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Foucault K
FYI
What does police or police state mean in context to
the 1NC evidence?
Johnson 2014 (Andrew PhD student in Political Science at the Uni- versity
of California at Santa Barbara Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a
Neoliberal Age Theoria, Issue 141, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2014): 5-29
doi:10.3167/th.2014.6114102 // Copenhaver)
Foucaults use of the term police is pervasive. Foucaults first reference is in
History of Madness (published in French in 1961) and The Birth of the Clinic
(published in French 1963), both written years before his prison publication.2 The Birth of Social Medicine (1976) and The Politics of Health in the
Eighteenth Century (1974) depict a medical police, the Medizinischep- olizei
(Foucault 2000: 945, 1402). In Space, Knowledge, Power (1982), Foucault
speaks of police as the result of urbanisation (ibid.: 3502). In two of his late
essays Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason (1979)
and The Political Technology of Individuals (1982), Foucault sepa- rates the
concept of the police into three modes: (a) as a model for a political utopia
via Louis Turquet de Mayerne in 1611, (b) as a political programme or
practice, from Nicholas Delamares 1705 Treatise of the Police and (c) as an
academic discipline, the German Polizeiwissenschaft, provided by Gottlob von
Justis 1756 Elements of Police (ibid.: 31723, 41015). In Security, Territory,
Population, Foucault speaks extensively of the grain police, a monolithic market mechanism coextensive with the rise of commerce (Foucault 2007: 53,
94). Finally, he heralds a Police-State, Polizeistaat, which is hyper-administrative (ibid.: 31819). One cannot help but notice the new vocabulary of
biopower: police deal with the circulation of populations and capital, with
health, disease and inoculation campaigns, but they also supervise life and
happiness in general (ibid.: 325). In an illuminating line, Foucault says the
police deal with living, and more than just living (ibid.: 326). Foucault identifies the police as a security apparatus (ibid.: 3434, 3534). He
provocatively calls the police a permanent coup dtat, also an instantiation
of the raison dtat, and finally, as one mode of his new schema
Governmentality (ibid.: 33940). The police are an extension of the state,
but also autonomous, exceeding state-control. Foucault claims that the term
police has vastly dif- ferent definitions from the sixteenth century, to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finally, resulting in little semblance to
our modern use of the simple police (ibid.: 31214). Foucault points to
Nicholas Delamares Treaty of the Police as fixing eleven different functions of
the early French police, but the extent of their control is indefinite.
1NC Generic
The plan is inseparable from the police state You should
view the 1AC with extreme skepticism because the plan is
merely a benevolent move to make the police state seem
a little bit more benign, which only creates the conditions
for surveillance to become much more insidious.
Johnson 2014 (Andrew PhD student in Political Science at the Uni- versity
of California at Santa Barbara Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a
Neoliberal Age Theoria, Issue 141, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2014): 5-29
doi:10.3167/th.2014.6114102 // Copenhaver)
Jeremy Benthams Panopticon was never intended to be solely an architectural blueprint for a prison, but was, from the outset, a plan for all types of
governmental institutions. In Panopticon; or Inspection House (1787), he entitled his design an: idea of a new principle of construction ... applicable to any
sort of establishment: Prisons, Houses of industry, Workhouses, Poor Houses,
Manufactories, Madhouses, Lazarettos, Hospitals, and Schools (Ben- tham
1995: 29). As a model for managing and controlling populations, Benthams Panopticon structures and governs all of society. Foucault
substantiates this expansive purview throughout his entire oeuvre; in his
19781979 College de France lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault
asserts: Bentham will propose that the Panopticon should be the formula for
the whole of govern- ment, saying that the Panopticon is the very formula
of liberal government (Foucault 2008: 67). Years earlier, in his Rio di
Janeiro lectures Truth and Juridical Forms (1973), Foucault declared:
Panopticism is one of the characteristic traits of our society. Its a
type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous
individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and
compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, the molding and
transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. This threefold
aspect of panopticism surveillance, control, correction seems to be a
fundamental and characteristic dimension of the power relations
that exist in our society. ... Today we live in a society programmed
basically by Bentham, a panoptic society, a society where panopticism reigns
(Foucault 2000: 70). Surveillance and control are mobilised onto the
whole social field. All of soci- ety works like a prison, everyone is
under surveillance, constantly being dis- ciplined according to a
bourgeoning liberalism. The prison is isomorphic with all of this ... prison
is not unlike what happens every day (ibid.: 85). The Panopticon is
most commonly aligned with factories, schools, military barracks
and hospitals. This is evidence of Foucaults desire to cut off the head of
the King in political analysis (Foucault 1978: 89; 1980: 121). Fou- cault seeks
to undermine the explanatory sway of state power in political phi-losophy by
identifying disciplinary techniques swarming freely throughout the social
body (Foucault 1977: 211). However, the de-institutionalized and diffuse
there is an
undeniable willingness to wage wars that were not acceptable before
September 11. One might argue that with September 11 there has been some kind of
breach of the biopolitical compact in the United States, or in the West
generally, which allows the public to tolerate the loss of American lives, with
the large numbers killed in New York being something biopolitically sheltered
Americans are simply not used to. But this would be wrong, because it is precisely because of
been general gains for the biopolitical over the right to kill since the Vietnam War. However,
biopolitics that this attack appears as such an unspeakable atrocityotherwise it might seem like a
rational act of war, rather than an unspeakable act of evil outside of the realm of comprehensible, valid
human conduct. For biopower, September 11 is unacceptable.30 Biopolitics is about the regularity and
stability of a population. Of course, biopower comes into its own in wartime, as in the Second World War in
Britain, though it breaks down when put under too much pressure 65 Contretemps 4, September 2004 (as
must look to the operation of biopolitics at the level of individuals. Differences in individuals values and
perceptions are utterly necessary for the operation of biopower: it is both a condition of the possibility of
Part of a biopolitical society is the horror of and taboo of death. Foucault in Society Must Be Defended
argues that this taboo is essentially due to the fact that power no longer cares about death: rather than
death being its stock-intrade, death becomes utterly private.31 In any case, for whatever reason, death is
seen as the ultimate evil. What Foucault describes is the political, or rather the biopolitical, dimension of
The need to defend America from attack at the level of the population has
its corollary at the individual level in the horror of dying in such an
unpredictable and violent way as having a plane tear into your office while
you are sifting through your spam e-mail. There is a psychology which is bound up with
this.
contemporary economics, which is notoriously fragile, as indicated in the index of consumer confidence,
biopolitics that people not be concerned about dying. When they feel under even a small threat of
extraordinary death in terrorist atrocities they will demand the utmost measures of their government to
eptirpate this, and disruption to the economy will occur far beyond the direct destruction caused by any
terrorist act. The result of September 11, then, has been for biopolitical society to go on the offensive. This
is nothing particularly newbiopolitical
what
alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can
Foucault present to us? Foucaults elaboration of the specific
intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the
intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and
constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points,
the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move,
doesnt know exactly where he is [they are] heading nor what he
as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case,
(PPC
p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside time, leads
Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is
the
intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific
singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this,
analyses , not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to
acknowledge that Foucaults position does entail the impossibility of
acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any
complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our
historical limits and, consequently, we are always in the position of bargaining again (FR p. 47).
The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is
not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but , in so far as it
involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, a hyper and pessimistic activism
(FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and particularity of
criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and
urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by
coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault
155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in
determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for
however, as to the capacity of Foucaults work to perform this crucial activity through an entrenchment of
the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the
contestation of determinations of who we are.
Links
Courts
Empirics prove the US Supreme Court is an instrument
utitlized as a biopolitical tool by the sovereign state to
extend its control of their citizens this means that reform
about the ideology of the way its used must be addressed
Jennings 14 (Bruce, director of bioethics at the Center for Humans and Nature Encyclopedia of
Bioethics http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/Biopolitics_Essay.pdf) Foronda
The history of biopolitics in social and political advocacy both as a term and as a set of concerns raised by
developments in the life sciences and the biotechnology industryhas been less frequently discussed than has its
academic genealogy. A full discussion of this history would be an important contribution to understanding the current
landscape of biopolitics. This entry provides just a few landmarks on a rather sketchy map. Emergence of Issues. Several
events in the mid-1970s presaged the emergence of biopolitics in the United States and around the world. The
publication in 1975 of Edward O. Wilsons Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which argued that genetics rather than social
and environmental conditions are determinant in individual human behavior and in social formations, sparked heated
controversy about the politics of biology. Also in 1975 some 140 biologists, physicians, lawyers, and others gathered in
California at the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA to discuss the potential hazards of biotechnology and to
draw up voluntary safety guidelines that many believe were designed to fend off calls for enforceable regulation. The
conference and its recommendations pushed the emerging field of biotechnology into public awareness (Berg et al.
1975). In 1976 venture capitalist Robert Swanson and biochemist Herbert Boyer launched a company called Genentech,
an event often said to mark the founding of the biotechnology industry. In 1980, still during the prehistory of biopolitics,
first century, cutting across the existing political lines. Hughes distinguishes between
what he calls right bioconservatives and left bioconservatives and describes a polarization between the
transhumanist and bioconservative positions within biopolitics (Hughes 2011, 165). The Center for Genetics and
Society (CGS), with which both authors of this entry are or have been affiliated, was founded in 2001. Its initial focus
was the threat to social justice and equality raised by the prospect of inheritable genetic modifications that could be
enabled by cloning, gene transfer, and assisted reproductive technologies. CGSs mission statement, published on the
organizations website, signaled its commitments to fundamental progressive principles, including the equitable
provision of health technologies, reproductive rights, disability rights, and a precautionary approach to new
technologies (Center for Genetics and Society 2013a). The organization soon adopted the term biopolitics; in 2006 it
established a blog called Biopolitical Times, accessible through its website. For CGS the term progressive biopolitics and
the phrase a new biopolitics connote a commitment to social justice, human rights, and public-interest values. CGS has
worked with scholars across a range of disciplines, including law, sociology, anthropology, public health, biology, and
science and technology studies, and with advocates promoting various issues, including reproductive health, rights, and
justice; racial justice; disability rights; and environmentalism (Center for Genetics and Society 2013b). BIOPOLITICAL
CONTROVERSIES What
triggered legislation or
judicial decisions, or have been engaged by public-interest organizations and
civil-society constituencies.
Yamin 96 (Alicia, board member of Physicians for Human Rights and is currently collaborating
with the Reproductive Rights Project at the Columbia School of Public Health Human Rights
Quarterly Defining Questions: Situating Issues of Power in the Formulation of a Right to Health
under International Law
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v018/18.2yamin.html#authbio)
Foronda
Infringements of control over health can often be characterized in the same way
as most violations of traditionally conceived civil and political rights. 97 These
situations generally can be conceptualized in terms of the government or its
agent(s) making its citizens do something that they otherwise would not do. 98 For
example, in a recent article on the role of the medical profession in the prevention and treatment of torture, the
American College of Physicians states that: Violation of medical neutrality; attacks on hospitals
and physicians; interference with the medical care of civilians; and the use of
poison gas, land mines, torture, mass executions, systematic rape, . . . forced
relocations are all forms of violence that affect the physical and psychological
well-being of persons. 99 [End Page 424] When this dimension of the relationship
between health and human rights is conceptualized in terms of the physical and
psychological sequelae of human rights violations, it tends to cast human rights
as narrowly defined civil rights and, in turn, implicitly leaves the right to health
with the lesser status of the "right to health care." 100 However, within the
empowerment analytic these situations can be understood as presenting
limitations on the right to control over health status and not just adverse health
consequences. Instead of categorizing what class of rights are involved, this
perspective invites an analysis of how power relations are structured and how
power is exercised. At least three elements in this power dynamic are discernable. First, there is an
observable conflict of interest. In torture, for example, this conflict is between the
intention of the government to torture and the desire of the individual to retain
control over her body. Second, there are observable actors, with the government
agent being the subject who acts on the victim, who is the object . Third, there is an
observable outcome. That is, that the torture is conducted evidences the power of
the government. In this view torture is not merely a violation of human rights
because it inflicts pain, but because it deprives the victim of the most elemental
control over her body and her entire affective world. In so doing, torture denies
completely a person's agency, which in turn denies her capacity for
consciousness, which in turn denies her personhood. Thus, the physical and psychological
sequelae of torture constitute evidence of the violation of a right to health, but do not constitute the violation per se.
