The Relevance

of Arson in
Philippine
Jurisprudence

Vilpa P. Villabas LLB 1

Philippine jurisprudence is enriched with cases that provide a discourse

on the crime of arson. With the various laws in our country which specifically
deal into the matter, it is of high relevance that one learns the concept of
arson vis a vis the different case laws. For law speaks one thing and how it is
applied in the actual context is anotherthe cases will provide one with a
distinct opportunity to understand the relevance of arson, hence the goal of
this paper is to review the specific rulings of the Supreme Court on factual
cases on arson and the application of the laws to the resolution of the issues.
Furthermore, the author will look into some points of comparison between
Simple and Destructive Arson. The distinction between the two is very
important considering that this is a source of confusion as to what type or
arson is appropriate in lieu of the circumstances involved in the cases.
Generally, simple arson is punished under P.D. 1613 and the same special
law contains a specific provision on destructive arson. With the enactment of
P.D. No. 1744, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code was revived and it
provides for destructive arson distinct from the provision on destructive
arson in P.D. 1613. Definitely, the laws of arson come from different sources
and the application of which depends on the facts involved in any case. The
courts will look into the facts properly, determine the issues, and rule on the
merits. However, it is the observation of the author that throughout the
years, the focus of the jurisprudence, as applied in relation to the facts of
each case, lies on the difference between the simple and destructive arson,
the latter being punished under the Revised Penal Code. There were
commentaries about simple and destructive arson, but the latter is plainly
understood as an offense punishable in the Revised Penal Code. A
documents review on the matter highlights the fact that the destructive
arson under P.D. 1613 is yet to be determined in an actual caseyet the
importance of this law should never be disregarded as it is a distinct offense
from the destructive arson of the Revised Penal Code. As a critique to the
existing literatures in the field of arson, this paper aims to emphasize that
even if the cases already decided by the Supreme Court ultimately
deliberates on the difference between simple and destructive arson (as
punished under the Revised Penal Code), the destructive arson of P.D. 1613
has to be recognized. Suffice it to say that the absence of any actual case
involving destructive arson of P.D. 1613 does not render the law invalid.
Nevertheless, the paper shall proceed with a review on the crime of arson in
general, followed by the comparison between the simple and destructive
arson, and finally, an evaluation on some of the literatures which deals into
the difference between simple and destructive arson.

I. The Nature of the Crime of Arson

The Supreme Court succinctly ruled in United Merchants Corporation v.

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 676 SCRA 382 that in prosecution
for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire caused by a criminal act; and

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(2) the identity of defendants as the one responsible for the crime1. Pursuant
to the jurisprudence, the crime of arson is committed with the malicious
intent of the person to burn a specific structure. The existing laws on arson,
P.D. 1613 and specific provisions on arson in the Revised Penal Code in
particular, differs on the extent of the crime of arson as viewed from the
various elements constituting the offense, the type of buildings burned, and
the criminal intent of the offender. For instance, under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code , the crime of destructive arson is committed if there was
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other
hand, simple arson is committed if there was malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320 of the Revised
Penal Code and classified as other cases of arson. The types of buildings
include inhabited houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills,
plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments2.

Existing literatures provide that in the crime of arson, first, there must
be actual burning or ignition of some part of the building to constitute the
offense3. However, to render one guilty of arson, the fire need not have been
applied by the accused with his own hand, nor need he have been present; if
he procured, aided or abetted the commission of the crime, it is sufficient 4.
Moreover, Section 7 of P.D. 1613 punishes conspiracy to commit arson with a
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Secondly, the corpus delicti
must be established. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crimeit is
the fact that a crime has actually been committed5. This is to affirm that the
fire is done through malice and intent. Intent can be inferred from the act
itself, because every person is held responsible for the necessary and natural
consequences of his acts, and is held to intend to produce such
consequences6. Morever, our Supreme Court in People vs. Soriano, G.R. No.
142565. July 29, 2003, emphasized that in the prosecution of the person
1 The same ruling was established in the case of People v. Bravo, 681 SCRA 607 [Supreme
Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 633 to 687 SCRA (2012), p.
109]. The identity of the persons liable for the offense matter in lieu of their intent to cause
the damage through their overt acts in the execution of the crime.
2 In addition to the simple arson (Sec. 1, P.D. 1613) and other cases of arson (Sec. 3), Sec. 2 of P.D. 1613 defines
destructive arson with the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. This is a
distinct offense from the destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code.

