EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No.

L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is
where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA)
is to beconstructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these
lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated
to the government without them reaching the agreement as to
the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for
the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining
the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of

justcompensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The
valuation in the decree may only serve as guidingprinciple or one
of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not

substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be

awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of
justcompensation is a judicial function. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the
private party may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, orexecutive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the justness of the decreed compensation.

Ichong vs. Hernandez, GR No. L-7995

Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate
theRetail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for
a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in
the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article
XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid

exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is

authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the
institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports
to remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by aliendominance and control of the retail business and
free citizens and country from dominance and control. Such
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future. Furthermore,
the law does not violate the equal protectionclause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to
carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as
a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion
the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.
Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that
it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into

on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or

surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

[Digest] People vs. Fajardo (1958)

PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

Facts
Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur.
During his term the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7
which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a
written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.

1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a

permit to construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on
Fajardos private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 request denied because it would destroy the view of
the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18,
1954.

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a

permit because they claimed that they needed a residence badly
due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace
court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7
o

CFI Affirmed

o CA forwarded the case to the SC because the appeal attacks

the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in

its regulation of property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality
could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

Ratio:

The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to

guide and/or control the discretion vested by the ordinance.
STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.
o Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant/deny construction/repair permits

Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of

general welfare
Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not
under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.

IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and

regardless of the fact that they are built on private land are
condemned by the ordinance appellants constrained would be
constrained to leave their land to idle without receiving just
compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private land

Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised

Administrative Code Sec. 2243 C that municipal council shall
have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding
establishing fire limits in populous centers empowers municipal
government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees
for such permits
o

IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the
municipal council promulgated in order to set a standard in the type
of building that can be safely constructed in the public plaza.