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HUMINT Data overload

Take notes here


Changes that were made to this draft:

What we are using for tomorrow:

The interactions with the Terror Disad:

Where the Neg is allowed to be break the script:

**Aff Section starts here

1AC version

HUMINT Advantage
Contention Three - is Human Intelligence
The squo relies Big Data surveillance. That means info
overload & less HUMINT.
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon
Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional
intelligence-gathering effortsand allowing terrorists to succeed, October 20, 2014, ak.)

Snowden on Monday suggested that if the National Security Agency focused more on
traditional intelligence gatheringand less on its mass-surveillance programsit
could have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker,
speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk
Edward

communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence


agencies, often leaving more traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back
burner. "We miss attacks, we miss leads, and investigations fail because when the
government is doing its 'collect it all,' where we're watching

everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is


impossible to keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet
freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden

Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S.


officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such
actionable intelligence was largely ignored . He argued that targeted surveillance on
known extremists and diligent pursuit of intelligence leads provides for better
counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really watch these guys and the
question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite resources
and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance
programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional
said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan

[targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has

no record of successfully thwarting a terror ist attack, a line of


argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities.

mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a


threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped
intelligence officials from performing their jobs takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level.
"We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may
Snowden's suggestionthat such

have value,

at the expense of being able to watch specific people for

which we have a specific cause for investigating , and that's something that we need
to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.

Big Data kills human-intel which is key to overall US


operations.
Margolis 13
Gabriel Margolis the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management &
Resolution from UNC Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was
published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a
premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving international security affairs.
All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peerreviewed process. From the article: The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem - Global
Security Studies - Spring 2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis
%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf

The United States has

accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the

Numerous methods of collection have been employed in


clandestine operations around the world including those that focus on human, signals,
geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation with technological
methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often
leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on
technological advances of the 20th century.

technical methods,

some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can

be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances
in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform;
however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs

will make the United States susceptible to intelligence failures


unless human intelligence can be properly integrated . In the near
future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a
thing of the past.

BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT is key to stay-ahead of


these risks.
Johnson 9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of
the journal "Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign
policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from
1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at
Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE
FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html

The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states;
competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-

seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
reason, government

officials leaders seek information about the capabilities andan especially elusive topicthe

intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation.
That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or
internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can
help advance the national interest the opportunity side of the security equation.
Through the practice of espionagespying or clandestine human intelligence : whichever is one's
favorite termthe central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for
achieving a more thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National
governments study information that is available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for
example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the
pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be
several missing pieces perhaps the most important ones.

They may be hidden away

in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired

the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying

through careful research; but often discovery of


, if they can be
found at all. Some things "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionalsare unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the
current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skillsay, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed

Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents


machines, respectively known inside America's secret agencies as human

submarines, which are vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking.

or with

intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign
agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_

Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of

Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft,
most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill
what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory:
listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs"
concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.

Techint attracts

the

most funding in

Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over
humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most
every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international

only human agents can provide insights into that most


vital of all national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals especially
those adversaries who are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint,
affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that

based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is
organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its
value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's
security.

Those impacts cause extinction.


Ochs 2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - Biological Weapons must be Abolished
Immediately, June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]

the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a


known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on
earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,

laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth

Biological weapons, on the other hand, can


get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the
and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control.

security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons
could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their

persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would
have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized

With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably


never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep
causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with
no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and
chemical extermination is over, it is over.

ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN

EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Plan solves and is reversible. Less Big Data means


conventional and targeted human intel.
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard
University, The Big Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting
terrorism?,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_state_terrorist_
cve, November 10, 2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the
Financial Times. In effect, Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly
aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda, by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor
online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protected, the greater the danger we
will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping
citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities
overseen by unelected officials such as Hannigan won't be abused.

I tend to favor the privacy side of the

argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not

much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us


significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate
among scholars over whether tracking and killing these guys is an effective strategy. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist
organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm

So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What would the United
States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of
regardless.

destruction that can make it remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a

would these powerful states do if


the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd have to rely more heavily on triedand-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and flipping
existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before
they occurred, and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty
of counterterrorism campaigns before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to
infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable points, it's not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't
terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists plotting various heinous acts, what

spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot

more of this.
(Note to students: Fort Meade internally referenced is a United States Army
installation thats home to NSA and other intelligence agencies.)

More funding WONT solve. Data overload overwhelms intel


and guarantees ongoing resource failures.
Tufekci 15
Zeynep Tufekci is a fellow at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University, an
assistant professor at the School of Information and Department of Sociology at the University of North
Carolina, and a faculty associate at the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet and Society. Terror and
the limits of mass surveillance Financial Times The Exchange - Feb 3 rd http://blogs.ft.com/theexchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-and-the-limits-of-mass-surveillance/

The most common justification given by governments for mass surveillance is that these
tools are indispensable for fighting terrorism. The NSAs ex-director Keith Alexander says big data is

what its all about . Intelligence agencies routinely claim that they need massive amounts of data on all of
us to catch the bad guys, like the French brothers who assassinated the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo, or the murderers of Lee Rigby,
the British soldier killed by two men who claimed the act was revenge for the UKs involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the assertion that big data is what its all about when it comes to predicting rare events is
not supported by what we know about how these methods work, and more importantly, dont work.
Analytics on massive datasets can be powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or
events that occur regularly and frequently, but are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable,
erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In fact, the bigger the haystack the more massive the

to
finding such exceptional events , and the more they may serve to
direct resources and attention away from appropriate tools and

scale and the wider

the scope of the surveillance the less suited

these methods are

methods. After Rigby was killed, GCHQ, Britains intelligence service, was criticised by many for failing to stop his killers, Michael
Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page report that lists all the
ways in which Adebolajo and Adebowale had brushes with data surveillance, but were not flagged as two men who were about to kill
a soldier on a London street. GCHQ defended itself by saying that some of the crucial online exchanges had taken place on a
platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not alerted the agency about these men, or the nature of their postings. The men
apparently had numerous exchanges that were extremist in nature, and their accounts were suspended repeatedly by the platform
for violating its terms of service. If only Facebook had turned over more data, the thinking goes. But that is misleading, and makes
sense only with the benefit of hindsight. Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies
every time that it detects a post containing violence, would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data

For big data analytics to work, there needs to be a


reliable connection between the signal (posting of violent content) and the event (killing someone).
quagmire, rather than clues to impending crimes.

Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebooks billion-plus users
post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent rhetoric.

Turning over the

data from all such occurrences would merely flood the agencies with false positives
erroneous indications for events that actually will not happen.

Such data overload

is not without cost, as it

takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are, indeed, not needles especially
when we dont even know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no
resolution, taking

away resources from any real investigation.

Besides, account suspensions

carried out by platforms like Facebooks are haphazard, semi-automated and unreliable indicators. The flagging system misses a lot
more violent content than it flags, and it often flags content as inappropriate even when it is not, and suffers from many biases.
Relying on such a haphazard system is not a reasonable path at all. So is all the hype around big data analytics unjustified? Yes and
no. There are appropriate use cases for which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform much better than any alternative
we can imagine using conventional methods. Successful examples include using Google searches to figure out drug interactions that
would be too complex and too numerous to analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using social media to detect national-level swings
in our mood (we are indeed happier on Fridays than on Mondays). In contrast, consider the lone wolf attacker who took hostages
at, of all things, a Lindt Chocolat Caf in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence, and random, crazed

men attacking them is not a pattern on which we can base further identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology
and brought a black flag with Islamic writing on it, but given the rarity of such events, its not always possible to separate the jihadi
rhetoric from issues of mental health every eras mentally ill are affected by the cultural patterns around them. This isnt a job for
big data analytics. (The fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges and was known for sending hate letters to the
families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for traditional policing). When confronted with their failures in

the NSA, should have said instead of asking


for increased surveillance capabilities: stop asking us to collect more and more data to perform an
impossible task. This glut of data is making our job harder, not easier , and the expectation that there
predicting those rare acts of domestic terrorism, heres what GCHQ, and indeed

will never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.

2AC Materials

2AC A-to Cplan - Fund HUMINT


( ) Perm do both
( ) Modest amounts of datas key. Cplan wont solve, doesnt
cut back on data overload.
Press 13
Gil - Managing Partner at gPress, a marketing, publishing, research and education consultancy.
Previously held senior marketing and research management positions at NORC, DEC and EMC. Most
recently he was a Senior Director, Thought Leadership Marketing at EMC, where he launched the Big
Data conversation with the How Much Information? study (2000 with UC Berkeley) and the Digital
Universe study. He is also contributes on computing technology issues as a guest writer at Forbes
Magazine The Effectiveness Of Small Vs. Big Data Is Where The NSA Debate Should Start Forbes
6-12-13 - http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/06/12/the-effectiveness-of-small-vs-big-data-iswhere-the-nsa-debate-should-start/

Most of the discussion around the revelations about the data collection activities of the NSA has been about the
threat to our civil rights and the potential damage abroad to U.S. political and business interests. Relatively

has been said, however, about the wisdom of collecting all

little

phone call records and lots of other

data in the fight against terrorism or other threats to the United States. Faith in the power
(especially the predictive power) of more data is of course a central tenet of the religion of big data and it looks like

not everybody agrees its the most effective course of


action. For example, business analytics expert Meta Brown: The unspoken assumption here is that
possessing massive quantities of data guarantees that the government will be able to
the NSA has been a willing convert. But

find criminals, and find them quickly, by tracing their electronic tracks. That assumption is

unrealistic. Massive quantities of data add cost and complexity to every kind of
analysis, often with no meaningful improvement in the results.
Indeed, data quality problems and

slow data processing are almost certain to arise ,

actually hindering the work of data analysts. It is far more productive


to invest resources into thoughtful analysis of modest quantities of good
quality, relevant data.
No solvency focus on metadata will still exist theyll use
metadata before Humint data.
Funding alone is not enough divisional focus must be
diverted for Humint.
Gallington 06 Daniel Gallington, Adjunct Professor of National Security Law at
the University of Illinois, senior policy and program adviser at the George C.
Marshall Institute, LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School, J.D. from the

University of Illinois, 2006 (What hope for HUMINT?, Washington Times, May 8th,
accessible online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508091537-5575r/?page=all, accessed on 6-30-15)
CIA housecleaning should continue
happening at the same time will be significant budgetary shifts from high-tech remotesensing intelligence operations, to human-intelligence collection, the traditional CIA
mission. Because the entrenched CIA senior bureaucracy remains resistant to
change, its also fair to ask if the CIA can improve its human-intelligence collection
Assuming Mike Hayden is confirmed as the new director, basic

even if we spend a lot more money on it. The answer in the shorter term three
to 10 years is probably no, and whether we can do it for the longer term is not at all clear yet. Why such a
negative assessment? Looking at how we have done in the past with human intelligence provides at least an
indicator of our probable success: Our archenemy for 50 years, the Soviet Union, proved very hard to collect against
using human sources. And, for most of the Cold War we seemed oblivious to this: Many sources we used were
double agents and played us like an organ, as the expression goes.

A primary way to get human

intelligence pay for it can too often become the only way , because it
is simply easier. And, we have probably paid a lot of money over the years for bad
information much of it planted with us by double agents. Traditionally, we have been
unable to develop long-term, well-placed sources in other countries . The reason is that the
time required sometimes 20 years seems beyond our comprehension and the ability of our government to

Too often, our idea of cover for our agents was


something your mother let alone the KGB could have figured out in about 30 seconds .
fund and keep secret for sustained periods.