3 Paul Jr. Sadler, The Crime of Arson, 41 J. Criminal Law & Criminology 290 (1950-1951), p. 293.

4 Curtis, Arthur, The Law on Arson, Buffalo, Dennis & Co., Inc. (1936), p. 17.

5 People v. Gonzales, 560 SCRA 419 [Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes
542 to 575 SCRA (2008), p. 167]

6 Curtis, Arthur, The Law on Arson, Buffalo, Dennis & Co., Inc. (1936), p. 74.

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liable for arson, it is necessary that mitigating circumstances are being

considered for an accused who acts with an impulse of invidious or resentful
feelings, suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his
mental and rational faculties. Furthermore, it is to be considered as well the
ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. De Leon, 580 SCRA 617 that when it
is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is
not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent7. The deliberate
act of setting fire to a structure is tantamount to ones intent and he should
be liable for all the consequences of ones act. This principle at once brings
up the matter of negligence. As a matter of fact, the courts of law, both in
the Philippines and Western countries, have always been extraordinarily
lenient in punishing negligence when it concerns fire. As properly observed
by Sadler, every state in some instances will take a particular and individual
point of view towards the question of negligence, but unless some intent can
be shown, seldom can a case of negligence be brought into a felony court8.
The Supreme Court held in People v. Baluntong, 615 SCRA 455 that in
in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetratedwhether
arson, murder or arson, and homicide/murder, it is necessary to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (1) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (2)
if the main objective is to kill a particular person who maybe in a building or
edifice where fire is resorted to as a means to accomplish such goal, the
crime committed is murder only; lastly (3) if the objective is likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate
and distinct crimes committedhomicide/murder and arson 9.

II. Simple and Destructive Arson: an Application of Law and Jurisprudence

The laws on arson in force today are P.D. No. 1613 and Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 765910. What is punished
under Article 320 is destructive arson while P.D. No. 1613 refers to three
types of arsonsimple, destructive, and other cases of arson. The elements
of destructive arson11 in this special penal law is different from the elements
7 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 576 to 609 SCRA (2009), p. 138.

8 Paul Jr. Sadler, The Crime of Arson, 41 J. Criminal Law & Criminology 290 (1950-1951), p. 295.

9 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 610 to 638 SCRA (2010), p. 155.

10 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Manila, Philippines: Rex Book Store, 18th Edition (2012), p. 873.

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constituting destructive arson of the Revised Penal Code12. The simple arson
as defined by law is punished with a penalty of prision mayor when a person
burns or sets fire to the property of another and the same penalty shall be
imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances
which expose to danger the life or property of another13. Section 3 of P.D.
1613 specifically defines other cases of arson14 which depends on the type of
property that is burned.

11 Destructive Arson under Section 2 of P.D. No. 1613 - The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period
to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:1. Any ammunition factory
and other establishment where explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are stored.
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social services.
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble.
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or property
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official
proceedings.
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private market,
theater or movie house or any similar place or building.
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.

12 Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as
but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether
the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and
regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public
use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of
public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of
law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

13 Section 1 of P.D. No. 1613

14 Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 1. Any building
used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

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In People v. Soriano15, Supreme Court emphasized the difference

between destructive arson (under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code) and
simple arson punished under P.D. No. 1613. In this case, a simple lovers
quarrel led to a tragic event. In the course of the quarrel, accused Nestor
Soriano remarked that it would be better if he burn the house, then took a
match, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as
divider of Honeys room (accused Sorianos lover). As a result, the house
occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five (5) neighboring
houses. The trial court convicted accused Soriano of destructive
arson penalized under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua (also in lieu of the presence of the special aggravating
circumstance punished under Section 4, par. 3 of P.D. 1613). The trial court
reasoned out that since the burning affects one or more buildings or edifices,
consequent to one single act of burning, accused is liable for the crime
charged. The Supreme Court disagreed where it held that the applicable law
should be Sec. 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613. In particular, the crime
committed was for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accusedappellant Soriano are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under P.D. No. 1613. The
Supreme Court relied on the descriptions alleged in the second Amended
Information16 where the properties burned are houses rather than buildings
or edifices. The dispositive portion held that accused Soriano was convicted
for simple arson but considering the facts of the case and the discussion of
the issues by the Supreme Court, the specific offense belongs to other cases
of arson. In convicting the accused, Supreme Court defined two elements of
simple arson (which fall under Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613: other cases of
arson)(a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned
is an inhabited house or dwelling and these elements were present in the
case at bar. In determining the penalty for the accused, the Supreme Court
considered the existence of a mitigating circumstance similar and analogous
to passion and obfuscation and that the special aggravating circumstance
that accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner
or occupant of the property burned cannot be appreciated in this case where
it appears that accused Soriano was acting more on impulse, heat of anger
or risen temper. The resentment accused-appellant felt came from the
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
5. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
6. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
7. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

15 People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565. July 29, 2003, Supreme Court, 2nd Division, Ponente: J. Bellosillo.
16 Hence, the particular crime with its specific descriptions should be properly alleged in the
information.
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realization that he may never see his son again once he left Davao; that his
utter frustration in trying to convince Honey Rosario Cimagala to return to
Manila with their son brought with it a reduction of his rational faculties
within that moment in time. Hence, the Supreme Court reduced the
imposable penalty.