Here, it
is important to point out how this form of direct power over health status
can be seen as directed simultaneously at individuals and groups . For instance, when Iraq
used biological warfare against Kurds in the northern portion of that country, the individual Kurd was targeted as an
In the
United States, feminist scholars have pointed out in criticizing the reasoning underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that restricting the right of abortion would
constitute effectively an attack on the sexual equality of all women and not
merely a limitation of individual interests in procreative autonomy. 101 These violations
object of the government's action by virtue of being part of a certain ethnic, social, and economic collectivity.
of control over health status are widespread and can often be egregious. However, they are also readily identifiable and, in
general, it is clear that remedying these violations calls for enjoining the direct behavior or policy of the government or its
agents. The
Drones
The rhetorical focus on drones as unique form of
surivllence and violence is naive and fuels militarism
Trombly 12 (Dan Trombly, The Drone War Does Not Take Place, 16
behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, who sent
operatives to case Camp Lemonier and launch a commando raid one which
looks, in retrospect, very much like the one that crippled Marine aviation at
Camp Bastion recently that might have killed a great many U.S. personnel
on a base then and now critical to American operations in the Horn of Africa
and Gulf of Aden. The existence of risk is an inherent product of an enemy
whose will to fight we have not yet overcome. The degree of that inherent
risk whether it is negligible or great is a product of relative military
capabilities and wars multifarious external contexts. Looked at through this
lens, its not drones that reduce U.S. political and material risk, its
the basic facts of the conflict. In the right context, most any kind of
military technology can significantly mitigate risks. A 19th century ironclad
fleet could shell the coast of a troublesome principality with basic impunity.
When Dewey said, You may fire when ready, Gridley, at Manila Bay,
according to most history and much legend he lost only one man due to
heatstroke! while inflicting grievous casualties on his out-ranged and outgunned Spanish foes. That some historians have suggested Dewey may have
concealed a dozen casualties by fudging them in with desertions, which were
in any case were a far greater problem than casualties since the Navy was
still in the habit of employing foreign sailors expendable by the political
standards of the day is even more telling. Yes, there are always risks and
almost always casualties even in the most unfair fights, but just as
U.S. policymakers wrote off Asian sailors, they write off the victims
of death squads which hunt down the chippers, spotters, and
informants in Pakistan or the contractors training Puntlands antipiracy forces. And no, not even the American spooks are untouchable, the
fallen at Camp Chapman are testament to that. This is hardly unique to
drones or todays covert wars. The CIAs secret air fleet in Indochina lost
men, too, and the Hmong suffered mightily for their aid to the U.S. in the
Laotian civil war. The fall of Lima Site 85, by virtue or demerit of policy,
resonated little with the American public but deeply marks the intelligence
community and those branches of the military engaging in clandestine action.
The wars we wage in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are not drone wars any
more than our war in Laos was an air war simply because Operation Barrel
Rolls bombers elicit more attention than the much more vulnerable propdriven spotting aircraft or Vang Paos men on the ground. There is a
certain hubris in thinking we can limit war by limiting its most
infamous weapons systems. The taboo and treaties against chemical
weapons perhaps saved men [and womyn] (but not the Chinese at
Wuhan, nor the Allied and innocents downwind of the SS John
Harvey at Bari) from one of the Great Wars particular horrors, but
they did nothing appreciable to check the kind of war the Great War
was, or the hypersanguinary consequences of its sequel but a
generation later. The Predators and Reapers could have never
existed, and very likely the U.S. would still be seeking ways to carry
out its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates under the auspices of
the AUMF in all of todays same theaters. More might die from rifles,
Tomahawks, Bofors guns or Strike Eagles JDAMs than remotely-launched
Griffins, and the tempo of strikes would abate. But the same fundamental
problems the opaque decisions to kill, the esoteric legal
FISA
FISA is a tool of biopower that allows the state to
reconfigure itself to further utilize their control over
citizens
Passavant 5 (Associate Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges The
Strong Neo-liberal State: Crime, Consumption, Goverance https://muse-jhuedu.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3passavant.html#auth
bio ) Foronda
The political
which would have brought those who worked to end apartheid in South Africa by supporting the African National
Congress (ANC) within the law's provisions if it had been in effect during the 1980s (since the Reagan administration
considered the ANC to be a terrorist organization), allows
FISA
account for over half of all federal wiretapping conducted, it appears that the DOJ
is doing an end-run around the Fourth Amendment in its criminal justice policy.
Rather than the government searching those who have committed a crime or who
have taken significant steps towards committing a crime, now it appears that the
government targets those it predicts are likely to commit a crime based on who
they are or their political associations.52 The Government of Consumer Capitalism Of course
we are not only governed out of a fearful criminology by the state, but also as consumers within a post-Fordist capitalist
regime, and here too surveillance has grown enormously. As has been noted by political scientists Matthew Crenson and
Benjamin Ginsberg, after September 11th , when George Bush addressed the nation to do its part in face of tragedy, he
merger of market and state interests that vastly expands state power such that the state no longer needs to rely upon a
warrant to compel a single private party like a bookstore or a library to produce information. Increasingly ,
the state
is governing through consumerism and the commodification of information that
this produces. This merger of state and market interests has produced two consequences. (A) Consumerism leads
to the compilation of vast databases, and companies have formed to take advantage of this situation by compiling
information from multiple sources and then selling access to this data. Indeed, information compilation has become a
highly profitable industry. As I shall explain below, the fact that these databases are privately compiled paradoxically
enhances the state's powers. (B) Furthermore, in light of the fact that much of this information profiles consumers and
that, in seeking access to this information, the state is relying upon consumerist mentalities, we can see that the logic of
governance is increasingly based on hierarchized market segments rather than a logic of equal citizenship. Third, utilizing
consumerism to seek security means that as markets are established for security -- often thanks to government contracts
-- stakeholders in this order (i.e., those who hold a financial stake in this state order) are created who will resist any future
change.
Governing through consumerism, then, reconfigures both the state and capitalism.
Legal Frameworks/Reform
Legal frameworks are just a faade for the government to
escape criticisms of their hypocritical actions leads to
torture and human rights violations
Sanders, 12 (Rebecca, Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Political
Science University of Toronto Exceptional Security Practices, Human Rights
Abuses, and the Politics of Legal Legitimation in the American Global War on
Terror
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/32880/3/Sanders_Rebecca_2
01206_PhD_thesis.pdf Access Date 7/13/15 Sharma)
Other pockets of exception have emerged in the history of American torture ,
most notably in the penal system. Chain gangs subjected prisoners to notoriously
brutal conditions. Various water tortures were commonly employed at Sing Sing
and San Quentin prisons in nineteenth century.73 Folsom prison had a chloride of
lime cell that created burning noxious fumes .74 During World War I,
conscientious objectors were tortured in custody . While President Wilson championed
democracy abroad, prisoners found themselves subjected to a litany of abuses.75 As described in a 1918
account by former detainees at the Camp Funston Guard House in Kansas: [The Officer of the Day]
proceeded to abuse and insult us, referring to those of Jewish birth as damn kikes, etc. He then had our
beds and blankets taken from us, and ordered that we be given raw rations pork and beans which we
were to cook in the latrine, if we wanted to eatIn the afternoon Larsen was brutally assaulted, being
choked, his head banged against the wall, and dragged around the room by the Sergeant of the guards
The bayonet was applied to all of us Larsen receiving a scar. Kaplan and Breger were beaten with the
butt end of the rifle. All were kicked and shoved about We were compelled to take a cold shower once in
the morning and once in the afternoon...The Captain himself brought forth scrubbrushes, used ordinarily
for cleaning toilet seats and brooms used for sweeping, and ordered that we scrub each other with them
Mr. Kaplan was forced to remain seated while cold water was trickled on his head and this process was
continued until he fainted, while Mr. Kaplan was bound with his hands above his head in a manner so
painful that he felt his arms were being broken and the pain caused him to scream repeatedly Most of
the mistreatment took place outside, notes the report, with large groups watching the sorry and revolting
spectacle of defenseless men being most brutally punched, shoved, and abused.76 In Delaware, the
extensive abuses are possible. One way this occurs is through the declaration by the
official state sovereign or more localized authorities either overtly or more
tacitly and informallyof law free zones where victims can be abused with
impunity. The law is in essence suspended and pushed aside, allowing
someone in power, be it a fascist dictator, colonial administrator, zealous
general, local sheriff, or sadistic prison warden, to exercise their unmitigated
power. Torture can be practiced relatively openly because no higher authority
is willing or able to stop it.
assertion that arguments produced via this strategy are in fact plausible or convincing. Just as Cold War
plausible deniability was generally fallacious, so too are most of the legal claims referenced in the
reframes
meanings, employs euphemisms and legalisms, fudges lines of responsibility,
and claims abuses are isolated incidents.166 Sometimes evasions are deployed because
following pages. Plausible legality is form of what Cohen terms interpretive denial that
some categorizations are so pejorative, stigmatic, and universally condemned that they cannot be openly
shifted to the terrain of interpretationa struggle made all the more difficult by its legitimate function in
normal legal argument.
for what on first glance appear blatantly illegal practices. Accordingly, plausible
legality combines the desire to break with existing norms found in states of exception with an awareness of
It attempts to legalize
the exception without publicly suspending the existing order . It aspires to
reconcile the normally irreconcilableto permit the impermissible without
fully admitting the move. As Lichtblau notes, For the architects of this new war, there was a
reputational and legal risks apparent in the practice of plausible deniability.
constant drumbeat: the rule of law still had to be followed, they said, but just what those rules really
meant was often malleable, subject to twisting, flexing, and reinterpreting so long as the tactics were
justified to stop another attack. In doing so,
Internet
The internet and the subtle surveillance conducted through
it is the states tool to extend their mechanisms of discipline
Boyle 97 (James, Professor of Law at Washington College of Law at American University
Foucault In Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=faculty_scholarship)
Foronda
From the point of view of this Article, one
warden. At any moment the warden might have the prisoner under observation through a nineteenth century version of
the closed-circuit TV.22 ' Unsure
striking. To this, Foucault added the notion of discipline-crudely put, the multitudinous private methods of
regulation of individual behavior ranging from workplace time-and-motion efficiency directives to psychiatric
evaluation." Foucault pointed out the apparent conflict between a formal language of politics organized
around relations between sovereign and citizen, expressed through rules backed by sanctions, and an actual experience
managed to be simultaneously coy and sinister, Foucault suggested that there was something strange going on in the
coexistence of these two systems: Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty from which it
differs so radically, this disciplinary power ought by rights to have led to the disappearance of the grand juridical edifice
created by that theory. But
was not writing about the Internet. He was not even writing about the twentieth century.
But his words provide a good starting place from which to examine the catechism of
Internet inviolability. They are a good starting point precisely because, when viewed within the discourse of
sovereign "commands backed by threats" aimed at a defined territory and population, the Internet does indeed look
almost invulnerable. Things
how far the Internet can be made to treat censorship as a feature not a bug, how far local ordinances may reach in
cyberspace, and how information's desire for freedom may be curbed.
State
Life under the federal government is inherently harmful
they present a myriad of abuses which people must live
under and fail to fix themselves
Simon 1 (Jonathan, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Sanctioning Government: Explaining
Americas Severity Revolution http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2222&context=facpubs )
Perhaps the best advantage of Parenti's Marxist political economy is that it carries his interpretation of the severity
revolution far beyond the precincts of crime, the criminal justice system, and the immediate interests involved in each.
