WhatDrivesPricingBehaviorinPeertoPeerMarkets?

EvidencefromtheCarsharingPlatformBlaBlaCar

MehdiFarajallah(Marsouin)
BobHammond(NorthCarolinaStateUniversity)
ThierryPnard(CREM,UniversityofRennes1)

April2016

Abstract: What determines prices and market outcomes in peertopeer platforms? We

study the leading European carsharing platform, BlaBlaCar, to understand price
determination and factors such as reputation that influence demand. Our econometric
modelcontrolsforthejointdeterminationofpriceandquantitydemanded.Controllingfor
price endogeneity, we find that reputation matters in interesting ways. Drivers with more
positive feedback ratings set lower prices and (controlling for price) sell more seats. It is
surprisingthatmorereputabledriverssetlowerprices,giventhatevidencefromotherpeer
topeermarketssuggestthatbrandloyaltyeffectsthatareseenofflinearealsocommonin
onlinemarkets.Weinterpretthis,alongwith otherofourresults,asevidencethat prices
andmarket outcomesonsharingplatformssuchas BlaBlaCararedetermineddifferently
thanonothertypesofpeertopeermarketssuchaseBay.

Introduction
The rise of the sharing economy and the success of sharing platforms like AirBnB have
attracted the attention of economists and other academics as well as the popular press.
Einavetal.(2016)definetheseplatformsaspeertopeermarketsandemphasizetheirrole
inmatchingbuyerstosellerstofacilitatetransactionswithreducedscopeforopportunistic
behavior. Similarly, Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Evans (2011) define these platforms as
twosidedmarketsthatbringtogethertwogroupsofeconomicagents.Thetwosidesofthe
market can be sellers and buyers, hosts and guests, or drivers and riders and are
characterized by crossnetwork externalities. The traditional analysis of these types of
marketsfocusesonmarketssuchaseBayorAmazonMarketPlace;recentlyhowever,these
analyses have begun to focus on markets for carsharing, lending, accommodation, home
services,deliveries,ortaskassignments(Srirametal.,2014).
WestudytheleadingEuropeancarsharingplatform,BlaBlaCar,whichisvaluedat$1.5billion
asofSeptember2015.1BlaBlaCarconnectsadriverwithemptyseatstoriderstosharean
intercitytrip.Similartomanyotherpeertopeermarkets,BlaBlaCarreceivesafeeoneach
ride that is reserved through its platform. A carsharing platform like BlaBlaCar has some
featuresthatmakeitparticularlyinterestingtostudy.Mostempiricalstudiesofpeertopeer
marketfocusonsettingswhereinteractionarelimitedtoonlinecommunication(e.g.,eBay).
In contrast, on BlaBlaCar, the interaction between the two parties begins online, but ends
offline in the drivers car where they share a small space for up to a few hours together.
Obviously, BlaBlaCar users may be motivated by monetary gains (revenue as a driver or
savings as a passenger relative to alternative transportation). However, nonmonetary

http://www.wsj.com/articles/blablacarjoinsranksofbilliondollarventurebackedstartups1442433577

factors, such as social and ecological motivations (i.e. to create social ties or reduce road
congestion and gas emissions) may be as important in determining supply and demand in
thesemarkets(SchorandFitzmaurice,2015).Formoredetailonsocialmotivations,seethe
behavioraleconomicsliteratureonprosocialbehavior,suchasBenabouandTirole(2006)or
Gneezy,Meier,andReyBiel(2011)..
Inthiscontext,westudypricedeterminationandtheroleofreputationinthefunctioningof
BlaBlaCar.Ourmaincontributionisanempiricalanalysisofthejointdeterminationofprice
andthequantityofseatsdemanded.BlaBlaCarpresentsaninterestingempiricalsettingfor
suchastudybecauseitspricesettingenvironmentisdifferentfromothercarsharingpeer
topeermarkets(e.g.,UberandLyft).OnplatformslikeUberandLyft,thepriceissetbythe
market maker and thus any driver offering a given trip at a given moment has the same
price.Incontrast,onBlaBlaCar,driverssettheirownpriceforeachtrip.Thisallowsamore
interesting empirical analysis of price setting by increasing price variation and allowing for
factorssuchasreputationandsocialpreferencestohavemorescopetoinfluenceprices.
Our econometric model addresses the endogeneity of a drivers price and, controlling for
price,modelsthenumberofseatssoldbythedriver.Notsurprisingly,wefindthathigher
pricesareassociatedwithfewerseatssold.Theeffectsizesuggeststhatthefractionofseats
solddecreasesby10percentagepointsforeachoneeurohigherprice.Reputationmatters
insurprisingwaysbecausemorehighlyrevieweddriverssetlowerprices.Incontrast,many
offlinemarketsexhibitbrandloyaltyeffects,wheremorereputablefirmsfetchhigherprices.
Evidence from other peertopeer markets such as eBay has confirmed these effects are
presentonlineaswell.Weinterpretourfindingthatdriverslowertheirpricesastheygain
more feedback ratings as suggestive of the importance of nonmonetary factors in price

setting on BlaBlaCar. Specifically, it may be the case that new drivers have a mix of
monetaryandnonmonetarymotivesforofferingatripbutthemoreexperienceddriversare
thoseforwhomnonmonetarymotivesaremostimportant.Anotherexplanationisthatnew
drivers are systematically overestimating the optimal price and drivers learn to decrease
theirpricewithexperience.Ineithercase,weconcludethatpricesandmarketoutcomeson
sharing platforms such as BlaBlaCar are determined differently than on other types of
peertopeermarketssuchaseBay.
Peertopeer markets serve an important role and have been argued to provide efficiency
gains(EdelmanandGeradin,2015).Specifically,thesemarketslowersearchandtransaction
costs(i.e.,reduceinformationasymmetries)andallowfulleruseofresources(i.e.,increase
car occupancy and reduce road congestion). Despite these benefits, these platforms have
raisedalotofregulatoryissues,especiallyinthetransportationandaccommodationsectors.
Many municipalities and countries have taken steps to restrict the use of residential
propertyforshorttermrentalthroughAirBnBorbannonprofessionaldriversonUber.Our
contribution is to analyze supply and demand factors in a specific peertopeer market,
which is essential to understanding the tradeoffs that are highlighted by these policy
concerns.
Theeffectofpeertopeermarketsonpricesandconsumerwelfareremainopenquestions
becausetheliteratureislimited(Einavetal.,2016).InastudyofAirBnB,EdelmanandLuca
(2014) show that rental prices depend on the characteristics of the apartment (size,
location), but also on the demographics of the landlord: nonblack hosts charge
approximately12%morethanblackhostsforanequivalentrental.Zervasetal.(2014)study
theeffectofAirBnBonthehotelindustry;theyfindthata1%increaseinAirBnBlistingsinan

