Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Anti-Corruption Legislation:
Implementation in Practice
The Publication has been prepared with the financial support of the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The views expressed in the report do not necessarily
represent those of Sida. Transparency International Georgia is solely responsible for the reports
content.
Contents
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 4
II. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4
III. Overview of Anti-Corruption Legislation ........................................................................................... 5
The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service ...................................................... 5
The Law on Civil Service ..................................................................................................................... 7
The Criminal Code .............................................................................................................................. 8
Law on Lobbying Activities ................................................................................................................. 9
Law on National Regulatory Authorities ............................................................................................ 9
IV. Implementation of Anti-Corruption Legislation in Practice ............................................................ 10
Law on Civil Service .......................................................................................................................... 10
The law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service ..................................................... 15
Civil Service Bureau .......................................................................................................................... 21
Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission ............................................ 22
Georgian National Communications Commission ............................................................................ 23
Lobbying Activities ........................................................................................................................... 24
Parliamentary Committee on Procedural Issues and Rules ............................................................. 25
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Chief Prosecutors Office ............................................................... 26
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 27
I. Introduction
Anti-corruption provisions have long existed in the Georgian legislation and have been constantly
undergoing change and improvement. For example, the Law on Civil Service1 and the Law on Conflict
of Interest and Corruption in Public Service2 have existed since 1997. The former has undergone 104
different amendments since its adoption, and the latter - 50. In 1998, Georgia adopted the Law on
Lobbying Activities3. The countrys Criminal Code4 provides for criminal liability for corruption and
malfeasance. Finally, conflict of interest and principles of integrity of various regulatory bodies and
their members are regulated by a number of other laws.
However, of equal importance to improving the legal framework is its effective enforcement. The
latter is the subject of this research.
Transparency International Georgia requested statistics from public agencies (ministries) on
violations and responses to the violations of the Laws on Civil Service, Lobbying Activities, and
Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service. We also requested statistics on investigations
launched and criminal prosecutions carried out under relevant articles of the Criminal Code.
The report also presents several case studies (identified though desk research) that illustrate
shortcomings in the implementation of anti-corruption legislation.
Most ministries have a department (usually the Internal Audit Department) that is
responsible for identifying, investigating and responding to violations of norms established
by the Law on Civil Service and the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public
Service.
These departments are mostly ineffective. This is evidenced by the fact that they have failed
to detect violations related to conflict of interest and corruption, which have been identified
by media and non-governmental organizations.
Independent regulatory commissions do not have departments tasked with investigating
cases of possible conflict of interest.
The majority of public agencies do not have a clear internal whistleblowing mechanism. The
existence of such a mechanism is not required by law, which is a significant obstacle for the
implementation of the existing legislation on whistleblower protection and fails to meet best
practice requirements.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Service have
yet to fulfill their obligation to develop a special legislation on whistleblower protection.
The activities of the Anti-Corruption Department of the State Security Service are not
transparent.
A number of inaccuracies have been identified in asset declarations submitted by MPs in
recent years.
The revolving door provision (Article 65 - restriction of employment) of the Law on Civil
Service is the most problematic of anti-corruption provisions. The law does not apply to local
government officials, and does not specify which government body is responsible for its
enforcement.
Based on these key findings, Transparency International Georgia has developed the following
recommendations:
The departments within public agencies responsible for enforcing the Law on Civil Service
and the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service must intensify their
efforts to detect and prevent violations. The capacity of these departments must also be
strengthened, including through training of employees.
Independent regulatory commissions must be obligated by law to set up internal
departments charged with investigating possible cases of conflict of interest.
Public agencies must be obligated by law to develop clear and simple internal procedures for
whistleblowing that will be proactively introduced to their employees.
An effective legislation on whistleblower protection must be adopted for law enforcement
agencies. Alternatively, the existing legislation must be extended to the employees of these
agencies.
Article 65 (restriction of employment) of the Law on Civil Service that contains regulations
on revolving door must be extended to local government employees. Other shortcomings
of this provision (e.g., the lack of a responsible agency) must also be addressed.
The activities of the Anti-Corruption Department of the State Security Service must become
more transparent.
The Procedural Issues and Rules Committee of Parliament must pay greater attention to
examining the asset declarations filed by MPs.
In order to effectively implement anti-corruption legislation, an independent anti-corruption
agency must be created that will have with proper authority, resources and political
independence.
basic principles of responsibility of perpetrators of corruption.5 This law also regulates whistleblower
protection and asset declarations filed by public officials.