To Parenti, it is United States Capitalism as a social system in crisis that is the real force
behind the "lockdown." While there are prices to be paid for so strong and structured a theory, it has the advantage of
bringing into view the full range of social relations actually at stake in the crack-down on crime. From this perspective,
Parenti identifies two critical moments that shape the severity revolution. The first takes place in the 1960s during the
administrations of relatively liberal presidents-Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-as the
federal government
began a sustained intervention in the quality of local law and state law enforcement. The initial motivations were largely
liberal pressures to address racism
riots, anti-war protests, and a rising tide of aggressive armed robberies and
killings in the formerly "safe" areas of the large cities. 43
representation of
interests through the channels of the institutions does not reveal the pluralistic
effects of social forces on the State; instead, it highlights the State's capacities to
organize, recuperate, even produce social forces. Michel Foucault's work has
made clear that the institutions and enfermements or enclosures of civil societythe church, the school, the prison, the family, the union, the party, et
ceteraconstitute the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments of
power in modern society, producing normalized subjects and thus exerting
hegemony through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but
no less authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through
coercion passage for the expression of worker interests to be represented in the plurality of rule, but rather as a
means to mediate and recuperate the antagonisms born of capitalist production and capitalist social relations-thus
creating a worker subjectivity that is recuperable within and actually supportive of the order of the capitalist State.
Foucault analyzes the institutions of civil society the very same way in which Hegel celebrates them. As we saw earlier,
the labor union and the other institutions
the passage to the modern State, however, the transcendence and singularity of the
State were overturned through the rise of what Foucault calls
"governmentality." The rule of the governmental State is characterized instead
by its immanence to the population through a multiplicity of forms. "The art of
government . . .," Foucault said, "must respond essentially to this question: how can it introduce the economy, in other
words, the manner of adequately managing individuals, goods, and wealth, as can be done within a family, like a good
father who knows how to direct his wife, his children, and his servants .. ." (1994c, 641-42).4 The management of people
and things implied by this governance involves an active engagement, exchange, or dialectic among social forces and
between social forces and the State. The same
abstraction and organization, Foucault
management. The channels or striae in which these processes function, recognized as social institutions by Hegel,
are characterized by Foucault in terms of deployments (dispositifs) and enclosures (enfermements). Civil society,
from this perspective, is the productive site of modern economy (economy understood now in the large sense); in other
words, it is the site of the production of goods, desires, individual and collective identities, et cetera. It is the site,
finally, of the institutional dialectic of social forces, of the social dialectic that gives rise to and underwrites the State. In
his extensive work on the nature of power, however, Foucault not only refuses Gramsci's inversion of the priority between
civil society and political society (that is, civil society and the State), he goes one step further and argues that we can
make no analytical distinction at all between them. When Foucault
a now famous passage, Foucault (1978, 94) writes that "relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect
to other types of relationship (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent to the
latter ... they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play." In the disciplinary and governmental society
the lines of power extend throughout social space in the channels created by the institutions of civil society. The
the State as
such is better understood as a result, the consolidation or molarization of forces
of "statization" (etatisation) immanent to social power relations (see Deleuze 1986, 84). The
causes and intentions that inform and order power relations are not isolated in some headquarters of rationality but are
immanent to the field of forces. Foucault thus prefers to use instead of State the term government, which indicates the
multiplicity and immanence of the forces of statization to the social field. While this denies all the moral and teleological
elements of Hegel's social theory, Foucault's understanding of the disciplinary and governmental society does in certain
respects take the Hegelian notion of civil society to its logical conclusion. In particular, Foucault emphasizes the
"educational" aspect of civil society whereby particular social interests are enlightened to the general interest and
brought in line with the universal. Education means discipline. More accurately, Foucault reformulates the educational
process of civil society in terms of production: power acts not only by training or ordering the elements of the social
terrain but actually by producing them-producing desires, needs, individuals, identities, et cetera. I see this not so much
as a contradiction but as an extension of Hegelian theory. The
Giving legitimacy to the state surrenders all privacy that citizens have
Henry A Giroux, 2014 (Henry A Giroux, Professorship at McMaster University in
the English and Cultural Studies Department, Totalitarian Paranoia in the PostOrwellian Surveillance State, 2/10/2014, http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwelliansurveillance-state#) K.GEKKER
The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward
Snowden about government lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a
revitalized urgency and relevance to George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984. Orwell offered his
readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which privacy as a civil
virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy
and thriving democracy. Orwell was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious
assault. But the right to privacy pointed to something more sinister than the violation of
individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy became a moral and political
principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of an emerging totalitarian state. As
important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century
totalitarianism and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a
brilliant but limited metaphor for mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and
authoritarianism now characteristic of the first decades of the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn
has indicated, "Orwell never could have imagined that the National Security Agency (NSA)
would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every
day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails,
file transfers, and live chats from the social media we use."1 To read more articles by Henry A.
Giroux and other authors in the Public Intellectual Project, click here. In his videotaped
Christmas message, Snowden references Orwell's warning of "the dangers of microphones, video
cameras and TVs that watch us,"2 allowing the state to regulate subjects within the most intimate
spaces of private life. But these older modes of surveillance, Snowden elaborates, however, are
nothing compared to what is used to infringe on our personal privacy today. For Snowden, the
threat posed by the new surveillance state can be measured by its reach and use of technologies
that far outdate anything Orwell envisioned and pose a much greater threat to the privacy rights
of citizens and the reach of sovereign powers. He reiterates this point by reminding his viewers
that "a child born today will grow up with no conception of privacy at all - they will never know
what it means to have a private moment to themselves, an unrecorded, unanalyzed thought."3
Snowden is right about the danger to privacy rights but his analysis fails to go far enough in
linking together the question of surveillance with the rise of "networked societies," global flows
of power and the emergence of the totalitarian state.4 In a world devoid of care, compassion and
protection, privacy is no longer connected and resuscitated through its connection to public life,
the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the frailty of human life. The
democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy under the modernist state in which Orwell lived out
his political imagination has been transformed and mutilated, almost beyond recognition. Just as
Orwell's fable has morphed over time into a combination of "realistic novel," real-life
documentary and a form of reality TV, privacy has been altered radically in an age of permanent,
'nonstop' global exchange and circulation. So, too, and in the current period of historical amnesia,
privacy has been redefined through the material and ideological registers of a neoliberal order in
which the right to privacy has succumbed to the seductions of a narcissistic culture and casino
capitalism's unending necessity to turn every relationship into an act of commerce and to make all
aspects of daily life visible and subject to data manipulation.5 In a world devoid of care,
compassion and protection, privacy is no longer connected and resuscitated through its
connection to public life, the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the
frailty of human life. In a world in which the worst excesses of capitalism are unchecked, privacy
is nurtured in a zone of historical amnesia, indifferent to its transformation and demise under a
"broad set of panoptic practices."6 Consequently, culture loses its power as the bearer of public
memory in a social order where a consumerist-driven ethic "makes impossible any shared
recognition of common interests or goals" and furthers the collective indifference to the growth of
the surveillance state.7 Surveillance has become a growing feature of daily life. In fact, it is
more appropriate to analyze the culture of surveillance, rather than address exclusively the
violations committed by the corporate-surveillance state. In this instance, the surveillance and
security state is one that not only listens, watches and gathers massive amounts of information
through data mining necessary for identifying consumer populations but also acculturates the
public into accepting the intrusion of surveillance technologies and privatized commodified
values into all aspects of their lives. Personal information is willingly given over to social media
and other corporate-based websites and gathered daily as people move from one targeted web site
to the next across multiple screens and digital apparatuses. As Ariel Dorfman points out, social
media users gladly give up their liberty and privacy, invariably for the most benevolent of
platitudes and reasons, all the while endlessly shopping online and texting.7A This collecting of
information might be most evident in the video cameras that inhabit every public space from the
streets, commercial establishments and workplaces to the schools our children attend as well as in
the myriad scanners placed at the entry points of airports, stores, sporting events and the like.
Rights
Rights presuppose the fundamental structure that places
the natural life of the human as the foundation for the
citizen and produces a community of violence.
Declarations of universal ethical principles and eternal
doctrines of human dignity become the inaugurating
feature of global biopolitics.
Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 1998, pg. 126-128
z.i.
Hannah Arendt entitled the fifth chapter of her book on imperialism, which is dedicated to the
problem of refugees, The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man. Linking together
the fates of the rights of man and of the nation-state, her striking formulation seems to imply the idea of
an intimate and necessary connection between the two, though the author herself leaves the question
The paradox from which Arendt departs is that the very figure
who should have embodied the rights of man par excellencethe
refugeesignals instead the concepts radical crisis. The conception
of human rights, she states, based upon the assumed existence of a
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those
who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with
people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific
relationshipsexcept that they were still human (Orz~ins, p. 299). In the
system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man
show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment
in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to
citizens of a state. If one considers the matter, this is in fact implicit in the ambiguity of the very
open.
title of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, of 1789. In the phrase La dicia ration des
dro its tie Ihomme et du citoyen, it is not clear whether the two terms homme and citoyen name two
autonomous beings or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included in the
second. And if the latter is the case, the kind of relation that exists between homme and citoyen still
remains unclear. From this perspective, Burkes boutade according to which he preferred his Rights of an
Englishman to the inalienable rights of man acquires an unsuspected profundity. Arendt does no more
than offer a few, essential hints concerning the link between the rights of man and the nation-state, and
eternal, metajuridical values binding the legislator (in fact, without much success) to respect eternal
ethical principles, and to begin to consider them according to their real historical function in the modern
nation-state.
remain free and equal in rights (from this perspective, the strictest formulation of all is
to be found in La Fayettes project elaborated in July 1789: Every man is born with inalienable and
continue to live under the auspices of a classical state as it was conceived in early modern Europe.
travelers at border crossings. Agamben, in all seriousness, has placed this trend in an epochal relationship
with the tatooing of concentration camp inmates.3 His essay's far-reaching appeal rests on the fact that it
combines in a single formula the moral and legal achievements of western societiesin particular the
once again afflicted by self-doubts about the moral standing of liberal societies and their legal systems.
already well-known and much-discussed, I will confine myself to a nutshell summary of his main argument
before I offer a concise critique of his ideas on the place of humanitarian law and humanitarian action in
the
"bare life" of the individual has been subjected to a twofold move: it
was given a protected, even "sacred" status beyond the immediate
grasp of political power, but it was also isolated and separated from the wider range of
human forms of expression. The bare life of physical individuals, stripped of
moral agency and social intercourse, became the object of a
today's legal and political world. Agamben maintains that since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
continuous attention of specialized NGOs and the media. In all these cases, Agambens principal cause for
vexation lies in the persistent separation of this core aspect of the human from wider political and
communitarian questions. Drawing on the distinction between human rights and civil rights made by
questionable on both empirical and normative grounds. In what follows, I will either reject these
propositions outright or extract the kernel of truth contained within them before making a suggestion
Technology
Modern technology takes away the matter of a human body
and turns them into cyborgs turns society under the
soverign into a real life panopticon where everyone is a
prisoner
Haggerty and Ericson 2000 (Kevin, Professor of Sociology and Criminology at
the University of Alberta, Canada; Richard, principal of Green College and a professor of Law and
Sociology at the University of British Columbia; British Journal of Sociology Vol. No. 51 Issue No.
4 May 2000 The surveillant assemblage http://docentiold.unimc.it/docenti/monicaraiteri/2010/sociologia-e-politiche-del-controllo-sociale-2010/lezioni/haggerty-e-ericsonsorveglianza/at_download/Haggerty%20and%20Ericson.pdf) Foronda
A great deal of surveillance is directed toward the human body . The observed body is of a
distinctively hybrid composition. First it is broken down by being abstracted from its territorial setting. It is then
reassembled in different settings through a series of data ows.
