purpose for seeking the tangible things. The government can apply for records
within the first hop of the specific selection term if it (1) states reasonable grounds
to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on [a] specific
selection term . . . are relevant to [an authorized] investigation, and (2) has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the selection term is associated with a
foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor. To apply for records within the second hop, the
government must state session-identifying information or a telephone calling card
number identified by the specific selection term used to produce call detail records
within the first hop. As a safeguard against overbroad collection, the Act requires
the government to adopt minimization procedures calling for the prompt
destruction of all call detail records determined not to be foreign intelligence
information. FISA court judges may, moreover, impose additional, particularized
minimization procedures with respect to any nonpublicly available information
concerning unconsenting United States person. Title II of the act, concerning pen
registers and trap and trace devices, is brief. In similar manner as Title I bans bulk
business records collection except by way of application based on a specific
selection term, Title II bans pen registers and trap and trace devices except by way
of application based on a specific selection term. It adopts the same definition of
specific selection term as in Title I. Similarly, Title V reforms the National Security
Letter program by extending the ban on bulk collection, except by way of
application based on a specific selection term, to various provisions in the U.S.
Code that would otherwise permit the FBI to issue the bulk collection of national

security letters. See this post by Tim Edgar from over the weekend for an
explanation why these little-discussed provisions are actually very important. Titles
III and VII of the Act deal with collection under Section 702. Title III prohibits the use,
in court proceedings, of information obtained under Section 702 through procedures
deemed by a FISA Court to be deficient concerning any United States person. Nor
may the government use[] or disclose[] in any other manner such information.
Title VII, conversely, attempts to correct for several concerns regarding the
targeting of non-United States persons. First, it creates an emergency exception
allowing the government to continue targeting roamerspeople lawfully targeted
as non-United States persons located outside the United States, but who suddenly
show up in the United Statesfor a brief period of time after they show up in the
United States, so long as a lapse in the targeting of such non-United States person
poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. Second, it expands
the definition of agent of a foreign power, as applied to non-United States
persons, in order to include non-United States persons who are lawful targets under
traditional FISA warrants but might otherwise become improper targets when they
leave the country. Third, it also expands the definition of agent of a foreign power
to include a non-United States person who engages in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor,
for or on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly aids or abets or knowingly
conspires with any person in activities related to the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction In these areas, the USA Freedom Act actually does
modestly expand surveillance authorities. Title IV is concerned with reform of the
FISA Court. Broadly speaking, the new law provides for the appointment of amici
curiae to assist the FISA Court, but it creates a fairly limited role for those amici. For
instance, amici may provide assistance with respect to legal arguments or
information regarding any . . . area relevant to the issue presented to the court, but
only if the FISA Court deems such information relevant and only in certain matters
that, for instance, present[] a novel or significant interpretation of the law in the
eyes of the FISA Court. Title IV also provides for limited appellate review of FISA
Court decisions, as well as limited Supreme Court review of FISA Court of Review
decisions. Finally, Title IV also requires the DNI to perform declassification review of
FISA Court opinions that include[] a significant construction or interpretation of
any provision of law and, following such declassification review, make certain parts
of FISA Court opinion publicly available.

Status quo reform composition plans do not address primary

concerns with appointment, expertise and specialization of
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf

To assess existing composition reform plans, I conducted a survey of all bills

referencing the FISA court statute introduced in Congress since President Obama
took office.65 None have become law, and as of writing, none are pending before
the new 114th Congress. Five bills, all of which died in committee, would have
altered the composition of the FISA courts.66 Six bills would have substan- tially
reformed their operation in ways beyond the scope of this discussion, primarily by
providing for participation of special advocates or amici to ameliorate the problems
of secret and ex parte proceedings.67 Each of these died in committee as well, save
the USA FREEDOM Act, versions of which commanded majorities in both houses and
the support of the intelligence community,68 though it failed to overcome a Senate
filibuster.69 None of the proposals introduced in Congress would ameliorate the
FISA courts issues with expertise and specialization. All would leave this a part-time
court with non-specialist judges who serve on the FISC one week of every eleven.
Four of the bills affecting composition concern only who gets to choose FISA judges
from among existing judges, while the fifth merely extends their tenure.70

Despite reforms, FISA Courts rubber stamping of surveillance

Joe Wolverton, II, J.D July 2 2015 Secret Court Revives NSA Bulk Surveillance
The hour is now late if this Republic is to remain a land under the rule of law. To that
end, it is critical that Americans recognize that the FISA Courts rubber stamping of
the exercise of such sweeping surveillance programs is in direct, open, and hostile
violation of the Constitution. Much of what is being done by the FISA Court is very
similar to the Star Chamber, an English court of the 14th to 17th centuries that met
in secret, with no record of indictments, no identification of witnesses, and no
transcript of the proceedings. Eventually this court was used as a political weapon
a way for the king and the Parliament to persecute their enemies and keep the
dirty details hidden from the public. The analogy of the FISA Courts absolute
approval of requests by the government to monitor citizens electronic
communication to the decisions of the Star Chamber is apt and accurate on many
points. The policies that permit this data sharing and grant such secret authority to
the NSA and the FISA Court are such a shameful disregard for our long history of
individual-based human and civil rights (including the freedom from unwarranted
searches and seizures) that it shocks the conscience even when the source is
considered. The FISA Courts decision demonstrates that the government considers
the protections of the Fourth Amendment to be nothing more than a "parchment
barrier" that is easily torn through. The Obama administration and the Bush
administration before it regards the Constitution, the separation of powers, and
the Bill of Rights as advisory at best. Judge Mosman summed up this constitutional
crisis perfectly in the first line of his order of June 29 reviving the surveillance: Plus
a change, plus cest la mme chose. Which, roughly translated from the French,
means: The more things change, the more they stay the same.

1AC Democratic Legitimacy Advantage

The FISA Court guts the 4th amendment and privacy
protections it operates with no democratic accountability or
The Daily Beast, 2013 The Secret FISA Court Must Go
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/the-secret-fisa-court-mustgo.html U.S. NEWS07.24.134:45 AM ET
We published an op-ed on June 27 in The New York Times setting out why mass
surveillance violates the law. Rather than respond substantively to these and similar
allegations, the president and his intelligence officials have made reassuring noises,
telling us not to fear, because the FISC serves as a check on the administrations
surveillance power and can be trusted to faithfully balance the governments need
to protect us from terror plots against our rights under the Constitution not to have
our personal communications seized and searched. The message from President
Obama and his intelligence underlings was clear: relax. But the FISC hasnt
protected our rights at all. Instead, it has secretly gutted both the Fourth
Amendment and the particular safeguards Congress put into the surveillance
statutes. The FISCs paralysis in the face of government overreaching shouldnt
surprise anyone. When you consider the courts history, composition, and lack of
public accountability, the FISC could hardly do otherwise. The FISC was designed to
secretly approve surveillance targets, not decide whether and when indiscriminate
mass surveillance is consistent with our democratic principles. The secret
intelligence court dates from 1978, when, in the wake of the Church Commission
report documenting decades of law-enforcement misconduct against domestic civilliberties groups, Congress reformed Americas foreign and domestic intelligence
policy. As part of this effort, it passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
FISA, establishing the FISC and a process for classified judicial review of surveillance
for foreign-intelligence purposes. The FISC was designed to ensure that
administration requests to target foreign powers or agents of foreign powers for
surveillance were within the bounds of the authority Congress had established in
the law. The bread and butter of the FISC was deciding whether the government had
probable cause to believe that a particular person or entity was an agent of a
foreign power and was likely to use a particular communications facility such that it
was acceptable to spy on that person or facility to get foreign intelligence
information. That all changed following 9/11. The Bush administration, feeling
enormous pressure to preempt any future terrorist attack, aggressively expanded its
spying programs. When Congress eventually learned about some of these
programs, it complained but then (mostly) acquiesced, passing laws to authorize
mostalbeit not allof the novel surveillance activities it knew about. Of particular
import is Congresss reaction in 2005 when the public learned for the first time that
the Bush administrations spy agencies had been intercepting Americans phone
calls and emails without any court order or demonstration of wrongdoing. Beginning

in 2006, Congress took a series of steps to revise FISA; the most current of those
changes, the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), was passed in 2008 and renewed in
2012. Section 702 of the FAA creates a new authority for targeting non-U.S. persons
or groups reasonably believed to be located overseas. Under the FAA, the attorney
general and the director of national intelligence jointly certify that the target is a
non-U.S. person or entity reasonably believed to be overseas. The FISC reviews the
certification, whether the procedures in place are reasonably designed to prevent
targeting people in the U.S. or obtaining purely domestic communications, and
whether the minimization procedures meet the statutory definition of minimization
procedures. So long as the government reasonably believes that the target is not an
American and is overseas, and it is not conducting the surveillance with the
subjective intention of learning about an American (something no court could ever
really review), the FISC must grant an order authorizing surveillance. The FISC does
not approve the targets, which need not be suspected of wrongdoing or be agents
of foreign powers. The FISC can review applicable targeting and minimization
procedures, but the court is not required to look behind the assertions made in the
certification. The FISC does not approve the directives or the individuals to be
monitored via those directives. Once the FISC issues its order, the government can
use it for up to a year, sending top-secret directives to Internet companies like
Google and Facebook specifying whose calls, emails, video and voice chats, photos,
voice-over-IP calls (Skype, for example), and social-networking information it wants.
The FISC trusts the government to follow the targeting procedures allowing
collection of Americans messages and calls with friends overseas while avoiding
collection of purely domestic communications. In sum, the FISC issues a blanket
surveillance order whenever the government mouths the correct wordsthat it is
collecting foreign-intelligence information relevant to a non-U.S. target. The FISC
provides very little independent oversight of the surveillance itself. The history of
the FISC can be summarized very compactly. Initially the FISC was a secret court
that assessed probable cause for targeted surveillance of foreign powers and their
agents. After the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the FISC mutated into a secret
kangaroo court that legitimates mass surveillance of Americans communications
with employers, friends, and family in other countries by lending it the appearance,
but not the substance, of judicial oversight. In sum, the FISC is now playing a
completely new and much wider role: authorizing mass surveillance programs
rather than approving specific surveillance targets. Yet it is simply impossible for the
FISC, or any secret court, to decide when and how our nation should conduct
surveillance consistent with our democratic principles and constitutional norms.
Theres no security need for those programmatic policy decisions to be kept secret,
and the secrecy ensures that the FISC will make the wrong decisions.

The concentration of judge appointment power in the Chief

Justice undermines the legitimacy of the FISA Court process .

Harvard Journal on Legislation, 2014 THE POWER TO APPOINT FISA

The concentration of power critique includes both a practical and a theoretical
element. The practical concern, voiced previously by Dr. Christopher Pyle, argues
that 1803 risks overburdening the Chief Justice, and that the Chief Justice is not
particularly well positioned to identify and select a balanced slate of judges. A
modern version of this argument asks with trepidation, whether we have given the
chief justiceany chief justice, not just this onetoo much to do?88 Answering her
own question, one scholar notes that, [t]he office of Chief Justice of the United
States has grown enormously in recent decades in responsibility and complexity
not because of power-grabbing chief justices but because Congress has piled into
the office a large number of added responsibilities.89 Another writes, [g]iven the
distrust of undue concentrations of power in one person and increased interest in
including multiple perspectives in decisionmaking, the recently expanded (but now
seen as customary) repertoire of powers of the Chief Justice becomes troubling.90
In my view, this practical concern, however valid, is secondary to the theoretical
one: that 1803s concentration of power creates the perception of partiality and
impropriety. This perception, even if never borne out in reality, undermines the
FISCs legitimacy. As one recent article notes, the specter of a politicized
appointment process will linger as long as the Chief makes the appointments
himself.91 This point echoes Professor William Van Alstynes remarks, discussed in
Part II, that such an expansive role for the Chief Justice is simply unseemly.

FISA judges lack the requisite specialization or expertise to be

accountable and legitimate representatives in matters of
domestic surveillance.
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
C. FISA Judges Lack Requisite Specialization or Expertise Beyond concerns about
democratic legitimacy and constitutional structure, it is bad policy to fill these
important specialist courts with part-time, generalist judges. The Federal Circuit and
Court of International Trade are the only other active Article III courts with subjectspecific jurisdiction. Their judges are appointed directly to those courts by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, serve for life on those courts,
and deal with their specialized issues full time.60 Presidents appoint lawyers to
specialized courts who already know the specialized law. The vast majority of
Federal Circuit and Court of International Trade judges had substantive experience
in their courts issue areas before appointment.61 FISA judges lack that expertise.

Surveillance law is complex, idiosyncratic, scientifically technical, and subject to

quick developments as technological capability rapidly evolves. But because the
FISCs extensive body of case law is mostly classified, a newly designated FISA
judge likely has less familiarity with FISC precedent than a new generalist judge has
about virtually any other area of law. No other court is composed of judges who
were totally ignorant of the underlying law until their appointment. Yet a
hypothetical Court of International Trade judge who knew nothing of trade law would
have a much easier time getting up to speed than FISA judges do. Secret law means
no scholarship and no commentary by other courts, so new FISA judges are without
secondary sources or persuasive authority to learn from. Appeals to the FISCR are
extraordinarily rare, so there is a dearth of higher court precedent for guidance. The
secrecy and lack of scholarship make for a steep learning curve, exacerbated by the
fact that FISA judges are not actually specializing. They spend ten of every eleven
weeks at their regular district courts.62 On top of all that, FISA judges are expected
to anticipate hypothetical arguments that might be made by an absent advocate for
privacy. Furthermore, because the only lawyers with experience in FISA court
precedent are the rare few who have practiced before the FISC, it is less likely that
any particular generalist judge would have experience with FISA court case law than
with nearly any other significant body of law. Likewise, one-sided ex parte
proceedings mean that all current and former FISA court practitionersall those
who know the case lawhave worked exclusively on the governments side. This
creates a risk of groupthink from which judges are not immune. That risk is
compounded by the intimate working relationship between FISA court personnel
and executive branch attorneys63 and the alleged pro-surveillance bias among
Roberts appointees to the FISA courts.64 In the absence of an adversary or any
advocate for the rights of the public, it is the judges responsibility to anticipate the
arguments those absent parties might make. Judicial deference must not be a
function of judicial ignorance.