We have the wrong kind of people doing the work: Despite being the most culturally diverse free nation in the
world, we seem to send blond-haired, blue-eyed people to do intelligence field work. They simply cant do the
mission in todays world however, they seem to rise to leadership positions without difficulty. What should we do?
(1) We have to take a very critical look at ourselves. This cannot be done objectively by the CIA and the other
agencies because their primary focus is on the very short term getting more money to spend. The president
consulting with the Intelligence Committees in Congress should call together a group of experts, including
counterintelligence experts, and chart out a long-term HUMINT collection strategy. We should get their guidance,
Congress should fund it and the president carry it out. (2) It isnt written in stone that the traditional HUMINT roles,
missions and collection authorities of the various intelligence agencies should stay the same. In fact, everything
should be on the table and no agency should expect its traditional HUMINT mission will remain intact. On paper at
least, the new director of national intelligence (DNI) would seem empowered to direct this kind of reallocation of
mission. (3) Too often, our intelligence collections overseas are based on second- and third-hand reports, and often
obtained from host or other nations intelligence services. As these reports are analyzed and similarities are seen
and written about, its easy to see how we can be misled by group speak reporting, mostly controlled by sources
we have no way of assessing. Spying is spying: We should do more of it on our own throughout the world and get
our own, firsthand information. (4) Most HUMINT collections should be controlled centrally: Local authorities
overseas including the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned and the regional military commander should
not, ordinarily, be in the loop for such activities. (5) There has been way too much emphasis on open source
reporting, and its become a crutch for a number of agencies. Many so-called open sources are manipulated by
those opposed to us, whether we consider them our friends or not. And, way too often, open source reporting
just means someone reading a foreign newspaper then writing an intelligence report on it. Will these

We are simply not getting the critical


information we need to be responsive to the ever-broadening spectrum of threats
from terrorism. And, unless we can penetrate terrorist organizations, including their
planning and financing, well simply be unable to prevent more terrorist attacks
against us around the world and at home. Nevertheless, even if we do all these things and do
recommendations work? We dont have any choice:

them right we may be 15 or 20 years away from developing a true world class HUMINT collection capability: as
good, for example as some of our key adversaries have had against us for years.

But lets make sure we

stay on task and do it right not just fling our money in a different

direction for a few years.

A shift in intelligence gathering priority is key commanders


still prioritize drones post-counterplan.
BI 14 Business Insider, major US business journal Byline: Robert Caruso, 2014
(Here's How the US Can Build the Intelligence Capabilities Needed to Defeat ISIS,
Business Insider, September 8th, accessible online at
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-needs-better-humint-to-beat-isis-2014-9,
accessed on 6-29-15)
The U.S. government has a large number of officers trained by the CIA that can be
deployed globally. Their efforts should focus on high-quality targets for human
source intelligence that can provide information on strategic intent. Sources that
only provide tactical and capability-based intelligence are insufficient.
Human source intelligence collection is as much a psychological and emotional
construct as it is a political, military, or national security one. Intelligence collection
is not an academic exercise that can be understood by rote formula or analyzed by
a linear thinking process.
Typical defense intelligence priorities must undergo a conceptual shift .
The practice of providing tactical intelligence to support military commanders is
extremely important. But only understanding our adversaries capabilities without
knowing their intentions means the U.S. is only winning half the battle.
There's a legal dimension to the problem that today's enemy combatants pose as
well. In order to expand the fight against groups like ISIS, a congressional
Authorization for Use of Military Force may be necessary. But that brings up
questions of its own: Authorization for what? And, more poignantly, against whom?
The language could become rapidly outdated as the nature of the enemy and the
scope of the fight changes.
Today's enemy is embedded in local populations. Drones have no way of
distinguishing between enemy combatants and noncombatants without actionable
intelligence. Deep knowledge of today's enemies is vital to understanding them
and defeating them.

Humnit must consistently be our focus to solve.


Webster 08 William Webster, Chairman of the National Security Council,
Former director of both the CIA and FBI, J.D. from Washington University, St. Louis,
2008 (How can the U.S. improve its human intelligence, Washinton Times, July 6th,
accessible online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/06/how-canthe-us-improve-its-human-intelligence/?page=all, accessed on 6-29-15)
Expansion of human intelligence (Humint).
These on-the-ground sources are the most reliable means of ascertaining the
intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. Whenever the threat seems lessened

these sources are the first to go and not be replaced. These sources are vital to our
security, they cannot be put on ice and immediately called up and
put in place to meet each new threat, whether officially assigned or as nonofficial
cover agents (NOCs). This takes time, and the time to do it is now. Complete the
FBIs reorganization of its data gathering and data mining electronic capability. Past
efforts have failed to transform this extremely valuable resource into a system that
can supply needed intelligence to CIA and other key agencies. Need to share is
just as important as need to know. The cost is high, but well worth it. Pre-emptive
and preventive intelligence. The intelligence gathered by modern digital technology
on a rapid basis should be made available to all personnel charged with spotting
suspected terrorists at various points of entry as will those on the watch lists
seeking to fly on commercial aircraft. Any useful intelligence gathered abroad must
be promptly conveyed to security officers looking for suspected individuals and
cargo so that the prompt and preventive policy can be more effective. Improve
National Estimates. The longer-view estimates have often been neglected by
consumers at the White House and elsewhere in favor of the current intelligence
that seems to be more readily actionable. The NIEs have real, though less apparent
value, in spotting trends and conditions that could result in hostile action against
the United States and should be elevated in quality and presentation. Retention of
objectivity. We may expect in a troubled world during this century that our leaders
may want to cherry-pick the intelligence to support a previously determined
program for action. Intelligence officers must not only be seen to be objective; they
must protect the work product from distortion by the consumers that can only
undermine its credibility. This can be a tough assignment, but it must be done. Our
satellites project important imagery and signals intelligence that expand our
understanding of potentially hostile activities and should be enhanced wherever
possible. They do not, however, replace the need for on-the-ground intelligence
about the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. A well-placed human source
can be of critical importance in explicating the purpose of such activities detected
by our electronic eyes and ears. Similarly, human intelligence can also be an
important factor in helping our electronic tools focus upon unusual plans or
activities on the ground. Each is important in early detection and analysis. Together,
they can make an important contribution to the safety of our nation by avoiding
surprise and miscalculation of the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and
are thus indispensable to our policy-makers in reaching sound decisions in the best
interest of our country. Public source information must also be factored in. But if we
want to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 we must have access to closely
guarded secrets. Humint cannot be an afterthought.

Aff Turns vs. Terror Disad


Info-overload big data floods the system with false positives
and stalls counter-terror ops
Schwartz, 15
(Mattathias Schwartz, a staff writer, began contributing to the magazine in 2011. A
Massacre in Jamaica, his investigation into the extradition of Christopher Coke, won
the 2011 Livingston Award for international reporting. He has reported for the
magazine from the Mosquito Coast, Tripoli, and Zuccotti Park. Between 2002 and
2005, he edited and published the twenty-one-issue run of the Philadelphia
Independent, a broadsheet newspaper, The Whole Haystack,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack, January 26, 2015,
ak.)
Its possible that Moalin would have been caught without Section 215 . His phone
number was a common link among pending F.B.I. investigations , according to a report
from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent agency created in 2004 at the
suggestion of the 9/11 Commission, which Obama had tasked with assessing Section 215. Later, in a congressional

the Department of Justice said that the Moalin case was part of a
broader investigation into Shabaab funding . Senator Ron Wyden, of Oregon, who, like Leahy, has
pressured the N.S.A. to justify bulk surveillance, said, To suggest that the government needed to
spy on millions of law-abiding people in order to catch this individual is simply not
true. He continued, I still havent seen any evidence that the dragnet surveillance of
Americans personal information has done a single thing to improve U.S. national
security. Representative James Sensenbrenner, of Wisconsin, who introduced the Patriot Act in the House,
agreed. The intelligence community has never made a compelling case that bulk
collection stops terrorism, he told me. Khalid al-Mihdhars phone calls to Yemen
months before he helped hijack American Airlines Flight 77, on 9/11 , led Obama,
Alexander, Feinstein, and others to suggest that Section 215 could have prevented the
attacks. We know that we didnt stop 9/11, Alexander told me last spring. People were trying, but they didnt
have the tools. This tool, we believed, would help them. But the PCLOB found that it was not
necessary to collect the entire nations calling records to find Mihdhar. I asked William Gore,
budget request,

who was running the F.B.I.s San Diego office at the time, if the Patriot Act would have made a difference. Could we
have prevented 9/11? I dont know, he said. You

cant find somebody if youre not looking for


them. Last year, as evidence of the fifty-four disrupted plots came apart, many people in Washington shifted
their rhetoric on Section 215 away from specific cases and toward hypotheticals and analogies. I have a fireinsurance policy on my house, Robert Litt, the general counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
said. I dont determine whether I want to keep that fire-insurance policy by the number of times its paid off.

Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, has called this the peace-of-mind
metric. Michael Leiter, who led the National Counterterrorism Center under George W. Bush
and Obama, told me that Section 215 was useful but not indispensable : Could we live without
James

Section 215? Yes. Its not the most essential piece. But it would increase risk and make some things harder. In

the N.S.A. has used Section 215 to collect records from hotels,
car-rental agencies, state D.M.V.s, landlords, credit-card companies, and the like ,
according to Justice Department reports. Once the N.S.A. has the phone metadata, it can
addition to phone metadata,

circulate them through a shared database called the corporate store. To some, this

sounds less like fire insurance and more like a live-in fire

marshal, authorized to root through the sock drawer in search


of flammable material . The open abuse is how they use that data, Mike
German, a former F.B.I. agent and lobbyist for the A.C.L.U ., who is now a fellow at the Brennan
Center, said. Its no longer about investigating a particular suspect . In 2013, Le Monde
published documents from Edward Snowdens archive showing that the N.S.A. obtained seventy
million French phone-metadata records in one month . It is unknown whether any of these calls
could be retrospectively associated with the Paris attacks. The interesting thing to know would be whether these
brothers made phone calls to Yemen in a way that would have been collected by a program like Section 215 or
another signals intelligence program, Leiter told me last week. I dont know the answer to that question. Philip
Mudd, a former C.I.A. and senior F.B.I. official, told me that tallying up individual cases did not capture the full value
of Section 215. Try to imagine a quicker way to understand a human being in 2015, he said. Take this woman in
Paris. Who is she? How are you going to figure that out? You need historical data on everything she ever touched, to
accelerate the investigation. Now, do we want to do that in America? Thats a different question, a political

Documents released by Snowden and published by the Washington Post show that the
N.S.A. accounted for $10.5 billion of the $52.6 billion black budget, the top-secret
budget for U.S. intelligence spendin g, in 2013. About seventeen billion dollars of the
black budget goes to counterterrorism each year , plus billions more through the
unclassified budgets of the Pentagon , the State Department, and other agencies,
plus a special five-billion-dollar fund proposed by Obama last year to fight the Islamic State
in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The maximalist approach to intelligence is not limited to the
N.S.A. or to Section 215. A central terrorist watch list is called the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment, or TIDE. According to a classified report released by the Web site the Intercept, TIDE, which is kept
by the National Counterterrorism Center, lists more than a million people . The C.I.A., the N.S.A.,
and the F.B.I. can all nominate new individuals . In the weeks before the 2013 Chicago
Marathon, analysts performed due diligence on all of the records in TIDE of
people who held a drivers license in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin . This was based
on the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon . In retrospect, every terrorist attack
leaves a data trail that appears to be dotted with missed opportunities. In the case of 9/11, there
question.

was Mihdhars landlord, the airport clerk who sold Mihdhar his one-way ticket for cash, and the state trooper who

In August, 2001, F.B.I. headquarters failed to


issue a search warrant for one of the conspirators laptops, despite a warning from
the Minneapolis field office that he was engaged in preparing to seize a Boeing
747-400 in commission of a terrorist act. There was plenty of material in the
haystack. The government had adequate tools to collect even more . The problem
was the tendency of intelligence agencies to hoard info rmation, as well as the cognitive
pulled over another hijacker on September 9th.

