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G.R. No.

203993
April 20, 2015
PRISCILO B. PAZ,* Petitioner, vs. NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSALITY, INC., Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Principles:
Commercial Law: Section 21 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible
corporation, as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. (Doctrine of Estoppel)
Facts:
Petitioner, as officer-in-charge of the Aircraft Hangar at the Davao International Airport, Davao City, entered into a MOA with Captain
Allan J. Clarke, President of International Environmental University, whereby for a period of 4 years, unless pre-terminated by both
parties with 6 months advance notice, the former shall allow the latter to use the aircraft hangar space at the said Airport
"exclusively for company aircraft/helicopter."
About five months thereafter, petitioner sent a letter to Capt. Clarke complaining that the hangar space was being used "for trucks
and equipment, vehicles maintenance and fabrication," and threatened to cancel the MOA if such were not stopped immediately. In
another letter, he reiterated his threat and offered a vacant space along the airport road that was available for Capt. Clarkes
operations. Unsatisfied, he again sent three letters demanding respondent to vacate the premises otherwise the company will apply
for immediate electrical disconnection.
Respondent then filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of contract before the RTC claiming that: (a) petitioner had
disconnected its electric and telephone lines; (b) upon petitioners instruction, security guards prevented its employees from entering
the leased premises by blocking the hangar space with barbed wire; and (c) petitioner violated the terms of the MOA when he took
over the hangar space without giving respondent the requisite six (6)-month advance notice of termination.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that: (a) respondent had no cause of action against him as the MOA was executed between him
and Capt. Clarke in the latters personal capacity; (b) there was no need to wait for the expiration of the MOA because Capt. Clarke
performed highly risky works in the leased premises that endangered other aircrafts within the vicinity; and (c) the six (6)-month
advance notice of termination was already given in the letters he sent to Capt. Clarke.
The RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction ordering petitioner to immediately remove all his aircrafts parked within the leased
premises; allow entry of respondent by removing the steel gate installed thereat; and desist and refrain from committing further acts
of dispossession and/or interference in respondents occupation of the hangar space. For failure to comply, respondent filed a
petition for indirect contempt against petitioner.
RTC: Petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt and liable for breach of contract for illegally terminating the MOA even before the
expiration of the term thereof. The MOA was executed by the parties not only in their personal capacities but also in representation
of their respective corporations or entities.
CA: Affirmed RTCs finding of petitioners liability for breach of contract.
The CA ruled that, while there was no corporate entity at the time of the execution of the MOA on March 1, 2000 when Capt. Clarke
signed as "President of International Environmental University," petitioner is nonetheless estopped from denying that he had
contracted with respondent as a corporation, having recognized the latter as the "Second Party" in the MOA that "will use the hangar
space exclusively for company aircraft/helicopter." Petitioner was likewise found to have issued checks to respondent from May 3,
2000 to October 13, 2000, which belied his claim of contracting with Capt. Clarke in the latters personal capacity.
MR: Petitioner raised an additional issue stating that the death of Capt. Clarke allegedly warranted the dismissal of the case. Motion
is denied. Capt. Clark is merely an agent of respondent, thus, his death extinguished only the agency between him and respondent.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Capt. Clarke is an indispensable party. NO
2. Whether or not respondent is liable for breach of contract. -YES
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. The CA is correct in denying the motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Failure to implead Capt. Clarke does not divest
the court of jurisdiction since he is merely an agent of respondent. While Capt. Clarkes name and signature appeared on the MOA,
his participation was, nonetheless, limited to being a representative of respondent. As a mere representative, Capt. Clarke acquired
no rights whatsoever, nor did he incur any liabilities, arising from the contract between petitioner and respondent. Therefore, he was
not an indispensable party to the case at bar.
2. From the very language itself of the MOA entered into by petitioner whereby he obligated himself to allow the use of the hangar
space "for company aircraft/helicopter," petitioner cannot deny that he contracted with respondent. Petitioner further acknowledged

this fact in his final letter dated July 23, 2002, where he reiterated and strongly demanded the former to immediately vacate the
hangar space his "company is occupying/utilizing."
Section 21 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation, as such,
cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is bound by his obligation
under the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law. As aptly raised by respondent in its Comment to the instant
petition, it is futile to insist that petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments in respondents name and not with Capt. Clarkes,
whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latters personal capacity, only because it was upon the instruction of an employee.
Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that all private transactions have been fair
and regular. Hence, it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing with respect to his business with
respondent.