Perception of a political or partial judiciary destroys its

Dickey (J.D. Univ of the pacific Mcgeorge school of law) 1997 [Joshua M.,
Judges as Legislators?: The Propriety of Judges Drafting Legislation McGeorge Law
Review. 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 111, L/N]
Where actions encroach upon the judicial function, a violation of separation of
powers will be found. 118 Encroachment occurs where the judiciary's authority and
independence are undermined. 119 The impartial appearance of the judiciary is
critical to the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial branch 120 because the
judiciary's legitimacy derives from the public perception that the judiciary is
impartial and independent. 121 Public cynicism towards the judicial system
jeopardizes the authority of the judicial branch and magnifies the need for the
appearance of an impartial judiciary. 122 Separating the judiciary from politics
preserves this appearance of impartiality. 123 By drafting legislation, a judge
participates in a function typically considered legislative and thus political. 124

Therefore, by participating in drafting legislation, judges surrender their politically

impartial appearance. Moreover, when judges draft legislation, they implicitly assert
that the legislation is valid. 125 This apparent approval suggests that the judge has
decided the legislation is valid and will not be impartial when he or she decides a
challenge to the legislation. Drafting legislation is analogous to pretrial statements
of a judge. If a judge, prior to a particular defendant's trial, announced to the press
that she thinks that the defendant is guilty, common sense weighs against the
conclusion that the judge could decide the case in a neutral manner. 126 When a
judge drafts legislation, the appearance of partiality is arguably worse.

Loss of judicial legitimacy destroys the environment

Stein 2005Former Judge of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the New South Wales Land and
Environment Court [Justice Paul Stein (International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Specialist Group on the

Judges and the Rule

of Law: Creating the Links: Environment, Human Rights and Poverty , IUCN Environmental
Judiciary), Why judges are essential to the rule of law and environmental protection,
Policy and Law Paper No. 60, Edited by Thomas Greiber, 2006]

The Johannesburg Principles state:

the fragile state of the global environment requires the judiciary , as

the guardian of the Rule of Law, to boldly and fearlessly implement and enforce applicable
international and national laws, which in the field of environment and sustainable development will
assist in alleviating poverty and sustaining an enduring civilization, and ensuring that the
present generation will enjoy and improve the quality of life of all peoples, while also ensuring that the
inherent rights and interests of succeeding generations are not compromised .
We emphasize that

environmental law, and sustainable development law in

are vibrant and dynamic areas, both internationally and domestically. Judge Weeramantry (of
the ICJ) has reminded us that we judges, as custodians of the law, have a major obligation to
contribute to its development. Much of sustainable development law is presently
making the journey from soft law into hard law. This is happening internationally but also it is
occurring in many national legislatures and courts.
There can be no argument that

environmental laws relating to water, air, our soils and energy are critical to
narrowing the widening gap between the rich and poor of the world. Development
may be seen as the bridge to narrow that gap but it is one that is riddled with dangers and
contradictions. We cannot bridge the gap with materials stolen from future generations .

Truly sustainable development can only take place in harmony with the environment. Importantly we must not allow
sustainable development to be duchessed and bastardized.
A role for judges?

It is in striking the balance between development and the environment that the
courts have a role. Of course, this role imposes on judges a significant trust . The
balancing of the rights and needs of citizens, present and future, with development, is a
delicate one. It is a balance often between powerful interests (private and public) and the voiceless poor. In a
way judges are the meat in the sandwich but, difficult as it is, we must not shirk our duty. Pg. 53-54

Global scale ecological collapse will cause extinction

Barry 13Political ecologist with expert proficiencies in old forest protection, climate change, and
environmental sustainability policy [Dr. Glen Barry (Ph.D. in "Land Resources" and Masters of Science in
"Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from the University of Wisconsin-Madison), ECOLOGY
SCIENCE: Terrestrial Ecosystem Loss and Biosphere Collapse, Forests.org, February 4, 2013, pg.

Blunt, Biocentric Discussion on Avoiding Global Ecosystem Collapse and Achieving Global Ecological Sustainability

Science needs to do a better job of considering worst-case scenarios regarding

continental- and

global-scale ecological collapse . The loss of biodiversity, ecosystems, and landscape

collapse of the biosphere and complex life, or eventually even all life, is a possibility that
needs to be better understood and mitigated against. A tentative case has been presented here that
connectivity reviewed here shows clearly that ecological collapse is occurring at spatially extensive scales.


ecosystem loss is at or near a planetary boundary . It is suggested that a 66%

of Earth's land mass must be maintained in terrestrial ecosystems, to maintain critical

connectivity necessary for ecosystem services across scales to continue, including the biosphere.
Yet various indicators show that around 50% of Earth's terrestrial ecosystems have been lost and their services
usurped by humans. Humanity may have already destroyed more terrestrial ecosystems than the biosphere can

There exists a major need for further research into how much land must be maintained in a natural

and agroecological state to meet landscape

and bioregional sustainable development goals

while maintaining an operable biosphere.

It is proposed that a critical element in determining the threshold where terrestrial ecosystem loss becomes
problematic is where landscape connectivity of intact terrestrial ecosystems erodes to the point where habitat

Based upon an understanding of how landscapes

percolate across scale, it is recommended that 66% of Earth's surface be
maintained as ecosystems; 44% as natural intact ecosystems (2/3 of 2/3) and 22% as
agroecological buffer zones. Thus nearly half of Earth must remain as large, connected, intact, and
patches exist only in a human context.

naturally evolving ecosystems, including old-growth forests, to provide the context and top-down ecological
regulation of both human agroecological, and reduced impact and appropriately scaled industrial activities.
Given the stakes, it is proper for political ecologists and other Earth scientists to willingly speak bluntly if we are to
have any chance of averting global ecosystem collapse. A case has been presented that Earth is already well
beyond carrying capacity in terms of amount of natural ecosystem habitat that can be lost before the continued
existence of healthy regional ecosystems and the global biosphere itself may not be possible. Cautious and
justifiably conservative science must still be able to rise to the occasion of global ecological emergencies that may
threaten our very survival as a species and planet.
Those knowledgeable about planetary boundariesand abrupt climate change and terrestrial ecosystem loss in
particularmust be more bold and insistent in conveying the range and possible severity of threats of global
ecosystem collapse, while proposing sufficient solutions. It is not possible to do controlled experiments on the Earth
system; all we have is observation based upon science and trained intuition to diagnose the state of Earth's
biosphere and suggest sufficient ecological sciencebased remedies.
If Gaia is alive, she can die. Given the strength of life-reducing trends across biological systems and scales, there is
a need for a rigorous research agenda to understand at what point the biosphere may perish and Earth die, and to
learn what configuration of ecosystems and other boundary conditions may prevent her from doing so. We see
death of cells, organisms, plant communities, wildlife populations, and whole ecosystems all the time in nature
extreme cases being desertification and ocean dead zones.

There is no reason to dismiss out of

hand that the Earth System could die if critical thresholds are crossed . We need as
Earth scientists to better understand how this may occur and bring knowledge to bear to avoid global ecosystem
and biosphere collapse or more extreme outcomes such as biological homogenization and the loss of most or even

all life. To what extent can a homogenized Earth of dandelions, rats, and extremophiles be said to be alive, can it
ever recover, and how long can it last?

The risks of global ecosystem collapse and the need for

strong response to achieve


ecological sustainability have been understated for decades . If indeed there is some
possibility that our shared biosphere could be collapsing, there needs to be further investigation of what sorts of
sociopolitical responses are valid in such a situation. Dry, unemotional scientific inquiry into such matters is
necessaryyet more proactive and evocative political ecological language may be justified as well. We must

we are speaking of

the potential for

a period of great dying in


ecosystems, humans, and perhaps all being. It is not clear whether this global ecological
emergency is avoidable or recoverable. It may not be. But we must follow and seek truth wherever it leads us.
Planetary boundaries have been quite anthropocentric, focusing upon human safety and giving relatively little
attention to other species and the biosphere's needs other than serving humans. Planetary boundaries need to be
set that, while including human needs, go beyond them to meet the needs of ecosystems and all their constituent
species and their aggregation into a living biosphere. Planetary boundary thinking needs to be more biocentric.
I concur with Williams (2000) that what is needed is an Earth Systembased conservation ethicbased upon an
"Earth narrative" of natural and human historywhich seeks as its objective the "complete preservation of the
Earth's biotic inheritance." Humans are in no position to be indicating which species and ecosystems can be lost
without harm to their own intrinsic right to exist, as well as the needs of the biosphere. For us to survive as a
species, logic and reason must prevail (Williams 2000).
Those who deny limits to growth are unaware of biological realities (Vitousek 1986). There are strong indications
humanity may undergo societal collapse and pull down the biosphere with it. The longer dramatic reductions in
fossil fuel emissions and a halt to old-growth logging are put off, the worse the risk of abrupt and irreversible
climate change becomes, and the less likely we are to survive and thrive as a species. Human survivalentirely
dependent upon the natural worlddepends critically upon both keeping carbon emissions below 350 ppm and
maintaining at least 66% of the landscape as natural ecological core areas and agroecological transitions and
buffers. Much of the world has already fallen below this proportion, and in sum the biosphere's terrestrial ecosystem
loss almost certainly has been surpassed, yet it must be the goal for habitat transition in remaining relatively wild
lands undergoing development such as the Amazon, and for habitat restoration and protection in severely
fragmented natural habitat areas such as the Western Ghats.
The human family faces an unprecedented global ecological emergency as reckless growth destroys the
ecosystems and the biosphere on which all life depends. Where is the sense of urgency, and what are proper
scientific responses if in fact Earth is dying? Not speaking of worst-case scenariosthe collapse of the biosphere
and loss of a living Earth, and mass ecosystem collapse and death in places like Keralais intellectually dishonest.
We must consider the real possibility that we are pulling the biosphere down with us, setting back or eliminating
complex life.
The 66% / 44% / 22% threshold of terrestrial ecosystems in total, natural core areas, and agroecological buffers
gets at the critical need to maintain large and expansive ecosystems across at least 50% of the land so as to keep
nature connected and fully functional. We need an approach to planetary boundaries that is more sensitive to deep
ecology to ensure that habitable conditions for all life and natural evolutionary change continue. A terrestrial
ecosystem boundary which protects primary forests and seeks to recover old-growth forests elsewhere is critical in
this regard. In old forests and all their life lie both the history of Earth's life, and the hope for its future. The end of
their industrial destruction is a global ecological imperative.
Much-needed dialogue is beginning to focus on how humanity may face systematic social and ecological collapse
and what sort of community resilience is possible. There have been ecologically mediated periods of societal
collapse from human damage to ecosystems in the past (Kuecker and Hall 2011). What makes it different this time
is that the human species may have the scale and prowess to pull down the biosphere with them. It is fitting at this
juncture for political ecologists to concern themselves with both legal regulatory measures, as well as revolutionary
processes of social change, which may bring about the social norms necessary to maintain the biosphere.
Rockstrm and colleagues (2009b) refer to the need for "novel and adaptive governance" without using the word
revolution. Scientists need to take greater latitude in proposing solutions that lie outside the current political
paradigms and sovereign powers.
Even the Blue Planet Laureates' remarkable analysis (Brundtland et al. 2012), which notes the potential for climate
change, ecosystem loss, and inequitable development patterns neither directly states nor investigates in depth the
potential for global ecosystem collapse, or discusses revolutionary responses. UNEP (2012) notes abrupt and
irreversible ecological change, which they say may impact life-support systems, but are not more explicit regarding

the profound human and ecological implications of biosphere collapse, or the full range of sociopolitical responses
to such predictions. More scientific investigations are needed regarding alternative governing structures optimal for
pursuit and achievement of bioregional, continental, and global sustainability if we are maintain a fully operable
biosphere forever. An economic system based upon endless growth that views ecosystems necessary for planetary
habitability primarily as resources to be consumed cannot exist for long.
Planetary boundaries offer a profoundly difficult challenge for global governance, particularly as increased scientific
salience does not appear to be sufficient to trigger international action to sustain ecosystems (Galaz et al. 2012). If
indeed the safe operating space for humanity is closing, or the biosphere even collapsing and dying, might not
discussion of revolutionary social change be acceptable? Particularly, if there is a lack of consensus by atomized
actors, who are unable to legislate the required social change within the current socioeconomic system. By not even
speaking of revolutionary action, we dismiss any means outside the dominant growth-based oligarchies.
In the author's opinion, it is shockingly irresponsible for Earth System scientists to speak of geoengineering a
climate without being willing to academically investigate revolutionary social and economic change as well. It is
desirable that the current political and economic systems should reform themselves to be ecologically sustainable,
establishing laws and institutions for doing so. Yet there is nothing sacrosanct about current political economy
arrangements, particularly if they are collapsing the biosphere. Earth requires all enlightened and knowledgeable
voices to consider the full range of possible responses now more than ever.

One possible solution to the critical issues of terrestrial ecosystem loss and abrupt climate change is a
massive and global, natural ecosystem protection and restoration programfunded by a carbon taxto
further establish protected large and connected core ecological sustainability areas,
buffers, and agro-ecological transition zones throughout all of Earth's bioregions. Fossil fuel
emission reductions must also be a priority. It is critical that humanity both stop burning fossil fuels and destroying
natural ecosystems, as fast as possible, to avoid surpassing nearly all the planetary boundaries.
In summation,

we are witnessing the collective dismantling of the biosphere and its

The loss of a species is tragic, of an

constituent ecosystems which can be described as ecocidal.

ecosystem widely impactful, yet with the loss of the biosphere all life may be
gone . Global ecosystems when connected for life's material flows provide the all-encompassing context within
The miracle of life is that life begets life, and the tragedy is that
across scales when enough life is lost beyond thresholds, living systems die .
which life is possible.

Democracy key to avoid extinction.