The law defines corruption in public service as the abuse of the position or the opportunities
related to the position by a public servant in order to obtain property or other assets prohibited by
law, and the transfer of these assets to him/her, or support in obtaining and legalizing them.6
According to the law, a corruption offense may involve disciplinary, administrative and criminal
liability. The law defines conflict of interest in public service as the conflict of property or other
private interests of a public servant with the interests of state service.7 The law also regulates gifts
received by public servants and their family members and the substantiation of the origin of their
property.8 If a public servant or his/her family member receives a gift that is prohibited by law, they
are obligated to transfer it to the LEPL Service Agency of the Ministry of Finance within three
working days.9
The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service sets restrictions and bans public
officials from making property transactions with a public institution in which they hold a position.
Public officials are also prohibited from making property transactions as public servants with their
close relatives or their representatives.10 In case a public servants personal or property interest is
present during a decision-making process, he/she is obligated to declare self-recusal.11 This law also
regulates the incompatibility of duties in public service. According to the law, an official or his/her
family member may not hold a position, perform any kind of work in, hold any stocks or a share in
the authorized capital of an enterprise registered in Georgia, if the control of its entrepreneurial
activities falls within the powers of this official or his/her office. Officials are also prohibited from
holding a position in any enterprise.12
According to the law, public officials shall be dismissed from their position if:
They or their family members have violated the incompatibility provisions under this Law.
It is confirmed by a court decision that the official owns illegal and/or unsubstantiated
property.13
The law obligates public officials and their family members to annually file asset declarations and
imposes sanctions in case of noncompliance.14
The law also determines the mechanisms of whistleblower protection, disclosure procedure and
other related issues.15 According to the law, disclosure may be made in writing, orally, electronically,
by telephone, fax, through the website administered by the Civil Service Bureau or other means. At
5
the same time, disclosure can be anonymous. If a whistleblower does not express in writing his/her
consent to release his/her identity, the body in charge of the review of whistleblower's applications
shall not disclose the whistleblower's identity.16 Article 204 of the law determines the guarantees of
whistleblower protection. For example, it prohibits the intimidation of a whistleblower or his/her
relatives.
However, this law does not apply to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
State Security Service. Whistleblower protection is supposed to be regulated through a special
legislation in these public agencies.17
16
Article 73 of the Law on Civil Service defines the general rules of conduct, their purpose and scope,
and imposes certain restrictions and obligations on civil servants.25 This article also establishes
general rules of conduct for preventing conflict of interest and corruption in civil service.26
Article 734, Paragraph 4 of the law defines the concept of a person related to a civil servant, which
may include a family member and a close relative under the Law on Conflicts of Interest and
Corruption in Public Service, as well as any other person with whom the public employee maintains a
common household, i.e. a special relationship that may affect conditions or economic outcomes of
their activity. Paragraph 3 of the same article obligates a public servant to provide information to
relevant authorities about related persons employed at the same public agency within one month
after joining civil service, and later by February 1 of each subsequent calendar year.27
In order to prevent corruption offenses, Article 735, Paragraph 2 of the law obligates civil servants to
inform the relevant department of the public agency about receiving a gift.28 If a public servant is
offered an undue benefit, he/she must notify his/her immediate superior in writing of the attempted
offer within three working days.29
Articles 78 and 79 of the law regulate disciplinary violations and related sanctions. The latter
include:30
Reproval
Warning
Deduction of no more than ten working days' salary
Suspension from work without pay for no more than ten working days
Transfer to a lower salary grade for no more than one year
Dismissal on the basis of this Law.31
38
10
Responsible department
Statistics on
violations of the
law
Number of
submitted
statements
on related
persons
4
(Article 73 ,
Paragraph 3)
Number of
submitted
statements
on gifts or
benefits
5
(Article 73 ,
Paragraph 2)
Number of
submitted
statements
on the
attempts to
offer gifts
5
(Article 73 ,
Paragraph 3,
Subparagraph
f))
Statistics
on the use
of
disciplinar
y sanctions
in 20102015
(Article 79)
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Internal Audit
Department
25
422
46
Ministry of
Energy
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Economy
Human Resources
Division of the Human
Resources Management
and Administration
Department
28
Ministry of
Health
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Refugees
1 case of violation
of Articles 66 and
2
73 in 2015. All
other violations
were of Article 52,
Paragraph 1.