Be that as it may, it is settled that courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.
The lower courts, therefore, did not err in finding petitioner liable for breach of contract for effectively evicting respondent from the
leased premises even before the expiration of the term of the lease. The Court reiterates with approval the ratiocination of the RTC
that, if it were true that respondent was violating the terms and conditions of the lease, "[petitioner] should have gone to court to
make the [former] refrain from its 'illegal' activities or seek rescission of the [MOA], rather than taking the law into his own hands."
G.R. No. 206540
April 20, 2015
ALICE G. AFRICA, Petitioner, vs. INSURANCE SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT AGENCY, INC. (ISIA) represented by its President,
DELIA DE BORJA; acting Register Of Deeds, Las Pias City, ATTY. ABRAHAM N. VERMUDEZ, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Principle:
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure): An agent, as party, may sue without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38910-A registered in the name of Spouses Orfinada. Such property was
the subject of 4 cases related to its ownership and titling. The cases resulted in conflicting rulings.
Respondent ISIA filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the Register of Deeds of Las
Pias City seeking the cancellation of TCT No. 38910A and the issuance of a new title in favour of the ISIA. ISIA alleged that it
purchased from Spouses Orfinada the subject property as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed 18 May 1981; paid the taxes and
fees for the transfer; and completed the requirements for the transfer of title. However, the Registrar of Deeds denied the registration
of the sale on the ground that another owners duplicate of the subject title is in possession of Alice Africa.
In turn, Africa filed a Vehement Opposition on the instant petition contending that the sale between ISIA and Spouses Orfinada is
tainted with fraud hence not valid. Nevertheless, the RTC granted ISIAs Petition for Mandamus. Both Africa and RoD filed separate
MRs. Both were denied.
Hence, Africa filed this Petition for Certiorari on behalf of the Spouses Orfinada. She alleged that her contract of agency with the
Spouses Orfinada is coupled with interest without explicitly stating her interest therein.
Issue: Whether or not Africa has legal capacity to file the Petition for Certiorari in her own name. NO
Ruling:
The Court denied the Petition on the ground that Africa is not a proper party under Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is explicit on the requirement that an agent as party may sue without joining the principal
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. The herein subject property is ostensibly owned by the Spouses
Orfinada covered by TCT No. 38910-A registered in their names. This TCT No. 38910-A is one of the titles ISIA seeks to annul as
part of its claim of ownership over vast tracts of land bounded by the Pasig River in the North, by the Tunisan River in the South, by
Laguna de Bay in the East, and by the Manila de Bay in the West. xx Africas belated claim of ownership via purchase cannot make
her a proper party to this case and circumvent the requirements for establishing ownership over the subject property.

[Pursuant to] Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, xx [it was] ruled that the lack of authority of the representative from the real party-ininterest, results in the complaint deemed as not filed. It does not make the representative as the actual plaintiff in the case.
G.R. No. 198356
April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUP APO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO,
JR., SHEILA LORENCE, all surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ROBERTO and SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM,
Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Principle:
Civil Law: Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Facts:
Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents. It sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece
of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City. The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441 registered
and titled under the Spouses Supapos names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos
(P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value.
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least
twice a year. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw 2 houses built on the subject lot which were built without their knowledge
and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the
appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Certificate to File Action for failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the AntiSquatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. Respondents appealed to the CA. While the appeal was pending,
Congress enacted RA No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the
dismissal of the criminal case. Such dismissal became final.
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents civil liability, praying that the latter
vacate the subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the
writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.
Petition for certiorari before CA: Granted; holding that upon the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, respondents criminal and civil
liability were extinguished. The CA stressed that recourse may still be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of
possession.
Petitioners thus filed a complaint for accion publiciana. Respondents argued that there is another action pending between the same
parties and the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations and the petitioners cause of action is barred by
prior judgment.
MeTC denied respondents motion to set the affirmative defences for preliminary hearing. Hence, repondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the RTC.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on the grounds that the action has prescribed; and accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the
complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC. MR is denied.
CA: Appeal is dismissed. The complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the
action had prescribed. MR: denied.
Issues:
1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction -YES
2. Whether the cause of action has prescribed -NO
3. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata -NO
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.

1. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers
to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their better
right of possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
plenary.
RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
Metro Manila.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its
assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to
taxable value.
xx The complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00,
as proven by the tax declaration. Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, the Supreme
Court held that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. The cause of action
has not prescribed.
