Jadewell Parking Systems

Corporation, represented by its

manager and authorized
representative Norma Tan vs.
Hon. Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr.,
Presiding Jude, MTC, Branch 3,
Baguio City, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169588

October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its

manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The
Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO
BALAJADIA,
EDWIN
ANG,
"JOHN
DOES"
and
"PETER
DOES"Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted
before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator
duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City
pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of
the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in
a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San

Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are
the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager
Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S
No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took
and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car
was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly
removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal
parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents
herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan,
Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the
clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to
Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by
Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and
carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which
is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the
declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an AffidavitComplaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3)
John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang.
The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell
president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his
co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked
illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car
since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an
illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to
remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using
the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to
use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4

In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City,
La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to
file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of
Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the
felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and
force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence
of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the
wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to
pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No.
003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of
such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands.
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into
this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of
the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in
both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in
Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did
then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp
then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate
No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized
by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance
No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell
Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp
worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia

and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20,
2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion
to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the
following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and
the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after
two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was
committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner
of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on
October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of
the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if
any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was
filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted
the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to
the February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the
period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed
period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution 15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the
Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on
one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action
has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged
violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on
any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En
Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails
over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive
period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the
filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the AffidavitComplaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the
complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws." 17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in
these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City

Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it

was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of
the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced
only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other
way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is
a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been
filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by
information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive
period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not
gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus,
this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003
and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed
with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the twomonth prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations
(for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents

and upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of
the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with
the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case,
assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of
two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in
Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not
err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the
other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that
the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with
more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders,
since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed
Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge
Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil
aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only
cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not
specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains
that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the
preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in
light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 and Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition
for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the
court.
The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law
and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to
the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive
period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not
argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of
prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should
be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time
the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period
was interrupted.28(Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two
months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants
of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the
running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope - This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however,
that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted
de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451
reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. - A city may either be component or highly urbanized:
Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component
cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting
for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized
cities or component cities. An independent component city has a charter that
proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all
cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United
States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio
Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of
Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in
an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in
Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the
offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30,
1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which
says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we
must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter
must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of
the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect
of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan 31 categorically
stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are
concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not
to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the
representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial

Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run

until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information
and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original
charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance
did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were
correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery
and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice - National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5
as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court.
The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is
sufficient if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the
offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period
of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in
court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the
same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices
Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These
Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions
where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of
responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes
Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and
the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was
designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided for in
Act No. 3326, as amended.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as
it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands
that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to
toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial

proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof
to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC
Associate Justice

MARIO

VICTOR

F.

LEONEN

WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice

ROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJustice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
Associate
Chairperson, Third Division

J.

VELASCO,

JR.
Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court s Division.
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.

A.

SERENO

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175939

April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether
his prosecution for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the information
sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense
established to have been committed by the accused.
The Case
Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006,
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)1 affirmed .with modification his conviction for the illegal
possession and control of 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) that the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed down through its decision dated February 1,
2000,2sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua maximum or
imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of
Seven Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment."
Antecedents
The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:
That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams
or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which
are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.

On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a
test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date,
following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC,
Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure
of prohibited drugs in Manansalas residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension,
Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City.4 SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of
the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac
Bajac, conducted the search of Manansalas house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19,
1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information,
which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized
was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial
numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy.5
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that
effect, along with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. 6 The
certification listed the following seized articles, to wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of suspected
dried marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money amounting toP655.00.
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they
turned over the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At
around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94, 7 to wit:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Spmn "A" One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2) rectangular bricks
of dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops having a total weight of seven hundred
fifty five (755) grams.
Spmn "B" One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried suspected
MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 9.045 grams. x x x.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in the abovestated specimen. x x x.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE
result for MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Spmns "A" and "B" contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. 8
Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994. 9

On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the
admission of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal
sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of
prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law.10 But the RTC did not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier
summarized.
In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up.
His version follows.
On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him
without any warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club
located on Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and
then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. They
turned down his request to be brought to a hospital for the treatment of the injuries he
thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his
captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court
when the latter testified at the trial.11
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, holding thus:
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly x x x engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing x x x falling under the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The
alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was
however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is alleged to have acted as a
poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the
testimony of SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to
the application of the search warrant, a member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able
to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find
marijuana leaves in the custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the
enforcement of the search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the
weakest defense, this Court is convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily included in the
crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. In light of
these circumstances, this Court has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the
crime proved. Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved is October 19, 1994,
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will
find application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY of Violation of Section
8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty
(30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty
(P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following issues, namely:
1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of an invalid
warrant, was erroneous;
2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited
drug on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425 was necessarily included in the offense in violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425; and
3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and misrepresented facts
and evidences of substance and importance that, if weighed, assayed and
considered were enough to acquit the accused.13
On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject
to modification, viz:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P750,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment.
Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are hereby ordered
transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned before the
CA.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the
City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less
750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the
cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control."
The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,15 which provides:

Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.

- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding
him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8,
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which states:
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that
the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the
misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4.
The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 under the information that had alleged the
illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as follows:
xxxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and
the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In
the case before Us, the trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much
less adduce proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the
present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is
absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in
the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the
seller. In the case before Us, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of
marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs
subject of the original Information. In this light, We find that the court a quo
committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized
under Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession
thereof. As borne by the records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the
lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045
grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of

the positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it
is indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the
author of the same.16
xxxx
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction
of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead of for
a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
him.
For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused
charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited case of People v.
Lacerna,17 the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs
the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal
possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale,
and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession, being an
element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale. The Court observed
thusly:
In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs,
as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew
that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly
state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited drugs.
Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the
prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellants culpability under
Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements
of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of
an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited
drug.18
In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however, the
involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal
possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged
in the information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to
support the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal
possession is either deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal
sale. On the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused
that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and
separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be
flagrantly violated.

It is true that there was an error in the informations statement of the facts essential to
properly describe the offense being charged against Manansala as that of illegal possession
of marijuana; and that the error became known to the Prosecution, leading Prosecutor
Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission of the amended information dated
January 3, 1995.19 In the motion, Prosecutor Manalansan manifested that the information as
filed charged a violation of Section 4; and that during the preliminary investigation, he had
concluded that Manansala should have been charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of
a violation of Section 4 as far as the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves seized from his
possession during the implementation of Search Warrant No. 8-94 was concerned. The
distinct and separate nature of the 750 grams of marijuana leaves from the quantity of
marijuana worth P100.00 that was the object of the test buy became all the more evident in
Prosecutor Manalansans letter dated December 28, 1994 addressed to City Prosecutor
Prudencio B. Jalandoni.20
There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had
been seized from the possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search
warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994
during the test buy conducted to support the application of the search warrant. The letter
specifically stated:
xxxx
3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19 October
1994 are separate incidents giving rise to two distinct offenses;
4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of prohibited drugs"
on 19 October 1994 because he was engaged in it before. There is no evidence to
show that the accused was engaged in the sale, administration, delivery, distribution
and transportation of drugs as provided under Section 4;
1wphi1

5. The two (2) P50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was engaged in
selling the 750 grams of marijuana leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October
1994 but cannot qualify his possession of the 750 grams of the drugs.
xxxx
Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.
The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is
necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have
been charged with." The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution 21 was
not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling,
delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves.
Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for
possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar
rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the
marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal
possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the

offense proved included in that which is charged.22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules
of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which
is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006;
and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164538

August 9, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
government on its own motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made of the
damage suffered by the private offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is
committed against the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal
of the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548
and its further Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit5 of petitioners audit officer,
Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and
lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions
perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.
(Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of the branchs credit committee
authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00; that through the socalled Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of
only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make
withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.006 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its
account at petitioners Port Area branch; that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize
petitioners funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that
Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior
approval of petitioners head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud,
deceit, and abuse of confidence.