The result is a
are born free, and are immediately electronically monitored. If such a slogan seems unduly
despairing, one might consider the new electronic ankle bracelet for infants , trademarked
HUGS, which is being marketed to hospitals as a fully supervised and tamper-resistant protection system that
automatically activates once secured around an infants ankle or wrist. Staff [are] immediately alerted at a computer
console of the newly activated tag, and can enter pertinent information such as names and medical conditions. Password
authorization is needed to move infants out of the designated protection area and if an infant is not readmitted within a
predetermined time limit an alarm will sound. An alarm also sounds if an infant with a Hugs tag is brought near an open
door at the perimeter of the protected area without a password being entered. The display console will then show the
identification of the infant and the exit door on a facility map. Alternatively, doors may also be tted with magnetic locks
that are automatically activated. As well, Hugs can be configured to monitor the progress and direction of the abduction
within the hospital. Weighing just 1/3 of an ounce, each ergonomically designed infant tag offers a number of other
innovative features, including low-battery warning, the ability to easily interface with other devices such as CCTV
cameras and paging systems and time and date stamping. (Canadian Security 1998) Professor Kevin Warwick of
Reading University is the self-proclaimed first cyborg, having implanted a silicon chip transponder in his forearm
(Bevan 1999). The surveillance potential of this technology has been rapidly embraced to monitor pets. A microchip in a
pets skin can be read with an electronic device which connects a unique identifying number on the microchip to details
of the pets history, ownership and medical record. Warwick has proposed that implanted microchips could be used to
scrutinize the movement of employees, and to monitor money transfers, medical records and passport details. He also
suggests that anyone who wanted access to a gun could do so only if they had one of these implants . . . Then if they
actually try and enter a school or building that doesnt want them in there, the school computer would sound alarms and
warn people inside or even prevent them having access. (Associated Press 1998) These examples indicate that the
accomplished by practitioners of the emergent social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. On a machine/human continuum, surveillance at that time leaned more toward human observation.
Terrorism
The state uses terror to purposely target marginalized
groups for the benefit of those higher in its hierarchy
extending its biopower
Simon 1 (Jonathan, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Sanctioning Government: Explaining
Americas Severity Revolution http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2222&context=facpubs )
C. The Functions of Terror Parenti is not the first recent critic of the severity revolution to a point to the disturbing trend
not simply toward a bigger penal system but toward a meaner, crueler one.54 Parenti's class analysis allows him to
project a wide variety of functions to terror. Terror
class gradient in United States society. Parenti surveys the extraordinary, overt, and often ritualized violence
which exists in contemporary prisons like California's notorious Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit and in special
police details like the New York Police Department's Crime Suppression Unit, whose members shot Amadou Dialo to
death in 1999.55 The
are also moving back toward the use of public spectacle as a device for
social control of the general population, something Foucault theorized was replaced by
the emergence of mass surveil lance in the nineteenth century . 8 In fact, both seem
likely to intensify, with terror aimed at the "social dynamite and social junk " 59 that
worry the urban gentry and surveillance aimed at suburban teenagers and others expected to remain part of society. Set
in a normatively safe context, like inflicting lawful punishment, terror
long as the terror is directed against those considered to be "beyond the law , 62
like those who are perceived as in the grip of evil or monstrous desires (sex offenders,
drug king-pins, and drug addicts),6 3 or those who do not yet belong, such as
asylum seekers or recent immigrant groups, there is little political price to be
paid for the exercise of terror and many interests can be rewarded .
unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be
significantly reduced in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements
supported in the war. For, Camus argued, only if the appeal to "spare a
handful of innocent victims at a solitary spot on the globe" is heard and
responded to by both sides in the war can anyone really be considered to be
freewith free men and women described by Camus as those "who refuse at
the same time to inflict and submit to terror."31 No one is free in a state of
terror: certainly neither the victims nor the perpetrators of terror. But neither
the victims nor perpetrators of counterterrorism either. What was true during
the Algerian War is still true today, for no one should be mistaken about the
sense of Camus' plea: freedom is always the issue, not just for the actual and
potential victims of terrorism, but also for those who order, carry out, or
justify torture and terrorism in the war against terrorism. And this is true
whether the war is waged in the name of religious or political absolutes, on
the one hand, or independence, the security and integrity of the nation, or
even or especially democracy, on the other. Camus knew this and attempted
to bring about a civilian truce based on the basic principle that to save
innocent lives was in fact the necessary first step in the defense of freedom
and the creation of a democratic Algeria. His appeal for a civilian truce fell on
deaf ears, of course, and the French government soon continued torturing
and executing FLN suspects, at which point the FLN resumed its terrorist
campaign [End Page 121] in Algiers, with the consequence that terrorism and
counterterrorism substantially escalated during the Battle of Algiers.
Prisons
The affirmatives use of legal reforms with the prison
system are used to mask the ways that torture happens
behind closed doors. This makes it possible to make the
prison industrial complex to become more insidious
Sanders, 12 (Rebecca, Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Political
Science University of Toronto Exceptional Security Practices, Human Rights
Abuses, and the Politics of Legal Legitimation in the American Global War on
Terror
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/32880/3/Sanders_Rebecca_2
01206_PhD_thesis.pdf Access Date 7/13/15 Sharma)
Other pockets of exception have emerged in the history of American torture ,
most notably in the penal system. Chain gangs subjected prisoners to notoriously
brutal conditions. Various water tortures were commonly employed at Sing Sing
and San Quentin prisons in nineteenth century.73 Folsom prison had a chloride of
lime cell that created burning noxious fumes .74 During World War I,
conscientious objectors were tortured in custody . While President Wilson championed
democracy abroad, prisoners found themselves subjected to a litany of abuses.75 As described in a 1918
account by former detainees at the Camp Funston Guard House in Kansas: [The Officer of the Day]
proceeded to abuse and insult us, referring to those of Jewish birth as damn kikes, etc. He then had our
beds and blankets taken from us, and ordered that we be given raw rations pork and beans which we
were to cook in the latrine, if we wanted to eatIn the afternoon Larsen was brutally assaulted, being
choked, his head banged against the wall, and dragged around the room by the Sergeant of the guards
The bayonet was applied to all of us Larsen receiving a scar. Kaplan and Breger were beaten with the
butt end of the rifle. All were kicked and shoved about We were compelled to take a cold shower once in
the morning and once in the afternoon...The Captain himself brought forth scrubbrushes, used ordinarily
for cleaning toilet seats and brooms used for sweeping, and ordered that we scrub each other with them
Mr. Kaplan was forced to remain seated while cold water was trickled on his head and this process was
continued until he fainted, while Mr. Kaplan was bound with his hands above his head in a manner so
painful that he felt his arms were being broken and the pain caused him to scream repeatedly Most of
the mistreatment took place outside, notes the report, with large groups watching the sorry and revolting
spectacle of defenseless men being most brutally punched, shoved, and abused.76 In Delaware, the
when were cold, want our toasters to know how we like our bagel, want our
search engines to know what were looking for even when we misspell it. So
far, we have been willing to pay for that intimacy in lost privacy. Which brings
us to a strange crossroads. The more technology endangers our privacy, the
less we seem to prize it. We post family photos on social-media sites and ship
our credit-card numbers to total strangers. We ask websites weve never
visiteddesigned by people weve never metto give us advice on treating
embarrassing maladies and hunting for potential mates. But the government
is different, as Litt acknowledged in his recent speech, because the
government has the power to audit our tax returns, to prosecute and
imprison us, to grant or deny licenses to do business and many other things.
And, he continued, there is an entirely understandable concern that the
government may abuse this power. In recent years, privacy advocates have
persuaded the Supreme Court to require search warrants before police can
sneak GPS trackers onto suspects cars or scan houses from the outside using
infrared devices that sense the telltale heat signature of marijuana grow
lights. Such steps seem small, however, compared with the rapid rise of
surveillance powers and the grim history of governments corrupted by the
temptation to watch their peoples too closely. The admirable goals of public
safety and national security have been exploited time and again by intrusive
regimes around the world seeking to spy on their critics and smother dissent.
Americans need only read the Bill of Rights to see that suspicion of
government intrusion is a national birthright. As tools for prying grow in
number and strength, this is no time to stop being suspicious.
Impacts
Biopower
The object of disciplinary power is the natural bodythe
development of biopower forces populations to wage war
in the name of life necessity
Dillon 8 [Michael, Professor of Politics, Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of Lancaster UK, Foucault on Politics,
security and war Palgrave, Macmillan,
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Neal7/publication/267206491_Fo
ucault_on_Politics_Security_and_War/links/54e39d060cf2b2314f5de23b.pdf]
This chapter traces the development of Foucaults articulation of the problem of war from its beginnings in
Defended, I explain how the development of Foucaults conceptualization of the problem of war
establishes the great paradox and crisis of political modernity. From demonstrating in Discipline and Punish
Recognizing
the roles of historico-political discourses of war in the constitution of
the power arrangements of modern societies makes him question
the efficacy of his own thought in promoting the desubjugation and
liberation of disqualified peoples and their knowledge (p. 8). This autosocieties realize. This argument, in turn, thrusts Foucaults own thought into crisis.
critique develops alongside his increasing concerns with the radicalized techniques of biopolitical regimes
of power.
new technology does not replace the sovereign right to kill, nor
has it ever. Biopolitics has always coexisted with the right to kill, both within
the state, with the state reserving a notorious monopoly right to use (lethal)
force, and outside, with the right of the state to wage war, defensively and
typically also offensively. However, there is a tension or contradiction in the coexistence of
etc).13 Now, this
biopolitics and the right to kill.14 The right to kill is problematized in the movement that founds biopolitics,
in that the government which uses biopolitics adopts the aim of keeping its people alive. This comes to be
conceived as the proper end of all government. Foucault refers to the emergence of contractarian theories
of government, in which the sovereign gains legitimacy precisely by being necessary to protect the lives
and well-being of the people hence, the state cannot legitimately harm them, since that would violate
the contract.15 Moreover, the biopolitical society is premised on internal homeostasisviolence can serve
to shatter this stability if it is itself unregulated. Certainly, the use of violent control by despots followed a
pattern of insurrection and repression. Yet
racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under powers control: the
break between what must live and what must die.16 State racism allows for the identification of enemies
as being outside of the population, whether they are to be found inside or outside the boundaries of the
state, and thus licenses the killing of these people, or simply letting them die, since part of the biopolitical
technology, at least in its more developed form, is trying to keep people alive. Foucault refers to this as
indirect murder, in which, for instance, some people are exposed to greater risks to which the bdy of the
population would not normally be exposed.17
illuminates the otherwise mysterious bombings of the U.N. buildings and attacks on health workers in Iraq.
