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RO W ANA K. RIGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AETNA LIFE IN SURANCE CO.;
AM ERICA N HERITA GE LIFE
IN SU RAN CE C O.; B OEIN G
W IC HITA CR ED IT U N IO N ; BOEING
M ILITA RY A IR CR AFT C O.; CUNA
M U TU A L IN SU RA N CE SO CIETY,
No. 05-3065
(D.C. No. 03-CV-2546-CM )
(D . Kan.)
Defendants-Appellees.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
CUNA with prejudice, 2 thus making final all claims against all parties. The
abatement order w as lifted. This court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
28 U.S.C. 1291.
W e do not address the substance of M s. Riggs claims against CUNA,
however, because she voluntarily dismissed those claims in the district court. By
doing so, M s. Riggs deprived the district court of an opportunity to rule on the
merits, which, in turn, gives this court nothing to review. Further, we will not
permit M s. Riggs to circumvent Rule 54(b) by voluntarily dismissing her claims
with prejudice in order to confer jurisdiction on this court, yet still pursue those
claims on appeal. Therefore, we conclude that M s. Riggs may not maintain her
claims against CUNA on appeal. See Pipeliners Local Union No. 799 v. Ellerd,
503 F.2d 1193, 1199-00 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding parties voluntary dismissal of
their claims constituted a bar to attack on district courts earlier order dismissing
their complaint).
The record does not make clear whether the district court dismissed
M s. Riggs claims against CUNA with or without prejudice. M s. Riggs has stated
unequivocally in her response to the abatement order that the dismissal was w ith
prejudice. Therefore, we conclude that M s. Riggs claims against CUNA were
dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. Cf. Heimann v.
Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1998) (Parties may not confer appellate
jurisdiction upon [the court of appeals] by obtaining a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice of some claims so that others may be appealed.).
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The district court correctly determined that M s. Riggs was not the real
party in interest and therefore could not bring claims against BW CU. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(a) (Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.). Once she filed for bankruptcy, her claims against BW CU became the
property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. 541(a). At that point, the
bankruptcy trustee, not M s. Riggs, was the real party in interest w ith authority to
dispose of the claims against BW CU, which he did. See 11 U.S.C. 323; Barger
v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003); Wieburg v. GTE
Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001). M s. Riggs attempt to reassert
her claims against BW CU in the underlying federal lawsuit w as properly denied.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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