Larry Diamond, 1995, Larry Diamond is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread.
The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made
common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.

The very source of life on Earth, the

appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and
unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
global ecosystem,

sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important

Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to

war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize
themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically
"cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build

weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic

countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships . In the long run
they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better
bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much

within their own borders, they

respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies
are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security
and prosperity can be built.
more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because,

1AC Separation of Powers Advantage

The current process of appointing FISA court judges violates
every basic principle of the separation of powers.
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
The FISA Courts Appointment Process Threatens Ideological Balance and Separation
of Powers Choosing Article III judges is a constitutional power of the President, and a
very significant one. The opportunity to shape the ideology of the federal judiciary is
one of the most important spoils owed to the victor of a national election. When this
is denied to a President, an executive branch prerogative is violated and public will
is disregarded. But the issue is also one of ideological balance. Each President
serves no more than eight years, and thus is unlikely to choose every judge of any
life-tenure court. However, a Chief Justice serving for life is very likely to choose
every judge of the FISA courts, as FISA judges serve no more than seven years.40
Every Chief Justice since the creation of the FISA courts has done so, and only one
Chief Justice in the past two centuries has failed to serve that long.41 The
traditional appointment process comes with a built-in ideological balancing function:
turnover among Presidents and Senators ensures that various viewpoints are
represented and no one faction can dominate the judiciary.42 When one person
unilaterally appoints every member of a court, that balancing is lost. The loss is
compounded by the fact that the party whose President appointed a Chief Justice is
likely to appoint the next one, even if it does not consistently hold the White House.
In fact, only six of the nations seventeen Chief Justices were appointed by
Presidents who did not share the previous appointers party.43 Recent experience is
illustrative. Between President Kennedys inauguration in 1961 and the anticipated
end of President Obamas second term in 2017, each party has had five Presidents
occupying the White House for exactly twentyeight years.44 During this period,
three of the five Republican Presidents appointed Chief Justices. Zero of the five
Democrats have.45 While some of this is coincidence, there is plenty of incentive
and ample evidence to suggest that strategic judicial retirement is a real
phenomenon.46 That is not to say Chief Justices would put FISA court appointments
above all else, but this is one among many ideological issues that may drive a judge
to seek a like-minded successor. Judicial ideology and viewpoint are of greater
concern for the FISC than for other trial-level courts. The issues are novel, they
evolve quickly, and they are immensely controversial. FISA court proceedings are ex
parte with only the government represented. No matter how noble or nonideological FISA judges may be, the circumstances systemically prejudice them in
favor of surveillance, rather than privacy.47 That problem is exacerbated by the
empirically evident selection of judges whose ideology and experience indicate
predisposition for the governments side of Fourth Amendment issues.48 As with
any other trial court, one judge typically presides over each case. But the last time
Congress amended the FISA court statute, it permitted the FISC to hear issues en

banc, so there really is potential for judges to get together and vote on tough
questions the way divided appellate courts do.49 Moreover, FISC decisions are
nearly always final in fact. The FISCR has only ever heard two cases, and the
Supreme Court has never once reviewed a case originating in the FISC.50 These are
costs to the political separation of powers as well. As an Associate White House
Counsel in the Reagan Administration, the future Chief Justice Roberts once wrote a
scathing critique of a proposal for a new tribunal below the Supreme Court to
resolve circuit splits. Roberts found particularly offensive the proposal that the
Chief Justice designate the members of the tribunal, believing that to be an
unprecedented infringement on the Presidents appointment powers.51 Because
the Chief Justices appointments would have required the approval of a majority of
the Supreme Court (unlike FISA court selections), Roberts posited that the new court
would be either bland or polarized, and [i]n either case the new court will
assuredly not represent the Presidents judicial philosophy.52 These same
criticisms apply to the FISA courts. The power to appoint judges is one of the core
constitutional powers of the President. When that power is given to someone else,
someone he may not even have appointed himself, it undermines his influence and
that of the voters who elected him. Of course President Reagan would not want to
sacrifice [his] Constitutionally-based appointment power by creating a court
composed of judges chosen by someone else, to provide nationally-binding legal
interpretations reviewable only by the Supreme Court.53 That is, however,
precisely what the FISA courts are. Every judge in the history of the FISA courts
been chosen unilaterally by either Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, or
Chief Justice Roberts. All three were white, male, Midwestern, Republican
appointees;54 no Democrat, woman, or person of color has ever had a voice in
selecting a FISA judge. All three Chief Justices previously served as high-ranking
Presidential appointees at the Department of Justice in Republican
administrations.55 Each has influenced his successor; Chief Justice Roberts clerked
for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who served as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court
for over a decade.56 Because Chief Justice Roberts has been in office for over seven
years, he has necessarily chosen every current FISA judge (as had Rehnquist and
Burger before him). Nine of the eleven current FISC judges were appointed to their
district courts by Republican Presidents, and half are former prosecutors.57 These
patterns are especially notable because the FISC nearly always rules in favor of the
Executive Branch. Thus, the FISA courts composition undermines all three
branches: the executive branch (which has an appointment prerogative), the
legislative branch (as the Senate confirms appointments), and the judicial branch
(as the FISC is unrepresentative of the judiciarys ideological balance and accused
of being a rubber stamp59).

Chief Justice Roberts has exclusive power to shape the

surveillance state and the FISA Court judicial structure which
functions to rubber stamp government decisions this is
counter to accepted rule of law.
Ezra Klein July 5, 2013
Chief justice of the United States is a pretty big job. You lead the Supreme Court
conferences where cases are discussed and voted on. You preside over oral
arguments. When in the majority, you decide who writes the opinion. You get a cool
robe that you can decorate with awesome gold stripes. Oh, and one more thing: You
have exclusive, unaccountable, lifetime power to shape the surveillance state. To
use its surveillance powers -- tapping phones or reading e-mails -- the federal
government must ask permission of the court set up by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. A FISA judge can deny the request or force the government to limit
the scope of its investigation. Its the only plausible check in the system. Whether it
actually checks government surveillance power or acts as a rubber stamp is up to
whichever FISA judge presides that day. The 11 FISA judges, chosen from
throughout the federal bench for seven-year terms, are all appointed by the chief
justice. In fact, every FISA judge currently serving was appointed by Roberts, who
will continue making such appointments until he retires or dies. FISA judges dont
need confirmation -- by Congress or anyone else. No other part of U.S. law works
this way. The chief justice cant choose the judges who rule on health law, or
preside over labor cases, or decide software patents. But when it comes to
surveillance, the composition of the bench is entirely in his hands, and, as a result,
so is the extent to which the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation can spy on citizens. It really is up to these FISA judges to decide what
the law means and what the NSA and FBI gets to do, said Julian Sanchez, a privacy
scholar at the Cato Institute. So Roberts is single-handedly choosing the people
who get to decide how much surveillance were subject to.

A strong rule of law serves as a framework to de-escalate

conflict some of these could escalate to nuclear war.
Charles S. Rhyne, May 1, 1958, Charles S. Rhyne has is J.D, and is a U.N. High
Commissioner on Refugees, President of the American Bar Association, Law Day
Speech for Voice of America delivered on the first Law Day,
Law and courts exist to protect every citizen of the United States in his person and property and in his individual
rights and privileges under the Constitution. The ultimate power to change or expand the law in our system remains
with its source, the people. They can elect as lawmakers those who will vote for wise laws and vote out of office
those who do not. They can also amend the Constitution as experience dictates the necessity of change. In these
days of soul-searching and re-evaluation and inventorying of basic concepts and principles brought on by the
expansion of mans vision to the new frontiers and horizons of outer space, we want the people of the world to
know that we in America have an unshakable belief in the most essential ingredient of our way of life the


of law. The law we honor is the basis and foundation of our nations freedom and the freedom for
the individual, which exists here. And to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of
law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities,
the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands
as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about justice under our rule of law, the
absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about freedom for the individual,

we talk about peace under lawpeace without

the bloodbath of warwe are appealing to the foremost desire of all peoples everywhere. The tremendous
Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when

yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving

best hope for preventing the

tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire
world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of
international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankinds

America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so
appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Mans relation to man is the most neglected field of
study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic
fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased

Men must either live together in peace

or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has
enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this
same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain
peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in mans relationship to man. There exists a
worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of
nuclear war overtake our people. It is said that an idea can be more powerful than an atom because
international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world.

strength today resides in mans mindnot his muscle. We lawyers of the world must take the idea of peace under
the rule of law and make it a force superior to weapons and thus outlaw wars of weapons. Law offers the best hope
for order in a disordered world. The law of force or the force of law will rule the world. In the field of human conduct
the law has never confessed failure. The struggle for a world ruled by law must go on with increased intensity.
must prove that the genius of man in the field of science and technology has not so far outstripped his
inventiveness in the sphere of human relations as to make catastrophe inevitable. If man


can conquer space he

can also solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and lasting peace. In our
country ignorance of the value of law in international relations and what it could do for the people of the world is
appalling. A major purpose of Law Day-U.S.A. is therefore to demonstrate to our people that the need for law in
the world community is the greatest gap in the growing structure of civilization. And we lawyers of America are
anxious to work with lawyers and men of good of all nations in filling this gap in that structure. We believe that no
greater challenge exists for any profession and that

no greater service

to mankind

can be performed.

Separation of powers key to heg

Ikenberry 01 (G John, Prof Georgetown U., The National Interest, Spring,
When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist
it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside world can see
American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process
and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo
and even Beijing-in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to
conclude that an engagement policy toward the United States will be more effective
than balancing against U.S. power. America in large part stumbled into this open,
institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to
counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the
United States was the world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP,

leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with
natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around
stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security
protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the
United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the
Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding
American political order in the half century after World War II was in important
respects an "empire by invitation."(n5) The remarkable global reach of American
postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European and
Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and
use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast
system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the
United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it
nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter
most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's
mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a
relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way
in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other
states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental
separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the
process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive
moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also
provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and
determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed,
frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long
term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies
that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.

US benevolent hegemony is critical to global peacethe

alternative causes massive wars
Kromah 9, Masters Student in IR
[February 2009, Lamii Moivi Kromah at the Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand, The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post
9/11, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf?
A final major gain to the U nited S tates from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps
been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term:
the pervasive cultural influence of the U nited S tates.39 This dimension of power base is often
After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan
were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures
revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was
nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions,

curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and
imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas
largely filled the cultural void.

The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose

regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its
culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects
American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and
middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "cocacolonization."40

After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to

facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic
advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market
and interstate system in the hegemon's own image . The interests of the leader are
projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world.
The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states
emulate it . Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic
project.41 Since wealth depended on peace

the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes

that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution . U.S. benevolent
hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII.

The upshot is that

U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable
political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or
Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because
then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic
states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself
peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international
primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful
means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of
highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order,

the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on
U.S. leadership in the traditional sense . U.S. leadership takes the form of
providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving

not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43

America as a big

and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is
considered legitimate by the other states . It is not in a hegemonic leader's
interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material
capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based
on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the
political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a
hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order,
it must articulate principles and norms , and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very
little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well,
it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas:
colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a
hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a

wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that
legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than
in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense
of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is
bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly

both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of

hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first
belongs, because

discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural
leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct
the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size
are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony.
If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The
relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its
hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It
had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in
1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide
range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century,

leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place
principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the
interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations
that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints
that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the
realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world
it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2)

economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of
American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that " institutions themselves

will need to play a

much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are
internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international
institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain
how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and
mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act.

They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic
leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation
quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see
specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state,
that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign
minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state
interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is
characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of
its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its
position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is
assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to

I see a different pattern: the U.S.

hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief
abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism.
Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the
major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system .
hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but

Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They

The nature of the

institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately
after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish
institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global
conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of
aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49

collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the U nited S tates, in so doing, was

providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially)
collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of
the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with
"national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it
was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals .
Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the
basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist
principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While
such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or
region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is
known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that

the benevolent hegemony

exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's
population . It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic
alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americansand far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by
the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A

world without U.S. primacy will be a world with

more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth
than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any
other country shaping global affairs. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is
still in place. It is this macro political system -a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that
remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what
people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony .52 If the U.S. retreats from
its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world and certainly not the
United Nations. Unfortunately,

the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral

utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age . Moreover, the alternative
to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity a global
vacuum of power .53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant
leadership as been unique; it has not been
tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has
leader politically, economically and military. But its

forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power . The
strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far
greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of
the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of
nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions.
That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put
it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54

To exercise leadership is to get others to do

things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or
indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to
not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and
policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the
Leadership is really an elegant word for power.

marshalling of power capabilities and material resources.

It also involves the ability to project a

set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of

po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by

several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the
actions of a group toward a collective end. 55 By validating regimes and norms of international
behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors , small and large, in the international arena to
behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable
international system . Woodrow Wilsons zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his
jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a
quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to
extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the
ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not
tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must
be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation
have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting
communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and
reducing the costs of transactions,

institutions can permit cooperation to continue even

after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for

commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such
opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum

as gaming experiments demonstrate.

Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not

institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of

desired outcomes , although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to

deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic.
Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was
America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the
economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATOs making Western Europe secure for the
unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the
unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to
unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of
the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy.
Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely,
that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur
in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom
elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national
security is impossible without a broad measure of international security. 57

I see a multi-polar world as

one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power
conflict . The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is
an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that
U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony
because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature

. The most

significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution .

It is

common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with

the fall of a great power . I feel that American hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on
liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and governance will be maintained
by others, if states vary in size, then cooperation between the largest of the former free riders (and including the
declining hegemonic power) may suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the
assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances
under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a hegemonic power declines.58


hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and commonalty of

social purpose among states, U.S. leadership and its institutional
creations will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military
and economic dominance ; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of
particular administrations.59 U.S. hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is
associated with despite the rise of other powers in the system cooperation may persist after
hegemonic decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and
different logics of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the current
economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American predominance in world affairs.60

Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core have come
to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided , so although they have their own
national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony . Why would other
states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their interests; one particularly ambitious
application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic stability. He argues that

the presence of a

hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace

in the

international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic
states provide an international order that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the
claim that international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states . This is, of
course, the essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant power not only
provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the good from subordinate states. In effect, the
hegemonic power constitutes a quasigovernment by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them.
Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's preponderant power, will
succumb. Indeed,

if they receive net benefits

extracted from them),

(i.e., a surplus of public good benefits over the contribution

they may recognize hegemonic leadership as legitimate

and so reinforce its performance and position . During the 19th century several countries
U.S. has also provided a
similar stability and security that as made smaller powers thrive in the international
system. The model presumes that the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to
benefited from British hegemony particularly its rule of the seas, since WWII the

enforce an international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to lower the
costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of
the system.

Even small violations of separation of powers must be avoided

like nuclear war risks
Redish and Cisar 1991, Professor of law at Northwestern and Law Clerk to
Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Martin H.
and Elizabeth J., December 1991, IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERN" *: the Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory ,1992 Duke Law Journal, 41
Duke L.J. 449, p. 474

no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the
existence of separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question
is whether we wish to take that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that
In summary,

might result. Given both the relatively limited cost imposed by use of separation of
powers and the great severity of the harm sought to be avoided , one should not
demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just
as in the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, I
told you so.

1AC Plan
The United States Federal Government should substantially
curtail its domestic surveillance by changing the composition
of the FISA Courts to make them like other Article III Courts.
Full time judges will be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate to permanent judgeships.

1AC Solvency
Plan solves FISA Courts should look like other Article 3 Courts
allows democracy, separation of powers, ideological balance
and expertise demonstrating legitimacy.
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
The clearest proposal to change the composition of the FISA courts would be to
make them look more like other Article III courts: full-time judges appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate to permanent judgeships on
these courts. This would alleviate the losses to representative democracy,
separation of powers, ideological balance, and expertise inherent in designation by
the Chief Justice. Allowing judges to devote their full attention to specializing in one
area is more important for FISA law than for other subjects because the law is
secret, the proceedings are ex parte, and individual rulings directly touch upon
millions of peoples constitutional rights. The Federal Circuit and Court of
International Trade provide working examples of Article III courts of special subject
matter whose judges are appointed directly, with life tenure on the specialist courts,
and with careers of experience in the areas of law for which they are responsible.
Their technical expertise and their democratic legitimacy are worth emulating. Of
course, this approach is not without drawbacks. A full-time FISC would need fewer
judges, increasing the influence of each judge.84 Unlike the district judges who
currently compose the FISC, full-time FISC judges would grow accustomed to a
system decidedly unlike traditional Anglo-American courts, in which the government
is the only party, decisions are made in secret, courts engage in informal dialogue
with government over policy minutiae, and the answer to the governments request
is nearly always yes.85 Through no fault of their own, full-time FISC judges might
become less skeptical of government requests and less vigilant about anticipating
contrary arguments. But the opposite phenomena are just as likely. Perhaps full-time
FISC judges would gain the expertise, experience, and confidence to assert a more
vigorous role in questioning the governments assertions. One need not take any
particular position on the proper extent of surveillance to realize the benefits of
having full-time, permanent FISA judges appointed through the regular
constitutional process. That said, if ones goal is to create a FISC more skeptical of
executive power, there appears little room to regress. A full-time FISCR, however,
would find three appellate judges with an empty docket for years on end. In that
case, I would abolish the FISCR rather than have full-time judges with an empty
docket. To replace it, I would suggest making greater use of the en banc FISC, with
appellate jurisdiction transferred to either the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court.
The FISCRs workload is so light that either of those courts could easily take it on,
though getting involved in this might damage their reputations. In particular, the
specter of secret, ex parte Supreme Court cases is an unpleasant possibility. Yet the
Supreme Court already has the power and responsibility to review FISCR

decisions.86 And to the degree that secret, ex parte proceedings sound unseemly,
one should question their suitability for any constitutional courtincluding the FISC.
Were Congress to adopt some version of the special advocate system that has been
debated,87 my proposal would become even more palatable. Routine involvement
of a privacy-protective counterparty could dramatically increase the frequency of
appeals, leading to a fully utilized FISCR. The presence of special advocates would
alleviate many of the concerns over full-time FISC judges, giving them a more
traditional adversarial process to preside over. Regardless of any change in
appointment or composition, special advocates would relieve FISA judges of the
burden of imagining contrary arguments and raising privacy concerns on their own.
No proposed legislation would effect a system of traditional presidential
appointment. Likewise, none of the proposed bills would create full-time FISA courts
or life tenure for their judges. Thus, the only FISA court composition problems that
Congress is even proposing to address are those stemming from the Chief Justices
unilateral selection power. Yet, as is so often the case, the simplest solution is the
best one. The FISA courts should look as much like other Article III courts as

Plan is a pre-requisite to any other true reform of surveillance.

Democratic legitimacy, separation of powers and concerns with
ideological balance require that FISA judges are appointed like
other Article 3 Courts.
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
No matter the wisdom of their jurisprudence, the FISA courts are institutionally
broken. In order to meet the threshold of democratic legitimacy found in other
courts, restore the separation of powers in judicial appointments, maintain the
ideological balance of the judiciary, and staff them with judges who truly
understand the law and the technology, FISA judges should be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate to dedicated FISA judgeshipsjust like any
other Article III court. There are other problems with the FISA courts that demand
legislative action. Ex parte proceedings and the inability of individuals to fight for
their rights are extremely problematic. A special advocate system is needed even if
my proposal is adopted. But until Congress fixes the composition of the FISA courts,
they will never be truly equipped to make the hard choices about privacy and
surveillance that a twenty-first century democracy demands.

Democratic Legitimacy Ext -L

The rule of law requires legal institutions with democratic
legitimacy; Judges of Article 3 courts should be appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate this includes the
judges of the FISA Court.
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
The Constitution structures relations between the judiciary and the representative
branches of government to accord with a fundamental insight: The rule of law
requires legal institutions that have democratic legitimacy.22 Article III courts or
constitutional courts, as contrasted with Article I courts or legislative courts,
are those in which the judicial power of the United States is vested.23 The
distinction is an important one in the doctrine of separation of powers. For example,
the FISCR has found that the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court
limit the proper role of the FISC in overseeing ex- ecutive programs.24 Judges of
Article III courts are required by the Constitution to be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and entitled to life tenure.25 The
appointment process and tenure of Article I judges, on the other hand, is
determined by Congress.26 The Chief Justice and chief circuit judges have broad
powers to designate Article III judges to temporary assignments on courts other
than those to which they were appointed.27 This normally consists of a judge from
one generalist court sitting temporarily on another generalist court.28 The FISA
courts are the only active Article III courts made up entirely of such designees.29 By
contrast, Supreme Court Justices, circuit judges, district judges, and judges of the
U.S. Court of International Trade are directly and permanently appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate as judges of those respective
courts.30 When district or circuit judges are assigned to sit by designation on other
district or circuit courts, the eclectic case mixture and random selection
mechanisms of these courts make it impossible to precisely match a judge with a
case . . . . [T]he veil of subject matter uncertainty obviates most of the potential for
meaningful strategic allocation of judges.31 But the FISA courts are narrowly
focused on a single issuesurveillanceso strategic allocation of judges for desired
outcomes is a real possibility. There exist other organs made up entirely of Article III
judges designated by the Chief Justice, but no other active courts. Like the FISA
courts, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) is made up exclusively of district
judges designated by the Chief Justice,32 but in the nineteen years since its
creation, it has never heard a single case.33 Thus, I do not consider it an active
court. I likewise exclude the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Though active
and made up exclusively of Article III judges assigned part-time, it is not a court that
rules on sub- stantive legal matters in the traditional sense.34 There have, however,
been other active Article III courts composed entirely of designees in the past. The
most recent was the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA), which was

abolished in 1992.35 When it abolishedww222 the TECA, Congress sensibly

transferred its jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuita
specialist Article III tribunal with normal appointment process and permanent, fulltime judges.36 However legally sound it may be, giving the Chief Justice the power
to appoint an entire court is a sharp departure from the normal mechanism by
which federal judges are chosen. The Framers, recognizing that the appointment of
judges was an act that entailed the exercise of political discretion rather than legal
judgment, vested that choice in branches of government that were at least
indirectly responsible to the public.37 Because FISA judges are chosen by a fellow
judge, FISA courts have a more attenuated relationship with the publicand with
the political branchesthan do other courts. Because a single individual unilaterally
fills the entire FISA courts, they lack the ideological balance of the generalist
judiciary. Finally, because FISA judges serve part-time and have no prior exposure
to FISA court precedent, they are not well prepared to deal with the issues before

The process of appointing FISA court judges violates

fundamental democratic principles and often violates the will
of the people
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
FISA Court Appointments are Uniquely Unmoored from the Will of the People
Because the Chief Justice is, himself, appointed, his appointees are a step further
removed from voters than judges serving on the courts to which they were
appointed by the President. Moreover, as the Chief Justice serves for life, the
disconnect between FISA court appointments and voters is a problem of time as
well as degree. Presidents are never more than four years removed from election,
and Senators never more than six. But Chief Justice Roberts, having been appointed in 2005, derives his democratic legitimacy from the voters who elected
President Bush in 2004, and who elected the Senators of the 109th Congress in
2004, 2002, and 2000. FISA judges chosen in 2015 thus find their (even more
indirect) democratic legitimacy through the same President and Senators who were
elected more than a decade prior. Life-tenured Chief Justices lack the political
incentives that bind Presidents and Senators to popular will. They never need to
seek reelection and as long as health permits, they can easily time their retirements
to ensure like-minded successors.38 Thus, in contrast to the primary appointments
that determine the makeup of all other active Article III courts, FISA court selections
are more indirect, made by a selector whose power and legacy are largely immune
to the will of the voters, and made unilaterally by a single individual. The fact that
FISA judges are chosen from among regularly appointed district and circuit judges
does not remedy the democratic deficit. Those judges were nominated and
confirmed with a certain understandingby the President, the Senate, and the

publicof what their roles would be. District and circuit judges sit on generalist
courts whose proceedings and dockets are open to the public, in which the public
may participate, with sub-national jurisdiction, and with appellate review by higher
courts. It is for those reasons that lower court appointments garner less political and
public attention than higher court appointments, and that individual Senators wield
substantial power over the selection of judges in the jurisdictions they represent.39
These initial appointment decisions are qualitatively unlike what the political
process would go through for direct appointments to secret courts with exclusive,
national jurisdiction over complex and highly salient constitutional questions, in
which only the executive branch is represented, and whose decisions are never
reviewed by any other court.

FISA Court restricts democracy, is too insulated from political

pressure and cannot guarantee objectivity.
Daniel Cetina Summer 2014 Balancing Security and Privacy in 21st Century
America: A Framework for FISA Court Reform, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1453 (2014)
In a democracy such as the United States, one expects pervasive surveillance
programs to operate under strict checks in order to prevent unconstitutional
overreach and ameliorate inefficiencies. 89 Not so. At the center of this
amalgamation of executive power and operative surveillance stands a single
supervisory committee: the FISA Court. 90 Created in 1978 and enhanced numerous
times in the 21st century during the War on Terrorism, 91 this chief check on
governmental surveillance authority is not operating meaningfully. 92 Because it is
literally a court within the larger federal court system it has been dubbed a
parallel Supreme Court93 the FISA Court is doubly insulated from political
pressure. Its twelve members deliberate the governments surveillance requests,
invariably granting most of them. 94 Additionally, the FISA Courts functionality,
independent of actual surveillance requests, is inadequate to guarantee objectivity.
The Chief Justice of the United States is vested with sole appointment power. 95
This is problematic because the Chief Justice, though sequestered by design, 96 is
given free reign to select like-minded judges without direct political or electoral
accountability. 97 Finally, the aura of secrecy surrounding the FISA Court and the
nature of secret surveillance militate against airing contrary opinions within or
fostering robust debate between the coordinate branches of government and the
American public. 98 Unsurprisingly, such defects inspire caustic criticism and
myriad proposed remedies.

Group polarization is almost certain given the process of

appointing FISA judges which destroys court legitimacy.
Ezra Klein July 5, 2013

Harvard Law School professor and Bloomberg View columnist Cass R. Sunstein has
found that judges are more ideologically rigid when their fellow judges are from the
same party, and more moderate when fellow judges are from the other party.
Federal judges (no less than the rest of us) are subject to group polarization, he
wrote. The FISA court is composed of federal judges. All are appointed by the same
man. All but one hail from the same political party. And unlike judges in normal
courts, FISA judges dont hear opposing testimony or feel pressure from colleagues
or the public to moderate their rulings. Under these circumstances, group
polarization is almost a certainty. Theres the real possibility that these judges
become more extreme over time, even when they had only a mild bias to begin
with, Catos Sanchez said.

Stakes require that FISA judges be knowledgeable and

appointed through the regular constitutional process
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
The makeup of the FISA courts is critical because the stakes are so high, the
technology changes so rapidly, and the law is so open to interpretation. Reasonable
citizens and respected scholars disagree as to whether certain programs authorized
by the FISC are vital to national security or infringe upon the rights of hundreds of
millions of peopleor both. The job of a FISA judge is to secretly rule on the
acceptable scope of a democratic governments dragnet snooping into its citizens
lives. The weight of that responsibility demands that the judges entrusted with it be
appointed through the regular constitutional process. Once chosen, they should
focus their professional energy on grappling with these issues, rather than doing so
as a secondary responsibility of a generalist judge.