Patriarchy
Panopticon based ideals leads to discrimination against
women
Lansky 1998 (Ellen, went to college at the College of St. Catherine in St
Violence
Governmentality allows sovereign states to control and lead
their societies toward violence
Curley 11 (Tyler, Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern California
Normalizing the Exception: Governmentality, Legal Discourse and Post-9/11 US
Security FIND THE DATE http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=32600600012602509412411109112011901403907607200806104910307011
31200010081271110980310490410971060460290270020780870050821071150
3300003803901408608012603101902807709204104607902909707211310503
0105126112084110079012105001006064088066099114064024030071&EXT=p
df&TYPE=2) Foronda
Within his account of governmentality, Foucault sets up a foundation for discovering how
individuals have increasingly become objects and effects of the sovereign aim to control
movements. Governmentality is a historically contingent strategy within the social exercise of
powers, which provides security within a population by managing the behavior of
individuals. As Butler (2004: 52) explains, Governmentality is broadly understood as a
mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and
persons, the production and regulation of persons and populations, and the
circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the
population. With a confluence of factors highlighted in Foucaults historyof
governmentality, including above all population growth and the expansion of
capitalism, sovereign power becomes involved in securing life within society to
guarantee productivity. This sovereign objective to ensure the efficiency and
survival of a population necessarily involves individuals in a war of movement
a war that demarcates who is safe to reside within the society and exorcises
those whom sovereigns deem to be dangerous. Additionally, governmentality represents
a project of population management whereby the sovereign deploys disciplinary powers to
normalize individuals behavior and biopowers to regulate the population. The development of
knowledge about individuals within and possible threats to the collectivity is essential to the
security strategy of governmentality. Sovereign powers extend disciplinary and
The legitimacy given to structures like the state is used to confirm a power
relationship that makes all violence possible
Michel Foucault, 83 (Michel Foucault, Philosopher, The Subject and Power, p.208-226,
1983, http://foucault.info/documents/foucault.power.en.html) K.GEKKER
The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is
a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called
Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or
diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is
integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures. This
also means that power is not a function of consent. In itself it is not a renunciation of freedom, a
transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few (which does not prevent the
possibility that consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance of power); the
relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the
manifestation of a consensus. Is this to say that one must seek the character proper to power
relations in the violence which must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret, and its
last resource, that which in the final analysis appears as its real nature when it is forced to throw
aside its mask and to show itself as it really is? In effect, what defines a relationship of power is
that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts
upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in
the present or the future. A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it
bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite
pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other option but to
try to minimize it. On the other hand, a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of
two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the
other" (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the
very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole held of
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up. Obviously the bringing into
play of power relations does not exclude the use of violence any more than it does the obtaining
of consent; no doubt the exercise of power can never do without one or the other, often both at the
same time. But even though consensus and violence are the instruments or the results, they do not
constitute the principle or the basic nature of power. The exercise of power can produce as much
acceptance as may be wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats
it can imagine. In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly,
is renewable. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids
absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by
virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions. Perhaps the
equivocal nature of the term "conduct" is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the
specificity of power relations. For to "conduct" is at the same time to "lead" others (according to
mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a
more or less open held of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility
of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation
between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This
word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century.
"Government" did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it
designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover
the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of action,
more or less considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action
of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible held of action of others. The
relationship proper to power would not, therefore, be sought on the side of violence or of
struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of
power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which
is government. When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of
others, when one characterizes these actions by the government of men by other men in the
broadest sense of the term includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective
subjects who are faced with a held of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several
reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the
whole, there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in
chains. (In this case it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint.) Consequently, there is
no face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom, which are mutually exclusive (freedom
disappears everywhere power is exercised), but a much more complicated interplay. In this game
freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its
precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support,
since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical
determination). The relationship between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot,
therefore, be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how
could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly
provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than
speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an "agonism" of a relationship
which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle, less of a face-to-face confrontation
which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.
V2L
Cascading ignorance to restraints on inherent rights leads
to a suppressive and inverted system that destroys value
to life
Giroux 6-19 , [Henry, Holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship
in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a
Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University, Orwell, Huxley
and Americas Plunge into Authoritarianism,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/06/19/orwell-huxley-and-americas-plungeinto-authoritarianism/] Chowdhury
Orwells Big Brother found more recently a new incarnation in the
revelations of government lawlessness and corporate spying by
whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond, and Edward
Snowden.[3] All of these individuals revealed a government that lied about its
intelligence operations, illegally spied on millions of people who were not
considered terrorists or had committed no crime, and collected data from
every conceivable electronic source to be stored and potentially used to
squelch dissent, blackmail people, or just intimidate those who fight to make
corporate and state power accountable.[4] Orwell offered his readers an
image of the modern state in which privacy was no longer valued as a civil
virtue and a basic human right, nor perceived as a measure of the robust
strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. In Orwells dystopia the right to
privacy had come under egregious assault, but the ruthless transgressions of
privacy pointed to something more sinister than the violation of individual
rights. The claim to privacy, for Orwell, represented a moral and political
principle by which to assess the nature, power, and severity of an emerging
totalitarian state. Orwells warning was intended to shed light on the horrors
of totalitarianism, the corruption of language, the production of a pervasive
stupidity, and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens in the
mid-20th-century. Orwell opened a door for all to see a nightmarish future
in which everyday life becomes harsh, an object of state surveillance, and
controla society in which the slogan ignorance becomes strength morphs
into a guiding principle of mainstream media, education, and the culture of
politics. Huxley shared Orwells concern about ignorance as a political tool of
the elite, enforced through surveillance and the banning of books, dissent,
and critical thought itself. But Huxley, believed that social control and the
propagation of ignorance would be introduced by those in power through the
political tools of pleasure and distraction. Huxley thought this might take
place through drugs and genetic engineering, but the real drugs and social
planning of late modernity lies in the presence of an entertainment and
public pedagogy industry that trades in pleasure and idiocy, most evident in
the merging of neoliberalism, celebrity culture, and the control of
On Foucault's account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model,
for which knowledge is power means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite
independently. Foucault's point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings ,
see but also for guards or security cameras to scan the audience. A perfect system of observation would allow one guard to see everything
(a situation approximated, as we shall see, in Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon). But since this is not usually possible, there is a need for
A distinctive
feature of modern power (disciplinary control) is its concern with what people have not done
(nonobservence), with, that is, a person's failure to reach required standards. This concern
illustrates the primary function of modern disciplinary systems: to correct
deviant behavior. The goal is not revenge (as in the case of the tortures of premodern punishment) but
reform, where, of course, reform means coming to live by society's standards or norms.
Discipline through imposing precise norms (normalization) is quite different from the
older system of judicial punishment, which merely judges each action as allowed
by the law or not allowed by the law and does not say that those judged are
normal or abnormal. This idea of normalization is pervasive in our society : e.g.,
national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products. The examination (for
example, of students in schools, of patients in hospitals) is a method of control that combines
hierarchical observation with normalizing judgment. It is a prime example of
what Foucault calls power/knowledge, since it combines into a unified whole the
deployment of force and the establishment of truth (184). It both elicits the truth
about those who undergo the examination (tells what they know or what is the state of their health) and
controls their behavior (by forcing them to study or directing them to a course of treatment).
relays of observers, hierarchically ordered, through whom observed data passes from lower to higher levels.
state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law
on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial
arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order (Agamben,
1995: 169). At the border, however, the exception becomes the rule. At the border, the
Australian government conduct is mostly ungoverned by statute and, therefore, almost ungovernable by the courts. Our
willingness to accept this situation reflects our understanding of the state as our only defence against the state of
nature (Taylor, 2005:75-6). In attempting to make sense of the break with normal politics that the attacks of
September 11th have come to represent, scholars have come to rely on the work of Giorgio Agamben, whose provocative
work on the state of exception has provided fertile territory for critical work on the meanings of torture, the accrual of
emergency powers to the executive, and the camp. The exception has become the rule. Jumping off from criminology,
critical legal studies, social theory, and sociology, this paper argues that governmental
procedures
institutionalize a continual state of exception at the border that in turn performs
the spatio-legal fiction of territorial sovereign and the sovereign subject in each
admission/exclusion decision. This argument is made not from extraordinary cases or
even from the consideration of the adjudication of asylum claims, but rather from the
mundane, ordinary evidence of the everyday passage of millions of normal
travelers across the border. Rather than view the border as a simple line indicating sovereign jurisdiction, this
article adopts the performative view of borders, indebted to Wonders and indirectly Butler. Following Butlers analysis
of the performativity of identity, Wonders argues that although 2 states
attempt to choreograph
national borders, often in response to global pressures, these state policies have little meaning
until they are performed by state agents or by border crossers Border agents and state
bureaucrats play a critical role in determining where, how, and on whose body a border will be performed (2006:66).
There are lessons to be learned about the politics of the sovereign state and
citizenship in general from the specific and longstanding example of the
institutionalization of the state of exception at the borders. The (momentary) reduction of
all travelers to homo sacer as they traverse the border can provide the ground for an empathetic, cosmopolitan ethic -based not on citizenship, but precisely from alienation. Agamben and SoE Provocatively argued by Agamben in Homo
sacer and The State of Exception, the foundational
outside where there is no difference between law and force, wherein individuals
are subject to the law but not subjects in the law (1995:181). The use of emergency powers and
the use of all means necessary in the war on terror demonstrate that the state of exception tends increasingly to appear
as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics (2005:2). But, in this article, I will not be examining
the role of the USA PATRIOT Act, Guantanamo Bay, Camp X-Ray, Abu Ghraib prison, the black sites in Eastern
Europe, extraordinary rendition, domestic surveillance programs, or other clear indications of the rise of executive
(2005:1). But, rather than the metaphorical border between normal and exceptional, I argue that we
take the material border seriously. Wherever the border is located, however it is administered, the
border has been and continues to be an on-going state of exception, based on a prior
assumption of the authority to define a particular security/territory/population
(Foucault).
0105126112084110079012105001006064088066099114064024030071&EXT=p
df&TYPE=2) Foronda
Defining a society of normalization is necessary for governmentality to function in
the post- 9/11 environment. Sovereign powers involve individuals in a war of movement, first of all, by discursively
constructing who belongs within a collectivity. The
of life are to be defended and secured from possible threats. Specifically, discourses distinguish what
from what must die (Lemke 2011). The commitment to state security, Reid (2008: 80) claims, is always by
necessity a commitment to the security of a particular form of life. Leaders construct an identity that separates forms of
life seen as acceptable from those seen as dangerous or warring enemies of a society. According to Campbell (1998: 68),
sovereigns secure identities through exclusionary practices. These practices define the
boundaries of self and other and expel to the outside of the population all that sovereigns deem threatening. Through
discourse, leaders position within an identity lives that must be defended and
remove dangers from this identity. Sovereign powers dictate the boundaries of a
collectivity by identifying the self and exorcising enemies from the society . U.S.
leadership employs various discursive techniques to construct a particular identity and define an international society of
normalization, in response to the attacks on 9/11. The Global War on Terror, above all, represents a strategy to classify
what is to be defended and what are the appropriate means to provide this protection. Days after 9/11, Bush (2001b)
interpreted the events as an act of war committed by enemies of freedom. Official discourses define this war
existentially, in the sense that U.S. security measures aim to protect the liberal democratic way of life. As Bush (2001a)
determines, We wage a war to save civilization, itself. This
supportstrengtheningexecutivecentredgovernment,andsuppressdissent,Huysmans(2004:332)argues.Thus,leaders
Alternative
Genealogy
Examining history in this way is the only way to look at
surveillance without the restraints of prejudiced
information formed by dominance.
Foucault 71 [Michel,French philospher and social theorist,Nietzsche
Genealogy and History,UC Denver,
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/CLAS/Departments/philosophy/S
tudents/Documents/'Nietzsche,%20Genealogy,%20History'%20by%20Michel
%20Foucault.pdf] Chowdhury
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a
field of entangled and confused parchments, on d ocuments that have been
scratched over and recopied many times. On this basis, it is obvious that Paul
Reel was wrong to follow the English tendency in describing the history of
morality in terms of a linear development-in reducing its entire history and
genesis to an exclusive concern for utility. He assumed that words had kept
their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas
retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of speech and
desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys. From
these elements, however, genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it
must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it
must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is
without history-in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive
to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution,
but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles.
