Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve
the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and
DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Case also under Articles 788 and 792
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari
from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao dated February 28,
1974, declaring illegal and void the will of
his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting
the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding and ordering the issuance of
the corresponding notice to creditors
(Special
Case
No.
1808).
The
antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in
Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She
was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina
B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court
a petition dated February 27, 1973 for
the probate of his mother's notarial will
dated September 5, 1970 which is
written in English. In that will Leodegaria
Julian declared (a) that she was the
owner of the "southern half of nine
conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the
absolute owner of two parcels of land
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio
and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
The pertinent provisions of the will
are as follows:
"II.
That I am the absolute owner of the
southern half of the following conjugal
properties which I acquired during my
married life with my husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., namely: (Here follows an
enumeration of nine lots).1wph1.t
"III. I am the absolute owner of the
following paraphernal properties which I
inherited from my deceased father,
Cecilio Julian, namely: (Here follows a
description of two lots).
ARTICLE 783
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
xxx
FOURTH
and
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3362
March 1, 1951
JUGO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila
admitted to probate the alleged will and
testament of the deceased Carlos Gil.
The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano
appealed to this Court, raising only
question of law. Her counsel assigns the
two following alleged errors:
CARLOS GIL
Testificacion:
The
above
attestation
clause
is
substantially perfect. The only clerical
error is that it says "testador" instead of
"testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina
del testador." The word "tambien"
renders unnecessary the use of the verb
"firmamos."
presencia
asimismo
testigos,
testadora
nosotros.
TUASON, J.:
This appeal is before us on a motion for
reconsideration of this court's decision.
Whereas formerly six justices voted for
reversal and five for affirmance of the
probate court's order admitting the will to
probate, the vote upon reconsideration
was six for affirmance and five for
reversal, thereby making the dissenting
opinion, which had been filed, the
prevailing rule of the case. Under the
circumstances, this resolution will largely
be confined to a restatement of that
dissenting opinion.
The will in question was presented for
probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila in 1943 with Roberto Toledo y Gil,
decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil Vda. de
Murciano, decedent's sister opposing the
application. Toledo's legal right to
intervene was questioned by the
proponent of the will, and the objection
was sustained in an order which was
affirmed by this court in G. R. No. L-254.
As a result of the latter decision, Toledo
and
BENGZON,
JJ.,
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ROWENA
FAUSTINO-CORONA,
respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for
private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit
decided by this Court 1 involving the
probate of the two wills of the late
Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U. S.A., on November 10,
1980,
naming
private
respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our
said decision, we upheld the appointment
of
Nenita
Alonte
as
co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with
her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug
filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of
stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he
claimed were personal funds. As found by
the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged
advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent
for the
payment of estate tax,
P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax,
and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3
According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the
sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99
from savings account No. 35342-038 of
the Bank of America, Makati, Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona
opposed the motion to sell on the ground
that the same funds withdrawn from
savings account No. 35342-038 were
conjugal partnership properties and part
xxx
xxx
xxx
...
Such
conclusion
is
evidently
predicated on the assumption that
Stephenson was the exclusive owner of
the funds-deposited in the bank, which
assumption was in turn based on the
facts (1) that the account was originally
opened in the name of Stephenson alone
and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as
housemaid of the deceased." But it not
infrequently happens that a person
deposits money in the bank in the name
of another; and in the instant case it also
appears that Ana Rivera served her
master for about nineteen years without
actually receiving her salary from him.
The fact that subsequently Stephenson
transferred the account to the name of
himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed
with
the
latter
the
survivorship
agreement in question although there
was no relation of kinship between them
but only that of master and servant,
nullifies the assumption that Stephenson
was the exclusive owner of the bank
account. In the absence, then, of clear
proof to the contrary, we must give full
faith and credit to the certificate of
deposit which recites in effect that the
funds in question belonged to Edgar
Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they
were joint (and several) owners thereof;
and that either of them could withdraw
any part or the whole of said account
during the lifetime of both, and the
balance, if any, upon the death of either,
belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Paras,
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
27, 2006
November
On
September
21,
1988,
private
respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and
praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as
special administrator and guardian ad
litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and
Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed
the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
(signed)
Tantunin ng sinuman
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND
TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT
IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
Lastly,
the
continuation
of
the
proceedings in the intestate case will
work injustice to petitioners, and will
render nugatory the disinheritance of
Alfredo.
SO ORDERED.
November 27,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Contrary to law.2
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
complainant
necessary.
that
it
was
no
longer
or
abuse
of
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to
the prejudice of another, money, goods
or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property;
xxxx
On the other hand, the CA found
petitioner guilty of Estafa as defined
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
As correctly enumerated by the CA, the
elements of Estafa by means of deceit as
defined under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2)
that such false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; (3) that the
offended party must have relied on the
false
pretense,
fraudulent
act
or
fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(d) that as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.11 The CA ruled
that the deceit employed by petitioner
consisted in his act of pretending "that
he had the authority and capability to
cover the payment of the realty taxes for
he is influential in Las Pias and has
connections with the Assessors &
Treasurers Offices being an alleged
nephew of then incumbent Mayor
Casimiro of Las Pias City."
However, a reading of the Information
filed against petitioner shows that while
it contains conclusions that petitioner
committed
fraud
against
private
complainant, there are no allegations
indicating specific acts which constitute
fraud as contemplated under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, more
particularly petitioners alleged act of
falsely pretending that he had the
needed connections to settle the realty
taxes due on the subject property.
Prior to its most recent amendment,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
which was in effect at the time the
Information against petitioner was filed,
states:
Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting
A None sir.
A No sir. In fact I was the one who asked
for such amount because I told him that I
would be needing the money for more
security guards as well as expenses for
fencing and for the processing of the title
of the property.
xxxx
A Yes sir.
Q How many security guards did you
hire?
A Ten (10).
ARTICLE 784
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1439
and
Quintos
for
ARTICLE 788
EN BANC
1.
Estela
Dizon ....................................... P
98,474.80
2.
Angelina
Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3.
Bernardita
Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ......................................
52,056.39
5.
Tomas
Dizon .......................................
131,987.41
6.
Lilia
Dizon ..............................................
72,182.47
7.
Marina
Dizon .....................................
1,148,063.71
8.
Pablo Rivera,
Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9.
Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon .................
72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition
dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1)
with the figure of P129,254.96 as
legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrixappellee) and Tomas (appellant) are
admittedly considered to have received
in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants,
namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;
(2)
thus, to each of the latter are
adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or
properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the
other hand, Marina and Tomas are
adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the
4.
Josefina
Dizon
..........................................
26,159.38
5.
Tomas
V.
Dizon
.........................................
65,874.04
6.
Lilia
Dizon
..................................................
36,273.13
7.
Marina
Dizon
...........................................
576,938.82
8.
Pablo
Rivera,
Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9.
Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et
al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ...................................................
P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate
(P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrixappellee and oppositors-appellants, to be
divided among them in seven equal parts
of P129,362.11 as their respective
legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained
and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and
907 of the New Civil Code specifically
provide that when the legitime is
impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is true
that this process has been followed and
adhered to in the two projects of
partition, it is observed that the executrix
and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions
shall be taken in order to fully restore the
impaired legitime. The proposition of the
oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which
is in controversion of Article 791 of the
New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix
has chosen to favor certain heirs in her
will for reasons of her own, cannot be
doubted. This is legally permissible within
the limitation of the law, as aforecited."
With reference to the payment in cash of
2.
This right of a testator to partition
his estate by will was recognized even in
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which
has been reproduced now as Article 1080
of the present Civil Code. The only
amendment in the provision was that
Article 1080 "now permits any person
(not a testator, as under the old law) to
partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11
This was intended to repeal the then
prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator
to partition his estate by an act inter
vivos, he must first make a will with all
the
formalities
provided
by
law.
Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment 13 but the
question does not here concern us, for
this is a clear case of partition by will,
duly admitted to probate, which perforce
must be given full validity and effect.
Aside from the provisions of Articles 906
and 907 above quoted, other codal
provisions
support
the
executrixappellee's
project
of
partition
as
approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed
by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would
reduce
the
testamentary
disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same,
which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the
estate as the disposable free portion, and
apply the other half of the estate to
payment of the legitimes of the seven
compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal
would
amount
substantially
to
a
distribution by intestacy and pro tanto
nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would
further run counter to the provisions of
Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A)
partition legally made confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3.
In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court
upheld the distribution made in the will
of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of
two large coconut plantations in favor of
his daughter, Concepcion, as against
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15737
1962
February 28,
LEONOR
VILLAFLOR
VDA.
DE
VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate
of
FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,
defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for
defendant-appellee.
(also under Article 791)
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on
points of law is the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case
No.
Q-2809,
dismissing
plaintiffappellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally
owned by the plaintiff's granduncle,
Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to
his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno,
bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas
nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On
October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,
executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor
of
his
wife,
Dona
Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
of
the
foregoing
ARTICLE 789
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or
enforceability of a devise of ricelands
located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a
total area of around forty- four hectares
That devise was made in the will of the
late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of
Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest
male relative who would study for the
priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed
to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that
the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs.
Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No.
24319-R, August 1, 1963).
Tax Dec.
Ass. Value
T-6530
3663
1.6249
18740
P 340.00
T-6548
3445-C
24.2998
18730
7,290.00
T-6525
3670
6.2665
18736
1,880.00
T-6521
3666
11.9251
18733
3,580.00
Total
amount and
P13,090.00
value
44.1163
2.
That the devisee could not sell the
ricelands.
3.
That the devisee at the inception of
his studies in sacred theology could enjoy
and administer the ricelands, and once
ordained as a priest, he could continue
enjoying and administering the same up
to the time of his death but the devisee
would cease to enjoy and administer the
ricelands if he discontinued his studies
for the priesthood.