difficulty of anticipating a spectacular and unprecedented attack. The 9/11 Commission called this a failure of the
imagination. Finding needles, the commission wrote in its report, is easy when youre looking backward,

It is much easier
after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals . After the event, of course, a
deceptively so. They quoted the historian Roberta Wohlstetter writing about Pearl Harbor:

signal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But

every bit of hay is


potentially relevant. The most dangerous adversaries will be the ones who most successfully disguise their
before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings. Before the event,

individual transactions to appear normal, reasonable, and legitimate, Ted Senator, a data scientist who worked on
an early post-9/11 program called Total Information Awareness, said, in 2002. Since then, intelligence officials have
often referred to lone-wolf terrorists, cells, and, as Alexander has put it, the terrorist who walks among us, as

Skinner, a
former C.I.A. case officer who works with the Soufan Group, a security company,
told me that this image is wrong. We knew about these networks, he said, speaking of the
though Al Qaeda were a fifth column, capable of camouflaging itself within civil society. Patrick

Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Mass surveillance, he continued, gives a false sense of

security . It sounds great when you say youre monitoring every phone call in the
United States. You can put that in a PowerPoint. But, actually, you have no
idea whats going on . By flooding the system with false
positives , big-data approaches to counterterrorism might actually make it harder
to identify real terrorists before they act . Two years before the Boston
Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the
attack, was assessed by the citys Joint Terrorism Task Force . They determined that he
was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F.
conducted that year, a number that had nearly doubled in the previous two years ,
according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice Department has trained nearly three
hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in how to file suspicious-activity
reports. In 2010, a central database held about three thousand of these reports; by
2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand . The bigger haystack

makes it harder to find the needle , Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a
former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one of the agencys most vocal critics,
told me, If you target everything, theres no target . Drake favors what
he calls a traditional law-enforcement approach to terrorism, gathering more
intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said,
should be driven by human expertise, not by a database. One alternative to data-driven
counterterrorism is already being used by the F.B.I. and other agencies. Known as

c ountering v iolent

e xtremism, this approach bears some resemblance to the community-policing programs


of the nineteen-nineties, in which law enforcement builds a listening relationship
with local leaders. The kinds of people you want to look for, someone in the
community might have seen them first, Mudd said. After the Moalin arrests, the U.S. Attorneys
office in San Diego began hosting a bimonthly Somali roundtable with representatives from
the F.B.I., the Department of Homeland Security, the sheriffs office, local police, and many
Somali organizations. Theyve done a lot of work to reach out and explain what theyre about, Abdi
Mohamoud, the Somali nonprofit director, who has attended the meetings, said. Does the Moalin case justify putting
the phone records of hundreds of millions of U.S. citizens into the hands of the federal government? Stopping the
money is a big deal, Joel Brenner, the N.S.A.s former inspector general, told me. Alexander called Moalins actions

Leahy contends that stopping a


few thousand dollars, in one instance, over thirteen years, is a weak track record .
The program invades Americans privacy and has not been proven to be
effective, he said last week. The Moalin case, he continued, was not a plot but, rather, a material-support
the seed of a future terrorist attack or set of attacks. But Senator

prosecution for sending a few thousand dollars to Somalia. On June 1st, Section 215 and the roving wiretap
provision of the Patriot Act will expire. Sensenbrenner told me that he doesnt expect Congress to renew either
unless Section 215 is revised. If

Congress knew in 2001 how the FISA court was going to


interpret it, I dont think the Patriot Act would have passed , he told me.

Superfluous data prevents the government from stopping


actual terror plots
Greenwald, 14

(Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times
best-selling books on politics and law. His most recent book, No Place to Hide, is about the
U.S. surveillance state and his experiences reporting on the Snowden documents around the
world. Prior to his collaboration with Pierre Omidyar, Glenns column was featured at The
Guardian and Salon. He was the debut winner, along with Amy Goodman, of the Park Center
I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism in 2008, and also received the 2010 Online
Journalism Award for his investigative work on the abusive detention conditions of Chelsea
Manning. For his 2013 NSA reporting, he received the George Polk award for National
Security Reporting; the Gannett Foundation award for investigative journalism and the
Gannett Foundation watchdog journalism award; the Esso Premio for Excellence in
Investigative Reporting in Brazil (he was the first non-Brazilian to win), and the Electronic
Frontier Foundations Pioneer Award. Along with Laura Poitras, Foreign Policy magazine
named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers for 2013. The NSA reporting he led for The
Guardian was awarded the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for public service what a baller , No Place

to Hide, http://www.simoleonsense.com/snowden-the-nsa-and-the-u-s-surveillancestate/ - some dude transcribed parts of the book here so swag, ak.)
Surveillance

cheerleaders essentially offer only one argument in defense of mass


surveillance: it is only carried out to stop terrorism and keep people safe. Indeed, invoking an
external threat is a historical tactic of choice to keep the population submissive to
government powers. That same month, Obamas hand-picked advisory panel (composed of,
among others, a former CIA deputy director and a former White House aide, and convened to
study the NSA program through access to classified information) concluded that the metadata
program was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily
have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional [court] orders . The
record is indeed quite poor. The collect-it-all system did nothing to detect, let alone
disrupt, the 2012 Boston Marathon bombing. It did not detect the attempted Christmasday bombing of a jetliner over Detroit, or the plan to blow up Times Square, or the plot
to attack the New York City subway systemall of which were stopped by alert bystanders or
traditional police powers. It certainly did nothing to stop the string of mass shootings
from Aurora to Newtown. Major international attacks from London to Mumbai to Madrid
proceeded without detection, despite involving at least dozens of operatives. In fact,
mass surveillance has had quite the opposite effect: it makes detecting and

stopping terror more difficult . Democratic Congressman Rush Holt, a physicist and
one of the few scientists in Congress, has made the point that collecting everything
about everyones communications only obscures actual plots
being discussed by actual terrorists . Directed rather than indiscriminate
surveillance would yield more specific and useful information . American dying in a
terrorist attack is infinitesimal, considerably less than the chance of being struck by
lightning. John Mueller, an Ohio State University professor who has written extensively about the
balance between threat and expenditures in fighting terrorism, explained in 2011: The number of
people worldwide who are killed by Muslim-type terrorists, Al Qaeda wannabes, is maybe a
few hundred outside of war zones. Its basically the same number of people who die
drowning in the bathtub each year. More American citizens have undoubtedly died
overseas from traffic accidents or intestinal illnesses , the news agency McClatchy reported,
than from terrorism. After the trouble-free Olympics, Stephen Walt noted in Foreign Policy that the outcry

was driven, as usual, by severe exaggeration of the threat. He cited an essay by John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
in International Security for which the authors had analyzed fifty cases of purported Islamic terrorist plots against
the United States, only to conclude that virtually

all of the perpetrators were

incompetent , ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized,


misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and
foolish. Mueller and Stewart quoted from Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for
transnational threats, who said, We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and
miserable opponents that they are , and they noted that al-Qaedas capabilities are far
inferior to its desires.

Not enough resources to watch everyone undermines actual


counter surveillance
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted
Boston Marathon Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass
surveillance is impeding traditional intelligence-gathering effortsand allowing
terrorists to succeed, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Snowden on Monday suggested that if the National Security Agency focused more on
traditional intelligence gatheringand less on its mass-surveillance programsit could
have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a
Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led
Edward

to resource constraints at U.S. intelligence agencies, often leaving more


traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We miss attacks, we miss
leads, and investigations fail because when the government is doing its

'collect it all,' where we're watching everybody, we're not


seeing anything with specificity because it is impossible to keep an eye on all of
your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example
of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were
pointed out by Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to the bombings last year
that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable intelligence was largely
ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent pursuit
of intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying.
"We didn't really watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of
that is because we do have finite resources and the question is, should we be spending
10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance programs of the NSA to the extent that we
no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have
frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully thwarting a
terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their
legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestionthat such mass surveillance has not only failed
to directly stop a threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting
resource-strapped intelligence officials from performing their jobs takes his criticism of
spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be

watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to

watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating ,
and

that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance ," Snowden said.

HUMINT key
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson 13
Kevin R. Wilkinson United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence
Company Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by
Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command Leadership and Management. This
manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies
Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle
States Association of Colleges and Schools Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the
United States Army - March 2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270

In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever . As employed
during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now
discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and
GEOINT alone.

Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as

weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT

collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months

conventional conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of
insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare . The continuation of conventional warfare paired with the
of

created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when countering a


conventional threat that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it
becomes invaluable when presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a
smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of insurgents , which other intelligence
collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.
asymmetric threat

BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of


these risks.
Johnson 9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of
the journal "Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign
policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from
1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at
Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE
FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html

The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states;
competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-

seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other

officials leaders seek information about the capabilities andan especially elusive topicthe
intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation.
That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or
internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can
help advance the national interest the opportunity side of the security equation.
reason, government

Through the practice of espionagespying or clandestine human intelligence : whichever is one's


favorite termthe central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for
achieving a more thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National
governments study information that is available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for
example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the
pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be
several missing pieces perhaps the most important ones.

They may be hidden away

in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired

the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying

through careful research; but often discovery of


, if they can be
found at all. Some things "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionalsare unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the
current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skillsay, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed

Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents


or with machines, respectively known inside America's secret agencies as human
submarines, which are vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking.

intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign
agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_

Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of

Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft,
most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill
what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory:
listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs"

Techint attracts the most funding in


Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over
concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.

humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most
every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international

only human agents can provide insights into that most


vital of all national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals especially
those adversaries who are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint,
affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that

based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is
organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its
value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's
security.

Those impacts cause extinction.


Ochs 2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - Biological Weapons must be Abolished
Immediately, June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]

the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a


known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on
earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in
Of all the weapons of mass destruction,

laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth
and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control.

Biological weapons, on the other hand, can

get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the
security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons

could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their
persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would
have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized

With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably


never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep
causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with
no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and
chemical extermination is over, it is over.

ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN

EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Ext. Yes Resource Wars


( ) Most probable conflict
Cairns 4
John Cairns Jr, Distinguished Professor of Environmental Biology Emeritus, Department of Biology and Director
Emeritus, University Center for Environmental and Hazardous Materials Studies @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University Eco-Ethics and Sustainability Ethics, Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics,
http://ottokinne.de/esepbooks/EB2Pt2.pdf#page=66

On a finite planet with


growth induces scarcity. Then, scarcity leads to resource wars, mass
migration, political instability and, arguably most importantly, competition for increasingly scarce
resources (e.g. oil). Equitable and fair sharing of resources, including those needed to maintain the planets
ecological life-support system, will require both sharing and population control. Humankind is rapidly
The most probable cause of this curious position is humankinds obsession with growth.
finite resources, continued

approaching the time when it will be attempting to manage the entire planet for sustainability. Half the worlds
human population is living marginally or worse, and yet Renner (2003a) reports that military expenditures are on
the rise. In 2001, a conservative estimate of world military expenditures was US$839 billion, of which the United
States spends 36% and those states considered hostile to the United States spend 3% (Renner, 2003a). Even so,
expenditures for the military are expected to continue rising (Stevenson and Bumiller, 2002; Dao, 2002). Even 25%
of these funds would provide a much needed programme to develop alternative energy sources, which would also
diminish the perceived need for resource wars. Renner and Sheehan (2003) state that approximately

the 50 wars and armed conflicts of

recent years

were triggered

25%

or exacerbated

of

by

resource exploitation.

Hussein persisted as a political leader by using resource money (in this case, oil) to
maintain power by a variety of methods, including murder. The use of resource funds to maintain power is all too
common (e.g. Le Billon, 2001). Ending such misuse of power and the resultant conflicts has proven impossible
because it is difficult to displace the power elite (e.g. United Nations Security Council, 2002).