The FISA Court is stacked; which prevents genuine oversight

and accountability.
Ezra Klein July 5, 2013
Robertss nominations to the FISA court are almost exclusively Republican. One of
his first appointees, for instance, was Federal District Judge Roger Vinson of Florida,
who not only struck down the Affordable Care Acts individual mandate but the rest
of the law, too. (The Supreme Court disagreed.) Vinsons term expired in May, but
the partisan tilt on the court continues: Only one of the 11 members is a Democrat.
Critics contend the FISA court is too compromised to conduct genuine oversight. It
meets in secret, and the presiding judge hears only the governments argument
before issuing a decision that cant be appealed or even reviewed by the public.
Like any other group that meets in secret behind closed doors with only one

constituency appearing before them, theyre subject to capture and bias, said
Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and
National Security Program. A Reuters investigation found that from 2001 to 2012,
FISA judges approved 20,909 surveillance and property search warrants while
rejecting only 10. Almost 1,000 of the approved requests required modification, and
26 were withdrawn by the government before a ruling. Thats a startling win rate for
the government.

Democratic Legitimacy IL Ext

Perception of impartiality is key to legitimacy
Smith 93 Christopher E., University of Akron, 1993, (Courts, Politics, and the
Judicial Process, p. 6)
Judges and lawyers work to maintain the judicial systems image as the branch of
the government guided by legal principles rather than by politics. U.S. Supreme
Court justices have noted that the judiciarys effectiveness depends on its success
in maintaining public faith in the neutral application of law by judges. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter once wrote, [T]he Courts authority possessed of neither the
purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction. Justice Harry Blackmun reiterated this idea that [t]he legitimacy of the
Judicial Branch Ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and
nonpartisanship. Scholars claim that, in order to protect judicial credibility and
power, judges and lawyers must behave as if their actions are guided by legal
principles: [T]he legitimacy of courts rests in their fidelity to the law and its
enforcementIf courts do not preserve their distinctiveness from other political
bodies if they cease being courts, then their claim to legitimacy and their power
will erode.

Democractic legitimacy Env IL

Courts legitimacy necessary for key environmental law
Long 08
Andrew Long,Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.,
International Consensus and U.S. Climate Change Litigation, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl.
& Pol'y Rev. 177 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol33/iss1/4
How U.S. Courts Should Use International Climate Change Norms In the near
future, climate change cases in U.S. courts are likely to increase. In the absence
of a comprehensive national policy, challenges to regulatory action based on
climate change concerns are likely to grow, as is the drive to find additional
litigation hooks for compelling action to reduce emissions. With a new
administration, a renewed push for more comprehensive climate policy is likely. If
successful, any new legislative or regulatory framework will surely trigger
challenges. In any of these situations, international law has something to offer
domestic courts.215 As the discussion above demonstrates, I am not urging that
U.S. courts adopt a strict monist stance. Their authority derives from a
constitution that, whatever its susceptibility to monist interpretation, has been
interpreted as at least partly dualist for over a century. That tradition can be
respected even as courts enter into transnational dialogue on global
environmental threats.216 International norms must be identified carefully, along
with the degree of U.S. accession to them. There are now two basic sources
demonstrating existing normative consensus in the international climate regime:
UNFCCC and Kyoto. Each can be used by U.S. courts for a distinct purpose. 1.
Kyoto and Its Implementation: Assessing Practice The value of the Kyoto Protocol
in the United States is limited because the political branches have rejected it.2"7
However, as a treaty adopted by every other developed country on the planet,
actions under it may offer a reference point for understanding U.S. actions toward
meeting UNFCCC commitments. For example, determining whether agency action
is reasonable rather than arbitrary may, in the context of a global threat with little
precedent in U.S. law, be aided by examining what standards have developed
internationally or in foreign jurisdictions. Pointing to similar practices throughout
Kyoto nations may demonstrate an agency's reasonableness, even though Kyoto
is not a substantive standard in the United States. Likewise, an agency practice
that is contrary to much of the world would suggest arbitrariness, perhaps in an
informal burden-shifting way. It is supported further by the role of customary
international law that states should avoid transboundary environmental harm. 2.
UNFCCC: Interpreting U.S. Law The climate change cases are not likely to be
constitutional, unlike human rights cases. Therefore, courts should be understood
to have significant leeway in looking to global consensus in understanding the
development of U.S. positions and agency actions. The norm espoused in the
UNFCCC-that states have an obligation to address climate change through

domestic action-can directly guide judicial understanding of the context in which

U.S. statutes and administrators operate.218 Courts could look to the UNFCCC as
an initial statement of U.S. commitment. In the absence of any significant
evidence that the nation has renounced the obligation to redress climate change,
the commitment should be used to interpret domestic law and frame agency
obligations. Thus, in the context of climate change, international norms should
serve a Charming Betsy function. The Court should read domestic statutes in
harmony with the norms developed in the UNFCCC and customary international
law. Unless it has renounced its promises, the U.S. should be held to its obligation
to take action seriously aimed at redressing climate change in order to avoid
damaging the territory of other nations and the global commons. It is a collective
responsibility that must, in large part, be enforced by each actor upon itself. The
courts are a direct and legitimate line toward bringing the framework to
fruition in the United States. CONCLUSION Climate change is a global commons
problem that is being addressed by virtually the entire international community
simultaneously. Undoubtedly, there are lessons of both practice and theory that
the United States can learn from the work being done in other nations. Largely
because of the political branches' failure to confront climate change, the courts
are on the front line of U.S. climate change law development .
Understanding how to read U.S. environmental statutes or assess U.S. agency
action in light of the growth of scientific and legal awareness of humanity's
impact on the climate is a daunting task. If ever there is a situation in which the
U.S. courts should look outward for aid in understanding a shared problem,
climate change is it. Within constitutional bounds, the court can employ the
norms enshrined in the UNFCCC to understand U.S. statutes and the
developments under the Kyoto Protocol to understand agency practice. This
approach will benefit the nation not only at home but internationally as well. It
will strengthen soft power to guide negotiations on the climate regime and
perhaps other issues. By engaging the norms of the international community, the
courts can add the U.S. normative perspective into the consensus and become a
leader in transnational understanding of the judicial role in tackling the emerging
law of climate change.

Democratic Legitimacy Heg IL

Legitimacys the fundamental internal link to effective
hegemony---power distributions perceived as illegitimate are
the most likely causes of great power war
Martha Finnemore 9, professor of political science and international affairs at
George Washington University, January 2009, Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social
Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isnt All Its Cracked Up to Be, World
Politics, Volume 61, Number 1
Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. Ones position or
power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has meaning in a particular
social context. Actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally . Legitimacy
can only be given by others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of
another power, or by those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout
history. Tradition, blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in
contemporary politics conformity with [End Page 61] international norms and law is more influential in
determining which actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate. 9 Recognizing the legitimacy of power
does not mean these others necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance
of the social structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still
believe that markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic growth. One may not
like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this
concession to power asymmetries.

We can see the importance of legitimacy by

thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the
withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis . In domestic
politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed.

Internationally, systems suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent

and noncooperative . Post-Reformation Europe might be an example of such a system. Without
at least tacit acceptance of powers legitimacy, the wheels of
international social life get derailed . Material force alone remains to
impose order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is
difficult, even under unipolarity . Successful and stable orders require the grease of some
legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10

The social and relational character of

legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the
kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their
will, but only to an extent . The willingness of others to recognize the
legitimacy of a unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment
shapes the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power
without any underlying legitimacy

will have a very particular character. The unipoles

will meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn .

Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is
obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have tried to do so.

Legitimacy is critical to make US leadership durable and

Knowles 9 [Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New
York University School of Law, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87]
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists . Unipolarity was thought to
be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to protect their own security, form alliances to
counter-balance the leading state. n322 But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to
challenge America's military predominance . n323 Although some realists predict that [*140]
counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring, n324 William Wohlforth has offered a compelling
explanation for why true counter-balancing, in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen for decades.

the United States is geographically

isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia. n327 This mutes
the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose while increasing the threats that
potential rivals seem to pose to one another. n328 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the
capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power - military, economic, technological, and
in terms of what is known as "soft power." This advantage "is larger now than any analogous
gap in the history of the modern state system." n329 Third, unipolarity is entrenched as
the status quo for the first time since the seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for
potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern previous experience with
balancing. n330 Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the
concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening . A war between great
powers in today's world is very unlikely. n331 These factors make the current system much more
stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United States
n325 American unipolarity is unprecedented. n326 First,

operated for all of its history until 1991.

The lack of balancing means that the U nited S tates,

and by extension the executive branch, faces much weaker external constraints on its
exercise of power than in the past. n332 Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S.
matter now more than any other nations' have in history

. n333 And

it is these

internal processes, as much as external developments, that will determine the

durability of American unipolarity . As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can
best ensure the [*141] stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that
its predominance appears legitimate . n334 Hegemonic orders take on
hierarchical characteristics, with the preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations
than in a unipolar order. n335 Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part through
security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic specialization
among nations. n336 For example, if Nation X's security is supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize

the preeminent state has "the

power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests." n337
military power and focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system,

The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as a whole. n338 The
hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic resources but "soft" power,
the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests. n339 The durability
and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance

of the hegemon's role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as

legitimate . n340 [*142] The U nited S tates qualifies as a global hegemon . In many ways,
the U.S. acts as a world government. n341 It provides public goods for the world, such
as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342 After World War II, the U.S.
forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the United
Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides
security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343
Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of
force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly,

the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and
confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345

The U nited S tates also provides a public

good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It

exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is
the largest "consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a
global scale. n346 The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and
the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and

controlling international norms are [*143] sometimes

embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or
customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be countered
effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules
that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that
define the proper treatment of enemy combatants. " n348 These public goods
private international law. n347 Moreover,

provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and

decreasing resistance to it . The transnational political and economic institutions
created by the U nited S tates provide other countries with informal access to
policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging
others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349
American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of

The legitimacy of
American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and
markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350

accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional

separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will
hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is
counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple
points of access to the government. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive
branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352
They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353
Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of
particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354

The courts, too,

are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens . The Alien Tort Statute is
emerging as an [*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among noncitizens in U.S. courts. n355 Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires
consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure, " with an imperial core - the preeminent state ruling the periphery through intermediaries. n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct,

asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries
(the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire

The success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim ."

n359 Stability in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing
the formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting differences among
to the other. n358

potential challengers. n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against
challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling "different
identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only
in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations scholars question the comparison. n362
However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign
policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply.
n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military
personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in
Iraq and Afghanistan had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365

the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of

globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend to fail when peripheries can
[*145] But

communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information ... about its bargains and
activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and
Iraq were the subject of intense media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another
classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial rule - is also

The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on

winning a battle of ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists,
through the Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their
unlikely to be effective today.

cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's
"brand" and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial
rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy.

B. Constructing a

Hegemonic Model International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led
international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from

The U.S. is
not the same as other states; it performs unique functions in the world and has a
government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system
traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical.

depends more on successful functioning of the U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances
crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. " World

power politics are shaped primarily not by

the structure created by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in
Washington." n370 These differences require a new model for assessing the
institutional competences of the executive and judicial branches in
foreign affairs.

[*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights

from a major alternative theory of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal
characteristics of states - in particular, the form of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do
not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international
institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has
proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, democratic states and non-democratic states. n373
Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the
courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal
states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of deference. n375 One
strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication.
Professor Nzelibe has observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are
liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these determinations, they would still face the
same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between
foreign affairs and domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights
and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be
applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling
that the functional justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role

effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve general governmental effectiveness
in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century,

America's global role has changed, and the

best means of achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as

well . The international realm remains highly political - if not as much as in the past - but it
is American politics that matters most.

If the U.S. is truly an empire - [*147] and in some

respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of managing relations

the management of hegemony or

unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American predominance is
with one other great power or many great powers. Similarly,

recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current
international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of
U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and
better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives.

If the United States were to

withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be

capable of taking its place. n378 The result would be radical instability
and a greater risk of major war . n379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from
the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the

American hegemony is unusually stable and durable . n380 As

noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current
order. n381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often
mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S. will
remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates,
the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. n382 The U.S. accounted for half
of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense
technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. n383 Predictions of American
decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. n384 [*148] Third, the
hegemonic model assumes that

hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American hegemony depends not

just on power, but legitimacy . n385 All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states although unipolarity less than hegemony or empire - suggest that

legitimacy is crucial to the

stability and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant

states in unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use
of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant state
and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. n386 Legitimacy as a
method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient.
generally values courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model.

The hegemonic model

The courts'

strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation

from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for
realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy .
This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of
domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty.

The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the
infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the
deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional
considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less
intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly
grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.

Environment impact ext

Eco collapse causes extinction
Jayawardena 09 (Asitha, London South Bank University, We Are a Threat to All
Life on Earth, Indicator, 7-17, http://www.indicator.org.uk/?p=55)
Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) explain in detail why the natural environment is
so important for life on Earth. It is from the environment that the living organisms of
all species import the energy and raw material required for growth, development
and reproduction. In almost all ecosystems plants, the most important primary
producers, carry out photosynethesis, capturing sunlight and storing it as chemical
energy. They absorb nutrients from their environment. When herbivores (i.e. planteating animals or organisms) eat these plants possessing chemical energy, matter
and energy are transferred one-level up. The same happens when predators (i.e.
animals of a higher level) eat these herbivores or when predators of even higher
levels eat these predators. Therefore, in ecosystems, food webs transfer energy and
matter and various organisms play different roles in sustaining these transfers. Such
transfers are possible due to the remarkable similarity in all organisms composition
and major metabolic pathways. In fact all organisms except plants can potentially
use each other as energy and nutrient sources; plants, however, depend on sunlight
for energy. Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) further reveal two key principles
governing the biosphere with respect to the transfer of energy and matter in
ecosystems. Firstly, the energy flow in ecosystems from photosynthetic plants
(generally speaking, autotrophs) to non-photosynthetic organisms (generally
speaking, heterotrophs) is essentially linear. In each step part of energy is lost to
the ecosystem as non-usable heat, limiting the number of transformation steps and
thereby the number of levels in a food web. Secondly, unlike the energy flow, the
matter flow in ecosystems is cyclic. For photosynthesis plants need carbon dioxide
as well as minerals and sunlight. For the regeneration of carbon dioxide plants, the
primary producers, depend on heterotrophs, who exhale carbon dioxide when
breathing. Like carbon, many other elements such as nitrogen and sulphur flow in
cyclic manner in ecosystems. However, it is photosynthesis, and in the final
analysis, solar energy that powers the mineral cycles. Ecosystems are under threat
and so are we Although it seems that a continued energy supply from the sun
together with the cyclical flow of matter can maintain the biosphere machinery
running forever, we should not take things for granted, warn Sloep and Van DamMieras (1995). And they explain why. Since the beginning of life on Earth some 3.5
billion years ago, organisms have evolved and continue to do so today in response
to environmental changes. However, the overall picture of materials (re)cycling and
linear energy transfer has always remained unchanged. We could therefore safely
assume that this slowly evolving system will continue to exist for aeons to come if
large scale infringements are not forced upon it, conclude Sloep and Van DamMieras (1995). However, according to them, the present day infringements are large
enough to upset the worlds ecosystems and, worse still, human activity is mainly
responsible for these infringements. The rapidity of the human-induced changes is
particularly undesirable. For example, the development of modern technology has
taken place in a very short period of time when compared with evolutionary time

scales within decades or centuries rather than thousands or millions of years.