36
Internal Audit
Department;
Department of Human
Resources Management
and Development
105
Ministry of
Education
Internal Audit
Department; and the
Department of Human
Resources Management
Ministry of
Agriculture
Internal Audit
Department
19
Ministry of
Regional
Development
and
Infrastructure
Administrative
Department (at the
competition stage).
Internal Audit
Department (detection
and response)
16
Ministry of
Finance
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Culture
51
Ministry of
Sport
Shared by several
departmnets
16
Ministry of
Defense
General Inspectorate
42
11
Ministry of
Justice
Ministry of
Internal
Affairs
Ministry of
Prisons
General Inspection
532
Ministry of
Environment
Protection
61
Office of the
State Minister
of European
and EuroAtlantic
Integration
Administrative
Department
Office of the
State Minister
of
Reconciliation
and Civic
Equality
Administrative
Department
Office of the
State Minister
of Diaspora
Apart from receiving statistics from ministries on violations of the Law on Civil Service, we also
identified several cases through desk research that help illustrate the problems of practical
implementation of the above law. These cases suggest that the revolving door regulations and their
enforcement are still very weak and, in many cases, ineffective in terms of preventing corruption
risks.
The revolving door phenomenon, or the kind of movement of officials between the public and the
private sectors or between supervisor and supervised agencies that gives rise to the risks of conflicts
of interest or corruption, is regulated by Article 65 (restriction on entry on duty) of the Law on Civil
Service.
Article 65 - Restriction of Employment:
For a period of three years after leaving public service, a civil servant may not start working
at an institution or enterprise which was under his/her systematic official supervision during
the preceding three years. In addition, he/she may not receive income from such institution
or enterprise during this period.
Our research revealed significant problems with the Law on Civil Service. Firstly, the law does not
specify the public agency responsible for determining which case of movement of public servants
between the public and private sectors constitutes a violation. It is also unclear what the response
mechanism is for cases when a person s relocation from the public to the private sector has been
identified as a violation of Article 65.
12
Mining company RMG was and perhaps is still headed by persons, who were previously
employed in public service and were responsible for granting licenses to this company and
overseeing its compliance with license conditions. These persons are Zurab Kutelia (former
head of the Mineral Resource Protection and Mining Department of the Ministry of
Environment Protection, and chairman of the Ministrys Interagency Council of Experts on
Mineral Resource Licenses until 2004) and Solomon Tsabadze (head of the Department of
Environmental Permits and State Environmental Assessment at the Ministry of Environment
Protection until 2003).49
Dariali Energy Ltd Director Zurab Alavidze held the position of deputy minister of economy in
2009-2010. The Ministry of Economy issues permits for the construction of medium and
large hydro power plants and is responsible for overseeing their compliance with permit
conditions.50
The following persons held high-ranking government positions before becoming affiliated
with a company set up to allow hunting of animals included in the Red List of Endangered
Species: Saba Kiknadze (former chairman of the Tourism and Resorts Department of the
Ministry of Economy) and Datuna Rakviashvili (former deputy state minister of reintegration,
later deputy ambassador of Georgia to the United States).51
The most noteworthy example is Zviad Cheishvilis movement between the largest
company involved in timber business and top positions regulating this very field (head of the
Department of Licenses and Permits; head of the Forestry Department; deputy minister of
environment protection; deputy minister of economy and sustainable development.)52
The mechanism for responding to violations identified during the movement of civil servants
between supervisor and supervised public agencies is also problematic. If a civil servant applies to
work at a public agency that they had supervised during their service in the public sector over the
preceding three years, the recipient public agency must refuse them employment on the basis of
Article 65. However, it is unclear what the response mechanism is when the recipient public agency
violates this norm, as it was likely the case with the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), when
Kakhaber Sonishvili was appointed as its Deputy Financial Director.
According to information received from the State Audit Office (SAO), from May 6, 2010 to
September 20, 2012, Kakhaber Sonishvili worked as the supervising auditor at the Economic
Activities Audit Department of the SAO. According to the SAO, Sonishvili was involved in compliance
49
Natural Resource Management and Factors Conducive to Elite Corruption, Green Alternative, 2015 (revised
edition), see: http://goo.gl/xNB9mt
50
Natural Resource Management and Factors Conducive to Elite Corruption, Green Alternative, 2015 (revised
edition), see: http://goo.gl/xNB9mt
51
Natural Resource Management and Factors Conducive to Elite Corruption, Green Alternative, 2015 (revised
edition), see: http://goo.gl/xNB9mt
52
Natural Resource Management and Factors Conducive to Elite Corruption, Green Alternative, 2015 (revised
edition), see: http://goo.gl/xNB9mt
13
audits of the measures against pollution of the Black Sea and the activities of the LEPL Georgian
Public Broadcaster.