( ) Best studies prove


Heinberg 4
(Richard, journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar
Living Institute and the Post Carbon Institute Power Down, Published by New Society Publishers, pg. 55-58)

This is a persuasive line of reasoning on the face of it, but it ignores the realities of
how markets really work. If the global market were in fact able to prevent resource wars, the
past half-century should have been a period of near-perfect peace. But resource disputes
have instead erupted repeatedly , and continue to do so. Just in the past twenty years,
resource disputes have erupted over oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Colombia, Yemen, Iraq/Kuwait,
and Sudan; over' timber and natural gas in Indonesia (Aceh); and over copper in
Bougainville/Papua New Guinea -and this is far from being an exhaustive list. In classical

theory , all actors within a market system act rationally in pursuit of their own
interests, and no one buys or sells without an expectation of benefit. In the real world ,
however, buyers and sellers enter the marketplace with unequal levels of power .
economic

Some economic players have wealth and weapons, while others don't; as a result, some have figurative -if not
literal -guns to their heads persuading them to act in ways that are clearly not in their own interest. Lest we forget:
the essence of the European colonial system was the maintenance of unequal terms of trade through military
duress. While nearly all of the old colonial governments were overthrown after World War II in favor of indigenous
regimes, much of the essential structure of colonialism remains in place. Indeed, some would argue that the new

institutions of global trade (the World Trade Organization, together with lending agencies like the World Bank) are
just as effective as the old colonial networks at transferring wealth from resource-rich poor nations to militarily
powerful rich consuming nations, and that the

failure of these institutions to enable the fair

distribution of resources will ultimately result in a

conflict

greater likelihood of armed

within and between nations. The new post-colonial international system works to maintain and

deepen inequalities of wealth primarily through control (on the part of the wealthy, powerful nations) over the rules
and terms of trade, and over the currencies of trade.

Ext. Bulk Collection Tradeoff


Bulk collection causes data overload makes law enforcement
less effective.
Ward 15
Stan Ward writer for the publication Best VPM and has been involved in writing and teaching for 50
years. This article internally quotes William Binney, a founder of Contrast Security and a former NSA
official. NSA swamped with data overload also trashes the Constitution From the publication: Best
VPN - May 18th, 2015 - https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/19187/nsa-swamped-with-data-overload-alsotrashes-the-constitution/

It has long been an argument of the civil liberties crowd that bulk data gathering was counterproductive, if not counter- intuitive. The argument was couched in language suggesting that to collect it

all , as the then NSA director James Clapper famously decried, was to, in effect, gather nothing, as the choking
amounts of information collected would be so great as to be unable to
be analyzed effectively. This assertion is supported by William Binney, a
a former NSA official, logging more than three decades at the
agency. In alluding to what he termed bulk data failure, Binney said that an analyst today can run one simple
query across the NSAs various databases, only to become immediately overloaded
with information. With about four billion people (around two-thirds of the worlds population) under the NSA and partner
agencies watchful eyes, according to his estimates, there is far too much data being collected.
founder of Contrast Security and

Thats why they couldnt stop the Boston bombing , or the Paris shootings,

The data was all there the NSA is great at going back over it forensically for years to
Binney is in a position to know, earning his
stripes during the terrorism build up that culminated with the 9/11 World Trade
Center bombing in 2001. He left just days after the draconian legislation known as the USA Patriot Act was enacted by
because the data was all there

see what they were doing before that. But that doesnt stop it.

Congress on the heels of that attack. One of the reasons which prompted his leaving was the scrapping of a surveillance system on
which he long worked, only to be replaced by more intrusive systems.

AT: Accumulo
( ) Accumulos not responsive to our human intel internal link.
Even if NSA can process a large quantity of data, the qualitys
low unless HUMINTs involved.
( ) Accumulo fails Boston Marathon proves it doesnt find the
needle.
Konkel 13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology
journalist for its publications. He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy
and other issues at the intersection of government and technology. He began writing about technology
at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a graduate of Michigan State University. NSA shows how big 'big
data' can be - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a magazine covering technology - Jun 13, 2013 http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
As reported by Information Week, the NSA relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel
processing key/value store capable of analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified

Accumulo, based on Google's BigTable data model, reportedly makes it possible for the
agency to analyze data for patterns while protecting personally identifiable information names, Social Security
version of

numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a
Carnegie Melon tech conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could represent phone numbers, IP addresses,
locations, or calls made and to whom; connecting those points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion edges. For a human being,
that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end computer system with the right big data tools and mathematical
algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, publicly
stated that the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few
years," and other media reports have cited anonymous intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled.

Needles in endless haystacks of data are not easy to find , and the
NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a flawless
as evidenced by the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more
The bombings were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan
Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was previously interviewed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in 2011 that he was a follower of radical Islam.
The brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well, meaning
several data points of suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a pattern in
time to prevent them from setting off bombs in a public place filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we haven't
system,

than 200.

even scratched the surface yet," said big data expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum Networks. "

ways, the technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."

In many

AT: Accumulo Solves Privacy


Accumulo doesnt solve privacy it cant keep info secure on
its own
Pontius 14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana
State University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this
piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science
Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO - September 2014 http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1

databases are gaining popularity due to their ability to store and process large
data sets more efficiently than relational databases. Apache Accumulo is a NoSQL
database that introduced a unique information security featurecell-level access control. We study
Accumulo to examine its cell-level access control policy enforcement mechanism. We survey existing Accumulo
applications, focusing on Koverse as a case study to model the interaction between Accumulo and a client application. We
conclude with a discussion of potential security concerns for Accumulo applications. We argue that Accumulos cell-level
access control can assist developers in creating a stronger information security policy, but Accumulo cannot provide
securityparticularly enforcement of information flow policieson its own. Furthermore,
NoSQL

heterogeneous

popular patterns for interaction between Accumulo and its clients require diligence on the part of developers, which may otherwise
lead to unexpected behavior that undermines system policy. We highlight some undesirable but
reasonable confusions stemming from the semantic gap between cell-level and table-level policies, and between policies for endusers and Accumulo clients.

Accumulo wont solve privacy security features fail


Pontius 14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana
State University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this
piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science
Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO - September 2014 http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1

We commented on potential security threats facing developers that build applications


based on Accumulo. We used a hypothetical application to illustrate potential user management concerns. We
identified injection attacks that have been carried out against other NoSQL databases and may be relevant to some uses of
Accumulo. We commented on Accumulos inability to enforce information flow policies. These
examples serve to demonstrate that using Accumulo and its cell-level security feature is
not a full solution to access control problems unless Accumulo is paired with welldesigned enforcement mechanisms in the client application. We believe that the combination of our technical
discussion of Accumulos cell-level access control enforcement, illustration of Accumulo integration in a larger application, and

identification of potential security concerns may help future studies learn more about Accumulo information security and lead to
development of more secure Accumulo based applications.

**Neg Section starts here

Fund HUMINT CP

1nc
Text: The USFG should substantially boost the HUMINT budget.
Solves the Aff their only internal link to HUMINT is a resource
tradeoff. We resolve that.
Koch1
et al; Andrew R. Koch is the Senior Vice President for Defense and Homeland Security issues at Scribe.
An expert on communications and the media, as well as market assessments for domestic and
international defense clients, he leads Scribes practice in providing such services as development and
implementation of strategic communications planning, media outreach support, as well as evaluation
of defense companies and related government programs. Scribe is a Strategic Advising firm. Article
Title: Chronic HUMINT under funding blamed for security failures - Janes Defence Weekly - vol. 36,
no. 12, 37153, p. 4

In the aftermath of the carnage in New York and Washington DC (September 11, 2001) hundreds of questions will be asked as to
how such an audacious and co-ordinated attack could have happened. This latest act of terrorism, although the most horrific to

use
of terrorist methods to strike at weaknesses in the societies of western countries - has been a worry of
strategic planners in the US for most of the 1990's. One possible contributing factor to this
failure of the intelligence and security system could be the lack of resources the US has
devoted to human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities throughout the past decade. While national technical
means continued to receive high levels of funding for surveillance satellites, signals intelligence flights
and other eavesdropping technologies, human-based intelligence capabilities have withered.
Areas such as analysis, linguistic skills, cultivation of agent networks, and 'tradecraft' were all of
paramount importance during the Cold War, particularly before the advent of space-based intelligence assets, but have
suffered a lack of resources of late. This shortfall has been exacerbated by the growing demand that increased
technical intelligence has placed on people who must process the vast amounts of resulting data and prioritise it. The US
intelligence community must work to close the gap between the amount of raw
intelligence it can gather and the quantity it can process, analyse, and disseminate.
date, is not the first time that the US Government has been caught unaware. Indeed the subject of 'asymmetric warfare' - the

2nc- solvency
HUMINT requires better integration with tech and more
funding only the cp solves
Sano, 14
Association of Former Intelligence Officer, Former Deputy Director National
Clandestine Service Central Intelligence Agency. Bachelors Degree in Political
Science and a Masters in Asian Studies from St. Johns University and a Masters of
International Affairs from Columbia University. (John, Guide to the Study of
Intelligence The Changing Shape of HUMINT Draft, Association of Former
Intelligence Officers, 11/24/14)//KTC
The Intelligence Community will continue to undergo change. Influenced as much by domestic politics as

Despite technological advances, HUMINT will continue to


occupy a critical role in providing intelligence to U.S. policymakers. Discerning plans and
developments beyond our borders.

intentions can only come from the recruitment of human sources. Even information stored digitally often requires
human access; and even with data that is extracted electronically, there is still the requirement to interpret those
documents and how they fit into the larger context. Human beings are essential to all processes and operations
whether they are public or privately based. As such they are the first and last line of security. They are also the first

As we continue to advance technologically, in essence


the potential threats posed by these advancements will make both
protecting and exploiting real secrets exponentially more difficult. In addition, as these
and last entry points into the intelligence arena.
making our world smaller,

challenges continue to grow, those tasked with addressing them will need to adjust at a much more rapid rate. This
applies both to field operatives as well as to their managers. As described above, the differences in experience and
cultural expectations will continue to exacerbate the relationship, but only temporarily as the old guard, or digital

Traditional approaches to
espionage while forming the bedrock for HUMINT, will have to be further augmented. The next
generation of operatives and their managers will need to be more familiar with, if not adept
at, technological augmentation. Augmentation, not replacement. While the tendency to rely increasingly
on technology to make HUMINT collection more efficient is commendable, adherence to the core
principals will ensure that human operations remain as secure as possible. Constrained
budgets, while often cyclical in nature, will likely remain flat, if not decreased, over the next several
years or longer. The Intelligence Community, for many years immune to the exigencies of financial
debate within Congress particularly during times of crises is no longer exempt. While the old adage,
there will always be money for good operations will remain fairly constant, what
constitutes good operations may likely shift dependent upon the prevailing political
wind and the prioritization of competing requirements (both operational and structural/administrative). In
addition, hiring and promotions within the IC are contingent to a significant degree on the
availability of funds. While both will continue hiring dependent on attrition rates and promotions on
immigrants gradually gives way to the new guard, or digital natives.

performance metrics the availability of both will be diminished. The impact on the future generation of officers
cannot be underestimated. With a workforce that can be expected to remain, on average 7 years, any limitations on
advancement could have a deleterious effect on morale as well as retention. Todays IC officers are however,
exceptionally adaptive, and resilient. Though they may stay for a shorter period of time than their predecessors,
their accomplishments

Case Frontline

1NC Case Frontline vs. the HUMINT Advantage


The haystack matters and solves BETTER than HUMINT. Turns
the case.
Porter, 15
(R.C. Porter, Retired Intelligence Official with more than 33 years of experience in both the military and
civilian affairs, M.S. Middle Eastern Studies/National Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University. One year study program, National Defense
University/Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Security Resource Management, 1994.
B.A., Criminal Justice, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge Louisiana, May, 1979, THE DUMBING
DOWN OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE; AND, WHY METADATA, AND THE HAYSTACK MATTER IN
COMBATING TERRORISM AND PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND YOU NEED A HAYSTACK.TO FIND A
NEEDLE, http://fortunascorner.com/2015/05/11/the-dumbing-down-of-u-s-intelligence-and-whymetadata-and-the-haystack-matter-in-combating-terrorism-and-protecting-the-u-s-homeland-you-needa-haystack-to-find-a-needle/, May 11, 2015, ak.)
The above is the title of an Op-Ed by Gordon Crovitz in the May 11, 2015 edition of The Wall Street Journal. Mr.
Crovitz begins by noting that FBI Director James Comey warned last week that the American Islamists who tried to
assassinate free-speech advocates at a cartoon exhibition near Dallas, Texas..are not alone.
hundreds, maybe

There are

thousands of potential terrorists in the U.S. being inspired by overseas groups.