Their observations and concerns are shared by a number of other scholars. Roling
(2009) warns that human activity is capable of making the collapse of web of life on
which both humans and non-human life forms depend for their existence. For Laszlo
(1989: 34), in Maiteny and Parker (2002), modern human is a serious threat to the
future of humankind. As Raven (2002) observes, many life-support systems are
deteriorating rapidly and visibly. Elaborating on human-induced large scale
infringements, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) warn that they can significantly
alter the current patterns of energy transfer and materials recycling, posing grave
problems to the entire biosphere. And climate change is just one of them! Turning to
a key source of this crisis, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995: 37) emphasise that,
although we humans can mentally afford to step outside the biosphere, we are
animals among animals, organisms among organisms. Their perception on the
place of humans in nature is resonated by several other scholars. For example,
Maiteny (1999) stresses that we humans are part and parcel of the ecosphere.
Hartmann (2001) observes that the modern stories (myths, beliefs and paradigms)
that humans are not an integral part of nature but are separate from it are speeding
our own demise. Funtowicz and Ravetz (2002), in Weaver and Jansen (2004: 7),
criticise modern sciences model of human-nature relationship based on conquest
and control of nature, and highlight a more desirable alternative of respecting
ecological limits, . expecting surprises and adapting to these.

Eco collapse causes extinction

Kline 98 (Gary, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia Southwestern
State University, Journal of Third World Studies, 15(1), Spring)
Additionally, natural ecosystems provide certain less obvious services that are
crucial to life as we know it.6 The atmosphere of our planet is the product largely of
ecosystem operations. About twenty-one percent of our atmosphere is made up of
oxygen, the result of plant photosynthesis which releases the gas. Approximately
seventy-eight percent of the remaining air we breathe is nitrogen, which is
regulated by the nitrogen cycle of plant production. Ecosystems then influence
weather and climate patterns by affecting the circulation of air in this atmosphere.
Plants, and especially forests, are instrumental in retaining and conserving our soil
and water. Destruction of forest areas results in soil erosion (deleterious to
agriculture and plant life in general), floods, and droughts. The rapid decertification
of large tracts of land in places like north Africa are a direct consequence of loss of
such ecosystems. Each year an area equivalent in size to Belgium falls victim to
decertification. Plant and animal life, much of it not visible to the naked eye, helps
create and maintain soil by breaking down rocks into finer and finer pieces and by
adding organic material to it, enriching it for agriculture. Except for some of the
most troublesome products of Humankind, like DDT and plastics, these same plants
and animals work to dispose of wastes. Decomposed wastes are then recycled as
nutrients into the food chain for the sustenance of new life. Natural ecosystems also
produce mechanisms in plants for the resistance of pests and diseases and for the

pollination of flowering plants, essential to their reproduction, including many of our

food crops. It should be apparent that biodiversity and life are synonymous. The
organisms in an ecosystem are part of a "trophic pyramid," as labelled by scientists.
That is, a large mass of plants supports a smaller number of herbivores; these
support a smaller number of primary carnivores and an even smaller number of
second order carnivores. Due to their more rapid rates of reproduction, the lower
order life forms are generally better able to adapt to changes in their environment
than the higher forms. The latter are also disadvantaged by bioconcentration of
harmful substances which make their way into the food chain. Every organism has
some niche and work to perform in the pyramid. Homo sapiens occupy a position at
the top and are therefore vulnerable to instability at the base. Human activity which
threatens the pyramid is akin to playing Russian roulette. Of this, Humankind is now
more aware. As Garrison Wilkes of the University of Massachusetts put it, "We have
been building our roof with stones from the foundation."7 This problem is now
manifesting itself especially in an area of human endeavor which is essential to our
existence: agriculture.

Environmental decay risks collapse of civilization

John C. Dernbach, Associate Professor, Law, Widener University, Sustainable
Development as a Framework for National Governance, CASE WESTERN RESERVE
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW v. 49, Fall 1998, p. 16.
The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are
unprecedented in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable,
but they are likely if these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed
or were severely weakened because they exhausted or degraded the natural
resource base on which they depended. n76 In addition, substantial economic and
social inequalities have caused or contributed to many wars and revolutions. n77
These problems are intensified by the speed at which they have occurred and are
worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt. The complexity of
natural and human systems also means that the effects of these problems are
difficult to anticipate. The potential impact of global warming on the transmission of
tropical diseases in a time of substantial international travel and commerce is but
one example.

Democracy impact ext.

Strong democracy maintains global peace the best research
Cortright 13, David Cortright is the director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute
for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Chair of the Board of Directors of
the Fourth Freedom Forum, and author of 17 books, Kristen Wall is a Researcher and
Analyst at the Kroc Institute, Conor Seyle is Associate Director of One Earth Future,
Governance, Democracy, and Peace How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence
the Prospects of War and Peace,
Drawing from the empirical literature , this paper identifies two underlying
pathways through which state governance systems help to build peace.
These are: State capacity. If states lack the ability to execute their policy
goals or to maintain security and public order in the face of potentially
violent groups, armed conflict is more likely . State capacity refers to two
significant aspects: security capacity and social capacity. Security capacity
includes the ability to control territory and resist armed incursion from
other states and nonstate actors. Social capacity includes the ability to
provide social services and public goods. Institutional qxuality. Research
suggests that not all governance systems are equally effective or capable
of supporting peace. Governance systems are seen as more credible and
legitimate , and are better at supporting peace , when they are
characterized by inclusiveness, representativeness, transparency, and
accountability. In particular, systems allowing citizens to voice concerns,
participate politically, and hold elected leaders accountable are more stable and
better able to avoid armed conflict. Both dimensionsstate capacity and quality
are crucial to the prevention of armed conflict and are the focus of part one
of this paper. Part two of the paper focuses on democracy as the most common
way of structuring state government to allow for inclusive systems while
maintaining state capacity. The two parts summarize important research
findings on the features of governance that are most strongly associated
with prospects for peace. Our analysis, based on an extensive review of
empirical literature , seeks to identify the specific dimensions of
governance that are most strongly associated with peace. We show
evidence of a direct link between peace and a states capacity to both
exert control over its territory and provide a full range of social services
through effective governance institutions. We apply a governance framework
to examine three major factors associated with the outbreak of warborder
disputes, ethnic conflict, and dependence on commodity exportsand emphasize

the importance of inclusive and representative governance structures for the

prevention of armed conflict.

The converse is true, backsliding causes great power war

Gat 11, Professor at Tel Aviv University, Ezer Weizman Professor of National
Security at Tel Aviv University, Azar 2011, The Changing Character of War, in The
Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32
the decline of major great power war has deepened

Since 1945,
further. Nuclear weapons have
concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related
process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade,
but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always sufficiently large and rich in natural
resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist
economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the
feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the

War now seems to be confined to the less-developed

parts of the globe, the worlds zone of war, where countries that have so
far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects
continue to be engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries. While the trend is very
real, one wonders if the near disappearance of armed conflict within the
developed world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the
world constitute a zone of peace.

collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a fleeting
one. The probability of major wars within the developed world remains low
because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the
deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more radical
notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate
victory of democracy; and that in an affluent and democratic world, major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously
prepared for. This notion, however, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist nondemocratic great powers that have been absent from the international
system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose
massive growth represents the greatest change in the global balance of power.
Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming
an increasingly authoritarian character. Authoritarian capitalism may be
more viable than people tend to assume . 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were
potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist
authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half of the twentieth
century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efficient economically
as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic
counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental
size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new nondemocratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the
largest player in the international system in terms of population and is
showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or two is likely to make it a true nondemocratic superpower. Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers does
not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony
since the Soviet Unions collapse could be short-lived and that a
universal democratic peace may still be far off . The new capitalist authoritarian powers are

deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic
cause. Thus, it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such
as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the
openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows
wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to
be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may

as China grows in power, it is likely to become more

assertive, flex its muscles, and behave like a superpower, even if it does not become
particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may coexist more
or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called security
dilemma, and against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic
relations, accentuated ideological rivalry, potential and actual conflict,
intensified arms races, and even new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions. Although great power
be more problematic. However,

relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they
may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

Global democratic transitions are inevitable preventing

democratic sliding prevents war.
Fareed Zakaria, 1997, Fareed Zakaria has a PhD in Political Science from
Harvard, hes also the managing editor for Foreign Affairs, Lexis Nexis
This is not a plea for the wholesale adoption of
the American way but rather for a more variegated conception of liberal democracy,
one that emphasizes both parts of that phrase.
there lies an
intellectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal tradition, central to
the development of good government throughout the world
If a
democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a democracy is a small
Of course cultures vary, and different societies will require different frameworks of government.

Before new policies can be adopted,

the Western experience

and to

. Political progress in Western history has been the result of a

growing recognition over the centuries that, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, human beings have "certain inalienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments are instituted."

LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY A proper appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility. While it is easy to

impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without
appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step. Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster constitutional liberalism in
developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements, and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end,
however, elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and symbols,
elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there. Conversely, the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not
the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue. Governments should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional liberalism as well. Economic, civil, and religious
liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands these freedoms, it should not be branded a dictatorship. Despite the limited political choice they offer, countries like
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a better environment for the life, liberty, and happiness of their citizens than do either dictatorships like Iraq and Libya or illiberal democracies like Slovakia or Ghana. And the pressures of
global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward. Markets and morals can work together. Even China, which remains a deeply repressive regime, has given its citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they
have had in generations. Much more needs to change before China can even be called a liberalizing autocracy, but that should not mask the fact that much has changed. Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the
overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries. Constitutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth century exponents, such as Montesquieu
and Madison, is a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which
government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."

also meant to tame the passions of the public

Constitutions were

, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government. Unfortunately, the rich variety of

unelected bodies, indirect voting, federal arrangements, and checks and balances that characterized so many of the formal and informal constitutions of Europe are now regarded with suspicion. What could be called the Weimar
syndrome -- named after interwar Germany's beautifully constructed constitution, which failed to avert fascism -- has made people regard constitutions as simply paperwork that cannot make much difference. (As if any political
system in Germany would have easily weathered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and hyperinflation.) Procedures that inhibit direct democracy are seen as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of the people. Today
around the world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democratizing countries, the winner really does take all. DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS

live in a democratic age.


Through much of human history the danger to an individual's life, liberty and happiness came from the absolutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror

Thus the

of dictatorships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. Dictators and a few straggling totalitarian regimes still persist, but increasingly they are anachronisms in a world of global markets, information, and media.

are no longer respectable alternatives to democracy

; it is part of the fashionable attire of modernity.

problems of governance in the 21st century will likely be problems within

democracy .

This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle of legitimacy. Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably

the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses

is that it will
discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance .
Every wave of democracy has been followed by setbacks
The last such period of disenchantment, in Europe during
the interwar years, was seized upon by demagogues
democratic. Conversely,

-- other than to its own people --

This would not

be unprecedented.

in which the system was seen as inadequate and new

alternatives were sought by ambitious leaders and restless masses.

, many of whom were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a

spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most importantly the United States, can play is -- instead of searching for new lands to democratize and new places to hold elections -- to
consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing
with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a challenge, to make the world safe for democracy. As we approach the
next century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.

Democratic backsliding causes great power war.

Azar Gat, 2011, Azar Gat is the Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel
Aviv University, 2011, The Changing Character of War, in The Changing Character
of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32
Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have
concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of
free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world.
The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced
substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always sufficiently large and rich in natural resources to
maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into
the global capitalist economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very
remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre
of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a zone of

War now seems to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the
worlds zone of war, where countries that have so far failed to embrace
modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be engaged in wars among
themselves, as well as with developed countries. While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near

disappearance of armed conflict within the developed world is likely to remain as

stark as it has been since the collapse of communism . The post-Cold War moment
may turn out to

be a fleeting


The probability of major wars within the developed

world remains lowbecause of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and
interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has
been based on the far more radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled
the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy; and that in an affluent and democratic world, major
conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for.