2. Spouses Supapo argued that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the
Torrens System.
The Supreme Court ruled that Spouses Supapo are correct. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by
a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950 ].
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The
right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right of the
holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.
3. The respondents reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action
between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property.

G.R. No. 183587


April 20, 2015
LEXBER, INC., Petitioner, vs. CAESAR M. and CONCHITA B. DALMAN, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Principle:
Commercial Law: The HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver is not a condition precedent before the
trial court can give due course to a rehabilitation petition of a real estate corporation.
Facts:
Lexber is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of housing, construction, and real estate development. Respondents
bought a house and lot under a contract to sell in Lexbers Regal Lexber Homes at Tuba, Benguet. Such housing project was
discontinued due to Lexbers financial condition during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Lexber filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with prayer for the suspension of payments on its loan obligations. The trial court granted
Lexbers petition and appointed a receiver. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Order and argued that the trial
court should have dismissed outright the rehabilitation petition because it failed to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180 days
from the date of the initial hearing. Such MR was denied.
CA: Granted. The CA ruled that the trial court should have dismissed Lexbers rehabilitation petition outright as there was no
evidence to show that the HLURB requested the appointment of Lexbers rehabilitation receiver. The CA posited that under Section
6(c) of Presidential Decree (PD) 902-A, as amended, it is only after the HLURBs request that a rehabilitation court can give due
course to a rehabilitation petition and validly appoint a receiver.
Hence, this Petition. Lexber argued that the CA erred in reversing the trial courts initial finding. It submitted that nowhere in Section
6(c) of PD 902-A, as amended, is it provided that the HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a receiver is mandatory before
the rehabilitation court can give due course to the petition for rehabilitation of a real estate company and the outright dismissal of a
rehabilitation petition for non-compliance with the 180-day period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan is against the Interim
Rules policy of liberal construction to facilitate the rehabilitation of distressed corporations.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a receiver is mandatory before the rehabilitation court can give
due course to the petition of a real estate company -NO
2. Whether or not the lapse of the 180-day period for approval of the rehabilitation plan automatically results to the dismissal of the
rehabilitation petition NO
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied this instant petition due to the pendency of CA G.R. No. 103917, which is reviewing the rehabilitation
petitions dismissal but for a different and more substantive reason, i.e., the disapproval of Lexbers rehabilitation plan. This is to
avoid conflicting decisions on the cases. However, it ruled on substantive issues, to wit:
1. The HLURBs prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver is not a condition precedent before the trial court can
give due course to a rehabilitation petition.
To support its argument that the HLURBs prior request is a condition precedent that must be complied with before the trial court can
give due course to a rehabilitation petition of a real estate company like Lexber, the CA invoked Section 6(c) of PD-902-A as basis.
The pertinent part of this provision states:
[T]he [SEC] may appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations supervised or regulated by
other government agencies, such as banks and insurance companies, upon request of the government agency concerned.
[Emphasis supplied.] Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SECs) jurisdiction over rehabilitation cases had already
been transferred to the regional trial courts acting as commercial courts by virtue of Republic Act (RA) 8799 or the Securities
Regulation Code. The CA argues that despite this jurisdictional transfer, the substantive provisions of PD 902-A, particularly those
powers which the SEC may exercise in rehabilitation cases, remain.
The CA is correct in this line of reasoning. However it erred in interpreting Section 6(c) to mean that no rehabilitation petition of a
corporation that the HLURB regulates, can be heard unless a prior request of this agency for the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver was made.
[The CA failed] to identify the distinction between the enumerated examples in Section 6(c), i.e., banks and insurance companies,
and Lexber, a construction and real estate company.
Clearly, the respective charters of the BSP and the IC specifically authorize them to appoint a receiver in case a company under
their regulation is undergoing corporate rehabilitation. xx in sharp contrast to the BSP and the IC, nowhere in the HLURBs
charter is it expressly or impliedly granted the power to appoint the rehabilitation receivers of financially distressed

corporations under its supervision and regulation. An administrative agencys powers are limited to those expressly conferred
on it or granted by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act.
2. The lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan should not automatically result to the dismissal of the
rehabilitation petition.
In ruling for the outright dismissal of Lexbers rehabilitation petition, the CA noted that the trial court failed to approve Lexbers
rehabilitation plan within 180 days from the date of the initial hearing, thus prompting the application of Rule 4, Section 11 of the
Interim Rules, to wit: Section 11. Period of the Stay Order- The stay order shall be effective from the date of its issuance until the
dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is
approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an
extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be
rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18)
months from the date of filing of the petition.