The haystack is the entire country , he said. We are looking for needles;

but, increasingly the needles are unavailable to us . The needles will be even
harder to find, if Congress weakens the Patriot Act, by reducing the intelligence
available to national security, and law enforcement agencies. With the rise of the Islamic State and its
global recruiting tools, intelligence agencies should be allowed to join the big data
revolution, Mr. Crovitz wrote. Edward Snowdens data theft raised privacy alarms; but, by now its clear
that no one working for the National Security Agency (NSA), leaked confidential data other than
Snowden himself, Mr. Crovitz correctly observes. He evaded the 300 lawyers and compliance officers who monitor

the 9/11 hijackers escaped detection


because laws prohibited NSA from gathering and connecting the dots. He explained
that the Patriot Act was passed, to address a gap identified after 911 , by having
intelligence agencies collect anonymous metadata date, time, and duration of phone calls.
But, POTUS Obama reversed himself and now wants to gut the program, Mr. Crovitz warns. Instead of the
NSA gathering call information, phone companies would hold the data. With multiple,
unconnected databases, the NSA would no longer be able to access data to mine. There
wouldnt be dots to connect to threats. As for privacy, the phone companies
databases would be less secure than the NSAS . Lawmakers will decide this month whether to
how NSA staff use data. POTUS Obama, last year, recalled how

extend the Patriot Act or, to water it down. Instead, they should update it to maximize both privacy, and
intelligence, Mr. Crovitz argues. Technology now

has the answer, if only politicians would get


out of the way. Recent innovations in big data allow staggering amounts of
information to be collected and mined. These data deliver correlations based on an individually
anonymous basis. This work was originally done to support the chief revenue engine of the Internet advertising.
The technology generates increasingly targeted marketing messages based on an individuals online activities.
The techniques have other applications. Google used them to become better than the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, at predicting flu outbreaks by monitoring search terms like flu medicine, by location. Canadian
researchers studied thousands of premature babies, and identified symptoms that precede fevers. Cities apply
predictive policing by mining online data to assign cops where theyre needed. The fast shift to self-driving cars is
possible, because of data transmitted among vehicles. Small drones share data that keep them from crashing into
one another. A Brown University researcher discovered how banks could use metadata about peoples cell phone

usage to determine their creditworthiness. The

Patriot Act was written in 2001, before any of these


advances. It lets the NSA keep anonymous data about who is calling whom for five
years; but, it isnt able to apply algorithms to find suspicious patterns. Analysts may
examine call logs for suspicious links, only if there is a pre-existing reasonable,
articulable suspicion of terrorism, or another threat to national security. There were 170 such
searches last year, [2014]. Before the Snowden leaks two years ago, Intelligence
agencies had planned to ask Congress to broaden their access to anonymous data
so they could use modern tools of big data. Technology has moved far ahead,
leaving intelligence -gathering stupider, Mr. Crovitz wrote. A measure of how far behind the
technology curve the intelligence agencies have become is that one of the would-be cartoon killers posted a
message on Twitter beforehand, with the hashtag #TexasAttack. Law enforcement [authorities] didnt spot it until
after the attack. In contrast, algorithms for delivering advertising parse signals such as hashtags to deliver relevant
ads in real timebefore the online page loads. In their 2013 book, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform
How We Live, Work, And Think, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier describe the history of information:
As centuries passed, we opted for more information flows rather than less, and to guard against its excesses not
primarily through censorship; but, through rules that limited the misuse of information. In conclusion, Mr. Crovitz
writes, Congress

should insist that the NSA ensure its data are used properly no more Snowdens but,
give the agency authority to catch up to how the private sector uses data.
Politicians should update the Patriot Act by permitting the intelligence use of data to
prevent terrorism. Mapping Terror Networks: Why Metadata And The Haystack Matters
also

Philip Mudd, former Deputy Director of the CIAs Counter-Terrorism Center, and Senior Intelligence Adviser to the
FBI, [at the time his article was published], wrote an Op-Ed in the Dec. 30, 2014 Wall Street Journal noting that the
CIA, FBI, and the entire U.S. Intelligence Community and national security establishment had devoted countless
hours as to how best can [we] clarify [and posture ourselves regarding] the blurring picture of an emerging terror
conspiracy [aimed at the United States] originating overseas, or inside the United States. How

can we
identify the key players (network/link analysis) and the broader network of their
fundraisers [enablers], radicalizers, travel facilitators and others.quickly enough so that they
cant succeed?, as well as protect civil liberties. And, Mr. Mudd adds, how do we ensure that
weve mapped the network enough to dismantle it?; or at a minimum, disrupt it ?
Mr. Mudd observes, in essence,

you need a haystack in order to find a

needle . Last year, Federal Appeals Court Judge William H. Pauley ruled NSA metadata collection lawful; and
added, the

government needs a wide net that can isolate gossamer contacts among
suspected terrorists in an ocean of seemingly disconnected data; HUMINT is the more
desirable method of collecting this kind of information but, gathering critical HUMINT is often
difficult and time consuming, not to mention that the Obama administration has been great at droning

You cant
get critical HUMIINT if you stick your head in the sand and

terrorists; but, hasnt added a single individual to Guantanamo Bay Prison. Dead men tell no tales.

refuse to establish an interrogation facility for this very purpose. Treating terrorists as criminals to
be tried in a normal court of law is absurd, counterproductive, and dangerous. As Mr. Mudd wrote at the time,
mapping a network of people is simple in concept; but, complex in practice: find the key operators, and then find
the support group. Map a network poorly, and you may miss peripheral players who will recreate a conspiracy after
the core of conspirators are arrested.

The goal, Mr. Mudd said, is to eliminate the entire spider-

web of conspiracy; cutting off a piece like an arm of a starfish, is a

poor second choice the starfishs arm regenerates. Investigators also


need an historical pool of data, Mr. Mudd argued at the time, that they can access only
when they have information that starts with a known, or suspected conspirator in
the middle of a spider-web they dont fully understand, and is missing a few corners. Who is watchers is a
legitimate concern; and, a healthy skepticism about government claims for access to even more personal datais
desirable, warranted, and needed. But,

the further and further we move away in time from the

September 11, 2001 terrorist attack here on the U.S. homeland the more we seem to lose the
raison d tere for why we passed the Patriot Act in the first place. As the Intelligence Community
and Law Enforcement authorities with respect to the mass collection of phone data are allowed to atrophy and
erode our ability to ferret out and discover potential terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland also decay. I am
not sure I know the right answer as to where the balance lied between the protection of civil liberties, versus the
requirement to collect enough data that enables our intelligence and law enforcement professionals to

If we do suffer a large-scale terrorist event


here at home on the scale of 9/11 or worse and, it is determined that we likely
would have been able to discover this event before hand if we had allowed a more
connect the dots. But, I think I know one thing for sure.

reasonable big data mining strata there will be hell to pay

and,

perhaps a

Patriot Act on steroids . It is easy to criticize law enforcement and intelligence agencies desires
for greater authority and flexibility in regards to the collection of data; but, how you see it depends on where you
sit. If you are charged with protecting the American homeland, it is a very difficult balancing act with few clear
answers.

Their Johnson card assumes Resource wars but those wont


happen.
Victor 8
David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on
Energy and Sustainable Development @ Stanford Smoke and Mirror
http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530

resource warshot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resourcesare


increasingly rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the
root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That
MY ARGUMENT is that classic

argumentin both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnationis hardly a straw man, as Thomas HomerDixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do
social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. Ive triggered this debate because
conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big
implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public
policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in
recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare

theyre expensive and rarely work.

(And even in Kuwaits case, many other forces also spurred


the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between

Saddam lost resources on the


order of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwaits 1.5 million
barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobils 1.7 million
barrels per day of oil and gas productiona merger that has held and flourished . As the bulging
sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources
through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.
Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end,

Alt cause Human intel fails for other reasons.


OBrien, 05- President and CEO of Artemis Global Logistics & Solutions, Former Graduate Research
Assistant at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Research, Former International Trade Specialist for the

Department of Commerce (James, Trojan Horses: Using Current U.S. Intelligence Resources To Successfully
Infiltrate Islamic Terror Groups, International Affairs Review Vol. 14 No.2 Fall 2005)//KTC

it is easier to recognize HUMINT deficiencies than to fix them. This is especially


true when reconstituting sectors spread over several agencies that have been allowed to corrode . There is no
quick fix in resolving this deficiency. This reality is recognized by both policy advisors and
policy-makers, who propose long-term investments in intelligence reform. A 2002 Congressional
Nevertheless,

Research Service report exemplifies this mindset: While U.S. policymakers are emphasizing the need for rapid
intelligence overhaul to close the HUMINT deficit, the United States is fighting a War on Terror with other countries

First is a renewed emphasis on human agents .


but intelligence to
counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence (HUMINT) such as spies and informers. Any
renewed emphasis on human intelligence necessarily will involve a willingness to
accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in
positions to provide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed to train analysts in
difficult skills and languages.h Unfortunately, the time and patience necessary to develop
these operatives is not a luxury the United States can afford. The 9/11 Commission Report describes the
unreliable eyes. 142 International Affairs Review

Signals intelligence and imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission,

rapid nature and lack of warning that defines the current security environment: National security used to be
considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might.
Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved
into place. Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country
on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless
scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States.i

even if the United States succeeds in developing the types of intelligence


operatives with the skill sets desired for an effective war against Islamic extremists, the
capacity to penetrate these groups will likely never be fully achieved. The problem is that
Islamic terrorist groups are highly insulated from outside intrusion because of their familybased and/or clan-based recruitment policies: Ethnically based terrorist groups recruit new
members personally known to them, people whose backgrounds are known and who often have family
ties to the organization. Intelligence penetration of organizations recruited this way is extremely
difficult.j Even those organizations that do not recruit exclusively through family
ties, such as al Qaeda, still employ a severe level of vetting that places an operatives survival in
Furthermore,

jeopardy. Regional dialects, local cultural sensitivities and six-degrees-of-separation within small populations all
work against an operative attempting to secure a terrorist leaders trust. Recognizing these difficulties, Rich Trojan
Horses 143 ard Betts summarizes this operational reality: More

and better spies will help, but no


one should expect breakthroughs if we get them. It is close to impossible to penetrate
small, disciplined, alien organizations like Osama bin Ladens al Qaeda, and especially hard to
find reliable U.S. citizens who have even a remote chance of trying.k Nevertheless, the intelligence
community should pursue HUMINT reform that will develop operatives with penetration potential, but accessing
the inner circles of terror groups may take years to materialize, or may even be
impossible. For example, if the operative is accepted by a terror group, he may be isolated or
removed from the organizations hierarchy, leaving the operative uninformed as to
what other groups within the same organization are planning, including the cell within which he may be operating.l
Therefore,

recognizing the U.S. HUMINT deficiency, the lengthy process of comprehensive


the unpredictable nature of terrorism as a constant imminent threat, and the
insulated structure of terrorist groups, the United States will need to employ creative
methods to collect information without jeopardizing long-term intelligence reform. Bruce Hoffman
suggests some new, out-of-the-box thinking that would go beyond simple bureaucratic fixes.m One
possibility is taking a backdoor approach to penetrating various fundamentalist
terrorist organizations. SOLUTION PROPOSED: WORK WITH THE TOOLS WE HAVE The Backdoor One
reform,

backdoor ripe for exploitation is the dependence of Islamic extremists on illicit activities and services to fund, train,

The Achilles heel of terror groups is their dependence on


criminal or other interconnected terrorist groups to provide certain services to them,
specifically weapons and drug smuggling. The United States should exploit this dependence and has
and/or facilitate their operations.n

the capacity to do The Achilles heel of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected
terrorist groups to provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. 144 International
Affairs Review so. This backdoor should be envisioned just as the name connotes: an alternative entrance that is
easier to sneak into than the front door. In the world of computer programming, a backdoor is an undocumented
way of gaining access to a program, online service or an entire computer system. The backdoor is written by the

A backdoor is a
potential security risk.o When hackers discover backdoors in software programs, they
exploit them. The U.S. intelligence community should adopt the hackers approach;
infiltration agents should be looking for similar types of alternative access routes .
programmer who creates the code for the program. It is often only known by the programmer.