4.
That if the devisee became a
priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers
for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor
and his parents.
5.
That
if
the
devisee
is
excommunicated, he would be divested
of the legacy and the administration of
the riceland would pass to the incumbent
parish priest of Victoria and his
successors.
6.
That during the interval of time
that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration
of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish
priest of Victoria and his successors, and
7.
That the parish priest-administrator
of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining
or getting from the annual produce five
percent thereof for his administration and
the fees corresponding to the twenty
masses with prayers that the parish
priest would celebrate for each year,
depositing the balance of the income of
the devise in the bank in the name of his
bequest.
From
the
foregoing
testamentary
provisions, it may be deduced that the
testator intended to devise the ricelands
to his nearest male relative who would
become a priest, who was forbidden to
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
MARIA
MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in
Bacolod
City,
and
ordered
the
defendants-appellees (including herein
petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to
the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of
the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then
Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the following
provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following
property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva,
Pasay City:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725
ARTICLE 791
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10763
AL.,
Marcial
G.
Mendiola
for
plaintiffappellant.
Onofre P. Guevara for defendantsappellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao
against Angelina Gonzales and Maria
Pablo praying that the latter be ordered
to appoint and employ him as tenant
during his lifetime on the parcels of land
bequeathed to and inherited by them
from Maria Gonzales, as well as to deliver
to him the value of the harvests
belonging to him as tenant of said
parcels of land. In their answer,
defendants averred that the provisions of
the will relied upon by plaintiff is not
mandatory; that the determination of
who should be the tenant of the land is
vested in a special court; and that the
present action is not the proper remedy.
After trial, the court dismissed the
complaint for lack of sufficient cause of
action. It held that the provisions of the
will relied upon by plaintiff merely
amount to a suggestion to the
defendants who, though morally bound,
are not legally compelled to follow said
suggestion, invoking as authority Article
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE 795
In Re Will of RIOSA*
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5064
1953
February 27,
BIENVENIDO
A.
IBARLE,
plaintiffappellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of
sale conveying to the defendant, in
consideration of P1,700, one undivided
half of a parcel of land which previously
had been sold, along with the other half,
by the same vendor to the plaintiff's
grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision
upon an agreed statement of facts, the
pertinent parts of which are thus
summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and
Catalina Navarro were husband and wife,
the former having died on June 6, 1946
leaving heir the surviving spouse and
some minor children;
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J.
Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of
title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Cebu;
3rd. That the above mentioned
property was a conjugal property;
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147145
the
the
not
the
will
Sometime
in
1993,
during
the
proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S.
Layumas discovered that in an Order
dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding
Judge Edgardo Catilo had already
submitted the case for decision. Thus,
the
RTC-Kabankalan
rendered
a
Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as
follows:
Hence,
the
present
Caponong-Noble.
by
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the
last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires
acknowledgment
before
a
notary
public;13
ARTICLE 16?
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595
1927
November 1,
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question
in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate
filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved
it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant
assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of
partition; (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana
of the deceased's business and the deed
of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of
the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
So ordered.
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a
question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor
in
Civil
Case
No.
37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a
citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.
N BANC
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
and Dorothy E.
shares.1wph1.t
Bellis,
in
equal
Their
respective
motions
for
reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this
Court to raise the issue of which law
must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit
the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749,
January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system
(law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par.
2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is
not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted
the
phrase,
"notwithstanding
the
provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph
of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16
in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and
intestate
succession.
As
further
indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the
decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing
a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law, for as this Court ruled in
Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in
Footnotes
1He later filed a motion praying that as a
legal heir he be included in this case as
one of the oppositors-appellants; to file
or adopt the opposition of his sisters to
the project of partition; to submit his
brief after paying his proportionate share
in the expenses incurred in the printing
of the record on appeal; or to allow him
to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters
but this Court resolved to deny the
motion.
2San Antonio,
residence.
Texas
was
his
legal
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749
1963
January 31,
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
FACTORS,
ELEMENTS
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
AND
THE
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE
THAT
UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC
VALIDITY
OF
THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED
BY
THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by
the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the
will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen
was born on November 29, 1875 in New
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board
the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Gonzales
for
private
2)
He ruled that petitioner can waive,
renounce or repudiate (not made in a
public or authenticated instrument), or
by way of a petition presented to the
court but by way of a motion presented
prior to an order for the distribution of
the estate-the law especially providing
that repudiation of an inheritance must
be presented, within 30 days after it has
issued an order for the distribution of the
estate in accordance with the rules of
Court.
3)
He ruled that the right of a forced
heir to his legitime can be divested by a
decree admitting a will to probate in
which no provision is made for the forced
heir in complete disregard of Law of
Succession
4)
He denied petitioner's petition for
Relief on the ground that no evidence
was adduced to support the Petition for
Relief when no Notice nor hearing was
set to afford petitioner to prove the merit
of his petition a denial of the due
process and a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5)
He acquired no jurisdiction over the
testate case, the fact that the Testator at
the time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently Cavite
Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs.
Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the
petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's
opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's
contention that the motion to withdraw
was secured through fraudulent means
and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-27860
March 29, 1974
and
L-27896
PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL
AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA
A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March
1974
29,
LORENZO
CARLES,
JOSE
PABLICO,
ALFREDO
CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR
GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO
IYULORES,
ESPERIDION
PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA,
ADELFA
PREMAYLON,
SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the
last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No.
1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San
Agustin for Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office
and Rizal R. Quimpo for private
respondents and appellees Avelina A.
Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari
and
prohibition
with
preliminary injunction; certiorari to
"declare all acts of the respondent court
in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to
the order of December 14, 1957 as null
and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the
respondent
court
from
allowing,
tolerating,
sanctioning,
or
abetting
private respondent Avelina A. Magno to
perform or do any acts of administration,
such as those enumerated in the
petition, and from exercising any
authority
or
power
as
Regular
Administratrix of above-named Testate
Estate, by entertaining manifestations,
motion and pleadings filed by her and
acting on them, and also to enjoin said
court
from
allowing
said
private
respondent to interfere, meddle or take
part in any manner in the administration
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
FOURTH:
At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
So ordered.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
6.
That in the meantime, it is
imperative and indispensable that, an
Administratrix be appointed for the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a
Special Administratrix for the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the
duties required by law, to administer,
collect, and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
both spouses, Charles Newton Hodges
and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for
in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
7.
That there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration,
because the last will and testament of
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still
kept in his safe or vault, and in the
meantime, unless an administratrix
(and,) at the same time, a Special
Administratrix is appointed, the estate of
both spouses are in danger of being lost,
damaged or go to waste.
8.
That the most trusted employee of
both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and
C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for
around thirty (30) years, in the person of
Miss
Avelina
Magno,
(should)
be
appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time
Special Administratrix of the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges. That the said
Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a
resident of the Philippines, the most fit,
competent,
trustworthy
and
wellqualified person to serve the duties of
Administratrix and Special Administratrix
and is willing to act as such.
9.
That Miss Avelina Magno is also
willing to file bond in such sum which the
Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately
appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles
"4.
That the approval of the aforesaid
documents will not reduce the assets of
the estates so as to prevent any creditor
from receiving his full debt or diminish
his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed
very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court, this honorable court
approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and
cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in
Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete
perspective or orientation on the part of
the respondent court and its hesitancy to
clear up matters promptly, in its other
appealed order of November 23, 1965,
on pages 334-335 of the Green Record
on Appeal, said respondent court allowed
the movant Ricardo Salas, President of
9.
Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137138, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2,
1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954,
before the death of his wife, which
contract
petitioner
claims
it
had
cancelled on February 16, 1966 for
failure of appellee Catedral to pay the
installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138139, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7,
1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950,
after the death of his wife, which contract
petitioner claims it had cancelled on June
29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to
pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp.
303-304, id., insofar as it approved the
deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Pepito
Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges
on February 5, 1951, before the death of
his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp.
335-336, id., approving three deeds of
sale executed by respondent Magno, one
in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis
and two in favor of appellee Adelfa
Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and
November
3,
1966,
respectively,
pursuant to separate "promises to sell"
signed respectively by Hodges on May
26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before
the death of his wife, and October 31,
1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances
when respondent court approved deeds
of sale executed by petitioner alone and
without the concurrence of respondent
Magno, and such approvals have not
been the subject of any appeal. No less
Linnie
Jane
(2)
On June 28, 1957 this Honorable
Court admitted to probate the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges executed November 22,
1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as
Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3)
On July 1, 1957 this Honorable
Court issued Letters Testamentary to C.
N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4)
On December 14, 1957 this
Honorable Court, on the basis of the
following allegations in a Motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P.
Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N.
Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges."
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada,
counsel for the Executory, for the
reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957 which the court
considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of
all properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said executor is further authorized to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament
of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
(5)
On April 21, 1959 this Honorable
Court approved the inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on
April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among
other things
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given
notice, as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the
Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.).
(6)
On July 30, 1960 this Honorable
Court approved the "Annual Statement of
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on
July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among
other things:
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given
notice as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last
will and testament of the deceased,
already probated by this Honorable
Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
(7)
On May 2, 1961 this Honorable
court approved the "Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor for the Year
1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada
on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the
Philippines be given notice, of the time
and place of examining the herein
account, as herein Executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last
25,
1962,
C.N.
(9)
On December 25, 1962, on the
Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada
filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307,
this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A.
Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane
Hodges
and
as
Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or
iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost,
damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of
Administration were issued to Avelina
Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's
aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of
all the property of said deceased in any
province or provinces in which it may be
situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of said
property, said Administratrix and/or
Special Administratrix having filed a bond
satisfactory to the Court."
