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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in
his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National
Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his
capacity as Minister of Public Highways, Respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229
of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full:
"[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled,
stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without
any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching
motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs
and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of
the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1.
That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all
times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning
device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red
and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the
sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for
respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations
and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they
"specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17they specifically deny the allegations in
paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of
Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended
by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land
transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions
on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the
issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from
meritorious and must be dismissed.
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4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on
such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his
Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of
instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by
petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too
vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because
allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of
petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable
data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It
admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is
that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean
the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled
vehicles?" 30It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter
of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the
Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the
due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that
exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well
known penchant for exaggeration.
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8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power is equally without any support wellsettled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint
himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he
would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt
from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the
matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel
A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained
as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to
adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a
decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into
force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments.' He continued:
'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder
that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed." 34
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10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference
to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of
Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical
why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case
is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was
referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig
not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted
upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a
talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a
lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The
law is anything but that.
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Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition
and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978
against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical
and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled
vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum
lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of
stalled vehicles on the highways; and
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Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition
and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978
against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor
vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device,
without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally
required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching consequence
such as the case at bar.
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out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of
any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
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