No NSA overload Accumulo tech solves.


Harris 13
(Not Scott Harris, because large data sets do sometimes overwhelm him But Derrick Harris. Derrick
in a senior writer at Gigaom and has been a technology journalist since 2003. He has been covering
cloud computing, big data and other emerging IT trends for Gigaom since 2009. Derrick also holds a
law degree from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This evidence is also internally quoting Adam
Fuchs a former NSA employee that was involved in software design. Under the covers of the NSAs
big data effort Gigaom - Jun. 7, 2013 - https://gigaom.com/2013/06/07/under-the-covers-of-the-nsasbig-data-effort/)

The NSAs data collection practices have much of America and certainly the tech community on edge, but sources
situation isnt as bad as it seems . Yes, the
agency has a lot of data and can do some powerful analysis, but, the argument goes, there are strict
limits in place around how the agency can use it and who has access. Whether thats good
enough is still an open debate, but heres what we know about the technology thats underpinning all that data. The
technological linchpin to everything the NSA is doing from a data-analysis
familiar with the agencys technology are saying the

perspective is Accumulo an open-source database the agency built in order to store and
analyze huge amounts of data. Adam Fuchs knows Accumulo well because he helped build it during a nine-year stint with the NSA;
hes now co-founder and CTO of a company called Sqrrl that sells a commercial version of the database system. I spoke with him
earlier this week, days before news broke of the NSA collecting data from Verizon and the countrys largest web companies.

The

NSA began building Accumulo in late 2007, Fuchs said, because they were trying to
do automated analysis for tracking and discovering new terrorism suspects. We had a set of
applications that we wanted to develop and we were looking for the right infrastructure to build them on, he said. The problem was
those technologies werent available. He liked what projects like HBase were doing by using Hadoop to mimic Googles famous
BigTable data store, but it still wasnt up to the NSA requirements around scalability, reliability or security. So, they began work on a
project called CloudBase, which eventually was renamed

Accumulo.

Now, Fuchs said, Its

operating at

thousands-of-nodes scale within the NSAs data centers. There are multiple instances each storing
tens of petabytes (1 petabyte equals 1,000 terabyes or 1 million gigabytes) of data and its the backend of the agencys most widely

Accumulos ability to handle data in a variety of formats (a characteristic called


means the NSA can store data from numerous sources all within the database
and add new analytic capabilities in days or even hours. Its quite critical, he added. What the NSA
used analytical capabilities.

schemaless in database jargon)

can and cant do with all this data As I explained on Thursday,

Accumulo is especially adept at

analyzing trillions of data points in order to build massive graphs that can detect the
connections between them and the strength of the connections. Fuchs didnt talk about the size of the NSAs graph, but he did say

the database is designed to handle months or years worth of information and let

analysts move from query to query very fast.

When youre talking about analyzing

its easy to see where this type of analysis would be valuable in determining
how far a suspected terrorists network might spread and who might be involved.
call records,

Aff exaggerates NSA budgets too small for untargeted mass


data collection
Harris 13
(Not Scott Harris, because large data sets do sometimes overwhelm him But Derrick Harris. Derrick
in a senior writer at Gigaom and has been a technology journalist since 2003. He has been covering
cloud computing, big data and other emerging IT trends for Gigaom since 2009. Derrick also holds a
law degree from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This evidence is also internally quoting Adam
Fuchs a former NSA employee that was involved in software design. Under the covers of the NSAs
big data effort Gigaom - Jun. 7, 2013 - https://gigaom.com/2013/06/07/under-the-covers-of-the-nsasbig-data-effort/)

Were not quite sure how much data the two programs

that came to light this week

collecting, but the evidence suggests its not that much

are actually

at least

from a volume perspective. Take the PRISM program thats gathering data from web properties
including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo and AOL. It seems the NSA would have to
be selective in what it grabs. Assuming it includes every cost associated with running the program, the $20
million per year allocated to PRISM, according to the slides published by the Washington Post, wouldnt be
nearly enough to store all the raw data much less new datasets created from
analyses from such large web properties. Yahoo alone , Im told, was spending over
$100 million a year to operate its approximately 42,000-node Hadoop environment, consisting of hundreds of
petabytes, a few years ago. Facebook users are generating more than 500 terabytes of
new data every day. Using about the least-expensive option around for mass storage
cloud storage provider Backblazes open source storage pod designs just storing 500 terabytes of Facebook data a day would
cost more than $10 million in hardware alone over the course of a year. Using higherperformance hard drives or other premium gear things Backblaze eschews because its concerned primarily about cost and
scalability rather than performance would cost even more. Even at the Backblaze price point, though, which is pocket change for

the NSA, the agency would easily run over $20 million trying to store too many emails,
chats, Skype calls, photos, videos and other types data from the other companies its working with.

Big Data can handle it.


Pontius 14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana
State University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this
piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science

Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR


APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO - September 2014 http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1

Generation of actionable intelligence from large data sets requires efficient analysis. Manual analysis of large data
sets to develop these insights is unsustainably resource intensive. In January 2014, the deputy director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency noted, Were looking for needles within haystacks while trying to define what the

Big data platforms have the


storage and analytical capabilities necessary to handle large data sets. These
solutions can relieve the processing burden on human analysts and allow them to
spend more time generating real intelligence [5]. Big data analytics make
information more usable, improve decision making, and lead to more focused
missions and services. For instance, geographically separated teams can access a real-time common operating
picture, diagnostic data mining can support proactive maintenance programs that
prevent battlefield failures, and data can be transformed into a common structure that allows custom
needle is, in an era of declining resources and increasing threats [7].

queries by a distributed force composed of many communities [4], [6].

Extensions Data overload = Wrong


( ) Data mining matters and empirically works
Schmitt et al, 13
(Eric Schmit, 2 Pulitzer Prizes, Harvard Universitys Executive Program on National and
International Security in 1991. Mr. Schmitt completed a Knight Journalism Fellowship at
Stanford University, David E. Sanger, Charlie Savage, received a Pulitzer Prize for
National Reporting in 2007 for his coverage of presidential signing statements for the Globe.
Other awards he earned while at the Globe include the American Bar Associations Silver
Gavel Award and the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on the Presidency ,

Administration Says Mining of Data is Crucial to Fight Terror ,


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/us/mining-of-data-is-called-crucial-to-fightterror.html, June 8, 2013, ak.)
In early September 2009, an e-mail passed through an Internet address in
that was being monitored by the vast computers controlled by
American intelligence analysts. It set off alarms. The address, linked to senior Qaeda
operatives, had been dormant for months. Investigators worked their way backward and traced the
WASHINGTON

Peshawar, Pakistan,

e-mail to an address in Aurora, Colo., outside Denver. It took them to Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old former coffee
cart operator, who was asking a Qaeda facilitator about how to mix ingredients for a flour-based explosive,

A later e-mail read: The marriage is ready code


that a major attack was planned. What followed in the next few days was a cross-country pursuit in
according to law enforcement officials.

which the police stopped Mr. Zazi on the George Washington Bridge, let him go, and after several false starts,
arrested him in New York. He eventually pleaded guilty to plotting to carry out backpack bombings in the citys
subway system. It is that kind of success that President Obama seemed to be referring to on Friday in California
when he defended the National Security Agencys stockpiling of telephone call logs of Americans and gaining
access to foreigners e-mail and other data from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and other companies. He argued that
modest

encroachments on privacy including keeping records of phone numbers


called and the length of calls that can be used to track terrorists, though not
listening in to calls were worth us doing to protect the country. The programs, he said,
were authorized by Congress and regularly reviewed by federal courts. But privacy advocates questioned the
portrayal of the programs intrusion on Americans communications as modest. When Americans communicate with
a targeted person overseas, the program can vacuum up and store for later searching without a warrant their
calls and e-mails, too. Mr. Obama acknowledged that he had hesitations when he inherited the program from
George W. Bush, but told reporters that he soon became convinced of its necessity. You

cant have 100


percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience , he
said. Were going to have to make some choices as a society. To defenders of the N.S.A., the Zazi case

Prism, which was set up over the past decade


has yielded concrete results. We

underscores how the agencys Internet surveillance system, called


to collect data from online providers of e-mail and chat services,

were able to glean critical information, said a senior intelligence official, who spoke on the condition
of anonymity. It was through an e-mail correspondence that we had access to only
through Prism. John Miller, a former senior intelligence official who now works for CBS News, said on CBS
This Morning, Thats how a program like this is supposed to work. Veterans of the Obama intelligence agencies

the large collections of digital data are vital in the search for terrorists . If youre
looking for a needle in the haystack, you need a haystack , Jeremy Bash, chief of staff
to Leon E. Panetta, the former C.I.A. director and defense secretary , said on MSNBC on Friday.
say

( ) Hindsight and foresight ensures terrorists dont slip


through the cracks
Hines, 13
(Pierre Hines is a defense council member of the Truman National Security Project,
Heres how metadata on billions of phone calls predicts terrorist attacks,
http://qz.com/95719/heres-how-metadata-on-billions-of-phone-calls-predictsterrorist-attacks/, June 19, 2013, ak.)
NSA Director General Keith Alexander testified before the House Committee on
Intelligence, he declared that the NSAs surveillance programs have provided critical leads
to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events . FBI Deputy Director Sean Boyce elaborated by
Yesterday, when

describing four instances when the NSAs surveillance programs have had an impact: (1) when an intercepted email
from a terrorist in Pakistan led to foiling a plan to bomb of the New York subway system; (2) when NSAs programs
helped prevent a plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange; (3) when intelligence led to the arrest of a U.S. citizen
who planned to bomb the Danish Newspaper office that published cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad;
and (4) when the NSAs programs triggered reopening the 9/11 investigation. So what are the practical applications
of internet and phone records gathered from two NSA programs? And how can metadata actually prevent terrorist
attacks? Metadata does not give the NSA and intelligence community access to the content of internet and phone
communications. Instead, metadata is more like the transactional information cell phone customers would normally
see on their billing statementsmetadata can indicate when a call, email, or online chat began and how long the
communication lasted. Section 215 of the Patriot Act provides the legal authority to obtain business records from
phone companies. Meanwhile, the NSA uses Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to authorize its

intelligence gathered based on


Section 702 authority contributed in over 90% of the 50 cases . One of major
PRISM program. According the figures provided by Gen. Alexander,

benefits of metadata is that it provides hindsight it gives intelligence


analysts a retrospective view of a sequence of events . As Deputy Director Boyce discussed, the
ability to analyze previous communications allowed the FBI to reopen the 9/11
investigation and determine who was linked to that attack . It is important to recognize that
terrorist attacks are not orchestrated overnight; they take months or years to plan.
Therefore, if the intelligence community only catches wind of an attack halfway into
the terrorists planning cycle, or even after a terrorist attack has taken place, metadata
might be the only source of information that captures the sequence of events
leading up to an attack. Once a terrorist suspect has been identified or once an attack
has taken place, intelligence analysts can use powerful software to sift through
metadata to determine which numbers, IP addresses, or individuals are associated
with the suspect. Moreover, phone numbers and IP addresses sometimes serve as a proxy for the general location