(a)
Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b)
Avelina A. Magno as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges; and
(c)
Joe
Hodges
as
Co-Special
Administrator of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On
February
20,
1963
this
Honorable Court on the basis of a motion
filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel
on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A.
Magno acting as Administratrix of the
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp.
114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the
following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A.
Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta
definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por
contratos para vender, firmados, en vida,
por el finado Charles Newton Hodges,
cada vez que el precio estipulado en
cada contrato este totalmente pagado.
Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a
firmar escrituras de cancelacion de
hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como
personales cada vez que la consideracion
de cada hipoteca este totalmente
pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se
otorguen debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
1.
On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges
acting as the co-administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the
undersigned
attorneys,
an
"Urgent
Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To
Administrator of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The
Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of
The Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P.
No. 1672).
2.
On January 24, 1964 this Honorable
Court, on the basis of an amicable
agreement entered into on January 23,
1964 by the two co-administrators of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of
the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute
over who should act as administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing
the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P.
No. 1672) and issuing letters of
administration to the PCIB.
3.
On January 24, 1964 virtually all of
the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two coadministrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and
Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon
family who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel
representing the aforenamed parties
entered into an amicable agreement,
which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed
that certain sums of money were to be
paid in settlement of different claims
against the two estates and that the
assets (to the extent they existed)of both
estates would be administrated jointly by
the PCIB as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
do so by this Honorable
September 7, 1964.
Court
on
(b)
Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as
though she alone may decide how the
assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges
should be administered, who the PCIB
shall employ and how much they may be
paid as evidenced in party by her refusal
to sign checks issued by the PCIB
payable to the undersigned counsel
pursuant
to
their
fee
agreement
approved by this Honorable Court in its
order dated March 31, 1964.
(c)
Avelina A. Magno illegally gives
access to and turns over possession of
the records and assets of the estate of
C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the
Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as
evidenced in part by the cashing of his
personal checks.
(d)
Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses
to execute checks prepared by the PCIB
drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C.
N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the
check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's
advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964
income taxes reported due and payable
by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7.
Under and pursuant to the orders
of this Honorable Court, particularly
those of January 24 and February 1,
1964, and the mandate contained in its
Letters of Administration issued on
January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of all
the property of the deceased C. N.
Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary
for the preservation of said property." (p.
914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8.
As administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to
the immediate exclusive possession and
control of all of the properties, accounts
(c)
On January 22, 1963, with the
conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K.
Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges
(pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who
thereupon was appointed on January 22,
1963 by this Honorable Court as special
co-administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1672) along with Miss Magno who at that
time was still acting as special coadministratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
(d)
On February 22, 1963, without
objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court appointed
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as
co-administrators of the estate of C.N.
Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to
the orders of this Honorable Court of
December 25, 1962, took possession of
all Philippine Assets now claimed by the
two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could
take possession of the assets registered
in the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in
her capacity as Special Administratrix of
the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the
appointment by this Honorable Court on
February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and
Fernando
P.
Mirasol
as
the
coadministrators of the estate of C.N.
Hodges, they legally were entitled to take
over from Miss Magno the full and
exclusive possession of all of the assets
of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the
appointment on January 24, 1964 of the
PCIB as the sole administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
PCIB legally became the only party
entitled to the sole and exclusive
possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted
their accounting and this Honorable
Court approved same, to wit:
(a)
The accounting of Harold K. Davies
dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI
Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its
face the:
(i)
Conformity of Avelina A. Magno
acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie
Jane
Hodges
and
Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges";
(ii)
Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas
lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N.
Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a
Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family
who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P.
No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by
this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963
(p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b)
The accounting of Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23,
1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 9901000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp.
1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by
this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c)
The PCIB and its undersigned
lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A.
Magno of her acts as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or
special administratrix of the estate of
C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting
of Harold K. Davies as special coadministrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which
Miss Magno manifested her conformity
(supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January
24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed
to receive P10,000.00
(1)
Set the Motion of October 5, 1963
for hearing at the earliest possible date
with notice to all interested parties;
16. The
Philippine
estate
and
inheritance taxes assessed the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and
paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the
sole beneficiary of the assets of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her
legal counsel at no time have questioned
the validity of the aforesaid assessment
and the payment of the corresponding
Philippine death taxes.
(3)
Order Avelina A. Magno to turn
over and deliver to the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges all of the funds, properties and
assets of any character remaining in her
possession;
(2)
Order Avelina A. Magno to submit
an
inventory
and
accounting
as
Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character
belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have
come into her possession, with full
details of what she has done with them;
(4)
Pending this Honorable Court's
adjudication of the aforesaid issues,
order Avelina A. Magno and her
representatives to stop interferring with
the administration of the estate of C. N.
Hodges by the PCIB and its duly
authorized representatives;
(5)
Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from
working in the premises at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee
of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
approve her dismissal as such by the
PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6)
Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys
Manglapus and Quimpo and others
allegedly representing Miss Magno from
entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City or any other properties
of C. N. Hodges without the express
permission of the PCIB;
(7)
Order such other relief as this
Honorable Court finds just and equitable
in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
THIRD:
I desire, direct and provide
that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during
his lifetime, and he is hereby given the
right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate by sale
of any part thereof which he think best,
and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best;
to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in
fee simple or for any other term or time,
any property which he may deem proper
to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases
shall pass the absolute fee simple title to
the interest so conveyed in such property
as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate
shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need
or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose
of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the
City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have
the full right to lease, manage and enjoy
the same during his lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farmland and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH:
At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate both
real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4.
On November 14, 1953, C. N.
Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his
Last Will and Testament, a copy of which
the
substitute
heirs.
(Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple
substitution. However, in order that a
vulgar or simple substitution can be
valid, three alternative conditions must
be present, namely, that the first
designated heir (1) should die before the
testator; or (2) should not wish to accept
the inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and,
therefore, the substitution provided for
by the above-quoted provision of the Will
is not authorized by the Code, and,
therefore,
it
is
void.
Manresa,
commenting
on
these
kisses
of
substitution, meaningfully stated that: "...
cuando el testador instituyeun primer
heredero, y por fallecimiento de este
nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse
que estas segundas designaciones solo
han de llegar a tener efectividad en el
caso de que el primer instituido muera
antes que el testador, fuera o no esta su
verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a
ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when
another heir is designated to inherit upon
the death of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in case
the first instituted heir dies before the
testator, whether or not that was the true
intention of said testator. Since C. N.
Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane
Hodges, the provision for substitution
contained in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis
void.
(d)
In view of the invalidity of the
provision for substitution in the Will, C. N.
Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable
and final.
3.
That all "rents, emoluments and
income" of the conjugal estate accruing
after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains
to C. N. Hodges;
(a)
If the HIGDONS wish to enforce
their dubious rights as substituted heirs
to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other
1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N.
Hodges which can not be affected by any
testamentary disposition), their remedy,
if any, is to file their claim against the
estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be
entitled at the present time to full
custody and control of all the conjugal
estate of the spouses.
(b)
The present proceedings, in which
two estates exist under separate
administration, where the administratrix
of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
exercises an officious right to object and
intervene in matters affecting exclusively
the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
prayed that after trial and reception of
evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1.
That the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges was and is composed exclusively
of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
estate of the spouses Hodges, computed
as of the date of her death on May 23,
1957;
2.
That the other half of the conjugal
estate pertained exclusively to C. N.
Hodges as his share as partner in the
conjugal partnership;
4.
That C. N. Hodges was the sole and
exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
5.
That, therefore, the entire conjugal
estate of the spouses located in the
Philippines,
plus
all
the
"rents,
emoluments
and
income"
abovementioned, now constitutes the estate of
C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to
his heirs upon termination of Special
Proceedings No. 1672;
3.
That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane
Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the
time survived by her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, and several relatives
named in her last will and testament;
6.
That PCIB, as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full
and exclusive custody, control and
management of all said properties; and
4.
That on June 28, 1957, a petition
therefor having been priorly filed and
duly heard, this Honorable Court issued
an order admitting to probate the last will
and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
7.
That
Avelina
A.
Magno,
as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no
right to intervene or participate in the
administration of the C. N. Hodges
estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other
relief as may be deemed just and
equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner
could
be
resolved,
however,
on
December 21, 1965, private respondent
Magno filed her own "Motion for the
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and,
through undersigned counsel, unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully states
and manifests:
1.
That the spouses Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
American citizens who died at the City of
Iloilo
after
having
amassed
and
accumulated extensive properties in the
Philippines;
2.
That on November 22, 1952, Linnie
Jane Hodges executed a last will and
testament (the original of this will now
forms part of the records of these
proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears
as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
5.
That the required notice to
creditors and to all others who may have
any claims against the decedent, Linnie
Jane Hodges has already been printed,
published and posted (Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the
reglamentary period for filing such claims
has long ago lapsed and expired without
any claims having been asserted against
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
approved
by
the
Administrator/Administratrix of the said
estate, nor ratified by this Honorable
Court;
6.
That the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to
probate contains an institution of heirs in
the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and remainder of
my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated or located, to my
beloved
husband,
Charles
Newton
Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my
said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD:
I desire, direct and provide
that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during
his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the
right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale
of any part thereof which he may think
best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best;
13. That, on the other hand, the onehalf interest of Charles Newton Hodges in
the combined conjugal estate existing as
of May 23, 1957, while it may have
earned exactly the same amount of
"rents, emoluments and income" as that
of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by
charges,
expenditures,
and
other
dispositions which are purely personal to
him in nature, until the death of Charles
Newton Hodges himself on December 25,
1962;
a.
Declaring the following persons, to
wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last
will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges
and as the only persons entitled to her
estate;
b.
Determining the exact value of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the system enunciated
in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c.