This notion, however, is fast eroding

with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent
from the international system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast
industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents the greatest change
in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist
liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character . Authoritarian
capitalism may be more viable than people tend to assume . 8 The communist great
powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems

capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half

of the twentieth century, Germany and Japan , particularly the former, were as efficient
economically as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic
counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the
failed them. By contrast, the

exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second

new non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in

is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is
showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or two is likely to make it a true nondemocratic superpower. Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers does not
necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony since
World War). However, the

the Soviet Unions collapse could be short-lived and that a universal

democratic peace may still be far off . The new capitalist authoritarian powers are deeply
integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not
of the liberal democratic cause. Thus, it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so

as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial
protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world
economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist,
as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible exception
of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany

China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, flex its muscles, and
behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and
non-democratic powers may coexist more or less peacefully , albeit warily, side by side,
and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more problematic. However,

armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called security dilemma, and against worst-case

But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated

ideological rivalry, potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even
new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary
from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the
same, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

FISA Courts allow for unchecked executive power
Goitein and Patel, 2015 What went wrong WITH THE FISA COURT Elizabeth
Goitein and Faiza Patel Foreword by Judge James Robertson Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein
co-directs the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and National Security Program.
Faiza Patel serves as co-director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and
National Security Program. http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-wentwrong-fisa-court
Moreover, under current law, the FISA Court does not provide the check on
executive action that the Fourth Amendment demands. Interception of Americans
communications generally requires the government to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause of criminal activity. Although some courts have held that a
traditional warrant is not needed to collect foreign intelligence, they have imposed
strict limits on the scope of such surveillance and have emphasized the importance
of close judicial scrutiny in policing these limits. The FISA Courts minimal
involvement in overseeing programmatic surveillance does not meet these
constitutional standards.

FISA Court rubber stamps surveillance requests this

overemphasizes executive power and the view of the
The Daily Beast, 2013 The Secret FISA Court Must Go
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/the-secret-fisa-court-mustgo.html U.S. NEWS07.24.134:45 AM ET
Like a modern-day Star Chamber, the FISC operates ex partethat is, the
applications and arguments are one-sided, and only the government appears before
the court. There is no one before the court to speak for the publics interest in the
privacy of its communications. And in a fight where only one side is allowed to show
up, the governments view almost always prevails. Since 2008 the administration
has submitted over 8,000 surveillance requests to the FISC. Only two have been
denied. The FISC has denied not a single surveillance request in the past three
years. By any measure, the court is simply a rubber stamp for the executive branch.

FISA Court has a huge incentive to say yes to the

government extending surveillance and governmental power .
The Daily Beast, 2013 The Secret FISA Court Must Go
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/the-secret-fisa-court-mustgo.html U.S. NEWS07.24.134:45 AM ET

Perhaps most importantly, the FISC has a strong practical incentive to find a way to
say yes to the government. The FISC conducts its review knowing that the
government is heavily committed to mass surveillance already and has been for a
long time. The Bush administration collected phone calls and emails in secret
without a warrant for years, and both the Bush and Obama administrations sucked
in phone and Internet traffic dataat first with no court orders and then on
questionable legal authority. In a sense, the government has gotten away with
massive violations of the law for so long that the institutional cost of reining them in
now is enormous. And so the FISCand perhaps other federal courtswill cave
rather than fight.

FISA Court record demonstrates their pro-government bias

99.7% approval rate on surveillance applications proves.
Harvard Journal on Legislation, 2014 THE POWER TO APPOINT FISA
Contemporary arguments regarding the FISCs pro-government bias find their
foundation in the empirical record of the Courts thirty-five year history. From 2008
2012, the government filed 8,388 applications for electronic surveillance.93 Of
these, the FISC approved 8,369 applications, which equates to a 99.77% approval
rate.94 Separately, from 19791983, the government filed 1,984 applications with
the FISC, of which 1,973or 99.45%were approved.95 The growth in applications
to the Court, while gradual and persistent over several decades, increased markedly
after the adoption of the Patriot Act in 2001. In 2003 and 2004, the government
made 1,727 and 1,758 applications respectively. In contrast, the number of
applications for 1999 and 2000 were 886 and 1005 respectively. In one sense, this
sharp increase in the volume of surveillance applications strengthens the position of
FISC critics: if criticisms of 1803 are meritorious, then they only become more
consequential as the scope and scale of the governments surveillance activities
grows. A counterargument to this data points out that, rather than revealing a progovernment court, these high rates of approval may merely reveal an Executive
Branch that is finely attuned to the limits of surveillance.96 This point is persuasive,
but falls short of fully undermining the allegations of bias. Even if it is presumed
that the Executive Branch effectively self-regulates the quality of its surveillance
applications, it seems unlikely that our Presidents, operating in a post-9/11
environment that saw a sharp increase in surveillance requests and the initiation of
novel surveillance programs pursuant to the Patriot Act, so seldom encroached on
legal boundaries to justify such infrequent court intervention.

FISA appointments have historically been biased toward

Republican government officials- appointed by white male
Republican chief justices.
Charlie Savage, 7-25-2013, "Robertss Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court," New York Times,

The recent leaks about government spying programs have focused attention on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and its role in deciding how intrusive the government can be in the name of national security.
Less mentioned has been the person who has been quietly reshaping the secret court: Chief Justice John G. Roberts

In making assignments to the court, Chief Justice Roberts , more than his predecessors,
has chosen judges with conservative and executive branch backgrounds that critics say
make the court more likely to defer to government arguments that domestic spying
programs are necessary. Ten of the courts 11 judges all assigned by Chief Justice Roberts were

appointed to the bench by Republican presidents; six once worked for the federal government. Since the chief

86 percent of his choices have been Republican

appointees, and 50 percent have been former executive branch officials . Though the
two previous chief justices, Warren E. Burger and William H. Rehnquist, were
conservatives like Chief Justice Roberts , their assignments to the surveillance court were more
justice began making assignments in 2005,

ideologically diverse, according to an analysis by The New York Times of a list of every judge who has served on the

66 percent of their selections were

Republican appointees, and 39 percent once worked for the executive branch.
Viewing this data, people with responsibility for national security ought to be very
concerned about the impression and appearance, if not the reality, of bias for
favoring the executive branch in its applications for warrants and other action, said
court since it was established in 1978. According to the analysis,

Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat and one of several lawmakers who have sought to change the
way the courts judges are selected

FISA Court does not deny government requests modifications

dont indicate denials; surveillance is nearly always approved.
ALEX SEITZ-WALD FRIDAY, JUN 7, 2013 02:43 PM CDT Despite Obamas claim,
FISA court rarely much of a check
Despite President Obamas reassurance today that there is strict oversight of the
governments data collecting activities, the federal court meant to provide a check
against such espionage overreach hasnt denied a single request in almost four
years and rarely rebuffs intelligence agencies desires to conduct electronic or
physical surveillance records reveal. Defending the National Security Agencys
massive intelligence gathering operation on U.S. soil today, President Obama said
the courts are an important safeguard. If people cant trust not only the
executive branch but also dont trust Congress and dont trust federal judges to
make sure were abiding by the Constitution, then were going to have some
problems here, Obama said. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence,
added that all information that is acquired under this program is subject to strict,

court-imposed restrictions on review and handling. Indeed, the secretive Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court, established in 1978 in response to government
abuses uncovered by a congressional report, reviews and approves intelligence
gathering requests. But how strict is that oversight? The court rarely, if ever,
denies the governments requests, according to annual reports issued to senior
members of Congress by the Department of Justice and collected by the Federation
of American Scientists. In 2012, the government made 1,789 applications to the
court one was withdrawn by the government and 40 were modified by the court,
but the FISC did not deny any applications in whole or in part, the report states. In
2011, there were 1,676 applications, of which two were withdrawn and 30 modified,
but once again, The FISC did not deny any applications in whole, or in part. In
2010, there were 1,511 applications, of which five were withdrawn and 14 modified,
but The FISC did not deny any applications in whole, or in part.

FISA Court is a rubber stamp on government request for

surveillance; Careful review does not explain a .03% failure
JOHN SEXTON14 Jun 2013 http://www.breitbart.com/blog/2013/06/14/the-fisacourt-is-a-rubber-stamp/
But as Tech Dirt points out, the FISA court is little more than a judicial rubber stamp.
The court has approved every single request of it for the past three years. And
thats not an anomaly: It last rejected a request back in 2009, and that was only one
out of 1320. In its entire history, since 1979, the court has rejected a grand total of
11 applications. 11. Out of 33,939 applications. Thats 0.03%. Not 3%. 0.03% with
not a single rejection in over three years. Thats not careful review. Thats a rubber
stamp. If the law says the government can collect any tangible things, having a
court agree that everyones phone metadata is a tangible thing is not oversight.
Whats missing is any argument or effort to omit data on the vast number of
Americans who never make (or receive) foreign calls. If Section 702 forbids the
targeting of Americans by the NSA, then why should section 215 allow data
collection on them by the same agency? At the very least, the NSA should have to
prove to Members of Congress that collecting this data has made a significant,
tangible contribution to preventing terror attacks. As of now, we havent seen a
single verifiable instance where that is the case.

FISA judges are selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, which gives too much authority to one individual and
packs the court.
The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies 2013 LIBERTY AND SECURITY I N A
CHANGING WORLD 12 December 2013 Report and Recommendations of The
Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies

Selection and Composition of the FISC. Under FISA, the judges on the FISC are
selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. In theory, this method of selection
has significant advantages. Concentration of the power of appointment in one
person can make the process more orderly and organized. But that approach has
drawn two legitimate criticisms. The first involves the potential risks associated with
giving a single person, even the Chief Justice, the authority to select all of the
members of an important court. The second involves the fact that ten of the eleven
current FISC judges, all of whom were appointed by the current Chief Justice, were
appointed to the federal bench by Republican presidents. Although the role of a
judge is to follow the law and not to make political judgments, Republican-appointed
and Democratic-appointed judges sometimes have divergent views, including on
issues involving privacy, civil liberties, and claims of national security. There is
therefore a legitimate reason for concern if, as is now the case, the judges on the
FISC turn out to come disproportionately from either Republican or Democratic

FISA Court is dominated by particular pro-government

ideologies that lack diversity
Harvard Journal on Legislation, 2014 THE POWER TO APPOINT FISA
What I have termed the homogeneity critique is essentially an argument for greater
diversity on the FISA Court. Although our earlier discussion focused on geographic
diversity, which is, to a certain extent, addressed even in the current language of
1803, the modern iteration of this critique also encapsulates political and
experiential diversity. The lack of diversity is evident when one considers both the
current and historical membership of the court. Chief Justice John Roberts has
appointed each of the eleven members on the current court.97 Of these eleven
members, nine were nominated to their judgeship by Republican presidents.98
Moreover, at least half of these judges were themselves former federal prosecutors,
while several others held high-ranking positions in the Executive Branch prior to
joining the court.99 Since FISAs adoption in 1978, only two other Chief Justices
have made appointments to the court: Warren E. Burger and William Rehnquist. Like
Roberts, the two men were appointed to the Supreme Court by a Republican
president and previously held senior positions in the Executive Branch. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, the historical makeup of the Court reflects the ideologies of the
three Chief Justices who controlled the power of appointment. Of the fifty-five
judges that have served on the FISC, just seventeen, or 31%, were appointed by
Democratic presidents.100 Viewed in these terms, the court has grown less diverse
over the last ten years. While one law professor has noted that critics have
suggested that the Chief might use the appointment power to influence policy,
others have gone further to argue that, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
adopted a partisan approach to his judicial appointments.101 Even this cursory

examination of the Courts homogeneity serves to highlight what makes many

critics uncomfortable.102

SOP Impact ext

Death by absolutist government has killed more people than
wars our impacts outweigh
RJ Rummel, Prof of Political Science at University of Hawaii, War Isnt This
Centurys Biggest Killer 1997 (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WSJ.ART.HTM)
Our century is noted for its absolute and bloody wars . World War I saw nine-million people killed in
battle, an incredible record that was far surpassed within a few decades by the 15 million battle deaths of World War II. Even the
number killed in twentieth century revolutions and civil wars have set historical records. In total, this century's battle killed in all its
international and domestic wars, revolutions, and violent conflicts is so far about 35,654,000.

