Cont Islam (2007) 1:109122

DOI 10.1007/s11562-007-0012-0

A theory of Islamic political radicalism in Britain:

sociology, theology and international political economy
Tahir Abbas

Published online: 9 June 2007

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This polemical essay based on on-going ethnographic research explores

the phenomenon of Islamic political radicalism in Western Europe, in particular
Britain, and the challenges that emerge in relation to the maintenance of a successful
multicultural project. Analysing recent events in Western Europe, namely the Madrid
train bombings and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the London suicide
bombings in 2005, this paper argues that Islamic political radicalism is on the
increase because of factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to the various
Muslim minority communities. Local, national and international pressures conspire
to compound the aspirations, expectations, attitudes and perceptions of already
disenfranchised groups. First, the layers of the radicalisation onion are peeled away
to explore the nature of the experience of Muslim minorities, analysing questions of
evolving Islamic political identities in the context of the 2001 terrorist attacks and
subsequent war on terror. Second, the dynamics of Islamic political radicalisation
are discussed, specifically alluding to the Quranic ideals that Jihadis variously
appropriate. Finally, the discussion explores the ways in which the nation-state has
involved Muslim elite groups in acting as a bridge between government and the
Muslim citizen. Many young Muslims view these actions cynically with elites vying
for position and profile in an intensely active period of political manoeuvring. In
conclusion, it is argued that should the status quo remain intact, the threat of Islamic
political radicalisation will persist and solutions will be as much dependent on the
nation-state becoming aware of its potential role while disaffected Muslim minorities
continue to develop theological and sociological approaches to life in the nonMuslim West.
Keywords Radicalism . Islamism . Multiculturalism . New Labour . Britain

T. Abbas (*)
Reader in Sociology, Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, Birmingham University,
32 Pritchatts Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
e-mail: t.abbas@bham.ac.uk

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Introduction
Where most of the Muslim world is still facing up to the challenges of Islam,
modernity and democracy Muslim minorities in Western Europe face a whole host of
issues in relation to ethno-national identity, the adaptation of religio-cultural norms
and values and issues in everyday matters of social and legal citizenship (Abbas
2005; Cesari and McLoughlin 2005; Modood et al. 2005). In the current climate in
Britain, and more widely in Western Europe, there is the increasingly significant
phenomenon of the indigenous-born, native-language-speaking Muslim youth
politicised by a radicalised Islam (Abbas 2007; Choudhury 2007). This experience
in contract to the ideologues who would argue that by alluding to an Islamic state
political Islam has largely failed to achieve its intentions to bring about a solution to
global problems (Kepel 2002; Roy 2004). This paper is a theoretical analysis of a
combination of complex factors in relation to cultural, economic, social and political
dislocation compounded by national and international neo-Orientalist and Islamophobic political and media discourse in the British context (Said 1997; Abbas 2001;
Poole 2002; Macdonald 2003).
Major concerns in the question of Islamic political radicalism are how it
originates in the first instance and having determined a solution, how it can be
alleviated. However, it is palpably clear that the questions in relation to what drives
radicalisation and how to engage with radicalised young people remain as difficult to
answer. The communities from which many so-called radicals emanate are generally
removed from formally engaging in the mainstream political process. Where there is
suspicion of activity it tends to centre on the movements of shadowy figures who
venture into homes late at night presumably engaging in radicalising others or selfradicalising themselves. It is possible to do this with developments to media in both
the Islamic and Western worlds, and how the bleak truths of war can stir the
imagination of young minds already susceptible to feelings of frustration, anger,
hate, and ultimately the will to carry out a seemingly honourable duty (Rai 2006).
The ways in which communities are subjected to multiple disadvantage and
alienation accelerates the process of isolation and disenfranchisement determined by
the actions of the nation-state.
There are cases were young Muslims, often of middle class status, can begin their
so-called radicalisation for the first time in universities. These young people arrive
in situations where their ethnicity and religion can cause further feelings of
disillusionment with wider society and the sense that they do not belong. Certainly,
there is a perceptible view that higher education institutions are hotbeds of radical
political Islamic activity, sometimes acting as launch pads for encouraging young
Muslims to become further radicalised, largely elsewhere (Glees and Pope 2005). In
many cases, these young Muslims are perhaps away from home for the first time and
are very much emotionally affected by the injustices of the world, and the general
response from Islamic societies on campus is that most are aware of the problems of
reconciling Islamic and non-Muslim identity issues, but need assistance and support
rather than the proverbial stick over ones head (FOSIS 2005).
Media and political discourses determine a popular culture through the force of
ideology and the power to influence that invariably reveal a worrying lack of
knowledge of Islam both just within majority society but also within Muslim