According to the Law on State Audit Office, compliance audit involves examination, evaluation and
reporting on the reasonability and legality of the auditee's activities. Article 24 of the same law
states that the SAO is entitled to develop recommendations based on audit findings and submit the
audit report and recommendations to the auditee. The SAO must be notified on the measures
undertaken in follow up on its recommendations within the period of 1 month, unless another time
frame has been set by the SAO. In other words, by taking part in the compliance audit of LEPL
Georgian Public Broadcaster Kakhaber Sonishvili had conducted official supervision over it.
Therefore, his relocation to the GPB as its Deputy Financial Director in March 2013 is a clear example
of a revolving door and constitutes a violation of Article 65 of the Law on Civil Service.
The GPB has not responded in any way to the discovery of this possible legal violation by
Transparency International Georgia, which serves as an illustration of the above-mentioned legal
shortcoming.
Finally, the current wording of the Law on Civil Service suggests that the restrictions set by Article 65
do not apply to local government employees, which is also a problem. According to the law, Article
65 applies to state employees, which is defined by Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the same law as an
employee who has working relations with the state, while a person who has labor relations with a
local government unit is a local government employee.
The following case discovered by Transparency International Georgia illustrates the need to extend
the law to local government employees:
Another case of notice involves Lasha Purtskhvanidze, former deputy mayor of Tbilisi and
head of the Old Tbilisi District Administration. After resigning from the City Hall in 2009,
Purtskhvanidze and his former deputy Koba Kharshiladze each acquired a 50 percent share
in Greenservice Ltd. at a token price of GEL 200 in November 2010. By then, Greenservice
was already a major recipient of public funds through procurement and had been
contracted by the City Hall to implement a number of projects in the city (including those
implemented during Purtskhvanidzes and Kharshiladzes time in the office). Allegations
were made that Purtskhvanidze was the beneficial owner of the company while holding
office in the City Hall. After the formal acquisition by these two former City Hall officials,
Greenservice continued to win public tenders and received at least GEL 4 million in
government contracts in 2010-2012. In April 2012, TI Georgia reported that the City Hall had
purchased trees from Greenservice at a suspiciously high price. When the story was picked
up by the media, the city mayor called a press conference, accused Greenservice of
cheating, and announced that the City Hall would cancel all of its contracts with the
company. While the city authorities did, indeed, stop working with Greenservice, they
continued to contract Greenservice Plus, a company which is also owned by Purtskhvanidze
14
and Kharshiladze, and has the same legal address as Greenservice. The company received
over GEL 0.5 million from the City Hall in the first three months of 2013 alone.53
The above problems point to the need to improve and better enforce the anti-corruption regulations
set by the Law on Civil Service.
Businessmen in Politics and Politicians in Business: Problem of Revolving Door in Georgia, Transparency
International Georgia, 2013, http://goo.gl/6xlO5z
15
Service. Therefore, no violations of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service
have been identified in the Office of the State Minister in 2010-2015.
Responses of this kind suggest that the law is not effectively enforced in these public agencies.
The remaining ministries responded that the departments responsible for monitoring the
compliance with the legal provisions of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption have either
found no violations of the law or this information is available elsewhere.
Statistics on the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service
Existence of a
responsible
department
Statistics on
the violation
of the law
Number of
submitted selfrecusal statements
(Article 11,
Paragraph 2)
Number of
cases of
incompatibility
of duties (Article
13) detected
Number of
corruption
offenses
detected
Number of
employees
dismissed on
the basis of
corruption
offenses
Ministry of
Foreign
Affairs
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Energy
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Economy
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Health
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Refugees
Internal Audit
Department;
Division of Human
Resources
Management and
Development
Ministry of
Education
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Agriculture
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Regional
Developmen
t and
Infrastructur
e
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Finance
Internal Audit
Department
Ministry of
Culture
Ministry of
Sport
No designated
department,
however, if
needed, several
departments can
conduct
monitoring.