After such determination ordering
its segregation from the combined
conjugal estate and its delivery to the
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges for distribution to the heirs to
whom
they
properly
belong
and
appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing
on its motion of January 8, 1965
aforequoted, as it had been doing before,
petitioner withdrew the said motion and
in addition to opposing the above motion
of respondent Magno, filed a motion on
April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1.
That it has received from the
counsel for the administratrix of the
supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a
notice to set her "Motion for Official
Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges";
2.
That before the aforesaid motion
could be heard, there are matters
pending before this Honorable Court,
such as:
a.
The examination already ordered
by this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations and
sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and
usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges';
b.
That "Urgent Motion for An
Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of
C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the
Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the
Rents,
Emoluments
Therefrom";
c.
Various motions
aforesaid motion;
and
to
Income
resolve
the
d.
Manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference of
Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which
involve no issues of fact, all facts
involved therein being matters of record,
and therefore require only the resolution
of questions of law;
3.
That whatever claims any alleged
heirs or other persons may have could be
very easily threshed out in the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4.
That the maintenance of two
separate estate proceedings and two
administrators only results in confusion
and is unduly burdensome upon the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
particularly because the bond filed by
Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which
she has inofficiously collected and held,
as well as those which she continues to
inofficiously collect and hold;
5.
That it is a matter of record that
such state of affairs affects and
inconveniences not only the estate but
also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex
"V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the
court, by quoting them, of the relevant
allegations of its earlier motion of
September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed
that:
1.
Immediately order Avelina Magno
to account for and deliver to the
administrator of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges all the assets of the conjugal
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
BARRIDO
CORONADO.
XXX to XXXIV
THE
LOWER
COURT
ERRED
IN
DETERMINING
THE
RIGHTS
OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF
THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
AND
PURIFICACION
XLI to XLIII
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH
THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE
PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH
THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90,
RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
EXERCISED
THROUGH
HIS
ADMINISTRATOR,
THE
INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
SERVED
UPON
THE
APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
BANK.
LXIII
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE,
BELCESAR
CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE
PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED
WITH
THE
DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE,
BELCESAR
CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH
THE
SAME
WAS
NOT
EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE
APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE
RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR
OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE
PABLICO,
ALFREDO
CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR
S.
GUZMAN,
FLRENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR,
MAXIMA
BATISANAN
AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
LXVII
APPOINTED
ESTATE.
ADMINISTRATOR
OF
HIS
LXXIII
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM
THE
SUPPOSED
ESTATE
OF
THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR
ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE
LOWER
COURT
ERRED
IN
IMPLEMENTING
THE
ALLEGED
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF
THE
SUPPOSED
ESTATE
OF
THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND
THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO,
AND
THE
APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL
AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE
LATTER
ONLY
AS
THE
LAWFULLY
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
(Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and
unavoidably extended narration of the
factual setting of these cases, it may also
be mentioned that an attempt was made
by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have
respondent
Magno
removed
as
administratrix,
with
the
proposed
appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her
place, and that respondent court did
actually
order
such
proposed
replacement, but the Court declared the
said order of respondent court violative
of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence
without force and effect (see Resolution
of September 8, 1972 and February 1,
1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B.
Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs,
appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs
themselves, and in a motion dated
October 26, 1972 informed the Court that
a motion had been filed with respondent
court for the removal of petitioner PCIB
as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672,
which removal motion alleged that
22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges
had already been acquired by the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her
husband. Further, in this connection, in
the answer of PCIB to the motion of
respondent Magno to have it declared in
contempt for disregarding the Court's
resolution
of
September
8,
1972
modifying the injunction of August 8,
1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a
joint
manifestation
and
motion,
appearing to have been filed with
respondent court, informing said court
that in addition to the fact that 22% of
IN
THE
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The
priority
question
raised
by
respondent Magno relates to the alleged
tardiness of all the aforementioned thirtythree appeals of PCIB. Considering,
however, that these appeals revolve
around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them
have been timely taken, and, moreover,
their final results hereinbelow to be
stated and explained make it of no
consequence whether or not the orders
concerned have become final by the
lapsing of the respective periods to
appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of
any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same
respondent is alleged impropriety of the
special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition in view of the existence of the
remedy of appeal which it claims is
proven by the very appeals now before
Us. Such contention fails to take into
account that there is a common thread
among the basic issues involved in all
xxx
xxx
2d. Does
the
surviving
spouse
contemplate renouncing the will and
electing to take dower, curtesy, or a
statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3.
According to the information and
belief of the person or persons filing the
return, is any action described under
question 1 designed or contemplated? ( )
Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer Record, p.
263)
None,
except
for
purposes
of
administering the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving husband of
deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in
their Community Estate to the devisees
and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and
paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of
Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
Hodges
arrogated
everything
unto
himself leaving nothing at all to be
inherited by his wife's brothers and
sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the
orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as
approving past and authorizing future
dispositions made by Hodges in a
wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void
for being violative of the provisions of
Rule 89 governing the manner in which
such dispositions may be made and how
the authority therefor and approval
thereof by the probate court may be
secured. If We sustained such a view, the
result would only be that the said orders
should be declared ineffective either way
they are understood, considering We
have already seen it is legally impossible
to consider them as adjudicatory. As a
matter of fact, however, what surges
immediately to the surface, relative to
PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is
that from such point of view, the
supposed irregularity would involve no
more
than
some
non-jurisdictional
technicalities of procedure, which have
for their evident fundamental purpose
the protection of parties interested in the
estate, such as the heirs, its creditors,
particularly the government on account
of the taxes due it; and since it is
apparent here that none of such parties
are objecting to said orders or would be
prejudiced by the unobservance by the
trial court of the procedure pointed out
by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience
in nor impediment to Our giving sanction
to the blanket approval and authority
contained in said orders. This solution is
definitely preferable in law and in equity,
for to view said orders in the sense
suggested by PCIB would result in the
deprivation of substantive rights to the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
whereas reading them the other way will
not cause any prejudice to anyone, and,
withal, will give peace of mind and
Again,
Philippine
law,
or
more
specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code
provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to
one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased spouse, and the testator may
freely dispose of the other half.
property
died
leaving
no
descendants
or
ascendants except brothers and sisters
and herein petitioner as the surviving
spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he
was not excluding his wife's brothers and
sisters from the inheritance.
4.
That
Hodges
allegedly
made
statements and manifestations to the
United States inheritance tax authorities
indicating that he had renounced his
inheritance from his wife in favor of her
other heirs, which attitude he is
supposed to have reiterated or ratified in
an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn
to here in the Philippines and in which he
even purportedly stated that his reason
for so disclaiming and renouncing his
rights under his wife's will was to
"absolve (him) or (his) estate from any
liability for the payment of income taxes
on income which has accrued to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife,
since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962,
Hodges died. The very next day, upon
motion of herein respondent and
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was
appointed by the trial court as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie
Jane
Hodges,
in
Special
Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, "in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or
iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost,
damaged or go to waste, unless Special
Administratrix is appointed," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on
A.) although, soon enough, on December
29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was
appointed
as
her
Co-Special
Administrator,
and
when
Special
Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe
Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased,
was in due time appointed as Co-
Initially,
We issued a preliminary
injunction against Magno and allowed
PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed
several separate orders of the trial court
approving individual acts of appellee
Magno in her capacity as administratrix
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as,
hiring of lawyers for specified fees and
incurring expenses of administration for
different purposes and executing deeds
of sale in favor of her co-appellees
covering properties which are still
registered in the name of Hodges,
purportedly pursuant to corresponding
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges.
The said orders are being questioned on
jurisdictional and procedural grounds
directly or indirectly predicated on the
principal theory of appellant that all the
properties of the two estates belong
already to the estate of Hodges
exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee
Magno denies that the trial court's orders
of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were
meant to be finally adjudicatory of the
hereditary rights of Hodges and contends
that they were no more than the court's
general sanction of past and future acts
of Hodges as executor of the will of his
wife in due course of administration. As
to the point regarding substitution, her
position is that what was given by Mrs.
Hodges to her husband under the
provision in question was a lifetime
usufruct of her share of the conjugal
partnership, with the naked ownership
passing directly to her brothers and
sisters. Anent the application of Article
16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the
applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges
is that of Texas under which, she alleges,
there is no system of legitime, hence, the
estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less
than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties. She further
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had
as a matter of fact and of law renounced
reserve
said
issues
for
further
proceedings and resolution in the first
instance by the court a quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate,
however, that pending such further
proceedings, as matters stand at this
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is
beyond cavil that since, under the terms
of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband
could
not
have
anyway
legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated
to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could
have disposed any part thereof during his
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs.
Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be
less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of
her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed
of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third
persons since then, for even if it were
assumed that, as contended by PCIB,
under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately
applicable, such one-fourth share would
be her free disposable portion, taking
into account already the legitime of her
husband under Article 900 of the Civil
Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the
Court with no alternative than to
conclude that in predicating its orders on
the assumption, albeit unexpressed
therein, that there is an estate of Mrs.