Finally, genealogy must define even those instances when they are absent,
the moment when they remained unrealized (Plato, at Syracuse, did not
become Mohammed) . Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a
knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source This
essay first appeared in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 145-72. Along with "Reponse au cercle
d'epistemologie," which became the introductory chapter of The Archaeology
of Knowledge, this essay represents Foucault's attempt to explain his
relationship to those sources which are fundamental to his development. Its
importance, in terms of understanding Foucault' s objectives, cannot be
exaggerated. It is reproduced here by permission of Presses Universitaires de
France . 76 Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 77 material. Its "cyclopean
monuments" 2 are constructed from "discreet and apparently insignificant
truths and according to a rigorous metho '; they cannot be the product of
"large and well-meaning rrors ." 3 In short, genealogy demands relentless
erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and
profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective
of the scholar; on the cOJ:ltrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of
ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search
for "origins."
Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,
https://www.academia.edu/679231/_Foucaults_Genealogy_] Reynoso
Foucault describes genealogy using one of Nietzsches well-known
metaphors. Genealogy is gray, its task being to decipher the hieroglyphic
script of humans past, a past that is neither black (i.e. totally unknown) nor
white (i.e. transparent), but something in between (gray), that is, ambiguous
and uncertain. Thus, a rigorous investigation is needed, if the meaning of the
past is to be uncovered: Genealogy, consequently, requires patience
and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation
of source material. Due to its minuteness, genealogy may at first give
us the impression that it deals with trivial, everyday things, rather
than with important developments. However, genealogy acquires its
character from recording what we tend to feel is without history, instances
such as sentiments, love, conscience, instincts. Crucially, the writing of the
human past by the genealogist is necessarily an interpretation, which itself is
neither true nor false. For Foucault, the genealogist is an interpreter but not a
hermeneutician. The genealogist as interpreter recognizes that the
meaning he/she gives to history is doubtful (hence gray),
acknowledges its system of injustice10 and the fact that his/her
interpretation is subject to revision. The genealogist-interpreter has
a sense of where he/she stands in history and does not ignore the
fact that he/she is the product of historic and social circumstances;
however, simultaneously he/she is able to distance him-/herself from
his/her situation in order to examine things from afar. In doing so,
the genealogist-interpreter ignores the actors own interpretation(s)
of the meaning of their actions. Therefore, the genealogical
approach is one of detachment. By contrast, the approach of the
hermeneutician is one of engagement, as he/she attempts to grasp the
significance of things from within them. As opposed to the interpreterhermeneutician, the genealogist-interpreter finds that the questions
which are traditionally held to be the deepest and murkiest are truly
and literally the most superficial. Thus, their meaning is to be
discovered in surface practices, not in mysterious depths. Accordingly, a
genealogical interpretation is distinctly different from a hermeneutical
approach. The claim that interpretation is not the uncovering of a hidden
meaning has revolutionary implications for philosophy; or better, it is a direct
attack against philosophy, as it traditionally has been understood. For
Foucaults genealogy undermines the belief in the existence of
unchanging essences and truths. When he realized that there are no
primordial verities in the world, Foucault shifted his emphasis from his early
studies on madness to his work of the seventies and eighties. In his early
work Foucault had pre-supposed an essence of madness, namely, an original
Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,
https://www.academia.edu/679231/_Foucaults_Genealogy_] Reynoso
What is wrong with a history of the past in terms of the present? According to Foucault, this is the
presentist fallacy; the historian takes a model or a concept, an institution, a feeling, or a symbol from
his present and attempts to find that it had a parallel meaning in the past.41 Nor does a genealogical
history attempt to discover the underlying laws of history, thereby falling in the trap of finalism. The latter
a
genealogical history begins with a diagnosis of the present. The
genealogist-historian locates the manifestations of a given
meticulous ritual of power to see where it arose and how it
developed. Discipline and Punish examines the Entstehung of the human sciences (which Foucault
holds that the present is the accomplishment of some latent goal in the past. Rather,
calls pseudo-sciences) and their relation to the Entstehung of the prison. Foucault says: This book is
intended asa genealogy of the present scientific legal complex from which the power to punish derives
its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant
singularity. A genealogical enquiry shows that power
produces knowledgethat
power and knowledge directly imply one another . What is the relationship
between the prison and the human sciences? It seems that Foucault does not clearly differentiate between
the two Entstehungsgeschichten, despite the fact that he did not wish to reduce the one to the other.
Notice: I am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if they have been able to
be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been
conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain way of rendering
two terms is meant to show the constitutive (or productive) aspect of knowledge.45 Power (relations) and
knowledge (or truth) implicate each other,46 hence Foucaults term power-knowledge47
(pouvoirsavoir).48 The meaning of the composite term pouvoir/savoir is more complex than the
English translation power/knowledge would at first sight suggest. In French there are different words for
different forms of knowledge. In his archaeological works Foucault used the word savoir to refer to the
implicit knowledge characteristic of an historical epoch, that is, to the common sense of a people at
that time at a specific place; he was concerned with how the savoir shaped the explicit knowledge
what he called connaissance that is institutionalized in the disciplines that make up the human
sciences.49 Concerning pouvoir, although it is translated as power, one should not forget that in
French it is also the infinitive form of the verb to be able to, i.e. can. Accordingly, as Ellen K. Feder
says: In Foucaults work, pouvoir must be understood in this dual sense, as both power as English
speakers generally take it (which could also be rendered as puissance or force in French), but also as a kind
composite power/knowledge. Gayatri Spivak draws our attention to the homely verbiness of savoir in
savoirfaire [a ready and polished kind of know-how, in English], savoir-vivre [an understanding of social
life and customs] into pouvoir. So pouvoir-savoir could mean being able to do something only as you
the explosion of discussion about sex in the Victorian age was due to a type of power that bourgeois
society brought to bear on the body and on sex.52 It, thus, casts doubt on the repressive
simultaneously objects of knowledge, namely, the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the
(un dispositif historique)59. Therefore, the real questions are whether prohibition and censorship are not
forms of power rather than repression and whether all this discourse on sex is not itself part of the power it
criticizes as repression.
Rejection
Criticism is the ultimate responsibility of intellectuals,
necessary to ensure that reforms and revolutions dont
replicate the problems they seek to address
Michel Foucault, Professor, College de France, Human Nature: Justice
Versus Power, Noam Chomsky Debates with Michel Foucault, International
Philosophers Project, 1971. Available from the World Wide Web at:
http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm.
"It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the
workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and
independent; to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the
political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely
through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. This
critique and this fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because
political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are
centres and invisible, little-known points of support; its true
resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn't expect it.
Probably it's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the
apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate
the point of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is
exercised. And because this domination is not simply the expression
in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and , to
a large extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of
the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of the
other. Well, if one fails to recognise these points of support of class
power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this
class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary
process."
Answers To
A2 Alt Fails
Criticism is fundamental to any meaningful social
transformation
Michel Foucault, College de France, POWER, ed. J.D. Faubion, 1994, p.
456.
I'll reply first to the point about not having "produced any results." There are hundreds and thousands of
people who have worked for the emergence of a certain number of problems that are now actually before
A2 - Framework
Conservatism DA
Any move to methodologically bracket out our discussion
cannot be viewed as value neutral, it is the worst form of
conservatism favoring the established order at the
expense of the oppressed.
Meszaros 89 (Istvan, likes Marx not Adam Smith. The Power of Ideology, p
232-234)
Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality the self-proclaimed Wertfreiheit or value neutrality of
so-called rigorous social science stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed , we are
Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly
explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and metatheoretical neutrality . But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely
because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of
fact and value, theory and practice, formal and substantive rationality, etc. The conflicttranscending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of
the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its valuecommitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to
bring them into the focus of discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the
conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the
ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and
semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the
impeccable methodologically sanctioned credentials of
procedural rules, models and paradigms? Once , though, such
rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of
reference of what may or may not '''be allowed'''' to considered
the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the
accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the
scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the
inexplicit ideological assumptions upon the basis of which the
methodological principles themselves were in the first place
constitution . This why the allegedly non-ideological ideologies which
so successfully conceal and exercise their
apologetic
function in the
Plan Focus DA
Focus on implementation means we never consider how
our communicative modes enable structural violence.
Cost/benefit is a poor
Gherke 1998 [Pat J, Former Debate Coach and Rhetorical Scholar, Critique
Arguments as Policy Analysis: Policy Debate Beyond the Rationalist Perspective,
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, 19, 1998, pp. 18-39]
Arguably, some policies may intend no more than their implementation. However, that does not free
such policies from responsibility for far more than they intend. While methods for considering these
interpretive and communicative aspects of a policy are beyond the rationalist perspective, any
evaluation of policy options must consider these communicative perspectives. To
limit these interpretations to the intentional and the nave is to limit policy
discourse and policy analysis, destroying our ability to consider the communicative
effects and influences of policy advocacy. In her analysis of the published reports
of the Tuskegee study, Martha Solomon notes that one reason the Tuskegee
experiment continued for as long as it did was that the rhetorical conventions of
the scientific community obscured and encouraged neglect of crucial human
concerns (243244). Her focus necessarily extends far beyond the intentional,
naive, rogate meanings of the Tuskegee texts. While recognizing these language
choices were not intentional attempts to deceive or manipulate, Solomon accounts
for their occurrence and impact upon the policy process. Attempts at similar
analysis of proposed policies might act as a check against policy actions such as
the Tuskegee study.Ignorance of these aspects of policy analysis may persuade
debaters that policies that meet rational cost-benefit criteria are always the most
effective and preferential policy options, regardless of how they characterize
individuals or communicate roles and obligations. Similarly, it will leave debaters
unable to account for the often enduring and dramatic effects of the
communicative aspects of policies and policy advocacy.
Spectator DA
The detached stance of the policy maker in debate
divorces us from true advocacy and is one of the most
debilitating failures of contemporary education. Their
dismissal of any argument that cannot be proven by
THEIR standards of "evidence" forecloses any discussion
of oppression.
DSRB 2008
(Shanara,"THE HARSH REALITIES OF ACTING BLACK: HOW AFRICANAMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL
PERFORMANCE AND STYLE," pg. 118-120)
the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a sense
of detachment associated with the spectator posture. In other words, its participants are
able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from
the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms
like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate
simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world
participation in the political contexts they debate about . As William Shanahan
Mitchell observes that
remarks: the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the
particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and
the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of
following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emorys Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the sweet
development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in recognition of their privilege, in an
attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.
A2 - Law Solves
Rules or regulations passed to prevent violence impacts
only further perpetuate the sovereigns power only
genealogical approaches can uncover the unquestioned
ways power has become manifested
Sembou 11 [Evangelia, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Social
Theory, Hegel, Political Science, and History of Political Thought (Ancient and
Modern), Foucaults Genealogy 6-16,
https://www.academia.edu/679231/_Foucaults_Genealogy_] Reynoso
In Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault isolates specific sites (not
places) of rituals of power, namely, Benthams Panopticon and the confessional. As genealogist, Foucault
the will to knowledge has not come to a halt in the face of a taboo that must not be lifted, but has
persisted in constituting despite many mistakes, of course a science of sexuality. Rules are
impersonal and can be bent to any purpose this is one of the most important lessons that Nietzsche has
taught us. A traditional historical analysis of the purpose of social and political institutions cannot unearth
their Entstehung because The
Marx's critiques of left Hegelianism worked closely with the texts and political
were not expressly organized by a
clear alternative. It was through the process of subjecting political
and philosophical idealism to critique that Marx found his way to dialectical
materialism and political economy, but a careful reading of this v work makes clear that Marx did
not know in advance where his critiques would take him, and that
premature closure on the question would have stymied both the
critique and the productive disorientation it achieved for him about left Hegelianism. Surely we
peremptorily.
in
justice
in America. Not knowing what a critique will yield is not the same
as suspending all political values while engaged in critique . It is
possible to care passionately about offering richer educational
opportunities to those historically excluded from them while subjecting
to ruthless critique the institutional and discursive practices that
have thus far organized that aim. It is possible to sustain a deep commitment to the
vision of equality for sexual minorities in a heterosexual culture while subjecting to critique a range of
techniques from the campaigned for gay marriage to the constitution of queers as genetically
predetermined----advanced in the name of such equality. And even if of racially marked ones but that
strike us as urgently unjust, or by revealing that the idea of "sexual minorities" is at once so incoherent
and so interpellative that it may belong under the heading "the problem" rather than the heading "the
although political
commitments may constitute both the incitement to critique and the
sustaining impulse of it, these commitments themselves will almost
inevitably change their shape in the course of its undertaking.
