DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P.

BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 194139, 24 January 2012, EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly
assail the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of
said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.

Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the
province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging
fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The
protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit
on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained
of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that
the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being
merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First
Division issued an order denying Cagas motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First
Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the
denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors
committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory
order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said

UST Law Review, Vol. LVII No. 1, November 2012

case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to
determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by
Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright
dismissal of the protest.

UST Law Review, Vol. LVII No. 1, November 2012