16
Ministry of
Defense
General Inspection
Ministry of
Justice
Ministry of
Internal
Affairs
Ministry of
Prisons
General Inspection
Ministry of
Environment
Protection
Inspection Division
of the Internal
Audit Department
Office of the
State
Minister of
European
and EuroAtlantic
Integration
Administrative
Department
Office of the
State
Minister of
Reconciliatio
n and Civic
Equality
Administrative
Department
Office of the
State
Minister of
Diaspora
Even though the examined ministries reported having detected no violations of the Law on Conflict
of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, violations of various provisions of this law have been
identified by non-governmental organizations and the media at all levels of government, as well as in
the executive and the legislative branches and in the local government bodies. For example:
As of May 5, 2015, the Governor of Imereti region was also a director of a company he held
shares in, which is a clear violation of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public
Service.54
For several years, Mariam Valishvili, Deputy Minister of Energy since 2008, was also the
director of TOT Energy (one of the companies where Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze had a
stake), in violation of Article 13, Paragraph 4 of the Law on Conflict of Interest and
Corruption in Public Service, according to which, a public servant may not hold a position in
any enterprise.55
54
17
Chairman of Poti City Council Aleksandre Topuria filed his asset declaration on December 2,
2014, without fully including the business shares held by his family members in the
document. Specifically, as of June 2015, his wife Eteri Topuria held 100% shares in two
companies and 50% in one company.56
As of April 2015, Deputy Mayor of Batumi also held 100% shares of Elit-Flora Ltd. In addition,
the Deputy Mayor did not declare his shares in two companies. Therefore, his asset
declaration does not include information about the income received from these
companies.57 Similar violations were identified in relation to the Chairperson and several
Members of Batumi City Council.58
These examples illustrate that the violations of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in
Public Service are not uncommon, while the detection and prevention mechanisms are weak.
The response to violations is also largely ineffective. For example, after Transparency International
Georgia informed the Anti-Corruption Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about an incomplete
asset declaration filed by a governor, the law enforcement agency responded by saying that Article
355 of the Criminal Code (entry of incomplete or incorrect information in an asset declaration) had
not been violated. It is unclear how law enforcement agencies determine whether inaccurate or
incomplete information was included in an asset declaration intentionally. The fact that the AntiCorruption Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not launch an investigation under Article
355 of the Criminal Code points to the weakness of response mechanisms and a lack of political
will.59
The fact that the response mechanisms are either weak or non-existent, even though violations of
the law are common, is undoubtedly one of the main problems of anti-corruption policy.
The study also revealed that a large majority of ministries have not developed internal mechanisms
of disclosure (for whistleblowers) and instead follow the general rules established by the Law on
Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service. Only a few ministries have issued clarifications
on the mechanisms and procedures of disclosure. For example, provisions related to disclosure are
included in the Employee Handbook that was approved by the Minister of Economy (Order N 11/130, April 28, 2014); According to Ministry of Finance, its Internal Audit Department runs an
electronic mailbox (internalaudit@mof.ge) and a hot line (226-22-22) that can be used to disclose
official misconduct. The information gathered this way is then published on the Ministry website and
inside its administrative building. The Ministry also stated that no other internal mechanism of
disclosure had been developed and no separate legal acts had been approved. The Ministry of
Finance explained that the administrative website of the LEPL Civil Service Bureau would serve as a
56
Commercial Activities of Public Officials in Samegrelo Municipalities and their Family Members,
Transparency International Georgia, 2015, http://goo.gl/m9zqC6
57
Commercial Activities of Batumi City Hall Officials, Transparency International Georgia, 2015,
http://goo.gl/mT9W1k
58
Commercial Activities of Batumi City Council Members, Transparency International Georgia, 2015,
http://goo.gl/E1PHAh
59
The Anti-Corruption Agency of the MIA does not respond effectively to alleged violations in asset
declarations of public officials, Transparency International Georgia, 2015, http://goo.gl/thMC8A
18
Existence of an internal
disclosure mechanism
Number of
whistleblowi
ng cases
Number of trainings /
information meetings on
whistleblower
protection
Number of
violations of
3
4
Articles 20 , 20
5
and 20 detected
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Ministry of
Energy
Ministry of
Economy
Employee Handbook
(Ministers Order)
Ministry of Health
Ministry of
Refugees
Ministry of
Education
Ministry of
Agriculture
60
http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/whistleblower_protection_and_georgia__policy_brief_july_2015.pdf
19
Ministry of
Regional
Development and
Infrastructure
Ministry of
Finance
Ministry of
Culture
Ministry of Sport
Ministry of
Defense
Ministry of
Justice
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Ministry of
Prisons
317
Office of the
State Minister of
European and
Euro-Atlantic
Integration
Office of the
State Minister of
Reconciliation
and Civic Equality
Office of the
State Minister of
Diaspora
Ministry of
Environment
Protection
According to Article 2011 of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, issues of
disclosure are to be regulated by special legislation for the Ministry Defense, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the State Security Service. In order to check the existence of this legislation,
Transparency International Georgia requested public information from the Parliamentary
Committee on Defense and Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
State Security Service.