Critique is worth nothing if it does not bring the very terms of such
solution" the resulting disorientation remains deeply political. And so,
which it is advanced. In this volume, Judith Butler argues for just such a transformation when she warns
that to remain within the existing terms of the gay kinship debates is to accept "an epistemological field
structured by a fundamental loss, one that we can no longer name enough even to grieve." So
immediate policy outcomes or table of tactics . And it can include on its casualty
list a number of losses discarded ways of thinking and operatingwith no clear replacements. But
critique is risky in another sense as well, what might be called an
affirmative sense. For critique hazards the opening of new
modalities of thought and political possibility, and potentially affords as well the
possibility of enormous pleasure political, intellectual, and ethical.
A2 Institutions Good
Institutions are constituted through discourseour
theoretical critique is simultaneously radical practice
which creates space within policymaking for intellectual
responsibility
Deleuze and Foucault 72 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault,
consequence;
and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it
began in the theoretical analysis of the context of confinement, specifically with respect to the psychiatric
asylum within a capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Then you became aware of the necessity for
confined individuals to speak for themselves, to create a relay (it's possible, on the contrary, that your
function was already that of a relay in relation to them); and this group is found in prisons -- these
individuals are imprisoned. It was on this basis that you organised the information group for prisons (G.I.P.)
(1), the object being to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak. It would be
absolutely false to say, as the Maoist implied, that in moving to this practice you were applying your
theories. This was not an application; nor was it a project for initiating reforms or an enquiry in the
traditional sense. The emphasis was altogether different: a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a
practical action which serve as relays and form networks. FOUCAULT: It seems to me that the political
involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different aspects of his activity: his
position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the
ideology it produces or imposes (his exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of
subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular
truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of
politicisation did not exclude each other, but, being of a different order, neither did they coincide. Some
were classed as "outcasts" and others as "socialists." During moments of violent reaction on the part of the
authorities, these two positions were readily fused: after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940. The
intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible,
when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes. The intellectual spoke the truth to those
who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience,
time that consciousness is a form of knowledge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a
prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those
who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A "theory " is the regional system
of this struggle.
A2 - Permutation
Panopticon ideals wont change need for completely new
system is required
Ajana 05 (Btihaj, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative
Industries Kings College London, Surveillance and Biopolitics, Electronic
Journal of Sociology,
http://www.sociology.org/content/2005/tier1/ajana_biopolitics.pdf)
Beutelspacher
petit bourgeois elements describing themselves as the successors to the Saxon inhabitants of England as
opposed to the monarchy, which represented the successors of Norman invaders (this is only one example
of the kind of ways in which English society was interpreted in the light of the dichotomy of Norman and
Saxon). In France, the aristocracy complained that their rights as Frankish conquerors had been eroded by
of these discourses of race struggle was such that they became ubiquitous as a way of thinking about
which internal and external racial others are dangers. We can see two lineages emerging in the nineteenth
century: state racism, which denies the conflict inherent in and basic to society in favour of a conflict
between society and its enemies, and another, coming down to Foucault through Nietzsche, which affirms
identified by Foucault (the other being discipline).8 These two are distinguished by the levels at which they
operate, and by their age (discipline is older), even though they dovetail into one another, which is to
say, they are deeply compatible and complementary.9 Discipline is a technology which is concerned with
individuals, the control of individual bodies; biopolitics is newer and correspondingly more sophisticated: it
The different levels at which these technologies operate is what makes them so easily compatible.
Case Debate
and statutory safeguards seeking to protect the privacy of Americans," they warned. While the researchers do not say whether
the
current legislation as it stands "opens the door for unrestrained surveillance ," they write.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent introduction of the Patriot Act allowed certain kinds
of data to be collected to help in the fight against terrorism -- so-called
"metadata," such as the time and date of phone calls and emails sent,
including phone numbers and email addresses themselves. But the contents
of those phone calls or emails require a warrant . The classified documents leaked by Edward Snowden
showed that while the public laws have been in effect for years or even decades, the U.S. government has used
secret and classified interpretations of these laws for wider intelligence
gathering outside the statutes' text. The Obama administration previously said
there had been Congressional and Judicial oversight of these surveillance
laws -- notably Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which authorized the collection of Americans' phone records; and Section 702 of the Foreign
these loopholes are being actively exploited -- saying their aim is solely to broaden the understanding of the current legal framework --
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorized the controversial PRISM program to access non-U.S. residents' emails, social networking,
Data takes the quickest route possible rather than staying solely within a
country's borders. Data between two U.S. servers located within the U.S. can
still sometimes be routed outside of the U.S. Although this is normal, the
researchers warn data can be deliberately routed abroad by manipulating the
Internet's core protocols -- notably the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which determines how Internet traffic is routed
between individual networks; and the Domain Name Service (DNS), which converts website addresses to numerical network addresses. If
the NSA took advantage of the loophole by pushing Internet traffic outside of
the U.S., it would have enough time to capture the data while it is outside the
reach of constitutional protection. The researchers rebuffed the NSA's statement in an email: "We argue that
these loopholes exist when surveillance is conducted abroad and when the authorities don't 'intentionally target a U.S. person'. There are
several situations in which you don't 'target a U.S. person', but Internet traffic of many Americans can in fact be affected." "We cannot tell
whether these loopholes are exploited on a large scale, but operation MUSCULAR seems to find its legal and technical basis in them." Mark M.
warned the agency's foreign data dragnet would inevitably include U.S. data. "The NSA is an intelligence organization -- it's going to be
staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union's National Security Project, said: "Today, Americans' communications increasingly travel the
globe -- and privacy protections must reliably follow. This academic paper raises key questions about whether our current legal regime meets
privacy regardless of where they are in the world, and that Congressional oversight of all rules governing surveillance is needed for
comprehensive reforms. The ACLU has also filed a Freedom of Information lawsuit with a federal court in New York, questioning "whether it
[EO 12333] appropriately accommodates the constitutional rights of American citizens and residents whose communications are intercepted in
network
monitoring firm Renesys observed two "route hijacking" events in June and
November 2013 that led Internet traffic to be redirected through Belarus and
the course of that surveillance." Although there is no direct evidence yet to suggest the NSA has exploited this loophole,
AFF Answers
Link Debate
engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the
always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the
regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can and historically does create
change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and
welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90
not
only does biopower seek to control the political life of bodies, but also the social
behaviors and interactions as well. This biopower shapes the lives of those in the
system through laws and regulations. Hardt and Negri suggest that biopower threatens us with death
but also rules over life.84 Death, also serves as a tool of subjugation and as a threat, which tries to reproduce certain
Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, echoed this in his address to the Oxford Union. In this address, he argues that
there will be a tipping point, a tipping in which so many of the leaders and operatives
of al Qaeda have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or
launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the
organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively
destroyed.85This statement is biopower at its best for all three scholars. Foucault would
point out the life-administering aspects of what the American government is
trying to do in terms of al Qaeda. The government is seeking to change a behavior
and ultimately produce a human being that would be more acceptable to the
status quo. However, if such conditioning is not possible then the only plausible
use of biopower would be the use of death as a final control against al Qaeda . This,
for Hardt and Negri, is the ultimate culmination of biopower. Hardt and Negri also talk about how counterinsurgency
strategies have to be formed in order to possibly compete with guerrilla fighters or in this case, insurgents. Hardt and
Negri suggest that the
manage something is an incredible type of power to hold, especially over the lives of men. And survival, which in a
Foucauldian sense would be avoiding death and being productive, is the purpose of biopower. Bodies most live in order
to be productive, however what happens when productivity is lost? Death
Negri assert, security is a form of biopower in the sense that security seeks to reshape and produce social life at its most
general global scale.99 Security, especially defined within previous National Security strategies, has been aimed at the
destruction of Al Qaeda and lessening their influence across the globe. By openly bringing death to Al Qaedas doorstep
and actively exerting power over life, security
become increasingly more desirable in the war against Al Qaeda. Drones have
and military powers are able to be carried out at a very low cost while
affording the government maneuverability and global reach; this global reach
allows for the regulation of life abroad and ultimately transforms not only the way Al
Qaeda operatives live, but the way both domestic and foreign civilians live as well. When looking at how one
should view the transformation of war in the 21st century, Al Qaeda and technology become synonymous with ideations
of global security. Using Hardt and Negris framework allows for a comprehensive analysis of the advent of global war
and the
have revealed that even encrypted emails, documents, and online banking transactions are being regularly
accessed by the NSA (Larson and Shane, 2013).
the scale of
the data collection and analysis performed by government and corporate
institutions created a panopticon wherein citizen actions would eventually
become circumscribed within an ever-widening net of personal data
surveillance. The end result, he observed, is an antidemocratic system of control
that cannot be transformed because it can serve no purpose other than that
for which it was designedthe rationalization and control of human
existence(Gandy, 1993: 227). Weve come a long way since 1993. Who could have imagined
Foucaults (1995) seminal analysis of disciplinary systems in society, Gandy argued that
services like Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr that not only encourage, but actively
incentivize the voluntary dissemination of personal information online? Over the
past 20 years, the centrality of the internet to the global communications
infrastructure has made it a target for the type of panoptic sorting that Gandy
described. Now that the world knows about PRISM, it is tempting to imagine
that enhanced public scrutiny will effectively limit these programs. I dont think
that is likely. In fact, there are four specific trends that foretell a greater
expansion of the data panopticon: convergence and the central place of
software in social, commercial and political systems; the growing importance of metadata
for routing, storage and sorting of information; the global business of data storage and
retrieval; the blurring of lines between corporate and government data
mining. The convergence of digital technologies and the importance of software In the previous
era of analog technologies, such as wired telephones and reel-to-reel tapes, each specific
technology had a limited range of capabilities alongside a specific set of legal
standards to accompany their use. The Wiretap Act of 1968, for example, prohibits law
enforcement from wiretapping telephones without a court order because doing so would violate the 4th
Today, there
are few discrete technologies anymore. Thanks to technological convergence, almost all
forms of communication today utilize some form of digital communication,
and many do this via the Internet. Software has now replaced specific forms of communication
Amendment protections of both the suspect and anyone that communicates with them.
hardware as the nexus for new types of digital communication, from Skype and FaceTime to emails and
and uses. We lack a coherent legal regime to counteract the interception of these communications. For
example, Skype phone calls can be protected under the existing federal wiretap laws, but emails and text
the usefulness of metadata in an analog era was limited (hence the lower evidentiary standards required in
courts to obtain that information), today, thanks to the internet, metadata
which ideas other than Panopticism were reflected in the structure of prisons
suggests otherwise. The lukewarm reception of imprisonment in France was
reflected in the disorganized state of the French prison system, which
consisted of two levels. Roughly 400 local prisons housed half the prison population, including
those waiting for trial and petty criminals serving brief sentences (Wright 1983,133-34). These squalid
facilities were described by shocked prison inspectors as "filled with stupor and horror";
the lack of
Impact Debate
course, never describes things in quite these terms, he does come remarkably close to doing so. In
power, unlike
violence, necessarily entails a capacity for resistance. To treat
someone as an agent, one has to recognise that they can do other
than one wishesthey can resist. Power can exist only where people have a capacity to
subject for agency, we can see why Foucaults later work on power emphasises that
act freely, and so only where they can resist that power. Perhaps, therefore, we should define as violent
any relationshipwhether overtly violent or notin which an individual has his action determined for him.