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communities. Politically, the debates in relation to the Muslims in Britain issue

have been between the left, which focuses on economic structure and the Iraq war
(Bunting 2005; Briggs et al. 2006), the right which has advocated culture and nation,
and the liberals who have focused on civil liberties and freedoms in a seemingly
secular democratic society (Mirza et al. 2007). For some analysts, dominant but
polarised societies remain in the hands of subjugated radical Islamists on the one
hand and dominant neo-conservative Christian evangelicals, with political rhetoric
dominated by such notions as good Muslims are with us and bad Muslims are
against us, on the other (Ali 2002; Dreyfuss 2005). Furthermore, concerns about
multiculturalism, segregation, British-ness and European-ness remain palpable in
a society which sees its elites struggle to appreciate the extent of its diversity while
only slowly relinquishing any notions of empire or as a nation trying to remain a
player in the global market place (Back et al. 2002). What ceases to enter the
imagination is that often Islamic political radicalism is about the tensions of trying to
be European, British Asian, Pakistani or (Azad) Kashmiri as much as it is about
being Muslim.
In Britain, many who have been involved in Islamic political radical activities
have been South Asian Muslim but not all a number have been African-Caribbean
reverts in prisons (cf. Garland et al. 2006; Beckford et al. 2005). Somali groups who
are now forming communities in increasingly segregated areas are experiencing
severe economic and social disadvantage and exclusion. They experience a
particular form of marginalisation which affects groups in three distinct ways: (1)
English society tends to strongly dislike foreigners Xenophobia remains an
important issue in white-English groups as well more integrated ethnic minority
communities. (2) Direct racism and discrimination is experienced because of their
skin colour. And (3) they experience hostility towards Islam in the same way as
other Muslims in British society. As the on-going trail (at time of press) of the
Somalis associated with the alleged attacks planned on 21/7 failed attacks on
London demonstrates, even this group can become embroiled in the act of engaging
in terrorist activities. Although the claim in court is that was merely an elaborate
hoax centred on increasing awareness in relation to the issues emanating from the
war on Iraq there is the notion that there is potentially influence from literalist
tendencies and radicalisation gaining influence in Somalia.
Most of these so-called radical Jihadis have emerged from communities that
have not at all been necessarily poor some attending universities but who were,
however, born or grew up in limited circumstances. They can experience prejudice,
racism and discrimination throughout their early lives and sustained themselves in
education in spite of its limitations in relation to Muslims or ethnic minorities per se.
By hoping to find the truth they are potentially ultimately misdirected by a
radicalising Islamism that seeks to convince apparently once decadent young
Muslims or those yearning for a more literal interpretation of the religion. By
providing a sense of belonging, identity, or an association with a struggle that
transcends everyday boundaries and barriers, theologically, metaphysically and
spiritually, radical Islamists have moved with a perverse message of salvation and
redemption (Malik 2006).
At the national and international level, the politics of George W Bush in the USA
and Tony Blair in Britain have helped to further radicalise Muslims here, although