The CA explained that the word "shall" is a word of command. Thus, the essential effect of the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan
after 180 days from the initial hearing is the dismissal of the rehabilitation petition.
However, while the general rule in statutory construction is that the words "shall," "must," "ought," or "should" are of mandatory
character in common parlance, it is also well-recognized in law and equity that this is not an absolute rule or inflexible criterion.
The records of the case show that on May 4, 2007, Lexber filed a motion for the extension of the period for the approval of the
rehabilitation plan. However, the trial court never issued a resolution on this motion. xx Lexber could not be faulted for the nonapproval of the rehabilitation plan within the 180-day period. A petitioner-corporation should not be penalized if the trial court needed
more time to evaluate the rehabilitation plan.
Rule 2, Section 2 of the Interim Rules dictates the courts to liberally construe the rehabilitation rules in order to carry out the
objectives of Sections 6(c) of PD 902-A, as amended, and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination of rehabilitation cases.
G.R. No. 182800
April 20, 2015
MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. LOWITO AMOR, ET. AL., Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Principle:
Labor Law: It must be emphasized that the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction
upon the NLRC, the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.
Facts:
Respondents were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation, a domestic corporation which operated a mining
claim in Placer, Surigao del Norte. Manila Mining temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of its application to
increase the capacity of its tailings containment facility before the DENR-EMB of Butuan City. DENR-EMB issued a temporary
authority to continue to operate for 6months but Manila Mining failed to secure an extension permit when it expired. Hence, it again
temporarily suspended its operations and informed DOLE about the said suspension, as well as, the temporary lay-off of 2/3 of its
employees.
Respondents filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and monetary claims against Manila Mining before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter held petitioner liable for constructive dismissal and ordered petitioner to pay respondents separation pay and damages.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC and moved for the reduction of the appeal bond to
P100,000.00 on the ground that its financial losses in the preceding years rendered it unable to satisfy the monetary award.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal in view of the fact that, despite receipt of he appealed decision on 24 November
2004, petitioner mailed their copy of the Memorandum of Appeal only on 7 February 2005. Without addressing the issues raised by
respondents, the NLRC rendered a Resolution dated 25 April 2005 reversing the appealed decision and dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. They insisted that petitioners Memorandum of Appeal
was filed 65 days after the lapse of reglementary period for appeal and the appeal bond was dishonoured upon presentment for
payment. Moreover, they also faulted the NLRC for applying Article 283 of the Labor Code absent allegation and proof of
compliance with the requirements for the closure of an employers business due to serious business losses.
On 29 November 2007, the CA granted respondents petition. It ruled that petitioner failed to perfect its appeal therefrom considering
that the copy of its 3 December 2004 Memorandum of Appeal intended for respondents was served the latter by registered mail only
on 7 February 2005. Aside from posting an unusually smaller sum as appeal bond, petitioner was likewise faulted for replenishing
the check it issued only on 1 April 2005 or 24 days before the rendition of the assailed NLRC Decision.

MR: denied. Hence, this petition.


Issue: Whether or not petitioner complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under the Labor Code. NO
Held: It has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must,
therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.
Insofar as appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that,
"(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC] by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders." In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, the same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from."
Having received the Labor Arbiters Decision on 24 November 2004, petitioner had ten (10) calendar days or until 4 December 2004
within which to perfect an appeal. Considering that the latter date fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day, 6
December 2004, within which to comply with the requirements for the perfection of its appeal. The rule is settled that the burden of
evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. As the parties claiming the non-perfection of petitioners appeal,
it was, therefore, respondents who had the burden of proving that said memorandum of appeal was, indeed, filed out of time. By and
of itself, the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for respondents was served upon them by registered mail only on
7 February 2005 does not necessarily mean that petitioners appeal from the Labor Arbiters decision was filed out of time. On the
principle that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, it has been ruled that the failure of a party to serve a copy of
the memorandum to the opposing party is not a jurisdictional defect and does not bar the NLRC from entertaining the
appeal. Considering that such an omission is merely regarded as a formal lapse or an excusable neglect, the CA reversibly
erred in ruling that, under the circumstances, petitioner could not have filed its appeal earlier than 7 February 2005.