20
The Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security stated that the question fell outside its
mandate and redirected it to the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs and the State Security
Service.
The State Security Service did not respond to this request, as it did with all other requests we sent as
part of this research. Both Ministries (Defense and Internal Affairs) stated that they are working on
developing the special legislation, but did not provide any information on specific deadlines.
Several recent whistleblowing cases demonstrated the necessity for the Ministries of Defense and
Internal Affairs and the State Security Service to develop their special legislation on whistleblower
protection. For example, on September 27, 2015, the media reported on a video which Giorgi
Babunashvili, a former senior lieutenant of the police, had obtained from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. The video revealed possible violations inside the Ministry. According to media reports, the
former police officer is currently in Europe and is seeking political asylum. Also, in March 2015, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs dismissed a police officer Ruslan Baziashvili, who had provided
information about possible violations in the Ministry to a Member of Parliament from the United
National Movement, Givi Targamadze. Moreover, the Chief Prosecutors Office launched an
investigation over possible abuse of power against nine employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Both Giorgi Babunashvili and Ruslan Baziashvili are former police officers who disclosed information
that revealed possible violations that harmed public interest.61 Despite this, and because of the
abovementioned legal shortcomings, these people cannot currently enjoy protection as
whistleblowers, which obstructs successful prevention corruption and other offenses.
Government Must Ensure Protection of Whistleblowers in Interior and Defense Ministries, Transparency
International Georgia, 2015, http://goo.gl/h9M8UO
21
The Civil Service Bureau reported that for each of the above violations, the officials were fined for
GEL 1,000 through individual administrative-legal acts. 15 of these acts were challenged in court, of
which:
A) 7 claims were fully granted;
B) 1 claim was not granted;
C) 1 claim was left unexamined;
D) 1 claim was recalled by the plaintiff.
E) 4 claims are currently being considered by the court.
The Civil Service Bureau also reported that there has not been a single case of criminal liability
having been imposed on an official for a failure to file an asset declaration after the initial fine
(Article 20, Paragraph 4).
In 2015, the Civil Service Bureau conducted three trainings for the employees of all 19 ministries and
their Internal Audit Departments on the strengthening of whistleblower protection. However, these
trainings were not mentioned in the responses from the Ministries of Energy, Prisons, Finance and
Diaspora. In addition, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy involves training two representatives of
each local government body on the issues of ethics and whistleblower protection in 2015.
In many cases, attendance to the whistleblower protection trainings was low, which suggests that
these trainings were probably not very effective in supporting the implementation of the legislation
on whistleblower protection in the public sector. Therefore, in the future, it is necessary to increase
the number of participants in these meetings.
22
Despite this response from the Commission, non-governmental organizations have raised questions
about conflict of interest within GNERC, specifically in relation to its former chairman Guram
Chalagashvili. According to his asset declaration, Chalagashvilis wife works at Georgian Water and
Power, the company operating Tbilisis water supply system, where she earned a total of GEL 25,024
in 2012. This appears to be a violation of the legal provision which prohibits family members of
independent regulators from involvement in private companies operating in respective sectors and,
once again, points to the poor monitoring and enforcement of existing restrictions. 62
Businessmen in Politics and Politicians in Business: Problem of Revolving Door in Georgia, Transparency
International Georgia, 2013, http://goo.gl/6xlO5z
63
Businessmen in Politics and Politicians in Business: Problem of Revolving Door in Georgia, Transparency
International Georgia, 2013, http://goo.gl/6xlO5z
64
Report of the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Georgian National
Communications Commission, Parliament of Georgia, reporting period: May 1, 2013 - November 1, 2013,
http://goo.gl/WUvvWU
23
believes that the legal amendments that recently introduced a requirement for public agencies to
conduct recruitment only through public competition have resulted in the GNCC almost exclusively
hiring supernumerary specialists. The problem is that the GNCC does not have a limit on its
supernumerary staff, meaning that, theoretically, it can hire unlimited number of employees
through a nontransparent process. IDFI found that, in 2012-2015, the GNCC had hired 51 new
employees, some of them being the relatives of MPs. For example, brother-in-law of MP Ana
Mirotadze and son-in-law of MP Irakli Tripolski had started working at the GNCC as supernumerary
specialists after the elections. The appointment of Tamta Tepnadze, former employee of the
Parliamentary Committee on Economics, as the GNCC Public Defender also raised questions. The
commission tasked with the selecting of the Public Defender was headed by MP Zurab Tkemaladze,
chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Economics, whose grandchild Tamta Tepnadze later
hired in her department at the GNCC, together with her bridesmaid and the son of MP Dimitri
Khundadze, chairman of the Health and Social Issues Committee.65 Such staffing policy gives the
impression that GNCC is not immune to external influence and raises questions about its
independence.
