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22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles

I. Consent to Contract Marriage
a. Requisites of consent.The requisites of consent are: (1)
it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers,
(2) it should be free, and (3) it
should be spontaneous.
b. Form of consent.The consent to marry is manifested
by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of2
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife"
No particular form of express consent is prescribed by law.
Consent to marry
may, therefore, be given by sign, nod of
the head, etc.
While Article 55 of the Civil Code requires the
contracting parties to declare before the person solemnizing
the marriage that they take each other as husband and
wife, there is nothing in the law which says that such
declaration must be made by word of mouth or that it may4
not be expressed in a mode other than in written form.
Thus, failure of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties
whether they take each other as husband and wife cannot
be regarded as a fatal omission, and is not a cause declared
in and signed the marriage contract that they were for
annulment, it being sufficient
that they were taking each
other as husband and wife A declaration by word of mouth
of what the parties had already stated in writing would be
a mere repetition, so that
its omission should not be
regarded as a fatal defect.
II. Grounds for Annulment of Marriage

1. Violence or intimidation
a. Concept.There is violence when in order7 to wrest
consent, serious or irresistible force is employed. There

8 Manresa 663.

De Loria v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958; Art. 55, N.C.C.

Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, 1950 ed., p. 81.

Karganilla v. Familiar, 1 O.G. 345 (1942).

Infante v. Arenas, CA-G.R. No. 5278-R, June 29, 1951.


Art. 1335, N.C.C.




Jocson vs. Robles

is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is

compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or
upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or
ascendants to give his consent. The duress that vitiates
consent in marriage must be a continuing one and must be
such as to decimate his will entirely or to deter his freedom
of movement that he could not9 evade the catastrophe, if he
really were minded to avoid it.
b. Requisites of duress.There are four requisites in
order that duress (including both violence and
intimidation) may vitiate the consent and render the
contract voidable or invalid, namely:10 (a) that it must be the
determining cause of the contract , (b)11 that it must be
unjust, (c) that it be serious or grave and (d) that it
produced a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact
that the person from whom it comes
has the necessary
means to inflict the threatened injury.
intimidated was taken from her residence to the intended
place of marriage ceremony at night; that said ceremony
was held at about one o'clock in the morning; and she
acceded to the signing of the marriage contract due to a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of losing her life due to
the threats and armed demonstration of the brothers of the

defendant, a good ground to annul the marriage under

peculiar and extraordinary circumstances exists. In the
same manner, where the aggrieved party contracted the
marriage under an impulse of an uncontrollable fear,
because the prospective bride threatened to denounce him
to the Japanese as a guerrilla spy if he refused to marry
her, there14 would also be no question that said marriage is

Art. 1335, Id.

People v. Anastacio, CA-G.R. No. 13397-R, Feb. 7, 1965.


Honnett vs. Honnett, 34 Am. Rep. 39.


Tapia v. Carman, 60 Phil. 956, dis. op. 965.


Alarcon v.. Kasilag, O.G. Supp. Oct. 11, 1941, p. 203.


Tiongco v. Matig-a, 44 O.G. No. 1, p. 96.


People v. Belen, CA-G.R. No. 150-R, May 29, 1947; 45 O.G. No. 4,

Supp. 88; See also Maitim v. Evangelista, CA-G.R. No. 295-R, Jan. 12,
1948, 45 O.G. 2135.

VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles

d. Duress must arise from unlawful act.The intimidation
that will annul a contract has to do with the evil or harm
arising from an unlawful act, not from the exercise of a
right, such as the right to file a criminal complaint against
a person who has committed a crime. Thus a threat to
prosecute a person for a15crime he has committed, does not
constitute intimidation. A threat to enforce one's claim
through competent authority,
if the claim is just or legal,
does not vitiate consent. Also, where a man who had a
previous carnal knowledge of a girl, married her under the
threat to oppose his admission to the practice of law for
immorality if he did not marry her, he cannot seek
annulment of the marriage
on the ground of duress. For
under existing rules, a man with bad moral character
should not be admitted to the bar. However, if the charge of
immorality, subject
of the threat, was false, the marriage
can be annulled.
2. Fraud

circumstances enumerated in Article 86 of the new Civil
Code constitute the kind of fraud 20acceptable as legal
ground for annulment of marriage. The enumeration
under this law is exclusive and no other ground
constitute f raud for the annulment of marriage. This is
clear from the provision: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for

Sotto v. Mariano, 36 O.G. 1056.