Yet, even more

unbelievable than these vast numbers killed in war during the lifetime of some still living, and largely
unknown, is this shocking fact. This century's total killed by absolutist governments
already far exceeds that for all wars, domestic and international. Indeed, this number
already approximates the number that might be killed in a nuclear war . Table 1 provides the
relevant totals and classifies these by type of government (following Freedom House's definitions) and war. By government killed is meant any direct or
indirect killing by government officials, or government acquiescence in the killing by others, of more than 1,000 people, except execution for what are
conventionally considered criminal acts (murder, rape, spying, treason, and the like). This killing is apart from the pursuit of any ongoing military action or
campaign, or as part of any conflict event. For example, the Jews that Hitler slaughtered during World War II would be counted, since their merciless and
systematic killing was unrelated to and actually conflicted with Hitler's pursuit of the war. The totals in the Table are based on a nation-by-nation
assessment and are absolute minimal figures that may under estimate the true total by ten percent or more. Moreover, these figures do not even include
the 1921-1922 and 1958-1961 famines in the Soviet Union and China causing about 4 million and 27 million dead, respectably. The former famine was
mainly due to the imposition of a command agricultural economy, forced requisitions of food by the Soviets, and the liquidation campaigns of the Cheka;
the latter was wholly caused by Mao's agriculturally destructive Great Leap Forward and collectivization. However, Table 1 does include the Soviet
government's planned and administered starvation of the Ukraine begun in 1932 as a way of breaking peasant opposition to collectivization and
destroying Ukrainian nationalism. As many as ten million may have been starved to death or succumbed to famine related diseases; I estimate eight
million died. Had these people all been shot, the Soviet government's moral responsibility could be no greater. The Table lists 831 thousand people killed
by free -- democratic -- governments, which should startle most readers. This figure involves the French massacres in Algeria before and during the
Algerian war (36,000 killed, at a minimum), and those killed by the Soviets after being forcibly repatriated to them by the Allied Democracies during and
after World War II. It is outrageous that in line with and even often surpassing in zeal the letter of the Yalta Agreement signed by Stalin, Churchill, and
Roosevelt, the Allied Democracies, particularly Great Britain and the United States, turned over to Soviet authorities more than 2,250,000 Soviet citizens,
prisoners of war, and Russian exiles (who were not Soviet citizens) found in the Allied zones of occupation in Europe. Most of these people were terrified of
the consequences of repatriation and refused to cooperate in their repatriation; often whole families preferred suicide. Of those the Allied Democracies
repatriation, an estimated 795,000 were executed, or died in slave-labor camps or in transit to them. If a government is to be held responsible for those
prisoners who die in freight cars or in their camps from privation, surely those democratic governments that turned helpless people over to totalitarian
rulers with foreknowledge of their peril, also should be held responsible. Concerning now the overall mortality statistics shown in the table, it is sad that
hundreds of thousands of people can be killed by governments with hardly an international murmur, while a war killing several thousand people can cause
an immediate world outcry and global reaction. Simply contrast the international focus on the relatively minor Falkland Islands War of Britain and
Argentina with the widescale lack of interest in Burundi's killing or acquiescence in such killing of about 100,000 Hutu in 1972, of Indonesia slaughtering a
likely 600,000 "communists" in 1965, and of Pakistan, in an initially well planned massacre, eventually killing from one to three million Bengalis in 1971. A
most noteworthy and still sensitive example of this double standard is the Vietnam War. The international community was outraged at the American
attempt to militarily prevent North Vietnam from taking over South Vietnam and ultimately Laos and Cambodia. "Stop the killing" was the cry, and
eventually, the pressure of foreign and domestic opposition forced an American withdrawal. The overall number killed in the Vietnam War on all sides was
about 1,216,000 people. With the United States subsequently refusing them even modest military aid, South Vietnam was militarily defeated by the North
and completely swallowed; and Cambodia was taken over by the communist Khmer Rouge, who in trying to recreate a primitive communist agricultural
society slaughtered from one to three million Cambodians. If we take a middle two-million as the best estimate, then in four years the government of this
small nation of seven million alone killed 64 percent more people than died in the ten-year Vietnam War. Overall, the best estimate of those killed after
the Vietnam War by the victorious communists in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is 2,270,000. Now totaling almost twice as many as died in the Vietnam
War, this communist killing still continues. To view this double standard from another perspective, both World Wars cost twenty-four million battle deaths.
But from 1918 to 1953, the Soviet government executed, slaughtered, starved, beat or tortured to death, or otherwise killed 39,500,000 of its own people
(my best estimate among figures ranging from a minimum of twenty million killed by Stalin to a total over the whole communist period of eighty-three
million). For China under Mao Tse-tung, the communist government eliminated, as an average figure between estimates, 45,000,000 Chinese. The number
killed for just these two nations is about 84,500,000 human beings, or a lethality of 252 percent more than both World Wars together. Yet, have the world
community and intellectuals generally shown anything like the same horror, the same outrage, the same out pouring of anti-killing literature, over these
Soviet and Chinese megakillings as has been directed at the much less deadly World Wars? As can be seen from Table 1, communist governments are
overall almost four times more lethal to their citizens than non-communist ones, and in per capita terms nearly twice as lethal (even considering the huge
populations of the USSR and China). However, as large as the per capita killed is for communist governments, it is nearly the same as for other non-free
governments. This is due to the massacres and widescale killing in the very small country of East Timor, where since 1975 Indonesia has eliminated (aside
from the guerrilla war and associated violence) an estimated 100 thousan d Timorese out of a population of 600 thousand. Omitting this

country alone would reduce the average killed by noncommunist, nonfree governments to 397 per 10,000, or significantly less than

the more freedom in a

nation, the fewer people killed by government. Freedom acts to brake the use of a
governing elite's power over life and death to pursue their policies and ensure their
rule. This principle appeared to be violated in two aforementioned special cases. One was the French government carrying out
the 477 per 10,000 for communist countries. In any case, we can still see from the table that

mass killing in the colony of Algeria, where compared to Frenchmen the Algerians were second class citizens, without the right to
vote in French elections. In the other case the Allied Democracies acted during and just after wartime, under strict secrecy, to turn
over foreigners to a communist government. These foreigners, of course, had no rights as citizens that would protect them in the
democracies. In no case have I found a democratic government carrying out massacres, genocide, and mass executions of its own
citizens; nor have I found a case where such a government's policies have knowingly and directly resulted in the large scale deaths

Absolutism is not only many times

deadlier than war, but itself is the major factor causing war and other forms of violent
conflict. It is a major cause of militarism. Indeed, absolutism, not war, is mankind's deadliest
scourge of all.
of its people though privation, torture, beatings, and the like.

Checks on tyranny are necessary to prevent democide

RJ Rummel, Prof of Political Science at University of Hawaii, Democracy, Power,
and Democide 1997 (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP17.HTM)
Where the political elite can command all, where they can act arbitrarily, where they can kill as they
so whim, they are most likely to commit democide . Where the elite are checked by
countervailing power, where they are restrained and held to account for their actions, where they must
answer to the very people they might murder, they are least likely to commit democide . That is
power kills; absolute power kills absolutely. This is the underlying principle. There is thus a
continuum here. At one end is liberal democracy, a type of regime in which through an open
and competitive system of electing the major power-holders and otherwise holding accountable other
political elite, through the freedom of speech and organization, and through the existence of multiple
and overlapping power pyramids (religious institutions, the media, corporations, etc.), power is
most restrained. At the other end are totalitarian regimes in which the power-holders exercise
absolute power over all social groups and institutions, in which there are no independent power
pyramids. The broad alternative to these two types is the authoritarian regime. Power is centralized and
perhaps dictatorial, and no competition for political power is allowed , but independent social
institutions (such as churches and businesses) exist and provide some restraint on the political elite.

Heg impact ext

U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring
terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars.
Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 A World Without Power, FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143
So what is left? Waning

empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy . A coming retreat into fortified cities.
the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly
find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the
ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound
to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the
harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction , too, so it
These are

is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for
commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the
process through tyranny or civil war. The

reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would

produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression . As the United
States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society,
less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as

Europe's Muslim enclaves grew,

Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing
trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic
meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the
centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires . Western investors would lose out and
conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the
edges of the waning great powers. The

wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to

Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates . With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically
concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear

wars could devastate numerous

regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending
catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical
Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would
continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these
continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an
apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs
of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony --its fragile self-image
dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that
they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good
old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be
multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more
dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new
world disorder

Heg solves all of your structural violence and war impacts

Thomas P.M. Barnett 11, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the
Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S.
Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat,

worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in
the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, The New Rules: The Rise of the
Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory, World Politics Review, online:
over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision
of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other
rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty
concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy,
don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. Meanwhile, the Chinese do their
First the absurdity: A few of the most

stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources

With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly

clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back , while that force's implied
successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection
capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot
of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own . We'll just have
to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. That gets us to the original "insult": the
U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s . Yes, it did argue for and promote
the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the
Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly
global middle class that the world has ever seen. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk,
flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets.

somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's
universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II.

Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came

along, and their record on economic development was painfully
transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America
showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order ,
one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now
for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in
conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere
sustenance. You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is
undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better
place. That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese,
have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already
democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that
reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a
"counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world. Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not
really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant
for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing

Let's remember what the U.S. actually did

across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's
poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call
repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes,
playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in
the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements, including al-Qaida, but we
made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers
are supposed to do. Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a
regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy.

chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as
America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not
intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden.
The rest, as they say, is history. The follow-on irony of

the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually

revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines
and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big
wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central
Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely
because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006

the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need
to manage this global era. But, of course, that can all be tossed into the
dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow
the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world
history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered
not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth
ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen.
Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great
power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the
world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power
to manage what's yet to come. As always, the choice is ours.
midterm election. But

Theres no alternative to US heg

Kagan 12 [Robert Kagan, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings
Institution, February 11, 2012, Why the World Needs America, WSJ,
History shows that world orders, including our own, are transient. They rise and fall, and the institutions they erect,
the beliefs and "norms" that guide them, the economic systems they supportthey rise and fall, too. The downfall
of the Roman Empire brought an end not just to Roman rule but to Roman government and law and to an entire
economic system stretching from Northern Europe to North Africa. Culture, the arts, even progress in science and
technology, were set back for centuries. Modern history has followed a similar pattern. After the Napoleonic Wars of
the early 19th century, British control of the seas and the balance of great powers on the European continent
provided relative security and stability. Prosperity grew, personal freedoms expanded, and the world was knit more

With the outbreak of World War I,

the age of settled peace and advancing liberalismof European civilization
approaching its pinnaclecollapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism
and economic calamity. The once-promising spread of democracy and liberalism
halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living
closely together by revolutions in commerce and communication.

nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the
20th century did not produce a new dark agethough if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might

Would the end of the

present American-dominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of
American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general
havebut the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating.

sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the
present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current
economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist
G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive."

believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers
like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international
system." And there are elements across the political spectrumRepublicans who call for retrenchment,
The commentator Fareed Zakaria

Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutionswho don't imagine that a "post-American world"
would look very different from the American world.

If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is.

The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences.


the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will
change to suit their interests and preferences . Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a
post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve
it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the
world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the

Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's

Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see
fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power . The balance in a
great-power autocracies. Both

new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democraciesBrazil, India,
Turkey, South Africapicked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to

What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that
China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in
preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs . Unfortunately, they
might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order
has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open
trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to
maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas , would other nations take on the
do it.

burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global
commonsor rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater
competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill
into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one
in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers

could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic
order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the
largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but
in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over
$40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic
forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly
where Slovenia and Greece are today. As Arvind Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will
make for a historically unique situation. In the past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have
also been the richest. Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system
have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep the system open.

China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may prove less willing to
open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to foreign
competition and are likely to close others in the future. Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian believe that the
liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which "China exercises its dominance by
either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas of the economy that are now highly protected."

American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because,
like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money
for its partners. Chinese economic dominance may get a different reception. Another problem is that
China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal
of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American preeminence, when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's

The government amasses

wealth in order to secure its continued rule and to pay for armies and navies to
compete with other great powers. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open
system is more like the mercantilist arrangements of previous centuries.

international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their
priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays

Finally, what about

the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would
the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive.

it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American

multipolar systems have

historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful . Rough parity among
predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But

powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in

War among the great powers was a common, if not constant,

occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries,
culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the
the delicate power equation.

French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of
great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was
a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine
other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian
War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were
killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition,
numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the
most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W.
Tucker has observed, "Such

stability and moderation as the balance brought rested

ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for
maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to
multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has
in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace
than certainty about who holds the upper hand. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for
America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to
prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can

the rules and institutions of international order

are like scaffolding around a
building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. Many foreign-policy
it be done? For particularly in matters of security,

rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They

experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing
science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms"
of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of
governmentforces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe
that our preferred order survives because it is right and justnot only for us but for everyone. We assume that the
triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better
system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so
attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The
idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But
international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over othersin
America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that
supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and
capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine
providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no
guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and
liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the
republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal
economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a
better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and
norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse
altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that


U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the
alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and
catastrophewhich is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

Heg solves nuclear war and decline of American power causes

Zhang and Shi 11 Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also
serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the
World Bank in Washington, D.C., 1/22, Americas decline: A harbinger of conflict

and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-aharbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be

the US still possesses incomparable military prowess

and its economy remains the worlds largest, the once seemingly indomitable
chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing . Thus, the global
distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less
peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict
regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military.
Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned
with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western
Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all
negative and perhaps alarming. Although

joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power
conflicts . However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so
will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international
order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more
readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history
attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation .
For example, in the late 19th century Americas emergence as a regional power saw
it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th
century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the
American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain rules the waves . Such
a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemispheres security to
become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this
US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of

As a
result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial
mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought
opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations .
However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines? Given
that Americas authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across
much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of
Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global
society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated
that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional
blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry . Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as
the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations . For
powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society.

example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership

Free markets would become more

politicised and, well, less free and major powers would compete for supremacy.
Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element . In the
to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders.

late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European
economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive.

And, as American power eroded, so did

international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world

without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge ,

the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade

protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is
one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled
US primacy.

A2 Politics
FISA Court reforms are the most popular of surveillance
Pema Levy July 17 2013 9:36 AM EDT NSA FISA Controversy: Congress Looks To
Reform Secret Court
Beginning last month, numerous bills have been put forward to make the court
more transparent and trustworthy. On Wednesday, a House Judiciary Hearing will
examine how the federal government is running programs that were approved by
the FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) court. Though some lawmakers have
been sounding alarm bells about the court for a few years, current bipartisan
interest in the courts activities put the FISC (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court)
at the center of possible congressional responses to Snowdens leaks. I think the
public is extremely concerned about the metadata that is being collected, said Rep.
Steve Cohen, D-Tenn., who has put forward a proposal to reform the secret court. I
think because of that massive concern, that because the Snowden situation has
maintained itself in the news, questions about the court have not been as frontburner as they are now, Cohen said. Civil liberties advocates also feel that the FISA
court is where they are most likely to win reforms, particularly when it comes to
increasing transparency. "In terms of issues that have bipartisan support and are
more likely than others to go forward, I would agree that this is one of those issues,
said Sharon Bradford Franklin, a senior counsel at the Constitution Project, a
nonpartisan legal research and advocacy group.

The FISA Courts are the best point of origin for discussions of
how to effectively curtail federal surveillance power.
Daniel Cetina Summer 2014 Balancing Security and Privacy in 21st Century
America: A Framework for FISA Court Reform, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1453 (2014)
There is no one supreme legislative grant augmenting federal surveillance powers.
n30 Surveillance authority grew over time and through various, often unrelated bills.
There is no effective point of origin from which to begin analyzing legislative
conferrals of surveillance authority. But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA") n31 is perhaps the logical starting point because it established the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Court"), n32 which is currently under
scrutiny for its centrality in [*1459] President Obama's overall surveillance
scheme. n33 Congress amended FISA numerous times, most importantly in 2001,
n34 2007, n35 and 2008. n36 The FISA Court is presently the body empowered to
curb federal surveillance power: it considers governmental requests for surveillance
warrants. n37 But, arguably, this deliberation is strictly nominal and an unsatisfying
check on potentially unlimited governmental power in the surveillance realm. n38