Terrorism

rrorism and Counter Terrorism

To what extent is non

non-state
state terrorism
different from state terrorism?

Student: Warren Quinton

Teacher: Diego Muro

June 2016

Warren Quinton

The definition of what constitutes terrorism is still a thorny issue in Critical Terrorism Studies
(CTS), and one such bone of contention is over whether the state should ever be considered

capable of carrying out terrorism, and even if it is, if the term state terrorism a useful one in

the CTS discourse. This essay will look at what state-terrorism is, as put forward by

advocates of the term, and explore how different this is from non-state terrorism. While it
will show that there is a fundamental difference between the two, it will argue that the term
state-terrorism is still valid and that there is an important normative justification for the

terms continued use. This essay will use Michael Stohls actor-neutral definition of terrorism
to define terrorism carried out both by the state and by non-state actors: Terrorism is the
purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and / or compliant behaviour
in a victim or and / or audience of the act or threat (Stohl & Wight, 2012, p. 46). This way,

greater importance is put on the act itself. First an outline of the differences and similarities
will be given, followed by a justification of case selection, and finally a more detailed
analysis of each difference and similarity.

Differences and Similarities

Of course, even if it is appropriate to use the term terrorism to describe some state actions, it
is undeniable that state and non-state terrorism are not exactly the same: if the actor were not

relevant they would both simply be called terrorism. It is the contention of this essay that
there is one fundamental difference between state and non-state terrorism, but that this brings
with it some important further distinctions and implications. The fundamental difference has

to do with the states Weberian status as holding the monopoly on the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory (Stohl & Wight, 2012). The implications of this status
are that the state has a:
a.

greater control over funding and resources,

c.

greater likelihood to use different actions,

b.

greater chance of impunity,

These are significant differences from a non-state terrorist group. Yet, crucially, in spite

of these fundamental differences, it will be argued that there is equivalency between state and
non-state terrorism in the following measures: intention, legitimacy, and morality. This
equivalency is sufficient to justify the use of the term state-terrorism.

Warren Quinton

Case Selection

This study seeks to show the similarities and differences between state and non-state
terrorism. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF), acting at the behest of the Israeli state, and

Hamas, a subnational fundamentalist organisation, have been chosen because they are rival
groups, representing two of the major parties on either side of the ongoing Israel/Palestine

conflict. Specifically, it will analyse the case of an Israeli checkpoint raid and subsequent
shooting in the West Bank, and a Hamas drive-by shooting, also in the West Bank.
Hamas West Bank Shooting

The August 2010 Hamas attack was a coordinated drive-by shooting, in which gunmen drove
alongside a car carrying four Israelis. They shot at the car, killing all four passengers. Hamas

admitted responsibility for the attack. The attack took place days before a renewal of peace

talks between Israel and Palestinian leaders, leading to accusations that the attack was a
spoiler, intending to thwart the negotiations (Pfeffer, et al., 2010).
Israeli Checkpoint Shooting

The January 2001 Israeli shooting occurred when a pregnant woman in labour, her husband

and father-in-law were driving to the hospital. They were stopped at the check-point, the
husband was asked to lift his wifes dress to prove she really was pregnant. They were then

told they could pass. However, 600 metres up the road, the soldiers began shooting at the car,
killing the husband. The wife and father-in-law were then ordered to strip, were taken back to

the checkpoint and detained there for an hour before being released. The shooting took place
whilst the Second Intifada was still taking place (Haalana & Trainor, 2002).

This is a case-orientated, small-N analysis; as such, it is not bound by the same confines

of a variable-based study (della Porta, 2008, p. 212). The two cases for this study have been

chosen in order to show the most similar cases, facilitating, as della Porta (2008, p. 214)
contends, the ceteris paribus rule, where the similarity of the cases focuses the analysis on

the most relevant variable to the discussion. This will allow for a deeper analysis of the

similarities and differences of state and non-state terrorism. However, owing to the caseorientated nature of the study, it also sidesteps the potential drawbacks to the most-similar

approach, such as the middle-range theories, whereby the bias in selecting most similar

cases means the theory has no applicability beyond such cases (della Porta, 2008, p. 215).
Had a least likely case comparison been chosen, only the nature of the act would have been
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different; the intention, legitimacy and morality would have been shown to be the same,
according to Stohls definition (Stohl & Wight, 2012, p. 46).

