CASES

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27232. June 30, 1969.]
BELEN CRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EXEQUIEL CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.
Ignacio Nabong for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cecilio F. Wycoco, for Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
CAPISTRANO, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 3946.
Plaintiffs poorly drafted complaint, liberally construed so as to do substantial justice, stated a
cause of action by the mother representing her recognized natural child for compulsory
recognition and support of the child by the defendant father. The acknowledging parent who
exercises parental authority over the acknowledged natural child (Article 311, Civil Code) has the
duty to represent the child in all actions which may redound to the childs benefit (Article
316[1]). The reason for the law is stated by a member of the Code Commission that drafted the
New Civil Code in his comment on Article 316 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The duty of the parents to represent their unemancipated children in all actions which may
redound to their benefit (which had been held impliedly repealed by Section 553, Act 190 in
Palet v. Aldecoa, 15 Phil. 232) was revived by the Code Commission in order to maintain the
principle of family solidarity consecrated in the new Code." (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Phil.
with Comments and Annotations, Vol. I, pp. 297-298.)
Defendants answer denied paternity of the child and liability to support said child.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on July 27, 1964 containing the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The evidence for the plaintiff shows that on October 4 up to November 13, 1959, the plaintiff
lived as housemaid in the house of Anselma de Leon, mother of the defendant, in the City of
Cabanatuan wherein the defendant also lived; that at that time the plaintiff and the defendant
were both single; that on October 5, 1959, the defendant embraced her and by force and threat
she surrendered her womanhood because he would kill her if she did not accede to the wishes of
the defendant; that she had sexual intercourse with the defendant on October 5, 12, 21, and 23,
1959; that on July 11, 1960 she gave birth to a child which was baptized Anselma Armi Castillo;
she gave that name to her child because that was the name of the babys grandmother, Anselma
de Leon, who is the mother of the defendant; that when Anselma de Leon, the mother of the
defendant, noticed that she was conceiving, she drove the plaintiff away; that she was asked at
first to go to the market to sell (to attend to the store of defendants mother) and during her
absence one of the sons of the mother of the defendant was ordered to bring all her belongings
to the house of the brother of the defendants mother; that Exhibit A is the baptismal certificate
of the child Anselma Armi Castillo wherein it appears that Edgardo Castillo, who is the brother
of the defendant, stood as one of the sponsors, that she demanded from the defendant support
for her child in the amount of P40.00 a month but the defendant refused to give support to her
child; that to maintain her child she used to sell assorted goods in the market; that the