Art. 1335, N.C.C.


Ruiz v. Atienza, O.G., Aug, 30, 1041, p. 1903; Soriente v. Aliman,

CA-G.R. No. 29350-R, Dec, 15, 1965.


Secs. 2 & 27, Rule 138, Rev, Rules of Court.


Cf. Collins v. Collins, 2 Brewst (Pa.) 515


Art. 86 reads: "Any of the following circumstances shall constitute f











Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; (2)

Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment
for two years or more; and (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her

Soriente v. Aliman, CA-G.R. No. 29350-R, Sept. 24, 1964.




Jocson vs. Robles

the annulment of marriage." Thus, in the Soriente case

the Court of Appeals refused to accept the claim of the
complainant "that she did not know that what she had
signed was a marriage contract" for, as she was a pharmacy
student, she could not have been easily misled into signing
such document; and furthermore, the ground she relied
upon is not among the circumstances enumerated in Article
b. Reason for annulment based on fraud.A husband
has a right to require that his wife shall not bear to his bed
aliens to his blood and lineage. This is implied in the very
nature of the contract of marriage. Therefore, a woman

who is incapable of bearing a child to her husband at the

time of her marriage, by reason of her pregnancy by
another man, is unable to perform an important part of the
contract into which she enters; and any representation
which leads to the belief that she is in a marriageable
condition23 is a false statement of a fact material to the
c. Effect of knowledge of pre-nuptial pregnancy.Prenuptial pregnancy is a valid ground for the annulment
of a
marriage, while pre-nuptial unchastity is not. However, if
at the time of the marriage, the groom was aware (or could
have been aware) of the bride's pregnancy, as when the
latter was already in the seventh month stage of
pregnancy, there can be no fraud to annul the marriage.
In this connection, it has been held that where the bride
was only four months pregnant at the time of the marriage,
the groom could not be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether
or not she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage.
d. Effect where both parties practiced fraud.In 27case
both parties were guilty of fraud, the marriage is valid.

Art. 86, last par.


Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (85 Marc) 605.


Aquino v. Delizo (CA), 14 Velayo's Digest 384.


Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil . 1


Aquino v. Delizo, L-15853, July 27, 1960.


Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 99, citing Art.

1344, N.C.C.

VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles

3. Insanity
a. Concept of insanity.Insanity is a manifestation, in
language or conduct, of a disease or def ect of the brain, or
a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by


impaired or disordered volition.

To be a ground29for annulment, insanity must exist at the
time of marriage. Insanity of one of the spouses occurring
after the celebration
of the marriage, cannot constitute a
cause of nullity.
b. Judicial declaration of insanity not required.It is
not necessary -that there be a previous judicial declaration
of mental incapacity in order that a contract entered into
by a mentally defective person may be annulled; it is
enough that
the insanity existed at the time the contract
was made.
The burden of proving such incapacity at the time the
contract was entered into rests upon he who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof
to this effect is adduced, his capacity will be
For all men are presumed to be sane and
4. Impotency or Physical Incapacity
a. Impotency defined.As a ground for annulment of
marriage, impotency
is the physical inability to have sexual
b. Test of impotence.The test of impotence is not the
capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. The
supervening35 sterility of the wife is not a ground for
annulment. Therefore, even if the wife is incapable of
procreation but she could copulate, there is no ground for

Eagle v. Doe, 47 Phil. 753.


Art. 85, N.C.C.


Katipunan v. Tenorio, 38 O.G. 172.


8 Nawasa 660-661.


Carrillo v. Jaoco, 46 Phil 597,


Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil. 679.


Menciano v. San Jose, L-1967, May 28, 1951, 89 Phil. 63.


Sarao v. Guevarra, CA-G.R. No. 47603, 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 263.