In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with

Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and
increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total
amount of P50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bimonthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by
postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and
other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001."9
Findings of the Prosecutor
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad
(Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue
that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this
case, the relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented
the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents.11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be
dismissed.12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against
its employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who
benefited from this transaction and instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment
basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the
law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed
that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player
and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are
based only on conspiracy with Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated theP53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its
checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present
considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly
notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your
client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal. 14

A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1,
2000 by then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice. Citing jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing
of the criminal information in court.20 Hence, according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot
be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private
respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same
transactions."21 The CA added that "[s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal
ground, public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in
court."22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
where the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with
petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that where novation does
not extinguish criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution negate the offense already
committed.24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead
other responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that
the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information.25 This notwithstanding,
however, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of
Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss,
on the petition within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu
of Comment28 while respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment 29 on
the petition. The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required comment on the OSGs
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado)
did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause order 30 on July 19, 2006.
Their persistent non-compliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that they had
waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine of P1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon
submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda, the instant petition
was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:

1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal
liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally
liable for the offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with
Universal did not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner
submits that the settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish
the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ
which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the
appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioners claim,
citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the "negotiations pertain [to] and affect
only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for the offense already
committed."32
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes
on the sole responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the
pertinent documents being the head of petitioners Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he
contends that because of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be held liable for
estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before
the CA to give due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the
complaint for estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the
execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents
liable to stand trial for estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. 33
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation
of contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability." 34
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise or novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this
Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party
of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter.
We also held in People v. Moreno37 and in People v. Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa
is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party." Similarly
in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by petitioner, we held

that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated,

after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his
criminal liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement
entered into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accuseds liability for
estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a
situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against respondents should not be
dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal.
Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into
between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect
of the latters liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who
actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in
the body of the assailed Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal
liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition
absolving the respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." The civil law
principle of relativity of contracts provides that "contracts can only bind the parties who
entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof."41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The
intention of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the
beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the
parties. Not being parties to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar
their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to
remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged
fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their
positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or matters
strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on subject
settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed to the end of
extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise
from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the agreement
between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the
respondents.
Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial
review allowed where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion.

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 42 The
Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial."43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion
"in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."44 Tested against these guidelines, we find that this
case falls under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997
readily reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed
probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged. From her own assessment of
the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioners auditor, her preliminary finding is that "Ordinarily, the
offense of estafa has been sufficiently established."45 Interestingly, she suddenly changed
tack and declared that the agreement altered the relation of the parties and that novation had
set in preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the
jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone that far and
executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing
petitioners petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor. Pertinent
portion of the ruling reads:
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated theP53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its
checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present
considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly
notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your
client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal. 46
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are
matters of defense best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after
conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."48 So we held
inBalangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming
the dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of
whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable
cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained
of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the

prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no
evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case
were teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence
presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and
capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered
its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
ofcertiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against
respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the
auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime
complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the
"presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." 51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the
sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have
previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioners appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave
another ground failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the
law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed
that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player
and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are
based only on conspiracy with Universal.52
1avvphi1

The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against
respondents rests upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal)
based on the latters conspiratorial participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the
charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who
must be charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private
complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed
it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines

against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty
for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be
responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who
ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is
definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG
correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees
of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding
petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of Universal
were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their noninclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor from
prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof
were charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." 54 The writ of
mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the
exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to
determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the
moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith
and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary
character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of
the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against
the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand,
gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime
of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters
finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters
in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure,
findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been
made with grave abuse.55 The present case calls for the application of the exception. Given
the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated
June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated July
12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information for estafa against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197291

April 3, 2013

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO
ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF

PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER

MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a
letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled
by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or
motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order
issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioners petition for mandamus. 2
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent
civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province.
Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu
Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on
November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to
Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a
hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera
constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding
informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On
December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief
Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre
from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer
of venue.7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to
Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional
informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. 8 Later on,
additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City,
Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder
when he was arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196
individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. 13 It appears that in
issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the
twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009. 14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ.15 On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein
Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion
of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed
his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. 18 Petitioner reiterated
the request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioners
request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in
Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as
another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in
Civil Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial
order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18,
2011,25 respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for
mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the
RTC in Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or
an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil
Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. 28 Petitioner opposed the
motion to quash the subpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically,
respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12,
2011;31 and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus.34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE
INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE
CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND
OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC; and,
2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NONINDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE
NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND
EXECUTION.35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre
despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion
the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. 36
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. 37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave
abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao
massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution
recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only
seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based
because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an
accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far

from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear
to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of
some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes
a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule
119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a
person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward
and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting
him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or
more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is
made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the
Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a
hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions
fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused
has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime
and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act
and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that
he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other
requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so
that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites
under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged
from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be
admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness
pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The
discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future
prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. 40 The
discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive
responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. 41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court,42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised
arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. 43 Anent the requisite
that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the
public prosecutor. The reason is obvious the public prosecutor should know better than the
trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify
to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed
to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, 44 as
well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of
the accused is the most guilty one, and the like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution
to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for
admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under
Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently
be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The
immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such
witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon
presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program,
shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness.46 The Court shall then order the
discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a
state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his
testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation
in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the
Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to
appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his
participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an

acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement
that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, 48or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. 49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of
petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letterrequest. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request,
mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final
order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in
Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160316

September 2, 2013

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND RAINIER

PUNZALAN, PETITIONERS,
vs.
MICHAEL GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND RUBEN PLATA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the September 29, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
62633, which annulled and set aside the June 6, 20002 and October 11, 20003 Resolutions of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and reinstated its (DOJs) March 23, 2000
Resolution4 ordering the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to file separate informations
charging the petitioners, Rosalinda Punzalan (Rosalinda), Rainier Punzalan (Rainier),
Randall Punzalan (Randall) and several other individual with various offenses - three (3)
counts of Slight Oral Defamation against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan (Rosalinda); two (2)
counts of Light Threat against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; Attempted Homicide against Alexander
"Toto" Ofrin, petitioners Rainier and Randall, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito
Dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven
Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit;
and Malicious Mischief and Theft against petitioners Rainier and Randall, Mark Catap,
Alejandro Diez, Jose Fregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel
Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does.
The basic facts as found by the Court in G.R. No. 158543,5 are as follows:
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At
around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was
in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan,
Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio
shouted at Dela Pea, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?" Dela Pea replied,

"Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako." Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio
slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on
him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, "Yariin na yan!" Thereafter, Alex "Toto"
Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was
able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in
order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun
away from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh.
Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latters house and locked
themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas house, shouted,
"Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!" Dela Pea, Cagara, and
Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek
assistance.
Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael
Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara
(Cagara). On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed several
complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, to wit:
Investigation
Slip No.
(I.S. No.)

Charge

Parties

97-11485

Slight
Physical
Injuries

Roberto Cagara v. Randal Punzalan, Avelino Serrano, Raymond

Poliguit, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Mark
Catap, Vicente "Joven" Manda, Mark Labrador and Herson Mendoza

97-11487

Grave Oral
Defamation

Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

97-11492

Grave
Threats

Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

97-11520

Grave
Threats

Dencio Del Pea v. Alex "Toto" Ofrin

97-11521

Grave
Threats

Dencio Dela Pea v. Alex "Toto" Ofrin

97-11522

Grave Oral
Defamation

Dencio Dela Pea v. Rosalinda Punzalan

97-11523

Grave Oral
Defamation

Robert Cagara v. Rosalinda Punzalan

97-11528

Attempted
Murder

Dencio Dela Pea v. Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose

Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito Dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nibida,
Randal Punzalan, mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, alejandro Diez, Vincente
"Koven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin
Vivar and Raymond Poliquit

97-11764

Grave Oral
Defamation

Roland Curampes and Robert Cagara v. Avelino Serrano, Randal

Punzalan, Emmanuel Nobida, Herson Mendoza, Alejandro Diez,
Raymond Poliquit, Alex Pascua, Rainier Punzalan, Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin and Edwin Vivar

97-11765

Malicious
Mischief

Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Avelino Serrano, Randal Punzalan,

Emmanuel Nobida, Herson Mendoza, Alejandro Diez, Rainier Punzalan,
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Edwin Vivar, Mark Catap, Joven Manda and
Jose Gregorio Lanuzo

97-11766

Robbery

Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Avelino Serrano, Randal Punzalan,

Emmanuel Nobida, Herson Mendoza, Alejandro Diez, Rainier Punzalan,
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Edwin Vivar, Mark Catap, Vicente "Joven"
Manda and Jose Gregorio Lanuzo