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there is a continued official denial in relation to this assertion. Since 9/11, throughout
much of the Western world, changes to international finance, anti-terrorism
legislation and debates around identity cards, citizenship, rights and obligations
have all seen the nation-state seemingly tighten its grip on Muslim minorities. Is it
that the war on terror has revealed itself to be an ideological construction, helping
to maintain the status quo, while Muslims are derided, misrepresented, incarcerated,
and, in general, made to feel and think they are unwelcome? Has there been a
perceptible shift towards regarding Muslims as the enemy-within, as an
undifferentiated mass of Arab terrorists, as groups who are overly demanding of
their religious and cultural rights, and as people unwilling to integrate into majority
society? Muslims are looking inside themselves and the British Muslim community
at large to determine what might be at fault within at the same time as the foreign
policies of the George W Bush and Tony Blair governments that have created havoc
in distant lands without. The global context has been the self-fulfilling prophecy of
the clash of civilisations thesis, a theory originally formulated by neo-conservative
ideologues, such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. The
stark realities of the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century have
revealed a whole host of examples where Muslims have suffered throughout the
globe. From the first Gulf War (19901991), to Somalia (1993), Bosnia-Herzegovina
(19931996), Chechnya (1999), the second Palestinian Intifada (2000), the war on
Afghanistan (20012002) and the war on Iraq (20032004), Muslims have been at
the receiving end of the western political and economic interests.
There are approximately 20 million Muslims in Western Europe and six million in
the USA. There are approximately 1 bn Muslims in the world, with Arabs forming
only 15% of this population. From attacks on the Paris metro (1996), the Moscow
theatre attack (2002), the Madrid bombings (2004) killing over 200 people, the
assassination of Theo van Gogh (2004), to the first ever suicide-bombings by homegrown radicals occurs in Europe in 2005 there are discernible connections between
attacks on western mainland and in other parts of the Muslim world. Terrorism on
the part of Islamists is often justified in reaction to violence inflicted by dominant
forces on Muslim people (Pape 2006; Sutton and Vertigan 2005). The events of 7
and 21 July 2005 were not the first time British-born Islamic political radicals have
come to the fore. The Seven in Yemen (1999) included five British-born Muslims,
the two failed shoe bombers Richard Reid (2001) and Saajid Badat (2005) and the
2003 Mikes Place bombers in Tel Aviv were from Derby and Hounslow, Omar
Khan Sharif and Asif Mohammed Hanif are notable examples.
It is clear that in any analysis of the drivers of Islamic political radicalism there
are local, national and international issues at play, often working in combinations
and permutations that are ultimately deleterious for some Muslim minorities.

The dynamics of Islamic political radicalisation

Since the dawn of Islam in the seventh century, the religion expanded vigorously
across the world, with massive inroads made in Eastern, Asian and North African
regions. Indeed part of Southern Europe was under Islamic influence for many
hundred years. But it is also true that this was carried out through a programme of

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Jihad the struggle for Islam, sometimes displaying non-Muslim characteristics of

barbarism, despotism, and rampant disregard for the humanism implicit in Islam
(Boston 2007).
For the purposes of detailed analysis it is important to show the distinctions
between fundamentalisms and radicalisms (Thompson 2006). Fundamentalisms
range from peaceful to violent and from active to passive. Radicalisms, however,
carry more negative connotations, and are often attributed with non-conformity and,
in many instances, violence. Radicalism, therefore, can be demonstrated as an
example of a fundamentalism. Although Islamic political radicalism is but one
aspect of the many strands of Islamic fundamentalism it can occur in a variety of
manners. At one end of the spectrum there are those such as some Salafi movements
that denounce any involvement with the secular democratic politics of the West,
such as Al-Muhajiroun, and there are others such as Al-Qaida (
, The Base),
whose approach is somewhat more inciting and hostile, irrespective of the fact that it
has its roots in CIA-backed campaigns that supported the Mujahideen during the
1980s Afghan-Russian war (Burke 2004).
For the context of this argument Islamic political radicalism is defined as any
movement or institution that is on the far right of Islamic thought, those instances
that discredit western cultures and lifestyles, denounce interaction with the west, and
in some cases call for its destruction. The radicalisation of Muslim youth in Britain
can be broken down into a number of sub factors; the most significant of these are
sociological, political and theological. Theology is an important factor that is often
underestimated or misunderstood in relation to the political radicalisation of
Muslims, and sometimes even overlooked in sociological study. In analysing the
issue of radicalisation, proceeding without taking into account the nature of religious
adherence and full understanding of the Muslim community is problematic. When
Islamic political radicals make claim to their views they do so in the name of Islam
and it has to be asked what the roots of these opinions are. Radicals that have voiced
their opinions in Britain such as now convicted Egyptian-born Abu Hamza AlMasry, and the former Head of Al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed, however
flawed, allude to Quranic bases for their argument. It encourages those in the public
eye that cite Islam itself as the problem, and that the faith promotes violence, and a
struggle to assert its dominance in all affairs (Gove 2006; Phillips 2006).
Considering the strict process of discerning an Islamic judgement, it is clear that
Islamic political radicals have derived their erroneous opinions from somewhere.
The Quran commands Muslims to defend themselves if an enemy attacks. Muslims
are encouraged to fight against the enemy until their aggression is no more. All the
verses that speak about fighting and war in the Quran are in this context. There are
some specific verses that are very often taken out of context, either by those trying to
malign the faith or by misguided Muslims themselves who wish to justify their
aggressive tactics. For example, one verse (in its reduced form) reads, slay them
wherever you catch them (Quran 2:191). But who is this referring to? Who are
they that this verse discusses? The preceding and following verses give the correct
context,
Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for
God loves not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn

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them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are
worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they
(first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of
those who suppress faith. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, Most
Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and
there prevails justice and faith in God; but if they cease, let there be no hostility
except to those who practise oppression (Quran, 2:190193)
It is clear from the context that these verses are discussing a defensive war, when
a Muslim community is attacked without reason, oppressed and prevented from
practicing their faith. In these circumstances, permission is given to fight back but
even then Muslims are instructed not to transgress limits, and to cease fighting as
soon as the attacker gives up. Muslim are only to fight directly against those who are
attacking them, not innocent bystanders or non-combatants. There is even an
injunction on the cutting down of trees during combat.
Another similar verse when quoted out of context version reads, fight and slay
the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait
for them in every stratagem (of war) (Quran (9:5). Once more, the preceding and
following verses give the context. This verse was revealed during a historical period
when the small Muslim community had entered into treaties with neighbouring
tribes (Jewish, Christian and pagan). Several of the pagan tribes had violated the
terms of their treaty, secretly aiding an enemy attack against the Muslim community.
The verse directly before this instructs Muslims to continue to honour treaties with
anyone who has not since betrayed them, because fulfilling agreements is considered
a righteous action. Then the verse continues, that those who have violated the terms
of the treaty have declared war so fight them. The subsequent verses instruct the
Muslims to grant asylum to any member of the pagan tribe who asks for it, and again
reminds that as long as these stand true to you, stand ye true to them: for God loves
the righteous.
Any verse that is quoted out of context misses the whole point of the message of
the Quran. Nowhere in the Quran can be found support for indiscriminate
slaughter, the killing of non-combatants, or murder of innocent persons in payback
for alleged crimes by other people. The Islamic teachings on this subject can be
summed up in the following verse,
It may be that God will grant love (and friendship) between you and those
whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For God has power (over all things), and God
is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. God does not forbid you, with regard to those
who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from
dealing kindly and justly with them: for God loves those who are just (Quran
60:78)
By taking these verses by themselves and not in their context it can be seen how
the justifications of radical clerics are not just an arbitrary affair. But this is not the
only way derivation of Islamic law is undertaken. In making a Fatwa or judgements
about Islamic proceedings and politics the scholar has to take in to account all the
Hadith and reports of the Sahabah concerning the matter, and not only a few verses
from the Quran. Under authentic Islamic jurisprudence there is no justification for

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the events of 7/7 or 9/11, and under Islamic law there is no jurisdiction for the
murder of civilians, or destruction of civilian infrastructure. In fact the Islamic
doctrines of war are implemented to prevent damage to civilian infrastructure, and
the murder of innocent civilians. There are strict codes of conduct for matters of
military warfare, including regarding it as the last option after all diplomatic
channels have failed. These events therefore cannot be attributed to Islam. On the
contrary the problem is the lack of understanding of Islamic doctrines that is the
cause of the radicalisation of Muslim youth. That is, how pseudo-scholars with little
understanding of Islamic jurisprudence are able to radicalise impressionable youth
who have limited knowledge of Islamic thinking themselves.