Hodges to be distributed among her
brothers and sisters and that respondent
Magno is the legal administratrix thereof,
the trial court acted correctly and within
its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition has to be
denied. The Court feels however, that
pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership and the determination of the
specific
properties
constituting
her
estate, the two administrators should act
conjointly as ordered in the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 and as
wife's
estate,
unless
subsequently
disposed of gratuitously to third parties
by the husband, and second, that should
the purported renunciation be declared
legally
effective,
no
deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said
estate; in consequence, the preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended
on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is
lifted, and the resolution of September 8,
1972, directing that petitioner-appellant
PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in
Special
Proceedings
1672,
and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno,
as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie
Jane
Hodges,
in
Special
Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently
from each other, as such administrators,
is reiterated, and the same is made part
of this judgment and shall continue in
force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased
spouses and the determination and
segregation from each other of their
respective estates, provided, that upon
the finality of this judgment, the trial
court should immediately proceed to the
partition of the presently combined
estates of the spouses, to the end that
the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges
may be properly and clearly identified;
thereafter, the trial court should forthwith
segregate the remainder of the onefourth herein adjudged to be her estate
and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings
1307, while the other one-fourth shall
remain under the joint administration of
said respondent and petitioner under a
joint proceedings in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, whereas the half
unquestionably pertaining to Hodges
shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672,
without prejudice to the resolution by the
trial court of the pending motions for its
removal as administrator 12; and this
arrangement shall be maintained until
Esguerra
and
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]
NENG
KAGUI
KADIGUIA
MALANG,
petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON,
Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia District
Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD
ULYSSIS
MALANG,
HADJI
ISMAEL
MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG,
DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG,
JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL
MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG,
respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special
civil action of certiorari is the issue of
whether or not the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains governed the
property relationship of two Muslims who
contracted
marriage
prior
to
the
effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, P.D.
1083 or Muslim Code). The question is
raised in connection with the settlement
of the estate of the deceased husband.
Hadji
Abdula
Malang,
a
Muslim,
contracted
marriage
with
Aida
(Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons
named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji
Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a
daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula
Malang was engaged in farming, tilling
the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or
majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of
land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula
and Aida already had two children when
he married for the second time another
Muslim
named
Jubaida
Kado
in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No
child was born out of Hadji Abdulas
second marriage. When Aida, the first
wife, was pregnant with their fourth child,
Hadji Abdula divorced her.
of
P860.00,
three
(3)
one-storey
residential buildings, and one (1) twostorey residential building.[17] All these
properties were declared for taxation
purposes in Hadji Abdulas name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an
inventory showing that Hadji Abdula
married to Neng Malang had seven (7)
residential lots with a total assessed
value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an
Isuzu
pick-up
jeepney
valued
at
P30,000.00 and bank deposits.[18]
In the Memorandum that she filed with
the Sharia District Court, petitioner
asserted that all the properties located in
Cotabato City, including the vehicle and
bank deposits, were conjugal properties
in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil
Code and Article 116 of the Family Code
while properties located outside of
Cotabato City were exclusive properties
of the decedent.[19]
On the other hand, the oppositors
contended in their own Memorandum
that all the properties left by Hadji
Abdula were his exclusive properties for
various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had
no conjugal partnership with petitioner
because his having contracted eight (8)
marriages with different Muslim women
was in violation of the Civil Code that
provided for a monogamous marriage; a
conjugal partnership presupposes a valid
civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage
or a common-law relationship. Second,
the decedent adopted a complete
separation of property regime in his
marital relations; while his wives Jubaida
Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap
Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents
properties, there is no evidence that
petitioner had contributed funds for the
acquisition of such properties. Third, the
presumption that properties acquired
during the marriage are conjugal
properties is inapplicable because at the
time he acquired the properties, the
decedent was married to four (4) women.
Malang
e)
Mohammad
Ulyssis
Malang-------------------------14/64 - do f)
Ismael
Malindatu
Malang---------------------------14/64 - do g) Datulna
14/64 - do -
Malang
-------------------------
Malang
Total------------------------ 64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given
to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of
advance be charged against her share
and if her share is not sufficient, to return
the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to
submit to this court their Project of
Partition for approval, not later than three
(3) months from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a
motion for the reconsideration of that
Order. The oppositors objected to that
motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia
District Court denied petitioners motion
for
reconsideration.[22]
Unsatisfied,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[23]
However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a
manifestation withdrawing the notice of
appeal on the strength of the following
provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --(1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity
of this Code shall be governed by the
laws in force at the time of their
execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall
affect their validity or legality or operate
to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent
with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively,
unless
the
contrary
appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied;[35] accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive opertion of laws.[36] Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general
rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and
implicitly upholds the force and effect of
a pre-existing body of law, specifically,
the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts
that took place before the Muslim Codes
enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism
arises when we consider that what the
provisions of the Civil Code contemplate
and nurture is a monogamous marriage.
Bigamous or polygamous marriages are
considered void and inexistent from the
time of their performance.[37] The Family
Code which superseded the Civil Code
provisions on marriage emphasizes that
a subsequent marriage celebrated before
the
registration
of
the
judgment
declaring a prior marriage void shall
likewise be void.[38] These provisions
illustrate that the marital relation
perceived by the Civil Code is one that is
monogamous, and that subsequent
marriages entered into by a person with
others while the first one is subsisting is
by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural
marriages
celebrated
before
the
enactment of the Muslim Code was
touched upon in two criminal cases, the
impossibility
may
be
the
of
their
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124371
2000
November 23,
F.
the
divorce
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088
31, 1954
July
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the
allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is
filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other
person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time
and place for the hearing, and cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of
an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will
should be allowed in the Philippines, the
court shall so allow it, and a certificate of
its allowance, signed by the Judge, and
attested by the seal of the courts, to
which shall be attached a copy of the
will, shall be filed and recorded by the
clerk, and the will shall have the same
effect as if originally proved and allowed
in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court
of Amoy, China, is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure
in the probate or allowance of wills must
also be proved. The legal requirements
for the execution of a valid will in China
in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on
these points. The unverified answers to
the questions propounded by counsel for
the appellant to the Consul General of
the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits
R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for
the appellee, are inadmissible, because
apart from the fact that the office of
Consul General does not qualify and
make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in
probate matters, if the same be
admitted, the adverse party would be
deprived of his right to confront and
cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters.
Moreover, it appears that all the
proceedings had in the municipal district
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139868
June 8, 2006
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
stock in A/G
P64,444.00.5
Interiors,
Inc.
worth
Maryland
follows:
on
Estates
and
Trusts,
as
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA,
capacity
of
the
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,
DECISION
FIRST DIVISION
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT
THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY
EXECUTED[63]
The pivotal issue is whether the
authenticity and due execution of the
notarial Will was sufficiently established
to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law is apparent from the
face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing
more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is
expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF
WILL NECESSARY.
Section
1.
Allowance
necessary.
Conclusive as to execution. No will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless
it is proved and allowed in the proper
court. Subject to the right of appeal, such
allowance of the will shall be conclusive
as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic
validity pertains to whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the
character
of
the
We
take
into
consideration
the
unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and
treated Lorenzo as her own son and that
love even extended to Lorenzos wife and
children. This kind of relationship is not
unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our
culture for old maids or spinsters to care
for and raise their nephews and nieces
and treat them as their own children.
Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural
practice that has resulted in many family
discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator
and those who stand to benefit in case of
intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the
acknowledged
fact
that
Paciencias
relationship with Lorenzo and his family
is different from her relationship with
petitioners. The very fact that she cared
for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him
both here and abroad, even if the latter
was already married and already has
children, highlights the special bond
between
them.
This
unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the
devisees
tends
to
support
the
authenticity of the said document as
against petitioners allegations of duress,
influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
trickery which, aside from being factual
in nature, are not supported by concrete,
substantial and credible evidence on
record. It is worth stressing that bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not
based on concrete and substantial
evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations.[71]
Furthermore, a purported will is not [to
be] denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its foundation, for even if a will
has been duly executed in fact, whether
x x x it will be probated would have to
depend largely on the attitude of those
interested in [the estate of the
deceased].[72]
I.
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A.
Facts. For a long time prior to
October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in
feeble health. His breakdown was
undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to
advancing years, and to an accident
which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6).
Ultimately, on August 10, 1923, on his
own initiative, Rodriguez designated
Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of
his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez
petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Manila to name a guardian for Tomas
Rodriguez because of his old age and
pathological state. This petition was
opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta
acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for
the reason that while Rodriguez was far
from strong on account of his years, he
was yet capable of looking after his
property with the assistance of his
administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The
deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken
and a perusal of the same shows that he
was able to answer nearly all of the
questions
propounded
intelligently
(Exhibit 54-G). A trial was had at which
considerable oral testimony for the
petitioner
was
received.
At
the
conclusion of the hearing, an order was
issued by the presiding judge, declaring
Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take
care of himself and to manage his
property, and naming Vicente F. Lopez as
his guardian. (Exhibit 37.)
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee
make much of one incident which
occurred
in
connection
with
the
guardianship proceedings, it may as well
be mentioned here as later. This episode
concerns the effort of deputy sheriff
Joaquin Garcia to make service on Tomas
Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will
let the witness tell in his own words what
happened on the occasion in question:
"A.
What happened is this: In view of
that agreement, I fixed up the rough draft
which I had, dating it the 31st of
December, putting everything in order;
we agreed that Santiago Lopez would
meet me on said 31st day between five
and six in the evening or a little before,
but it happened that before the arrival of
that date Santiago Lopez came and told
me that I need not trouble about going to
the General Hospital because it could not
be carried out for the reason that certain
requisites were lacking. In view of this
and bearing always in mind that on the
following day I had to go to the
provinces, I told Santiago Lopez that I
would leave the papers with him because
I might go to the provinces.
"Q. What may be the meaning of those
words good Christmas present?
"A.
They are given as a Christmas
present when Christmas comes or on the
occasion of Christmas.
"Q. I show you this document which is
marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the
will or copy of the will which you
delivered
to
Santiago
Lopez
on
December 31, 1923? "A.
With
the
exception of the words '3 de enero de
1924' it seems to be literally identical."
(S. R., pp. 244-249.)
As the witness stated, the will which was
prepared by him is identical with that
signed by the testator and the attesting
witnesses with the single exception of
the change of the date from December
31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies
besides the original of the will were
made. The will is brief and simple in
terminology.
