Case Study of Toyota: Strategy Evaluation and

Selection
According to Toyotas own president, Akio Toyoda, the companys
traditional priorities safety first, quality second, and volume third became
confused. We [Toyota] pursued growth over the speed at which we were
able to develop our people and our organization, which resulted in the
safety issues. Internal documents from Toyota seem to back up the
presidents statement. In a document from Toyotas Washington office, the
companys stated goals were to Promote Toyotas Agenda, Protect
[Toyotas] interests, and Maintain receptive environment to grow [Toyotas]
business.
Later in the same document, Toyotas Safety Group called the
negotiated recall of the Camry/ES a Win for Toyota because it saved the
company more than $100 million. This shift in Toyotas priorities away from
quality to quantity reveals a problem with its internal decision-making
process. The decline in quality of Toyota vehicles resulted in safety issues
that affected North American consumers.
In the year 2000, Toyota recalled 8,379 vehicles, which accounted for
just 0.034% of all cars recalled that year. In 2010, a decade later, 4,872,583
Toyota vehicles were recalled more than any other auto manufacturer that
year. This made Toyota responsible for 29.7% of all vehicles recalled in 2010.
In 2006, the disconnect between the North American and Japanese
branches of the company was highlighted by Jim Press, then the president of
Toyota Motors North America, in a slideshow. In the presentation, he gave
evidence of the brands slipping reputation in the form of customer loyalty
graphs and excerpts from such media outlets such as the Detroit News and
the Associated Press.
The authority that the Japanese office had over the American office
and the lack of communication between the two was also mirrored in
Toyotas dealing with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA). LaHood and the NHTSA met several times with as he described
them very good professional, capable people at Toyota Motors North
America. He believed, though, that the company responded in a timely and
effective way only after his visit to Japan to talk to Toyota Motor Corporation
President Akio Toyoda.
Toyotas slow reaction may have stemmed from cultural differences
between Japan and the US. In Japan, the decision-making process is typically

longer than in the United States, because Japanese companies like to reach a
consensus for action. In Japan, taking the time to reach a consensus before
action shows humbleness and modesty. In America and the West more
generally, on the other hand, this lack of time sensitivity may be interpreted
as a sign of apathy and indecisiveness. In Japan, companies also have the
luxury of operating in a society in which consumer activism is undeveloped
and lawsuits uncommon. They are therefore sometimes unprepared for and
unfamiliar with having to respond quickly to public pressure.
Toyota was afraid of experiencing the same outrage from its customers
that it had experienced from the government. Its good reputation had been
garnered from excellent customer service and top-of-the-line workmanship
resulting in unrivalled reliability. So, in an attempt to protect itself and avoid
damaging its pristine reputation, Toyota needed to determine whether it
should admit fault to customers or try to solve the problem and keep them in
the dark. Toyotas external communication with its customers was
questionable regarding the sudden accelerations in vehicles. It issued a
statement saying that, Toyota does not believe that uncontrollable
acceleration can occur without the driver applying the accelerator pedal. In
further attempts to discourage any belief that Toyota was at fault, the
company issued another statement regarding the allegations that the floor
mat was the culprit, saying, No defect exists in vehicles in which the drivers
floor mat is compatible with the vehicle and properly secured.
Finally, Toyota relented and took a minimal amount of responsibility for
the problem. First, it addressed customers in a letter, explaining that the
NHTSA conducted a very thorough inspection and it only could conclude that
the acceleration problems were attributable to improper installation of floor
mats. This statement faced resistance very quickly when numerous Toyota
owners stepped forward complaining that they too experienced sudden
unintended acceleration, even after they took the floor mats out of their
vehicles.