Islam and Western Europe

The question of Muslim minorities living in western European nation-states is met
with differing answers in differing countries. In France, the general attitude is very
much that of assimilation, where society regards all the French as the same. At the
other end of the spectrum is Germany where, until 2002, the general consensus was
that immigrants, including their German-born descendents, were guest workers.
Britain had adopted a reasonably successful approach towards multiculturalism but
the characteristics of the 7/7 bombers, who were all British nationals, seem to show
this as a failing concept. Probably one of the big issues lies in defining what it is to
be British as Britishness was a concept that was conceived to amalgamate the
English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh. In the same way that a definition of Britishness is
discussed, certain institutions in British society need to emerge from their lack of
awareness in relation to Islamic issues and sensitivities. There is a general
misunderstanding amongst British society as to what Islam is, and a lack of
understanding of Islamic thought leads many people to ask the leading question of
many Muslims, Are you British or Muslim? when clearly they are both.
There are also a number of important sociological factors that come into play
when explaining the marginalisation or disenfranchisement of young Muslims in
Britain. The conditions that Muslims find themselves in help to create a social
divide. Muslims, for example, face discrimination in education and employment
(Modood et al. 1997; Brown 2000; White 2002). The majority of Muslims also live
in poor neighbourhoods, in crowded houses often lacking basic amenities (Peach
2006). Where there is this clear separation between Muslims and non-Muslims there
is room for jealousy and resentment, and this is something that some radical scholars
can exploit. The original immigrant Muslim community to Britain was of Yemeni
origin and their primary role was to aid in the ship building history (Ansari 2003).
After the Second World War, the need for labour in the 1950s opened up the doors
for work and immigration from once-colonised nations to aid in the redevelopment
of the country. Many who South Asian Muslims who came over seeking work were
generally Pakistani and Bangladeshi by origin. The original intentions were
temporary, that is the immigrant community would 1 day return to their native
society. With these intentions in mind the communities remained close to their
cultural and religious identities, i.e., there was no obvious need to fully integrate

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(Anwar 1979). Nor was the host society entirely prepared to relax its prejudices
again the oriental other. The problem with radicalisation today partly stems from
this aspect of recent economic and social history.
The 1960s saw increased migration extending to the families of the pioneer
migrants, remaining in the Britain rather than returning became an attractive
prospect. For some in the second generations born in this country and are British
nationals there exists a mixed perspective on loyalties. The first generation is eager
to maintain its strong ties with heritage and religion, and any reproach towards
losing this is strongly scrutinised. The second generation, unlike the first, finds itself
dealing more actively with wider British society (Anwar 1998). As well as the
scrutiny from within the community, second generations are also subject to
discrimination from wider British society, who challenge their concept of
Britishness, and are keen to see them adopt British values and morals over
cultural and religious norms. They are, therefore, subjected to a problem on a
number of fronts. Being British is seemingly at odds with what the first generation
perceives as being Muslim. The trouble lies in the fact that their perceptions of
what it is to be a South Asian Muslim are built upon the model of culture and the
Islam that came with immigration. The second generations are therefore finding
themselves in a dilemma. They are both British and Muslim but they find the two on
conflicting terms. The choices appear mutually exclusive because they cannot be
both at the same time due to seemingly conflicting issues. Faced with the demand for
conformity from majority society, Muslim minority communities are precariously
balancing many potentially conflictual modes of being.
There is another similar mechanism that works to extenuate the circumstances.
That is, the broad opinion amongst wider European society seems to be that the
development, and particularly expansion, of an Islamic presence in Europe is
somewhat problematic (Ramadan 1999). It is the assimilation of these ideas in the
minds of the Muslims that has led to inaccurate assumptions that the Western ideals
and Islamic identity are two entities that are irreconcilable. This puts forward the
presupposition that it is not possible for an individual to be Western and Islamic
simultaneously. The result is that the youth become marginalised, and unable to
reconcile their identity conflicts. Given this condition, the prospects for radicalisation are greatly increased. For some Muslim youth searching for recognition,
radicalism provides a solution to their problems through three channels. First,
radicalism provides a front to criticise their ethnic minority community but at the
same time remain loyal to it. Second, they are presented with an intellectual way to
satisfy their diasporic religious identities. Finally, it provides a channel to help deal
with the discrimination that they face in their communities, particularly through
greater participation in formal political processes (cf. Yaqoob 2007). Radicalism
renders invisible the task of having to negotiate a British identity with a Muslim
identity as the core principle of radicalism rests on the belief that such a merger is
not only impossible but potentially a betrayal to Islam and the writings of the
Quran. In todays modern societies there is an increasingly cosmopolitan
environment, evident through the increasing diversification of personalities,
theologies and politics. It is the increase in these differences between individuals
in society that lead to an increasing need for recognition. The rise in this
diversification has redefined what conformity essentially is by expanding the