The fact that, in recent years, Parliament, media and non-governmental organizations have
identified possible cases of conflict of interest and nepotism in the Georgian National
Communications Commission illustrates that the existing mechanisms and legal framework cannot
effectively prevent of conflict of interest, corruption and nepotism.
Lobbying Activities
Transparency International Georgia requested public information on registered lobbyists since 1999
from the Government Administration, Parliament, and local government bodies of Kutaisi, Batumi
and Tbilisi
According to the information received from Parliament, there were a total of 27 cases of lobbyist
registration in 2003-2015, while 7 persons were denied registration. During this period, a total of 19
persons have exercised their right to register as lobbyists in Parliament. Tbilisi City Council reported
that only one person had registered as a lobbyist in 2014, and that none had been refused
registration in 2003-2015. Tbilisi City Hall reported that its database does not hold information about
registered lobbyists. The local government bodies of Batumi and Kutaisi reported having had no
cases of lobbyist registration either.
The above information shows that lobbying in Georgia is not a widespread practice. However, this
issue still requires attention since, without appropriate regulations and enforcement, it may give rise
to serious corruption risks, specifically in relation to the so-called revolving door phenomenon.
For the purpose of preventing corruption risks, the Law on Lobbying Activities determines work
position as one of the bases for denying lobbyist registration. Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph
a) of the law states that a lobbyist registration shall be denied if: a) a citizens work position is
65
Signs of Nepotism in the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC), Institute for Development
of Freedom of Information (IDFI), 2015, https://goo.gl/f4PTny
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had not fully declared their property and business activities.69 Cases such as these illustrate that
certain norms of the anti-corruption legislation are not being implemented effectively. In addition,
violations that are being detected are often left unaddressed by the relevant authorities.
11
1818
1533
193
216
79
68
220 (Negligence)
221(commercial bribery)
98
81
69
26
825
356
205
338 (bribe-taking)
520
456
339 (bribe-giving)
136
159
23
25
180
287
The above statistics are not enough to draw any definitive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
implementation of the anti-corruption legislation. However, the problems described in this report,
specifically, those concerning asset declarations and the revolving door phenomenon, indicate that
greater attention needs to be paid to the implementation of the existing legislation in practice. This
can be achieved by strengthening the existing control mechanisms (e.g., more frequent and
comprehensive inspections of civil servants by responsible internal structural units) as well as by
creating new mechanisms, such as an independent anti-corruption agency.
V. Conclusion
Anti-corruption provisions have long existed in the Georgian legislation and have been constantly
undergoing change and improvement. However, effective implementation of the anti-corruption
legislation in the Georgian public sector, including crime detection and prevention, remains a
challenge. Our research revealed a number of problem areas. One of the main obstacles for this
research was incomplete information provided by public agencies. In some cases, we had the
impression that public agencies deliberately avoided answering certain questions. The following are
the key findings of our research and the corresponding recommendations:
Findings:
Most ministries examined during this research have a department (usually the Internal Audit
Department) responsible for identifying, investigating and sanctioning the violations of
norms established by the Law on Civil Service and the Law on Conflict of Interest and
Corruption in Public Service. However, in many cases, these departments are ineffective,
since there are no clear regulations on the frequency and scale of relevant inspections.