arearesultsina0.05%decreaseinhotelrevenues,withalargereffectonlowerendhotels.
There is also a literature on the effect of online ratings and reputation in peertopeer
markets(CabralandHortacsu,2010;Cabral,2010;HouserandWooders,2006;Resnickand
Zeckhauser,2002;Resnicketal.2006;HaleyandVanScyoc,2010).Howeverratingaproduct
isquitedifferentfromratingapersonalexperiencewithadriverorahost.Thus,weknow
much less about rating behavior and their effects on sharing platforms such as BlaBlaCar.
One exception is Zervas et al. (2015), who find that ratings on AirBnB platform are
overwhelmingly positive (the average AirBnB property rating is 4.7 stars) but there exists
significantvariability.ThiscorroboratesthefindingsofFradkinetal.(2014),whodocument
underreportingofnegativeexperiencesandotherreviewingbiasesonAirBnB.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Inthenextsection,webrieflyintroducethecarsharing
platformBlaBlaCar.Section2describesourdataandsection3explainstheempirical
methodologytoanalyzemarketoutcomesandaddressendogeneitybias.Section4displays
themaineconometricresultsandsection5providesseveralextensions.Section6concludes.

1. ThecarsharingplatformBlaBlaCar
Founded in France in 2006, BlaBlaCar has become the leading European carsharing
platform.2 BlaBlaCar offers intercity ridesharing services, connecting drivers with empty
seatstopeoplewhoaretravelingonthesametrip(seeFigure1inappendix).Driversearn
money and passengers save on travel expenses (given that the typical trip on BlaBlaCar is
cheaperthanthecorrespondingtrainticket).BlaBlaCarnowoperatesin19countries(mainly

2
ThenameBlaBlaCarcomesfromtheFrenchwordblablathatistheEnglishequivalentofblah.
Driverprofilescandisplaytheirtalkingpreference:Blaiftheydonotliketotalkwithpassengers,
BlaBlaiftheyliketotalkalittle,andBlaBlaBlaiftheyliketotalkalot.
5

inEurope,butalsoinMexicoandIndia).InApril2015,BlaBlaCaracquiredthesecondlargest
Europeancarsharingcompanycarpooling.com,whichexpandedBlaBlaCartomorethan20
million members. In September 2015, BlaBlaCar has raised $200 million, bringing its total
fundingasof2015toover$300million.Thecompanyhasa$1.5billionvaluation.BlaBlaCar
has not seen the types of regulatory battles faced by carsharing companies like Uber,
because BlaBlaCar is considered as a notforprofit ride service (the stated purpose of the
moneyreceivedbydriversisonlytosharethefuelcostofthetrip).
Over2millionpeopleuseBlaBlaCareverymonth,around29%ofwhomaredrivers.In2015,
the average BlaBlaCar user is 34 years old. The platform is popular among young people,
with14%ofdriversand36%ofpassengersbeingstudents.RegistrationonBlaBlaCarisfree
but passengers pay fees that are about 15% of the price of the ride paid to the drivers.3
Similar to most other peertopeer markets, passengers and drivers are asked to provide
ratingofeachotherandwritereviews.
Foreachtrip,BlaBlaCarsuggestsarecommendedpricebasedonthetripdistanceandthe
estimatedpriceoffuelandtolls.4Therecommendedpricedoesnotdependonthenumber
of seats offered. The driver is allowed to adjust the price up or down, with the minimum
(maximum)pricesetas50%(150%)oftherecommendedprice.5InFebruary2012,BlaBlaCar
introducedapricecolorclassification,wherethedriverspricedisplaystopotentialridersas
greenifthedriverchoosesapricethatdoesnotexceedtherecommendedprice.Otherwise,
thepriceisorange(upto125%oftherecommendedprice)orred(upto150%).

3
BookingfeesandVATareaddedtothepricethatthepassengerpaystothedriver.Thefeesearned
byBlaBlaCararecomposedofafixedcomponent(0.89)andavariablecomponent(9.90%,ofthe
pricepaidtothedriver).AVATof20%isaddedtothesefees.
4
Forinstance,in2015,thesuggestedpriceofBlaBlaCarwasautomaticallycalculatedasfollows:.065
perkilometerandperseatifthedrivertakesatollroadand.048perkilometerandperseat
otherwise.
5

https://www.blablacar.in/faq/question/howdoisetmyprice


2. Datacollection
Data were collected from February 2013 to March 2014, but our analysis focused on the
period from August 2013 to March 2014, when data were collected daily. We selected 43
Frenchintercitytrips,chosentoensurearepresentativesampleoftripsthatareofferedon
BlaBlaCar.Ofthese43trips,40tripswereofferedatleastseveraltimesandourfinalsample
containsthese40trips.TheshortesttripisNimesMontpellier(56km)andthelongesttripis
Paris Marseille (774 km). Trips from all around the country were selected: trip between
provincialcitiesaswellastripbetweenParisandaprovincialcity.Thelistoftripsisavailable
in the appendix, including descriptive statistics (distance, number of observations, and
uniquedriversforeachtrip).Thereare41uniquecities(33ofmorethan100,000inhabitants
and8oflessthan100,000inhabitants).
Thedatacollectionprocedurewasautomated.Foreachtrip,wecollectedalloffers,resulting
in948,789 observationsfrom297,582individualdrivers.Thedatacollectionscriptscraped
theBlaBlaCarwebsite,resultinginmultiplesnapshotsofeachobservation(e.g.,threedays
beforedeparture,twodays,etc.).Here,wefocusonthelastobservationforeachoffer.The
data contain the departure and arrival cities; departure date and hour; driver name; and
their profile (gender, age, etc.); whether the drivers photo is shown; and declared
preferencesforsmoking,pets,music,andtalking(dislikestalking,likesalittletalking,orlikes
alotoftalking).Foreachtrip,wehavethenumberofseatsavailable,theprice,andprice
color (green = [50%,100%] of recommend price, orange = (100%,125%], or red =
(125%,150%]).