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boundaries of identity, recognising it as multiple and no longer singular, fixed or

uncontested. As the world becomes increasingly globalised cosmopolitan individuals
will align themselves with parochialisms of different kinds, including certain
radicalisms. In global terms, the deterioration of Islamic institutions in Muslim
countries has been cited for the rise in Islamic political radicalism, with the leaders
of Muslim countries being portrayed in a self-fulfilling manner, rather than being
portrayed as actively protecting Muslims. Militant groups gain popularity by
highlighting this progressive deterioration (usually associating it with Westernisation) and then portray themselves not as revolutionaries but as saviours trying to
save the old society from self-destruction. In many cases these groups give off the
impression not of radicalism but of conservatism, which has as its main ideology
two powerful concepts, the concept of the Umma together with Muslim suffering,
and this is attractive to a broad range of the community that identify themselves as
Islamic. On the surface, it encourages an Islamic identity that transcends ethnicity,
stimulating emotions that could be thought of as positive, such as charity and
empathy.

Scholars for dollars

An important issue is the pernicious lack of leadership amongst Muslims in Britain.
Young Muslims have little in terms of role models, and there is no one even
approaching establishing a truly representative body for the Muslims to provide for
national community direction, support and guidance. The only attempt at this so far
has been through the Muslim Council of Britain, an organisation that the majority of
Muslims believe does not reflect their opinions (McLoughlin 2005). Existing
leaders, who despite their intellect and good intentions have submissive characteristics that do not captivate younger Muslims. This is important to note as Muslims
have a comparatively young population. Where Muslim youth have the problem of a
lack of role models there is a greater scope for the influence of radical scholars.
There is a clear lack of British Islamic thinkers who can establish interpretations that
take into account the conditions that Muslims find themselves in Britain. Sheikh
Zaki Badawi was debatably the only such notable scholar to fit this specification. He
worked towards a Shariah compliant finance system for Europe, and established The
Muslim College in London. Unfortunately, however, he passed away in January
2006. Since his death, Muslims now more so than ever find themselves having to
turn to scholars from abroad, such as Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who although has
a prolific understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, living in the Emirates, his primary
concern is the Arab people. Or, Sheikh Hamza Yusuf Hanson, who is a scholar held
in high esteem by Muslim youth. He calls for an understanding of Islam under a
Western pretext but again he is an American and the conditions of social cohesion
are different in America than in the UK. Swiss-born Tariq Ramadan is another
example of a progressive Islamic thinker calling for the scholars to establish Ijtihad
(individual interpretation) based on European affairs. Unlike the models of
assimilation and integration, he is calling for Muslims to remain true to their
Islamic identities but at the same time he wants to see Muslims making a more