For purposes of record, we copy the will
as here translated into English: "ONLY
PAGE
"In the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas Rodriguez,
of age and resident of the City of Manila,
Philippine
Islands,
do
freely
and
voluntarily make this my will and
been
the
subject
of
the
direct
examination.
"COURT:
Objection overruled. "ARANETA:
Exception.
"A.
No, sir, they joined us.
"Q. What was D. Tomas told when he
signed the will? "A.
To sign it.
"Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the Will?
"A.
Luz Lopez.
"Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas
Rodriguez in order that he should sign
the Will?
"A.
She told him to sign the document;
the deceased Tomas Rodriguez before
signing the document asked what that
was which he was to sign.
"Q. What did anybody answer to that
question of D. Tomas?
"A.
Luz Lopez told him to sign it
because it concerned a complaint against
Castito. D. Tomas said, 'What is this?' And
Luz Lopez answered, 'You sign this
document, uncle Tomas, because this is
about the complaint against Castito.' "Q.
Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the
will?
"A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. Who had the will? Who was holding
it?
"A.
Mr. Vicente Legarda had it in his
own hands.
"Q. Was the will signed by Tomas
Rodriguez lying down, on his feet, or
seated? "A. Lying down.
"Q. Was the will read by Tomas
Rodriguez or any person present at the
time of signing the will, did they read it
to him?
"A.
Nobody read the will to him. "Q.
Did not D. Tomas read the will? "A.
I have not seen it.
"Q. Were you present?
"A.
Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 8.) As it would be
quite impracticable to transcribe the
testimony of all the others who attended
the making of the will, we will let Vicente
L. Legarda, who appears to have
assumed the leading role, tell what
transpired. He testified in part:
"ARANETA:
Q.
Who exhibited to you those
documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2?
'LEGARDA:
"A.
Santiago Lopez.
"Q. Did he show you the same
document?
"A.
First, that is to say the first
document he presented to me was a
rough draft, a tentative will, and it was
dated December 31st, and I called his
attention to the fact that the date was
not December 31, 1923, and that it was
necessary to change the date to January
3, 1924, and it was done.
"Q. And it was then, was it not, when
Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written? "A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know where it was written ?
"A.
In the General Hospital.
"Q. Did any time elapse from your
making
the
suggestion
that
the
document which you delivered to
Santiago Lopez be rewritten until those
three exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were
presented to you?
"A.
About
nine
or
ten
minutes
approximately. "Q.
The time to make
it clean.?
"A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. Where were you during that time?
"A.
In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
"Q. Were you talking with him during
that time? "A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. About what things were you talking
with him?
"A.
He was asking me about my
health, that of my family, how my family
was, my girl, whether we were living in
Pasay, he asked me about the steamer
Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that it
had been lost because he knew that my
father-in-law was the owner of the
steamer Ildefonso.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. When those documents, Exhibits A,
A-1, and A-2, that is, the original and the
two copies of the will signed by D. Tomas
Rodriguez were written clean, will you
please tell what happened?
one
on
Calle
Magallanes, another on Calle Cabildo,
and the third on Calle Juan Luna, and
besides he had money in the Monte de
Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. From the questions made by you
and the answers given by Mr. Tomas
Rodriguez on that occasion, what is your
opinion as to his mental capacity.
"A.
The following: That the memory of
Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed as to
things of the present, but is all right with
regard to matters or facts of the past;
that his ideas were coherent; that he
thought with logic, argued even with
power, and generally in some of the
interviews I have arrived at the
conclusion that Tomas Rodriguez had an
initiative of his own, did not need that
anybody
should
make
him
any
suggestion, because he answered in such
"A.
I examined him physically and
mentally; I am not going to tell here the
physical result but the result of the
mental examination, and that is: General
Conduct: In most of the times that I have
seen him, I found him Lying on his bed,
smoking a cigarette and asked for a
bottle of lemonade from time to time; I
also observed that he was very careful
when throwing the ash of the cigarette,
seeing to it that it did not fall on the
blankets; he also was careful not to throw
the stub of the cigarette in any place to
avoid fire; I made more observations as
to his general conduct and I found that
sometimes Don Tomas could move within
the place although with certain difficulty.
On two occasions I found him seated,
once seated at the table, seated on the
chair, and the other on a rocking-chair. I
also examined his manner of talking and
to all questions that I put to him he
answered with a fair coherence and in a
relevant manner, although sometimes he
showed meagerness and certain delay. I
based these points of my declarations on
the questions which are usually asked
when making a mental examination, for
instance I asked him, 'What is your
name,' and he correctly answered Tomas
Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married
and he answered 'No;' I asked him his
profession and he answered that formerly
he was an attorney but that at the time I
was making the examination he was not
practicing the profession; I asked him
with what he supported himself and he
said that he lived upon his income, he
said verbatim, 'I live on my income.' I
also asked him what the amount of his
income was and he answered that it was
about P900; I asked him what the source
of this income was and he said that it
came from his property.
"Q. Did you ask him about his
property? "A.
No, at that time.
"Q. Proceed.
"A.
I also observed his emotional
status and affectivity. I found it rather
superficial, and he oftentimes got angry
"P.
Este es el Doctor Burke, le conoce
usted? "R. De nombre.
"P.
Este es el Doctor Domingo, le
conoce usted? "R.De vista.
"P.
Este es el Doctor Burke, recuerda
usted su nombre? "R. No. (P. 10, sten.
n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P.
Usted conoce a este Doctor?
(Senalando al Doctor Burke). "R.
De
vista; su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no
me acuerdo.
"P.
Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores
Angeles, Burke y Tietze). "R. Ya lo creo.
"Dr. BURKE:
"P.
Que
profesion
tenemos?
(Senalando a los Sres. Angeles, Burke y
Tietze). "R. Yo creo que son doctores.
"P.
Y los dos? (Senalando a los
Doctores ~ngeles y Tietze). "R.
No.
se.
"P.
Y este senor? (Senalando al
Doctor Angeles).
"R.
No me acuerdo en este momento.
(Pp. 4 and 5, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"(f) Other facts bearing upon the
history of the case obtained by
investegation of Doctor Angeles:
"I.
Family history. His parents were
noted to be of nervous temper and
irritable.
"II.
Personal history. He was a
lawyer, but did not pursue his practice,
devoting the greater part of his life to
collecting antiquities. He was generally
regarded by his neighbors as miserly and
erratic in the ordinary habits of life. He
lead a very unhygienic life, making no
attempt to clean the filth or dirt that was
around him. He was neglectful in
personal habits. On April, 1921, he
suffered an injury to his forehead, from
which
he
became
temporarily
unconscious, and was confined in the
Philippine General Hospital for treatment.
He frequently complained of attacks of
dizziness and headache, following this
injury; suffered from a large hernia; and
about two years ago, he was fined for
failure in filing his income tax, from
which incident, we have reason to
appointment
of
a
guardian,
nor
eccentricities are sufficient singly or
jointly to show testamentary incapacity.
Each case rests on its own facts and
must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the
capacity to make a will which is of some
practical utility. This rule concerns the
nature and rationality of the will. Is the
will simple or complicated ? Is it natural
or unnatural ? The mere exclusion of
heirs will not, however, in itself indicate
that the will was the offspring of an
unsound mind. On the issue of
testamentary capacity, the evidence
should be permitted to take a wide range
in order that all facts may be brought out
which will assist in determining the
question. The testimony of subscribing
witnesses to a will concerning the
testator's mental condition is entitled to
great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent. The evidence of those present
at the execution of the will and of the
attending physician is also to be relied
upon. (Alexander on Wills, vol. I, pp. 433,
484;
Wharton
&
Stille's
Medical
Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is
sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow
the
will
have
clearly
established the charge of mental
incapacity that the courts will intervene
to set aside a testamentary document.
(Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689;
Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of
the testator being under guardianship at
the time he made his will. Citing section
306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
certain authorities, they insist that the
effect of the judgment is conclusive with
respect to the condition of the person. To
this statement we cannot write down our
conformity. The provisions of the cited
section were taken from California, and
there the Supreme Court has never held
what is now urged upon us by the
appellee. The rule announced that in
UNDUE INFLUENCE
A.
Facts. The will was attacked on
the further ground of undue influence
exercised by the persons benefited in the
will in collaboration with others. The trial
judge found this allegation to have been
established and made it one of the bases
of his decision. It is now for us to say if
the facts justify this finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntarily named
Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The
latter subsequently became his guardian.
There is every indication that of all his
relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the
most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and
his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again,
it was Vicente F. Lopez who, on the
suggestion
of
Rodriguez,
secured
Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it
was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to
have gathered the witnesses and
physicians for the execution of the will.
This faction of the Lopez family was also
shown a favor through the orders of
Doctor Domingo as to who could be
admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion
that there existed "a preconceived plan
on the part of the persons who
surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure
his signature to the testament. The trial
judge may be correct in this supposition.
It is hard to believe, however, that men
of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors
Calderon, Domingo,Herrera, and De Asis,
and Mr. Legarda would so demean
themselves and so sully their characters
and reputations as to participate in a
scheme having for its purpose to delude
and to betray an old man in his dotage.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 39033. November 13, 1933.]
"1.
The lower court erred in holding
that Matea Abella was in the full
enjoyment of her mental faculties and
executed the document, Exhibit A, as a
true expression of her last will.
"2.
The lower court erred in holding
that the requirements of the law have
been complied with in the execution of
the will, Exhibit A.
"3.
The lower court erred in holding
that when the late Matea Abella affixed
her alleged signatures to the will, Exhibit
A, she did not act under the illegal and
undue influence of certain legatees.
"4.