Differences

Greater Control over Funding and Resources

The first implication is that the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, can
legitimately control its armed forces, paramilitaries, weapons or any other resources needed
to carry out state-terrorism. This is because, for the state, all of the resources that can be used

to commit acts of terror can be sourced legally for legitimate purposes. A non-state terrorist
organisation, on the other hand, has no legitimate recourse to violence, so has greater barriers.

Funding, for example, is a non-state terrorist groups lifeline. The group has to seek

funding from wherever it can, usually employing a combination of donations, illegal

activities and legitimate cover operations (Kaplan, 2006). A state, on the other hand, can use
its defence budget to provide the means to carry out its actions: a state-terroristic action will
take place amongst a number of other legitimate actions.

Hamass changes in sources of funding illustrate the difficulties facing all non-state

terrorist organisations. The group has been cut off from funding from US and EU assistance
to the PLO. Moreover, it has also become more and more isolated politically: Egypts al-Sisi

government has severed ties with the organisation, as has Iran, which used to provide funding
until Hamas distanced itself from Tehran following its support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria

(Laub, 2014). This leaves Palestinian expatriates and private donors in the Gulf as the groups
main sources of funding (Laub, 2014).

Israel enjoys the full military and economic support of the USA. It receives more than

$3 billion a year in military financing, making it the USs largest cumulative aid recipient
since the Second World War. It also participates in joint military exercises, military research
and weapons development (US State Department, 2014).
Greater Chance of Impunity

The states privileged status as having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force means that

it is harder for the international community to hold it to account. This is in part owing to the
principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states enshrined in Chapter I, Article II of
the UN Charter, which until the turn of the century made it difficult to address human rights

abuses stemming from another state. With new principles such as Responsibility to Protect,

this is changing, but the tension between national sovereignty and the duty to intervene
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continues, further exacerbated by accusations of less-than-pure motivations from intervening

states, as seen in Iraq and Libya.

No Hamas attack escapes notice. Its terroristic actions have led it to being designated

a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US State Department. The Hamas drive-by shooting
was rightly condemned as a terror attack, prompting an immediate reaction from Israeli

forces to find the gunmen; Fatah security forces in the West Bank also launched their own
investigation (Pfeffer, et al., 2010).

Israels strength, support and international legitimacy mean that it can frequently use

pretexts of security to justify its actions. The Israeli checkpoint attack was one of many such

examples,1 most of which have occurred with no repercussions. According to Machsom

Watch, an Israeli human rights organisation that monitors the conduct of Israeli soldiers and

police at checkpoints, the IDF mount a limited investigation occasionally but seem

unwilling to accept either the scope or prevalence of the problem. The response blames the
individual soldier, who may have become unhinged or acted contrary to orders (Machsom

Watch, 2004, cited in Nasr, 2010, p. 73). However, the argument that these are isolated

incidents is belied by other testimonies, including one by an IDF officer, who said, We dont

understand why youre upset, events like this occur ten times a day (Machsom Watch, 2004,
cited in Nasr, 2010, p. 73).

Greater Likelihood to Use Different Actions

The illegitimacy that non-state terrorist organisations have dictates the kinds of actions they
tend to carry out. This is why in the University of Marylands Global Terrorism Database
(2015), bombings make up the plurality of attacks. This tactic is unlikely to be seen carried

out by a state simply because it has no need to. Instead, when state-terrorism is studied, it is
usual to find examples of torture and repression (Combs & Slann, 2007).

Even in the two case studies, we find slight variance in the method. The Hamas attack

was a calculated attack carried out directly against the passengers in the car. The Isareli

attack, even if there was no legitimate reason for shooting at the car, took place within the
context of passing through a checkpoint, which provides a potential justification.

A number of sworn affidavits of similar experiences are collated in a Human Rights Focus report by Al Haq
(Haalana & Trainor, 2002).
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Warren Quinton

Similarities

Intention
Most definitions tend to agree that a terrorist act has to have pretensions beyond the
immediate act itself. As Stohl states, in terrorism the violence, threatened or perpetrated, has

purposes broader than simply physical harm to a victim (Stohl & Wight, 2012, p. 46). This
is uncontroversial with non-state terrorism because a non-state group may explicitly state its

goals; a state, however, will be more reluctant to admit their actions for fear of losing

legitimacy amongst its population. As Nasr explains, as no state is likely to acknowledge

that the intended purpose of its policies is to spread terror among a population in order to gain
political control advantages, we must deduce intent from the context (Nasr, 2010, p. 68).