defendant is now married and they own a big store in the public market with a car of their own
and a television set; that she contracted her lawyer for P300.00 . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial court, for the reasons stated in its decision, gave credence to the plaintiffs evidence.
Judgment was rendered as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders its decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Declaring Anselma Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo;
(b) Ordering the defendant to give support to the child Anselma Armi Castillo in the sum of
P30.00 per month from the date of the filing of the complaint;
(c) Further ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P300.00 as attorneys fees
and to pay the costs of the suit."cralaw virtua1aw library
Defendant appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Said court, however, certified
the case to this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law.
In appellants brief, it is admitted that Anselma Armi Castillo is appellants natural child.
Appellant, however, contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to give support to the
child from date of the filing of the complaint. The contention is tenable insofar as the giving of
the support was to begin from the time of the filing of the complaint. The fact of the child being
natural is distinct from the fact of the childs recognition. A natural child not recognized by the
father has no rights whatever, not even to support. This doctrine, laid down as early as fifty-one
years ago in Concepcion v. Untaran, 38 Phil., 736, has been followed in later decisions. It is the
fact of recognition, voluntary (by any of the four means specified in Article 278, Civil Code) or
compulsory (in any of the cases mentioned in Article 283), that gives the natural child the rights
of support and succession. In the case at bar, the defendant father not having voluntarily
recognized his natural child by any of the means specified in Article 278 of the Civil Code, he
had no obligation to support said child until after judgment was rendered by the lower court
declaring that he was the father of the child. The distinct effects of voluntary recognition and
compulsory recognition may be further clarified with examples.
(1) The birth certificate giving the names of the unmarried father and mother of the newly born
child was sworn to by both parents (Sec. 5, Act No. 3753). Subsequently, the father refused to
support the child. In such case an action for support (not for recognition) of the child may be
brought against the father founded upon his voluntary act of having recognized the child in the
record of birth.
(2) Suppose in the first example, the father who has refused to support his natural child did not
recognized the child in the record of birth. In such case the child is not entitled to support, but a
combined action for compulsory recognition and for support may be brought against the father,
and the court may render judgment ordering the defendant father to recognize the child as his
natural child and to give support to the child from the date of the judgment. The support should
commence from the date of the judgment because it is the judgment compelling recognition that
gives rights to the child.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in declaring that he is the father of the natural
child on the ground of physical resemblance between him and the child. The contention is
unmeritorious. The finding of close resemblance between the child and the defendant was a
minor one. It was not even mentioned in the trial courts conclusion as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in this case, the Court is convinced that
the defendant really had sexual relations with the plaintiff on October 5, 12, 21, and 23, 1959, at
first with force and intimidation but the subsequent sexual relations were done without force. As
a consequence thereof, the plaintiff conceived and gave birth to a baby girl on July 11, 1960 who
was named Anselma Armi Castillo. At that time, the plaintiff and the defendant were both single
and had no impediment to marry each other."cralaw virtua1aw library
In addition, counsel for appellant admitted in appellants brief that appellant is the father of