Jocson vs. Robles


It was held that the fact that the physician

was able to get a specimen of the semen of the supposed

impotent for examination as to its contents, through the
use of a
rubber sac and a woman, conclusively shows
The annulment of the marriage cannot be decreed upon
the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of
his marriage; and this would particularly be true, if the
alleged impotent failed to appear 'in court and refused to be
subjected to physical examination on the38pretext that such
examination would be self-incrimination.
c. Effect of knowledge of one party.Even if the physical
incapacity of one party was known to the other at the
of marriage, such marriage is voidable just the same.
5. Marriage Without Parental Consent
a. Age requirement.A marriage between the ages of 16
and 20, if male, or between the ages of 14 and 18, if female,
solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian, or
person having authority over the party, is also voidable,
unless after attaining the ages of 20 or 18 years, as the case
may be, such party freely cohabited with 40the other and
both lived together as husband and wife. This kind of
marriage was valid under the old law; hence, the ruling on
that point in Aguilar vs. Lazaro, 4 Phil. 735,. may be
deemed legislatively changed by Article 85 of the Civil
b. Mistake of fact as to age.Where the woman was
made to believe by her f father that she was already of
marriageable age (although such was not the fact), and on
the strength of that belief she entered into the marriage,
she and her husband are not liable for violation of Article
350 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes any person
who "shall contract marriage knowing that the

Sarao v. Guevarra, supra.


Menciano v. San Jose, supra.


Jimenez v. Caizares, L-12790, Aug. 31, 1960.


Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 99.


Art. 85, No. 1, N.C.C.


VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles

requirements of the law have not been complied with." For
under the circumstance, there was a clear mistake of fact
as to her age and her husband had the right to
rely on the
sworn statement she executed relative thereto.
The principle of good faith applied in the Pealosa case
applies with equal force to the person 42
performing the
ceremony which makes them man and wife.
6. Voidable Bigamous Marriages
a, Kinds of bigamous marriages.Under
Article 83 of
the new Civil Code there are two kinds of
bigamous marriages, to wit: first, a bigamous
marriage subsequently contracted in bad faith by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person without44 the first marriage being
annulled or dissolved ; and, second, a bigamous
marriage contracted in good faith under any of the
three circumstances
mentioned under No. 2 of said
Article 83.
b. Distinction.The first kind of bigamous marriage
is void ab initio and the good46faith of the second
wife or husband is immaterial In the second, the
bigamous marriage, under any of the three cases
mentioned in No.

U.S. v. Pealosa, 1 Phil . 19


U.S. v. San Juan, 25 Phil. 513.


Art. 83 reads: "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court."


Art. 83, No. 1; People v. Subano, L-48143, Sept. 30, 1942, 73 Phil.

692; 3 Viada, Codego Penal, 275.


Cf. U.S. v. Enriquez, 32 Phil. 202; Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.

People v. Concepcion, 40 O.G. 2878; Capistrano, Civil Code

Annotated, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 97.




Jocson vs. Robles
2 of Article 83, is merely voidable"valid until
declared null and void by a competent court".
Under the first kind, the bigamous marriage is
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code; while, in any of the three kinds of bigamous
marriage under No. 2 of Article 83,
said Article 349
of the Penal Code is inapplicable.

If the second wife married the erring husband knowing

that his first marriage is still valid and subsisting, she is
also liable for bigamy, even if she had never been married
bef ore and even if the
charge does not allege that this is
her second marriage.
c. Meaning of "proper proceedings" used in Article 449.
The words "proper proceedings" used in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to
those proceedings authorized by law such as those
which refer to the administration or settlement of
the estate
of a deceased person (Arts. 390 and 391,
d. Judicial declaration of absence not necessary in
marriage.For the purpose of the civil marriage
law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former51spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such

former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and

the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Art. 85, No. 2, N.C.C.; People v. Mendoza, L-5877, Sept. 28, 1954;

Cortez v. Brownell, L-7554, Aug. 31, 1955; People v. Baluya, CA-G.R. No.
16762-R, Aug. 26, 1958.

Cf. U.S. v. Enriquez, 32 Phil. 202.