97-11786

Grave Oral
Defamation

Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint Resolution, 6 dismissed the
complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law,
giving the following reasons:
The investigation and affidavits of all parties reveal that the above cases have no sufficient
basis. First, as regards the Grave Oral Defamation charges against Rosalinda Punzalan
allegedly committed on the 13th of August 1997 and 16th of October 1997 (I.S. Nos. 9711487, 97-11786; 97-11522 and 97-11523), the alleged defamatory statements are not
supported by any evidence to prove that they would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon another person (Article 359, Revised Peal Code), which are essential requisites of
Grave Oral Defamation. Complainants presented no evidence aside from their claims to
prove their cases; hence, insufficient. Further, the records show that the alleged defamatory
statements were made by respondent during the scheduled hearing of one of the above
case, which even if true, must have been said while in a state of distress caused by the filing
of the above numerous cases filed against her family, hence, not actionable. The same also
holds true with the other Oral Defamation and Grave Threat charges allegedly committed on
October 21, 1997 by Avelino Serrano and 15 other persons including the sons of Rosalinda
Punzalan named Randal and Rainier against Roberto Cagara and Ronald Curampes (I.S.
No. 11764), the alleged defamatory statements are not supported by any evidence that
would cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person neither would such
utterances constitute an act which may fall under the definition of Grave Threat which
complainants claimed against them because such utterances do not amount to a crime.
Merely insulting or abusive words are not actionable, unless they constitute defamation
punishable by law (Isidro vs Acuna, 57 O.G. 3321) as to make the party subject to disgrace,
ridicule or contempt or affect one injuriously in his office, profession, trade or occupation
(People vs. Perez, 11 CA Rep. 207).
Moreover, the elements of PUBLICATION is not alleged nor proved by complainants, hence,
not applicable.
The only element of grave oral defamation not found in intriguing against honor is
publication (People vs. Alcosaba, 30 April 1964)

As regards the case of Attempted Murder (I.S. No. 97-11528) allegedly committed on 13
August 1997 by Ranier Punzalan, et al., the same is already the subject of other two (2)
criminal cases docketed as Crim. Case No. 66879 and 66878 entitled People vs. Michael
Plata for Attempted Homicide and People vs. Roberto Cagara for Illegal Possession of
Firearm, respectively, both pending before Branch 60, MTC of Mandaluyong; hence, cannot
be the subject of another case, conformably with the foregoing pronouncement of the high
court:
xxxx
In the case at bar, what is undisputed is that RAINIER sustained a gunshot wound in his
thigh for which reason he filed a case of frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms.
The version of Michael Plata and Dencio Dela Pea (the defendants in said two cases) is
that the latter was seen by Plata and Cagara while Dencio was being mauled by RAINIER, et
al., thereby compelling Plata and Cagara to go out of Platas house and defend Dencio.
Dencio run towards Plata and Cagara and took the gun out of Cagaras hand and aimed the
gun at RAINIER, et al. which, in turn, forced Plata to grapple with Cagara to prevent Cagara
from hurting anyone but unfortunately, the gun accidentally fired and hit RAINIER in the
thigh.
Thus, whether the shooting of RAINIER arose from Platas and Cagaras attempt to defend
Dencio from the mauling by Rainier, et al. or from an accident, the elements of these
justifying (defense of strangers) and exempting circumstances (accident) should properly be
established WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE NOT in the attempted murder
case filed against RAINIER, et., al. by Dencio but in the attempted homicide case filed
against Michael Plata by RAINIER, there being a clear admission as to the fact of shooting
which wounded RAINIER who filed a frustrated murder case but was eventually downgraded
to attempted homicide.
With regard to the alleged robbery (I.S. no. 97-11766) which was allegedly committed on the
same date as the malicious mischief (I.S. No. 97-11765), these two (2) cases cannot be the
product of the same criminal act for some element of one may be absent in the other,
particularly "animus lucrandi." Further, it is noted that the complainant in the robbery case,
who is the same complainant in the malicious mischief (Michael Plata), use the very "same
affidavit" for the two (2) different charges with no other obvious intention aside from
harassing the respondents.
As regards the claim of Slight Physical Injuries (I.S. No. 97-11485), it appears on the affidavit
of the complainants, Robert Cagara ("CAGARA") and Dencio Dela Pea ("DENCIO"), that
they have conflicting statements which were not properly explained during the investigation.
According to Cagara, he and Dencio were standing near the gate of the Platas bandang
looban and it was the house which was stoned and Cagara was accidentally hit by one of
these stones which were aimed at the house and not at him; however, in Dencios affidavit,
he claimed that Randal Punzalan hit Cagara on the shoulder with a bottle while the latter
himself did not even mention this in his own affidavit. These inconsistencies belied their
claim. Moreover, it is noted that the complaint for Slight Physical Injuries was filed belatedly
(10 October 1997), more than a month after the commission of the alleged act on 30 August
1997 and that the Medical Certificate of Cagara was issued much later (15 October 1997)
from the commission of the alleged injuries and Cagara did not even bother to explain this in
his affidavit.

As regards the charge of Grave Threat (I.S. No. 97-11492, 97-11520 and 97-11521), there is
no act which may fall under the definition of "grave threat" because the utterances claimed
do not amount to a crime. Further, in I.S. No. 97-11492, the alleged threat was made through
telephone conversations and even to the complainant himself, hence, they did not pose any
danger to the life and limbs nor to the property of the complainant.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above cases are hereby dismissed for lack of
sufficient basis in fact and in law.7 [Emphases supplied]
The complainants in I.S. Nos. 97-11487, 97-11523, 97-11786, 97-11520, 97-11521, 9711528, 97-765, and 11-766 filed their separate petitions8 before the DOJ. On March 23,
2000, the DOJ modified the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light
Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief, and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier,
Randall and the other respondents in the above cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration,9 dated April 28, 2000. Upon review , the DOJ reconsidered its findings and
ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set
aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to
withdraw the informations.
Not in conformity, the complainants moved for a reconsideration of the June 6, 2000
Resolution but the DOJ denied the motion in its Resolution, dated October 11, 2000.
On January 11, 2001, the complainants elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the
withdrawal of the separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Other Light Threats,
Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief and Theft.
On September 29, 2003, the CA annulled and set aside the June 6, 2000 and October 11,
2000 Resolutions of the DOJ and reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution. In the said
decision, the CA explained that:
In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the main purpose of the same is to determine
"whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof," (Tandoc vs. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37). Based on the records
We hold that probable cause exists in the subject complaints.
Re: the complaints filed for malicious mischief and theft, We hold that said complaints had
sufficient basis. Contrary to the second ruling of the Secretary of Justice that there was lack
of eye witnesses to support the alleged act constituting the complaint, there were persons
who claimed to have seen the respondents as they were running away from the place of
incident. The joint affidavit of witnesses Rolando Curampes and Robert Cagara attest and
corroborate the allegations in the complaint. Further the circumstances surrounding the
incident as well as the presence of the defendants in the scene of the crime yield to strong
presumption that the latter may have had some participation in the unlawful act. Since there
was positive identification of the alleged malefactors, the complaints should not be
dismissed, and trial should proceed to allow for the presentation of evidence in order for the
court to determine the culpability or non-culpability of the alleged transgressors.

As regards the complaints for oral defamation, the Secretary of Justice belatedly maintains
that said complaints had no basis and that the evidence presented was not sufficient
considering that the alleged defamatory words were uttered in a state of shock and anger.
We, however, rule otherwise.
The complaints for oral defamation were filed based on three separate occasions whereupon
the respondent Rosalinda Punzalan by harsh and insulting words casted aspersions upon
the person of Michael Plata in the presence of other people. To say that the words thus
uttered were not malicious and were only voiced because of shock and anger is beyond
disbelief since respondent Punzalan could not have been in a state of shock in all three
separate occasions when such remarks were made. And even if such remarks were made in
the heat of anger, at the very least the act still constitutes light oral defamation.
Likewise, the complaint against Ofrin was not without basis since the supporting affidavits
submitted and the allegation of the complainant positively identifying defendant Ofrin as the
culprit, were sufficient to establish probable cause. That there were other persons who
allegedly did not see any fighting that day and time when the incident took place, was not
sufficient reason to dismiss the said complaint for lack of basis. The positive identification
made by the witnesses for the complainant must be given credence over the bare denials
made by respondents. "Alibi and denial are inherently weak and could not prevail over the
positive testimony of the complainant" (People v. Panlilio, 255 SCRA 503).
From the above discussions, We find that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion when he issued the assailed June 6, 2000 Resolution where he reversed himself
after finding earlier, in his March 23, 2000 Resolution that:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated
June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice dated March 23, 2000 (Resolution No. 594, Series of 2000) is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition filed by Rosalinda, Randal and Rainier, anchored on the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER
11, 2000.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, THE REMARKS MADE BY PETITIONER ROSALINDA
PUNZALAN CONSTITUTE SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS WITNESSES, ROLANDO CURAMPES
AND ROBERT CAGARA, ARE SUFFICIENT BASES FOR PROSECUTING