In the case of Buebos v. People17, the Court is tasked to determine

whether petitioners are liable for simple arson (Section 1 of P.D. No. 1613) or
arson of an inhabited house (Section 3, par. 2 of P.D. No. 1613). This case
clarified the ruling in People v. Soriano where the Court specifically ruled that
there exists a difference between simple arson and other cases of arson (i.e.
arson of an inhabited house). The information alleged that the accused
conspired and set on fire the nipa roof of the house of Adelina b. Borbe, to
the latters damage and prejudice. The Regional Trial Court convicted the
accused Dante and Sarmelito Buebos (herein petitioners) of arson (as it was
found out that they are liable for the arson of an inhabited house). The Court
of Appeals rendered a different ruling since the accused could only be
convicted of simple arson (penalty is prision mayor) and not for burning of an
inhabited house (punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua). According to the appellate court, the
information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. The
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court. Based on
circumstantial evidence, it was found out that the accused-petitioners
conspired to commit the crime of arson. Their defense of alibi and failure to
present clear and convincing evidence indicated an unequivocal proof of
their guilt. More importantly, the Supreme Court held that the information
failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or
dwelling. That is fatal because Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandates that the information or complaint must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged
in the information. Since the information failed to allege that what was set on
fire was an inhabited house, the accused were liable only for arson in its
simple form. In determining the imposable penalty, the Court considered that
there was no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which attended the
commission of the offense, thus the penalty was imposed in its medium
period.

The ruling in Buebos v. People was instructive of a recent case of

People v. Macabando18, where the Supreme Court held that:

17 Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938. March 28, 2008, Supreme Court, 3rd Division, Ponente: J. Reyes, R.T.

18 People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013, Supreme Court, 2nd Division, Ponente: J. Brion.

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The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple

Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes19 "for being grievous, odious
and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society." On the other hand, acts committed under P.D. No.
1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes
with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications than Destructive
Arson.
In this case, accused-appellant Macabando broke bottles on the road while
holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even. Afterwards, he
uttered that he would burn his house. That same night, a fire broke out in
Macabandos house. Those living nearby tried to call for help and stop the
fire but was prevented by the Macabando who stood outside his house and
fired several gun shots in the air. He also threatened to kill anyone who
would try to put out the fire. In the process, other residential homes were
also destroyed. On arraignment, the accused plead not guilty and used alibi
as a defense. The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of destructive arson and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. On the other hand, the Supreme Court modified the
crime from destructive arson to simple arson, punishable under Sec. 3 (2),
P.D. 1613. The Court pointed out that no one saw that the appellant set fire
to his house. Thus, resort to circumstantial evidence is permitted since there
was no direct evidence to prove the appellants culpability to the crime
charged. Anent the issue on the crime committed, the Court reiterated the
elements of simple arson (in this case, the specific crime committed falls
under other cases of arson) as present in the case. Furthermore, the Court
considered the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that
damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was
used as a residence. With these circumstances, the Supreme Court ruled that
the appellants act which affected many families will not convert the crime to
destructive arson, since the appellants act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to
those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. Thus, the crime was
modified to simple arson20.

III. An Evaluation of the Status Quo

19 Pursuant to R.A. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of death penalty, the mandatory penalty of
death for Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is now downgraded to reclusion
perpetua with no eligibility for parole (Reyes, 2012).
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As much as the author wanted to expand ones research, yet a review of

these documents point out that there was yet no jurisprudence which
specifically deal into the destructive arson under the Revised Penal Code in
relation to destructive arson under P.D. 1613. The case laws among others,
highlight the difference between simple arson of P.D. No. 1613 (in relation to
other cases of arson) and destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code. Considering this limitation, it is still highly important that we
recognize the law on destructive arson under P.D. 1613 as a crime distinct
from that of Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. It is of the observation of
the author that existing literatures, commentaries, and even short discourses
in social media relating to arson reflect of only two instancessimple arson
of P.D. No. 1613 and destructive arson under the Revised Penal Code. It
seems that the destructive arson under P.D. 1613 is disregarded. This should
not be the case considering that the special penal law still stands as an
existing law on arson. The laws on arson are specific to the extent that each
offense consist of various elements distinct from the other types of arson as
established by other laws. As of the moment, there was no amendment
concerning destructive arson under P.D. 1613 and thus, it coexist with Article
320 of the Revised Penal Codedefining a separate and distinct crime of
destructive arson. Hence, the absence of any actual case involving
destructive arson of P.D. 1613 does not render the law invalid. If faced by
circumstances involving the elements of destructive arson under P.D. 1613,
then the law should be applied.

Index of Authorities:
Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 542
to 575, SCRA (2008), p. 167
Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 576
to 609 SCRA (2009), p. 138
Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 610
to 638 SCRA (2010), p. 155
Supreme Court Reports Annotated, Quick Index-Digest (Part 1), Volumes 633
to 687 SCRA (2012), p. 109
Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Manila, Philippines: Rex Book Store,
18th Edition (2012)
Paul Jr. Sadler, The Crime of Arson, Article 4: Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology, Volume 41 (1950-1951)
Curtis, Arthur, The Law on Arson, Buffalo, Dennis & Co., Inc. (1936)
20 The imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. In this case, Supreme Court held that applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
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Jurisprudence:
United Merchants Corporation v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 676
SCRA 382
People v. Bravo, 681 SCRA 607
People v. De Leon, 580 SCRA 617
People v. Gonzales, 560 SCRA 419
People v. Baluntong, 615 SCRA 455
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565. July 29, 2003, Supreme Court, 2nd
Division
Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938. March 28, 2008, Supreme Court, 3rd
Division
People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013, Supreme Court, 2nd
Division

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