Violence manifests itself in any relationship between individuals, groups, or societies in which one denies
the agency of the others by seeking to define for them actions they must perform. Power, in contrast,
appears in any relationshipalthough no overtly violent relationship could meet the following requirement
in which an individual does not have his action determined for him. Power manifests itself whenever
individuals, groups, or societies act as influences on the agency of the subject without attempting to
a rejection of autonomy
implies that power is ineliminable, while a defence of agency implies
that power need not degenerate into violence. Foucaults final work on the nature
determine the particular actions the subject performs. Here
of governmentality suggests, therefore, that society need not consist solely of the forms of discipline he
had analysed earlier. Society might include an arena in which free individuals attempt only to influence one
a
distinction between violence and power might provide us with
normative resources for social criticism absent from his earlier work.
Provided we are willing to grant that the capacity for agency has ethical value and
this seems reasonable enoughwe will denounce violent social relations and
champion instead a society based on a more benign power.29 We will
favour forms of power that recognise the other as an agent, and so
provide openings for resistance. As Foucault suggested, we will judge
societies against an ideal of a minimum of domination. 30A good
society must recognise people as agents: it must encourage forms of
resistance. What is more, of course, if we are to recognise people as agents and encourage forms of
another. I hope my discussion of Foucaults theory of governmentality has pointed to the way in which
resistance, we must tolerate, perhaps even promote, difference. Most discussions of the sort of ethics
poststructuralism might sustain, especially in relation to feminism, highlight the ideas of a recognition of
the other and a tolerance of difference.31 What I hope I have added to these discussions is the suggestion
that one way of generating these values is to treat Foucaults concept of governmentality as implying a
recognition of the subject as an agent but not an autonomous agent. No doubt important questions remain
to be answered. Questions such as, can we devise criteria by which to determine the extent of violence
within a society? how should we promote resistance? and can we make further relevant distinctions
between forms of violence or even between forms of power? It seems clear already, however, that Foucault
provides us with a point of departure from which to address these questions. His concept of
governmentality encourages us to look at social formations to see how they provide possibilities for agency
and resistance understood as key forms of human freedom. As he himself said, the notion of
governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others,
i.e., that which constitutes the very matter of ethics.32
The decisionistic
interpretation of the performative force of foundations tends to take
Schmitts account of sovereignty as the power to decide on the
exception as axiomatic. In Schmitts original formulation and in Agambens faithful reiteration
of it, the sovereign is defined as the one who decides on the
exception. The circularity in this definition (Bull 2004) effaces the
interval between claiming the necessity of making an exception of
suspending the law and the successful enactment of this claim. The
absence of objective foundational validity to norms is, through reference to
the Derridean theme of undecidability, made to imply that application and
judgement are a purely arbitrary imposition of force by the
strongest will. This interpretation misconstrues the practice of
judgement that the deconstruction of foundations is meant to throw
into new relief (see Brenkman 2007, 59-77, Zerilli 2005). In Derridas writings, the
absence of foundations is not the occasion for a depressed
resignation to a decisionistic interpretation of sovereign power at
all. Rather, a distinctive sense of responsibility is made visible by the
undecidability of normative foundations. Derrida does not locate the mystical
arbitrary force and unfounded decisions (see Barnett 2004).
foundation of authority in the self-assertive will of the sovereign who decides on the exception, but in the
exposure to the demands of others (see Barnett 2005). Derrida clearly articulated his doubts about the
contemporary geopolitics after 9/11, Derrida undermines the model of sovereignty as wilful self-assertion
attention to this entangled relationship of violence and non-violence in Derridas work is to underscore that
It is the
state that holds open or radically shuts down the possibility of local
resistance.* The agents of every Disciplinary institution strive, of
course, to extend their reach and and augment their discretionary
power. In the long run, only political action and state power can stop
them. Every act of local resistance is an appeal for political or legal intervention from the center.
establishes the general framework within which all other disciplinary institutions operate.
Consider, for example, the factory revolts of the 1930s that led (in the United States) to the establishment
of collective bargaining and grievance procedures, critical restraints on scientific management, which is
one of Foucaults disciplines, though one that he alludes to only occasionally. Success required not only the
solidarity of the workers but also the support of the liberal and democratic state. And success was
functional not to any state but to a state of that sort; we can easily imagine other social wholes that
would require other kinds of factory discipline. A genealogical account of this discipline would be
fascinating and valuable, and it would undoubtedly overlap with Foucaults accounts of prisons and
hospitals. But if it were complete, it would have to include a genealogy of grievance procedures too, and
this would overlap with an account that Foucault doesnt provide, of the liberal state and the rule of law.
Here is a kind of knowledgelets call it political theory or philosophical jurisprudence that regulates
disciplinary arrangements across our society. It arises within one set of power relations and extends toward
the others; it offers a critical perspective on all the networks of constraint. The possibility of knowledge of
this sort, specific to institutions and political cultures rather than to points in the power network,
suggests that we still require (I dont mean that society requires, or capitalism or even socialism requires,
inhabit a realm of pure value, such as Bends described; Foucault is right to insist that there is no such
place, no value untouched by power. They stand among us, in this place, here and now, and they find in
Alt Debate
Society is
just an assemblage of autonomous self-disciplining agents, with no
sense that their self-realization might flourish within bonds of
mutuality. The ethic in question is also troublingly formalistic. What matters is ones
control over and prudent distribution of ones powers and pleasures; it is in this ascetic selfAs with Nietzsche, Foucaults vigorously self-mastering individual remains wholly monadic.
restraint that true freedom lies, as the freedom of the artefact is inseparable from its self-imposed law. It
was not a question, Foucault claims, of what was permitted or forbidden among the desires that one felt
or the acts that one committed, but of prudence, reflection, and calculation in the way one distributed and
controlled his acts (p. 54). Foucault has now at last! introduced the question of critical self-reflection
into desire and power, a position perhaps not wholly at one with his Nietzscheanism; but he does so only to
produce a formalistic account of morality. The ancients, he writes, did not operate on the assumption that
sexual acts were bad in themselves; what matters is not the mode of conduct one prefers but the
intensity of that practice, and so an aesthetic rather than ethical criterion. But it is surely not true that
some sexual acts are not inherently vicious. Rape, or child abuse, are signal examples. Is rape morally
vicious only because it signifies a certain imprudence or immoderacy on the part of the rapist? Is there
having sexual relations only with her husband was a consequence of the fact that she was under his
control. For the husband, having sexual relations only with his wife was the most elegant way of exercising
his control (p. 151). Chastity is a political necessity for women and an aesthetic flourish for men. There is
no reason whatsoever to imagine that Foucault actually approves of this dire condition; but it is one odious
corollary of the ethic he most certainly does endorse. It is also true that Foucault, at least at one point in
would Foucaults case work if it were transferred to, say, the act of slander? Is slander acceptable as long
as I exercise my power to perform it moderately, judiciously, slandering perhaps three persons but not
thirty? Am I morally admirable if I retain a certain controlled deployment of my slanderous powers, letting
them out and reining them in in an elegant display of internal symmetry? Does it all come down to a
question of how, in postmodernist vein, one stylizes~ ones s conduct? What would a stylish rape look like,
precisely? Foucaults Greeks believe that one should temper and refine ones practices not because they
are inherently good or bad, but because self-indulgence leads to a depletion of ones vital powers a
converted into the basis of a discriminatory ethics by virtue of adding to it the techniques of prudence and
temperance. And the ethical theory which is the upshot of this that the physical regimen ought to
accord with the principle of a general aesthetics of existence in which the equilibrium of the body was one
of the conditions of the proper hierarchy of the soul (p. 104) has long been familiar on the playing fields
of Eton. With The Use of Pleasure, Foucault completes his long trek from the hymning of madness to the
public school virtues. The ethical techniques with which Foucault is concerned in this book are ones of
subjectivization; but how far the long-despised subject actually makes its belated appearance in these
pages is a moot point. It is clear that Foucaults repressive hostility to subjectivity, which he can usually
see only as self-incarceration, deprives him of all basis for an ethics or a politics, leaving his rebellion a
he still
cannot quite bring himself to address the question of the subject as
such. What we have here, rather than the subject and its desires, is the body and its pleasures a halfuseless passion; and this volume is among other things an attempt to plug that disabling gap. But
way, crab-wise, aestheticizing move towards the subject which leaves love as technique and conduct
rather than as tenderness and affection, as praxis rather than interiority. It is symptomatic in this respect
that the practice closest to sexuality in the book is that of eating. A massive repression, in other words,
would still seem operative, as the body stands in for the subject and the aesthetic for the ethical. In one
sense, the sudden appearance of the autonomous individual in this work, after an intellectual career
devoted to systematically scourging it, comes as something of a surprise; but this individual is a matter,
very scrupulously, of surface, art, technique, sensation. We are still not permitted to enter the tabooed
realms of affection, emotional - intimacy and compassion, which are not particularly notable among the
public school virtues.
An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence73 and its drive to
produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the
semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh
forms of life among existing political communi- ties. Central to this critique is an
assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural
flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms;
modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a
repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of
humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of
been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The
stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and
alternative forms of social orga- nization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of
The
postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against
hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater
capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the
arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of
inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No
doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance
and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can
also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic
the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures.
interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or
blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma";
there are
always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A
rejection of the state as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to
straitjacket the South Asian imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical
inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But
and humane order based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich
a
reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to
be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be
swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful
institutions. A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good
over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state,
or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering
space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to
rhythms dictated by globalization
towards cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for peoples
culture', indigenous culture, local knowledge and culture, can lead if not to ethnochauvinism, to reification
Post- Development to belong to the neo-traditionalist reaction to modernity (Nederveen Pieterse 1998:
concern. Storey asks for example how local actors are supposed to find solutions at the global level (Storey
2000). in emphasizing cultural diversity and in rejecting universalism, Post- Development is criticized of
neoliberal thinker Deepak Lal condemns state-centered development economies (Nedeveen Pieterse 1998:
The state of
exception argument is informed by and also confirms a model of
action that is freed from any horizon of responsibility whatsoever .
conceptualising the double responsibility discussed in the first section of this paper?
There are two dimensions to this disavowal of responsibility. First, with respect to political responsibility,
In turn, the
expression of dissent is thereby freed from any sense of the
legitimacy of struggling over the control of institutions (Brennan and
Ganguly 2006, 27). Second, this abjuring of political responsibility is matched
by the account of ethical action that likewise leaves no ontological
or normative space for responsibility. Agamben takes his distance from Schmitt only
of states can be traced back to this fundamental root (Brenkman 2007, 66).
in so far as the latter sought to recuperate foundational, sovereign violence within the scope of the law
revolution is recuperated as a preferred figure of authentic ethical action freed from subordination to the
law (Agamben 2005, 88). Pure violence is a figure for action as pure means, with no relation to an end
keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but
make us wary about humankinds supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving
or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical trackrecord of last-minute, technical quick-fixes is hardly reassuring. Whats more,
most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate
change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex,
sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand,
Moreover,
an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the
outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face
should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support
public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future
that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucaults Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of
genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing
social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil
Once competing
dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility,
ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups
and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios
societys participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come.
through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the
present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of
options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired
farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so
doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and
extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of
Permutation
Foucault suggests the scrutiny of discourse WITHOUT
rejection so the perm solves
Foucault 77 (Michel, philosopher, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pg. 25
http://monoskop.org/images/9/90/Foucault_Michel_Archaeology_of_Knowledge
.pdf) Wadhwani
We must renounce all those themes whose function is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its
secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence .
We must be ready to
receive every moment of discourse in sudden irruption; in that punctuality in
which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be
repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from
all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant
presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs. These pre-existing
forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question,
must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but the
tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show
that they do not come out about of themselves, but are always the result of a
construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be
scrutinized.