The lower court erred in decreeing
the probate of the will, Exhibit A." The
following facts have been proven by a
preponderance of evidence presented
during the trial, to wit:
The testatrix, Mates Abella, resident of
the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had
been informed that Dr. Antonio Querol of
San Fernando, La Union, was a good
physician. On April 13, 1932, she left her
home situated in the said municipality of
Sinait, accompanied by her niece,
Filomena Inay, to consult the said
physician in his clinic in San Fernando, La
Union, stopping at the convent of the
parish church of the said municipality, in
charge of Father Cordero with whom she
was acquainted he having been the
parish of Sinait. During her stay in the
said convent, she went to Dr. Antonio
Querol's clinic twice within the period of
one week accompanied by her aforesaid
niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said
physician who, after submitting her to a
general medical examination, found that
she was suffering from dyspepsia and
cancer of the stomach.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS,
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
ET
AL.
vs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-46430-31. July 30, 1979.]
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O.
BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.
RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUABUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his
guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid
Law Office for private respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which
reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Albay allowing the probate of
the will of Don Jesus Alsua in Special
Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case 3068 after
declaring the two deeds of sale executed
by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The
respondent court 1 denied the probate of
the will, declared null and void the two
sales subject of the complaint and
ordered the defendants, petitioners
herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs,
now the private respondents, the sum of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to
render an accounting of the properties in
their possession and to reimburse the
latter the net gain in the proportion that
appertains to them in the properties from
the date of the filing of the complaint up
to complete restoration plus Fifty
Thousand
Pesos
(P50,000.00)
as
attorney's fees and costs.
One
of
the
most
fundamental
conceptions of probate law, is that it is
the duty of the court to effectuate, in so
far as may be compatible with the public
interest, the devolutionary wishes of a
deceased person (Matter of Watson's
Will, 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787;
Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc.
320, 325, 208, N.Y.S.,
672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div.,
733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S.,
Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587,
593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the
court is, in effect, an additional party to
every litigation affecting the disposal of
the assets of the deceased. Matter of Van
Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298,
N.Y.S., 219.'" The next issue that
commands Our attention is whether the
respondent court erred in not allowing
the probate of the last will and testament
of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that
the
disallowance
was
based
on
speculations, surmises or conjectures,
disregarding the facts as found by the
trial court. The Civil Court is very clear
and explicit in providing the cases where
a will may be disallowed under Article
839 which provides as follows:
"Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in
any of the following cases:
(1)
If the formalities required by law
have not been complied with;
(2)
If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable of making
a will, at the time of its execution;
(3)
If it was executed through force or
under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4)
If it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other
person;
(5)
If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud;
(6)
If the testator acted by mistake or
did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto."
SYLLABUS
1.
WILL;
PRESUMPTION
OF
REGULARITY. An instrument purporting
to be a will executed and witnessed in
accordance with the formalities required
by the statute is entitled to the
presumption of regularity. But the burden
of the evidence passes to the proponent
when the oppositors submit credible
evidence tending to show that the
supposed testator did not possess
testamentary capacity at the time or that
the document was not the free and
voluntary expression of the alleged
testator or that the will, for any other
reason, is void in law. The finding that the
will was executed under undue influence
or by the fraud of another presupposes
testamentary capacity.
2.
ID.;
LACK
OF
TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY. The doctrine that where the
testator has had an opportunity to revoke
his will subsequent to the operation of an
alleged undue influence upon him but
makes no change in it, the courts will
consider this fact as weighing heavily
against the testimony of undue influence,
has no application to cases in which
there has been an initial lack of
testamentary
capacity.
It
has
no
application, moreover, where from the
day of execution until the death of the
testator his mental condition is such that
he cannot judge the propriety of revoking
the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a
case where the alleged testator harbors
the belief that he had not executed the
will in question.
DECISION
BUTTE, J p:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga
denying the petition of Vivencio Cuyugan
for the probate of the will of Silvestra
Baron.
MALCOLM,
J.,
"1.
That the said Emigdio Zarate was
mentally incapacitated at the time he
authorized and signed his will.
"2.
That he executed the said will
under illegal and undue influence or
persuasion on the part of some persons
who acted in behalf of the beneficiaries
or heirs.
"3.
That the signature of the testator
was obtained by deceit or fraud, for the
reason that it was not his intention that
all that was recorded in the said
instrument should be his will at the time
he signed it; for the testator had
informed the opponent, Maria Calderon,
before and after the said will had been
signed, that he had not disposed of the
one-half of the house and lot now
mentioned in the third clause, letter (a),
of the said will, because the said testator
recognized that the house and lot
referred to belonged to the said Maria
Calderon.
"Therefore, the opponent prays the court
to annul the will alleged to have been
executed by Emigdio Zarate, and to order
that its probate be disallowed, with the
costs against the petitioner."
After hearing the evidence adduced pro
and con, the lower court reached the
following conclusion:
"It having been proved completely on the
part of the petitioner that the will in
question was executed and signed in
entire
conformity
with
all
the
requirements and solemnities set out in
the Code of Civil Procedure, the court
overrules the opposition, sustains the
petition, admits to probate Exhibit A,
holding that the same is legal in all its
parts as the last will and testament of the
deceased Emigdio Zarate."
From that conclusion of the lower court,
the oppositor appealed to this court and
made the following assignments of error:
"I.
The court erred in holding that the
deceased, Emigdio Zarate, was in the full
vs.
JUSTINIANO
JAOJOCO
and
MARCOS
JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.
Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for
appellant.
Salinas
&
Salinas
for
appellees.
AVANCEA, J.:
On the evening of December 9, 1918,
Adriana Carrillo executed a document of
sale of eleven parcels of land, with onehalf of the improvements thereon,
situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig,
municipality of Carmona, Province of
Cavite, containing an area of 330,409
square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco
for the price of P4,000 which the seller
admitted having received. Nine days
afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared
mentally incapacitated by the Court of
First Instance and later on died; and
proceeding having been instituted for the
administrator and settlement of her
estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was
appointed judicial administratrix of said
estate. In her capacity as such
administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now
brings this action for the annulment of
said contract of sale executed by Adriana
Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against
Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his
father Justiniano Jaojoco. The defendants
were absolved from the complaint, and
from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
Attention
is
also
called
to
the
disproportion between the price of the
sale and the real value of the land sold.
The evidence, however, rather shows
that the price of P4,000 paid for the land,
which contained an area of 33 hectares,
represents it real value, for its is little
more than P100 per hectare, which is
approximately the value of other lands of
the same nature in the vicinity. But even
supposing that there is such a
disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to
justify the conclusion that Adriana
Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for
having made the sale under such
conditions. Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of
Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco
her brother-in-law, and both defendants,
who are father and son, had Adriana
Carrillo in charge, took her to the
"Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared
for her during the time she was there,
and for such acts they may have won her
gratitude. Under these circumstances
there is nothing illegal, or even
reprehensible, and much less strange in
Adriana Carrillo's having taken into
account those services rendered her by
the defendants and reciprocated thereof
by a favorable transaction. Having no
ascendants and descendents, she could,
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4. March 21, 1946.]
In the matter of the testate estate of the
late
Encarnacion
Neyra.
TRINIDAD
NEYRA, petitioner-appellee, vs. TEODORA
NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA
JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO, oppositorsappellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and
MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
BLANCO,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD
NEYRA
and
EUSTAQUIO
MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
Llucio Javillonar for oppositors and
appellants. Alejandro M. Panis for
applicants and appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.
WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY,
DEFINED. Testamentary capacity is the
capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of, and the
persons
who
would
naturally
be
supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner
in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.
2.
D.; ID.; INSOMNIA, TUBERCULOSIS,
DIABETES, NOT SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY
MENTAL CAPACITY. Insomnia, in spite
of the testimony of two doctors who
testified for the opponents of the probate
of a will, who stated that it tended to
destroy mental capacity, was held not to
affect the full possession of the mental
faculties
deemed
necessary
and
sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs.
Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix
was held to have been compos mentis,
inspite of the physician's testimony to
the contrary, to the effect that she was
very weak, being in the third or last stage
of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan
and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The
testimony of the attending physician that
the deceased was suffering from
diabetes and had been in a comatose
It
may,
therefore,
be
reasonably
concluded that the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease,
like the testatrix in this case, remains
unimpaired, partly due to the fact, on
account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis,
insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of
their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited,
the conclusion made by the trial court
that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was
of sound mind and possessed of
testamentary capacity, at the time of the
execution of the will, cannot be properly
disturbed.
The oppositors also claim that the
attesting witnesses were not present, at
the time that the testatrix thumb marked
the will in question, on her bed, in the
sala of the house, as they were allegedly
in the caida. But it has been fully shown
that the attesting witnesses were present
at the time of the signing and execution
of the agreement and will in question, in
the sala, where the testatrix was lying on
her bed. The true test is not whether
they actually saw each other, at the time
of the signing of the will, but whether
they might have seen each other sign,
had they chosen to do so; and the
attesting witnesses actually saw it in this
case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.)
And the thumbmark placed by the
testatrix on the will is equivalent to her
signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
The oppositors as well as their principal
witnesses are all interested parties, as
said oppositors had been named legatees
in the will dated September 14, 1939, but
eliminated from the will dated November
3, 1942.
SYLLABUS
1.
TESTAMENTOS;
LEGALIZACION;
CAPACIDAD MENTAL. La finada fallecio
el 25 de junio de 1936, al rededor de las
8 de la maana, en el municipio de
Laoag de la Provincia de llocos Norte,
teniendo ella entonces 68 aos de edad.
Padecio de diarrea y enteritis con
complicaciones de miocarditis, desde el 3
de junio de 1936 hasta el momento de su
fallecimiento el cual no se debio mas que
a dichas causas. Su debilidad fue
acentuandose de dia en dia desde poco
despues de haber caido enferma,
habiendo contribuido a esto la absoluta
dieta liquida a que habia sido sometida,
mas su ya bastante avanzada edad. La
postracion que le sobrevino mas tarde
fue tal que el 22 de los expresados mes y
ao ya deliraba y apenas podia moverse
y hablar; y si hablaba, sus palabras eran
entonces incoherentes. El 23 perdio
completamente el habla, y aunque tenia
abiertos los ojos, ya no se movian,
notandose que tampoco veian; y nada de
lo que le rodeaba le causaba ya
impresion o reaccion. Continuo asi hasta
sobrevenirle
la
muerte.
