Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
3d 1175
98 CJ C.A.R. 5199
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
unanimously determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance
in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9.
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This case is before the court on petitioner Landree Wauford's application for a
certificate of appealability. Wauford seeks a certificate of appealability so that
he can appeal the district court's dismissal of Wauford's 28 U.S.C. 2254
habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1) (providing that no appeal
can be taken from the denial of a 2254 habeas petition unless the petitioner
first obtains a certificate of appealability).
Under New Mexico law, "[a]ny person convicted of a noncapital felony ... who
has incurred one prior felony conviction ... is a habitual offender and his basic
sentence shall be increased by one year, and the sentence imposed ... shall not
be suspended or deferred." N.M.Stat.Ann. 31-18-17. In 1992, Wauford was
convicted of attempted armed robbery, aggravated burglary, and escape.
Pursuant to New Mexico's habitual offender statute, the state trial court
enhanced Wauford's sentence based on a 1983 New Mexico conviction for
armed robbery. In the instant 2254 petition, Wauford asserts that the habitual
criminal enhancement violates his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the 1983 conviction was the result of an unknowing and
involuntary guilty plea. Wauford further alleges that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate the 1983 conviction and challenge the
habitual offender enhancement.
The district court succinctly summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
Dist. Ct. Order at 1-2. In light of this procedural history, the district court
assumed the petition was not barred as successive or abusive and proceeded to
decide the petition on the merits.
As to the merits of Wauford's petition, the district court first concluded that
11
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not err
in dismissing Wauford's petition. The record on appeal contains copies of
Wauford's Plea and Disposition Agreement to the 1983 felony as well as a copy
of the Guilty Plea Proceeding. In each of these documents, Wauford
specifically acknowledges that he is entering the plea knowingly and
voluntarily. Furthermore, in the Plea and Disposition Agreement, Wauford's
attorney attests that he has discussed the case in detail with Wauford and
advised Wauford of all his constitutional rights. Finally, in the Guilty Plea
Proceeding, the trial judge specifically found that Wauford had "knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently plead[ed] guilty" to the charged crimes. These
documents clearly demonstrate on their face that Wauford's 1983 guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557-58
(10th Cir.1991) (finding trial court's journal entry sufficient to prove voluntary
and intelligent plea where journal entry recited that "the plea was freely and
voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature of the charge and
consequences of the plea"). Accordingly, Wauford's claim that his 1983
conviction was involuntary and, therefore, cannot be counted under New
Mexico's habitual offender statute is without merit.
12
13
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir.R. 36.3