[As to the issue on the appeal bond], xx the ruling in McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., [clarified that] xx while it is true that reduction of the
appeal bond has been allowed in meritorious cases on the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing appeals on
the merits, it has been ruled that the employer should comply with the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall
be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant,
otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Respondent correctly called attention to the fact that the check submitted by petitioner was dishonored upon presentment for
payment, thereby rendering the tender thereof ineffectual. xx Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last day of the
reglementary period for appeal, moreover, petitioner had no one but itself to blame for failing to post the full amount pending the
NLRCs action on its motion for reduction of the appeal bond. xx it must be emphasized that the posting of a bond is
indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the NLRC, the rule is settled that noncompliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.
Without necessarily resulting to a termination of employment, an employer may at any rate, bona fide suspend the operation of its
business for a period of not exceeding six months under Article 286 of the Labor Code. While the employer is, on the one hand, duty
bound to reinstate his employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights if the operation of the business is resumed
within six months, employment is deemed terminated where the suspension exceeds said period. Not having resumed its operations
within six months from the time it suspended its operations on 27 July 2001, it necessarily follows that petitioner is liable to pay
respondents separation pay computed at one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher, as well as the damages and attorneys fees adjudicated by the Labor Arbiter. Without proof of the serious
business losses it allegedly sustained and/or compliance with the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
petitioner cannot expediently plead exemption from said liabilities due to the supposed financial reverses which led to the eventual
closure of its business. It is essentially required that the alleged losses in business operations must be proven for, otherwise, said
ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning business losses or
reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. The condition of business losses justifying retrenchment is
normally shown by audited financial documents like yearly balance sheets and profit and loss statements as well as annual income
tax returns which were not presented in this case.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 199166
April 20, 2015
NELSON V. BEGINO, GENER DEL VALLE, MONINA A VILA-LLORIN AND MA. CRISTINA SUMAYAO, Petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN
CORPORATION (FORMERLY, ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION) AND AMALIA VILLAFUERTE, Respondents
PEREZ, J.:
Principles:
Remedial Law: A party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision
rendered.

Liberal interpretation of procedural rules on appeal had, on occasion, been favored in the interest of substantive justice.
Labor Law: Four-fold test to determine employee-employer relationship: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee on the means and methods by
which the work is accomplished.
The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the
employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer.
Facts:
ABS-CBN employed respondent Amalia Villafuerte as Manager. Thru Villafuerte, ABS-CBN engaged the services of petitioners
Benigno and Del Valle as Cameramen/Editors for TV Broadcasting. Petitioners Sumayao and Llorin were likewise similarly engaged
as reporters. With their services engaged by respondents thru Talent Contracts which, though regularly renewed over the years,
provided terms ranging from 3 months to 1 year, petitioners were given Project Assignment Forms which detailed the duration of a
particular project as well as the budget and the daily technical requirements thereof. In the aforesaid capacities, petitioners were
tasked with coverage of news items for subsequent daily airings in respondents TV Patrol Bicol Program.
The Talent Contracts included provisions on the following matters: (a) the Talents creation and performance of work in accordance
with the ABS-CBNs professional standards and compliance with its policies and guidelines covering intellectual property creators,
industry codes as well as the rules and regulations of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) and other regulatory
agencies; (b) the Talents non-engagement in similar work for a person or entity directly or indirectly in competition with or adverse to
the interests of ABS-CBN and non-promotion of any product or service without prior written consent; and (c) the results-oriented
nature of the talents work which did not require them to observe normal or fixed working hours. Subjected to contractors tax,
petitioners remunerations were denominated as Talent Fees.
Petitioners filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the NLRC claiming that they were regular employees of ABS-CBN.
Petitioners were terminated during the pendency of the case. Hence, they filed another complaint against respondents for
regularization, payment of labor standard benefits, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. Such complaint was dismissed for
violation of the rules against forum shopping.
However, the Labor Arbiter resolved in favor of petitioners. Respondents appealed before the NLRC. During the pendency of which,
petitioners filed a third complaint against the former for illegal dismissal, regularization, non-payment of salaries and 13th month pay,
unfair labor practice, damages and attorneys fees. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents then filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the ground that there is no employee-employer relationship
between the parties since petitioners were engaged as talents for periods and were paid talent fees instead of fix salaries, as well
as, respondents did not exercise control over the manner and method by which petitioners accomplished their work.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing respondents petition for certiorari for failure to file a Notice of Appeal at the NLRC
level -NO
2. Whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship between the parties YES
3. Whether or not petitioners are regular employees YES
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit.