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dynamic contribution to European societies. However, negative representation in the

media of many scholars that Muslims in the West consider to be moderate is counterproductive and only feeds the feeling of alienation that many Muslims feel. The
British national newspaper responses to Professor Ramadan entering the UK days
after the 7/7 bombings were vehemently anti-Muslim. Banned from France and
subsequently from working in the USA even after securing a university post he was
criticised heavily for alleged links to terrorists because of his position as grandson
of Hassan al-Bana the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to being
criticised and misrepresented in the Western media, such scholars are often shunned
by already disillusioned young Muslims, who view these notable figures as sell
outs or scholars who are prepared to provide a message that has been
preconditioned by state apparatus hence the term scholars for dollars. Clearly,
as Davidson (1998: 63) contends, Western-Islamic animosity has some historical
roots that have their foundations mainly in the Crusades of the Middle Ages and the
result was to ingrain in the Muslim psyche an image of the West as not only
culturally backward...but aggressive and barbaric, he goes on to claim that the two
sides came to hold a deep mutual dislike of each other...Among some, these feelings
persist to this day.
The continuing war on terror, a politico-ideological project buttressed by
unprecedented military might as a response to the events of 9/11, has placed
Muslim minorities in the West in ever more precarious positions. Dictated by a
neo-conservative capitalistic philosophy of freedom and democracy Blair was
bamboozled into taking the nation into war on Iraq, a war that that no one
wanted. The British nation-state, for all its privileged status on the world stage,
effectively grossly exaggerated the threats from Iraq, scaremongering parliament
into submission. It has turned out to be the biggest disaster of British foreign
policy in its history. The tactics of shock and awe are isolated memories,
relegated to the vaults of war studies memorabilia. Meanwhile, Iraq implodes
before the world. In his video suicide note aired in September 2005, Mohammad
Sidique Khan categorically stated that the London bombings were about Iraq and
that he was a solider in a war defending his people. At present, the horrors of
Guantanamo Bay, Abu Gharib, Fallujah and Haditha are sharp reminders of
Muslim human suffering at the hands of an illegal invading force. The particular
case in relation to the recent case of the June 2006 Forest Gate raid is important
to note. Here, a young Bengali Muslim was shot through the chest, fortunately
not fatally. He was half-naked at time, getting out of his bed and of the view that
he was being burgled at 3 AM. Having been shot through the chest and still
bleeding, he was dragged down a set of stairs held only by one leg and finally
thrown onto the pavement for the medical staff to intervene. The senior police
officer, Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman, who presented a public apology
for the hurt caused by the raid, was given a CBE in the 2006 Queens Birthday
Honours. It was largely for services in relation to the events of 7/7. A case of
unfortunate timing here it would seem. All the same, the Muslim community
regards the nation-state as legitimising the severe behaviour of the security
services, irrespective of the fact that of the many hundreds of young Muslims
picked up in high-profile raids there have only been a handful of arrests and
convictions.

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Discussion
The idea that there is something inherently problematical about British multiculturalism because of Muslims has been presented for some time, namely since the urban
disturbances in the former northern mill towns in 2001 (Goodhart 2004). A more
recent critique of multiculturalism has been expressed by certain liberal commentators but what it fails to appreciate is that although France has an assimilationist
notion of integration and the Netherlands work towards a cultural pluralism model,
both countries have suffered attacks by radical Islamists. It seems the problem is less
about the nation-state contexts but that which intersects the local and global in how
disaffected Muslims determine their relations to the rest of world. This has been
accelerated by the advance of communication technologies. The belief that the
problem of Muslims is a function of over-pandering to difference is to exaggerate the
debate and return to a culturalist socio-pathological argument which suggests that
Muslims are not working hard enough to better integrate into society, ultimately
ignoring the structural context that many Muslims find themselves in. However, it is
important to highlight that the model of multiculturalism in Britain is probably the
most advanced in Europe, with a great many political philosophers gaining
prominence in their elucidation of the theory. It is both embraced and hotly
contested by wide sections of middle Britain. Indeed, there are parts of British
society who deeply respect Islam the future monarch of England is a notable
example. Nonetheless, in the inner cites, where most Muslims remain concentrated
there tends to be neglect on the part of the nation-state and the establishment, until,
of course, something tragic happens. The nation-state has been witnessing these
problems and the often lacklustre responses since the 1980s (i.e., Brixton,
Broadwater Farm or Handsworth). In 2001, Muslims in Britain needed a Scarman
(1982) and not a Cantle (2005). The former suggested the important link between
racism, discrimination, structural disadvantage and poor policing-community
relations the latter stressed the need for changes to culture and values significantly
under-emphasising the importance of structural inequalities. This, however, is
precisely where the multiculturalism model in Britain works least well. In
celebrating differences and being culturally sensitive to minority interests and
demands on the part of the nation-state ethnic and Muslim minorities in the inner
cities are effectively competing directly with each other for what are often the
crumbs of society.
The British nation-state has determined a range of responses to the events of 7/7
but one essential concern that has fallen on deaf ears is the call for an official
inquiry. This is exacerbated by the fact that officially the government completely
dismisses any link between home-grown terrorism and foreign policy, particularly in
relation to activities in Muslim lands. In specific attempts to directly tackle
extremism, New Labour kick-started the setting up of MINAB (Mosques and Imams
National Advisory Board). Formally launched at the end of June 2006, this body
consists of members from the Al-Khoei Foundation, Muslim Council of Britain,
Muslim Association of Britain and the British Muslim Forum. It is seen as a
tremendous opportunity by those working closely within it. First, it spells wide
Muslim ownership of such an important set of issues pertaining to development and
integration. Second, it shows the importance of Muslims building consensus with