Anselma Armi Castillo. In the case of Navarro v. Bacalla, G.R. No. L-20607, October 14, 1965,
this Court said that "once the fact of paternity of a natural child is found to have been
established by evidence and is no longer disputed by the father, he should be compelled to
recognize the child as his own."cralaw virtua1aw library
The appealed judgment merely declared Anselma Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant
Exequiel Castillo. It should be modified by ordering said defendant to recognize the child as his
natural child and to give the child support in the sum of P100.00 per month, considering that
the child is now of school age and that the defendant father has the means, from July 27, 1964,
the date the lower courts judgment was promulgated.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed judgment is modified so as to read as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Declaring Anselma Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant-appellant Exequiel Castillo,
and ordering said appellant to recognize said child as his natural child and to give her support in
the amount of P100.00 per month from July 27, 1964; and
(b) Ordering defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee the sum of P500.00 as counsel fee.
Costs against defendant-appellant also in this instance.
G.R. No. L-54097 September 30, 1981
ROMEO N. GUMBA, Petitioner, vs. JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT
OF CAMARINES SUR AND THE CITIES OF NAGA and IRIGA and HAIDE B. VISTAGUMBA Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
AQUINO, J.:
The spouses Romeo N. Gumba and Haide B. Vista, both lawyers, were married in 1968. They
lived with Haide's parents in Naga City. Some months after the marriage, Romeo left Haide and
lived in Canaman, Camarines Sur with his concubine, Josefina Ballena and their two children.
Haide was then pregnant. On August 19, 1969, she gave birth to a baby girl who was named
Romy Fay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In 1972, Haide sued Romeo for support. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Naga City
Branch II, in a decision dated February 14, 1974, ordered Romeo to pay Haide "in advance every
month" seventy-five pesos for the support of their child and past support at the same rate as of
July 7, 1972 (when the complaint was filed) plus five hundred pesos as attorney's fees (Civil Case
No. 7334).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
No support was adjudged in favor of Haide because she was working as legal officer of the
regional health office at P472 per month. Romeo did not appeal. So, judgment became final and
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On December 17, 1974, Romeo rejoined Haide and lived with her in an apartment at Naga City.
On April 27, 1978, he again abandoned her and refused to pay the rental for the apartment and
to support her and their child. Haide was constrained once more to go to
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On August 21, 1978, she sued Romeo in the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court in Naga City
for the revival of the judgment against him. As a second cause of action, she asked that Romeo
be ordered to pay P950 (instead of P75) a month for the support of their child and of herself
because she was no longer gainfully employed (Civil Case No.
81).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Romeo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the five year period for the executing the
judgment by writ of execution had not yet expired and that the modification of that judgment is
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in its orders of December 14, 1979 and March 6,
1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Romeo filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari dated March 17, 1980 wherein bhe
prayed for the annulment of the order of December 14, 1979. After the respondents had filed
their comments, the Court of Appeals in its resolution of May 23, 1980 certified the case to this
Court because it involves the trial court's jurisdication (CA-G. R. No. 10542SP).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The issues are whether the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has jurisdication over the
action filed by Haide and whether the record of Civil Case No. 7334 of the Court of First Instance
should be transferred to the special court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Republic Act No. 6591, which took effect on September 30, 1972, created the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for Camarines Sur and the Cities of Naga and Iriga. It contains the
following provisions on jurisdication and transfer of cases:chanrobles virtual law library
SECTION 1. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdication to hear and decide the following cases:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(c) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obigations, legal separation of spouses,
and actions for support;
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 9. Transitory provisions.- Upon the organization of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, the Secretary of Justice shall cause all cases and proceedings pending before the courts of
first instance, municipal courts and icty courts in the Province of Camarines Sur and the Cities
of Naga and Iriga, properly cognizable by said court to be transferred thereto.
The Chief Justice in Administrative Order No. 4 dated February 3, 1976 directed that "all cases
and proceedings, except those that have already been submitted for decision as of this
datee, pending before the Courts of Frist Instnace, Circuit Criminal Court, City Courts and
Municipal Courts within the Province of Camarines Sur and the Cities of Naga and Iriga, which
are within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the Province of
Camarines Sur and the Cities of naga and Iriga," should be transferred to the latter court (72
O.G. 2050).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the complaint by haide in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Civil Case
No. 81, should be regarded as a new actionwhich is seperate and distinct from Civil Case No.
7334 (R-799) of the Court of first Instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The new action is based on the inadequacy of the support awarded to the child in Civil Case No.
7334 and the necessity for giving support to the mother who had a job in 1974 when Civil Case
No. 7334 was decided but who was jobless in 1978 when the new case was
filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The complaint in Civil Case No. 81 covers a period starting on April 27, 1978, when Romeo
abandoned Haide for the second time, or at least from August 21, 1978, when the complaint was
filed and which is, therefore, the the date of the judicial demand for
suppport.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
That case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. The casue of action for revival fof the 1974 judgment may be disregarded as not being in
order because the judgment for support does not beocme dormant and the five-year peiord for

executing it by motion does not apply thereto (Velayo vs. Velayo, L-23538, July 21, 1967, 20
SCRA 734, 65 O.G. 2096).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the transfer of the expediente of Civil Case No. 7334, that cannot be allowd since
it was not a pending case when the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court was organzied in
1976. The original record of the case was destroyed. Only the decision was reconstituted and a
copy of that decision already forms part of the record of Civil Case No. 81 of the Juvenile and
Domestice Relations Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court of First Instance should be the one to resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No.
7334 and should enforce the 1974 judgment in that case which judgment will not be affected by
the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 81. The two cases are independent of each
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
JDRC Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa did not err in denying Remeo N. Gumba's motion to
dismiss and in setting Civl Case No. 81 for pre-trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is dimissed and the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals
is dissolved. Costs against the petitioner
G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, v. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Decision1dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondents
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries
and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. 4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004
granting support pendente lite, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is
demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the
vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant
complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00)
Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of
the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed
from September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven
Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004,
until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two

Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each
corresponding monthpursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
decrease thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for
support. 6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and wellbeing in accordance with familys social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted
by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not
having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final
and executory since respondents motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper
for violation of the three-day notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal.
Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the
court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondents contention that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to
petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus
decreed:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed
Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled Susan Lim
Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered
ordering herein petitioner:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 beginning the
month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the
number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005,
respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to
petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the
amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalling P2,645,000.00,
the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with
attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner
asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the
monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioners motion for
issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA decision.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for
inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr.
issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let,

therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for

the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
G.R. No. L-7071 April 29, 1954
PEDRO CRISOLO, Petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINO B. MACADAEG, ETC., ET
AL., Respondents.
Ramon J. Liceralde and Felicisimo U. Tia for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order of the respondent judge requiring Pedro
Crisolo to pay a monthly pension pendente lite to a minor allegedly his
daughter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner asserts that, summoned to answer Marieta Villa' s complaint for support of Maria
Erlinda Crisolo as his and her natural daughter, he denied such paternity in an answer properly
filed; that upon request of complainant the respondent judge, acting in excess of jurisdiction,
before the hearing of the case, and without affording petitioner a chance to object, issued an
order directing him to pay Marieta Villa P50 monthly for support pendente lite and for medical
expenses of said minor Maria Erlinda; and that his motion for reconsideration was
denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents reply that support pendente lite was ordered in the interest of justice, after the
judge had been shown the birth certificate of the child and a medical certificate showing she had
been suffering from Little's Disease and had been confined at the Children's Hospital (National
Indigent) for about three years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners invokes Francisco vs. Zandueta's holding 1 that were a minor through a
guardian ad litem, brings an action for support on the ground that he is a son of the defendant,
and the defendant denies his paternity, the court has no jurisdiction to award support pendente
lite, because paternity having been denied and this civil status, from which the right to support
is derived, being an issue, there is no authority to grant support pendente lite until a positive
declaration has been made as to the existence of the
relationship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Without going into question whether the documents exhibited to the respondent judge
established prima facie the disputed relationship in this case, and whether upon such proofs
provisional maintenance could be decreed, 2 we deem it sufficient to observe that the complaint
merely averred that Maria Erlinda Crisolo was the natural daughter of Pedro Crisolo. It did not
aver that she was his recognized natural daughter. And yet under the Civil Code and the new
Civil Code a natural daughter, as such, has no right to maintenance, unless she has been
recognized. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
It is earnestly urged that un unrecognized natural child would thus be in worse condition than
other illegitimate children, who are admittedly entitled to support. But such was the juridical
situation under the Civil Code for sixty years. It was criticized on that score - it was defended
too. The Congress in the new Civil Code (Art. 291) elected not to alter the situation. Ours is not
the duty nor the power to amend the statute, which by the way, presents no interstitial space
wherein to insert, in the words of Cardozo, "judge-made innovations."chanrobles virtual law
library
It is alleged however that: (a) the complaint for support was precisely a petition to compel
recognition of a natural child; (b) recognition was in order, the certificate of birth being prima
facie evidence of paternity and (c) consequently support pendente lite was justified. These three
propositions will separately be discussed and rebutted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