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The fact that public agency departments responsible for detecting violations have not found
any reinforces our doubts about their effectiveness, especially since many independent
studies conducted by non-governmental organizations and the media have repeatedly
shown that violations of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service are
common on all levels of government, in the legislative, the executive and the local
government bodies.
Some public agencies do not have departments responsible for detecting violations of the
Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service and, therefore, are unaware of
possible violations. These public agencies responded to our requests by saying that there
were no cases of conflict of interest.
Under the current law, no public agency is responsible for verifying and reviewing the asset
declarations filed annually by public officials. The facts presented in this report point to the
need for systematic monitoring of asset declarations and verification of filed information in
order to effectively enforce the conflict of interest and anti-corruption regulation. We
welcome the amendments to the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public
Service, hereby, starting January 1, 2017, the Civil Service Bureau will monitor the
compliance of asset declarations with the law and verifying the accuracy and completeness
of the declared information. However, the problem will remain unaddressed for the
remaining one-year period until the amendment enters into force.
The majority of public agencies do not have a clear internal whistleblowing mechanism. The
existence of such a mechanism is not required by the law, which is a significant obstacle for
the implementation of the existing legislation on whistleblower protection.
Public agencies that are obligated by law to develop special legislation on whistleblower
protection (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the State Security
Service) have yet to do so. Both Ministries have stated that they are working on developing
this legislation, but have not disclosed any information about the process or its deadlines.
Seminars and information meetings on whistleblower protection legislation conducted by
the Civil Service Bureau are being attended by only a handful of employees from public
agencies. This fails to meet the goal of having public servants be thoroughly informed about
the issue.
The revolving door provision (Article 65 - restriction on entry on duty) of the Law on Civil
Service is the most problematic anti-corruption provision. The regulations included in this
provision are quite weak and often do not address corruption risks. More specifically:
o The law does not specify which public agency is responsible for determining whether
Article 65 has been violated. It is also unclear what the response mechanism is for
the cases where a public servants relocation from public to the private sector has
been identified as a violation of Article 65.
o The mechanism for responding to violations identified during the movement of
public officials between the supervisor and supervised public agencies is
problematic. If a civil servant applies for a job at a public agency that they had
supervised during the past 3 years, the recipient public agency must refuse them
employment on the basis of Article 65. However, it is unclear what the response
mechanism is when the recipient public agency violates this norm.
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Finally, the current wording of the Law on Civil Service suggests that the restrictions
set by Article 65 do not apply to local government employees, which is also a
problem.
The State Security Service did not reply to any of our freedom of information requests,
which points to its lack of transparency and accountability. This is especially alarming,
considering the fact that the Anti-Corruption Agency is part of the State Security Service.
o
Based on these key findings Transparency International Georgia has developed the following
recommendations:
The public agency departments responsible for enforcing the Law on Civil Service and the
Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service must intensify their efforts to
detect and prevent violations. The law must clearly set this obligation and must determine
the frequency and the scope of the relevant inspections. The capacity of these departments
must also be strengthened, including through the training of their employees.
According to an amendment to the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public
Service, on January 1, 2017, the Civil Service Bureau will start monitoring the compliance of
asset declarations with the law and verifying the accuracy and completeness of the declared
information. However, the problem will remain unaddressed for the remaining one-year
period. We believe that the part of the amendment that grants the Civil Service Bureau the
right to respond to violations of asset declaration must enter into force before January 1,
2017, so that there is a legal mechanism of responding to inaccuracies established by nongovernmental organizations and the media.
Public agencies must develop clear and simple internal procedures for whistleblowing and
provide detailed information about these procedures to their employees.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Service must
adopt effective legislation on whistleblower protection that will be based on the relevant
best practice. Alternatively, the existing legislation must be extended to cover the
employees of these agencies.
The Civil Service Bureau must continue its information campaign on whistleblower
protection and, to the extent possible, must widen the group of public servants attending its
information meetings and seminars. The information campaign could include the
preparation and distribution of information booklets, videos, flyers and guidebooks.
Article 65 (restriction of employment) of the Law on Civil Service which regulates the
revolving door must be extended to local government employees. Other shortcomings of
this provision must also be addressed.
Transparency International Georgia believes that an independent anti-corruption agency
must be created in order to effectively enforce anti-corruption legislation. The creation of
this agency is part of the best practice in combating corruption. Among other things, this
agency must be tasked with improving the legislation and monitoring its implementation.
This would solve the problems discussed in this report arise from the absence of a body
responsible for enforcing anti-corruption legislation.
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