Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2d 1544
Steve Russell, Kathryn Collard, of Collard & Russell, Salt Lake City, UT,
for plaintiff-appellee.
David E. Yocom, Salt Lake County Atty., Patricia J. Marlowe, Deputy
County Atty., Salt Lake City, UT, for defendant-appellant.
Before EBEL, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District Judge.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Defendant James R. Strong appeals from a jury verdict against him for
violation of the familial association rights of plaintiff Dorothy Griffin.1
Plaintiffs Steven, Dorothy, and Angie Griffin brought a civil rights suit under
42 U.S.C. 19832 against Strong, a police officer, and codefendant Gale, a
social worker, alleging deprivations of various constitutional rights, and seeking
damages, including punitive damages, arising out of the investigation and arrest
of Steven Griffin on charges of rape and sexual abuse of a child. The
underlying facts and early procedural history of this case are discussed in some
detail in the district court's order granting in part plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment against Strong, Griffin v. Strong, 739 F.Supp. 1496, 149799 (D.Utah 1990), and thus the factual discussion here will be abbreviated.
2
* Following the district court's summary judgment ruling, the remaining claims
were tried to a jury. Strong's motion, after the close of evidence, for a directed
verdict on plaintiffs' familial association rights claims was denied. The jury
returned several special verdicts. One found Gale not liable for any of plaintiffs'
claims. Another found Strong had violated the familial association rights of
Dorothy Griffin but not those of Steven or Angie Griffin. That same special
verdict then awarded damages to each of the Griffins on their familial
association rights claims. The remaining special verdicts dealt with claims not
before us on appeal. Strong's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial was denied.
II
4
Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1174, 117 L.Ed.2d 419 (1992). The freedom of intimate
association is a substantive due process right, as is its subset, the familial right
of association. Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 865-66 (7th Cir.1985);
see Archuleta, 897 F.2d at 499 n. 7 (contrasting procedural due process right at
issue in that case). This substantive right is consonant with the right of privacy.
See Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1499 (9th Cir.1987) (stating
freedom of intimate association "substantially overlaps" right of privacy), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961, 108 S.Ct. 1225, 99 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988); Arnold v. Board
of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 312 (11th Cir.1989) (characterizing right as "familial
right to privacy"); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446, 110 S.Ct.
2926, 2943, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990) (family has a privacy interest in
"intimacies of the marital relationship").
IV
9
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18, 104 S.Ct. at 3249 ("choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue
intrusion by the State"); Arnold, 880 F.2d at 312 (right protected against
"unjustified interference" from the government). See also Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2820, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)
(applying "undue burden" standard to substantive due process abortion right).
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11
V
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Finally, we look to the facts surrounding the parties' interests. Not every
statement or act that results in an interference with the rights of intimate
association is actionable. Rather, to rise to the level of a constitutional claim,
the defendant must direct his or her statements or conduct at the intimate
relationship with knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect
that relationship. Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190. With that in mind, the following
The record supports Dorothy's allegation that Strong told Dorothy, falsely, that
Steven had confessed to child abuse, and that he would be provided an attorney
when he got to jail. Further, Dorothy testified that Strong questioned her morals
when she told him she did not believe that Steven had committed child abuse.
Strong interviewed Steven Griffin in jail; during that interview, Steven
confessed to abusing several young girls. Steven testified that Strong, after
asking if Steven had heard from his wife, said "the reason she feels this way is
because you won't confess to what you've done and get the help that you need."
After Steven's arrest, Dorothy visited Strong at his office and discussed her
plans to move to another state. She testified that Strong told her "to go ahead
and start my life over. It was a good idea." She also said that Strong "us[ed] me
against Steve" when she tried to explain to Steven during a telephone
conversation that she was told to leave him and not help him.
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hold that the district court should have granted Strong's motions for directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's judgment and remand Dorothy Griffin's familial association
rights claims against Strong. In light of our conclusion that Dorothy Griffin's
rights of familial association were not violated in this case, we need not address
Strong's remaining contentions on appeal. The judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah is REVERSED, and the case
REMANDED. The district court is directed to enter judgment for Strong on
plaintiff Dorothy Griffin's claims for violation of her familial rights of
association.
**
Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of these appeals. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia
42 U.S.C. 1983.
While we note that Dorothy Griffin's interests in her relationship with her
husband may be tempered by her interest in her relationship with her daughter,
the record contains no evidence of any interference with her relationship with
her daughter, nor has any been alleged or argued
Here, the district court instructed the jury on this issue in part as follows: "The
right to family integrity or association protects family relationships. The
interest in protecting the family is counterbalanced by two competing interests,
the interest of a child within the family to be free from abuse, and the
government's interest in protecting powerless children who may be subject to
abuse." Appellant's Brief, Tab D, Instruction 29. We do not disagree with this
statement to the jury. However, on the record before him, in applying this
balancing test, the judge should have directed a verdict or granted judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to Strong