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other Muslims something which has been significantly lacking until recently. What
happens now in terms of delivery will be important to explore.
In the final analysis, with the nation-state making its moves through the
empowerment and incorporation of a burgeoning professional and more importantly
what are regarded as a moderate middle class of Muslims there have been some
gains particularly in how this process has positively engaged young people and
Muslim women. At the level of the community, which is differentiated by ethnicity,
culture, social class, region and sect a number of Muslim civil society and
community organisations are working at the chalk face and these projects are
delivering some valuable outcomes. As developments emerge in the light of
concerted efforts to confront the problems of extremism what will remain important
are issues that exist at the heart of the problem. For most Muslims in Britain there is
pernicious socio-economic exclusion. As structural pre-conditions emerge to permit
education, jobs and housing opportunities only then will groups value their presence
in society by becoming engaged citizens in the context of an ever-evolving national
politico-cultural framework.
At the level of the nation-state, popular discourses have been focusing on
culturally essentialist notions of the Muslim for example, based on the
perceived problems of arranged marriages, cultural relativism and self-styled
segregation. It is a blame-the-victim pathology that is subliminally inculcated to
majority society. In a hostile local, national and international climate, susceptible
young Muslim men are easily targeted by radical Islamism, directly or indirectly.
The violent radical Islamist ideology appeals because of its political and
theological context, however improperly appropriated. It is also fuelled by the
actions of certain nation-states and their approaches to foreign policy as well as
how they go about effectively integrating Muslim minorities at home. As the
nation-state continues its legal, social and cultural assault on Muslims with its
attempts to ever-strengthen draconian anti-terror legislation at home while fighting
Muslim insurgents abroad many more young Muslim men are being radicalised.
Unless there are greater efforts to tackle the structural issues and politicoideological constructs in relation to being Muslim the potential threat of violent
Islamic political radicalism will remain. The local area efforts are compounded by
national and international issues. Muslims locally are generally disempowered and
so the force to bring about the necessary change has to be generated bottom-up.
Furthermore, the nation-state recognises its role in this for a successful
multicultural project.

Acknowledgements This article develops and extends arguments first published by Abbas (2001) and in
the introduction to Abbas (2005) and Abbas (2007). It has been presented and benefited from discussion at
a number of domestic venues, including at foreign and Commonwealth office, Prison service
Headquarters, Franco-British Council and Oxford University Centre for Islamic Studies. And,
Internationally, on foreign office and British Council funded trips to Indonesia and Singapore in 2006
and to Pakistan in 2007, and at the September 2006 Association of Muslim of Social Scientists
International Conference, Citizenship, Security and Democracy, Istanbul, Turkey. I should also like to
thank Dr Laura Zahra Macdonald, Dr Aslam Khaki and Shamila Ahmed of the Centre for the Study of
Ethnicity and Culture at the University of Birminghan for valuable comments on an earlier version of this
paper.

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