En estas
circunstancias, claro esta que era
fisicamente imposible que otorgase como
trataron de probar los apelantes, su
alegado testamento Exhibit A en el
expediente No. 4054 (C. S.-R. G. No.
47428). Hay que tener presente que
dicho documento muestra en su faz, y asi
lo declararon ademas los testigos de los
apelantes, que fue preparado y firmado
por la finada y por los testigos
que presentaron, llamados A. Q., A. R. e
1. S. P., a las 6 a. m. del dia 24 de junio
de 1936.
D E C I S I O N DIAZ, M p:
Estos dos expedientes nos fueron
elevados en virtud de la spelacion,de
algunas de las
partes interesadas contra la sentencia
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Ilocos Norte, por tratarse en ambos de
una legalizacion de dos alegados
para
estampar
dichas
firmas,
no
hubieran salido tan bien como aparecen
en el expresado documento.
La mocion para una nueva vista que los
apelantes presentaron y fue denegada
por el Juzgado a quo, no aleganingun
nuevo
hecho.
La
presentaron
simplemente proforma, para que puedan
revisarse los hechos.
Por todo lo expuesto, y siendo
manifiestamente infundados los errores
atribuidos por los apelantes al Juzgado a
quo, por la presente, confirmamos en
todas sus partes la decision apelada, con
las costas a dichos apelantes, en ambas
instancias. Asi se orden. Avancea, Pres.,
Imperial, Laurel, y Horrilleno, MM., estan
conformes.
Moran, M., no tomo parte.
ARTICLE 800
G.R. No. L-19910 May 31, 1971
IN RE: LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ
vs. JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19910. May 31, 1971.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF MARIE GARNIER
GARREAU.
LIRIO
PFANNENSCHMIDT
RAMIREZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE
MA. RAMIREZ, oppositor-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for
oppositor-appellee.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
At issue in this appeal is the due
execution of the last will and testament
of Maria Garnier Garreau, which was
R.
Perturbada para las circumstancias
normales de la vida.
P.
Un sujeto en esas condiciones,
tiene voluntad libre o es facilmente
presionable de ser llevado por personas
extraas a resoluciones no personales
del enfermo?
R.
Todos estos enfermos lo que tienen
es una disminucion del criterio personal
y, por tanto, son susceptibles de ser
influenciados.
P.
Normalmente por personal de su
intimidad?
R.
Por cualquier persona, el primero
que venga.
P.
Ha expedido usted un certificado?
R.
Si, seor.
P.
Podia esta persona tener intervalos
lucidos para que fueran validos?
R.
Repito
que
es
un
proceso
irreversible
y,
por
tanto,
la
sintomatologia tenia que seguir mas o
menos en el primer plano de su
personalidad.
SR. GALLARDON: Nada mas.
xxx xxx xxx
P.
Pero usted conoce los requisitos
para una incapacitacion?
R.
Si, seor.
P.
Esta seora incurria en todos los
elementos
para
ser
incapacitada
totalmente?
R.
Si, seor.
P.
Al reconocer a ella, tenia usted
algun prejuicio?
R.
No, seor.
P.
Usted dijo que era una enfermedad
irreversible, es decir que no tiene
curacion?
R.
Exacto.
P.
Pero puede mejorarse?
R.
No, seor, irreversible y progresiva,
es un proceso degenerativo cerebral.
In the light of the foregoing expert
medical opinions the letters written by
herein appellant to her uncle, Jose
Eugenio Ramirez, assume a vital
significance on the issue of testamentary
capacity, and of her own credibility as
proponent of the probate of the will. In
The
condition
and
physical
appearance of a questioned document is
a factor which, if correctly evaluated in
the light of surrounding circumstances,
not
have
signatures.
written
the
questioned
November 29,
CONNECTION
WITH
ATTESTATION
CLAUSE. The statement in the
penultimate paragraph of the will as to
the number of the sheets or pages used
is sufficient attestation which may be
considered in conjunction with the last
paragraph which was herein held as the
attestation clause. The law does not
require the attestation to be contained in
a single clause.
3.
ID.;
TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY;
TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN
PREVAILS OVER THAT OF TESTAMENTARY
WITNESSES. Where the family
physician attended the testatrix during
her last illness and saw her on the day
when the alleged document of revocation
was executed, the testimony of the
attesting witnesses tending to imply that
the testatrix was of sound mind at the
time said document was executed,
cannot
prevail
over
the
contrary
testimony of the attending physician.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J p:
On November 27, 1948, Manuela Ibarra
Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be
referred to as testatrix) died at the age of
about seventy-eight years, leaving five
children, namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr.,
Manuel Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales,
Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and
Juan Gonzales. The estate left by her is
estimated at P150,000.
On December 22, 1948, Manuel Gonzales
filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
a petition (Special Proceeding No. 837)
for the probate of an alleged will
executed by the testatrix on November
16, 1942 (Exhibit B Manuel Gonzales),
devising to Manuel Gonzales the greater
portion of the estate, without impairing
the legitimes of the other children.
On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de
Carungcong died in the same court a
petition (Special Proceeding No. 838) for
the probate of another alleged will
REYES
LOS
R.
No, seor.
"P.
Despues del 15 de noviembre de
1948 en que segun usted fue ingresada
la paciente en el hospital podia hablar
ella y hacer entender sus palabras?
R.
No, seor.
"P.
Y que hacia la paciente?
R.
Estaba durmiendo continuamente,
no podia abrir sus ojos por si sola, sino
que yo abria para ver la pupila.
"P.
Trato usted de tener conversacion
con la paciente?
R.
Naturalmente trataba, pero no
contestaba, y ni creo que me entendia.
"P.
Podia levantarse la paciente?
R.
No, seor, porque estaba en estado
comatoso, y para prevenir la pneumonia
hypostatica dos o tres hombres tenian
que levantarla y ponerla algo de costado
o algo asi reclinada.
"P.
Y
que
resultado
tuvo
esa
precaucion que usted tomo?
R.
Se ha retrasado o retardado la
pneumonia, pero sobrevino, al fin, que
siempre es fatal.
"P.
Usted dijo que al fin sobrevino la
pneumonia,
que
efecto
tuvo
esa
pneumonia a la paciente?
R.
Precipito la muerte de la paciente.
"P.
EI 18 de noviembre de 1948,
segun testimonio de los testigos,
otorgaron el documento Exhibit 2
Alejandro y Juan Gonzales, puede usted
decir al Juzgado en que estado se
encontraba Doa Manuela I. Vda. de
Gonzales?
R.
Estaba en esetedo comatoso. "P.
Por que sabe usted eso?
R.
Porque en esa fecha yo la visite dos
veces: una por la maana y otra por la
tarde.
"P.
Y estando en el estado comatoso,
como usted, dice, puede usted decir al
Juzgado si podia ella hablar o entender
sus palabras o su deseo?
R.
No, seor.
"P.
Hizo usted esfuerzos pera hacerie
comprender sus palabras?
R.
Siempre examinaba a ella para ver
si
reaccionaba
favorable-mente
la
paciente, pero cada vez era peor.
"P.
Puede usted decir si en equella
fecha la paciente podia siquiera hacer
movimiento de cabeza?
R.
No, seor, porque la parte derecha
del cuerpo tenia hemihejia o paralisis. "P.
Cual es la causa de eso que usted
dice hemiflejia o paralisis?
R.
Generalmente se debe a una
hemorragia cerebral o trombosis del
cerebro. "P. Teniendo
hemorragia
cerebral o trombosis del cerebro, segun
usted, cual ee la parte del cuerpo
humano que queda afectada?
R.
La cabeza y tambien los brazos,
como los miembros del cuerpo. "P. Que
quiere usted decir 'como los miembroe
del cuerpo'?
R.
Las manos y los pies.
"P.
Podia mover la paciente sus
manos y su cuerpo?
R.
La parte izquierda si. "P.
Y la
parte derecha?
R.
No, seor.
"JUZGADO. Pero una persona en ese
estado de salud, como estaba la paciente
Doa Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales, el 18
de
noviembre
de
1948,
podia
comprender palabras dichas a ella o
indicaciones hechas por alguna persona
a ella?
R.
No, seor."
(t. s. n. Laquindanum, March 21, 1948,
pp. 30-33.)
While appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr.
has attempted to show that Dr. Leveriza
was not an expert, the latter's testimony
remains uncontradicted. The fact that the
testimony of the attesting witnesses
tends to imply that the testatrix was of
sound mind at the time the alleged
instrument of revocation was executed,
cannot prevail over the findings of the
attending
physician,
Dr.
Leveriza,
because even Dr. Ramon
C. Talavera (an attesting witness)
testified that although he had not
examined the testatrix, her case
appeared serious; that he had a hunch
doubtful
whether
the
testatrix
understood the meaning and extent of
the ceremony. Assuming that the
testatrix answered in the affirmative the
two questions of Constancio Padilla,
without more, we cannot fairly attribute
to her a manifestation of her desire to
proceed, right then and there, with the
signing of the questioned instrument. In
other words, contrary to the recital of the
attestation clause, the testatrix cannot
rightly be said to have published her last
will to the attesting witnesses.
The appealed decision is, therefore,
affirmed without costs. So ordered. Feria,
Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and
Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur and dissent for the same
reasons given by Mr. Justice Montemayor
in the case of Cuevas vs. Achacoso, * G.
R. No. L-3497, 18 May 1951.
Footnotes
*
88 Phil., 730
*
76 Phil., 296.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
*
88 Phil., 730.