F I L E D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAR 5 1997

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

In re:
MIDGARD CORPORATION,
Debtor.
MIDGARD CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL TODD, CUSTOM CUTTING
MILLWORKS INCORPORATED
and TODDS RECYCLING
CENTER INCORPORATED,

Nos. 96-6016, 96-6017

(D.C. Nos. CIV-94-2073-T &
CIV-94-2072-T)
(W.D. Okla.)

Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This appeal challenges the bankruptcy courts imposition under Bankruptcy
Rule 9011 of sanctions of $500 each, payable to the court, against debtor Midgard
Corporations president, David Personette, and its attorney, Wilburn C. Hall, for
bringing an adversary proceeding against defendants that was not well-grounded
in law or fact. (The merits of the adversary proceeding are addressed in a
separate appeal, No. 96-6018.) Midgard itself was not sanctioned because the
bankruptcy court expressly chose not to further burden the estate. However,
Midgard is the appellant here, as it was in the district court. The district court
questioned its jurisdiction over the sanctions imposed on Hall, but entered orders
affirming the imposition of sanctions on both Hall and Personette.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal because Midgard itself was
not sanctioned and therefore lacks standing to appeal. Midgard contends that it is
the real party in interest and that [a]ll related sanction rights, titles, interests or
expectancies have been disclaimed by Hall and Personette in favor of Midgard.
Appellants response to appellees motions to dismiss at 1. It also contends that
the district court ratified its interests by ruling on the matter. Id.
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Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any time. See

Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854 (10th Cir.
1993). Federal courts have only limited jurisdiction, and when the record
discloses that the district court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of a case,
we will correct the district courts error. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); see also Deyhimy v. Rupp (In re Herwit), 970
F.2d 709, 709-10 (10th Cir. 1992) (dismissing appeal where district court lacked
jurisdiction over appeal from bankruptcy court, even though district court
addressed merits of appeal). Thus, the district court here could not have
ratified Midgards standing if Midgard lacked standing to begin with.
We conclude Midgard did lack standing. To have standing, one must be
aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken. Uselton, 9 F.3d at 854. The
imposition of sanctions against Hall and Personette personally did not aggrieve
Midgard. We note that Midgard cites no authority for the interesting proposition
that a party can assign its rights or interests in being sanctioned.
The district court orders affirming the imposition of sanctions are
VACATED. Appellees motion to dismiss these appeals is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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