People v. Arcilla, et al., L-15632, Feb. 28, 1961.


Lukban v. Republic, L-8492, Feb. 29, 1966.


The period of absence may be less than seven years if the absentee

"is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse

present" (No. 2, Art. 83, N.C.C.).

See Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179; People v. Mendoza, supra, and

People v. Aragon, L-10016, Feb. 28, 1957, in rel. Sec.


VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocso n v s. Rob
III. Cohabitation and Acts of Ratification
a. Concept
something more than merely living together
voluntarily in the same house or even occupying the
same bed, but is the living together of the parties as
husband and wife, and including sexual relations.
Neither law nor jurisprudence fixes a definite
period for an effective cohabitation; hence, in such
case, the environmental
facts of each must be
b. Effects of cohabitation.A man who is forced into a
marriage against his will would not, even after the
threat or violence has disappeared, ordinarily have
carnal knowledge with the woman whom he
married under such condition. His natural reaction,
even after the violent circumstance, would be to
avoid the evil of going through a loveless marriage.
And, if inspite of the coercion and his lack of
consent thereto, he took advantage of a husband's
privilege by having carnal knowledge with her, it
must be because either (a) the force was in reality a

fiction, or that (b) he had forgiven those responsible

for it. Consequently, he cannot later on be heard to
say that his marriage was ef f ected through duress,
intimidation or violence, because the law would
step in and estop the husband from avoiding
effects of his voluntary act of cohabitation. It is for
said reasons that cohabitation, if voluntary,
cleanses the marriage of its infirmities, if any there
are, and constitutes
a forbidding obstacle to the
annulment thereof.
Cohabitation also gives rise to the presumption that the
husband and his wife have been legally married,
notwithstanding any defect in the ceremony of marriage or
in the 4 (Presumption of Death), Rule 73 (Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons), Rule 107 (Absentees), and
Sec. 5[x] (Disputable Presumptions), of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Sis on v. Te Lay Li , 48 O.G. 3906, citin g Zoske 64 N.Y.S. 2d 819;

Menciano v. San Jose, L-1967, May 28, 1961.




C f. Faja rd o v. G al ao, 54 O .G. 707


Art. 85, pars. 4 & 5, N.C.C.; Menciano v. San Jose, L1967, May 28,

1951; Castro v. Dabu, 57 O.G. 1060 (1960), in pari materia: Katipunan v.

Tenorio, 38 O.G. No. 10, p. 172.



Jocson vs. Robles

records thereof And when the marriage has been shown in

evidence, whether regular or irregular,
the law raises a
strong presumption of its legality.
For obvious reason, the rule on the effects of
cohabitation aforementioned is not applicable to the kind of
marriage falling under No. 2, Article 83, of the new Civil
c. Particular acts constituting confirmation of marriage.
If after the marriage ceremony, the supposed aggrieved
husband readily took his wife with him to Legaspi where
they spent the night together as husband and wife, and,

later, to Manila in the very house of his own sister, where

his mother also lived, and thereafter continued with their
marital relationship, such subsequent acts of the parties
have produced the effect of ratifying 59the marriage
supposedly effected by force or intimidation.
Likewise, if on the night of the marriage the spouses
voluntarily slept together by themselves in the same room
and continuously lived like husband and wife (for a little
more than three years), there would undoubtedly be more
than sufficient acts of ratification or confirmation of their
marriage, even 60
if the same was originally effected by force
or intimidation.
But, if immediately after the marriage ceremony the
groom, who previously had carnal knowledge with the
woman by force, gave the latter a few pesos and sent her to
her father's home, such conduct shows that he had no
intention of making her as his wif e e a nd the cere mony
not be considered as binding on her because of duress,
and there would be no cohabitation to speak of.
IV. Effects of Non-compliance with Formal Requirements of

Sison v. Ambalada, 30 Phil. 118; Santos v. Cruz, CA-G.R. No. 2722-

R, Dec. 27, 1949; Sec. 5(bb), Rule 131, Rev. Rules of Court; Que Quay v.
Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 128.

Sy Joc Lieng v. Si Quia, 40 Phil. 113.