Whenthesedatawerecollected,theratingmechanismofBlaBlaCarallowedonlyapositive
or negative rating. In our data set, members reputation is, therefore, measured by the
numberandpercentageofpositiveratingsthatwerereceived.6Arelatedmeasureofdrivers
reputationisthefivelevelstatusassignedbyBlaBlaCaronfourcriteria(profilecompletion,
membershipseniority,numberofratings,andpercentpositiverating).Thisstatusispublicly
observable on the drivers profile. The following table shows how a driver is classified as
newcomer, intermediate, experienced, expert, or ambassador. Finally, we also have the
comfort of the drivers car (that takes values between zero and four where higher values
indicateamoreluxuriousvehicle).

Newcomer

Intermediate

Experienced

Expert

Ambassador

Profile completion

> 60%

> 70%

> 80%

> 90%

Number of positive
ratings

>1 rating

>3 ratings

>6 ratings

>12 ratings

Seniority

>1 month

>3 months

>6 months

>12 months

Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data. Panel A summarizes the outcomes of
interest for the entire sample, while Panel B presents our explanatory variables, including
eachdriveronlyonce.Driversare36yearsold,onaverage,andaround40%oflistingsareby
females.Driversincludeapicturewiththeirprofilein39%ofcases.56%ofdriversindicate
thattheyplaymusicduringthetrip,9%allowpets,and7%allowsmoking.Finally,26%of
driverstendtoofferroundtriptravel,while12%ofdriversallowaseattobesoldonlyafter
manually confirming the sale (as opposed to an immediate sale). Regarding drivers

6
Asof2015,BlaBlaCarsratingsystemisricherwithafivepointscale:5pointsifthepassengerrates
theexperienceasoutstanding,4pointsifexcellent,3ifgood,2ifpoor,and1ifverydisappointing.
8

experience,thenumberofratingsreceivedis8.4onaverage,whiledriverstatusis2.7and
carclass2.3onaverage.Usingthesedata,weestimatetheeconometricmodelexplained
next.
[InsertTable1]

3. EconometricModel
To understand the functioning of the BlaBlaCar carsharing sharing platform, we perform a
regression analysis to explain the pricescharged and quantitiessold by drivers in the data
described above. We use data listed on BlaBlaCar starting from August 2013 until March
2014.WecleanedthedatatoexcludelistingswithadeparturedateafterDecember2014.
Theresultingdatasetcontains948,789listingsfrom297,582drivers.
Oureconometricmodelusesafixedeffectspaneldataregression,withtripfixedeffects.A
tripisdefinedasadeparturecityarrivalcitypair.Thereare40tripsinthedata,withthe
following five trips as the most commonly offered trips in descending order: (Nimes,
Montpellier), (Nantes, Rennes), (Lille, Paris), (Lyon, Paris), and (Toulouse, Bordeaux).
Includingtripfixedeffectsallowsustocontrolforthegeneralcharacteristicsofthetripand
thenlookseparatelyatlistingspecificfactorsthataffectdrivers'pricesandriders'purchase
behavior.

withi=driver,j=tripandt=departuredate.

Measuringthequantitysold
Todefinequantitysold(qijt),weusethepanelnatureofourdatawithrepeatedlistingsofa
givendriver.Whilethedatacollectionislikelytomissseatssoldforadriveronalisting,itis
unlikelytosystematicallymissseatssoldonalllistingsthatadrivereveroffers.Assuch,we
constructavariablethatisequaltothemaximumnumberofseatsavailableeverobserved
bythedriveracrossalllistings.Whilethismeasurecouldbenoisyifadriverusesdifferent
carsfordifferenttrips,wehavecharacteristicsthathelptoidentifythecarusedinalisting
(specificallytheratingofthecar).Weusethevariablestoconstructanalternativemeasure
ofthemaximumnumberofseatsavailable,findingthatthetwomeasureslargelyoverlap.
We use the maximum number of seats available for each driver to construct two quantity
soldvariables.First,fractionsoldmeasurestheproportionofmaximumseatsavailablethat
soldforthelisting,varyingbetweenzeroandone.Second,allseatssoldisadummyvariable
thatequalsonewhenfractionsoldequalsone,thatis,whenthenumberofseatsavailable
equalszeroatthecloseofthelisting.Notethattheallseatssolddummyisrobusttoour
approach for measuring the maximum number of seats available. In particular, while we
imperfectlyobservethenumberofseatsinitiallyoffered,weperfectlyobservethenumber
ofseatsavailableforeachlisting,irrespectiveofhowsoonorhowoftenthedataextraction
softwaregathereddataonalisting.Ifalistinghaszeroseatsavailablewhenitcloses,then
allofthelistingsseatssold,bydefinition.Thetwoquantitysoldmeasuresprovidesimilar
resultsinwhatfollows,providingsupportforourapproachfordefiningquantitysold.
Controllingforpriceendogeneity
Theoutcomesofprimaryinterestarepriceandquantitysold.Ourapproachistopresentan
instrumentalvariablesregressionanalysis,wherepriceisconsideredanendogenousvariable
10

that affects quantity sold. As such, we use an instrument that we argue affects the price
that a driver sets but has no effect on riders, except through its influence on price. The
instrumentisconstructedfromthetriplevelpanelnatureofourdata.Specifically,welink
drivers who offer a given trip to other trips offered by the same driver to construct the
universeoflistingsofferedbythedriverduringoursampleperiod.
Importantly,thisapproachrequiresthatwepreciselyidentifydrivers.Unfortunately,unlike
other online marketplaces, BlaBlaCar does not use unique user IDs as part of its listing
interface,anapproachthatisusefulwitheBaydata,forexample.Asaresult,weneedto
identifydriversascarefullyaspossibletobeabletosaywhichlistingswereofferedbythe
samedriver.Todoso,weusethreevariablesinourdata:firstname,age,andgender.We
have explored including other variables to identify drivers uniquely, including whether a
photo is shown and whether smoking is allowed in the car. Reassuringly, each approach
classifies the vast majority of drivers in the same way and all the results that follow are
robusttoalternativedriverclassifications.
Having identified drivers, we construct driver characteristics in three ways: over all trips,
overthetripinquestion,andoveralltripsotherthanthetripinquestion.Tobeclear,this
impliesthatifadriverisonlyeverobservedofferingtripsfromLyontoGrenobleandfrom
Lyon to Paris, then we use characteristics of the Lyon to Paris trips when referring to the
LyontoGrenobletripandusingthetermtripsotherthanthetripinquestion.
Usingthisapproach,theinstrumentistheaveragepricechargedbythesamedriveronall
tripsotherthanthetripinquestion.Forthedriverswhoonlyeverofferonetrip,thenthere
arenosuchtrips.Werefertothesedriversassingletripdriversand,forthesedrivers,the
averageotherpriceinstrumentequalszero.Thisinstrumentisessentiallyacombinationof
11