1. Petitioners preliminarily fault the CA for not dismissing respondents Rule 65 petition for certiorari in view of the fact that the latter
failed to file a Notice of Appeal from the Labor Arbiters decision and to verify and certify the Memorandum of Appeal they filed
before the NLRC. While concededly required under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, however, these matters should have been
properly raised during and addressed at the appellate stage before the NLRC. Instead, the record shows that the NLRC took
cognizance of respondents appeal and proceeded to resolve the same in favor of petitioners by affirming the Labor Arbiters
decision. Not having filed their own petition for certiorari to take exception to the liberal attitude the NLRC appears to have adopted
towards its own rules of procedure, petitioners were hardly in the proper position to raise the same before the CA or, for that matter,
before this Court at this late stage. Aside from the settled rule that a party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief
other than the ones granted in the decision rendered, liberal interpretation of procedural rules on appeal had, on occasion, been
favored in the interest of substantive justice.
2. To determine the existence of employee-employer relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to
control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. Of these criteria, the so-called "control test" is
generally regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee

relationship. Under this test, an employer-employee relationship is said to exist where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end result but also the manner and means utilized to achieve the same.
As cameramen/editors and reporters, it appears that petitioners were subject to the control and supervision of respondents which,
first and foremost, provided them with the equipments essential for the discharge of their functions. Prepared at the instance of
respondents, petitioners Talent Contracts tellingly provided that ABS-CBN retained "all creative, administrative, financial and legal
control" of the program to which they were assigned. Aside from having the right to require petitioners "to attend and participate in all
promotional or merchandising campaigns, activities or events for the Program," ABS-CBN required the former to perform their
functions "at such locations and Performance/Exhibition Schedules" it provided or, subject to prior notice, as it chose determine,
modify or change. Even if they were unable to comply with said schedule, petitioners were required to give advance notice, subject
to respondents approval. However obliquely worded, the Court finds the foregoing terms and conditions demonstrative of the
control respondents exercised not only over the results of petitioners work but also the means employed to achieve the same.
3. Notwithstanding the nomenclature of their Talent Contracts and/or Project Assignment Forms and the terms and condition
embodied therein, petitioners are regular employees of ABS-CBN. Time and again, it has been ruled that the test to determine
whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the
business or trade of the employer. As cameramen/editors and reporters, petitioners were undoubtedly performing functions
necessary and essential to ABS-CBNs business of broadcasting television and radio content.
If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent,
the law deems the repeated or continuing performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity in
the business. Indeed, an employment stops being co-terminous with specific projects where the employee is continuously re-hired
due to the demands of the employers business. When circumstances show, moreover, that contractually stipulated periods of
employment have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, this Court has not hesitated in
striking down such arrangements as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order.
The presumption is that when the work done is an integral part of the regular business of the employer and when the worker, relative
to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or professional service, such work is a regular employment of such
employee and not an independent contractor. The Court will peruse beyond any such agreement to examine the facts that typify the
parties actual relationship.
G.R. No. 209537
April 20, 2015
THE PLAZA, INC., Petitioner, vs. AYALA LAND, INC., Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Principles:
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure): [T]he court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or
quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by
raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it
appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
Facts:
On May 19, 1983, Plaza entered into a contract of lease with Ayala Corporation involving a parcel of land located within Greenbelt
Commercial Center in Makati. The term of the lease is until December 2005. Accordingly, Plaza constructed a building thereon
known as the Plaza Building and leased its commercial spaces to various tenants.
In 1988, Ayala Corporation transferred its real estate operations to ALI. In 2000, ALI commenced construction, pursuant to its
Redevelopment Plan. It undertook the closure and boarding-up of the parking access road and driveway in front of Plaza Building, to
the prejudice of its customers and tenants.
In 2001, Plaza filed an action for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against ALI before the RTC
seeking to enjoin the construction under the Redevelopment Plan. Eventually, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement
which the RTC approved. Said agreement provided that the lease would expire on December 31, 2005, without any renewal, and
that Plaza shall surrender the possession of the leased premises to ALI, subject to the formers right to demolish and remove any
and all improvements built or introduced thereon since 1983, no later than March 31, 2006. Plaza claimed that it gave its tenants
until January 6, 2006 within which to vacate the sub-leased premises. However, said tenants refused to follow Plazas directive
since ALI allegedly sent them letters informing them that they still have until March 31, 2006 to leave. Upon learning this, Plaza
immediately wrote ALI about the matter and demanded that the latter pay them the salvage value of the Building or give Plaza a
period of ninety (90) days starting April 1, 2006 for its demolition. In response, ALI offered Plaza P1,000,000.00 as payment for the
salvage value of the Building and all the improvements, but Plaza rejected such offer.