Fajardo v. Galao, 54 O.G. 7074 (1958); Menciano v. San Jose, supra.


Castro v. Dabu, supra.


People v. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68.


VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles

1. Informalities or irregularities
grounds for nullity of marriage



a. The fact that the application for marriage license

contains false statements62 is not a ground for
annulment of the marriage.
b. The fact that the marriage license was not

personally signed by the officer (Civil Registrar or

Assistant Civil Registrar) authorized to sign or
issue the same but by the clerk in the Registrar's
office, is not a cause for nullity, there being proof
that the latter had been signing the name of the
Civil Registrar on marriage licenses 63with the
tolerance ond acquiescence of said officer. Also, the
fact that it was the municipal clerk and not the
municipal treasurer who signed and issued the
marriage license is not a ground for annulment of
the marriage, it appearing that the former signed it
"for and in the name of the local Civil Registrar"
and that the latter signed the solemnization receipt
of P1.00, which latter act is one way of confirming
the authority
of his clerk to sign for and on his
c. Lack of qualification relative to residence, as when
the accused was a resident of Tanauan and the
marriage license was issued thereat (but the
marriage was celebrated in
Manila), is not a cause
for nullity of the marriage.
d. Non-compliance with the 10-day period of
publication of the application for a marriage license
as required by Article 63 of the Civil
Code, cannot
give rise to nullity of the marriage.
e. Failure of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties
whether they take each other as husband and wife
cannot be invoked as basis to annul the marriage, it
being suf

Karganilla v. Familiar, 1 O.G. 345 (1942).


San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, 56 O.G. 3555 (1959).


San Miguel v. Marca, CA-G.R. No. 17527-R, May 18, 1964;

Digenman v. Guerra, CA-G.R. No. 2372-R, May 11, 1964,


People v. Belen, 45 O.G. No. 5, Supp. 88.


People v. Belen, supra; Soriente v. Aliman, CA-G.R. No. 29350-R,

Sept 24, 1964.




Jocson vs. Robles

ficient that they signed and declared in the

marriage contract that
they were taking each other
as husband and wife.
f. The f act that the application f or marriage license
was not sworn to before an officer authorized by law
to administer oath does not render the marriage
voidable where the essential requirements for its
validity were present. This irregularity68 is primarily
the look out of the subscribing officer. A marriage
under a license irregularly issued or wrongfully
obtained is not equivalent to "a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license"
Article 80 (No. 3) of the new Civil Code.
An "Acting Mayor" or a "Vice-Mayor as Acting
Mayor"7 or a
"de facto officer" may solemnize marriage for in such
instances, the solemnizing officer discharges all the duties
and wields the powers appurtenant to his office.
g. Non-compliance with the rule that the marriage
shall be solemnized publicly in the office of the
judge in open court (Art. 57, N.C.C.) or the fact that
the marriage was performed outside said office, is
not a cause for annulment, or does72 not in any way
affect the validity of the marriage. In the Catholic
religion, a marriage can be solemnized
by a priest
outside his parish or jurisdiction. Similarly, the
fact that the marriage took place74 on a Sunday
would not also vitiate the marriage.
h. The signing of the marriage contract or certificate
was required by the statute simply for the purpose
of evidencing the act. The "signing of the marriage
contract," therefore, is merely a "formal
requirement of evidenciary value" and there is no
statutory provision or court ruling

Karganila v. Familiar, 1 O.G. 345, (1942).


San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, CA-G.R. No. 23729-R, Nov. 27, 1959.


See Melchor v. Melchor, 102 Neb. 790, 169 N.W. 720.


People v. Bustamante, L-11598, Jan. 27, 1959.


People v. Blanco, CA-G.R. No. 2678-R, Nov. 20, 1950.


Fernandez v. Soriano, CA-G.R. No. 1814-R, Dec. 23, 1949.


Bucado v. Gimson, CA-G.R. No. 11463-R, June 7, 1958.


San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, CA-G.R. No. 23727-R, Nov. 27, 1959.

VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968


Jocson vs. Robles


making it an essential requisite. There is also no

law or regulation requiring that a marriage
contract need be sealed with the seal of the official,
priest, or76minister performing the ceremonies of the
i. The failure of the solemnizing officer to furnish to
the contracting parties copies of the marriage
pursuant to Article 68 of the new Civil
Code, or the failure to forward a copy of the
marriage certificate to the proper Civil Registry
does not affect the validity of the marriage where
the essential requisites for its validity were present.
Identical remarks apply to the failure of the priest
to make and file the affidavit required
by Articles
72 and 73 of the new Civil Code.
2, Effect of attestation in marriage certificate.The
attestation in the marriage certificate that on the
date and at the place stated therein, the parties
"take each other as husband and wife," and "were
with their mutual consent lawfully joined in
matrimony by me in the presence of the abovenamed witnesses," gives rise to the presumption
that the legal formalities required
by law had been
complied with and fulfilled.
V. Rules in Annulment Proceedings
1. Policy of the State.The fundamental policy of the
State, which is predominantly Catholic and
considers marriage as indissoluble, is to be cautious
and strict in granting annulment of marriage.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them. This is necessary for the order of
society and to prevent constant violation of decency


De Loria v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958.


People v. Yu (CA), 52 O.G. 4703.


De Loria v. Felix, supra.


Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179; Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.


People v. Bondoc, CA- G.R . No. 4 483-R , M arch People v. Baluya,

CA-G.R. No. 16762-R, Aug. 26, 1958.


Laririt v. Laririt, CA-G.R. No. 21356-R, April 11, 1960; Bigornia v.

Cardinas, 51 O.G. 6167.


Roque v. Encarnacion, 95 Phil. 643.




Jocson vs. Robles

law. All inducements

for illicit relationship should
be avoided.
2. Judgment on pleadings and summary judgment not
allowed.Pursuant to said policy, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage
shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 & 101 [par. 2])
the Revised Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without the formality of an actual trial (Sec. 1, Rule
9). The purpose of the provision and the prohibition
is to prevent collusion between the parties.
In actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved and such annulment in a summary
judgment proceeding without actual trial is not allowed.
Neither could a counterclaim that would pave the way for
the annulment of the
marriage be permitted in such
summary proceeding.
3. Compromise impermissible;
Exception.An admission
or confession by the parties, or an agreement between the
spouses, cannot serve as a basis for the annulment of a
marriage without being sufficiently corroborated by other
proofs distinct
from the admission, confession, or
agreement. The default of the defendant spouse, in cases
of this nature, could very well become the means of
fulfilling a previous agreement between husband and wife
so as to evade the requirements of the laws on annulment


of marriage and legal separation.


Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, 40 Phil. 113; Arca v. Javier, 95 Phil. 579.


Jamias v. Rodriguez, 81 Phil. 303.


De Cardinas v. Cardinas, L-8218, Dec. 15, 1955.


Sec. 1, Rule 19, Rev, Rules of Court.


Roque v. Encarnacion, 95 Phil. 643.


Roque v. Encarnacion, supra.


Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant

appears in court and confesses the right to judgment or files a pleading

expressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand (Ocampo v. Florenciano, L13553, Feb. 23, 1960).

Cf. de Cardinas v. Cardinas, Id.; Ocampo v. Florenciano, Id.


Bello v. Bayani (CA), 2 O.G. 686.


VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 10, 1968,


Pacis vs. Commission on Elections

Thus, where the complaint raised the issue whether the
wife entered into the marriage in good faith, the trial court
cannot ignore said issue and declare as forfeited her rights
to properties obtained during the marriage and deny her
custody of one of her children, in a summary
without the formality of a trial.
However, in an
annulment proceeding, where the possibility of such collusion is remote because the interests of the wives are
conflicting and the two marriage certificates are attached
to the stipulation of facts 92as part of the evidence, such
stipulation may be allowed. Similarly, where the evidence
sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together
with what has already been adduced, would be sufficient to
sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff in a complaint for
annulment, and the fiscal had already been ordered to
represent the Government in said proceeding, the failure of
the defendant spouse to file her answer
thereto, cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion. Judge DOMINGO

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