A. The complaint did not expressly ask for recognition. Neither did it impliedly ask for the
recognition, because it related no facts either voluntary recognition by defendant under article
278, or of compulsory recognition under article 283 of the new Civil Code. It merely proceeded
on the theory - erroneous indeed - that as Erlinda was defendant's natural daughter support
should be furnished by him. Furthermore, acknowledgment could not have been properly asked,
because the action had been initiated by Marietta Villa, the mother and not by the daughter 4.
Litigations for recognition are between parent and child (Arts. 283, 284, 285 new Civil Code) not between one parent and the other, unless one litigates as guardian of the
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And the circumstance that at the ex-parte hearing of the petition for support pendente lite some
paper was exhibited - supposedly competent evidence of fatherhood - did not have the effect of
altering the issues or competing theories as previously outlined by the respective pleadings. To
hold the contrary view would sanction the employment of surreptitious maneuvers definitely out
of place in judicial proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
B. The certificate of birth, it is argued, which was exhibited to the judge, constituted prima
facie evidence of filiation. We disagree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is a document, filed with the Local Civil Register of Iloilo, and signed by "Clarita Gustillo,
informant" on March 4, 1948, stating that Maria Erlinda Crisolo had been born in Iloilo on
February 5, 1945, the legitimate daughter of Marieta Villa and Pedro Crisolo. Under article 410
of the new Civil Code this would be prima facie proof that Erlinda was the legitimate daughter
of the persons mentioned. But having alleged and admitted that Maria Erlinda was not a
legitimate daughter, plaintiff completely destroyed the certificate's worth as
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If it be contended that such certificate could, at least be proof that Maria Erlinda was the
daughter of Pedro Crisolo, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus would at once come to
mind poisoning the question whether it applies to documents as well as witnesses. At any rate
there is another line of thought compelling outright rejection of such certificate as proof of
bastard father-and-child relationship: Had it expressly so state - that. Maria Erlinda was the
illegitimate daughter of the persons mentioned - the certificate would not have been
recorded (and would not be prima facie evidence) because it was signed only by Clarita
Gustillo, and not by the parents of the infant.
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. . . . In case of an
illegitimate child, the birth certificateshall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to
state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or
to give therein, any information by which such father could be identified. (Act No. 3753)
(Emphasis ours.)
However, because the certificate described the child as legitimate it was accepted for registration
upon the information of a third person, Clarita Gustillo. It is plain to see that to give the
document probative value in court would be to approve evasion or circumvention of the aboveindicated requirement, not to mention the violation of the specific prohibition against the
revelation in the certificate of the name of the father without his
consent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Again pursuant to section 5, of the article 3753, the local civil register had no authority to make
of record the paternity (illegitimate) of Pedro Crisolo upon the information of a third party.
Wherefore his record could not be competent evidence of such paternity. Records of public
officers which are admissible "are limited to those matters which the public officer has authority
to record." 5 And it is essential, to authorize admission of copy of the record of a private
instrument "be made in accordance with the statutory requirements." 6 chanrobles virtual law
library
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming
unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and for herself) from any eligible bachelor or

affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that
the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be
accepted for registration, and it will be evidence for support pendente lite. And any lawyer with
sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities for mischief of such prima
facie evidence - when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design. The spirit of
liberality towards illegitimate children need not be carried to that
extent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Divested of its official character, the document signed by Clarita Gustillo, the "certificate of
birth", is undoubtedly incompetent evidence of fathership against Pedro Crisolo. As to him it is
hearsay, it is res inter alios acta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
C. Supposing that the complaint amounted to a petition for recognition as natural child, and that
the certificate of birth was prima facie evidence, the question remains whether
support pendente lite may decreed. The argument might be advanced that as defendant is
obliged to support only an acknowledged natural child, his obligation to support begins only
from the moment he acknowledged i.e., only after he is compelled to acknowledge by decree of
court at the petition of plaintiff. Nevertheless the angle need not be explored, because the two
major premises on which it is constructed happen to be without foundation as above
demonstrated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, in the absence of legal basis for Maria Erlinda's support, this petition will be
granted, 7 and the questioned order is hereby declared null and void. No
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pablo, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-5153

December 10, 1951

GLICERIO MANGOMA, Petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, as Judge of the

Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, and CANDELARIA
BAUTISTA, Respondents.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for petitioner.
Ricardo D. Galano for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to declare null and void an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated September 28, 1951, ordering petitioner to give
support pendente lite to his wife and daughter in the amount of P750 a month beginning
January 17, 1951 up to the termination of the case of separation of property pending between
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against petitioner seeking the separation of the
property of the spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation of their conjugal
partnership. Months thereafter, prior to the trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that
pending the determination of the case, she and her daughter Leticia be given support pendente
lite in the amount of P1,000 a month and that petitioner be ordered to act accordingly. Her
motion is based on the following ground: On August 30, 1945, while their marriage was still
subsisting, petitioner contracted another marriage with one Luceria Bernardo; in January, 1946,
petitioner abandoned respondent and two minor daughters and went to live with his second
wife; while the bigamy case against petitioner was under investigation by the City Fiscal of
Manila, petitioner refused to give any support to respondent and her children for their
maintenance; petitioner and respondent, through their joint effort and industry, acquired
considerable property which, added to the earnings of petitioner from his various kinds of

