Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during
the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of
the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling
law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American
occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto
government are good and valid
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as
the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present
case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.
Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority
of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the
rightful government. it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of
the second kind.
The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals,
is of no consequence.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even
during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation
abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it
to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or
the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur
said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their
force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS
NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts
of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts
may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or
the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would
violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and
maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a
government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Bacani v. NACOCO Digest

G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956
Two-fold Function of the Government
Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court,
counsel for one of the parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said
counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said
transcripts at the rate of P1 per page.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of
Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that
NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying
the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
trial, the court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1) that Defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) that the payments already made by said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and
received by the latter from the former in the total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just and legal;
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) that Plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to make a refund of these payments already received by them. This
is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and
among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them that may be requested by any interested perso n
(section 8). The fees in question are for the transcript of notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National Coconut Corporation is
interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Government of the Philippine Islands is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government
are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of
local government

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

HELD:
No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of being part of the government because they do not come
under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of adjusting
the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra

products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut
industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our
Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518
the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different
from our government.
The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government. Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature. According to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as follows:
1. The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.
2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
4. The determination of contract rights between individuals.
5. The definition and punishment of crime.
6. The administration of justice in civil cases.
7. The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.
On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely
optional. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and
regulations of trade and industry. The principles to consider whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1)
that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should
do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals.

LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate
Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
1.

On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested
that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

2.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino

3.

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and
the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of
ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, .
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioners lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this
Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the
incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of
their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections . Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides
for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986
Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with
the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [Peoples Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.];
and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the
National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus
invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to
comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands
brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs.
Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws
which promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. The government has the right to enforce
all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful
heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA G.R. NO. 164785. APRIL 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against
INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng
mga demonyong ito.[1] x x x
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5,
Art.III.
Held: No
. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental
rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan
for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either
as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language.
The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene , at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be
considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and
found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the
show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.
In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose
under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior
restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it
was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines
Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the
Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of
the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over
Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline
law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss
of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with
the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country
exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the

exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under
UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be
enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing
a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws
(CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative
power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations
among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of
sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of
membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.