There can be no question that Hamas wants to create a climate of fear through its

actions, although their stated goal is to end the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
In the drive-by shooting, Hamas admitted to the attacks, calling it a natural response to the
crimes of occupation (Pfeffer, et al., 2010).

The intentions behind Israels actions are harder to discern because they are always

justified as necessary security measures; it is therefore necessary to look at the

proportionality of Israels actions at the checkpoints (Nasr, 2010, p. 69). The IDF follows

Open Fire Regulations, which stipulate that any shooting must be in direct response to a

life-threatening situation. As Haalana & Trainor (2002) explain, however, the rules constantly
change. Btselem, an Israeli human rights organisation, concluded that the rules had changed
so that they enable firing in situations where there is no life-threatening danger at all (cited

in Haalana & Trainor, 2002, p. 16). Even without killings, the checkpoint system, it could be
argued, is designed to cause panic and fear, as a statement by an Israeli soldier suggests: No

one knows what is going on; the rules change every minute. Palestinians get shot because no
one knows what theyre supposed to be doing and everyone is scared (cited in Nasr, 2010, p.
73).

Legitimacy
Those who argue against state-terrorism claim that the Weberian definition of the state
renders state-terrorism meaningless (Stohl & Wight, 2012, p. 47). The legal permission to
resort to violence, it is argued, makes states exceptional, including when there are abuses.

However, legitimate in the Weberian formulation qualifies the dependent noun phrase use
of force, which means that the monopoly is granted only if the use of force is legitimate. If it

is not, there is no justification for treating it differently from illegitimate acts carried out by
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non-state actors. As Stohl illustrates, State actors do in fact violate the laws of the state and
are frequently held accountable by the judicial system for those acts... Their actions are not
considered legitimate (or legal) simply because they hold state office (Stohl & Wight, 2012,

p. 48). The only way to treat state acts of terror differently from non-state acts is to resort to
making the non-state actor an inherent aspect of terrorism; this carries a burden of proof,
however, which, if not met, simply begs the question.

Morality
Differences between state and non-state acts of terrorism notwithstanding, there is a

normative political justification for the continued use of the term state-terrorism, owing to the

moral equivalency between the two acts. Terrorism is a term that carries more than merely

taxonomical properties. It is used in the popular media to ascribe connotations of illegitimacy

upon an actor, and these connotations have inevitably influenced the academic domain. While
academics argue for the non-existence of state-terrorism for expedient reasons, they overlook

that states employ political reasons, intentionally limiting the term terrorism to non-state

actors in order to confer greater legitimacy upon the state. An act of terrorism can simply
become an abuse, or worse can be justified as necessary given a certain set of circumstances.
This decision is purely political, according to Michael Stohl:

The same process is employed to label the terrorist of which one approves as freedom
fighters, and those that one does not as terrorists. There is no firm conceptual ground to do
so, however (Stohl & Wight, 2012, p. 45).

The technique has led dissident voices such as Noam Chomskys to criticise the double

standards of the US with statements such as: When they do it, its a crime. When we do it,
its not (Chomsky, 2004).

Conclusion

The state has a privileged status through its legal recourse to violence. This, however, doesnt
preclude it from abuses, and this can sometimes take the form of terrorism. This essay has

shown that there are some important implications of the states special role, namely that it has
greater access to resources and funding, it has greater chance of impunity in it actions, and

that it can resort to different kinds of acts from non-state groups. The similarities, however,
hold important political implications, drawing equivalencies between the two groups in

intentional, legitimate and moral terms. The cases of Israel and Hamas also contain these

fundamental differences. Hamas is granted no legitimacy, although some of its demands may
be legitimate; Israel has legitimate reasons to resort to force when confronting Palestinian
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terrorism, but it is also guilty of creating a climate of fear itself, facilitating the prevalence of

extrajudicial killings against Palestinians at its checkpoints. Given such differences it may be
seem reasonable to make a taxonomical distinction between the two actors, but this could
lend legitimacy to and encourage impunity of state terror.

Word Count: 2,476

Warren Quinton

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