business, yields a net income of at least P5,000 a month; petitioner owes them in arrears by way
of support a total of P6,000 from January 17, 1951.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the following grounds: Respondent
abandoned the conjugal home to live with an American soldier, a fact admitted by her when she
testified in the city fiscals office of Manila in the investigation of the charge of bigamy filed by
her against petitioner; respondent committed adultery with said American soldier from October
to December 1945, and lived with him from January to August 1946; later in 1947, respondent
also lived with one Celestino Fernandez up to October 1949; having committed adultery,
respondent, therefore, is not entitled to support; their child Leticia who is under the custody of
respondent should be turned over to petitioner to free her from the influence of her mother who
is living under immoral circumstances; their other two children, Glicerio Jr. and Mercedes, are
at present under the custody of petitioner and are properly taken care of and educated;
petitioner has no other occupation except that of a real estate broker and as such cannot earn
more than P20 a month, which is barely sufficient to support and maintain the two children
under his care; due to repeated civil and criminal cases filed against him by respondent,
petitioner had to close his titles factory. thereby incurring a loss of P5,000, as well as his
machine shop, incurring amounting to P30,000; at present petitioner is heavily indebted to
several banks and because of the lis pendensannotated on his certificate of title upon
respondent's request, he is placed in a position where he could not pay his obligation due to his
inability to negotiate with said properties. Wherefore, petitioner prayed that the motion for
support pendente lite be denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On August 18, 1951, respondent judge authorized his deputy clerk to receive the evidence on the
motion for support pendente lite, and accordingly several trials were held before said deputy
clerk for that purpose, but before petitioner has had a chance to present his evidence on his
special defenses, respondent judge issued on September 28, 1951, an order granting the motion
and ordering petitioner to give supportpendente lite to his wife and daughter Leticia in the
amount of P750 a month beginning January 15, 1951 up to the termination of the case, and to
pay the accrued payments within five days from notice. Hence this petition
for certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 110 wherein the Court a quo, without acceding to
the petition of the husband that he be given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his
defense, favorably acted upon the petition for support pendente lite of the wife and ordered the
husband to pay his wife and child a monthly allowance of P50 pendente lite, this Court, in
revoking the order, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals, said:
We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present
his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
(Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is
the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant
and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established,
and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of
course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being which it may deem sufficient to
enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
character of the resolution to be entered." (Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 112.)
The facts of this case show that petitioner has not also been given an opportunity to adduce
evidence in support of the defense he has set up against the motion for support pendente lite. It
appears that the respondent judge commissioned his deputy clerk to receive evidence the parties
may desire to present on said motion, but that after respondent had presented her evidence and
before the deputy clerk and been able to complete the hearing, respondent judge issued the
order subject of these proceedings without giving petitioner an opportunity to present his
evidence. It is true several trials were held before the deputy clerk of court, but there is nothing
to show that petitioner has resorted to dilatory tactics as to justify that action on the motion be
taken without receiving his evidence. The affidavit submitted by counsel for petitioner, which
stands uncontradicted, shows that said counsel asked for postponement of the hearing only one
and that he failed to appear on the date set for the continuation of the hearing due to a
misunderstanding. At any rate, the court is not persuaded from a consideration of the pleadings

that there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the petitioner, or his counsel, to delay the
proceedings, and, therefore, before action is taken on the matter, an opportunity should be given
him to be heard, considering the serious nature of his special defense. In line with the ruling of
this Court in the Sanchez case, supra, there is no other alternative than to remand this case to
the lower court in order that immediate steps may be taken relative to the reception of the
evidence of petitioner in support of his opposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Wherefore, the order appealed from dated September 28, 1951, is hereby set aside, without
special pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After this decision had become final, the preliminary injunction issued will be
dissolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library