This ability to narrow down the location of terrorists can


help determine whether the intelligence community is dealing with a domestic or
of where the planning has taken place.

international threat. Even more useful than hindsight is a crystal ball that gives

the intelligence community a look into the future . Simply knowing


how many individuals are in a chat room, how many individuals have contacted a
particular phone user, or how many individuals are on an email chain could serve as
an indicator of how many terrorists are involved in a plot. Furthermore, knowing when a
suspect communicates can help identify his patterns of behavior . For instance,
metadata can help establish whether a suspect communicates sporadically or on a
set pattern (e.g., making a call every Saturday at 2 p.m.). Any deviation from that pattern could
indicate that the plan changed at a certain point; any phone number or email address
used consistently and then not at all could indicate that a suspect has stopped

communicating with an associate. Additionally, a rapid increase in communication could


indicate that an attack is about to happen . Metadata can provide all of this
information without ever exposing the content of a phone call or email . If the
metadata reveals the suspect is engaged in terrorist activities, then obtaining a
warrant would allow intelligence officials to actually monitor the content of the suspects
communication. In Gen. Alexanders words, These programs have protected our country and
allies . . . [t]hese programs have been approved by the administration, Congress, and
the courts.

( ) Aggregated data historical records key to efficiency and


precision
Watkins et al, 3
(R. C. Watkins, K. M. Reynolds, R. F. DeMara, M. Georgiopoulos, A. J. Gonzalez, and R.
Eaglin, TRACKING DIRTY PROCEEDS: EXPLORING DATA MINING TECHNOLOGIES AS
TOOLS TO INVESTIGATE MONEY LAUNDERING, Police Practice and Research, An
International Journal,
http://www.eecs.ucf.edu/georgiopoulos/sites/default/files/196.pdf, June 1, 2003, ak.)
The most basic approach to data mining, a linear regression model, is designed by
defining a dependent variable (output) and a number of independent variables (inputs). The result of a
linear regression model is an equation of a line that best fits the data set, which can be used for prediction

This is useful for discovering, validating, and quantifying trends from


previously solved money laundering cases for use on current cases. Linear regression
techniques center around the ability to predict useful quantitative probabilities . For
purposes.

instance,

data from previously observed behaviors can be used to

focus new investigative activities on the most promising locations at the most
probabilistically promising day and time. Logistic regression is a very popular means
of data mining because it can solve problems involving categorical variables (e.g.,
variables that can be described by a yes/no answer or male/female answer). This technique can be
applied to rapidly evaluate all financial transaction records belonging to classes of
interest to the investigator. The results can be displayed in a number of graphical formats so that
commonalties among the subset of the variables selected become evident. Using logistic regression, graphic views
of only the trends in the data, rather than the data itself, are displayed in multi-dimensional format using
distinguishing shapes and colors without the need for the investigator to sort through the underlying data.

investigators will be presented with improved ways of viewing large


masses of data in a manageable format. This makes pattern and trend identification
Consequently,

more apparent and timely . This approach will also serve to expedite the
investigation process by reducing the amount of time spent manually
searching for case leads or patterns of illicit activity.

( ) Statistics prove
Mayer, 13

(Jane, The New Yorker, Susan Landau is an American mathematician and engineer,
and Professor of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute,
Whats the Matter with Metadata?, http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/whats-the-matter-with-metadata, June 6, 2013, ak.)
metadata has led
to breakthroughs. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the master planner of the September
11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, got picked up by his cell phone, Landau said.
Many other criminal suspects have given themselves away through their metadata
For the law-enforcement community, particularly the parts focussed on locating terrorists,

trails. In fact, Landau told me, metadata and other new surveillance tools have helped cut

the average amount of time it takes the U.S. Marshals to


capture a fugitive from forty-two days to two .
( ) RTRG proves that even the mundane can be essential
Gorman et al, 13
(SIOBHAN GORMAN, ADAM ENTOUS and ANDREW DOWELL, The Wall Street Journal,
Technology Emboldened the NSA,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578535290627442964,
June 9, 2013, ak.)
NSA stumbled in a number of its data-collection and management efforts, particularly a program called Trailblazer,
but it began to gain traction with another program, which became known as Real Time Regional Gateway,
or RTRG, former officials said. Initially deployed in Iraq, the program's focus moved to Afghanistan
in 2010, where it assembled and analyzed all the data over a 30-day period on
transactions that intelligence officials could get their hands on : phone
conversations, military events, road-traffic patterns, public opinioneven the price
of potatoes, former officials said. Changes in prices of commodities at markets proved to
be an indicator of potential for conflict, they said. The in-country intelligence was paired
with larger computer networks capable melding cellphone data with information
collected from sensors on drones and other sources , said former officials and defense
contractors. Some of these drones use high-power cameras to scan large tracts of earth to
look for changes that could indicate the locations of improvised explosive devices .
Analysts discovered that the system's analysis improved when more information was
added, so they moved to merge 90-day batches of data . The result, said a former U.S.
official,

was an ability to predict attacks 60% to 70% of the time . "It's

the ultimate correlation tool," a former U.S. counterterrorism official said. " It is literally

being able to predict the future ."


Data mining more effective than individual collection
efficiency
Watkins et al, 3
(R. C. Watkins, K. M. Reynolds, R. F. DeMara, M. Georgiopoulos, A. J. Gonzalez, and R.
Eaglin, University of Central Florida, Tracking Dirty Proceeds: Exploring Data Mining

Technologies As Tools To Investigate Money Laundering,


http://www.cal.ucf.edu/journal/j_watkins_reynolds_jppr_03.pdf, January, 2003, ak.)
data mining technologies could reduce problems in financial
that result from manpower shortages. Closely tied to the problems
associated with time demands in money laundering investigations, manpower is always a
major obstacle to successful lead and pattern identification . The use of data mining
technologies could lessen the burden on already strained manpower resources. Because
these methods have the ability to rapidly explore large financial data sets and identify
case leads and money laundering patterns, it is conceivable that the inefficiencies in the
current investigative processes could be reduced . Use of these technologies to
rapidly and accurately identify leads and suspicious activity patterns could permit
small well-trained units of domain experts to rigorously focus on analyzing outputs
and leading investigations. This would be in stark contrast to the current use of undertrained and inexperienced investigators sifting through voluminous financial record
sets attempting to isolate money laundering leads, patterns, and trends. A third potential benefit of using data
mining technology in money laundering investigations is the identification of more case leads ,
potentially more accurate case leads, and certainly more timely case leads . The use
of a cluster analysis technique or a neural network technique offers the ability to
identify previously undiscovered case leads. Domain experts have considerable experience working
with financial data. They identify patterns and case leads to focus money laundering investigations. However, due
to the sheer volume of financial transactions, it is humanly impossible to identify all
leads and activity patterns given the stringent time constraints under which money
laundering investigations proceed. The aforementioned methodologies can rapidly
process data and expeditiously generate outputs for review by financial investigators. The
use of linear regression could provide financial investigators with more accurate and
timely leads. This methodology is used to predict useful quantitative probabilities
and delineate between strong and weak leads . For example, data from previously
observed behaviors can be used to focus new investigative activities on the most
promising locations at the most probabilistically promising day and time . This could
remedy some of the problems in financial investigations that are associated with
time and manpower shortages. In other words, if financial investigators can secure more
accurate leads in a more timely fashion, they could more efficiently and effectively
allocate resources.
Second, it is feasible to suggest that
investigations

Extensions - No Resource Wars


( ) Resource wars are empirically false and wont escalate
Homer-Dixon 8
(Thomas,- Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University.
of Toronto. "Oil, Oil, Toil and Trouble." The National Interest January /February, edition)

resource stress always interacts in complex conjunction with a host


of other factors--ecological, institutional, economic and political--to cause mass violence. Also,
Rather, we argue that

causation is almost always indirect . People, groups and countries rarely fight
over natural resources directly; instead, resource stress causes various forms of social dislocation-including widening gaps between rich and poor, increased rent-seeking by elites, weakening of states and deeper

this violence is almost


always sub-national; it takes the form of insurgency, rebellion, gangsterism and urban criminality, not
overt interstate war. The claim that resource stress is sufficient by itself to
cause violence is easily refuted. One simply has to identify cases where
resource stress was present but violence didn't occur . Likewise, the claim that
ethnic cleavages--that, in turn, make violence more likely. And, finally,

resource stress is a necessary cause of violence is easily refuted by finding cases of violence not preceded by
resource stress. At various points in his article, Victor uses exactly these strategies to debunk the link between
resources and war.

( ) Best studies prove resources have very small effect on


warfare.
Goldstone 2K
(Jack,- professor of public policy, George Mason, Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to
Violent Conflict., JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall2002, Vol. 56, p. 123)

the most comprehensive global test of the


hypothesis with recent data (198092), found
that while deforestation, land degradation and low freshwater availability
were positively correlated with the incidence of civil war and armed conflict, the magnitude
of their effects was tiny. By themselves, these factors raised the probability of
civil war by 0.5 to under 1.5 percent. These factors did have a slightly higher impact on the probability
For example, Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, in

environmental-scarcity-leads-to-violence

of lesser kinds of armed conflict (causing increases in the chances of such conflict by from 4 percent to 8 percent);

their influence paled compared to the impact of such traditional risk


factors as poverty, regime type and current and prior political instability .
but

Extensions HUMINT fails


HUMINT fails- intelligence officers cant adapt
Sano 1/28

(John, 2015, Former Deputy Director, National Clandestine Service, CIA, Guide to the Study of
Intelligence: The Changing Shape of HUMINT, Draft of paper, http://www.afio.com/publications/SANO%20Changing
%20Shape%20of%20HUMINT%20DRAFT%202015Jan28.pdf)//RTF

Managing this younger, more technically astute, workforce can be problematic for a
number of reasons not the least of which is the dramatic generational difference
when it comes to learning. Todays workforce thinks and processes information
significantly differently from its predecessors . As Dr. Bruce Perry of Baylor College of Medicine has
stated, Different kinds of experiences lead to different brain structures.2 As such todays workforce
receives information much faster than their predecessors. And while reception does
not always equal comprehension, it does present an issue for managers as well as
for IC instructors. Education within the world of HUMINT is in large measure
anecdotally based, with instruction incorporating legacy-based scenarios, or tribal memories to
emphasize key points. While useful, it is often a technique that many younger
practitioners of espionage find unfamiliar, even ineffective . Growing up on a regular
diet of technology driven information todays clandestine officer is better connected
and more adept at multitasking and networking than previous generations .
Adjusting to this significant divide is often difficult, for most instructors view
education in much the same way as they themselves were taught via lectures, step-bystep logic and tell-test instruction. Todays officers are more comfortable with procedures
that they grew up with TV, Internet, video cams, cell phones and all the other accruements associated
with the digital age. What does this mean? Aside from the way todays officers want to learn, it
also impacts expectations. Todays clandestine service officer expects to access any
information, anytime, anywhere, and on any device. Aside from the obvious security
aspects, there is also the problem of managing these expectations attempting to
inculcate the proper balance of security vs. expediency, not to mention patience
within an increasingly impatient workforce is no easy task, but nonetheless critical
aspect of any clandestine activity.
HUMINT is a bad form of intelligence gathering 7 reasons

Turner 5 -Dr. Michael A. Turner teaches at both San Diego State University and the University of
San Diego. He is also a consultant to the United States Government on national security matters.
Until 2006, Dr. Turner was the Director of International Relations Program at Alliant International
University in San Diego, CA. Before joining Alliant, Dr. Turner was a senior CIA officer, attached both to
the analytical directorate as well as to elements supporting the Director of Central Intelligence. At
varying times, Dr. Turner has taught strategic affairs at the University of Maryland, the University of
Virginia, John s Hopkins University, the University of Southern California, and the Air War College. Dr.
Turners research interests include intelligence and national security, American foreign policy, Middle
East as well as Central and South Asian Politics, and counterterrorism policy. Dr. Turner teaches both
graduate and undergraduate international relations courses. (Michael A., Why Secret Intelligence
Fails, pg 92, accessed 6-30-15)//KTC

HUMINTs disadvantages probably outweigh its advantages. One,


American case officers may not have sufficient training and know-how to perform their jobs
well. According to the one analyst, CIA operatives are not particularly well prepared; they
seldom speak foreign languages well and almost never know a line of business or a technical field. 13
Two, the process of recruiting spies is time consuming and lengthy, which often brings
On the other hand,

into question the benefits of such an activity in relation to its cost . Three, HUMINT
information is highly perishable and therefore has a low threshold of utility. Four,
HUMINT is often vulnerable to deception and double- agent operations . Five, spying
is illegal everywhere, and case officers who have been caught in the process of recruitment
have embarrassed the U.S. government and damaged relations with both unfriendly and friendly
governments. Six, espionage is risky to the lives of the intelligence agents and their assets.
Seven, because HUMINT assets are often employed in covert actions , espionage
operations sometimes become corner shed in political controversies at home. Eight,
many people believe that spying is ethically wrong, an activity that diminishes the moral standing of
the United States around the globe.

Extensions Accumulo solves


Accumulo solves without violating privacy.
Henschen 13
Doug Henschen is Executive Editor of InformationWeek, where he covers the intersection of enterprise
applications with information management, business intelligence, big data and analytics. He previously
served as editor in chief of Intelligent Enterprise, editor in chief of Transform Magazine, and Executive
Editor at DM News. He has covered IT and data-driven marketing for more than 15 years. Defending
NSA Prism's Big Data Tools- Information Week - Commentary - 6/11/2013 http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/defending-nsa-prisms-big-data-tools/d/did/1110318?

The more you know about NSA's Accumulo system and graph analysis, the less likely you
are to suspect Prism is a privacy-invading fishing expedition. It's understandable that democracyloving citizens everywhere are outraged by the idea that the U.S. Government has back-door access to digital details surrounding
email messages, phone conversations, video chats, social networks and more on the servers of mainstream service providers
including Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, YouTube, Skype and Apple. But the more you know about the technologies being used
by the National Security Agency (NSA), the agency behind the controversial Prism program revealed last week by whistleblower
Edward Snowden, the less likely you are to view the project as a ham-fisted effort that's "trading a cherished American value for an
unproven theory," as one opinion piece contrasted personal privacy with big data analysis.

The centerpiece of the

NSA's data-processing capability is Accumulo , a highly distributed, massively parallel


processing key/value store capable of analyzing structured and unstructured data. Accumolo is
based on Google's BigTable data model, but NSA came up with a cell-level security feature that
makes it possible to

set

access controls on individual bits of data.

Without that capability,

valuable information might remain out of reach to intelligence analysts who would otherwise have to wait for sanitized data sets
scrubbed of personally identifiable information. Sponsor video, mouseover for sound [ Want more on the Prism controversy? Read
NSA Prism: Inside The Modern Surveillance State. ] As InformationWeek reported last September, the NSA has shared Accumulo with
the Apache Foundation, and the technology has since been commercialized by Sqrrl, a startup launched by six former NSA
employees joined with former White House cybersecurity strategy director (and now Sqrrl CE0) Ely Khan. "The reason NSA built
Accumulo and didn't go with another open source project, like HBase or Cassandra, is that they needed a platform where they could
tag every single piece of data with a security label that dictates how people can access that data and who can access that data,"
said Khan in an interview with InformationWeek. Having left government employment in 2010, Kahn says he has no knowledge of

Accumulo makes it possible


to interrogate certain details while blocking access to personally identifiable
information. This capability is likely among the things James R. Clapper, the U.S. director of National Intelligence, was
the Prism program and what information the NSA might be collecting, but he notes that

referring to in a statement on the Prism disclosure that mentioned "numerous safeguards that protect privacy and civil liberties." Are
They Catching Bad Guys? So the NSA can investigate data with limits , but what good is partial information?
One of Accumulo's strengths is finding connections among seemingly unrelated information. "By bringing data sets together,
[Accumulo] allowed us to see things in the data that we didn't necessarily see from looking at the data from one point or another,"

Accumulo gives NSA the


ability "to take data and to stretch it in new ways so that you can find out how to associate it with
Dave Hurry, head of NSA's computer science research section, told InformationWeek last fall.
another piece of data and find those threats."

( ) Data overload wrong Accumulo tech solves


Gallagher 13
Sean Gallagher is the IT editor at Ars Technica. Sean is a University of Wisconsin grad, a former
systems integrator, a former director of IT strategy at Ziff Davis Enterprise. He wrote his first program
in high school What the NSA can do with big data - Ars Technica - Jun 11, 2013 http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/06/what-the-nsa-can-do-with-big-data/2/

Ironically, about the same time these two programs were being exposed, Internet companies such as

Google and Yahoo

were solving the big data storage and analysis problem . In November of 2006,
Google published a paper on BigTable, a database with petabytes of capacity capable of indexing the Web and supporting Google
Earth and other applications. And

the

work at Yahoo to catch up with Google's GFS file systemthe basis for BigTableresulted in

the Hadoop. BigTable and Hadoop-based

databases offered a way to handle huge amounts of

data being captured by the NSA's operations, but they lacked something critical to intelligence
operations: compartmentalized

a better version

security (or any security at all, for that matter). So in 2008, NSA set out to create

of BigTable,

called Accumulo now an Apache Foundation project. Accumulo is a "NoSQL"

database, based on key-value pairs. It's a design similar to Google's BigTable or Amazon's DynamoDB, but

Accumulo

has special security features designed for the NSA , like multiple
levels of security access. The program is built on the open-source Hadoop platform and other Apache products. One of
those is called Column Visibilitya capability that allows individual items within a row of data to have different classifications. That
allows users and applications with different levels of authorization to access data but see more or less information based on what
each column's "visibility" is. Users with lower levels of clearance wouldn't be aware that the column of data they're prohibited from

Accumulo also can generate near real-time reports from specific patterns
in data. So, for instance, the system could look for specific words or addressees in e-mail messages that come
viewing existed.

from a range of IP addresses; or, it could look for phone numbers that are two degrees of separation from a target's phone number.

spit those chosen e-mails or phone numbers into another database, where NSA
workers could peruse it at their leisure. In other words, Accumulo allows the NSA to
do what Google does with your e-mails and Web searchesonly with everything that flows across
the Internet, or with every phone call you make. It works because of a type of server process
called "iterators." These pieces of code constantly process the information sent to them and send back reports on
Then it can

emerging patterns in the data. Querying a multi-petabyte database and waiting for a response would be deadly slow, especially
because there is always new data being added.

The iterators are like NSA's tireless

data elves.
( ) No NSA data overload - Accumulo checks.
Kelly 12
Jeff Kelly is a Principal Research Contributor at The Wikibon Project and a Contributing Editor at
SiliconANGLE. He focuses on trends in Big Data and business analytics. His research has been quoted
and referenced by the Financial Times, Forbes, CIO.com, Network World, GigaOM, TechTarget and more
Accumulo: Why The World Needs Another NoSQL Database Wikibon Blog August 20 th http://wikibon.org/blog/breaking-analysis-accumulo-why-the-world-needs-another-nosql-database/

If youve been unable to keep up with all the competing NoSQL databases

that have hit the


market over the last several years, youre not alone. To name just a few, theres HBase, Cassandra, MongoDB, Riak,
CouchDB, Redis, and Neo4J. To that list you can

add Accumulo, an open source database originally

developed at the N ational S ecurity A gency. You may be wondering why the world needs yet another
database to handle large volumes of multi-structured data. The answer is, of course, that no one of these
NoSQL databases has yet checked all the feature/functionality boxes that most enterprises require before deploying
a new technology. In the Big Data world, that means the ability to handle the three Vs (

volume,

variety and velocity ) of data, the ability to process multiple types of workloads (analytical vs.
transactional), and the ability to maintain ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability) compliance at
scale. With each new NoSQL entrant, hope springs eternal that this one will prove the NoSQL messiah. So what

Accumulo is capable of
maintaining consistency even as it scales to thousands of
nodes and petabytes of data ; it can both read and write data in near real-

makes Accumulo different than all the rest? According to proponents,

time; and, most importantly, it was built

from the ground up

with cell-level security functionality.

( ) Accumulo tech solves overload and does so without mass


privacy violations.
Jackson 13
Joab Jackson covers enterprise software and general technology breaking news for the IDG News
Service, and is based in New York. NSA's Accumulo data store has strict limits on who can see the
data - PC World - Oct 31, 2013 - http://www.pcworld.com/article/2060060/nsas-accumulo-nosql-storeoffers-rolebased-data-access.html

With its much-discussed enthusiasm for collecting large amounts of data , the NSA naturally
found much interest in the idea of highly scalable NoSQL databases. But the U.S. intelligence
agency needed some security of its own, so it developed a NoSQL data store called Accumulo , with builtin policy enforcement mechanisms that strictly limit who can see its data. At the OReilly StrataHadoop World conference this week in New York, one of the former National Security Agency developers behind the software, Adam
Fuchs, explained how Accumulo works and how it could be used in fields other than intelligence gathering. The agency contributed
the softwares source code to the Apache Software Foundation in 2011. Every single application that we built at the NSA has some
concept of multi-level security, said Fuchs, who is now the chief technology officer of Sqrrl, which offers a commercial edition of the
software. The NSA started building Accumulo in 2008. Much like Facebook did with its Cassandra database around the same time,
the NSA used the Google Big Table architecture as a starting point. In the parlance of NoSQL databases, Accumulo is a simple
key/value data store, built on a shared-nothing architecture that allows for easy expansion to thousands of nodes able to hold
petabytes worth of data. It features a flexible schema that allows new columns to be quickly added, and comes with some advanced

Accumulos killer feature, however, is its data-centric


security, Fuchs said. When data is entered into Accumulo, it must be accompanied with tags
specifying who is allowed to see that material. Each row of data has a cell specifying
the roles within an organization that can access the data, which can map back to
specific organizational security policies. It adheres to the RBAC (role-based access control) model. This
data analysis features as well. Accumulo's killer feature

approach allowed the NSA to categorize data into its multiple levels of classificationconfidential, secret, top secretas well as who
in an organization could access the data, based on their official role within the organization. The database is accompanied by a
policy engine that decides who can see what data. This model could be used anywhere that security is an issue. For instance, if used
in a health care organization, Accumulo can specify that only a patient and the patients doctor can see the patients data. The
patients specific doctor may change over time, but the role of the doctor, rather than the individual doctor, is specified in the

The NSA found that the data-centric approach greatly simplifies application
development, Fuchs said. Because data today tends to be transformed and reused for different analysis applications, it
database.

makes sense for the database itself to keep track of who is allowed to see the data, rather than repeatedly implementing these rules
in each application that uses this data.