two distinct characteristics of drivers. First, does the driver offer trips between a pair of
citiesthatisdifferentfromthepairofcitiesinquestion?Thisfactordetermineswhetherthe
instrument is positive. Second, if yes, did the driver set prices that were high or low, on
average, on those other trips? This factor determines the continuous variation in the
instrumentifitisnonzero.Inessence,ourinstrumentisacombinationofadummyvariable
for whether the driver offers trips other than the trip in question and, if so, a continuous
variablemeasuringaveragepriceonthosetrips.
Webelieve(andwillprovideevidencetosupport)thattheinstrumentis verystrong. The
intuitionbehindtheaverageotherpriceinstrumentisthatacombinationofobservedand
unobserved characteristics of the driver affects the price she sets. However, the
econometricianhasaccesstoallobservedcharacteristicsandthusthevariationinpricethat
isaffectedbytheunobservedcharacteristicsshouldbehighlycorrelatedacrossthedrivers
listingsonthetripinquestionandherlistingsontripsotherthanthetripinquestion.
Further,webelievethattheaverageotherpriceinstrumentisplausiblyexogenousbecause
itreflectsunderlyingfactorsaboutthedriverthatshouldnotaffectdemandexceptthrough
thepricesetonthelistinginquestion.Itisveryusefulthatwehavealargenumberoftrips
becauseconstructing the averageprice the driver set for other listings on the same trip is
likely to itself be endogenous; such an averagesameprice instrument is problematic
because potential riders might observe a given driver offering a given trip across multiple
listingsofthe trip.Byusingtheaveragepriceontripsotherthan thetripinquestion,we
greatlyreducethepossibilitythatridershaveanysenseofwherethedriverfallsintheprice
distributionforothertrips.

12

Using the averageotherprice instrument, we conduct an instrumental variables analysis,

where the first stage asks what factors affect the drivers price and the second stage asks
what factors affect the quantity sold, controlling for the endogeneity of the price in its
determinationofquantitysold.Ourpricemeasureisstraightforward,thepricesetininteger
Euros.However,quantitysoldisbased onthenumberofseatsavailable thatis shownto
potential riders and our variable construction requires further explanation. The data
extractionsoftwareusedtogatherdataregularlyvisitedhundredsofthousandsofBlaBlaCar
listingpagesbutinstantaneousdatacollectionisinfeasible.Asaresult,thedataoccasionally
containanumberofseatsavailablevariablethatalreadyreflectsalowerquantitysupplied
thanthetruequantitysupplied.
NowreturntoTable1,whichshowssummarystatisticsforthekeyvariablesinourdata.The
average price set by drivers is around 13 euros, with substantial variation (standard
deviation of 9.4 euros). As discussed in the previous section, we have two measures of
quantity sold: fraction sold measures the proportion of listed seats that sold (average of
62%),whileallseatssoldisadummyvariable(averageof53%).Theinstrumentalvariable
used to handle the endogeneity of price is the averageotherprice variable, which has an
averageofaround11euros.Driversoffer3.8listingsoftheirmodaltripand2.6listingsof
tripsotherthantheirmodaltrip.Justoverhalfofthedriversinoursampleonlyeveroffer
onetrip,implyingthattheaverageotherpriceinstrumentequalszerojustoverhalfofthe
time.
Figures2and3presenttheevolutionofmeanpricesandtheaveragepercentageofseats
sold for all trips and for the single trip ParisLyon, where ParisLyon is chosen as a
representativetripamongthemostcommonlyobservedtrips.Pricesexhibitsomevolatility

13

around a trend over time. Further, seats sold appear to positively covary with prices,
reflectingunderlyingseasonalityinbothsupplyanddemand.Finally,thereisanoticeable
decreaseinpricesandseatssoldaroundtheendof2013thatrecoversearlyin2014.Inthe
appendix,welistthecoefficientofvariationbytripovertheperiod,whichmeasuresprice
dispersion for a given trip. This dispersion measure ranges from 10.5% to 47.5% in these
data.
[InsertFigure2and3]

EconometricSpecification
Theeconometricspecificationthroughoutusesfixedeffectspaneldataregression,withtrip
fixedeffects.Forprice,themodelisalinearregression.Forthefractionofseatssoldand
the all seats sold dummy variable, we again use linear regression. In both cases, the
appropriate econometric specification is nonlinear: fractional logit in the case of fraction
sold (which continuously varies between zero and one) and logit/probit in the case of all
seats sold (which is a dummy variable). However, econometric models that handle
endogeneity and allow for fixed effects are not available for either fractional logit or
logit/probit. We could use a randomeffect paneldata model but the orthogonality
assumptionontheunobservedeffectsimposedbytherandomeffectsmodeldoesnothold
inthesedata.Insteadofignoringendogeneityorignoringunobservedtripleveleffects,we
uselinearmodelsthroughout.Ourapproachisconsistentwiththeapproachadvocatedby
Angrist and Pischke (2008). In all specifications, continuous explanatory variables are
includedinquadraticform,withtheresultsshownasthemarginaleffectatthemean.

14

Wenowpresenttheresultsfromthefirststage(price)andsecondstage(quantitysold).

4. EmpiricalResults
Table 2 presents the determinants of price, which serves as the firststage of our
instrumental variables regression analysis. Recall that our econometric specification is a
paneldata regression with trip fixed effects. First, the averageotherprice instrument
(average price set on trips other than the trip in question) is highly statistically significant,
withaneffectsizeofonecentforeacheurohigherthepriceissetonothertrips.
[InsertTable2]
Regardingdriverexperience,thenumberoffeedbackratingsisstatisticallyinsignificantbut
driver status is not, probably due to the high correlation between the two measures. For
status,driverswithmoreexperiencesetlowerpricestoaquantitativelymeaningfuldegree.
If we omit driver status, we find the same result with the number of feedback received:
driverswithmoreratingssetlowerprices.Intuitionfromofflinemarketssuggestthatbrand
loyalty effects should allow more established firms to charge higher prices. Evidence from
eBayshowthatsellerreputationdoeshaveapositiveeffectonprices:buyersarewillingto
pay more for items sold by sellers with a good reputation (Cabral, 2016). In contrast, we
interpret our finding as suggestive that new drivers on BlaBlaCar are using a different
decisionmaking process when setting prices than that of experienced drivers. A first
explanation is the new drivers are unsure of the appropriate price, and set systematically
highprices,whileexperienceddriverslearnabouttheplatformandadjusttheirpricesdown
toincreasetheirchancetoselltheiremptyseats.Asecondexplanationisthatnewdrivers