PETITIONERS RANDALL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

AND THEFT.11
In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause is
lodged with the prosecutor, who assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They
insist that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued the June 6, 2000
and October 11, 2000 Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations. In the
absence of grave abuse of discretion, they contend that the courts should not interfere with
the discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor.12 Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as amended, 13 provides:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of
public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of
a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. "A
necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their
violators." Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime
and should be held for trial.14 In the case of Crespo v. Mogul,15 the Court ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according
to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a
crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.16
Consequently, the Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of the supposed offenders.17 The rule is based not only upon the respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive
department but upon practicality as well.18 As pronounced by this Court in the separate

opinion of then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in the case of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,19
In this special action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor.
It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More
concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far
been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or
not it suffices to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a
Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves adjudication process
of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is
moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at
the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action.
The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially
preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the
guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor-i.e.,
whether or not he had made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case- is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
There is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for a such a
determination. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of an information
against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court
praying for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon
which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the
evidence is in truth adequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court
praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against
the accused.
Besides, the function this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it does not
generally do, and if at all, only exceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action where the
penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or death has been imposed by a lower court
(after due trial, of course), or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as regards a
particular factual conclusion in the judgment of such lower court.
Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that
the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.20 Grave abuse of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."21 The party seeking the writ of certiorari
must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.22
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998
Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the

complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the
other complaints, the Court agrees with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately
supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors
discretion by its own. In dismissing the complaint of Michael and Ruben, the DOJ reasoned
that:
Record reveals that Plata and Caraga instituted the instant complaints against herein
respondents only after they were charged with attempted homicide and illegal possession of
firearms by respondent Rainier Punzalan. Hence, it appears that the complaints are in the
nature of countercharges against respondents.
Indeed, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the evidence on record is not sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause against all of respondents for the crimes charged. When
Rosalinda Punzalan uttered the alleged defamatory statements, she was in a state of anger
and shock considering that her son Rainier was injured in an altercation between his group
and that of Platas. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the case show that she did not act
with malice. Besides, aside from complaints allegations, there is nothing on record to prove
that the utterances were made within the hearing distance of third parties.
Relative to the charge against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, there is likewise no corroborative
evidence to show that he drew a knife in a quarrel with Dela Pea. In contradiction,
respondents witnesses Ravina Mila Villegas and Ruben Aguilar, Jr., who were not assailed
as biased witnesses, stated that they did not see anyone fighting at the time and in the place
of the incident.
With respect to the charge of attempted homicide, the allegations supporting the same
should first be threshed out in the full blown trial of the charge for attempted homicide
against Plata, wherein, the testimony of complainant Dela Pea will be presented as part of
the defense evidence. Moreover, it bears stressing that aside from Dela Peas allegations
and the medical certificate obtained forty-five (45) days after the mauling, there is no
showing that respondents intended to kill him.
Further, the charge for malicious mischief and theft are also not supported by evidence. In
the absence of eyewitnesses who positively identified respondents as the perpetrators of the
crime the photographs submitted are incompetent to indicate that respondents committed
the acts complained of. The respondents here were merely charged on the basis of
conjectures and surmises that they may have committed the same due to their previous
altercations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The
resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is
directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats,
attempted homicide, malicious mischief, and theft against all respondents and to report the
action taken withim ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.23 [Emphases supplied]
Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to
be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous
conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.24 After all, not "every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is
an abuse of discretion."25

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62633 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The June 6, 2000 and
the October 11, 2000 Resolutions of the Department of Justice are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171222

February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174786
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S.
VELASCO, and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members
for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school
authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been
characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and
responsibility. This responsibility has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing
Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as
provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts.
Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts
committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure
that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
1

It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as
accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the
Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
2

Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayans
quashal of the Information.
THE CASE BACKGROUND
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period," which was set from 2 May
to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.
3

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the
orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. Subsequently, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the
following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C.Montez
(Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) collectively,
Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales (RTCZambales).
7

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to
hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.)
Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor
(Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG.
Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator
agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered
re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against
respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as
accomplices to the crime of hazing.
10

11

Meanwhile, the RTCZambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the
principal accused, Alvarez et al. The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a
Motion to Quash the Information. They argued that the Information did not contain all the
essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the
purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they
stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a
sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any
assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized
that there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that
they had permitted the activity.
12

13

As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had
already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case
against them must be dismissed.

The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the
Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the
essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was
nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could
be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was,
however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the
supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether
the academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
14

Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan issued the
assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal
case against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal
accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment
against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that
of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal
by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as
there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with
whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the
dismissal of the case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging
Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
15

In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no
averment that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members" of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the
law. It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical
determination that the PMMA was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the
Anti-Hazing Law.
16

Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case
against Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to
Quash, adopting the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August
2006. However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB
Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According to the court, since Velasco was
similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in
light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.),
explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same
offense. It is unclear from the records whether the accused Aris and Mabborang
surrendered or were arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest was recalled prior to the
dismissal of the case.
17

18

19

20

21

Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this
Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006,
another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
THE ISSUES

The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough
evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed
by this Court as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed
in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for
the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against
the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against
those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the
purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal,
especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. In People v.
Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding responsibilities of
the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal."
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those
charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of
that of the alleged principal. We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely
presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez et al.
Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged
principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial courts
reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it
simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason
for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
22

23

24

25

Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against
respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this
constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an
offense be "sufficient." One of the key components of a "sufficient information" is the
statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the
complaint. The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough
to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against
them. This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they
are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they
have purportedly committed. The information need not be in the same kind of language
used in the law relied upon.
26

27

28

29

At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which
is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an
information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts
averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the
30

law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims
therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of
the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to
do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National
Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring
shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
(Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are
established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed
as a prerequisite for the persons admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of
hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under
Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in
the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or
faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing
in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes but
is not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps,
educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships,
corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for
the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
31

32

34

33

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption
relating to the duly recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and
practices" for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an
affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an
assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason
for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. Thus, the
prosecutions failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would
not justify the quashal of that Information.
35

Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses [RADM] VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY
G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD G. MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.]
GERRY P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S.
VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as
follows:
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the
campus of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San
Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29];
LTSG. DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G.
FERRER, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG.
KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P. DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.;
ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S.
VELASCO, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their
duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty members did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing
perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary
midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. during the schools Indoctrination and Orientation;
and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of
psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. thereby causing
the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.
36

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver
this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility
of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference
to a technical term in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter
alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutors belated argument in
his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and
37

38

orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy
i.e., attainment of active midshipman status does not cure this defect in the Information.
Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the
crime of accomplice to hazing. Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the
Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of
the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright. Indeed, Section 4, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to
correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution
fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the
Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no
defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was
sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering
the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
39

40

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing
another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a
motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents
are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double
jeopardy has already attached.
1wphi1

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED
and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in
Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No.
28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192565

February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and
set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners).
The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City)
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information
for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against
her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No.
342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines
has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby
making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury
the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without
specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another
court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving
false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false
affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTCMakati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration. 6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside
the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners
anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was
presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v.
Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long
standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high
court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential

ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of
which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the
court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the
city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as
the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells
solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against
the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits
therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the
introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later
than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from
the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was
improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTCMakati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. 10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information
for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable
to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. 11 They argued that the facts
in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was
the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements
were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime
of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the
evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction
to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial
courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the
locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. 13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in
the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients
took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b)
if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation
to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the
truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora.14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article
183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together
with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis,
we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of
perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping
to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to
have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x. 16
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion
of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum
of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public
in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore
to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper
court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of
perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in
verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed
was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and
hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing
that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the
case of United States. v. Caet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the
information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly
submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of
the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn
to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the
GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila
where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v.
Norris.20We ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of
the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime
of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our
jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases

(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of
an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in
their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008,
harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC
took effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case
that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet,
Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect. 22
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the
presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the
Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in
Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury,
and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment
for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any
public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 24 and 539325 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere
execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. 27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the
court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of
representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was
the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157
of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of
the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August
23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act
2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code

were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury
Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas,
under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony
is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived
from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace
perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act
1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or
make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases
ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an
oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and
submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this
perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place
where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been the
City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied
by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue
related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when
Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other
proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements
under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal,
civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false
affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made
to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was
sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly
lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated
in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati
and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds
relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the

[Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the
Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed
and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving
of false statement,"32citing Caet as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of
its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of
venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a
material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations
while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been
Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony
in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn
statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet
because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then
only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been
applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium
Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a
false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the
place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from
the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on
July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of
criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not
only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
1wphi1

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent
spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit
against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that
contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one
who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense
is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed
at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through
false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the
place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or
where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on
the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO**
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200465

April 20, 2015

JOCELYN ASISTIO y CONSINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated January 31, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2008 and 12
February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01197750, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be

REMANDED to Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). The accusatory portion of
the Information filed against her reads:
4

That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers MultiPurpose Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the
entire business of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such
and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering into a
contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully
well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers MultiPurpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers MultiPurpose Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."

Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive
dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of
softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between
the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed
petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead, petitioner
claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce financial
statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the
Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica
Nealiga (member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who
later executed their respective affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on
the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and
sales, and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that
petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in the following
amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 P40,503.00; and
S.Y. 2000-2001 P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the
amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so. Thus, the
Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.

After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss
the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other
matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction
over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with
it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of
[Sec.] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or
both at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
the instant case which properly pertains to the first level courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court
having no jurisdiction, further discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a
violation of the principle of primary jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a
falsified resolution to purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot and
academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's motion for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The RTC held:
7

Nowhere in said [Sec.] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability for
violation of acts or omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and
for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a
fundamental rule in law that an act or omission is not a crime unless there is a law making it
so and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts charged in the information do
not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do constitute an offense, the
penalty therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is
"imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is the undisputed
fact that before this case was filed in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable
settlement of the dispute was not availed of by the private complainants who are all
members (directors) of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the Cooperative Code
itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative
dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute involving the parties is
certainly a dispute and issue between and among directors, officers or members of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the
Guidelines.

Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the President as
outlined in the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to
by the complainants, the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the present case.
8

Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders
dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC
for further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its decision.
9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF
DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUO[U]S AND CATEGORICAL
PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE
TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC.] 46 OF THE
COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE
DERIVED FROM ITS INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A
HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT THE
RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND
TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER
GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE
OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE
CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY
JURISDICTION EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE
COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO COURT. 3. WHETHER THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS ORDER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE
THAT DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS
TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASEBACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED
COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE(SIC) FACTO LAW.]
10

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
which the OSG points out as the proper remedy to assail the CA decision.

Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the assailed CA
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the
exclusion of the CA as one of the party respondents, and considered the petition as one filed
under Rule 45, since the focal issue raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an
interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691. She adds that
had she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same
question of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for
review under Rule45 of the Rules of Court. In Mercado v. Court of Appeals, the Court had
again stressed the distinction between the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65,
to wit:
11

12

x x x [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a

petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under
Rule65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to
us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule,
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that
to be taken under Rule 45. x x x.
13

In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowners Association, Inc., the Court
explained that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party
cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said
procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. The remedy of
appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper
remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.
14

However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the petition
before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. In accordance
with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the
Court may treat the petition as having been filed under Rule45. Here, no justifiable reasons
were proffered by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it
was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks substantive merit
and raises only questions of law which should have been duly made in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over
petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her case.
15

16

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
of its commission. Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has
17

exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years,
irrespective of the amount of fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of
fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of
RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has
jurisdiction over her criminal case which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are
hereby prohibited:
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a
fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis added) Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal
Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and categorical. She submits that statutory
construction of such clear provisions, especially if prejudicial to her rights as an accused and
would subject her to higher penalty, should not be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's case
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Section 47 (liability
of directors, officers and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and
Section 51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not
less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis supplied)

The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical error
because the "liability of directors, officers and committee members" is undisputedly governed
by Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors,
officers and employees, to wit:
Section 46.Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts
or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers
or committee member shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting
therefrom to the cooperative, members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of
his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has
been reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for
damages and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation.- (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their
compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by
a majority vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special general assembly
meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided further, that no additional compensation
other than per diems shall be paid during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason
to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has
jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical
errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless,
empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the
meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision
is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute and
give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible
construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its
duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule
under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended to
make a typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act, and
not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
xxxx
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec.] 124, paragraph 4, as the
trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for
lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec.] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers,
and Committee Members," provides for violations under which the said officers could be held
liable for, and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from the said violations.
Since the said [section] does not provide for penal sanction, an application of [Sec.] 124,
paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently refers to the penal sanction on
erring directors, officers and committee members. It would make no sense if we were to
follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec.] 124, paragraph 4
instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec.] 47, which upon

examination of the Code provides for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other
employees of the cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should refer to
"[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49
(Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential information)."Following
this interpretation, violation of [Sec.] 46, therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not
more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
18

It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in Section 124 (3) of
RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and committee members, has been recognized
and duly corrected when the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of
2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. Directors, officers and
committee members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors, officers or committee members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are
hereby prohibited:
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Article 45 on the
Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a
Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction
suffer a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but
not more than ten (10)years or both at the courts discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the
Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation
proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the
Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a
criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intracooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and should
have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an
intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among
members of the same cooperative. The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative
and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution authorizing the filing
of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is

proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the regular
court.
19

Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability,
and her role in the prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. In petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is
the real offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere private
complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly,
such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one
arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
20

On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts
to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
21

In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
22

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
23

In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not
for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the
RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the
October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still
be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As aptly noted by the CA:
24

The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is
an acquittal. It should be emphasized that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is,
the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a
court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not
valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."
25

On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double
jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in

the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon
petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not attach, thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon
this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised
upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court
that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accusedappellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with
express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly
jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double
jeopardy, thus, did not attach.
26

The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case
before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is
barred by res judicata because the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution dated
August 13, 2012, granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. In support of her
flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private complainants [officers and directors of
the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of
both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually
and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private documents.
27

28

At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings. At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy
which embraces a prohibition against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
29

Section 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy
may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of
double jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC Resolution dated August 13, 2012 which
granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification
of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on
whether the third requisite of double jeopardy a second jeopardy is for the same offense
as in the first is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is
addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.
30

31

32

33

34

Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the
information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a
crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for falsification of
private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46,
RA6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which
petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the
second offense. The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand,
alleged that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare
financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales
profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2) of the RPC. The elements of
falsification of private document under Article172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article
171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage.
35

36

The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being
then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal
interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon
her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully
well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The
essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a director,
officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and knowingly (a) votes for or
assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with
their duty as such directors, officers or committee member.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of
falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of
the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the
third requisite for double jeopardy to attacha second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the firstis, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct
nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part
of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special
law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez, the Court held:
37

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional

fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased else wise, where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
38

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate and distinct offenses as
discussed abovethe first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second
against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an
accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these
arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act
constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a
special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not
an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.
39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals
Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No.
32363, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________

Please verify thid because the date of the year

is different

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171542 : April 6, 2011]
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , MICHAEL
MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON,
DONATO ENABE and ALFIE FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), datedSeptember 26, 2005[2] in People of
the Philippines , et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56,
et al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution datedFebruary 6,
2006[3] denying respondents motion for reconsideration. [4] The assailed rulings denied the
petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the ruling [5] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMandaueCity, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting
as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU-10123. [6]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were
public officers working under the National Bureau of Investigation. [7]

During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance
and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and
on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.[8] The oral objection was reduced to writing onJuly
21, 2003 when Magno filed an opposition[9] before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City,
citing the provisions of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[10]
The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment, [11] while the accused submitted their
joint opposition.[12] The respondents likewise submitted their comments to the opposition of
the other co-accused.[13]
OnSeptember 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is proper, legal
and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other
than those authorized under R.A. 6770.[14]
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which
the RTC later denied in itsOctober 1, 2003 Order.[15]
Proceedings before the CA
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty.
Sitoy, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended that the RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel
for the private offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private
offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses. [17]
Magno, in his comment[18] filed onDecember 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before
the RTC was the appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in
behalf of the Ombudsman.[19] He stressed that while the Office of the Ombudsman can
designate prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing,
deputizing or authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state
prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to private practitioners/private
prosecutors.[20] He further stressed that while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the
Ombudsman is the proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect
the right to intervene personally, as the Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the
private respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case. [21]
OnFebruary 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may
appear for the petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of
the case is concerned.[22]
The respondents moved for the reconsideration[23] of the CA decision. OnSeptember 26, 2005,
the CA amended its decision,[24] ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to intervene in the prosecution of the offense
charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.
[25]

Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute
to this Court through the present petition for review on certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the
power to hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan. [28] To support this
contention, Magno invokesEngr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al.

where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions
for certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[30]
[29]

Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor
cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No.
6770.[31] Section 31 limits the Ombudsmans prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals,
state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the
Ombudsman to deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the
Office of the Ombudsman.[32]
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its
memorandum onFebruary 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy
may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court.[33] Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and
deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases. [34] The
Ombudsman opines that the two provisions of law are not diametrically opposed nor in
conflict,[35] as a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended complainants in the
prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman to
deputize.[36] The Ombudsman, however, did not address the contention that the
Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision
not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade
27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where
the civil action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as
the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by
RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition
for certioraribefore the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not
dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA
refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the petition. Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975, [38] we
sustained the CAs position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayans

jurisdiction to include petitions for mandamus, prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus,

injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[39]
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by
Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable
by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition
for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC
since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as
Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation. [40]
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we
overrule theSeptember 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of
Magnos motions for reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
[41]
and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void [42] and cannot be given any
effect.[43] This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on
appeal or even after final judgment.[44]
We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L.
Gatdula, et al.,[45] as follows:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or
conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal
where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after
final judgment.Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and
not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for reconsideration
before the CA[46] the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CAs Decision became final. The
CA did not even consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged
failure to raise new or substantial grounds for reconsideration. [47] Clearly, however, its lack of
jurisdiction is a new and substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure the
jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since Magno raised the
issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been
raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured.
In Machado,[48] citing People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,[49] we held:
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but
the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties

are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist
as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided
upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated
onSeptember 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution ofFebruary 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for
having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days
from the finality of this Decision within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
___

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156287

February 16, 2010

FELICITAS M. MACHADO and MARCELINO P. MACHADO, Petitioners,

vs.
RICARDO L. GATDULA, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS,
and IRINEO S. PAZ, Sheriff IV, Office of the Provincial Sheriff, San Pedro,
Laguna, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners Felicitas M.
Machado and Marcelino P. Machado (the Machados), assailing the decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2002 and the resolution 3 dated December 5, 2002 in CAG.R. SP No. 65871. The CA decision dismissed the Machados petition for certiorari and their

motion for reconsideration, and upheld the jurisdiction of the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) to render judgment over a private land and to issue the
corresponding writs of execution and demolition.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The dispute involves two adjoining parcels of land located in Barangay San Vicente, San
Pedro, Laguna, one belonging to the Machados, and the other belonging to respondent
Ricardo L. Gatdula (Gatdula).
On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter4 to the COSLAP requesting assistance because
the Machados allegedly blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a
two-door apartment on their property.
Acting on Gatdulas letter, the COSLAP conducted a mediation conference on February 25,
1999; the parties then agreed to have a verification survey conducted on their properties and
to share the attendant expenses. Thereafter, the COSLAP issued an Order dated March 16,
1999 directing the Chief of the Survey Division of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), to
conduct a verification survey on May 9, 1999. The order likewise stated that in the event that
no surveyor is available, the parties may use the services of a private surveyor, whom the
CENRO-DENR Survey Division would deputize.
As scheduled, a private surveyor, Junior Geodetic Engineer Abet F. Arellano (Engr. Arellano),
conducted a verification survey of the properties in the presence of both parties. Engr.
Arellano submitted a report to the COSLAP finding that the structure built by the Machados
encroached upon an alley found within the Gatdula property. Engr. Arellanos findings
corroborated the separate report of Engineer Noel V. Soqueco of the CENRO, Los Baos,
Laguna that had also been submitted to the COSLAP.
The Machados contested these reports in their position paper dated August 26, 1999. They
alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since they did not violate Gatdulas rights. 5 They
further assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the proper forum for the present
case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
The COSLAP Ruling
On October 25, 1999, the COSLAP issued a resolution6 (October 25, 1999 COSLAP
Resolution) directing the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula. In so
ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made by Engr. Arellano, which
established that the Machados had encroached on the existing alley in Gatdulas property.
The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning its jurisdiction to decide the
case, since they actively participated in the mediation conferences and the verification
surveys without raising any jurisdictional objection. It ruled that its jurisdiction does not
depend on the convenience of the Machados.
The Machados filed a motion for reconsideration which the COSLAP denied in a resolution
dated January 24, 2000.

On February 18, 2000, the Machados filed a notice of appeal7 with the Office of the President
(OP).
While this appeal was pending, the COSLAP, upon Gatdulas motion, issued a writ of
execution8 enforcing the terms of the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution. The Machados
opposed the writ by filing a motion to quash on March 30, 2001. 9 They argued that the
October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution was not yet ripe for execution in view of the pending
appeal before the OP.
Since the Machados persistently refused to reopen the right of way they closed, the
provincial sheriff recommended to COSLAP the issuance of a writ of demolition. The
COSLAP issued the writ of demolition10 on July 12, 2001.
The CA Ruling
On July 31, 2001, the Machados went to the CA for relief through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,11 claiming that the COSLAP issued the writs of execution and demolition with
grave abuse of discretion.
The CA found the Machados claim unfounded and, accordingly, dismissed their petition in its
decision of January 31, 2002.12 It declared that the COSLAP correctly issued the assailed
writs because the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution had already become final and
executory for failure of the Machados to avail of the proper remedy against the COSLAP
orders and resolutions. Under Section 3 (2)13 of Executive Order No. 561 (EO 561), the
resolutions, orders, and decisions of the COSLAP become final and executory 30 days after
promulgation, and are appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. In Sy v.
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,14 it was held that under the doctrine of
judicial hierarchy, the orders, resolutions and decisions of the COSLAP, as a quasi-judicial
agency, are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and not to the Supreme Court. Thus, the CA ruled that the Machados appeal to
the OP was not the proper remedy and did not suspend the running of the period for finality
of the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA found that the COSLAP was created to provide a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems, in general; the present
case, therefore, falls within its jurisdiction.15Moreover, the Machados active participation in
the mediation conference and their consent to bring about the verification survey bound them
to the COSLAPs decisions, orders and resolutions.
From this CA decision, the Machados filed a motion for reconsideration, 16 which the CA
subsequently denied in its Resolution of December 5, 2002. 17
The Machados thus filed the present Rule 45 petition with this Court, raising two vital issues:
1. Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over Gatdulas complaint for right of way
against the Machados; and
2. Whether the COSLAP can validly issue the writs of execution and demolition
against the Machados.
THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

The COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the present case
In resolving the issue of whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the present case, a
review of the history of the COSLAP and an account of the laws creating the COSLAP and
its predecessor, the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP), is in order.
The COSLAPs forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive
Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and
coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten
administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or
recommend other solutions.
On March 19, 1971, Executive Order No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP. The
committee was given exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other
lands of the public domain,18 and was likewise vested with adjudicatory powers phrased in
broad terms:
1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline
administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain.19 [emphasis supplied]
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. 832 (PD 832)20 was issued on November 27, 1975
reorganizing the PACLAP and enlarging its functions and duties. The decree also granted
PACLAP quasi-judicial functions. Section 2 of PD 832 states:
Section 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The PACLAP shall have the following
functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of
the various government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or
disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and timeconsuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the
attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof:
Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its
resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon
the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction
thereof;
xxxx
4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation
and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible.
[emphasis supplied]

The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September 21, 1979, and was replaced
by the COSLAP. Unlike the former laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when
the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any
land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in
the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical
situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or
timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the
public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will ensure expeditious
resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the
Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and
upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall
become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be
appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. [emphasis supplied]
Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of
those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to
the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. 21 In resolving whether
to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the
case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms
of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over
any land dispute or problem.22 Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may
resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a
specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.23

Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are private lands owned by
private parties, none of whom is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government
reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any cultural minority.24
Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in
nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require
immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case primarily involve the
application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way. As
held in Longino v. General,25 "disputes requiring no special skill or technical expertise of an
administrative body that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts."
The Machados cannot invoke Section 3, paragraph 2(e) of EO 561, which provides that the
COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving "other similar land problems of
grave urgency," to justify the COSLAPs intervention in this case. The statutory construction
principle of ejusdem generic prescribes that where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not
to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.26 A dispute between two parties concerning
the right of way over private lands cannot be characterized as similar to those enumerated
under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d) of EO 561.
1avvphi1

In Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land

Problems27 where we ruled that the COSLAP does not have blanket authority to assume
every matter referred to it we made it clear that its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes
over lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest.
The CA apparently misread and misapplied the Courts ruling in Baaga v. Court of
Appeals.28 Baaga involved two contending parties who filed free patent applications for a
parcel of public land with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of Lands failure to act
within a reasonable time on the applications and to conduct an investigation, the COSLAP
decided to assume jurisdiction over the case. Since the dispute involved a public land on a
free patent issue, the COSLAP undeniably had jurisdiction over the Baaga case.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body
without jurisdiction is void
By reason of the Machados active participation in the mediation conferences and the
COSLAP verification surveys, the CA declared the Machados estopped from questioning the
bodys jurisdiction and bound by its decisions, orders and resolutions. We disagree with this
ruling.
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or
conduct.29 Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal
where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC,30 we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In
People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel However if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court
had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction in conferred
by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. [emphasis
supplied]
In this case, the COSLAP did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
filed by Gatdula, yet it proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs
of execution and demolition against the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured
by the parties participation in the proceedings before the COSLAP.31 Under the
circumstances, the Machados can rightfully question its jurisdiction at anytime, even during
appeal or after final judgment. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction
is void.32 It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The
assailed Court of Appeals decision dated January 31, 2002 and resolution dated December
5, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65871 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems dated October 25, 1999 in COSLAP Case
No. 99-59, as well as the writ of execution dated March 21, 2001 and the writ of demolition
dated July 12, 2001, are declared NULL and VOID for having been issued without
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of
the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and
GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order
dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in
the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith
Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T.
Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all
of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to
this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed
a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz,
and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by

the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the
petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as
well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523
and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001
issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an

accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal
Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering
the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the
order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals
ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance,
such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of
the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6,
1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may
validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest." 4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications
for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the

Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the
case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the
accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the
Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by
the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court
ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not
have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to
bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the
body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant
being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail
is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus,
bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort
to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to
post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance
therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of
the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground
of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with
the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to
cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the

Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for
bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail
to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who
issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did
find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day
and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused
can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of
guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous
to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing
so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of
arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112,
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue,
after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding
Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. 26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be
drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that
he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix 30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on
the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find
probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for
being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a
"politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within
the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of
the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41,
Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October
9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes
his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision
acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April
27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated
and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court
agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the
Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case
No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but
with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R.
No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence
presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder
filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision
and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of
the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We
never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on
circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of
the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the
use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points
to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt
certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after
we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him
from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the
temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of
Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall
or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. 36 According to the petitioners, it was an
error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable
cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest
or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is
merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be
allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals
had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to
carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge
Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants
of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest
based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them
to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of
Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this
Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification
of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in
those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge
reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 363524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the

assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by
private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the
validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent
Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of
Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more
serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience
to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which
require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, 39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises
should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 40

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow
the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City
of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10)
days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of
these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases
within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance;
and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said
cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest
for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B.
Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 164368-69
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,

DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 2, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for
Review onCertiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint
Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito
Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.[2]
THE FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim.
Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of
alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against
Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position
and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to
CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and
his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT
HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND

use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for
joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed
as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and
26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest
that the Sandiganbayan issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in
the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related
cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.[3]
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use
of alias, and perjury. The Peoplesevidence for the illegal alias charge, as
summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel
Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000,
Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with
PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening
documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio
Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa
Barcelan, who declaredthat a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza)
transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several
checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account
name Jose Velarde on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit
receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM)
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL)

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN)

24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO)
25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP)
20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ)
21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR)
29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS)
4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT)
10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU)
6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV)
25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW)

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena

Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later
on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these
positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings
Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated
cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution
dated October 13, 2003.[4] The accused separately moved to reconsider the
Sandiganbayan Resolution;[5] the People, on the other hand, filed its
Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.[6] The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be
allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. [8] In its Joint
Resolution dated March 10, 2004,[9] the Sandiganbayan only granted the
defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of
alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos.
26565 and 26905.[10]His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565
(illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds[11]:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only
two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato,
testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use
the name Jose Velarde;

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was
prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral
Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents
offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their
nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following
proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition

that presented the following arguments:[12]
1.

That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly
prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as
early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already
prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142
and not BSP Circular No. 302;

2.

Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147

[1996]) is misplaced;

3.

Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires

publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution
has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict
movant for illegal use of alias; and

4.

Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use

of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the

Consolidated Reply Opposition.

Consolidated

Opposition

through

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now
assailed in this petition.The salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found
that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what

is described in the Informationi.e., the testimonies and documents on the

opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan
reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive or between on or about 04
February 2000 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto means that the
act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken
place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply
the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any variance between the
date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation
in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean
and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or
events separate and distinctfrom those that took place on the single date on
or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive or prevented it from
interpreting the Information any other way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas
commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed
to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085
(CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.
[13]
It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142
only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the
Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple
because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction
involved the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered
trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,
[14]
and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15]
Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:
a.
Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with
Dichavez and Ortalizaafter February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the
conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the
act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada
did represent himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions, standing alone,
violates Estradas right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and
explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the said alias Jose
Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name,
in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate

entities.Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those

mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not
fall within the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified
in the Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are
not therefore covered by the indictment.
b.
The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in
the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it
reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is
defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law
definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling
in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly
against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition
under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a
third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be nonactionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one
such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The
Sandiganbayan said:
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being
absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were
likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as public
as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the
absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant
intended to beknown by this name in addition to his real
name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity.Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different
name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the userintends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No.
142 as amended.

c.
The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be
publicly known by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a
numbered account a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust
Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account,
the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to
disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file
under oath a statement of assets and liabilities. [16] Reading CA No. 142, R.A.
No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to
disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was

under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank

account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The
Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against
the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all
other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole
previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true
identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7,
2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was
perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as
interpreted in Ursua,must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of
R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute
should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A
reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to
the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the context
of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made
before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No.
1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into
law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of
Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4
February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules,

despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No.

142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of
alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by
the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act
No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias
Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4,
2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the
non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing
its application to the instant case.

THE COURTS RULING

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,

television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at
birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized
for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not
been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for

authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an
alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien,
and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's
name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person
shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of
an alias a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to
his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the
words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by
this name (the alias)in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the
use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended.[18]

Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led
to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such
a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which
for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and
one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.[19]

Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by

the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be
committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in
the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No.
142.

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application
of the Ursuaruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the
time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic
who is required by law to disclose his true name.We do not find this
argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on
one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of
applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any
distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential
treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his
cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even
when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner
has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the
title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on
the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by
the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [21] The mode of
violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling

(Resolution datedFebruary 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application
of Ursua under the following tenor:

The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself

serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of
Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused
heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term alias means otherwise
known as (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p.
53). The charge of using an alias logically implies that another name has
been used publicly and habitually.Otherwise, he will not be known by
such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to several
transactions and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly
employed by the accused.

The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from

facts established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the
accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic]
he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real
name.[22]

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
applying Ursuanotwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its nonapplicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People
thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its
discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the
reversal of its earlier final ruling.

We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a
motion to quash[23] that cannot be given the attributes of finality and

immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally

dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.[24] The
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects
would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing
court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to
rest.[25] It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under
the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment. [26] Perez v. Court of
Appeals,[27] albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory
order carries no res adjudicata effects.Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only

an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be
applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the
previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but
was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties
to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the
lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of
the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives
pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other
words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be
considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to
possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet
to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted. [28]

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at

the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these
allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different
from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller
view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the
prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the
Information.Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a
different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the

application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of

grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our
consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect,

the People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is different
from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and
intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name
Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a
single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was designed to
cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which the
anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues
that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No.
142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that
Estradas use of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed

positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The
prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented
with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the
matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.

What is the coverage of the indictment?

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused
its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim.
Case No. 26565 to Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4,
2000. It posits that there was a main transaction one that took place on
February 4, 2000 but there were other transactions covered by the phrase
prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred
to several transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities. To the People, the restrictive finding thatthe phrase prior to or

subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase on or about 04 February 2000

drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive
criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and
the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential
relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on
one hand, and the additional antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on
the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or
subsequent thereto into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a
convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least
exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused has to
be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date
of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same
Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule
that when the time given in the complaint is not of the essence of the
offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to be
proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action
(citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v.
Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an
offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or
subsequent thereto; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts
constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations
of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that
would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information
fully notified him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde
in more than just one instance.

We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the
provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the
offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and
for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the
offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except
when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.[31]

The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the
crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for
and undertake his defense.[32] In short, the allegations in the complaint or
information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused the
primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or
information of the charge/s laid.