After several exchanges, Plaza filed a Motion to Fix the demolition date of the Building before the RTC. Pending resolution thereof,
ALI took possession of the Building on April 1, 2006. During the hearing for the Motion, ALIs counsel manifested that the Building
had already been demolished, therefore the motion is moot. Plaza filed a motion for restitution, seeking from ALI the delivery of all

scrap and salvageable materials derived from, and produced by its demolition of the Building, or in the alternative, pay the amount
of P5,200,000.00 representing the value of said scrap and salvageable materials.
ALI filed a motion to defer the proceedings on Plazas claim for restitution arguing that Plazas Motion for Restitution aims to
resurrect Plazas failed attempt to stop ALI from implementing the Redevelopment Plan; and that the same was used as means to
get more money from it. ALI also claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the said motion.
Meanwhile, Plaza served written interrogatories related to its Motion for Restitution on ALIs President, which ALI opposed through a
Motion to Quash. In turn, Plaza filed a Motion to Strike out ALIs motion to quash, as well as a motion to compel ALI to answer the
written interrogatories, which motions ALI equally opposed.
RTC: denied ALIs Motion to Defer and Motion to Quash. It granted Plazas Motion to Strike Out and Motion to Compel. MR: denied.
CA: granted ALIs petition and annulled the RTCs Resolutions. Plaza filed an MR, but denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly annulled and set aside the RTCs Omnibus Resolutions. -YES
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The case from which the present petition originates comes before the Court at its execution stage. Notably, the Compromise
Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well as the demolition period of the Building and/or
removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, "immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion."
With no such motion having been filed, the RTC is bound to issue a writ of execution to carry out the said judgment to its full force
and effect. In Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., v. Vda. de Hernandez, the duty of courts dealing with final and executory
judgments was explained as follows:
[T]he court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay,
for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues
of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution
inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it
appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against
the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without
authority.
ALI is authorized under the approved Compromise Agreement to enter and take possession of the leased premises at the first hour
of 01 January 2006 or at any time or date thereafter. PLAZA and its sub-lessees are authorized to remove, at its cost and expense,
all its properties from the Leased Premises not later than 31 March 2006, and any improvements or properties found therein after
the aforesaid date shall be deemed abandoned. However, PLAZAs authority to remove its properties from the premises shall not be
in any way construed as an extension or renewal of the lease contract. After 31 March 2006, ALI has the option to either demolish or
remove any improvements or properties found in the premises and charge the cost thereof to PLAZA, or to occupy or appropriate
improvements found at the premises, without obligation to reimburse PLAZA for the cost or value of such improvements.
The failure of PLAZA to vacate the premises after 31 December 2005 shall entitle ALI to a Writ of Execution in the Civil Case for the
eviction of PLAZA without the necessity of filing a separate ejectment suit without prejudice, however, to PLAZAs right to demolish
and remove any and all improvements introduced or built within the leased premises by 31 March 2006.
Thus, although the fixing of a period of demolition would have been merely incidental to the execution of the Compromise Judgment,
as it covered, among others, the demolition of the Building, the parties explicit agreement on said period precluded the RTC from
resolving Plazas Motion to Fix. To allow the RTC to fix such period would allow it to amend a substantial part of the parties
agreement. Verily, judges have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce a compromise agreement. Absent any
appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose conditions different from the terms of a compromise
agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their
discretion, as in this case. The same principle applies to the RTCs cognizance of Plazas Motion for Restitution. xx This motion goes
beyond the scope of the Compromise Judgment as restitution in view of the Buildings supervening demolition was not even
contemplated by the parties in their Compromise Agreement. As mentioned, the Compromise Judgment only covers the terms of
surrender of the leased premises possession, as well as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials
salvaged therefrom. Confined as it is to such limitations, the RTC cannot extend the coverage of the execution proceedings to deal
with a supervening event that carries with it a new cause of action.
The fact that Plaza couches its Motion for Restitution as a relief against ALIs supposed violation of the Compromise Agreement, xx
does not detract from the foregoing finding. The Court, in the recent case of Gadrinab v. Salamanca, discussed the remedies in the
event a compromise agreement is breached: xx
A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right on final judgments. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion
of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution. (n)
If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an action for indirect
contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. xx
Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments
may be used against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds
exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b) motion for new trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from
judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment.
Moreover, in Genova v. De Castro, the Court stated that a partys violation of a compromise agreement may give rise to a new
cause of action, which may be pursued in a separate action as it is not barred by res judicata. xx Plazas Motion for Restitution is not
one of the remedies that can be availed against ALIs purported violation of the Compromise Agreement. On the contrary, the same
is a new cause of action arising therefrom.
G.R. No. 195203
April 20, 2015 [Formerly UDK No. 14435]
ANTONIO PAGARIGAN, Petitioner, vs. ANGELITA YAGUE and SHIRLEY ASUNCION, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Principles:
Civil Law (Land Titles and Deeds): Occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make
one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent
of the landowner.
The presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done
away with by mere conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.
Facts:
Anastacio Yague, the previous owner of a 21,459 square meter-parcel of rice land located at Brgy. San Carlos, Paniqui, Tarlac, had
initially instituted his stepfather Macario Pagarigan as tenant of the land. Macario, with the help of his son Alfonso, cultivated the
land and, as agreed upon, shared equally the lands yearly harvest with Anastacio. Allegedly with Anastacios consent, Alfonso
became a tenant of the land in place of his ailing father sometime in 1957. Alfonso continued to cultivate the land after Macarios
death and religiously delivered to Anastacio his share in the harvest.
In 1993, Anastacio transferred the title of the subject rice land to his daughters, herein respondents. In the succeeding years, the
respondents noticed a decline in the number of cavans produced and delivered to them each year. They claimed that, in 1999, they
did not receive any share in the lands harvest.
Upon investigation, the respondents were surprised to find that the petitioner was cultivating the land; they thought all along that
Alfonso was still the lands tenant and that Antonio was merely delivering to them their share in the harvest upon Alfonsos
instructions. The respondents confronted the petitioner and demanded that he vacate the property because they did not consent to
his institution as tenant of the land. They also argued that the petitioners house and the two fishponds on the property were
constructed without their knowledge and consent, and that the petitioner even allowed his son to build a house on the property
without first seeking their permission. The petitioner refused to heed the respondents demand so the dispute was brought to the
barangay for conciliation.
Respondents filed an ejectment complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator,
DARAB, Region III upon failure to reach a settlement before the barangay and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office.
Petitioner contended that the respondents father consented to his institution as tenant of the land and to the construction of his
house on the property. With respect to the house being occupied by his son, he claimed that it was built on the property in 1997
originally for use as an animal shelter, and that his sons use was temporary. Also, the petitioner claimed that the fishponds were
constructed in 1995 supposedly to serve as a catch basin for water to irrigate the rice fields without any objection from the
respondents.

The Provincial Adjudicators office ruled in the respondents favor after finding that the petitioners cultivation and occupation of the
subject rice land was without the respondents consent.
On appeal to the DARAB, the DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicators decision. MR: denied.
CA: affirmed the DARABs decision. It held that the petitioners status as de jure tenant to the subject rice land was not properly
established due to the absence of the elements of consent and an agreed sharing system of harvest between the parties. Petitioner
failed to prove that his institution as tenant in 1979 was with the consent of the respondents father; and that the "acquiescence by
the landowners of the petitioners cultivation of the land does not create an implied tenancy if the former, as in this case, never
considered petitioner Antonio Pagarigan as tenant of the land." Also, it held that the petitioner failed to provide evidence, such as
receipts, that he had been delivering to the respondents their corresponding share in the lands harvest. MR: denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not an implied tenancy is created between petitioner and respondents. -NO
Ruling:
For an implied tenancy to arise, it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must first be present, to wit: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, the element of consent from the landowner to the petitioners tenancy is absent.
We have consistently held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make one a
de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the
landowner. We emphasize that the presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are
explicit in law and cannot be done away with by mere conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere
congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial.
Petitioner consistently failed to provide independent and concrete evidence to show that the respondents and their father, Anastacio,
gave their consent (impliedly and expressly) to his institution as tenant of the subject rice land. Proof of consent by the landowner/s
is largely a matter of evidence, and not a proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. Well-settled is the rule that only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we shall rely and give credence to the factual findings of the DARAB on the question of whether the
landowners gave their consent to the petitioner's tenancy, especially when its finding on the matter was affirmed on appeal to the
CA.