15

aremoreattractedtoBlaBlaCarbyaprofitmotive,whileexperienceddrivershavegainedan
appreciationforthenonpecuniaryattributesofridersobtainedthroughtheplatform(pro
social behavior). In either case, we interpret this as evidence that prices and market
outcomesonsharingplatformssuchasBlaBlaCararedetermineddifferentlythanonother
typesofpeertopeermarketssuchaseBay.
Next, car class measures the luxurious nature of the vehicle, where zero represents no
indication of the class, relative to values between one (basic comfort) to four (luxurious).
Interestingly,whenthereisnoindicationgiven,pricesaresetasifthevehicleisaverage(a
classbetweentwoandthree).Otherwise,moreluxuriousvehicleshavehigherprices.The
fact that cars of an undisclosed comfort level are being priced as if they are of average
quality runs counter to the intuition that suggests unraveling would force undisclosed
vehicles to be treated as if they were of the lowest level of comfort. To gain a full
understanding,thequestioniswhetherthesevehiclesofundisclosedcomfortlevelsellata
similarratetoaveragequalityvehicles.
Regarding other characteristics of the driver, older drivers set higher prices, as do female
drivers. We discuss the result on age in Section 5, which contains extensions of the main
results.Specifically,recallthatage(alongwiththeothercontinuousvariables)isincludedin
quadraticform,wheretheresultsshowninTable2arethemarginaleffectatthemean.In
Section 5, we ask whether age has a nonlinear effect, which would not be apparent by
consideringonlytheeffectatthemean.
Driverswithaphotosetpricesthatarenodifferentfromdriverswithoutaphoto.Drivers
who declare to listen to music in their car set lower prices, perhaps suggesting that these
driversseekridersforenjoymentmoresothanforprofit.Thisresultmayalsosuggestthat
16

riders who do not want to be disturbed by music are willing to pay more for a quiet ride.
Further,driverswhoallowpetssetlowerprices,whiledriverswhoallowsmokingsethigher
prices.Finally,roundtriplistingsaresetwithhigherprices,whiledriverswhorequiremanual
confirmationalsosethigherprices.
Also shown in Table 2 is the firststage F statistic, which measures instrumental validity of
the averageotherprice instrument. The statistic equals 1683.5, which is very large and
considerablyabovetheruleofthumbthatitexceed10inordertomitigateconcernsabout
weakinstruments(AngristandPischke2008).Further,weruntworobustnesschecksofthe
instrumenttomeasurethestrengthofbothcomponentsofthevariationinourinstrument:
first,thezero/nonzerovariationinourinstrumentofwhetherthedriverofferstripsother
than the trip in question and, second, the continuous variation in our instrument of the
averagepriceonthosetrips.
To measure the strength in the zero/nonzero variation, we rerun the firststage weak
instrumenttest withan instrumentthatequalsoneifthe driveroffersmultipletrips. The
firststageF statisticin thiscaseequals173.1. To measure thestrengthin the continuous
variation,wererunthefirststageweakinstrumenttestforonlymultipletripdriverstoask
whether the continuous variation in our instrument is strongly associated with price. The
statisticinthiscaseequals 1672.2.Theseresultssuggestthatmost ofthestrength ofthe
instrument comes from the continuous variation but that both sources of variation are
sufficiently strong to support the use of the averageotherprice instrument as a strong
predictorofprices.
Turningtothedeterminantsofquantitysold,Table3displaystheresultsforthefractionsold
measureinColumn(1)andtheallseatssolddummyinColumn(2).Thetwosetsofresults
17

areverysimilar,leadingustoonlydiscussColumn(1).Havingahigherpriceisassociated
with fewer seats sold, where fraction sold decreases by around 10 percentage points for
eachoneeurohigherprice.
[InsertTable3]

Driverswithmoreexperiencesellmoreseats,wheretheresultsareconsistentbetweenthe
feedbackratingvariableandthedriverstatusindicators.Forstatusinparticular,theresults
suggestthatmoreexperiencehasasmallreturnwhenmovingfromstatusonetostatusfour
butameaningfulreturnofmovingtostatusfive,whichBlaBlaCarreferstoasAmbassador
status.Ambassadorssellaroundfivepercentagepointsmoreseats.Giventheinteresting
resultsthatweseeforexperiencewithregardtopriceandquantitydemanded,wefurther
considertheseresultsinthenextsectionofextensions.
Forcarclass,moreluxuriousvehiclesareassociatedwithmoresoldseats,whichisintuitive.
Vehicles of the lowest comfort levels, one and two, sell more often than the omitted
category,whichreferstovehicleswithundisclosedcomfortlevel.Recallthatdriverswhodo
not disclose the comfort level set prices as if their vehicles are of average quality. When
consideringquantitydemanded,thesevehiclesofundisclosedqualityaretreatedasifthey
areofthelowestqualitylevel,consistentwiththeunravelingresulteconomistsoftenpredict
undervoluntaryqualitydisclosure.
Concerningotherdrivercharacteristics,thefollowingareassociatedwithmoresales:older
drivers,females,photoshown,playingmusic,androundtrips.Incontrast,allowingpetsand
requiring manual confirmation are associated with fewer sales, while allowing smoking is

18

associatedwithneithermorenorlesssales.Thestatisticallyinsignificantresultforsmoking
is the only case in which the two measures of quantity demanded give different results:
Column(2)(allseatssolddummy)showsastatisticallysignificantnegativeeffectofallowing
smoking,whileColumn(1)(fractionofseatssold)showsastatisticallyinsignificantnegative
effect. In both case though, allowing smoking appears to have a small effect on quantity
demanded,whichcouldsuggestthatthepricepremiumsmokersarewillingtopaytosmoke
partiallyoffsetsthepricepremiumnonsmokersarewillingtopaytoavoidsmoking.
Finally, Table 4 presents the final set of covariates, displaying the effects of departure
time/day characteristics on price and quantity. That is, Column (1) of Table 4 presents
resultsfromthesameregressionasColumn(1)ofTable2,whileColumns(2)and(3)ofTable
4presentresultsfromthesameregressionsasColumns(1)and(2)ofTable3,respectively.
Fordeparturedayofweek,dayswithhigherpricesarealsothosedayswithmorequantities
sold,showingastrongpreferencefordeparturesonSaturdayandSunday(theomittedday).
From these results, a Tuesday departure is associated with the lowest prices yet also the
lowest quantity sold (controlling for the endogeneity of price). For departure time in six
hourintervals,wefindthatpricesarelowerfortripsthatdepartlaterintheday,especially
after 6PM, while more seats are sold between 6AM and 6PM, relative to nighttime hour
departures. Finally, a time trend is included to control for patterns over our eight month
sample period. We find that prices trend downward, as do quantities; however, the
aggregatedatainFigure2donotsuggestadownwardtrendotherthanadiparoundtheend
ofthecalendaryear.Thesetrendsareinterestingbut,asoursampleislessthanoneyear,
wecannotcontrolforanoveralltrendseparatelyfrommonthlyseasonality.Asaresult,we
donotdrawmuchinthewayofinterpretationofanypotentialtimetrend.

19

[InsertTable4]

5. Extensions
a) NonlinearitiesintheEffectofAgeonPriceandtheProbabilityofSale
Figures 4 and 5 present an analysis of the effects of the age of the driver on price and
quantity demanded, respectively. This analysis uses the fraction of seats sold as the
measure of quantity demanded, but results are very similar when using the all seats sold
dummyvariable.TheseresultsaregeneratedusingStatasmarginscommandandshowthe
marginal effect of age on each outcome, along with 95% confidence intervals. Age is
included in the earlier specifications in quadratic form but the earlier regression tables
displayedonlythemarginaleffectatthemean.
[InsertFigures4and5]

Now,weaskwhethertheeffectofageislinear,orwhetherincrementalincreasesintheage
ofthedriverareassociatedwithdifferenteffectsatdifferentages.Fortheageofthedriver,
anadditionalyearofageisassociatedwithhigherpricesatallages;therelationshipshows
minimalcurvature,suchthattheslopeisslightlydiminishinginage.Themagnitudeofthe
effect is small but highly statistically significant, as can be seen by the 95% confidence
intervals.Theeffectsizesuggeststhatcomparinga25yearolddrivertoa41yearolddriver
(the25thand75thagepercentiles,respectively)resultsinapriceincreasefrom13.33euros
to13.44euros.

20

In contrast to the linear effect on price, there is a nonlinear effect of age on quantity
demanded such that the effect is increasing at first and then decreasing. That is, among
youngerdrivers,anadditionalyearofageisassociatedwithmoresales,while,amongolder
drivers,anadditionalyearofageisassociatedwithfewersales.Theeffectofagechanges
frompositivetonegativearound38yearsofage.
Puttingtheresultsonpriceandquantitydemandedtogether,weseethatdriversintheir30s
fare better than drivers in their 20s, in terms of quantity demanded, despite the fact that
driversintheir30ssethigherprices.Oncedriversreacharoundage40,theeffectoffurther
increasesinageareassociatedwithlowerdemand,yettheseolderdriverscontinuetoset
higherprices.Thispatternisconsistentwithhomophily,thatis,youngerdriverswantingto
travelwithyoungriders,perhapsbecausetheysharecommoninterests.Asyoungerriders
are likely to be more price sensitive, young drivers may be setting lower prices to attract
theirpeers.Similarly,olderdriversareprobablymoreselectiveinwithwhomtheyrideand
highpricesserveasascreeningdevicetoselectriders.

b) HeterogeneityinthePriceElasticityofDemand:DriverReputation
Next,theanalysisconsiderswhetherourmainresultsonthepriceelasticityofdemandmask
importantheterogeneityinpricesensitivityacrosscharacteristicsofthedriver.Wefocuson
the drivers reputation, as measured by her number of feedback evaluations. We split
driversintofourcategoriesusingquartilesofthereputationvariable,splittingdriversfrom
leasttomostexperienceasfollows:zeroratings,onetothreeratings,fourto13ratings,and
morethan13ratings.Theresultsareverysimilarifweinsteadcategorizedriversusingthe

21

driverstatusvariable;usingthenumberoffeedbackratingsinsteadallowscomparisonwith
relatedworkinonlinemarketssuchaseBay.
TheresultsinTable5suggestamonotonicrelationshipsuchthatridersaremoresensitiveto
the prices of more experienced drivers, relative to less experienced drivers. The effect of
each category is statistically significantly different from the effect of the neighboring
category. However, the maintakeaway from Table5 isthattheeffectsin Columns(2)(4)
are relatively similar, while the effect in Column (1) is markedly smaller. That is, price
mattersmoreforexperienceddriversthanfornewdrivers.Ourinterpretationisthatanew
drivercannotsimplysellherseatsbysettingaverylowprice;instead,ridersappeartobe
cautiouswhenbuyingfromnewdrivers.Itmaybethecasethatridersarerelyingonother
signalsofanewdriversqualityandthatpricealonedoesnotallownewdriverstogenerate
aninitiallevelofdemand.
[InsertTable5]

c) PricingDecisionsRelativetotheSuggestedPrice
Table6presentssummarystatisticsonthefractionofpricessetateachcolorlevel(green,
orange, red), overall and separately for drivers in each quartile of the reputation
distribution.Recallthatthepriceisgreenwhenthedriversetsapriceequalorbelowthe
suggestedprice.Ifthedriverchoosesafareupto125%oftherecommendedprice,thecolor
becomesorange.Thepricecolorisredifthepriceismorethan125%oftherecommended
price.Table6showsthatthevastmajorityofdriversstayinthegreencolor(only11.9%of
pricesareorangeand1.5%red).

22

[InsertTable6]

Wepreviouslysawthatlessexperienceddriverssethigherprices.Table6allowsustosee
whether this finding also holds for prices relative to the recommended price and whether
this translates to a meaningful difference in prices set at each color. The results clearly
suggestthatitdoes,witharound83%oftheleastexperienceddriverssettinggreenprices
and90%ofthemostexperienceddriverssettinggreenprices.Further,Table6allowsusto
seewhetherthemovementtowardgreenpricesisrelativelyuniformindriverexperience,or
whetherdriversquicklyshifttowardgreenpricesastheygainexperience.Theresultshere
suggestthatthetrendtowardgreenpricesissteadilyincreasinginexperienceanddoesnot
sharplyjumpatanyparticularlevel ofexperience.For the mostexperienceddrivers,only
1%ofpricesaresetsofarabovethereferencepricethattheydisplaytodriversasred;for
the least experienced drivers, the number is 2.5%. Finally, the ratio of the frequency of
orangeprices,relativetoredprices,staysapproximatelyconstantasexperiencegrows.

6. DiscussionandConclusion
Despitetheincreasingimportanceofcarsharing,theseplatformshavereceivedonlylimited
economic analysis. Our paper studies a large carsharing platform to understand price
determination and factors such as reputation that affect demand. These peertopeer
platformsallowbothonlineandofflineinteractionsbetweenusers.Asaresult,pricingand
reputation effects are likely to present novel insights relative to the large literature that
studiesthesequestionsusingdatafromelectronicmarketplacessuchaseBay.

23

Our analysis focuses onthe leadingEuropean carsharing platform, BlaBlaCar, which allows
sharingofanintercitytripbyconnectingdriverswithemptyseatstopotentialriders.The
main reason to study pricing and market outcomes on BlaBlaCar is that prices are set by
individual drivers, relative to a recommended price that is suggested by BlaBlaCar. In
contrast,onothercarsharingpeertopeermarketssuchasUberandLyft,thepriceissetby
themarketmakerandthusanydriverofferingagiventripatagivenmomenthasthesame
price. Our focus is on reputation and the potential for social motives in pricing behavior,
thusdriverlevelvariationinpricesisimportantforafullunderstandingofstrategicbehavior
(BenabouandTirole,2006;Gneezy,Meier,andReyBiel,2011)..
Inaneconometricmodelthatexplicitlyaccountsforpriceendogeneity,wefindthatdrivers
with more positive feedback ratings set lower prices and (controlling for price) sell more
seats. However, experience has a significant return when the drivers reach the highest
status, Ambassador, who sell around five percentage points more seats. Moreover, riders
are more sensitive to the prices of more experienced drivers, relative to less experienced
drivers.Further,wefindthatdriverdemographicsmatterininterestingways:femalesset
higher prices, yet (controlling for price) sell more seats. Finally, older drivers set higher
prices, while there is a nonlinear effect of age on quantity demanded; in total, drivers in
theirlate30sfarebestintermsofrevenue.
The rich nature of our BlaBlaCar data allows us to present a detailed analysis of market
outcomesinanimportanttypeofpeertopeermarket.However,asusualwithdatafrom
online markets, there are some features of the data that limit the questions we can ask.
First, we do not observe information about the riders who are buying seats. Thus, we
cannot measure the degree of homophily or social links between drivers and their

24

passengers.Second,wehaveonlyabinaryscaleforratings(positiveornegative).Sincethe
time of our data collection, BlaBlaCar has adopted a fivelevel reputation measure, which
would be useful to verify our findings on the effects of reputation on price and quantity
demanded.Moreover,astheplatformhasmatured,itwillbeinterestingtoanalyzehowthe
roleofreputationhasevolved.
Intotal,ourstudyrepresentsafirststeptowardanunderstandingofpricingbehaviorand
marketoutcomesonpeertopeermarketsandtheeffectofsocialmotivations(sharing)in
thesetypesofmarkets.

25

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28

Figure 1: Screenshots of BlaBlaCar website

29

Figure 2: Average percentage seats sold and mean prices over time for all trips

16

1.200

14

1.000

12

0.800

10

0.600

0.400

0.200

4
8/19/13

%seatssold

MeanPrice()

AllTrips

0.000
9/19/13

10/19/13

11/19/13

12/19/13

MeanPrice()

1/19/14

2/19/14

%seatssold

30

Figure 3: Average percentage seats sold and mean prices over time for ParisLyon

ParisLyon
1.2

31
30

29

0.8

27
26

0.6
25
24

0.4

23
22

0.2

21
20
8/19/13

0
9/19/13

10/19/13

11/19/13

12/19/13

MeanPrice()

31

1/19/14

%seatssold

2/19/14

%seatssold

MeanPrice()

28

Figure 4: Nonlinearities in the Effect of Age on Price

13.3

Predicted Price
13.4
13.5

13.6

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

20

30

40
Age

50

60

Figure 5: Nonlinearities in the Effect of Age on Pr(Sale)

.605

.61

Predicted Pr(Sale)
.615
.62

.625

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

20

30

40
Age

60

32

50

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Unit of Observation = Trip
Price
13.386

(9.421)
Fraction Sold
0.618

(0.435)
All Seats Sold
0.529

(0.499)
Avg. Price, Other Trips
11.149

(7.867)
N
948789
Panel B: Unit of Observation = Driver
Number of Same Trips
3.787

(6.944)
Number of Other Trips
2.565

(6.760)
SingleTrip Driver
0.547

(0.498)
Feedback Rating
8.344

(18.456)
Driver Status
2.655

(1.447)
Car Class
2.263

(1.053)
Age
36.034

(13.307)
Female
0.401

(0.490)
Photo Shown
0.388

(0.487)
Plays Music
0.555

(0.497)
Allows Pets
0.089

(0.284)
Allows Smoking
0.067

(0.250)
Roundtrip
0.260

(0.439)
Manual Confirmation
0.116

(0.320)
N
297582

33

Table 2: FirstStage Regression Results

(1)

Price
Avg. Price, Other Trips
0.010
(0.000)***
Feedback Rating
0.000
(0.000)
Driver Status=2
0.150
(0.009)***
Driver Status=3
0.278
(0.010)***
Driver Status=4
0.399
(0.010)***
Driver Status=5
0.445
(0.012)***
Car Class=1
0.326
(0.018)***
Car Class=2
0.183
(0.012)***
Car Class=3
0.018
(0.012)
Car Class=4
0.313
(0.016)***
Age
0.006
(0.000)***
Female
0.137
(0.007)***
Photo Shown
0.007
(0.007)
Plays Music
0.113
(0.007)***
Allows Pets
0.201
(0.011)***
Allows Smoking
0.141
(0.013)***
Roundtrip
0.168
(0.007)***
Manual Confirmation
0.509
(0.008)***
N
948789
FirstStage F Stat
1683.508
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

34

Table 3: Main Regression Results

(1)

Fraction Sold
Price
0.097
(0.003)***
Feedback Rating
0.000
(0.000)***
Driver Status=2
0.018
(0.002)***
Driver Status=3
0.011
(0.002)***
Driver Status=4
0.009
(0.002)***
Driver Status=5
0.053
(0.002)***
Car Class=1
0.010
(0.003)***
Car Class=2
0.035
(0.002)***
Car Class=3
0.032
(0.002)***
Car Class=4
0.044
(0.003)***
Age
0.000
(0.000)***
Female
0.035
(0.001)***
Photo Shown
0.007
(0.001)***
Plays Music
0.019
(0.001)***
Allows Pets
0.018
(0.002)***
Allows Smoking
0.002
(0.002)
Roundtrip
0.011
(0.001)***
Manual Confirmation
0.420
(0.002)***
N
948789

35

(2)
All Seats Sold
0.086
(0.003)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.013
(0.002)***
0.008
(0.002)***
0.005
(0.002)***
0.058
(0.002)***
0.013
(0.003)***
0.037
(0.002)***
0.039
(0.002)***
0.046
(0.003)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.057
(0.001)***
0.008
(0.001)***
0.020
(0.001)***
0.016
(0.002)***
0.006
(0.002)***
0.019
(0.001)***
0.530
(0.002)***
948789

Table 4: Regression Results of Departure Characteristics

(1)
(2)

Price
Fraction Sold
Departure=Monday
0.127
0.064
(0.011)***
(0.002)***
Departure=Tuesday
0.162
0.113
(0.013)***
(0.002)***
Departure=Wednesday
0.111
0.104
(0.013)***
(0.002)***
Departure=Thursday
0.009
0.065
(0.012)
(0.002)***
Departure=Friday
0.054
0.026
(0.009)***
(0.001)***
Departure=Saturday
0.066
0.005
(0.011)***
(0.002)***
Departure=[6AM,12PM]
0.007
0.052
(0.023)
(0.004)***
Departure=[12PM,6PM]
0.077
0.050
(0.023)***
(0.004)***
Departure=[6PM,12AM]
0.230
0.002
(0.024)***
(0.004)
Departure Time Trend
0.006
0.002
***
(0.000)
(0.000)***
N
948789
948789

36

(3)
All Seats Sold
0.066
(0.002)***
0.119
(0.002)***
0.113
(0.002)***
0.071
(0.002)***
0.028
(0.001)***
0.003
(0.002)*
0.066
(0.004)***
0.064
(0.004)***
0.013
(0.004)***
0.001
(0.000)***
948789

Table 5: Heterogeneity in the Price Elasticity of Demand

(1)
(2)
(3)

Rating=0
Rating=(1,3)
Rating=(4,13)
Price
0.053
0.213
0.242

(0.003)***
(0.013)***
(0.013)***
N
217345
226896
279355

37

(4)
Rating>13
0.309
(0.019)***
225193

Table 6: Distribution of price color by ratings received by the driver

Green Price

Orange Price

Red Price

Rating=0
0.829

0.146

0.025

Rating=(1,3)
0.851

Rating=(4,13)
0.877

0.133

0.112

0.088

0.017

0.011

0.010

38

Rating>13
0.902

Total
0.865

0.119

0.015

Appendix:Summarystatisticsbytrip

Numberof
observations

Distinct
drivers

Average
price

Coefficient Percentage
ofvariation
Sale

AixAvignon

15407

10701

5.188

0.290

AmiensBeauvais

4485

2472

4.264

AngersLeMans

23635

16248

BesanconDijon

3274

BordeauxNantes

Soldall

Distance
(km)

0.581

0.500

81

0.282

0.546

0.472

66

6.184

0.223

0.552

0.460

97

2241

5.893

0.357

0.444

0.342

93

37304

27029

21.169

0.111

0.619

0.521

353

BrestSaintBrieuc

8049

5059

8.055

0.211

0.440

0.314

144

CaenRennes

23293

14371

10.987

0.158

0.499

0.378

185

ClermontLyon

29589

20859

12.351

0.161

0.555

0.446

166

DijonBesancon

3430

2294

5.876

0.337

0.434

0.330

93

GrenobleLyon

24507

15337

6.850

0.217

0.498

0.383

105

LeHavreCaen

8984

5032

5.841

0.185

0.512

0.388

96

LeMansTours

14716

10694

5.651

0.252

0.538

0.440

102

LensParis

45467

27644

14.306

0.118

0.585

0.487

199

LilleParis

50244

29957

14.559

0.111

0.598

0.504

220

LimogesToulouse

20093

14779

18.015

0.169

0.543

0.437

291

LyonGrenoble

24544

15589

6.889

0.244

0.489

0.370

105

LyonParis

49602

35312

29.155

0.117

0.661

0.573

466

MarseilleNice

5283

3477

13.213

0.238

0.379

0.271

198

MetzNancy

32984

22394

3.544

0.279

0.923

0.912

60

MontpellierMars

15636

10843

10.911

0.196

0.506

0.405

169

NancyStrasbourg

4426

2960

9.206

0.250

0.453

0.339

156

NantesBordeaux

37241

26965

21.136

0.108

0.609

0.510

353

NantesRennes

53147

28492

5.868

0.237

0.501

0.386

113

NiceToulon

2086

1159

10.935

0.257

0.298

0.161

150

NimesMontpellier

91661

59904

3.071

0.266

0.962

0.957

58

OrleansParis

25468

19028

8.270

0.296

0.544

0.445

133

Trips

39

ParisBrest

17447

13044

36.114

0.105

0.708

0.636

591

ParisCaen

18308

11947

15.006

0.133

0.520

0.411

234

ParisLyon

48023

34552

29.117

0.126

0.654

0.566

466

ParisMarseille

5471

4798

47.387

0.206

0.604

0.512

774

PauBordeaux

12665

8361

13.927

0.187

0.460

0.336

218

PerpignanNarbonne

24071

16778

4.197

0.300

0.744

0.698

66

ReimsTroyes

9472

6516

8.086

0.241

0.460

0.338

127

RennesBrest

11546

7170

12.763

0.198

0.458

0.325

243

RouenParis

14182

8205

8.772

0.171

0.502

0.392

136

SaintEtienne
Clermont

36819

22047

22.191

0.475

0.562

0.451

144

StrasbourgColmar

8780

6449

4.337

0.269

0.713

0.664

76

ToulonAix

11237

7268

5.488

0.325

0.518

0.414

84

ToulouseBordeaux

48769

30144

15.114

0.134

0.535

0.413

245

ToursParis

27444

20069

15.441

0.184

0.624

0.536

240

Total

948789

13.386

0.618

0.529

40