The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February

2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused [did] willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT
HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND
use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his

registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents

with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the

Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read and
understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his
defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the
Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before
February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4,
2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in
several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of

documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had
their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior
or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions
took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime
before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have
simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative
approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto
would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the
on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or
subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the
THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of
course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been
clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information
simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer
to various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all
proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the
People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live
with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple
transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in

surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right
to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time

in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above
conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the
offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case,

as it deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the
Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a
single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary
practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under
CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.

We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and
Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two
other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando
Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents as Jose Velarde amounted to
a public use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise

the validity of Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere
banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse
of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the
opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere
convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the
legislature.Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on
BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as
Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936,
and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain
purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in
CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the
law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error
for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank
regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the
effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship
with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an
alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s coverage. Harmonization of
laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be
harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one
another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not
remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different subject
matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a
different class of persons,[33] and there was no need to force their application
to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the
existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of
various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust
transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to
traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People,
may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical
relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated

separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is

separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority,
and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the
transaction or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a
congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a
person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other
than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable
for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the
confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated
in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No.
1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does
not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to
other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a
public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use
of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively
encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten
wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy
that uses the law to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the
commission of crimes. The People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was
not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for
the commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be
interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail.

We see no merit in these arguments.

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan

position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third
person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close

reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the

user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the
required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a
third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made
openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally
known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of
the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be
known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the
alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed
as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily
indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In
relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had
no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired
in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua
was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not
be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time.The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations
with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations
to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made
in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests,

affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal
act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405
considers absolutely confidential in nature.[34] We previously rejected,
in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,[35] the Peoples nitpicking argument on the
alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we
said:

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the

term deposits, as used in R.A.1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail
a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not
lie. An examination of the law shows that the term deposits used therein is
to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise
to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government
to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic
development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for

authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether
it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the
bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to
protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the
country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The
Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the
trust account covers deposit, placement or investment of funds by Urban
Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust
Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the
bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is
not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds
that could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the
policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the
term deposits was intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued
by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked

into by any person, government official, bureau or

office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases
of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where
the money depositedor invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive
interpretation of deposits.Moreover, it is clear from the immediately
quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which
is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that
the law was not intended to apply only to deposits in the strict sense of the
word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase or
invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust
Account No. 858.[36]

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405
(the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized
zones of privacy.[37] Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the
documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here
the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers;
what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily
implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy
and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant

development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment,
numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking
transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking
regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively
recent
law
cannot
be
maintained
without
violating
the
[38]
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of

these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of
commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest
on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The
application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the
alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the
very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to
the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405
tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142.In this light, there is
no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires
harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be
read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A.
No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against
Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at

the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose
Velarde vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether
Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in
the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan
did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the
evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be
based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of
criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as
they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare.We do so
now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the
assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack

of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157472

September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose
M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25,
20022 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent
judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No.
02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding
officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick
Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank. 4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference
and trial on October 8, 2002.5
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the
crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
"Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from
"Escuita" to "Escueta."7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to
be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that
the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner
refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent
entered for him a plea of not guilty.8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner
alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a
competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the
case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the
Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash.
He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy
and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the
defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of
Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial

commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently
insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the
allegation of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is
qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to
Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious
and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in
disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground
to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense
constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion
that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance
which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued
that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done,
since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit
and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing
this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original
information charging the crime of homicide stands.13
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide
to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION
FOR MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.15

Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide,
the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder
because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in
violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public
respondents ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which
qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance
which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after
petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original
Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus,
prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of
double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the
Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again
be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating
the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder
renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth
element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner
confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order
dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do
not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in
double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet
commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was
amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of
Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering
that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such amendment was
tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the
judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy

of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but legal questions.17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal
interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the
Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of
the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second
punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions
and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the
policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to
the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner -Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without
his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve
the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide
without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this
time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit -SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form
or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided
the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good
cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while
the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court,
but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information
has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea
has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph
of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof,
the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense
is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined
in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the
only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble
of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word
"Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in
the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information
for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing
of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made
in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the
rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made;
and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information
are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect
on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the
rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank"
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating
circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely
affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the
charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide.
Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy
is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double
jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the

accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.24
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that
bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the
frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.26
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for
homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional
dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy
clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
1wphi1

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again -If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good
cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged
is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime
with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there
must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the

proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same
offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint
or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.28
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information.
To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the
word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no
dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of
rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right
against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has
already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on
his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not
qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the
original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither
convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160451

February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68492, and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents

Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service

Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to
the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to
collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices
to Caltexs customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager
Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Romano
alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic
report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one
of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, a company
check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to
Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An investigation
also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and
that in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory, Victor S. Goquinco,
were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 in the amount
of P1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same
bank on September 24, 1997; this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the
signatures appearing thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that
Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oros SM Makati Branch
under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of
Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal
portions thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings account.
Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by
petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. A
bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz, positively identified
petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using Gutierrezs name. 4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998.
However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63. The Informations are worded as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge
and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized officers/representatives,
and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused,
having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922 dated September 15, 1997
payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50 with intent to defraud or
cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed
or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing
it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of

PCIBank check no. 72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in
fact, as said accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen
from Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document,
was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the
payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 20040047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount
of Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge
and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized officers/representatives,
and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused,
having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 payable to
Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with intent to defraud or cause
damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or
caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing
it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of
PCIBank check no. 74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in
fact, as said accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen
from Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document,
was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the
payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 20040047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount
of Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. 6 Pretrial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after
which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private
prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending
that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and
Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the
ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had
no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private
complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO
should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however,
that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned
under the original Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to
substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.

PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the
amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the
rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to
receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the accused.
Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by Ramon Romano
who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence
the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo
sent by PCIB to Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred
that the substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion;
the Information must be amended to allege that the private complainant was PCIB and not
Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the
Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended
party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party
in the Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v.
People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for
the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioners
motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record. 12 Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001. 13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the
annulment of the RTCs Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The petitioner
averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION
HAS ALREADY TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY
VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON
CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER
RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR
EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of
estafa. The amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the
offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available before

the amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are amended. Petitioner
further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001
and November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal Case
Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it
was subrogated to the latters right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be
properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Ho 16 and
People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665,
NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE
110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK.
ASSUMING THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO
PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED,
ARRAIGNED, PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED THE
PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID,
HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE
RECORD NOR EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.

VIII. PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID

NOT VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late
stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to
a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage
or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal
acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved
the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the
prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A
separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and timeconsuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity
of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action,
the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason
of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101,
102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a
formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights
of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same
is beneficial to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 24 The
following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in
the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in
the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor
did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged
checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the
trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex,
considering that he has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it.
Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him should
be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In estafa
one of the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315 of the
Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony should
be clearly indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL PRECISION.

This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the
felony committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE and
FALSE for there is no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG
MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party is
already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as early as
March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject decision
concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE (3) MONTHS
before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person
DEFRAUDED in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons
which the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is
total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September
24, 1997 and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the
felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND
VOID due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the prejudice of
Caltex when it truth and in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of another information which should state the offense was committed to
the prejudice of PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory
rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioners argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIBs
comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional
subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who
substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is
that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law because of certain
acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those provided in Article 1302 30 of the Civil Code.
Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the
parties.31 Thus, petitioners acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place
because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and
without need of the debtors knowledge.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the
appellate court is in point. The Court declared
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the crime
resulted to the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International
Banking Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co. compensated it
for its loss and thus became subrogated to all its rights against the defendant (article 1839,
Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in the shoes of the
International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of
the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the filing of the information in the
case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the defendant's unlawful acts,
and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be stated in the information; it stands to
reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage resulting therefrom need not necessarily
occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other essential elements of the crime.

Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to
intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioners gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations
in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If
there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause
such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any
name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without
need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with
law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no
better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110,
Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint
or information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
provides that:

Section 11. Name of the offended party

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such
particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information or record.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall
have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a
mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant.
Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant
case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds
of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint
to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in
reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial
on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the
complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged. In the
instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since
the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity
as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting
the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioners claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO 34 as private
prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his
claim, petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as the RTC
acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999.35 Thus, petitioner cannot feign ignorance or
surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his] failure to make a timely
objection thereto."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice